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Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1.
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1.
: 3. Both TDI and Mississippi Power & Light Company
: 3. Both TDI and Mississippi Power & Light Company
("MP&L") (the Grand Gulf licensee) filed letters with the NRC in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 21. The TDI letter dated March 12 is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". The MP&L letter dated April 26, 1985, is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
("MP&L") (the Grand Gulf licensee) filed letters with the NRC in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 21. The TDI letter dated March 12 is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". The MP&L {{letter dated|date=April 26, 1985|text=letter dated April 26, 1985}}, is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
: 4. As described in these exhibits, the Grand Gulf failure involved the lower guide from the disk of one of the air start system header check valves. A part of the guide broke off and became wedged in the starting air valve. An examination of the three other air start system header check valves in the Grand Gulf Division 1 engine showed that the disk assembly of one other check valve exhibited a circumferential crack of about 180 degrees.
: 4. As described in these exhibits, the Grand Gulf failure involved the lower guide from the disk of one of the air start system header check valves. A part of the guide broke off and became wedged in the starting air valve. An examination of the three other air start system header check valves in the Grand Gulf Division 1 engine showed that the disk assembly of one other check valve exhibited a circumferential crack of about 180 degrees.
: 5. In accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 21, TDI's March 12 letter identified other TDI-supplied engines with the potential defect in the check valve. These facilities were Shoreham, River Band, Catawba, San Onofre, Midland and Rancho Seco. The Perry TDI diesels'were not included on this list.
: 5. In accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 21, TDI's March 12 letter identified other TDI-supplied engines with the potential defect in the check valve. These facilities were Shoreham, River Band, Catawba, San Onofre, Midland and Rancho Seco. The Perry TDI diesels'were not included on this list.

Latest revision as of 02:05, 23 September 2022

Affidavit of EC Christiansen Re NRC Weekly Info Rept for Wk Ending 850322 Concerning Tdi Diesel Generators.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20117E974
Person / Time
Site: Perry  FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/09/1985
From: Christiansen E
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20117E961 List:
References
OL, NUDOCS 8505130076
Download: ML20117E974 (16)


Text

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May 9, 1985 DOLKETC USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 15 MY 10 #0:23 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ICE OF Sgcgg7 p ,

DOCKETING & sggy;;u' BRANCH In the Matter of )

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD C. CHRISTIANSEN City of Washington )

) ss District of Columbia )

I, Edward C. Christiansen, being duly sworn, state as follows:

1. I am employed by The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company as a Senior Design Engineer. A complete description of my responsibilities with respect to the Transamerica Delaval, Inc. ("TDI") diesel generators at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, as well as my technical and professional. qualifications, appears following Tr. 2179 (April 9, 1985) and in my affidavit dated February 1, 1985, in support of Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue 16, dated February 5, 1985. I 8505130076 850509 PDR ADOCK 05000440 g PDR w . ___ _ _.

have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and believe them to be true and correct.

2. The item in the NRC Weekly Information Report -- Week ending March 22, 1985, attached as Exhibit "A" to OCRE's Motion to Reopen (and also attached as Exhibit "A" to this Affidavit)

' describes a failure in a check valve in the on-engine mounted air start system header of the Division 1 TDI diesel engine at

~

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

3. Both TDI and Mississippi Power & Light Company

("MP&L") (the Grand Gulf licensee) filed letters with the NRC in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 21. The TDI letter dated March 12 is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". The MP&L letter dated April 26, 1985, is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".

4. As described in these exhibits, the Grand Gulf failure involved the lower guide from the disk of one of the air start system header check valves. A part of the guide broke off and became wedged in the starting air valve. An examination of the three other air start system header check valves in the Grand Gulf Division 1 engine showed that the disk assembly of one other check valve exhibited a circumferential crack of about 180 degrees.
5. In accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 21, TDI's March 12 letter identified other TDI-supplied engines with the potential defect in the check valve. These facilities were Shoreham, River Band, Catawba, San Onofre, Midland and Rancho Seco. The Perry TDI diesels'were not included on this list.
6. The Perry TDI diesels were not if.entified as being potentially affected by the air start system header check valve failure at Grand Gulf for an obvious reason: the Perry TDI diesels do not have an air start system header check valve.

Nor do any other of TDI's DSRV-16 engines manufactured since about 1976.1/

7. The Grand Gulf diesel engines (and the others identified in TDI's March 12 letter) include the check valve as part of the air. start system header because these units include an air start header crossover. The crossover interconnects the two redundant air receiver tanks which supply starting air to the engine. With the air start header crossover, a failure in one receiver tank system would cause the redundant tank to lose its air supply. The air start system header check valves were therefore included in the design to isolate the two receiver tanks so that a failure of one could not cause the other to lose its air supply.
8. The air start header crossover was deleted from the DSRV-16 design in about 1976, prior to the fabrication of the 1/ These include the TDI diesel generators for Shearon Harris, Comanche Peak, Bellefonte, Vogtle, WPPSS 1 and 4, Maanshan (Taiwan Power Co.), Korean Nuclear Units 5-8, Phipps Bend, and Hartsville A and B.

~

Perry diesels. The air start system header check valves were also removed, since they were only needed to protect against a failure which the crossover made'possible.

9. The air start system for the Perry diesels is fully redundant. This redundancy has been verified by tests at Perry and at TDI. Each of the two redundant air receiver tanks is capable by itself of providing enough starting air to start the diesel engine. This was demonstrated in the starting air capacity tests, successfully completed for the Perry Divisicin 1 diesel on May 4, 1985, and for the Division 2 diesel on May v, 1985. Five starts were made using starting air from only the left air receiver tank and another five using starting air from only the right receiver tank. In every test, the engines were successfully started and brought to operating speed within the time set by the Technical Specifications. Similar qualification testing had been performed earlier by TDI.
10. The isolated failure of the air start system header check valve at Grand Gulf in no way calls into question the TDI Owners Group Program. The check valves in question were sub-vendor supplied items, designed and manufactured by Williams Gauge Co. (Williams-Hager) of Pittsburgh, Pa. The valves are a standard design and are used in the natural gas industry and other industrial applications. Although the primary purpose of the Owners Group program was to revalidate those-components designed and fabricated by TDI, sub-vendor supplied items were also evaluated to determine whether there was any history of failures for such components in either nuclear or non-nuclear service and to determine whether the component was being properly applied by TDI.
11. The air start system header check valve is inc2nded in the Owners Group Component Tracking System, the computerized data base which collects adverse operating experience (both nuclear and non-nuclear) with diesel engines and components.

(The Component Tracking System is discussed in Mr. Kammeyer's direct testimony at pp. 16-20.) The Component Tracking System shows no adverse experience with these check valves.

12. The Owners Group performed an engineering application review of the air start system header check valve used at Grand Gulf to determine whether the valve was adequately designed to perform its intended function. This included a comparison of the pressures that the valve would be subject to with the rating specified by TDI, an analysis of the valve's nozzle loadings, and a determination that the materials matched the conditions that the valve would see.
13. Because the air start system header check valve had no failure history in diesel engine use and because it was supplied by a sub-vendor, no quality revalidation was required.

. if ,

14.. Neither the Owners Group program nor any other program can totally prevent random isolated failure. Redundant diesel generators are provided for just that purpose. The Grand Gulf check valve failure, which was discovered after the engine had operated for approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />, appears to be such an isolated failure.

G hk Edward

. N M%2O C. Christiansen Subscribed and Sworn this day of May, 1985 8

__ YWL. b Notary Public 4 h - - rag w c,.p ber 30, 1;;s t

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6 -

s-Palo Verde, Units 1, 2 and 3 On March 15, 1985, Mr. E. Van Brunt, the Executive Vice President for - ,

Arizona Public Service Company (APS), informed us that the Board of Directors of APS has proposed a plan of restructure for the company. N.

In.'the present' structure, APS has 6 wholly-owned subsidiaries. The new proposed structure will consist of a holding company (AZP Group) with APS and 3 of the previous entities not directly related to the ,

utility business (Energy Development Co., Malapai Resources Co. and El Dorado Investment Co.) as its wholly-owned subsidiaries. The other 3 entities (APS Fuels Company, APS Finance Company, N.Y., and Bixco, Inc.) will remain subsidiaries of APS. The initial Board of Directors

__ of AZP Group will be the same as the current APS Board. .

The proposed change will require approval by the IRS and a majority of the APS stockholders (annual stockholders meeting will be held on April 18, 1985).

Grand Gulf, Unit 1 A-small piece of a metal pin (1" x 1" dia.) broken off of a check valve in the air start system caused the Division I emergency diesel generator to malfunction during a surveillance test.-

The metal . pin fragment was carried by the air to one of the cylinder air inlet valves, where it lodged between the valve disc and the seat.

preventing the valve from closing. This allowed hot gases from the cylinder to get into the air start system resulting in the malfunction of the engine. 1 The licensee found the portion of the pin when it examined the air inlet

. valves after the malfunction. Examination of the other three check valves in the Division I air start systen showed that one of the valves had a~ cracked pin on the disc which appeared to be near the failure point. The other two valve discs did not appear to have cracks in them.

The discs from all four valves were replaced with new discs and the old discs were sent to the vendor for tests and examination to determine possible causes of failure.

The diesel generator manufacturer, Transamerica Delaval, Inc. issued a .

10 CFR'Part 21 report on this matter to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement on March 12, 1985. There are several plants that have the same design of check valves in the air start system. ~

7.

s MAR 2 21985 ENCLOSURE B L

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Misch 12, ID85 U.S. Itaclear Regulatory CommissionDirestor Office of Inspecticn & Enforc

)inshingten, D.C. 20555 Daar. Sir h accordance with the requirements of Title 10, Chapter 10, code of Federal P@ dens Part 21. Tranamerica Dalsval Inc hereby notifies the Ccesstsalan of a Potential defect in a ccus .,

p eant of a DSR or DSRV Standby Diesel Canarator. There could ._

)trated availability.Starths Air Pipeg Wich coald result in mgine nen-s Transamerica Delaval has supplied the DER and DERV kginsa with the potential defect to the fo11cwh  !

6 sites: '

E!11131 8.111 Serial No. lk!M, Im a Island Lightire Shorehan Middle South Eriargy 74010/12 D6R 48 Grand Galf 74033/36 Qalf States Utilities River Band DERV 16 hate Power Ccepany 74039/40 DSR 48 Catawba 75017/20 DSRV 16 Southern Califomia Edison San Onofra 75041/42 D6KV 20 Consumers Power Nidland BCD 77001/04 DSRV 12 Rancho Seco 81015/16 D6R 48 At Grand dalf on March 11 &aring operational testing on Engine the Air Start Hender Assectly.74033, flames were noticed comitis cu ridt bank Air Start Valve was recoved.b haina7/8 A 3/8 diamatar, was longshutdown non- and ambe assnetto piace was obsesved lying en top of the Pisten. This resultad inStarting a furtherAir exadnation, Check Valve edDisk.

it is felt chat this piece brcke off of pids. This Dise has a top and a boccas are 4 of these Valves an the RV 16 Engina.It appears There this piece '"

be other 3. Orand Gulf checked the '

was used to One checkof these theseValves, was cracked and the other 2 were ck.171 i

1hese Check Valves were supplied by the Williaans Gauge Co. ..-1 Otilliams-Hager .

% gina by Transa)merica Delaval.of Pittsbugh, PA. They were installed cm the i Ored Gulf has the failed parts, by are em&mting an investigatico -

to determina the cause of failure.

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March 12, 1943 E

b. Itaclear Regulatory Ccanission We have centacted the Marufacturer to repnt this failure, and will meet with than March 13 ao that they begin their investigatica.

In the mean time, cur rec:enandstien for corrective action is to .

df ==adle the check Valves m the Engine and inspect the Disk '

thside for cracks UJI). Attached is a cc' of thia Valve showing the area of concem;.y of the assembly drawing He will inform all the sites listed in Paragraph 2 en this lottar of this potential problan by sendine them cepten of this letter as indicated on the cc's.

Since acticrt is required by others, we caxtot estimate at this time den the final corrective action will be carpista. We will koop you infomed of our progress.

Our evaluation of the potential proble was cecpleted en March 12, 1985. We were infor::md by Orand Cul.f of the pocetial pechism late m March 11, 1985.

Very truly ycurs, J'l 4

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m. s so Hanseer,yerqualityAssurance

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OM 9171P GCLDSTEIN (MPtL) 1/.-MAR-95 14: 53 PT Subjecl'.: CHECK VALVE FAILURE D CDC Tu scuARW.ONEC3, MINNS , VAND.IW ALLE , J '; TiELL , i ! P'UNU . l iTT , Ct Ur G O , CORCSS ING INC , MCCLQUD , CUCWA, GCt.D.ITC N , H G NG I.3 ,

UNIT: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATICN, U' COC N0/LER NO: N/A EVENT DATE: 03/11/05 NSSS/AE GE/BECHTEL AATING: 1250MW DATE OF CCMMERCIAL OPERATION: FCWER ASCENSION TESTING SUPPLEMENTAL DESCRIPTION:

AN AIM START HEADER CHCCK YA.VE ON THE DIVISIGN I CMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) FAILED.

EVENT DESCRIPT!ONI lDURING A RCUTINE MAINTENANCE RUN OF THE DIVISION I EDG ENGINE, iBUPPLIED BY TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL, INC.tTDI), MCDEL DGRV-16-4, IT WAS l3DGERVEDTHATTHE#6RIGHTSANKAIRSTARTVALVEMADDURNED.

3URING REMOVAL OF THE AIR START VALVE OYLINORICAL METAL OBJECT, AAPRCXIMATELY IT WAS 2/9 JISCOVERED THAT A

)!NCH.LONG HAD WEDGED BETWEEN THE VALVE AND HOUSING. INCH IN DIA A FRELIMINARY i!NVESTIGATION l

)IGC ASSENDLY FACM A DETERMINED CHECK VALVE IN THAT TWIG METAL OBJECT WAS A FART O

'O VERIFY THIS DETERMINATION AN THE AIR START SYSTEM HEADER.

INGFECTION WA3 FERFORMED ON THE

)ISC ASSEMBLY CN EACH OF THE FOUR AIR STAR <T SYSTEM PEADER CHE MLVES. DURING THIS INSPECTION THE LOWER DISC GUIDE l*HE RIGHT BANK REAR CHECK VALVE WA3 NOTED TC SE MISSING; . THE STEM) OF

'!!GSING

' ALVE . PART WAS FOUND WEDGED IN "hE 96 CYL!NDER AIR START I HIS FAILURE HAS SEEN REPORTED AS BYATDI.

FART 21

' e.'sL CTERMINE IS THECURRENTLY CAUSE. IN PRCGRESS OF ~ERFCF. MIN 3 AN !NYFGT!24 TION UI.D 3HUTDCWN CCNDITICNDURING THfl TIMC CF CAI.LRE 1 WAS *N A 3GNS COU TAGE: .

I O OTHE.'t ME NOTED CONDITION. MECHANICAL DAMAGE HAS DEEN FnUND WH.CH AAS CAus:ED BY DMMENTS:

l dE CHECK VALVES, l

TDI PART ftKE-002-000, WERE n W* LIED TO DI BY 4E WILLI 4ECK VALVE. AM GALGE CG. , MODEL #CC9-SB-SSM-COO liS A 3" 3ILENT T

IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS EVENT WILL DE REVIEWED OT THE NEXT JI CWNERS GROUP MEETI.NG SCHEDULED FCR MARCH19G C2,0.

t (3NS

)DITIONAL IS ANALYZING INPUT WHEN OBTAINED.THE FAP ED CCMFCNENT AND WILL PRCVICE u.uu uv Cw a a,Rnm u w ,

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MISSISSIPPl POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Helping Duild Affssissippi ,

P. O. 5 0 X 184 0. J AC K S ON. MIE SIS SIP PI 39215-1540 l April 26, 1985 NUCb8 Ae LICENil80s & LAPETY OtPARTMS NT If. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., N. W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Attention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace. Regional Administrator

Dear Dr. Crece:

SUBJECT:

Grand Culf Nuclear Station Unita 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-416 and 50-417 License No. NPF-29 File: 0260/0511/0512 Reportable Deficiency 85/02, Final Raport - TDI Diesel Generator Air Start Header Check Valve Failure AECM-85/0133 On March 19. 1985, Mississippi Power & Light Conpany (MP&L) notified Mr. Robert Carroll of your office of a Reportable Deficiency at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (CGNS) Unit 1. The deficiency concerns the failure of an air start header check valve on the Division I Diesel Generator.

This deficiency was determined to be reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21 for Unit 1. In addition, the deficiency has been determined reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21 and 10CTR50.5)(e) for Unic 2. Attached is a final report on the subject.

Yours truly, f

L. F. Dale Director ,

EBS/SHHarv Attachment cc:. (See Next.Page) ..

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Attachment to AECM-85/0133 Page 1 FINAL 10CFR21/50.55(e) REPORT

1. Name and address of the individual informing the Commission:

J. B. Richard Senior Vice President, Nuclear .

P. O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205

2. Identification of the facility . . . which . . . contains a deficiency:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (CCNS) Units 1 & 2 Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

3. Identification of the firm . . . supplying the basic component which . . '

contains a deficiency:

Supplied to Grand Gulf by Transamerica Delaval, Inc., (TDI)

Dakland, California

4. Nature of the deficiency . . . and the safety hazard which . . . could be created by such a deficiency . . ."

A. Description of the Deficiencv:

During a surveillance test run of the Division I Emergency Diesel Generator Engine. TDI, Model DSRV-16-4, it was observed that the #6 right bank air start valve had failed.

During removal of the air start valve a cylindrical metal object, approximately 3/8 inch in diameter and 1 inch long van found on top of the piston during.a.slaenliness inspection. recuired by the maintenance procedure used to replace the air start valve. A ,

preliminary investigation determined that this metal object was a part of the disc assembly from a check valve in the on-engine mounted air start system header. To verify this determination a visual inspection was performed on the disc assembly on each of the four air start system header check valves. This inspection disclosed that the right bank rear check valve was missing a parc of the lower disc guide. This missing part was the part found in the #6 right bank cylinder. The inspection on the Division I Diesel Generator also revealed the left bank rear check valve disc assembly exhibited a circumferential crack that extended approximately 180 degrees in roughly the same location as the fracture of the right bank rear check valve disc. The left bank front and right bank front check valves had no visible cracks upon visual examination of this sama area. The Division II Diesel Generator air start header check valves were also inspected and no visible cracks were identified in these valves.

J0P14ATTC85042401 - 1

07 -! 05:03 7 _ w.._I ; II: ::EI - . ri. ~l

, ,3 1

. i Attschaent to AECM-85/0133 -

l Page 2

< a.

B. Analysis oE Safety ! plicatienst-  ;

i The failed check valve disc guide part was carried through the starting air systes to the #6 right bank starting air valve where it

! became wedged between the starting air valve internals and valve

. houeing. Based on matching indications on the air start valve and the evlindrical metsi object during visual inspection following the ,

event, it is postulated that the disc guide pin wedged in the valve.

} causina the valve to remain in the open position during engine operation, resulting in the failure of the air start valve. At some

point during the event or the subsequent removal of the air start

! valve by maintenance personnel the obiect was freed and came to

! rest on top of the piston in the f6 right bank cylinder.

i j There are 2 check valves (front and rear) utilized on each air header (left bank and right bank). Multiple failures occurring on these four check valves is a highly unlikely event. However, it is conservatively postulated that the condition could lead to a <

subsequent loss of engine air start capability or availability and possibly affect subsequent engine operation. Since these check valves are redundant basic components on the Division 1 and II j Emergency Diesel Generator Engines, the postulated failure could reduce the degree of protection provided to public health and safety.

I 5. The date on which the information of such deficiency . . . was obtained i Mississippi Power & Light received information of'the deficiency on March 11. 1985

6. 'In the case of the basic component . . . the number and location of all 4

such components:

There are four 3 inch check valves utilized in each Division I and II Emergency Diesel Generator Engine on Unit I and 2 for a total of 16 check valves. However, the Unit 2 check valves have been utilized as interim  !

_ replacements on Unit 1.

4

7. The corrective action which has been taken . . . the name of the individual responsible for the actions and the length of time that has been . . . taken to complete the action:

A. Corrective Actions Taken ',

Unit 1 4

Material Nonconformance Report MNCR #149-85 has been issued to document the failure. An initial failure analysis revealed that the failure was due to low and hish cycle fatigue. Aa a ,

precautionary measure, air start header check valves on both Diesel

Generators were replaced. In addition, a 800 hour0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> limit has been placed on the use of these valves as interim corrective action.

d J0P14ATTC85042401 - 2

, Attechasnt to AECM-85/0133 Page 3 TDI has recommended in its 10CTR21 Report to the NRC dated April '

10. 1985, the replacement of the existing check valves (Clov williams-Hagar) with a TRW Mission Duo Check II as final corrective actions.

A design change has been initiated to replace the eight existing check valves on Division I and II with appropriate check valves that are suitable for the destAn conditions.

Unit 2 The e1Aht Unit 2 check valves will be replaced with the sene type check valves as Unit 1. The replacement of these valves will bs tracked by Bechtel Management Corrective Action Report, MCAR-158.

B. Responsible Individual J. B. Richard Senior Vice President. Nuclear Mississippi Pever & Light Company C. Lenzth of Time to Comolete Actions Unit 1 Corrective actions will be completed prior to restart after the first refueling outage.

Unit 2 Unit 2 corrective actions will be scheduled for completion upon resumption of normal construction activities.

8. Any advice related to the deficiency . . . that has been, is being, or vill be given to purchasers or licensees

As the deficiency did not originate with MP&L. it has no advice to offer.

e T

l J0P14ATTC85042401 - 3

f J.

DOCKETEC May 9, 1985 USNRC 15 MAY 10 A10:23 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA E OF SEcatrem ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFigET DOC PgERVlU:

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

THE. CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket,Nos. 50-440 -

ILLUMINATING COMPANY ) 50-441

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and-2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing

" Applicants' Answer to OCRE Motion to Reopen Record on Issue

  1. 16" were served by deposit in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 9th day of May 1985, to all those on the attached Service List. ,

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Jo L , DLkV -

Jar . S:i lberg DATED: May 9, 1985 -

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{

..o 3' i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  :

i BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i In the Matter of )-

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441

)

(Perry _ Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

SERVICE LIST James P. Gleason, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing 513 Gilmoure Drive Appeal Board Panel Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Jerry R. Kline Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Glenn O. Bright Colleen Woodhead, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the E;.ecutive Legal U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission Director Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. '. Washington, D.C.- 20555

, Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Terry Lodge, Esquire Appeal Board Suite 105 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 618 N. Michigan Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Toledo, Ohio 43624 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire .

Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Prosecuting Attorne'y Appeal Board Lake County Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Center

' Washington, D.C. 20555 105 Center Street Gary J. Edles, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 John G. Cardinal, Esquire Ms. Sue Hiatt Prosecuting Attorney 8275 Munson Avenue Ashtabula County Courthouse Mentor, Ohio 44060 Jefferson, Ohio 44047

. . . . . . _ . - . - - ,