ML20138B449
| ML20138B449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/07/1985 |
| From: | Hankins D GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138B407 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8510150363 | |
| Download: ML20138B449 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCI2AR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Appeal Board t
I In the Matter of
)
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THE CLEVIIAND ELECTRIC
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Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET.AL.
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50-441
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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
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Units 1 and 2)
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AFFIDAVIT OF DR. DEBORAH A. HANKINS State of California
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sa County of Santa Clara
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Dr. Deborah A. Hankins, being duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.
I, Deborah Hankins, an a Principal Engineer at the General Electric i
company ("GE").
My business address is 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, CA 95125.
l I as currently a Principal Engineer in the Systems Integration and Performance i
Engineering Subsection of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor Program.
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2.
My technical areas of expertise include probabilistic risk assessment, l
sethodology and analysis of source terms, suppression pool scrubbing and hydro-l gen control issues. I have published 20 technical papers,12 of which are 1
I concerned with severe accident issues and analysis. A statement of my profes-sional qualifications and experience is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and believe them to be true and correct.
3.
The purpose of this affidavit is to address the risk to the public health and safety of operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, both before and af ter full power operation.
3.
The purpose of this affidavit is to cddress the risk to the public health and safety of operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, both before and after full power operation.
I 4.
The Perry FES assesses the environmental' impact of potential releases of radioactive material during normal operation at full power (i.e., exposure to routine emissions of radiation). These routine releases produce an arnual dose less than the 5 arem limit prescribed in 10CFR50 Appendix I.
Any potential environmental impact during low power (up to 5%) operation would result in at least a factor of 20 reduction in the routine emissions compared to the values l
l listed in the affidavit of Dr. Carl J. Johnson.
l S.
The actual risk to the.public from postulated severe accidents at Perry is lower than stated in the Perry FES for full power operation and far lower for l
operation at low power for the reasons stated below.
6.
The analyses in the Perry FES are conservative lice 6 sing calculations which do not provide a realistic representation of the consequences of accidents at Perry. Tr. 3180-83 Olankins).
1 INUREG-0884, Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (August 1982).
2-
7.
A GE evaluation of the consequences of a core-melt accident at Perry shows that even at distances as close as one mile from the plant such an
. accident would produce low doses (less than 25 rea) when the Perry specific f
1 fission product releases are coupled with the Perry site specific features.
These doses would not result in any early fatalities or injuries. GE estimated the probabilty of such an accident at Perry to be one chance in 200,000 per f
reactor year. Rebuttal Testimony on NUREG/CR-2239, ff. Tr. 3158, at 9; Tr. 3173 (Hankins).
8.
The.GE study was performed assuming the plant operated at full power.
The expected frequency and consequences of a severe accident for a plant oper-ated at low power would be less for the following reasons (1) The likelihood of a severe accident during low power operation is less than at full power since:
At shutdown from low power operation, the core cooling requirements are at least a factor of 20 less than the core cooling requirements after full power operation. There are more systems which can successfully cool the core after low power operation. The core t
cooling requirements at shutdown from full power are about 400 spa.
At shutdown from low power, adequate core cooling c.ould be supplied by the control rod drive system, which supplies about 125 spa. The many other core cooling systema (e.g., HPCS, LPCS, LPCI, RCIC) would not even be necessary after shutdown from operation at 5%
power or below.
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Accidents proceed at about one-half of the rate of the full power case thereby providing more time for operator action and recovery of safety systems. For example, in a non-break severe accident, with an assumed loss of all core cooling makeup systems, the, operator would have double the time to restore core cooling compared to the full power case.
The suppression pool has a passive heat sink capacity which could store decay heat for about 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> (in the full power case) without compromising primary containment integrity thereby preventing any release. For the low power case, the pool storage capacity corresponds to about 600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> (25 dayo).
(2) The consequences of a severe accident are more than 20 times less when initiated from up to 5% power operation compared to full power for the following reasons:
The slow progression of the accident provides additional time for decay of fission products which could potentially be released.
This delay time (which ranges from an additional I hour to 10 days) results in lower offsite doses from the radiologically important fission products %enon, krypton, cesium, iodine and tellurium. The important isotopes and their half-lives are listed in Table 1.
For example, the noble gas (xenon krypton) dose, which constituter.
most of the potential offsite dose, decreases by a factor of 2 every 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
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The inventory of fission products is propetional to power level, l
therefore the magnitude.or the number of curies, available to be l
released is a factor of at least 20 less than the full power case.
l These two factors, the icnger delay time and smaller core inven-tory, result in calculated offsite doses within 1 mile of Perry which are less than 1 ren'(i.e., more than a factor of 20 less than the 25 ren full power case.)
j 9.
Therefore, the risk (frequency x consequences) of severe accidents l
j during low power operation is more than a factor of 20 smaller than during full-l power operation.
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10.-For the reasons stated above, the risk from severe accidents at Perry is insignificant during full power or. low power operation.
OEAca @ d 848 Deborah A. Hankins, Ph. D.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7
day of & h em 1985
%M YLALQ NOTamT PUBLIC g
~
l OFFICIAL SEAL -
KAREN 9 VOGFlHU3ER My Commission Empires:
Not * *usuc.c3 pro w a SANT4 CLARA COUffiy i
,,/, /g Wy comm. espires 00C 30,1933 i
l I
- 1 m.
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t TABLE 1 Radioisotopes Important to Offsite Dose Calculations Half-life Isotope (Days) i 0.0528 KR-87 KR-88 0.117 XE-133 5.28 XE-135 0.384 I-131
.8.05 I-132 0.0958 I-133 0.875 I-134 0.0366 I-135-0.28 RB-86 13.7 CS-134 750 CS-136 13 TE-127 0.391 TE-127M 109 TE-129 0.048 TE-129M 34 TE-131M 1.25 TE-132 3.25 i
EXHIBIT A
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l I
NAME:
Deborah A. Hankins CURENT TITLE:
Principal Engineer, Systems Integration Engineering NUCLEAR EXPERIENCE: 13 Years EDUCATION:
Ph.D. NJclear Engineering, University of Washington-1979 M.S.
Nuclear Engineering, University of Washington-1975 B.A.
Chemistry, Reed Co11ege-1973 EXPERIENCE:
General Electric Company - 6 Years Principal Engineer and Technical Leader (1984-present) o Supervise three engineers in areas of core and plant performance improvements Provide technical support for NRC review of Standard Plant Licensing relative to severe accident issues.
Senior Engineer, Program Manager (1980-1984) o Provided technical integration and direction of GE's severe accident program.
Responsible for defining work to meet NRC requirements for severe accident analyses for BWRs. Responsible for technical defense of results before regulatory bodies and NRC contractors (e.g. National Laboratory personnel). Technical areas of expertise include:
Probabilistic risk assessment Source term i
Emergency planning i
Suppression pool scrubbing Hydrogen Control o
Engineer (1979-1980)
Provided radiological analyses for FSAR and environmental reports Chem-Nuclear Systems Inc.-Consultant-1979 University of Washington Pre-doctoral Lecturer (1976-1977) o Taught cellege course in Nuclear Engineering University of Washington and Reed College Senior Reactor Operator (Non-Commercial)-(1972-1979) o Licensed SRO for two research reactors Directed activities of. reactor operators, approved and performed experiments i
utilizing reactor.
PUBLICATIONS:
Twenty published papers twelve in the area of severe accident issues.
i
i D. A. Hankins J
PUBLICATIONS i
1.
" Relationship Between Trace Metal Concentration in Human Organs and Kidney Failure", Abstracts of Papers. American Chemical Society,170: 75 (1974).
2.
"A Simple Test for Mercury", Chemistry, 48: 29-30 (1975).
3.
" Activation - Radiochemical Analysis for Copper and Mercury in Biological Samples" Transzetions of the American Nuclear Society, 21: 98 (1975).
4.
"Whole Blood Trace Element Concentrations During T*tal Parenteral Nutrition",
Surgery, 79: 674-677 (1976). '
5.
"An Economic Analysis of the Transport of Radioactive Materials in LWR and LMFBR Fuel Cycles in the United States", Proceedings of the Symposium on Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Materials (PATRAM 1980), Berlin, West Germany, November 10-14, 1980.
40 "
6.
" Creatinine Production Rate Measured by Whole Body Counting of K, The International Journal of Artificial Organs, 4: 35-39, (1981).
7.
" Creatinine Degradation I: The Kinetics of Creatinine Removal in Patients with Chronic Kidney Disease", The International Journal of Artificial Organs, 4: 35-39, (1981).
8.
" Creatinine Degrada' ion II: Mathematical Model including the Effect of Extra-renal Removal Rates", The International Journal of Artificial Organs, 4: 68-71 (1981).
9.
" Preliminary BWR/6 Mark !!! Probabilistic Risk Assessment" ANS Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Sept. 21-23, 1981, Portchester, 2
10.
"Effect of BWR Suppression Pool Scrubbing on Degraded Core Accident Conse-quences", Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, 39: 77-78 (1981).
- 11. " Retention of Fission Products by the BWR Suppression Pool During Severe Accidents", International Meeting on Thermal Nuclear Reactor Safety. Aug. 29-Sept. 2,1982, Chicago, Illinois.
- 12. " Assessment of Hydrogen Combustion Effects in the BWR/6-Mark III Standard Plant". Workshop on the Impact of Hydrogen on Water Reactor Safety, Albuquerque, N.M., Oct. 3-7,1982.
- 13. "Effect of Hydrogen Control on the Risk from Severe Accidents in a BWR/6-Mark III Standard Plant". Workshop on the Impact of Hydrogen on Water Reactor Safety, Albuquerque, N.M., Oct. 3-7, 1982.
- 14. "BWR Suppression Pool Scrubbing Model for Severe Accident Risk Assessment".
ANS Winter Meeting, Nov. 14-19, 1982 Washington, D.C.
- 15. " Resolution of Severe Accident Issues for the GE BWR Standard Plant", ANS Winter Meeting, Nov. 14-19, 1982 Washington, D.C.
- 16. " Pressure Suppression Bubbles Enhance Safety", huclear Europe No. 5, p 28 ff, May 1983
O. A. Hankins PUBLICATIONS (continued)
- 17. "The General Electric BWR/6 Mark III Standard Plsnt PRA", ANS Winter Meeting,
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Oct. 30 - Nov. 4,1983, San Francisco, CA
- 18. " Analysis of General Electric Standard Plant for Severe Accidents", ANS Winter _ Meeting. Oct. 30 - Nov. 4,1983. San Francisco, CA.
" Resolution of Applicable unresolved ~ Safety Issues and Generic Issues for 19.
GESSAR II", NEDO-30670 June 1984
- 20. " GESSAR.II Seismic Event Risk Analysis ", ANS Summer Maeting, June 3-8, 1984, New Orleans, LA.
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