ML20203F768

Insp Rept 70-7002/97-15 on 971215-980125.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20203F768
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	02/24/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203F728	List: ML20203F721 ML20203F750 ML20203F768
References
70-7002-97-15, NUDOCS 9803020040
Download: ML20203F768 (10)

Text

. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . - _ . _ . _ _ .

s 1

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket No: 70 7002 Certificate No: GDP 2 l l

Report No: 70 7002/97015(DNMS)  !

United States Enrichment Corporation l Applicant:

t Facility Name: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location: 3930 U.S. Route 23 South P.O. Box 628 '

Piketon, OH 45661 3

Dates: December 15,1997, through January 25,1998 Inspectors: D. J. Hartland, Senior Resident inspector C. A. Blancisard, Fuel Cycle inspector Approved By: Patrick L. Hiland, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials safety

~

9003020040 980224 PDR ADOCK OTOO7002 C .- -PDR

---..u .n, ..-,-.nn n ,,,,,,,,. n -,._..,.n,,.n.-<r--,... ,n ,, m .n . . . ,-..r-n.n.,, . , . . ,n-..+

s EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC Inspection Report 70 7002/97015(DNMS)

This inspection report lacludes aspects of plant operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a six week period of routine resident inspections.

Plant Operatipna e The inspectors noted that the certificatee's corrective actions were inadequate in preventing continued violatbos of nuclear criticality Safety approval (NCSA) requirements.

Several examples of ons violation were identified bf that staft hud the NRC, (Section 01.1)

Maintenance and Surveillance

• The certificatee failed to isolate extended range product (ERP) withdrawal manifold, as required by the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), prior to commencing testing of the smoke detection system. The inspectors concluded the certificatee continued to have problems with TSR implementation due to poor procedural guidance. One violation was identified (Section M1.1) inaineerina e The inspectors determined that selected pipl.s (stem drawings accurately represented the piping irddbtion 89 a facility. (Sectior) EL ";

• The inspectors determined that the certificatee had taken tppropriate action to tapair the heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC) syatem in the X 100 Building. (Section E2.1)

Plant Support

• The inspectors determined that the addition of appropriate emerg,ency procedures to the controlled procedures manuals at the switch houses will assist the staff's ability in correctly responding to emergency conditions. (Section P3.1) 2

_ - . - . -~ _. - - - - - - . -

Report Details

1. Ooorations 01 Conduct of Operations i 1.1 NCSA Imolementation

a. lagpaction Scqpe f8802,Q)

The inspecton, toured the plant facilities to verify implementation of NCSA requirements,

b. Observations and Findinos on January 15,1998, during a routine tour of the X 344 Building, the inspectors observed that several orange dry active waste (DAW) bags were located less than two feet from uranium bearing 18 sample cylinders. The inspectors discovered the condition in a storage area where cylinders were unloaded from drums used to transpon the cylinders.

The area was controlled as a radioactive contamination control zone (CCZ) and the DAW bags were used to hold the packing material removed from the drums. Technical Safety Requirement 3.11.2 requires, in part, that all operations involving uranium enriched to 1.0 weight percent (wt%) or higher U 235 and 15 grams (g) or more of U 235 shall be performed in accordance with a documented nuclear criticality safety approval (NCSA).

NCSA PLANT 018.A01,' Dry Active Waste (DAW)in Waste Generation Areas and in Interim Storage," requires that DAW containers with a capacity of 55 gallons or less be spaced at least two feet edge to edge from uranium bearing material. Contrary to the above on January 15,1998, the NRC inspectors identified that DAW bags located in X 344 Building storage area were spaced,less than two feet from 18 sample cylinders containing uranium bearing material, a violation (VIO 70 7002/97015 01).

The building manager initiated problem report number PTS g8 00346 upon notification of the condition by the inspectors. During followup, the inspectors identified several issues with regards to this observation.

The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), with concurrence from Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS), initially determined that the event was not reportable. This determination was apparently based on surveys taken afterwards that concluded that the contents of the DAW bags were not radioactive. The Inspectors determined that this logic was flawed, as the certificatee was required to control the matertalin the bags as potentially contdminated and comply with the NCSA requirements when working in the CCZ. The certificatee could not take credit, after the fact, for the negative survey results for reportability purposes, After discussions with the inspectors and upon further evaluation, the certificatee made a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> notification based on a loss of a single NCS control.

3 Topical headings such as 01, M8. etc., are used in accordance wrth the NRC standardtzed inspection report outhne contained 6n NRC Manual Chapter 0A10. Ind!vidual reports are not expected to address all outhne topics, and the topical headings are therefore not always sequential.

3

i In response to previous events, from November 25 to December 8,1997, the General Manager conducted all hands briefings to communicate management's expectations regarding implementation of NCS controls. This action appeared to be ineffective in preventing this, and other similar reportable events that were identified by the certificatee during the inspection period. These events included the following:

a. NCSA PLANT 057.001, *Use of Gas Sampling Cart," requires that a minimum two foot edge to edge spacing be maintained between the sampling cart and other uranium bearing material. On January 23,1998, plant staff discovered that two gas sampling carts containing uranium bearing material were opsced less than two feet from each other in the X 333 Building.

b. NCSA PLANT 48.A00, ' Contaminated Metal," requires a two foot edge to eJge spacing horizontal and vertical to other contaminated items (uranium bearing material). On December 31,1997, plant staff discovered two buckets containing contaminated valve intemals were spaced less than two feet from each other. In addition, on January 15,1998, plant staff discovered that bagged valve subassemblies were spaced less than two feet from AG 17 valve in the X 320 Building.

c. NCSA PLANT 66.A02,

• Mop Buckets," requires passing design feature, i.e., slots and holes, in the sides of the bucket for volurre control. On January 15,1998, plant staff discovered an upright, empty mop bucket in a posted contamination area (uranium bearing material area)in the X 344 Building without the required passive design features.

The aforementioned observations are additional examples of Violation (VIO) 70-7002/97015 01 where the certificatee failed to imnlement nuclear criticality safety requirements.

c. Conclusions The inspectors noted that the certificatee's immediate corrective actions appeared to be inadequate in preventing continued violatior a of NCSA requirements. One violation was identified with several examples, 08 Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Closed) IFl 70-1902/96007 01: Evaluation cf Li',uld-filled Cylinder Handling Activities In response to the subject event involving the movement of a tails cylinder by a straddle carrier before its cooldown period was completed, the certificatee implemented corrective actions as discussed in Observation Report 70 7002/97001 for handling liquid cylinders.

The inspectors have monitored activities to ensure proper implementation of the new requirements and have no further concerns regarding this issue. This item is closed.

4

4 I

11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Surveil!ance To: tina

a. lDingetion Scope (88102)

The inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to verify compliance with TSR requirements,

b. Observations and Findinal On December 15, the PSS declared the Extended Range Product (ERP) Station No.1 inoperable for surveillance tecting, but the system was not isolated as required by Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) 2.5.3.4. At the start of test activities, the X-326 Building operations supeNision contacted the PSS for an operability call and gave electrical maintenance permission to start pyrotronics system testing. Upon further review, the PSS determined that the station needed to be isolated to perform the testing; however, maintenance had already cornmenced testing.

During followup, the inspectors reviewed the work package, including surveillance Procedure XP4 OM EM6307,'TSR Maintenance surveillance of Pyrotronics Smoke Detectors System For ERP Station in X 326 Bu., ding," and noted that the system conditions, as wel' as the TSR limiting condition for operation (LCO) actions, required for the testing were not provided. The inspectors noted previous examples of a lack of procedural guidance which contributed to poor implementation of TSRs, as discussed in previous inspection reports:

. In inspection Report 70 7002/97002, the inspectors identified a TSR violation when the certificatee did not enter an LCO action statement for cascade DC control power when surveillance requirements for battery specific gravity were not m'Jt. As followup to this event, the certificatee identified a similar concern with fire protection supervisory alarm testing. The procedures for these surveillances did not address the LCO actions required to perform the testing, as well as actions required when the surveillances failed.

+ in Inspection Report 70-7002/97003, the inspectors noted that the work package used to remove an x joint containing a uranium deposit did not address the TSR LCO requirement for retuming buffer air to an adjacent deposit, which contributed to a violation of that requirement.

Technical Safety Requirement 2.5.3.4 requires, in part, that the affected cylinder and withdrawal manifold be isolated within 15-minutes after declaring both smoke detectors for a withdrawal position inoperable. Contrary to the above, on December 15, the certificatee did noiisolate the withdrawal manifold at ERP Station No.1 within 15-minutes after declaring ':ee ERP station inoperable for surveillance testing of the smoke detection system, a violation (VIO 70 7002/97015 02).

l 5

l l

c. fconclusion The inspectors concluded the certificatee continued to have problems with TSR implementation due to poor procedural guidance.

Ill. Enoineerina E2 Ent'ineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 g.fftgilveness of the X-100 Buildina MVAC Syste.m

a. Insnection Scope (88100)

The inspectors reviewed with a facility engineer and an engineering npervisor the corrective action to repair the X 100 Building HVAC system.

b. Observation and Findinat The inspectors discussed with the X 100 Building facility engineer and an engineering supervisor the condition of the building HVAC system. The engineer and the supervisor explained that the HVAC unit operated adequately based on the condition of the building.

The engineer and the supervisor expla',1ed that the building was not insulated and had single pane windows.

The inspectors noted that the HVAC system components were manufactured in 1935 and installed in the 1950's. The engineet explained that, each summer, the HVAC unit would not operate for periods of time because either the unit broke down or was shut down for environments' concems. The engineer explained that the unit was shut down when t'ie .

chiller's warm discharge water environmentally affected the cooling pond, in addition, the eng!neer stated that when the unit failed, the manufacturer was contacted immediately to fix the unit.

The inspectors leamed that the r.1anufacturer recommended replacement of the chiller in the spring of 1997. At that time, the chiller bearin0 catastrophically failed which resulted in the inoperability of the system. The engineer explained that a temporary chiller was installed and the system was operating within four days of the bearing failure, in addition, the engineer and the supervisor reported that a contract was issued to install a new chiller unit. The new chiller unit was scheduled to operate by the spring of 1998.

c. Conclusion The inspectors determined that the certificatee had taken appropriate action to repair the HVAC system for the X 100 Building.

6 s

E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation E3.1 &ccuracy of Mechanical Ploina System Drawinas

a. Inspection Scope (88101)

The inspectors compared piping layouts on drawings with the piping installations in the facility,

b. Observation and Findinal The inspectors reviewed selected UF6 mechanical piping drawings. The inspectors verified that the UF6 mechanical piping drawings were appropriately classified per the General Plant Q, AQ NCS, and AQ System Boundary Definition Manual, POEF-CM-009.

The selected UF6 drawings were classified is AQ NCS, Drawings classified es Q, AQ.

NCS, and AQ were required to accurately illustrate the actual system installation. The inspectors verified that the selected drawings accurately illustrated the configuration of the piping system installation. In addition, the drawings specified accurately the type, size, and material for pipes, pipe fittings, valves, and test connections used ir the system.

The inspectors also reviewed the accuracy of six drawings associated with Building X 700 cleaning tanks. In discussions with the inspectore, a system engineer explained that the six cleaning tank drawings did not accurately represent the actual system configuration.

The system engineer explained that the systems illustrated in the six cleaning tank drawings were not Q, AQ NCS, or AQ; therefore, detailed accuracy of the six drawings was not required. The inspectors reviewed POEF CM-009 and verified that the six cleaning tank drawings were not classified Q, AQ NCS, or AQ.

c. Conclusion

The inspectors determined that selected AQ NCS piping system drawings accurately represented the piping installation in the facility.

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues E8.1 LClosed) CER 70 7002/97 23: High Condensate Level System autoclave actuation at the X 343 Building.

The certificates determined that the cause of the actuation was the accumulation of fine particles in the condensate strainer. As corrective action, the certificatee increased the screen mesh size and decreased the stralner cleaning interval for Buildings X 342 and X 343 autoclaves. These actions had been previously taken at the X 344 Building, as previous actuations had been isolated to those autoclaves. The inspectors will continue to track tha effectiveness of the certificatee's corrective actions under Violation 70-7002/97003-02.

7

e s I

IV. Plant Suonort ,

P3 Emergency Procedures and Documentation ,

P3._1 povere Weather Response

a. Inspection Scope (8QQ)_Q)

The inspector reviewed the additions of emergency procedures to the controlled procedure manual for electrical switch houses.

I

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors documented in Inspection Report 70 7002/97011(DNMS) that applicable

! emer9ency procedures were not available in electrical switch houses X 530 and X 533. i in response, the certificates added the following emergency procedures to POEF 275,

• Power Operations Procedure Manual":

o Procedure XP2 EP EP1030,' Accountability"

• Procedure XP2 EP EP1031,' Evacuation *

• Procedure XP2 EP EP1042,

• Earthquake Response"

• Procedure XP2 EP EP5030,' Bomb Threat"

• Procedure XP2 EP EP5032,

• Severe Weather Response" The inspectors verified that the above emergency procedures were included in buildings' controlled procedure manuals, in addition, the inspectors noted that the operators were aware of the recently added emergency procedures to the manual.

^ *

c. Conclusiqat The Inspectors determined that the addition of appropriate emergency procedures to the ,

l controlled procedures manuals at the swhch houses will assist the staff's ability !n correctly responding to emergency conditions.

V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection reJutts to membcrs of the facility management on January 28,1998. The facility staff acknowledged the findings presented.

4 8

e PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Lockheed Martin Utility Services (LMUS) ,

'J. B. Morgan, Acting General Manager i M. Hasty, Engineering Manager

'R W. Gaston, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager ,

'C. W. Sheward, Maintenance Manager

'R. D. McDermott, Operations Manager United States Enrichment Corporation J. H. Miller, USEC Vice President Production

• L. Fink, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Manager United States Dersartment of Enerav (DOE)

J. C. Orrison, Site Safety Representative

' Denotes those present at the exit meeting on January 28,1998.

INSPECTlON PROCP.DURES USED lP 88020 Regional Criticality Safety IP 88050 Emergency Preparedness IP 88101 Configuration Control IP 88102 Surveillance Observations  ;

IP 97012 Inoffice Reviews of Written Reports on Nonroutine Events 9

- , _ . _ _ ~ _ _ _ , . _ . _ _ .

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUS 8CD i Opened

70 7002/97015-01 VIO DA N Bags Within Two Feet of 1S Cylinders 70 7002/97015 02 VIO Failure To isolate ERP For Surveillance Testing i Gl919.d l

70 7002/96007 01 IFl Evaluation of Liquid Filled Cylinder Handling Activities 70 7002/97 23 CER Higle Condensate Level System Autoclave Actuation At The X 343 Building Discussed None ,

Certification issues - Closed

, None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

^

CER Certificate Event Report i CFR Code of Federal Regulations

, CCZ Contamination Control Zone

. DAW Dry Active Waste .- 1 ERP Extended Range Product g Gram

. HVAC Heating, Ventilation. and Cooling 4

IFl Inspection Followup Item IP inspection Procedure 2

LCO Limiting Condition for Operation NCS Nuclear Criticality Safety NCSA' Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NOV Notice of Violation NRC Nuclear Reguletory Commission

., PDR - Public Document Room PSS Plant Shift Superintendent TSR Technical Safety Requirement UF. Uranium Hexafluoride VIO Violation wt% weight percent 10

. - . .