ML20207D134: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
||
| Line 362: | Line 362: | ||
An exemption from the requirements of DLC.2 for the control room is requested based on the unique features I inherent in the control. room design. CYAPCO also proposed customized administrative controls for | An exemption from the requirements of DLC.2 for the control room is requested based on the unique features I inherent in the control. room design. CYAPCO also proposed customized administrative controls for | ||
( flammable liquids and submitted the results of a quantitative room. | ( flammable liquids and submitted the results of a quantitative room. | ||
analy' sis of an exposure fire in the control July 16,1982 l Aeditional information is provided to the NRC Staff to supplement to that provided on March 1,1982 in response H. R. Denton letter dated May 10, 1982. | analy' sis of an exposure fire in the control July 16,1982 l Aeditional information is provided to the NRC Staff to supplement to that provided on March 1,1982 in response H. R. Denton {{letter dated|date=May 10, 1982|text=letter dated May 10, 1982}}. | ||
exemption An ] | exemption An ] | ||
from .the separation and suppression requiremenu automatic of Section DLG.2.b of Appendix R is requested. CYAPCO provides the results of a panel-by-panel evaluation of a control room exposure fire including compensatory operator actions. | from .the separation and suppression requiremenu automatic of Section DLG.2.b of Appendix R is requested. CYAPCO provides the results of a panel-by-panel evaluation of a control room exposure fire including compensatory operator actions. | ||
Latest revision as of 23:24, 5 December 2021
| ML20207D134 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/22/1983 |
| From: | Whitney L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Anderson C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H089 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-88-92 NUDOCS 8808150270 | |
| Download: ML20207D134 (47) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.= - 7 : [.. ...g'g UNITED STATES
. ! n,. -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g I
.B WASHING TON, D. C. 20555 i
4, / FEB 2 21983 l l i MEMORANDUM FOR: Safe Shutdown Inspection Program Lead Staff Contacts ! Clifford Anderson, Region I ! Thomas Conlin, Region II / Cordell Williams, Region III V Michael Murphy Region IV Gerald Zwetzig, Region V , FROM: Leon E. Whitney Lead Staff Contact for Safe Shutdown ; Inspections,DQASIP,IE I
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE IE/ REGIONAL SAFE SHUTDOWN INSPECTION PROGRAM COORDINATION MEETING OF FEBRUARY 2, 1983; FORWARDING OF 1 Enclosed please find an agenda, a list of attendees and meeting minutes for the IE/ Regional Safe Shutdown Inspection Program Coordination Meeting held in Bethesda, Maryland on February 2,1983. As noted in the enclosed minutes, , another IE/ Regional Coordination Meeting will be held subsequent to the initial safe shutdown inspections planned for the latter half of Fiscal Year l 1983. A topic not discussed at the coordination meeting was that the potential security ! implications of information developed during the safe shutdcwn inspections i should be considered in the preparation of the resultant inspection reports. l
&(w Leon E. Whitney .
Lead Safe Shutdown Inspection Program Safe Contact, DQASIP, IE . N x _
\
N ege2;g;$eso7s 48 24 g JONES 88-92 PDR I
@/P
~
, e IE/ Regional Safe Shutdown Inspection Proaram Coordination Meeting February 2,1983 Agenda Time Function 0800 Introduction L. E. Whitney Present Agenda and Handouts -
0815 Safe Shutdown Inspection J. M. Taylor Program Objectives 0915 D. C. Cook Background Brief J. C. Stone
- 1. References Material Collection
- 2. Possible Lines of Inquiry
- 3. TI-2515/62 Development 1000 Break 1015 Fire Suppression Systems L. E. , Whitney Interaction 1030 Appendix R, Section III.G.
Related Issues Presentations
- 1. Hot and Cold Shutdown: Plant N. E. Fioravante Status Definitions and Assumptions used by NRR
- 2. Associated Circuits E. A. MacDougall
- 3. Core Uncovery in BWRs J. H. Taylor 1130 Lunch !
1300 IE/ Regional Coordination Discussion L. E. Whitney
- 1. Inspection Team ,
Organization
- 2. Inspection Phase Location, '
Duration and Logistics
- 3. Coordination Responsibilities
- 4. Inspection Emphasis Consistency
- 5. Statement of Work Administrative Projects .
- 6. Near term inspection schedule
- a. plant availability i
- b. site visit constraints j 1
s e I 1 )
. c' , - -
. l IE/ REGIONAL SAFE SHUTDOWN INSPECTION PROGRAM COORDINATION MEETING Feb>_ary 2, 1983 List of Attendees Organization Attendee James M. Taylor D/DQASIP/IE Brian K. Grimes DD/DQASIP/IE James G. Partlow Chief,CRPB/DQASIP/IE James C. Stone Chief, CPS /RCPB/DQASIP/IE Phillip F. McKee Chief, Section 1, ORPB/
DQASIP/IE Leon E. Whitney Section 1, ORPB/DQASIP/IE Lead Safe Shutdown Contact, DQASIP Clifford J. Anderson Lead Safe Shutdewn Staff Contact, Region I Stuart Richardson Region I Themas E. Conlon Lead Safe Shutdown Staff Contact, Region II William H. Miller Reactor Inspector, Fire Protection Engineer, Region II Cordell C. Williams Lead Safe Shutdown Staff Contact, Region,II Joseph H. Ulie Reactor Inspector, Fire l Protection Engineer, Region III l 1 Charles B. Ramsey Reactor Inspector, Fire 1 Protection Engineer, Region III Michael E. Murphy Lead Safe Shutdoin Staff Contact, Region IV I i l l
- l. '
o e ll. . > L. . Attendee Oraanization Ken Scown (for Gerald E. Zwetzig, Lead Safe Reactor Inspector Fire l Shutdown Staff Contact, Region V) Protection Engineer, Region V Mark L. Padovan Region V John F. Stang, Jr. CHEB, NRR Randall Eberly CHEB, NRR Francis J. Nolan CHEB, NRR Nicholas E. Fioravante ASB, NRR Terence L. Chan ASB, NRR William J. Luckas Brookhaven National Laboratory Edward A. liacDougall Brookhaven National Laboratory John H. Taylor Brookhaven National Laboratory ag I e 1 1 2
. ..,..._,.,.__...-m___. . _ . , . _ , . . , . , _ _ . . . , - _ _ . , _ . . . . , . , . . , . . . _ , , , _ . . -
~
. \
l
. ..- i
)
. l IE/ Regional Safe Shutdown Inspection i Procram Coordinatien l'eeting l February 2, 198_3 Minutes The Regional safe shutdown lead staff contacts or their representatives were provided with a package of handouts related to the upcoming safe shutdown inspections. Handouts outlining brief talks scheduled on the agenda were also provided.
The following information was developed:
- Region to Region consistency in inspe.ction emphasis and followup activities was acknowledged as essential in the upcoming Regional Safe Shutdown inspection.
- Leon Whitney of IE will participate as a working member of the initial safe shutdown inspection teams.
- Extension of inspection scope to areas outside those addressed in 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G. is a Regional option. IE requests notification if such extensions cause lengthening of inspection phase durations for safe shutdown specialists or NRR provided fire protection engineers.
- Regional requests or inputs regarding the technical research and analysis .
of the Statement of Work Task 1.1 will be acted upon by Leon Whitney ) ofIE(NRCTC). i
- 10 CFR 50.48 section "b)" was presented and interpreted to specify that the entirety of Appendix R (not just sections III.G., III.J. and 111.0.) 1 apply to plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979, unless superseded by staff SERs issued prior to or under Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1.
- During the NRR review process it was noted that several licer) sees :
erroneously cited compliance with provisions of Regulatory guides 1 1.120 or 1.75 and/or Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 as satisfactory (in lieu of the requirements of Appendix R, section III.G).
- It wa noted that the licensee analysis of section III.G.2 of Appendix R was not reviewed by NRR (except to the extent that analysis was submitted i in support of exemption requests for the requirements of III.G.2). l l . j
e
- The base analysis developed to support licensee contentions with regard to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section Ill.G. may not be held on tte reactor site, but may be held, for example, at the licensees corporate headquarters or at the office of the licensees architect engineer.
- The licensees lists of systems required for hot shutdown and cold shutdown should be obtained.
- Safe shutdown procedural walkthroughs (observations at each operating station) can be a very useful line of inspection inquiry.
- Thorough preparation will include detailed review of applicable plant instrumentation drawings :nd electrical schematics.
- It was noted that licensees will normally require their own health physics training for site access regardless of prior experience or qualifications in the area of radiological controls.
- The Regional lead staff contacts stated that a "Q" level security clearance is an essential entry on the Regional access lists provided to the licensees prior to the site visits. A "0" level of clearance nomally results in unescorted access to most areas of comercial reactor plants.
- Cross-regional inspection manpower support for the near term safe shutdewn
> inspections was identified as an option for enhancing inspection efficiency and inspector experience levels.
- It was noted that, since TI-2515/62 has now been placed in the public ,
docur.ent room, it may be made available to licensees. TI-2515/62 is ( filed under the heading of "Inspection and Enforcement Nnual Change 82-03". The follcwing agreements were reached among the Regional safe shutdown lead staff contacts and IE.
- All NRC held licensee submissions on safe shutdown issues should be collected and reviewed prior to making requests for additional plant specific licensee held documentation. ,
- IE agreed to have Brookhaven National 1.aboratory mail all plant specific safe shutdown documentation (assembled for Task 1.1 of the Statement of Work) to the Regional safe shutdown lead staff contacts.
- IE agreed to provide inspection readiness status (with technical review analysis) for all reactor plants of Enclosure 1 to the safe shutdown inspection technical assistance statement of work.
. - Regional safe shutdown lead staff contacts agreed that safe shutdown inspection report followup activity tracking would be handled on a Regional basis.
/
- Regional safe shutdown, lead staff contacts agreed to forward copies of the final safe shutdown inspection reports to the other four Regional lead contacts and to the IE lead staff contact (L. IIhitney),
NRR (ASB) and NRR (Ci1EB).
- Regional safe shutdown lead staff contacts agreed to forward to L. Whitney (for further transfer to Brookhaven National Laboratory) as soon as possible, a schedule for near term reactor plant outages in their respective regions.
p 3
i ~. o _ j 1l
- l. ..
1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION YlSIT TO THE HADDAM NECK PLANT SEPTEMBER 4,1984 ) ; r j a ,, f A w% p Af*-
'j , a 3 d w , ,b , <v,4 ~p b ' p J & '
g ( "wW W Li k w?h~ 5 W ^ g
*~de w ,
g rM/
'Wf hj(s GJfg 4
,6 ' a p - 44 prA #d 5 g rA &.
- ~ ~ ~ ciax;% gdgAJ<a e!.
,A &.
A P-
& ' '* "fLA (ftee L-- . . - _ _ _ _ . - _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . .
1
- r. ,
e
^
CONTENTS - l
- 1. Participants .
- 2. Agenda .
- 3. Overview Philosophy of Approach to ' Appendix R and Control Room Exemption
~
- 4. Control Room Fire Protection and Habitability
- 3. Impacts and Compensatory Measwes for a Control Room Fire
- 6. Plant Modifications identified in Appendix R Evaluations e
t I l ( . l l l l
s o . .
, , PARTICIPANTS I
Nu: lear Regulatory Commisslort , H. R. Denton F. Rosa Direetor, NucJeat Reactor R egulation R. L. Ferguson Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch D. 3. Kubicki Chemical Engineering Branch Chemicaj Engineering Branch N. E. Floravante Auxillary Systems Branch
- 2. E. Lyons Operating R eactors Branch 5 Northeast Utilities / Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Co.
W. G. Comsil Senior Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Operations R. H. Graves Station Superintendent i N. A. Burnett 3 Operations Assistant, CYAPCO R. Rogozinski Senior Engineer, CYAPCO R. M. Kacich M. P. Cass Generation Facilities Licensing
- 3. 3. Roncaloll Generation Facilities Licensing A. O Patrizz Generation Fire Protection Engineering G. R. Pitman Generation Fire Protection Engineering ;
- 3. R. Ferraro Gener:.tlon Electrical Engineering B. A. Tuthill Generation Electrical Engineering G. E. Cornelius Generation Electrical Engineering B. M. Pokora Generation M echanical Engineering Generation M echanical Engineering e
l l 1 i l i _ __ , , - . - - - --+- ~ - ~ ~ ~ ' ~~~
v
. l
_ AGENDA, t 11:00 a.m. Introduction W. G. Counsll l H. R. Denton H 00 a.m. Review of Control Room R. M. Kacich appendix R Inues 12:00 a.m. Lunch 1200 p.m. Review of Crtto! h - 4 A. N. Patr!zz Fire Protecti i ed e Habitability ~ astvrna 1:00 p.m. Effects of Contros Bo .c 3. R. Ferraro Fires and Comper..;;ory Actions 100 p.m. Control Room Tour R. H. Graves 200 p.m. General Discussion 3:00 p.m. NRC Caucus 300 p.m. ( Adjourn
]
1 l
3 .. o , . HADDAM NECK PLANT APPENDIX R APPROACH o IILG review conduc ed for each fire area o-Areas where safe shutdown equipment was identified, conformance with IILG.2 was assessed 3 o Safe shutdown equipment includes cold shutdown related components - o Liscrepaneles'in compliance with IILG.2 resolved through modifications to achieve compliance or exemptions o Exemptior requests predicated on an equivalent level of fire protection o Areas which currently or will conform 14 o Areas with requested exemptions 8 I e
,-.ey-..-,---.,-c.-.-,,. ,w y- wy,,wy.w,,,,y, . - - -c- - . - - - , p. .-,. , , - - -
1 . CONTROL ROOM EXEMPTION PHILOSOPHY I o- Exemption Based on' Defense in Depth ! o l Equivalent Level of Fire Protection Provided
- o Fire Protection Improved with Proposed Modifications o
Urdque Features of tNs Fire Area Warrant Unique Resolutfors o Ctrrent Position has Evolved over Last Three Years t O e --
7 -
.. , ./
l i CONTROL ROOM DESIGN FEATURES 1. The control r5om is enclosed by reinforced concrete shielding walls. 2. All exit doors are blast resistant and provide a minimum of three-hour fire protection. 3.. The drop ceiling is mineral acoustic tile (noncombustible), and the fjooring is vinyl asbestos tije. 1
- 4. Volume: 71,000 f t3.
1
- 5. Continuously manned by licensed operators.
6. Restricted area with transient combustibles controlled.
- 7. Fire Protection o
Two 20-pomd carbon dioxide extinguishers are located in the control room on the north r.nd west walls. o A hose cabinet is located in the hall outside the south door, o There is a 125 potr.. 'y chemical wheeled extinguisher at the elevator, outside the o at door to the control room. i ( o ( Fire detection s quipment is installed in the main control board interior corridor. o Fire detection equipment is insta!!ed in the areas that are outside the line of vision of the operators at the console. o Manually initiated smoke removal system is insta!!ed with a capacity of 9500 cfm. l o Breathing air capacity includes six, 5-minute quick don air pa' ks, five, 30-minute self contained breathing apparatus and an air cascade system providing 18 man-hours of breathing air.
- 8. Low Combustible Loading i
_ Quantity (Btu /ft2) Paper 45 f t3 4,600 Plastic 200 lb 400 Cabinet Cab!es 100it3 16,200
*S
.. - , , , - , ..--,..-,.,-.----,.,,-.-,n,..,, , , r--,
MODIFICATlONS PROPOSED FOR CONTROL ROOM 1. Custtenized . ,a'dtninistrative controls will be implemented to minimize introduction of flammable materials in the control room. 2. Revise normal operat.ng procedwes to require an inspection each
~
shif t in the control room f or mcontrolled flammable materials. 3. All openings between the cabinets and the floor that would allow a spilled flammable liquid to enter the cabinets will be sealed. 4. A Halon 1301 suppression system will be installed inside the main control board with detection consisting of both lonization and photoelectric sensors 4 automatjcally. which initiate the suppression system
- 5. Develoh alternate operator procedi.res to demonstrate:
o operability to safe shutdown with loss .of the main control board 3 auxiliary control ecbinets, o that spurious operation 'of' affected equipment can be compensated for using either a sptem's approach or a loss of adjacent panel section analysis. o ( actions being taken outside the control room are achievable considering a fire in the control room time needed to accomplish the itnction and manpower requ, ired. 6. Provide a safe shutdown instrumentation panel remote from the control room including indication for: o pressurizer 1evel and pressure, o steam generator level and pressure, o reactor coolant system temperature (hot leg or in-core thermocouples and cold leg), and o source range neutron monitor. 7. Modifications discussed in Attachment 2 of the letter to D. G. Eisenhut from W. G. Counslj, dated March 30,1983 with the exception of load shedding and sequencing circuit modifications. The load shedding and sequencing circuit modifications in the auxiliary control cabinets are not necessary as CYAPCO has proposed alternate operator actions to compensate for the complete
. loss of function of the auxiliary control cabinets.
- y-------u- -vee-- w- nT
~
D l e
- 1
. . 1 NU POSITION FOR CONTROL ROOMS WITH RESPECT TO APPENDIX __
The fire protection rules .promulgatect by the NRC in 10CFR50.48 and Appendix R to 10CFR50 require licensees to evaluate the effect on safe shutdown from fires. Licensees must identify redmdant safe shutdown i equipment located in the same fire area and assess conformance with the i criteria of Ill.G.2 of Appendix R. Where redmdant saf e shutdown systems, equipment ) or components located in the same fire area can not be
- demonstrated to conform to the provisions of Ill.G.2 through existing plant }
features or with proposed modifications, then the rule requires a licensee l l to install an alternate or dedicated shutdown systern of an exemption from a specific requirement of !!!.G.2 can be requested. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) has evaluated the control room at the Haddam Neck Plant in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.48 and Appendix R to 10CFR50. < Based on the l unique function which the control room serves and the numerous design featwes inher'ent in this fire area, CYAPCO has proposed an exemption from specific requirements of Section Ill.G.2 of Appendix R based on a defense in depth approach to fire protection and prevention. We have ! chosen to improve the fire protection features of the control room with both hardware and procedural modifications which in our judgement provide an equivalent level of fire' protection to that afforded by conformance to the literal requirements of the rule. The exemptlon ; request room contro' was developed taking into consideration the miqueness of the and the design proposed. featwes which. currentJy exist and are k 11 is CYAPCO's position that <l .maging or destructiva fires can only result from fires that go mdetected for considerable periods of time, or those fires that develop rapidly because of large quantities of combustibles such as flammable liquids. The control room differs from a!! other areas of power plant with respect to potential destructive firts. The control room has unique featwes which i eliminate damaging / destructive fires. These unique features include the 1 following: l
- 1. i Control room is continuously manned by licensed operators.
2. Control room is a restricted area and transient combustibles are controlled.
- 3. Hardened /secue area of plant: Totally enclosed by reinforced conc: rete with restricted entey.
- 4. No significant permanent combustibles.
- 5. No high/ medium voltage power sources.
- 6. !
Adequate fire protection for type and ' quantity of combustibles, portable extinguishers located throughout the room and hose ; b 3tations available in areas outside control room.
i . l
. ,. \
l 7. Early ' warning detection; provided, by control room licensed t operators and lonization detection.
- 8. . {
Proposed custo'mized ' administrative controis to restrict flammable . materialin the control room. ' 9. Proposed Halon suppression system inside main control panels. l
- The control room also has many other favorable features which contribute l to preventing, detecting, and/or suppressing a fire.
In 1978 the NRC . conducted site fire protection inspections to evaluate compliance with Branch Technical Positions 9.5-1 Appendix A. All fire protection , 1 recommendations generated for the control room by the NRC and their fire .. protection consultants have been implemented. The combined features listed above represent a defense-in-depth appro to fire protection by providing sufficient echelons / levels of active, , passive and administr'ative cc.ntrol room. control features to assure the functionability of the If one were to postulate a credible fire in the control room, it would be combustible materials present, and heat sources available incipient fire would be detected promptly by licensed personnel on dutyTh and/or the installed lenization smoke detection system. Pertable extinguishers could occur. could readily handle any control room incipient fire that (- trained mernbers of the plant fire control brigade.It should be noted also It is CYAPCO's position that a room fire v/ould be promptly discovered and extinguished well in advance of any damage to redundanteffectively controls. shutdown A limited fire scenario affecting safe shutdown, while considered extremely unlikely, has been evaluated. CYAPCO has postulated a limited affects on safe shutdown due to such a fire includi equipment developed to operations compensate. have been identified and operator actions have been CYAPCO's evaluation of the control room for Appendix R has been an of the requirements of Appendix R and NRC Staff in actions which have been conceptualized to deal with t control room fire are predicated on the philosophy established by CYAPCO historically. Resolution of the control room Appendix R review, while essentially complete in our view, cannot be based on the fulfi!! ment of the requirements discussed below.of I!1.C.3 of Appendix R for several important reasons as Operator actions have been developed to compensate for fire damage in the control room to safe shutdown equipment. While these actions are proposed to be completed from areas ouuide the control room, CYAPCO firmly believes that the control room is the preferred location from which
-. -- - - - - ~-~
to affect safe shutdown. A host of controls and Instruments are available which complement the minimum requirements for equipment identified for safe will remain shutdown. It is functional highly alikely following fire. that most of the control room equipment The evaluations operations. ' of control room fires includ e d Such events can be critical to safe shutdown. potential spurious Certain ! components such as PORV's and MSIV's play a particularly sensitive role in
- the safe shutdown scenarlo. ;
the control spurious o room will enable the operators to quickly compens 1 shutdown.peration of these components thereby limiting the impact on safe CYAPCO's position regarding a limited control room fire is ! essential function (to to the limit location of this modification which in turn ensures fulfilled. the effects of spurious PORV or MSIV operation) is l Our position with respect to the control room fire is predicated on the 1 reviews performed and documented to date. ' the control room to CYAPCO has not reviewed Appendix contro! room. R as would be required if Section III.G.3 were inv , i a l l l a e 9 s
.~.-,-,,----------~~.,.,n. r-n- .-,,,,-,.ew-
_ , a ,n-.- y,.a ,- , - -, a, ,,n,,,,,w, , . , - . -,-,s - n,.,,,-,- , , -, ~ . - -- - - - , -
- u-Section Ill.G.2 vs. Ill.G.3 o
One fire involving the entire contro! r' oom was not postulated. - o Modifications to mitigate spurious operation of PORV's and MSN's are predicated on 111.G.2 exemption. o Detailed evaluations of SectionIII.L of AppencDx R not docketed. o Assumptions regarding extent o, fire, potential spurious operatfors, and how they are dealt with are explicit. o Control room is most desirable area to conduct safe shutdown. ( 1 6 f
Significant Documents Associated i with the Control Room Exemotion I
.- -l
. l February 17,1981
'10CFR30.48 and Appendix R became effective.
March 19,1981 An exemption is requested from the schedular requirements of 10CFR50.48 for providing information in response to Section DI.G of Appendix R. An evaluation of alternate and dedicated shutdown systems is provided based on the understanding of the type of systems the Staff Intended at that time. June 23,1981 January 13,1982 Revised re for schedular exemption from September, quest 1981 i to March 1, 1982 for providing evaluations in accordance with IILG of Appendix R. March 1,1982 CYAPCO submits capabilities based on results of evaluations of safe shutdown the requiremenu Appendix R to 10CFR30, of ID.G of 1 An exemption from the requirements of DLC.2 for the control room is requested based on the unique features I inherent in the control. room design. CYAPCO also proposed customized administrative controls for ( flammable liquids and submitted the results of a quantitative room. analy' sis of an exposure fire in the control July 16,1982 l Aeditional information is provided to the NRC Staff to supplement to that provided on March 1,1982 in response H. R. Denton letter dated May 10, 1982. exemption An ] from .the separation and suppression requiremenu automatic of Section DLG.2.b of Appendix R is requested. CYAPCO provides the results of a panel-by-panel evaluation of a control room exposure fire including compensatory operator actions. December 1,1982 CYAPCO met with the NRC Staff to discuss the Staff's draft safety evaluation report of the lil.G.2 evaluations and specifically the three exemption requests which' i remained unresolved (Control Room, Cable Spreading Room and Intake Structure). It was agreed at that meeting that the control room exemption would be found acceptable based on the favorable results of our evaluation of a limited control board fire (two adjacent main control board panels or a single fully enclosed auxiliary cabinet fire).
~
Decernber l'5,1982 CYAPCO dockets the information presented at the December 1,1982 meeting including the understandings
\
.'
- l l . ,
l l reached regarding the information required by the Staff I to find the control room exemption acceptable. i l CYAPCO proposes to install a Halon suppression system l internal to the control boards. ' January 31,1983 i CYAPCO submits the results of failure mode and effects ! analyses of the main control board and auxiliary control board resulting from a fire. Operator actiers were l identified to compensate for the effects on safe shutdown of such a limited fire including effects of 1 spurious equipment operation, l March 30,1983 CYAPCO provides information in resporse to Generic ! Letter 81-12 at the request of the NRCStaff. A'pril 22,1983 4 Details of the Auxiliary Control Boards are provided to I the NR C Staff (photographs). t May 10,1983 ' ' CYAPCD commits to install additional instrumentation on the remote instrumentatJon panej proposed to be instaJled to facilitate safe shutdown in the event a control room fire disables control room instruments. October 13,1983 CYAPCD met with 'the NRC Staff to discuss several technical detaus regarding the control room exemption and the anajyses performed in j support of it . '
- Compensatory actions for total loss of f metion of the
( Auxiliary Control Boards were identified and control room habitabUity concerns were addressed. The Control Room exemption request is cJarifjed based on the discussions with the Staff at this meeting. November 4,1983 CYAPCD doctrnents the information exchanged at the October 13, 1983 meeting includin exemption request for the control room.g the clarified ' I S
.- - ,a. - - ,, - , , ,,,- ----,--,,=-,-,v-e,----,- n. r--r, - . . - ~ . - - , - , . - , -~,-,-na,-, n . , - ,,- - -e- - , ,
- i 1
' i 4
CONN. YANKFF CONTR01 ROOM -
. l FIRF DROTECTION FEATURFS
)
. l 0
UNIQUENESS OF CONTROL ROOM: CONTINUOUSLY MANNED BY LICENSED REACTOR OPERATORS. I O HARDENED / SECURE AREA 0F THE PLANT: IOTALLY ENCLOSED BY REINFORCED CONCRETE AND RESTRICTED ENTRY. I O NO SIGNIFICANT PERMANENT COMBUSTI'BLES.
' j i
0 NO HIGH/ MEDIUM VOLTAGE POWER SOURCES. ~ 0 ADEQUATE FIRE PROTECTION FOR TYPE AND QUANTITY OF COM PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE ROOM A STATIONS AVAILABLE IN AREAS OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM. 0 EARLY WARNING DETECTION; PROVIDED BY CONTROL ROOM LICENSEDl OPERATORS AND IONIZATION DETECTION. O PROPOSED CUSTOMIZED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS TO R FLAMMABLE L10UIDS IN THE CONTROL ROOM TSEE AFOREMENTION DISCUSSION ON ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS). O SEAL BOTTOMS OF CONTROL ROOM PANELS. _ _ _ , _ , . ..--e s* * " ' ' '~""'
,m ...s . . . .
.. ... ......... . .. . . . ?
1 CONTROL ROOM MODIFICATION i
~ '
BASED 'ON NRC INSPECTION - o EARLY WARNING DETECTION: ' o OUT-OF-LINE-OF-SIGHT O COMPUTER ROOM j i o KITCHEN AREA o MAKE-UP AIR SUPPLY 1 o 1" BOOSTER HOS.E LINE ADJACENT TO CONTROL ROOM. o PORTABLE HALON 1301 EXTINGUISHERS. o ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS SEALED. o ONE-HOUR FIRE RATED WALLS FOR COMPUTER ROOM AN AREA. ' '
e e , O C .Y. c4 20L hoy }_,py:ogy.
/ /_
u.m
^
,4- , , _ ,
N i<
-- / 2 3 4 5 4 Mb:s: 8:6.y y j p at gagg g, AuxouAev Cm,an y was
,, ,b .
~ * .
NC I WR c, g Fr. ' i 1-c' <n o~ g.c J H ~a st-F ( fjf o E '< D A N?L .I. lLS- c
'rai c~~r n i
l MfW f/;, j B v-
# FictAREA gg l r
<t .
{
'Q' Nt b,c'.g A4 g
t"
.20.- HU"'M l
~
.\
/ .
. / ,.-
CONNECTICUTYANK5E CONTROL PANEL - HALON SYSTEM '
\
. i HALON l
- 1 0 101 CONCENTRATION O ELECTRICALLY NONCONDUCT!YE O
. INHIBITS THE CHEMICAL REACTION OF A FIRE t
DETECTION I O REDUNDANT TO EXISTING DETECTION SYSTEM , l O SPACED APPROXIt%TELY EVERY FIVE FEET 0 30 SQUARE FOOT COVERAGE PER DETECTOR k (NFPA ALLOWS UP TO 900 So.FT. COVERAGE PER DETECT 0 CROSS ZONE O IONIZATION & PHOTOELECTRIC FOR QUICKER RESPONSE 9 k
., ,-, , - ,,,__,4,. ,, , , , . , . - , _ , , , , _ ., p.-. 9 w,,,.,-,. y,w-.. ,,y%w=., -..y..
1s g5 . u :: - J
+-
, 01
-9l 3
, kg 3 see m 2
)g e S
y i
/
1 C
' o O
c J 3 E h(w r a y 2 w
' ' o 4 G y E O d V i t -
t W c W g ( ' ' b y l I
/
Z 6 3 C
- y -
( 3
._, 2 is H Z 1
N* , ; c is 3' 2 U C E g _.)
, O_
N e v w *
,! s ,- ..... .,-
J U- g g c a o c .c o a a y$ ti\]l - y 13 1 l
l
- l l
4
' 1 i . . . .
CONNECTICUT YANKEE CONTROL ROOM -
, 1
_ VENTILATION e ROOM VOLUME - 71,000 CUBIC FEET i
\
l e AIR CHANGES - 1 EVERY 7 MINUTES
}
e SM0KE DETECTORS ANNUCIATES SM0KE CCtOITIDM - ( . e MANUAL START SM0KE REMOVAL SYSTEM 1
,e THREE 5,200 CFM PORTABL$ VENTILATION SM0KE EJECTORS 9
_e a .. - s===._a==-==_ _. o ..n ~m
.N. .
4
,. * % W
%m Y $
As, l
?,-
9* i
)
/
s
'o -
s r d 8 i l 1 l l l
/ \
I W
? l 4
a >s Y .. \
, w '
6 CT 6 Li- W O h O ( O - f*
) '
\
i i % z o
}
. F s
g (n n u V
'n
.Y W f1 %@
fE w #
%s 2 CV g o .
+ .
2 =*=
- f. 3
.3 >- a
% ~
0 o
'e o 5 q -
o h' d. o
+ b #
w O
_ ___- w ,- w gphtr LORTQOllOOm
- 5OM -
0 , \ brxAl OTTMNOW .
, .. t
~ s.ns >
, u .
[' f v ~ l , ~ l ~g+ - Il0's.ili At.y PAMi ! eM ,-.__ ki l pq f hh i i - T
.s"+ .
a d
\
* /
.- %/
E,* e, \
'94 r
~
t
, N.
+
4 4... Rh S H N - E db 6t C M ad h m M EsbA4W- % %-4 m.t.s.% kt. hthem t. E.U
,944 h L \,
e.s\n\n-
]_
V f
LONN
.. %HREE CoNittel TODM 3mdE DmM -
Natural .hh\Mu is stAh,w f. .
,.( 2 v r.
/_.
/_
- a -
[ . N N' 8{ 1 "
,A0silian.v Phuds l - - -
,a I
f,A Y d& 77
/ l l -
, x; c tin e.ns~b wa X '
N e%e, . 1 I 4 7 k .
- %Nauw\ VEdhb %hl. w eN b h am - muun dr
- -Sub hwi Snit.m ffAkud\ M YhEtk h7 ca4 w wtwa-w w.s -
asA
~
q,- y' f g
1
. l CONNECTICLIT YAl1KEE CONTROL RODM 3REATHING AIR SYSTEM e
6 - FIVE MINUTE QUICK DON AIR PACKS
/
e 5 - THIRTY, MINUTE AIR PACKS ~ e AIR CASCADE SYSTEM i 0 8 BOTTLES 1 0 6 CONNECTIONS o 18 MANHOURS AlR SUPPLY6 MEN /3 K)URh) o 50 FOOT AIR HOSE I I . i .. m- - g n ,,we-g--.--..,y...,e, --w --,ev. e g..%m-p . aw-.,. . --..m.*.-ww -,w+a _.e. _, a,--- . - -.-- -.m .-
y. e . .
* ,e .
. t **-*.*a.a.*'sar'z* wus.'t .
f'e.,rr.
. . :,fer.Yp:, .
' . V .s. ;.t . e;rvi t:wg., n _
, o,.. .<,. i f . ). < . :,3,
}. - ll
( . ..
- z .a: v s..n.~..r: .. ,9.
e.
. ... i y .
g...n. . . .
- n. e 1
L. r..:.,..;. y. c:...,..g.
, !e. .;c,. w : &..:e;.
f,<.. n . 7 5 W ..e. .. . e ....e.u.., . n,; .
. ..e.. . . . n:..
. (_ ...
%,. . .n
.... ~:,...y .. :.n.,,..a.a::w:;.}y.r.
., . . . .n .y..w;: . ,. . ..:.,.; .e. .
. ...... . ~ .. .;.
l . . r d. , w, r . a pp 'fb::U'?:i<9.n'& =:n m .,..m.n.s. .'w .5.
- n. .'k.
- ...: . .:. .:.s..m. . ~.,
E .v . .. u< ... l g [f;,.: t -(?,'.,..,
'- ] .. ,
.t
.'.e/s , .
.'4 ....'
. r ...
M t .
,...P *. *.*.*
c ':.*l*Q c . J t .
, p . . ... '
. 3 ,. ,
.p s V. ; ..y, . ... .. .,
3 .,. c,. . . . .
- r. ei -. , .
s,,.. .
$.t.* '. .,. . p.
- J '. .. .. a. .
* =~..t. .
1 r..it" . . *v.' i
.s*>.*te- a- "....
g . , .g *;. . f ; '. ' '.f. ' * .. . ' * ..
- 6 n.'II . . g4a. .., ..L.*..'.,...s.'
.: n'- K,y.y..
$t m$%.p.':b~.
~
- . w. e'm s , ., 4 ':: t,:?.hP -
s\ .
..,v..=..
. n ,., e T yn . . .. A' .
~
5 E t;, . :.
. ... ,e 3; + 'I .>a-Y3.
. .L.... $m.-s.,w.d1MMY:.yQ ;,
W,%
!. .y
. )
< 3n s 1
..a
.. s
, .:1(,
..,,. ,.a~< 2 -
. w.p.,.m .
..,. n.
4 w W 1y. mi n.
,g. yw. r2 y',.3a si. d 3 ,
s.,,.
-L.Hg::.yg, ..f..%, G".q,, ! . -4 J.3
.t
- s. . ..
y.p q,o.p. )
.. . i.
r A.';f. . 2 p . ..f,, .s, (
- . . t .
@>~~.-sm ._.
~
c.m. ., . , . a. gs d>7d.. - M.. ..j gga r. . - , @., nm, n iM;5'p- @e: .M. - f mM wp i
. ' 8 d. , .=4 -
;; 1 J
i
@m;..swed.~,.
&,:' g' % .iet h... , 3Ye ,ki
-k '.
d h'l,
- . .i.
. t -
.w
.c*
i s;.,*yc.g ? .:. Ah ir','::*-f'T,
&* +- a H. } '3.p. ?, fJM- .%v:'Yr.%.,m ,. ;.'.3. j
,...g .* " =,q ,;;* . e
- - / -
x d- 1/ 8'* .".b. R. l.:i. 7 %'%Wh.95-:iM l' .. ,.. . _ ._!-3 %- k.t =;_' . .%e.w .4_ ;r .: M:'se;a.,;f,= r5 g.1.A Q,e 9 .. f%~M @.. .. 4 g.
'M.a * . . , .' ,.
.g .. . c'. s. %,
,. p:., 9 1
'N>..n.y.t'. ... . . ".. . e..,,
- g. .
l - t,.9. . w - < . .%
,. -4
.. i
; M . . . ,. . .v.'il g ,4.> . . ,,g.: n. .y %. / ,,
. ye., ....
s..y..,d L
.,...M.s.a. a.
. y .l,'.f. w . 4 . s..
st ' MM:.
%%." [ .%.
?@w...
[:: . . .. ,> o;- y3 ..
. c . ....: . .4
.:c "
.g . w, .o .1 1. e. ' _ .
- n. :s...;,. .. g.e._w.a wa f.te p. . ..-c.;-~ E s, :, .a.,. .c ... .v%n
.m , u. .
. s.
e: . . , .
...a. .e: 3 . .,
.....a.......:.
. a .
....:f. .
..* . ~,. .
. q'e, , ( 4.J' .% ..
. ., .o r =.% n
. ..~. ...m;. . . .. .~ . . ..
.- ::.s. ~ ..>. < ..
.~._.n. e.
.: us.-s:.5.. n.
5.,. . . ... e.w.4.. s,.
.,. r :,f..,.
. . . . . . . . 2 n.r
- <: - e. ., (r.
, . n,. . . , : t s ..
- y. .e:y-im x,g: .a w
- r. -
*; 1. . v. .
u :, y,n. .-.,: w.y..;epq
. :. ..s'
~
. m ' . ' .' 6, .:t , . :. 4,' * .\.*
*.'... * % r. . w
*' *s .v.'>.
. . * >> 6 ; * . * *.r.
- a
.g w!)
,, =;,. . . . ==~-
. m e,
y.m.n}.:g.v, i o t , V'. U' t w :a.; W "%.. d."
~ .,, '.&. ...,-.n..;>..<..
? v. . g; ; .,,
, .).s,e
.* .t'.. p ' ys *
- r , = .* * ^ <,,...
, 3 C4 g '
. . . . ./ ,.e ,/ . . r;.sT,s4. 's;., J.. :aS
- A.< o
- i, ,...g. . .
- g i.=
- '.* . .'
== **
-N A
1. C.
;e, , . e
.g
.~
., s .%. ,
?. . . .i -2.,,,.. .
.' - , u!~ := ? ;..a.
*. .. .v =; ' .
'M u - .,
..- Q ., ,. . .-
. g.
s.. X.. ,.:;:,:.. :- -' .C , , m*% '
..,,, U -
es .,
' ti ,
.\, 2. .. ... ..'. . . n -.
- c. '. - /, .
..a../.. 4Nt c: ,s. . .:
- s . . . ,a ,
2 .f ,- ..
... - t 'i4 6,.,. ,'
% ' +.
- l
{. a .4 .g . . ~
.. ;, y.g..
lIL .,:.
* :?.
' 5 6 '. < '-
g.
; J ?- . .% -
*OO%~.. [ - . - - - -
v
\
)
- ["s'( )
4, 3 . (
.M*.e5X*n2: i' -C'
.. u : ,. .
.. ;'d.k, &;;;.2~ ~~4 s- ~. $ '
. = ^ ^ .^ . .i $$.6:.
.. - r .. s . .. L' ....
P'Q4 x
~ '
- 3. %-::#,'~.2
& [>.
7p
. ..4
- r. _ -:
t=- y .
' 5 * ' . . , ,
~ -
1.. . f W .'
*~
r
~4' r . w _ T{r' ? _
~ A
/[.
W _-
~
n 5 . ,/ /'.i 4 .
}9,.- l
- 'd's. m ..
'.'5 ri a-
~'
i
~--- .'} c .>?..g- - - m,3w g' - d pr-eg.e., p .1 g,1 e ,. f o.0- h g, ELY$
} 1 s -6
- & Gd-P*1 i '
9 ;.7~KO. ?Y . k A f' .
. .=:1.?.:!-C+,-*'?<
' g -
' M6d. . . d- (i [ M ~ $ $ $,.
$.L,..
ua . w;.% . -t~nM"raffy&g w..
. e r gc~ w&*.f'.%.h A.,
L M,
-- t VI
~ g y @% F 8 .s@.g$* .! b t.
t
}d r
-9.gJD.p's
- +.t $yN
+pp?>h2: E in ..
Q$tM*-- h-Ay-hK.w SWQ.WRWUiQ i 4.JPest @$g . 3IpThy@6 Sg5+*e..:f MMS;-2@3R@% TR (
; I -i ).
1 i
^
-i-i:h::.3k[Eh'M@*g@e.2fmM.9hc'd
- . c %'
.c*-u. M >r-i~.y+p . . . - L 5
Asis .9 II
\ Yh
.cgr.;.w -
.,.y,' i t f
- n. ,< , n$
$$w.:~- - 5h '
?3 hf!Sr. h Y^ -em t
I kVk p.'
"a :~sf'),.
q $. _ . $ M. g.3.~5i'.ge#Els,$ ,b. ..
$ [_@ % M E 1 [k'$'~ y a....
v.n* J ('.
'5 3.;p.zan.r W % c-.-s.}.y M~.-- .a
.. - =.
- ~~ '
'@l:.^;";3>
. . r- .. m. a j. $..
W M R:) R ~ - hp . . . .
- ,1.
e
-M
_ t,,, g
- O
. *..... * 'y .
y'm=ygmeysm&mm.m: M M w.s.r,,2.c=m 4fuk M =-:52htm ar 1 E'.l ? 5 N'*.) w ' we < ; . . &T
.M. swc3'.*%-
,~ . :-:.%*
.p; q y w -',- ~- W*
w' ?*'s5 h, ~.-*?. *
**-' hh+
.. -r~-
g- - r-
. M_.v. a, m.
n,..
.f..
v.;,. . . 3.?,Q, . rC.Q.:Y,,r.n ,M;:) W y mn-c=1?'W
~
~ %.,v-y:9. .,.[=. -+
~
~ m-
-.m.
..v ,
;.a j g . -
u s% . n... ~ . . ~ .
^
~ . g ( :
pu:. 4:, * - a E .*
.v. L:5. s.. -:>. - . r. g r . *. p
- + m-':
3 _ _a - 1
.J. .: -
q..:.+$. H& .'@ {, 4.u .Q; 2..i W- y.'.'.i=G-?i j df i .,.&..,.,.........,
< t- :; . .. ,
..- g . j, m e. :? .'.'7..'.'n .. .
e.. .: x .. a .2 . . a ...~ ,r r .v..-e . : v.: '... .. Q v ,
~ .. .eo . , -n -
.v2 - ..+ _ ..
n%-. ~ . :W,,3d y il ll, . . M M,u l
. . .. k '8 .
[ m..
,~ ., y - ,.s. p.
., ..i.m.;,,; ' .!.D..
x W'M. .
;p. .
r -,-,. a.,t . c .. .. a, .... ,-
-n - .
- s. ~ 4.,.v.. -
..: . .; ,;s..5.
. . .y., ..g
- y. J ..;. . . .
. . . . ',. :. . .a. g. { ?
.s .
5 5 $"S.Y. ' m ,; ..,.- -= ,,, h k-s-s. & :':.T. -a .. . , . .
; x. & ~I' $y$$.$
y *- . .
.: .-1. , . .
. ..r- ...j... N.m'&. : a. . .. : .y . . '.
A.'..ic'.% . .. . ' ' '. E Y."s ?,. . -
.-i
.. . - - :m: - v.,.4y,d.. .%. i.e
% .: c.- . ..g.r.v.
,.,, ; . w.- . ..-..
*- . .:. r r c. ,. t 1 -s\.
.u. ... . s .. .
t ., 7 r-
,-.. c ;. 4 h', . m_m a ;, L.;. :q-.x rrr
.? ..
m ',..
, M .-.3 'W -
f *+.5.G%p.,3 - M,
- Yi W;r, :.A:. '
v'.1h . p. n. g.-t ?m' . .. . . , .g.
.s' h u...n M,g_ nl
..' 4.'1'. y ]. ..". ',...
<A
~:..
) --
m .. - . _ g**_. T,. V,.~ g.k. . , . . ..i
.m
.q/.,,~e.y. - ). e l ','. ' '.2. e.
e._,.,...e,...
, nr r m.. .. .p
.m
~
.w--s~ c. :, m),. . r-9,,s...,v,e.
.w. ~o~r t, ..
. .s . o. ,, .
3
. ~
l *
<M,
.t . *
- r f - , ;__ ' ._ > -] : L..b 'M.A y ha-Y. "-.l.AF. , @.'E. . ' ri ' ' ' ,'N Ig
.. ?
L - t .I. % .
*.+1 :... s . Tg :. y .x .;... . : f-)? lI ~ ~
- .a .
..'c '1 -
i i p) r; ,. u,. I Q *yQ; . ,.. ._y,a r p .y, .:.n(. 4...'t..4. . U. b.::. *:; . . '. 8,:3 > f..*y. O e .
$'e:~i.p.*:*<.&:..:.N .Q M \
\)fdf[l.. .:..g'-Qt;.q:;L '4 ' *
- y,', =u ,,,,6~ , g {g?.i,*:.W i
1
) \
.. c . , 3. ~ ,. !, , .
}
Un .:.:
.. b..
& 4)N[#' !.* 4*d A *(.YnNi;~Y'i,:p%'
- fJ .%:,::]g. . %yMr , t s. \,i
&C :~.-
- - 'r ..4 .. .
1 sv., ~..... .w - r4 - . - a
~~'~~
,--a &l .. ,
l' . L %~~'~"F" . J( &g a-.%6 . -:i&u.5)* r 2?e . ' '*. s - q
.w C,.;,~W =4 '".l'.**'.~-
*+
, N..C'5:T:-
?:+{h k.gc Mg,[- ."T':
Yy() [ .: ..%',=*g.hl% :
- 5- .
Q;.3Jid d2, j '-{. 3.V4. '5.* '.
)
P-
?, .
$. LOb.# i s f
- a. a fg4 f i - d=
. .1.; 64*i.;i.'
=
8h h* l
- e r.
=7'.g 4*..-T w .n n .. ; a
) iMff.5.
1
.h y -l.*l B .
A' *
- fl.6 Y .A .*.
* * ' ='
-/..f[,> -
3 , g;D 3le- p '#* w.4 Idc
,.Mr1 M*i
- m. + ' -.u,!
j g Wccy* . '. -i'. ) n k c- d -)- %.;.. e. ~s.,v. .c
..t t -. 3i - n, s
w,[ u ;..! !!.a.t.tah. 9
~.
- .' :j
- p. :.. . . . . .
L g. .,c , , .
;)
=
.t 0 t 0.: ,
t . .
. 3 . .. g . .
.Q Q.. - :,! .
_p . 5 I : ' 3 [k. b
- , i
-3 s _ w. -- . -.. -=- '1
~ . ....:;.u. :.;:.. ., ,.:..~.,-
- .: .~...~..
-. .'..~ .: y n . .
. [. --
,- .s... ....a.. ,...y..t.
,3 >..,,.
-. x,. . ,.c. .:y, y . m .,. ...,d.
~: ,s., . ... ..: .c. :.;. . = .n. g . ?. .. ~ .
. . ; . . .s. .. . . .: , , . :: . x, .:;. y,i ,.,., ... :., , . .- , '., ... . ,-
.w y ,,. r .. -. .
y o w .
..., ) z.. .....
. . v. m. .. . ;;. ..,
,, . .o .e. ,. 4,.
s a.. ...v.... > W. y ..y., *- .
,. .W. .......
.: ( -. .c- 'j. y.'.
,p3
___.'.% - - 4: ' e - _--.. . ) _m . - - - ..__-----.-__.-~_..___--,.._.---.~r.,- ,.--.m.. - .. . -
o ANALYZED FIRES THAT TOTALLY DISABLE EITHER THE AUXILIARY CONTROL BOARD LINEUP. OR T BOARD . o FOR EACH FIRE, DETERMINED WHAT OPERATOR _ ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO SET UP SAFE SHUTDOWN FUN ADVERSE SPURIOUS OPERATIONS 1 l o BASED ON REVIEW 0F OPERATOR ACTIONS, DETERMIN l TO THREE OPERATORS WOULD BE RE0VlRED l o FOR ACB FIRE 1 OPERATOR A - DIESEL ROOM OPERATOR B - SWITCHGEAR ROOM ( OPERATOR C - CONTROL ROOM i o FOR MCB FIRE 1 OPERATOR A - SWITCHGEAR ROOM l 1 OPERATOR B - DIESEL ROOM, TURBINE HALL, BUILDING AUX FEED OPERATOR C - PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING OPERATOR D - MITIGATE SPURIOUS PORV/M l 4
,_ - - - - _ - , , . . , . . . . , , , _,,,.,,-.,~,.--..__.,y .
MAJOR PROPOSED PLANT MODIFICATIONS ( -- - 1. PROVIDE ISOLATION OF ONE DIESEL'S CONTROL AND INDICAT LOCALLY AT DIESEL. ISOLATION TO BE PROVIDED FOR CIRCUITS CRUCIAL TO LOCAL OPERATION OF DIESEL.
- 2. LOCAL CONTROL WILL BE PROVIDED FOR DIESEL GENERATOR l BREAXER, BREAXER 4850, AND CHARGING PUMP BREAXER.
, j 1
3. PROVIDE SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION IN SWI l l l
TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN
,' ', CONTROL BOARD
_j OPERATOR I CORRECTIVE ACTION l ASSUME TRAIN A t i OPERATOR A - SWlTCHGEAR ROOM 1. MANUALLY TRIP TURBINE AFTER LEAVING CONTROL ROOM 2, MANUALLY LOAD SHED NON-ESSENTIAL 480V LOADS 3. START SERVICE WATER PUMP BY MANUALLY CLOSING
- 4. '
POSITION BA-MOV-32, CH-MOV-257, AND BA-MOV-373 FROM MCC-5 TO LINEUP CHARGING TO THE RWST, ( 5. MANUALLY TRIP MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS !
- 6. !
MANUALLY TRIP RCP'S '
- 7. \
ENERG12E MCCE-E TO PROVIDE POWER FOR VENTILATI
- 8. MONITOR INSTRUMENTATION 1
l STEPS 2, 3, 4, 5, E, & 7 - REMOVE CONTROL POWER FIRST STEPS 2, 5, 8 6 - NOT NECESSARY IF LNP OCCURS l O e.
. - _._ .,_- _ ,,,_ ~_ , _ .,- _ - , , , , ._ _ _ _ ___ . . _
/
, l
. 1 OPERATOR B
- 1. MANUALLY CLOSE 'SW-MOV-1
~
ROOM - AND SW-MOV-2 ON WAY TO DIESEL - l
- 2. IN DIESEL ROOM, A.
REMOVE BREAKER CONTROL POWER FROM ALL 5 B OPEN UNNECESSARY LOADS MANUALLY s B. START DIESEL GENERATOR EG2A t. C. MANUALLY INITIATE CLOSING OF DIESEL OUTPUT BREAKER ! BREAKER 4850, AND CHARGING PUMP BREAKER 3, IN THE TURBINE BUILDING, OPEN HICV-1301-1 THRU 4 FOR FEED FLOW ( 4. IN AUX 1LIARY FEED PUMP R00.M, START AUXILIARY FEED PUMP 5. MODULATE STEAM / FEED FLOW AS NECESSARY i 1 i l l l l ' l
OPERATOR C - PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING 1. MANUALLY CLOSE SW-MOV-3 AND SW-MOV-4 IN PAB 2. MANUALLY CLOSE BA-FCV-Il2C TO PREVENT DILUTION 3, MhNUALLY CLOSE LD-V-221 TO BLOCK LETDOWN 4. THROTTLE CHARGING FLOW VIA CH-V-28EA AND CH-OPERATOR D - CONTROL ROOM (SAFETY SYSTEMS L
- 1. DVERRIDE PORV CONTROL 2.
( DVERRIDE ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP CONTROL 3. OVERRIDE TURBINE STOP VALV'E CONTROL
y* . * .
. 3 TOTAL LOSS OF AUXILIARY CONTROL BOARDS ,
i OPERATOR .
.iORRECTIVEACTIONS ..
1 l t . DIESEL ROOM (BUS 8) 1. VERIFY ST2, HPSI, AND LPSI BXRS OPEN AND tidMOVE POWER. 2. ISOLATE DIESEL'S CONTROL AND INDICAT { 3. LOCALLY START DIESEL WITH LOCAL MODIFICATION #1), (SEE PROPOSED START SW (s SWITCHGEAR R'00M 4. REMOVE LOADS (BUSCONTROL 5 DNLY) AND PWRBUS 11E AND4T5. MANUALLY LO '
- 5. 1 REMOVE CONTROL POWER AN.D START SW CLOSING BREAXER. .
- 6. '
VERlFY MCC-5 BREAXER IS CLOSED. . 7. VERIFY A851 15 CLOSED. ' l P O O" " ^ ^ ^ m,._ m, _ . _ _ _ , . , . , _ . , . . , .vv r* --m== =---
c T
.s..
- DIESEL ROOM (BUS 8) it (SEE PROPOSED MODIFICATION #2) 8.
LOCALLY CLOSE DIESEL BREAKER. L
- 9.
. VERIFY THAT LOAD CENTER BREAKER IS CLOSED i
- 10. \
LOCALLY START CHARGE PUMP P-18-1B. LOCAL OPERATIONS' 11. MANUALLY SERVICE AIR COMPRESSORS. CLOSE SW-MOV-1 - AND SW-12. ( MANUALLY CLOSE SW-MOV-3 AND SW-! BUILDING, i
'BY DIESEL ROOM OPERATOR CONTROL ROOM t
- 13. i BRING PLANT TO COLD GHUTDOWN USIN INSTRUMENTATION AND SWITCHGEAR ROO SWITCHGEAR ROOM 1 14 MANUALLY OPERATE BREAXERS'AS N OPERATOR,
, - - - ,.,g,,- - - - - , - . , - -
,n,.w-,
~
e ~
~~
FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS . 10CFR50.48/ APPENDIX R ' Plant CY Disciplines ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING . MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
FIRE ZONE -
- 1. -
Reroute RHR pump ID cable outside this fire zone. A-1A
- 2. ..
Reroute cable for MOV 373 outside these fire A-IAzones. .
- _ _ A-lo '.-
A-IC A-3 5-17 . 3. Cables for one of the RMR pumps will be rerouted' A-ID outside these fire areas. - A-l C '
. .- A-6 5-17 _
- 4. :
MO 192B will be deenergized to eliminate its susceptibility to hot shorts. A-3 ( 3. MOV M2C will be deceergized to eliminate its A-4
~
susceptibility to hot shorts.
- a G
. i
,~. -
. ~
L. . . FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS 10CFR50.48/ APPENDIX R , . Plant: CY Discipliner ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING _ MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
FIRE ZONE
- 6. .
Move one of the station batteries to the south 5-8 end of the switchgear room to provide a minimum - ' of 20' separation. .
' Move one battery charger and DC bus to the south end of the switchgear room to provide a minimum * '
of 20' separation. i - Move two of the static inverters to the south end of the switchgear room to provide a minimum of 20' separation from the other two inverters. ,
~
~
I Install new 480 voit load center for Division B switchgear. 1
- 7. .
Reroute two channeis (one division) of the instru-5-8 - mentation cable identified for safe shutdown for 5-17 Appendix R. The cable to be rerouted origir.ates R-1 . in the control room and terminates in the cable vault. R-2 , 8. Install a one hour fire barrier to required cables.. 5-3 - 5-17 R-1 P-1/P-2 -
- t
~~
,e ,
a c
~ -
FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS 10CFR50.48/ APPENDIX R 8 Plant: CY . Discipliner ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING i A1ODIFICATION
SUMMARY
.F_lRE ZONE -
- 9. .
Add isolation circuitry to safety systems lockout 5-1 display panel to miti PORY's and MSIV's. gate spurious operation of ' j 10. Install remote shutdown Instrumentation panel S-1/R-1 ~ i 11. Modify charging pump control circuit to trip pump S-1 on loss of suction.
! 12. -
4 4 Modiff4.16 Ky breakers for manual operation. S-I - } l : 4 . - l l i .
~
4 l . i . J l 1 - 4 . I 1
m, - ( FIRE PROTECTION MvGIJICATIONS 10CFR30.48/ APPENDIX R ' Plants CY Dixipline CIVIL ENGINEERING - t MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
FIRE ZONE - '
- l. Install curhing. -
g,g g . A-15 ~ ' ' P-1/P-2
=
- e O
e e e e e f . e
- e 9
- e
, D 9
e
- l 1
e l . l . e 9 O e e e O e e
* ';}
4
,c FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS '
10CFR50.48/ APPENDIX R 8 Plant CY Discipliner FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING MODIFICATION
SUMMARY
FIRE ZONE . . .
- 1. .
Seal openings between floor and cabinets to prevent S-1 IIquid spill scepage. - Install a halon suppression system inside maln' ' control boards. .
~
i 2. Install a directionct water spray in hallway. 17 -
- 3. Install radiant energy shields.-
- R-2 4
Instal! carly warning detection. R-3 '
- 5.
Install water curtains around service water pumps. P-l/P-2 . 6. Install fire stops / seals between necessary auxillary 5-1 control panels. i 7 Install fire dampers. - 1 A-3/A-4 1 i i . i
n ... F *
, j v
. . 3 FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICAT!ONS 10CFR50.48/ APPENDIX R ,
Plant: CY Discipline bPERATIONS (PLANT) MODIFICATION SUMM ARY FIRE ZONE - -
- 1. .
Develop procedures to restrict flammable materials 5-1 from control room. .
- 2. .
Develop safe shutdown procedure for a fire in the 5-1 control room. 3. Revise normal operating procedure to require 5-1 inspection of control room for flammable materials. . 4. Lock open breakers listed in W. C. Counsil let ter to 5-t , ' '
~
D. G. Eisenhut, dated March 30,1983. , O O g - . # - G e . b 9
, 9
@ g e
O O
. 8 e
9 e 9 e e # e e
~
, _ . _ . _ _ _ - .}}