ML19351A665

Proposed Tech Specs Re Limiting Conditions for Operation for RCS Pressurizer & Steam Sys Safety Valves

ML19351A665
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	08/01/1977
From:	OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML19351A663	List: ML19351A662 ML19351A664 ML19351A665
References
NUDOCS 8912200330
Download: ML19351A665 (15)

Text

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l 2.0 LIMITTWO CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 2.1 gggg}ge Coolant Pistem (Continued) 2.1.1 Omventle "=ats (Continued)

(S) Maximum steam generator steam side leak test pressure shall not exceed 1000 psia. A minimum temperature of 82*F is required.

ll

) A non-operating reactor coolant pump shall not be started 4

(9) valeas at least one of the following conditions is metr (a) A pressuriser steam space of 605 by volume or greater

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exists, or (b) The ctaan generator secondury side temperature is less than 500F above that of the reactor coolant system cold (b, ,

leg.

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7 When reactor coolant baron concentration is being changed, the pro-essa aust be uniform throughout the reactor coolant system volume h to prevent stratification of reactor coolant at lower borea consen-4 tration which could result in a reactivity insertion. Suffielent

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i* mixin6 of the reactor coolant is ass Ared if ew low pressure enfety injection pump w one reactor coolant pump ir. in operatica. '1%e

~ low pressure safety injection pump wi u circulate the remator eeolent i

system volans in less than 35 ainuten vben operated at rated capacity.

1. The pressuriser volume is relatively inactiven therefore, it will  ;

' tend to have a borce concentration higher than the test of the re-actor coolant systen during a dilution operation. Administrative

-[ procedures will provide for use of pressuriser sprays to asiatata l

j a acainal spread between the baron concentration in the preagiaer and the reactor coolant system during the addittom of borca.

g Both steam generators are reguired to be filled above the low steen c generator water level Mip set point whenever the temperature of s.

the rosetor eoelant 4

• greater than the ensign toegerature of the sbatdeum ocoling system to assure a redundant beat reasval system i

for the reester.

i the design cys11e trenaiente for the reaetor system are givea la R PBAR 8eettaa b.t.t. In edeities, the steen generatore areFloodse desigend v- for a48141ceal eensiticas listee in 78AR 8ection b.3.h.

a ame pressurised eca81ticas on the steen stee assure staiawa tehe -

sheet temperature differential during leak testing. The mia*=== .

( temperature for pressuristag %a steen generator steen stee is 3,

A 708P.

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Permatico at a 605 steen ageoe ensures that the resv' .iag pressure inerease wee 34 ac4 result ta em coorpressurisation, skuld a re-ester ecolaat pump be started when the steen gaaerator seeendary

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p aide temperature is greener %en that of %e BCS onld leg.

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A of the steen gamerstar seemdary side /BCS m._, a _1- co&& leg W to SC 5: se&&cn due to estustica et a reastor ecolant pump.

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3 9.0 N tTIBO CORDITICEB FOR OPERATICS 8.1  % or 5 1 ant erstem (continued) 9.1.6 Pressuriner and Steaa System Safety Valves N

Agplies to the status of W pressuriser and steen system estety ulves.

n Otdestive

's 3A to specify minimum requiremsats pertaining to the pressuriser and

• E, eteen system safety valves. ,

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.,- ,8pecifications To provide adeguate overpressure protection for the reactor ooalent

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system and steam system, the following safety valve requiremsata "

D shall be met:

?' (1) The reactor shall act be ande critical unless the two pree-

,f suriser safety valves are operable with their lift sett adjusted 5 1*;

paia 3)$.gensure valve opening betwoon 9500 psia and A

Vbenever there is fuel in the reactor, and the roseter vessel k

"2' (2) head is installed, a miniaan of one operable safety m19e shall k be installed on the pressuriter. However, when in at least J

the acid shutdova ocadition, safety valve mostles say be cpea  : ,

?- to ecstainment atmosphere durt yg performance of safety valve tests or maintenance to es.tisfy this spectrication.

vbenever the reeeur is in power operation. etahs of the tem Ik ;

(3) steen safety valves stall be operable with their itet settiass between 1000 psia and 1950 paia with a gerease or 3AS at.

t the nominal nameplete est point values. > , e lt N e & Q f1 . .

cola les temperature ehan est be treacht belov 3000P essai ,

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the been pressurteer power vet to the les seteosat, qpemenea me Waitre maan reasereliet aos setpoint termee tha. cold aus temperscare to bease 3IWW j e tal nties (PORea) r s

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'- 9' ena the reester ve6est bees.12;senienea. . L

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m a in , se tas,c.m* t n.fassteente amanymes was sWe pain saa somattee from a eampaete anneyw u.est rees M ~

% i' .testeme gamershoe agg$ witheeh mamantenecas toestor tr.tp 41%e V 1

,L. @ et 1900 agegaua ghe am to ame==ma to trip on a , '

Pressueteer Preemare* trip signal. . ,

to esternise the =d== steen ties, the cair other pressere neuestes

1. k eyesea assumed operaticael is the steen system safety alves. See-",

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servative velaos fee all ayatens gerumstees eenay times ese .

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F W ' A nnu anenPftens Pts opunartos 90 I 31 " Coolant System (Cont.taued) 3.1.6 pressuriser .ad Stoca System Safett Valves (Continued)

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provided to pwtions of the reactor ecolant ayeten which are at the k[ hi8 hest pressee ocasidering pump head, flow pressure drops and 1( elevation heads.

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If no residual heat were removed by any of W amaas available. the amount of steem which could be generated at safety valve lift gree- Thie Q".' aure would be less than half the capacity of ano amfety valve.

specification, therefore, provides adeguate 6efense against over-g;E; pressurisatica when the reaetor is suberitical.

L en Performance of certain enlibration'and mainsemance procedures Should a h"n . safety valves requires removal from the pressuriser.

• ff , matety valve be removed, either operability of the other safety Q valve or maintenance of at least one aossle opea to a*=naphast will

p. assure that sufficient relief capacity is available.

Use of plastie i or etber stailar asterial to prevent the entry of foreign antarial k'$. into atmosphere the opa nosale will act be ocastrued to violate the "open topr g'f . significantly restrict the discharge of nactor ecolaat.

kh The total relief espacity of the tea steen erstem safety valves is 6 At the rated power of ik20 W4. a relief espeett;t

.f~ .' 6.56 x 10 of only k.7 x 10 lb/hrb lb/br is required to prevent overpressurinatica M, of the steam erstem on loss-of-load eem41tions sad eight valves pro.

vide re11oving eapability of k.976 a 106 ab/hr.L3)

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% AH gnment of the power.cperated relief valve low setpoint belge JE 3008F provides sufficient margia, when used in ocajunetien with

't/. Teehnical Specificatica Seettwa 2.1.1 and 8.3, to prevent the

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design basia pressure treasients from eausing am cycrisa.

N ties insident. Limitation of this retuiressat to sehedulee e001=

%f doun ensure.1 that, abou14 emergemey conditions 41 state repid soe1= J down of the reentor ecolant eyesen. Anopershility of the los ten-

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parature overgressure pro 6eetica system voele met prove to be sa

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iaksbiting festor.

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if BrasetA et the remator vassal head providos suffittent esgensica Thus, '

votese to limit any of the design basia pressiere trenaiente. ~

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y'g as adeittenal reli'et espasity ta regaired.

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4.? Batneggg (1) Anicle 9 of the 1968 Amet aniler esa pressure Tessel coes.

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[ (3) Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperst w o is

'; below 8100F and the reactor vessel head is installed, at least two (2) EPSI pump control evitches shall be placed in pull-y[, stop.

,Y Whenever the reactor coolant system cold leg temperatwo is M inslow 1100F and the reactor vessel head is installed, all gti three (3) NPSI pay control switches shall be placed in pall-stop.

<f y, In the event ht no charging pumps are operable, a single NPSI pump any be taken from pull-stop and utilised for borte b ,

acid injection to the core.

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C. g f .L. The normal procedure for starting the reactor is to first heat the

%C resetor coolaat to near operating temperature ty running the reester ooolant pumps. The reactor is then ande critical by withdrawing h CBA's ano diluting borea in the reactor coolant. With this apoo

i of start-up, tbs energy stored in the reactor ooolaat dwing the

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agproach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power

. f. opssstion and therefore all engineered safety features and amatliary 4,:9 cooling eyetens are required to be fully operable. Daring len poser

$ physics tests at low temperatures, there is a negligible escuat of off stored energy in the reactor coolants therefore, an accident aan-fg parable in severity to the design basis accident is not possible W and the engineered safeguards erstems are not required.

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d. The SIRW tank ecstains a aum of 983.000 gallene of usable water contaiaias 1900 ppa berm.1(7 This is suffistent boroa eeneantre-

$pI tion to provide a akuteous margin of 55. Amelusing allemameos for i

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d rode wi%k4rema aat a noe sore e4 97/g .

\ff meertainties, with al}8 a temperatwo of 60sP.\ 'g

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,% the limits for the safety indestaan tank presome see vele assare .'E.

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the requirst amoent of watee taaestaan twing en ene14ent ed. ade ' c %w.

c beset on values coe6' for stus asetemat emanyees. the stataan 316.9 ..

g- tash level oorressemes to a volume et 825 ft3 gas the ==rt=== 38.1\ d

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Sach level oceroepenes to a volume of 885 5 ft3

f ff ab Prior to the ties the reester is broaght erttimal. the volvias'or . .% D 6

9 '. %he safety $ajestica est espropriate system anst he eksobee fer sorrest alis membsamm t valves acabe4. ,

toun oeoling the volving vill be chammed age anot %e proper 3F ,

%y i price to etert-up et the seestar.

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,g The egerable states et the wartoes systems est easponesta la to %e .; ea e p esmometrated by periodie %esta. A large freettom of these teste l6 6 will be performee

• 11e %be reeetor is operattag ta the pDuer Fenge. . , ,,j, -

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i LDETTWO s-viriOIS PGl OPERAT"0B

. ,i 3.0 q 8.3 'rnener em Mina ersten scantinued)

Y 7 If a ecaposent is found to be inoperable, it will be possible la most cases to effect repairs and restore the system to full oper.

t ability within a relativuly short time. For a stagle eosponent to be inoperable does not negate the ability of the systea to per-form its fumation, but it reduces the redundamey provided in the reenter design and thereby limits the ashility to tolerate additlemal

.s equipment failures. To provide naziones n.asur see ht the redundant E oceqponent(s) will operate if reguired to to so, the redundant osus-( posent(s) is to be tested prior to initiating repair of the inoper-able ecaposeat. If it develops that the lacperable component is

-j mot repaired within the specified allowable time period, or a seecad eceponent is the some or related erstem is found to be inoperahla.

• the reactor will initially be put in the hot abutdown canditica te (y provide for reduction of cooling requirements after a postulated loss-of-coolant teoident. This will also permit taproved aseees for repairs in some eases. After a limited time in het abandoua,

'J( if the malfumetton(s) is not corrested, the reactor will be phased in the cold shutdown conditica utilising moraal shutdous and scal-p' , lA down procederes. In the cold shutdova oceditica, release of fissies i$.; products or damage of the fuel elements is not considered possible.

t The plant opere+.ing procedures will require immediate actica to

" effect repairs of an inoperable coeponent and therefore in anet y,' cases repairs will be coupleted in less than the specified alloth-3 able repair times. The limiting times to m pair are intended to ip assure that operability of the ecaponent will M restored preuptly f and yet allow sufficient time to effect repaire using safe and pro- '

hi- per procedures.

. i,.,

4 The requiremsat' for oore cooling in case of postulated loss-of-coolant accident while la the het shutecem ocedition is significantly re-7 deced below the requirements for a postulated lose of-ooolant acei-k dont during power opeastica. Putting the remeter la the not staut-does condition reduees the consegesaeos of a loss-of-emlant ase&-

dent and aise allows more free access to esas of the easiasemed enth.

ty%yl .

gassMis ocuponents la es6er to offset repairs. j. J/

.a e,' N Y Failure to emplete receirs withia M hours of gotag to the het stads ecun eenettica as seesteerea <=Ana=give of a regatrement see amear g' , y maastamanee and, % hare $cee, Sa'soeb' & emme the remator to to be N i.?: pu6 into the eeld stehkan come1%Aes.

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with respeet ta the are ecostas tenesien.ammaanny

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- 'M L the se seen emelo-eneet treak to easured with thea w nt- anfety tajestica espeb&lity which is dettaed as foliose. The entire com- NdM

~ M^ tents of all four safety tajeetica tanks are assunsd to be ava13abas , gyp y - 4 fer easegeasy eere ecoltag but the ecotests of one of the aanka la . .Q .

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{4 aseened to be lost throesh the remetee ecolant system break. ma .

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-T ".# 9.0 p TT90 005D171088 7011 CrgtA s.f s' 8.3 maeraency bore Cooline,arstna tinued) addition, of the three high-pressure safety tajoetica page and tbs

/ 4 two low-pressure safety tajaeties pumps, only one of eseb %Fpe is

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assumed to operaten and also that 255 of their eembined dioeharge rate is lost from the reactor soolant erstem out of the break.

The transient hot spot fuel elad temperatures for the break eines ocasidered are shown ce PBAR Pisures 1-19 (Anneesent so 3b).

'. Placing at least two EPBI pump ecotrol switebee in pell-seap belev g 210*P results in no more than one EPB1 puq mining operable A

,Y single low setpoint PORY is sufficient to prevent en omargressuri-

- - sation, t.aused by operation of one EPSI pump and three eberging pumps, above a cold leg to:sperature of 1108P. placing of alA three

'EPSI pump control evitebes in pull-stop below 1100P results is no

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S EPB7 pumps remaining operable. A sinal 4 low eespoint PORT is suffi-e9ent to prevent an overpressurisation, eaused by operettee of three charging pumps, at any eoid les temperetare.

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1 Technical Specificatico 2.2(1) specittee that, when fuel is La the

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reactor, at' least one flow path shall be provided for boeta maid indvetion to the core. shod

• borie acid injection beecen neeee-m- n sar/, and no charging pumps are operable, operation of a single EPSI rnrep woult provie the required flow path.

1. ; s poterence.

--h. (1) PBAR, Section ik.15 1 Nk (a) PsAR, Section 6.a.3.1

- (3) PsAR, section 14.15 3 (h) PBAR, Appendix E

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DISCULMICR OF PROPOSED CHABCID -

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g Beetion 2.1.1 - Resctor Coolant System Operahle C: __ nrta s

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f( Qae potential cause of reactor coolant systen overpressurisation re-eults from actuation of a reactor coolant pump. In the event that stema e,9 '

generator secondary side temperature is greater than reactor coolant eye-JS

% 'c tea cold leg temperature, actuation of an idle-loop reactor coolant pump results in an energy input to the reactor coolant aFotse. Unless eartata '

s %g precautions are taken, this energy input is potentially severe esseagt to ,

.4 1 eause an overpressurisation incident at low reactor coolmat system ten-

i. i. peratures. ,

.K 94* The proposed change in Technical Specification Beetion 2.1.1 is in-tended to sharply reduce the probability of such an overpressurisatica

,t- incident. Two procedures are proposed to prevent a reactor coolant pump-induced overpressurisation formatim of a pressuriser stema space and

-p limitation of the AT between the stema generator and reactor .elaat eye.

tea. Either of these procedures, when applied per the proposed Teelmaleal y

Spectrication, is sufficient to prevent an overpressurisation imeleset.

Pornation of a steam space in the pressuriser provides a compreas1Me j' oushion in the event of a mass or energy input to the reactor coolant

, erstem. A 605 stean space is sufficient to contrd the largest aattei-Y pated reactor coolant pump-induced pressure transient, without resulting

• ( in an overpressurisation incident. Additional protection from a pressure-relief system is not required.

%f.

F Limitation of the steen generator seconde ~ y side to reactor ecolaat W, erstem AT to 500F is intended to function La rudunetica with the low eetpoint PORY eystem. Either of the two prt Med lod setpoint PORV's b is sufficient to prevent a rosetor coolant pump overpressurisatica inei-

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dent, provided that the AT limit of 500F is observed.

4 Beetica 9.1.6 - Roaster M=t Brates M-iaer nad Steen Bratem Safety T, Batat p.

me proposed ehance to asetton a.1.6(a) 1seroves maintenamee espahi- ,

@f ti lities ty alisulas substitutica et en open safety valve aosale for en egen

& safety valve. The relief espeetty et en open acaale to equal to, er y, greater then, that et en coerehte safety valve.

y '

Mp The poestMe eauses et &ow temperature cosegressure tae14ents were?.'

41eeeesed $a the " plant Speettie Re

, Freneestem ser part cathema unit 1* .port LoumWeaperature estet y. 1977. 3a Overpressere reerceae to this report. .en oveegressure gueteettaa erstema ocasisting or tse low ses-

.y point power-cparatee reliet valves (PCRT's) la sobeemae4 for &aste41abica ,

y eurias the 1977 refeelias antage. Above 3000P. esegnate overpressure Set * '

6 %ection to grorteet ty too high setpatas PCRV's emi two safety relief ? '

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vahvos. Selow 300DP, a ataale low setynist PCRT is eageham or surft.

etently 18mittag all poetenstet preneure tremotesta eLeopt those resalta Sag tron eartata marsty taaeetten systen assassione ena reenter ecolant

$' & ., puse starts.

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.s proposed Technical Specification Sections 2.1.1 and 2.3 provide limit-ations for reactor coolant pusy starts and HPSI pw p availability, respeet-ive3y. When Sections 2.1.1 and 2.3 are used in conjunction with this pro-7.

P posed chance to Technical Specification Section 2.1.6(h), sufficient emp-ability exists to prevent any of the postulated pressure transients fren q'

resulting in an overpressurisation incident.

bl, Section P.3 - Emeraency Core Coolinn System f

• Inadvertent safety injection constitutes one of the most severe potes-The proposed change f taal reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure transients.

p to Technical Specification Section 2.3 is intended to sharply reduce the y probability of such a transient resulting in an RCS ovenressuris.ation

% incident.

f h District plans to install a low temperature overpressure pro-

% 3 tection systen during the 1977 refueling outage. This system will make '

] use of low setpoints on the two pressuriser power :;; i.'ed relief valves y (PORs). Operation of both PORV's provides protection a%:'ainst actuation V; However, the 'A'*ehnical Specia p of two HPSI puses and three charging pumps.

fication was prepared with the conservative assumption that a single PORY og .

tai.s to opus ale.

j;;.

efA A single P0hV provides sufficient overprtssure protection, assinat actuation of two EPS1 pumps and three charging pumps, for RCS cold les a

F temperatures above 2100F. Between 2100F and 1108P, protection is pro-f' of vided against actuation of one NPSI and three charging pumps and belos 1100F, prctection is provided against actuation of three charging pumps.

jlf h proposed Technical Specification will ensure that an inadvertent i' safsty injection actuation would not result ia na RC8 overpressurisasten ri incident.

g.-

M A potential necessity of operating a single EPg1 pump for borte amid '

'.> injection is discussed in the basis. It is believed that failure to geo-i vide borte acid injection when necessary would result la signifieent1F sore severe eoaseguances than would a loe-tesqperature ..e.,r:::f.estica Qw incidmet.

Dk for borie at abou14 he engiucitet that the probability of requiring a EPSI peup asid indestii.a is gutte low. Even if this geratica die result

^ ( in an increase la 908 pressure, aetaaties of both los eetpotat pCET's

' woele prevent an overpressuriaation int 16ent.

7 T--**== ef 7 k,ati---1 bua S - ?natymaatatism b3 . lat=im- and n-imola pronusemies fteW M=. a=5thm**=,

pM*

'F %be Die % ele % intendt %O 1Bstall a low $6ere ovesi ::The system in Gesissee Y n testica erstem during the 1977 refueling outase.i e itry een be tested. gp to the 70RV solencie i ,

Q seek that the actuat ng c r mwithout opening either 30RV ce rea4ertag the overpressure protec g ,Y, tea inoperable. ,W 4 e

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I f,l he proposed reviates to Techsteal Speetticattaa Table 3-3 speetties f'- teettag of %e estutor otrenitry prior to bringing cold leg temperstare

.g l- beloe 3007. Rio procedure vill aneure operability of the metua11ag

.' . ~ oircuitry prior to reaching the pressure /tesperature regime la whiek overa i '

pressure protection is required. Furthermore, this test will be repeated es a acathly beste for period,e in which the cole leg temperature remains

• E below 3000P.

Calthretion of the pressure end temperature channele during eseh re-

[7 1% slims is comeistent with the freguemey utiliset for other critieel 80B

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-#instrunestation.

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1 p/' Testing of I.he PORV's will be in aceordance with the CPf3 in-service j j inspectica program.

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The p-;me Taehnical Spesificatica revistens do not eenetitute en 2.Q'D

'" - E unreviewed sa.'ety gueation as defined in 10 CFR $0 59 y' ~A:'.

g,,'- 1. The probability of occurresse or'the eensequaneos of an aseident er malfume%1em of egeipment important to safety previemely evaluates in the safety analysis report will not be imoreased. Ttse evaluateens A(7 .

in the final safety analysis report are unaffestet by thsee stanges.

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Possibility of an aseident or malfumetica of a different type than

.,3 any esalvated previsaaly in the safety smalysis report will act be

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$8 - pperated relief valve siremitry will be designet to fulfill its

)g function during surve111ames testing. -

6 The margia of safety a defined in the basis for any Teeknical theet.

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y fiention is not reduced. The proposed revisiema de not affeet any .,-

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