ML20129K145
| ML20129K145 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1985 |
| From: | Kanda W CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129K143 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8507230428 | |
| Download: ML20129K145 (6) | |
Text
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July f9, 1985 E2 All 23
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA E'I"ck.t.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
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Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL.
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50-441 l
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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
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l Units 1 and 2)
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AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM R.
KANDA, JR.
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County of Lako
)) as:
State of Ohio
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I, William R.
Kanda, Jr., being duly sworn, stato as fol-lows:
1.
I am currently employod by The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ("CEI") as a Gonoral Supervising Engincor of the Porry Nuclear Power Plant ("Porry") Technical Depart-mont.
My responsibilition include the overall supervision of tho engincora providing technical support to Plant operations.
I am also responsibio for the direction of the Instrument and Control Group at Porry.
I provido the overall coordination for 0507230420000$f) pDH ADOCK 000 40 PDH Q
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the investigation and resolution of plant events, such as the fire which occurred at Reactor Building No. 1 on May 5, 1985.
I am a graduate of the University of Detroit, from which I obtained a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering in 1972.
I also hold a M.S. degree in Managerial' Economics from Case West-ern Reserve University.
I have been employed by CEI since 1973 and have been assigned to Perry since 1976.
I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and believe them to be true and correct.
2.
On the morning of May 5, 1985, fast-speed, preoperational testing of the Unit 1, D-33 recirculation pumps was being conducted.
Two-by-fours and plywood had been laid down to protect the reactor vessel mirror insulation during testing.
This testing had been proceeding for a number of days, causing the reactor vessel wall to roach temperatures ap-l proaching 500 F.
As a result of exposure to the high tempera-tures over a prolonged period of time, the two-by-fours and plywood spontaneously ignited near the top of the reactor vos-sol.
t 3.
The firo was reported to the Perry Control Alarm Sta-cion at 2:05 a.m.
The fire brigade was notified immediately and Reactor Duilding No. I was evacuated by security personnel.
4.
Initially, dry chemicals were applied in an attempt i
to extinguish the fire.
Itowever, because of the intenso heat, the two-by-fours and plywood continued to ro-innito.
At 2:30 l
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i a.m.,
it became apparent that the Perry Township. Fire Depart-ment should be called because of the re-ignition problem.
The i
j Fire Department arrived at the site in five minutes.
By 5:00 a.m. the fire was extinguished by using a combination of water l
and dry chemicals.
There were no injuries and damage to equip-ment was minor.
f 5.
The NRC resident inspector was notified at 7:00 a.m.
l Within twenty-four hours of the fire, Perry inspection teams l
I were assembled by Nuclear Construction to investigate the im-
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pact of the fire on a) piping supports; b) electrical equip-t ment and cables; c) instrumentation, impulse lines and sup-i ports; d) mechanical components; and e) the area between the L
bioshield and reactor pressure vessel.
Twenty-five j
Nonconformance Reports (covering safety-related items), and five Deficiency Peports (covering non-safety-related items),
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were generated as a result of this investigation.
Reports were i
i written for any item that was charred or might have been ad-versely affected by the heat generated during the fire.
Neces-4 l
l sary corrective action is being taken by Nuclear Construction j
Engineering for each of the items identified by the inspection.
Those' items not already closed out will be closed out prior to l
I fuel load.
i 6.
All piping supports within the fire area were in-spected by the piping contracts administrator, reactor building f
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manager, senior civil / structural engineer, and operations and t
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l 1
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i constructi,on quality control personnel.
As a result of this inspection, seventeen snubbers (which act as " shock absorbers" f
for the piping) have been replaced as a precautionary measure, j
although no significant damage was apparent, due to the possi-i bility of corrosion from the dry chemicals h plied during the T
fire.
All of the snubbers will be replaced prior to fuel load.
l f-Eight spring cans in the area of the fire were also the subject v
of a Nonconformance Report by this task group.
These cans have l
l been replaced and the Report closed out.
1 7.
Each electrical device and cable within the fire zone was inspected by a team of senior electrical engineers and l
quality control personnel for possible fire and/or heat damage.
Three Deficiency Reports and one Nonconformance Report were developed, covering each piece of equipment potentially affect-ed by the fire.
Corrective action, as necessary, is being i
taken in every case.
All Reports have been dispositioned by j
i t
Nuclear Construction Engineering and will be closed out by fuel i
load.
)
r 8.
Inspection of instrumentation, impulse lines and sup-l ports in the fire zone by a team of Instrument and Control per-
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l sonnel indicated that damage was minimal.
Temperature elements i
in the fire zone are being removed and recalibrated, with re-f placements being made, as necessary.
Seven snubbers were re-f i
placed, as a precaution against corrosion, although none of l
them showed signs of damage.
Damage to a radiation monitor in l
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the fire zgne was assessed by a Deviation Report.
The monitor has been recalibrated and the Report closed out.
9.
A construction inspection team consisting of mechani-cal and welding engineers, quality control inspectors, and a coatings engineer inspected mechanical items in the fire zone.
Eleven Nonconformance Reports were generated as a result of their investigation.
Necessary repair work for piping has been completed.
Mirror insulation panels affected by the fire are being replaced.
Remaining items have been dispositioned by Nu-l clear Construction Engineering and will be closed out prior to fuel load, i
f 10.
The space between the bioshield and reactor pressure vessel was inspected by a construction inspection team of me-chanical and welding engineers and a quality control inspector.
Dry chemical residue, charcoal particles, and some water were evident.
No problems were anticipated with the small quan-tities of water and chemical residue found.
The area will be l
wiped down with de-mineralized water to remove the chemical j
residue.
11.
An investigation was conducted by a fire protection i
specialist, compliance engineer, and two system enginoces to analyze the cause of the fire and to evaluate actions taken to l
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extinguish it.
As a result of their investigation of the incl-dont, a series of recommendations were made to improve Perry's response in such a situation.
Recommendations included
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I suggested. areas of improvement in radio cormunications, the placement and maintenance of fire-fighting equipment, as well as suggestions th modifications in the administration and coordination of fire-fighting personnel.
Some of the recommen-1 i
dations generated as a result of this investigation have al-i ready been implemented at Ferry.
Othere are still being evalu-ated.
All of the recommendations will be dispositioned prior to fuel load.
1 W
n-r Willaan n. Nandy Jr.
i Subscribed and sworn to before me this /7 day of July, d
$21 b.
Isetary Futlic My commission empires
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Molefy Pubre. StJte of CNe f/y Co m m.s Jon b elres Fenesaay 71 1940 (NecatJec in.aise Gevnte l
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