ML080170286: Difference between revisions

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Once the decision to shutdown is made, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. The Reactor will trip and the crew will perform Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs). Emergency Diesel Generator 2G003 will trip while SPTAs are being performed (one minute post-trip). Four rods remain stuck out of the core requiring manual boration alignment on the part of the RO in preparation for Bus 2A06 power restoration.
Once the decision to shutdown is made, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. The Reactor will trip and the crew will perform Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs). Emergency Diesel Generator 2G003 will trip while SPTAs are being performed (one minute post-trip). Four rods remain stuck out of the core requiring manual boration alignment on the part of the RO in preparation for Bus 2A06 power restoration.
* The crew diagnoses a Loss of Reactivity Control due to a Station Blackout and enters EOI SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery. The success path will require cross-tying power with Unit 3 and establishing a boration flowpath.
* The crew diagnoses a Loss of Reactivity Control due to a Station Blackout and enters EOI SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery. The success path will require cross-tying power with Unit 3 and establishing a boration flowpath.
*
* The scenario is terminated when Bus 2A06 is energized and boration at greater than 40 gpm is established.
* The scenario is terminated when Bus 2A06 is energized and boration at greater than 40 gpm is established.
* Risk Significance:
Risk Significance:
* Risk important components out of service:            CS P-012, HPSI P-017
* Risk important components out of service:            CS P-012, HPSI P-017
* Failure of risk important system prior to trip:      Loss of Vital Inverters
* Failure of risk important system prior to trip:      Loss of Vital Inverters

Latest revision as of 07:01, 13 March 2020

2007-12 - Draft Scenarios/Outlines
ML080170286
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 01/18/2008
From:
Operations Branch IV
To:
Southern California Edison Co
References
50-361/07-302, 50-362/07-302, ES-D-1 50-361/07-302, 50-362/07-302
Download: ML080170286 (68)
v • d • e


Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: San Onofre Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service
  • Train A High Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-017) OOS
  • Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) OOS Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions.

Critical Tasks:

  • Transfer the Non-Critical Loop (Train A Critical Loop rupture).
  • Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
  • Manually initiate MSIS (Auto actuation failure).
  • Stabilize RCS temperature/pressure following loss of heat removal from the faulted Steam Generator.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 SEIS OBE TS (CRS) Seismic event without Main Feedwater Pump trip.

+ min FW25 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P-140) trip 2 CH04A I (RO, CRS) Containment Pressure Transmitters (PT-0352-1 & 3) fail high.

+ min CH04C TS (CRS) 3 FC05A I (BOP, CRS) Steam Generator E-089 Master Controller Setpoint failure.

+ min 4 CV16A I (RO, CRS) VCT Level Instrument fails low (LT-0226).

+ min 5 CC03A C (BOP, CRS) Rupture of Component Cooling Water line to the Shutdown

+ min TS (CRS) Cooling Heat Exchanger.

6 MS03B M (ALL) Excess Steam Demand Event on Steam Generator (E-089)

+ min inside Containment.

7 RP01C C (RO) Train B High Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-019) start

+ min failure.

8 RPS LP I (BOP) Main Steam Isolation Signal fails to actuate, manual actuation

+ min required.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #1 The crew will assume the watch and maintain steady-state conditions per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations. When turnover is complete, a seismic event will occur. The crew will respond per Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-3, Earthquake. The initial earthquake will cause trip and damage to the linkage of the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications. When plant conditions are stable, two Containment Pressure Transmitters fail high. The crew will ensure that a Containment Spray Actuation Signal has not generated per the Annunciator Response Procedures (ARP). AOI SO23-13-18, Reactor Protection System Failure will require placing one channel in Bypass and the other channel in Trip. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

When actions of SO23-13-18 are complete, a Feedwater Master Controller Setpoint will fail to 58% level. The crew will regain control of feedwater per the ARP and/or AOI SO23-13-24, Feedwater Malfunctions. When the plant is stable, the VCT Level Transmitter (LT-226) will fail low. The crew will secure VCT makeup per the ARP and SO23-3-2.2, Makeup Operations. The RCS Makeup Control System will then be aligned for Manual Blended Makeup mode.

During aftershocks, a Train A Component Cooling Water header rupture is initiated. The crew will respond per AOI SO23-13-7, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) / Saltwater Cooling (SWC). The crew will align Train B SWC & CCW and the ruptured header will be removed from service. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

The EOI entry point is caused by an Excess Steam Demand Event (ESDE) on Steam Generator E-089 inside Containment. The crew performs Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) SO23 1, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnoses an ESDE. The crew will transition to EOI SO23 5, Excess Steam Demand Event and perform necessary actions to stabilize RCS temperature.

The Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) fails to actuate and the BOP will be required to manually actuate MSIS. Additionally, the RO will be required to manually start Train B HPSI Pump P-019.

The scenario is terminated when the crew stabilizes RCS temperature and pressure following pressure following loss of heat removal from the faulted Steam Generator.

Risk Significance:

  • Risk important components out of service: CS P-012, HPSI P-017
  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of CCW Train due to rupture
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: ESDE without MSIS
  • Risk significant operator actions: Transfer the Non-Critical Loop Manually start HPSI Pump Manually initiate MSIS Stabilize RCS temp following ESDE SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SONGS 2007 Facility NRC Initial License Examination Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 1 MACHINE OPERATORS INSTRUCTIONS SETUP IC: Use IC #XXX and see attached Event File for NRC Scenario #1.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 4 of 68 Event

Description:

Seismic Event / AFW Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: EXECUTE IC #XXX and NRC Scenario #1 SETUP file to align components.

ENSURE Control Board Tags are hung on P-012 and P-017.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags #029 (CVCS) and #005-4 (CVCS Ion Exchanger) reflect the scenario boron concentration.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on the RO desk:

- Copy of SO32-5-1.7, Power Operations open to Section 6.4, Guidelines for Steady State Power Operation.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm at 100%:

57A52 - CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYS TRAIN A INOPERABLE Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1.

- Seismic OBE without Main Feedwater Pump trip

- FW25, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P140) trip Indications Available:

61C21 - SEISMIC RECORDING SYSTEM ACTIVATED 61C22 - OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE DETECTED 61C03 - SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL HI/LO 64A26(29) - CCW SURGE TANK TRAIN A(B) LEVEL HI/LO 99B49 - TURBINE VIBRATION HI 99A11 - TPCW SURGE TANK LEVEL HI/LO 53A15 - MFWP TURBINE K006 VIBRATION HI PRETRIP 53A30 - MFWP/TURBINE P062/K006 VIBRATION HI 53B58 - CONDENSATE TANK T120 LEVEL HI/LO 50A54 - CEDMCS MG OUTPUT CONTACTOR OPEN 58A25(35) - BAMU TANK T072 (T071) LEVEL HI/LO 57A(B)16 - RWST T006 (T005 ) LEVEL LO 63B(C)50 - DIESEL GEN 2G002 (2G003 ) STORAGE TANK LEVEL HI/LO

+1 min CREW REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Operating Basis Earthquake and INFORM the BOP CRS AOI SO23-13-3 entry required.

DETERMINE Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P-140)

BOP tripped and REPORT to the CRS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 5 of 68 Event

Description:

Seismic Event / AFW Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS DIRECT performance of SO23-13-3, Earthquake.

CRS DISPATCH an operator to the AFW Pump Room.

M.O. Cue: Once dispatched, WAIT three (3) minutes and REPORT P140 linkage is damaged and pump is tripped.

NOTE: Shift Manager will SHOW Seismic Panel indications to the CRS.

CRS VERIFY the following occurred:

  • Valid activation of any of the following alarms or Seismic Instrument Panel indications:
  • 2UA61C21, Seismic Recording System Activated alarm -

illuminated.

  • Strong Motion Acceleration System Activation (light indication on 2UA-8020, actuates at 0.019g)
  • Ground motion that is readily felt by a consensus of Control Room personnel.

Floor Cue: Shift Manager will REPORT there was ground motion.

CRS DETERMINE Operating Basis Earthquake occurred:

  • OBE alarms (both white lamps: Containment Base OBE BOP AND Containment Operating Level OBE) on Seismic Instrumentation Panel ILLUMINATED.

BOP INITIATE Attachment 1 of SO23-13-3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 68 Event

Description:

Seismic Event / AFW Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

+ 10 min CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications

  • ACTION B - One AFW Train inoperable for reasons other than Condition A in MODE 1, 2, or 3; Restore AFW train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

M.O. Cue: When directed, CLEAR the Seismic alarms on Control Board Panel 61C in preparation for the aftershock.

When SO23-13-3, Attachment 1 is initiated and Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 7 of 68 Event

Description:

Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-0352-1 & 3) Failures Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.

- CH04A, Cont. Pressure Transmitter (PT-0352-1) fails high

- CH04C, Cont. Pressure Transmitter (PT-0352-3) fails high Indications available:

56A08 - CTMT PRESS HI HI ESFAS CHANNEL TRIP 56A18 - CTMT PRESS HI ESFAS PRETRIP 56B06 - PPS CHANNEL 1 TROUBLE 56B26 - PPS CHANNEL 3 TROUBLE

+ 1 min RO REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Containment Pressure Channel failures and RO INFORM the CRS AOI SO23-13-18 entry required.

DIRECT performance of AOI SO23-13-18, Reactor Protection CRS System Failure/Loss of Vital Bus.

DETERMINE failure by observing instrumentation for the RO affected channels and alternate redundant indications monitoring the same parameter.

IDENTIFY Containment Pressure Channel PT-0352-1 and RO PT-0352-3 failures.

PLACE the one of the affected Functional Units in BYPASS RO and the other affected Functional Units in TRIP per SO23-3-2.12, Reactor Protection System.

M.O. Cue: When directed, EXECUTE the following Remote Functions:

RP51 = OPEN (PPS Door Open Annunciator 56B46)

RP5XX = BYPASS ( )

RP5XX = TRIP ( )

Delete RP51 (PPS Door Open Annunciator 56B46)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 8 of 68 Event

Description:

Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-0352-1 & 3) Failures Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO VERIFY the Trip Channel Bypassed Annunciator alarms.

  • 56A29 - PPS CHANNEL 1 TRIP BYPASSED
  • 56A49 - PPS CHANNEL 3 TRIP BYPASSED LOG the bypass and the reason for the bypass in the Control RO Operators Log.

CRS INITIATE a LCOAR or follow guidelines of SO123-0-A5.

+ 10 min CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications

  • ACTION B - One or more functions with two automatic RPS trip channels inoperable; Place one Functional Unit in bypass and the other in trip within one (1) hour.

When one channel has been placed in BYPASS and the other channel in TRIP, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 9 of 68 Event

Description:

Steam Generator E089 Master Controller Setpoint Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

- FC05A, E089 Master Controller Setpoint failure to 58%

Indications available:

52A07 - FWCS SG1 E089 LEVEL DEVIATION 52A13 - FWCS TROUBLE 53B23 - CONDENSATE FLOW BALANCE TROUBLE SG E089 Feedwater Control Valve modulating closed then open SG E089 level lowering

+ 1 min BOP REFER to Annunciator Response Procedure.

RECOGNIZE E089 Master Controller Setpoint at 58% and BOP INFORM the CRS AOI SO23-13-24 entry required.

DIRECT performance of AOI SO23-13-24, Feedwater Control CRS System Malfunctions.

CRS DIRECT use of AOI SO23-13-24, Attachment 1.

BOP Using Attachment 1, DETERMINE that SG E089 level is low.

DETERMINE that SG E089 Master Controller output is NOT BOP rising.

BOP PLACE E089 Master Controller in MANUAL and RAISE output.

Floor Cue: As the Shift Manager, DIRECT the crew to maintain SG levels at 68%.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 10 of 68 Event

Description:

Steam Generator E089 Master Controller Setpoint Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP DETERMINE that SG E089 Feed Control Valve is opening.

DETERMINE that Main Feedwater Pumps K-005 and K-006 BOP speed is rising.

VERIFY SG E089 level is stable at or near program level with

+ 10 min BOP SG E089 Master Controller in MANUAL.

When SG level is restored, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 11 of 68 Event

Description:

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.

- CV16A, VCT Level Transmitter LT-0226 fails low Indications available:

58A04 - VCT LEVEL HI/LO VCT Level Indicator LI-0226A lowering VCT Auto Makeup initiation

+ 1 min RO REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RO DETERMINE that VCT Auto Makeup has started.

CHECK VCT Level indicator LI-0227 on PCS and DETERMINE RO that level is normal (~51% and trending up due to auto makeup initiation).

RO IDENTIFY that VCT level indicator LI-0226 has failed low.

RO PLACE Makeup Mode Selector, HS-0210, to MANUAL.

NOTE: When Makeup Control is placed in MANUAL, the following alarms will illuminate (on short time delay):

  • 58A07 - DEMIN WATER TO VCT FLOW HI/LO (45 sec TD)

DIRECT performance of SO23-3-2.2, Makeup Operations to CRS ensure proper CVCS alignment is achieved.

+10 min CRS REQUEST I&C assistance.

When VCT Makeup is in Manual or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 12 of 68 Event

Description:

CCW Train A Header Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5.

- CC03A, CCW Train A rupture at SDC HX E004 @ 500 gpm.

Indications available:

64A26 - CCW SURGE TANK TRAIN A LEVEL HI/LO (time delay of ~7 min) 64A07 - CCW PUMP TRAIN A DISCH PRESS LO 64A45 - CCW HX TRAIN A OUTLET PRESS LO 64A17 - CCW TRAIN A RETURN FLOW LO 56C58 - SAFETY EQPT BLDG SUMP LEVEL HI-HI (time delay of ~10 min)

+30 sec BOP REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RECOGNIZE lowering surge tank level and CCW Pump BOP discharge pressure and INFORM the CRS AOI SO23-13-7 entry required.

+1 min CRS DIRECT performance of AOI SO23-13-7, Loss of SWC/CCW.

ISOLATE Radwaste by closing 2HV-6465, 3HV-6465, BOP 2HV-6217, and 3HV-6217.

CRS/BOP DETERMINE that the leak is not isolated.

CRS DIRECT placing Train B CCW in service.

START CCW Pump P-026 and VERIFY that SWC P-114 BOP automatically starts.

+3 min CRS DIRECT transfer of the CCW Non-Critical Loop to Train B.

Within ten (10) minutes from loss of flow to the CCW Non-Critical Critical Task Loop and prior to exceeding RCP operating limits, restore flow Statement to the NCL from any available CCW train.

Elapsed Time: _____________

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 13 of 68 Event

Description:

CCW Train A Header Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRITICAL TASK BOP TRANSFER the CCW Non-Critical Loop to Train B.

CRS DIRECT transfer of Letdown HX to Train B.

BOP TRANSFER Letdown HX to Train B.

CRS/RO DISPATCH PEO to investigate flooding alarms.

CRS DIRECT securing CCW Pump P-025.

BOP STOP CCW Pump P-025 and SWC Pump P-112.

M.O. Cue: If directed to rack out breaker for CCW Pump P-024, WAIT 3 minutes and EXECUTE remote functions CC57A (DC to P-024) and CC58A (P-024 Breaker). If directed to rack out breaker for CCW Pump P-025, WAIT 3 minutes and EXECUTE remote functions CC57B (DC to P-025) and CC58B (P-025 Breaker).

DISPATCH PEO to close Loop A CCW Surge Tank Outlet, CRS/ BOP HV-6225.

M.O. Cue: If directed to close HV-6225, Loop A CCW Surge Tank Outlet, WAIT 3 minutes and EXECUTE remote function CC60.

M.O. Cue: If contacted to report status of Unit 3 CCW Surge Tank Level, REPORT that Train A CCW Surge Tank level is stable and unchanged.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 14 of 68 Event

Description:

CCW Train A Header Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

+10 min CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION A - Restore CCW Train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
  • ACTION A - Restore SWC Train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

NOTE: The crew may decide to place CCW pumps P-024 and P-025 OOS, swap CCW Pump P-025 to Train B, and/or place Train A HPSI and CS Pumps OOS. Crew may remove DC Control Power for Train A HPSI and CS pumps to avoid damage due to lack of cooling water.

M.O. Cues: If directed to open the DC power supply breaker for the Train A ESF Pumps, ACKNOWLEDGE the order but do not perform (Time restriction).

If directed to transfer Emergency Chiller E-336 to Unit 3, ACKNOWLEDGE the order but do not perform (Time restriction).

If directed to transfer CCW Pump P-025 from Train A to Train B, ACKNOWLEDGE the order but do not perform (Time restriction).

CRS ENSURE ECCS is not required.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Events 6, 7, & 8.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 6, 7, and 8.

- MS03B, ESDE on E089 inside Containment @ 1.2%

- RPS LP, MSIS fails to actuate

- RP01C, HPSI Pump P019 start failure Indications available:

60A02 - CONTAINMENT HUMIDITY HIGH 60A12 - REACTOR CAVITY TEMP HI 60A03 - CONTAINMENT / FHB TEMP HI 56A35 - CONTAINMENT PRESSURE HI PRETRIP 56A17 - CONTAINMENT PRESS HI ESFAS PRETRIP RECOGNIZE that an uncontrolled cooldown is in progress and

+30 secs RO/BOP INFORM the CRS that a Reactor trip is required.

CRS DIRECT entry into SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • VERIFY Reactor Power lowering and Startup Rate -

negative.

  • VERIFY maximum of one full length CEA - NOT fully inserted.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

o HP and LP Stop and Governor valves - closed.

  • VERIFY both Unit Output Breakers - open.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRS INITIATE Administrative Actions:

  • INITIATE Attachment 4, Worksheet.
  • INITIATE Attachment 5, Administrative Actions.

BOP VERIFY Vital Auxiliaries functioning properly:

  • VERIFY both 1E 4 kV Buses A04 and A06 - energized.
  • VERIFY both 1E 480 V Buses B04 and B06 - energized.
  • VERIFY all Class 1E DC Buses - energized.
  • VERIFY all 6.9 kV and Non-1E Buses - energized.
  • VERIFY one CCW Train - operating AND aligned to Non-Critical Loop (NCL) and Letdown Heat Exchanger.

M.O. Cue: If directed to check Main Steam Safety Valve status, REPORT that all safety valves appear to be seated, with no steam coming from the MSIV roof.

RO DETERMINE RCS Inventory Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE PZR level NOT between 10% and 70% AND NOT trending to between 30% and 60%.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE PZR Level Control System is NOT restoring PZR level.
  • VERIFY Core Exit Saturation Margin 20°F:

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 RO DETERMINE RCS Pressure Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE PZR pressure (WR and NR) NOT between 1740 PSIA and 2380 PSIA AND NOT controlled AND NOT trending to between 2025 PSIA and 2275 PSIA.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE PZR Pressure Control System is NOT restoring PZR pressure.
  • [RNO] ENSURE Normal and Aux Spray valves -

closed.

  • [RNO] ENSURE SIAS, CCAS, and CRIS - actuated.
  • [RNO] If PZR pressure is < 1430 PSIA, then ENSURE at least one RCP in each loop - stopped.
  • [RNO] If RCP NPSH requirements NOT satisfied, then ENSURE all RCPs - stopped.

REPORT that HPSI Pump P-019 failed to start and START RO HPSI Pump P-019.

RO DETERMINE Core Heat Removal criteria is NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE no RCPs should be operating due to CIAS.
  • VERIFY Core Exit Saturation Margin 20°F.

BOP DETERMINE RCS Heat Removal criteria NOT satisfied:

  • VERIFY at least one SGs level between 21% and 80% NR.
  • DETERMINE TC less than 545°F and NOT controlled.
  • DETERMINE heat removal NOT adequate:
  • [RNO] TC - less than 545°F.
  • [RNO] ENSURE SBCS valves closed.
  • [RNO] ENSURE ADVs closed.
  • [RNO] ENSURE SG Blowdown valves closed.
  • E-088 - HV-4054
  • E-089 - HV-4053
  • [RNO] ENSURE Main Steam to Reheaters valves SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 closed.

  • HV-2703 or HV-2704; HV-2721; HV-2751
  • DETERMINE SG pressures - less than 740 PSIA.
  • ENSURE MSIS actuated.

Actions are taken to isolate the SGs prior to either SG blowing Critical Task dry. These actions may include either manual actuation of the Statement MSIS signal, or manual closure of MSIS-actuated components.

CRITICAL TASK Manually INITIATE MSIS.

RO DETERMINE Containment Isolation criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE Containment pressure - greater than 1.5 PSIG.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE Containment pressure > 3.4 PSIG.
  • [RNO] ENSURE SIAS, CIAS, CCAS, and CRIS actuated.
  • [RNO] ENSURE all RCPs stopped.

Within ten (10) minutes of a loss of CCW the affected RCP(s) will Critical Task be stopped.

Statement Elapsed Time: __________

CRITICAL TASK RO

  • STOP all RCPs due to CIAS.
  • VERIFY Containment Area Radiation Monitors energized AND NOT alarming or trending to alarm.
  • VERIFY Secondary Plant Radiation Monitors energized AND NOT alarming or trending to alarm.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 DETERMINE Containment Temperature, Pressure and RO Combustible Gas Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE Containment average temperature > 120°F.
  • DETERMINE Containment pressure > 1.5 PSIG.
  • [RNO] ENSURE proper functioning of the Normal Containment Cooling.
  • [RNO] ENSURE at least one Containment Dome Air Circulator operating.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE Containment pressure > 3.4 PSIG.
  • [RNO] ENSURE all RCPs stopped.
  • [RNO] ENSURE all available Containment Emergency Cooling Units operating.
  • DETERMINE Containment pressure > 14 PSIG.
  • [RNO] ENSURE CSAS actuated.

+15 min CRS DIAGNOSE event in progress:

  • DETERMINE all safety function criteria are NOT met per Attachment 4, Worksheet.
  • [RNO] COMPLETE Attachment 1, Recovery Diagnostics.
  • [RNO] DIAGNOSE event as ESDE on SG E089.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE all RCPs stopped.
  • DIRECT initiating steps 12 through 15.

BOP INITIATE steps 12 through 15.

Examiner Note: When SG E089 reaches dryout conditions the crew should initiate FS-30, Establish Stable RCS Temperature during ESDE.

DIRECT performance of SO23-12-5, Excess Steam Demand CRS Event.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

  • RECORD time of EOI entry.

CRS VERIFY ESDE diagnosis.

  • INITIATE SO23-12-10, Safety Function Status Checks.
  • INITIATE Foldout Page.
  • DIRECT performance of FS-7, SI Throttle/Stop.
  • DIRECT performance of FS-3, Monitor Natural Circulation.
  • DIRECT performance of Attachment 22, Non-Qualified Loads Restoration.
  • DIRECT performance of FS-30, Stabilize RCS Temperature.
  • DIRECT performance of Attachment 28, Isolation of SG with ESDE.
  • VERIFY ESDE diagnosis using Figure 1, Break Identification Chart.

M.O. Cue: If directed to sample SGs, WAIT 10 minutes and then REPORT that E088 and E089 both have activity near background, and normal boron levels. If the SG sample valves are closed, REPORT that you are unable to establish sample flow.

CRS INITIATE Administrative Actions.

  • NOTIFY Shift Manger/Operations Leader of entry into SO23-12-5, Excess Steam Demand Event.
  • IMPLEMENT Placekeeper.

RO VERIFY ESF actuation.

  • VERIFY SIAS actuation required.
  • PZR pressure less than SIAS setpoint.

OR

  • Containment pressure > 3.4 PSIG.
  • ENSURE the following actuated:

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

  • SIAS / CCAS / CRIS RO/BOP VERIFY SIAS, CCAS, CRIS actuated.

CRS RECORD time of SIAS.

BOP STOP unloaded Diesel Generators.

INITIATE SO23-12-11, Attachment 22, Non-Qualified Load BOP Restoration.

M.O. Cue: When directed to restore non-qualified loads, WAIT 2 minutes, then EXECUTE ED85, Non-Qualified Loads Restoration. INFORM the Control Room that you have restored non-qualified loads.

BOP VERIFY MSIS actuation required and ENSURE MSIS actuated.

  • SG pressure < 740 PSIA.

RO VERIFY CIAS actuation required and ENSURE CIAS actuated.

  • Containment pressure > 3.4 psig.
  • CFMS pages 342 and 343.

RO VERIFY SIAS actuated.

RO ESTABLISH Optimum SI Alignment.

  • ESTABLISH two train operation:
  • All Charging Pumps operating.
  • One HPSI and one LPSI per train operating.
  • All Cold leg flow paths aligned.
  • VERIFY SI flow required:
  • SI flow indicated OR RCS pressure >1250 psia.

OR

  • VERIFY FS-7, Verify SI Throttle/Stop criteria satisfied.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 BOP CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV Bypasses:

  • HV-8205 for E088
  • HV-8204 for E089
  • ENSURE MSIV Bypasses - closed:
  • HV-8203 for E088
  • HV-8202 for E089 CREW PREVENT Pressurized Thermal Shock.
  • INITIATE FS-30, Establish Stable RCS temperature during ESDE.

NOTE: The following steps from FS-30 will be performed when conditions are met. Both the ESDE procedure and the ESDE Foldout Page direct performance of these steps.

+20 min VERIFY SG least affected by ESDE, SG E088, NOT isolated BOP for SGTR.

BOP VERIFY most affected SG level E089 - less than 50% WR.

BOP PERFORM the following on least affected SG E088:

  • TRANSFER ADV to Auto/Modulate.
  • MAINTAIN least affected SG pressure 200 PSIA above most affected SG pressure.

BOP VERIFY SG dryout on most affected SG E089:

  • RCS Tcold - stable or rising, OR
  • SG pressure - 200 PSIA SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Within ten (10) minutes of loss of heat removal from the affected SG, transfer the primary to secondary heat sink to the least affected SG. Actions shall include the following:

Critical Task

  • Steaming of the least affected (non-ESDE) SG to Statement maintain Psat for lowest RCS Tc ;
  • Manipulation of feedwater controls to maintain SG level of 40% to 80% NR.

CRITICAL TASK BOP STABILIZE least affected SG E088 pressure:

  • VERIFY ADV on SG E088 in Auto/Modulate.
  • MAINTAIN Psat for lowest RCS Tc on SG E088.
  • STABILIZE AFW flow on SG E088.

VERIFY RCS pressure is to the right of the Appendix E curve RO on Attachment 29, Post-Accident Pressure/Temperature Limits.

OPERATE feedwater on SG E088 to maintain level between BOP 40% and 80% NR.

Examiner Note: The following steps are for EOI SO23-12-11, Attachment 28, Isolation of SG with ESDE.

BOP DETERMINE E089 is the most affected SG.

NOTIFY Shift Manager / Operations Leader of the SG most CRS affected by the ESDE.

VERIFY SG least affected by ESDE available for heat removal BOP and not affected by SGTR.

Critical Task Isolate the most affected Steam Generator (ESDE).

Statement CRITICAL TASK BOP ISOLATE SG E089. CLOSE/STOP the following components:

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

  • ADV HV-8421
  • MFIV HV-4052
  • AFW valves HV-4715, HV-4731
  • Steam to AFW P-140 HV-8200
  • SG Blowdown Isolation HV-4053
  • SG Water Sample Isolation HV-4057
  • Electric AFW Pump P-141

+30 min BOP ENSURE ADV on SG E089 selected to MANUAL.

When Steam Generator E089 is isolated, TERMINATE the scenario.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: San Onofre Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • 69% power - RCS Boron is 956 ppm (by sample)
  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service
  • Train A High Pressure Safety Injection Pump (P-017) OOS
  • Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) OOS Turnover: Dilution and power ascension in progress at 10% per hour.

Critical Tasks:

  • Restore flow to the CCW Non-Critical Loop (RCPs operating).
  • Restore power to at least one 1E 4kV Bus.
  • Establish Reactivity Control (> 2 FLCEAs Not Fully Inserted & No SIAS).

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 R (RO) Dilution and power ascension in progress at 10% per hour.

+ min N (BOP, CRS) 2 RC24A I (RO, CRS) Pressurizer Spray Valve (PV-0100A) fails open.

+ min TS (CRS) 3 CH01 I (BOP, CRS) Train A & B Toxic Gas Isolation Signals due to rail car chlorine

+ min TS (CRS) tank rupture.

4 ED03A C (ALL) Bus 2A04 Overcurrent lockout.

+ min TS (CRS) 5 TU08 M (ALL) Turbine trip.

+ min PG24 Loss of Offsite Power.

PG57 Loss of SDG&E Switchyard.

6 RD8802 C (RO) Four fully stuck CEAs; Loss of Reactivity Control.

+ min RD8902 RD9002 RD9102 7 EG08B C (BOP) Emergency Diesel Generator (2G003) mechanical failure.

+ min Station Blackout.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #2 The crew will assume the watch with a dilution and power ascension in progress per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations.

When the power change is underway, the Pressurizer Spray Valve will fail to 80% open. The crew will respond and stabilize primary plant using Annunciator Response Procedures (ARP) and Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

After the crew has removed power from the Pressurizer Spray Valve, a chlorine tank will rupture on a passing rail car and initiate Train A & B Toxic Gas Isolation Signals (TGIS). The crew will be required to complete the TGIS alignment due to relay failure per SO23-3-2.22, Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. The CRS will enter AOI SO23-13-1, Local Area Evacuation and also be required to evaluate Technical Specifications.

This is followed by a bus fault and lockout on 1E Bus 2A04. The crew will refer to AOI SO23-13-26, Loss of Power to an AC Bus. Actions include transferring the Non-Critical Loop to Train B and stopping and placing the Train A Emergency Diesel Generator in Maintenance Lockout. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications and determine that a plant shutdown is required.

Once the decision to shutdown is made, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. The Reactor will trip and the crew will perform Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs). Emergency Diesel Generator 2G003 will trip while SPTAs are being performed (one minute post-trip). Four rods remain stuck out of the core requiring manual boration alignment on the part of the RO in preparation for Bus 2A06 power restoration.

  • The crew diagnoses a Loss of Reactivity Control due to a Station Blackout and enters EOI SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery. The success path will require cross-tying power with Unit 3 and establishing a boration flowpath.
  • The scenario is terminated when Bus 2A06 is energized and boration at greater than 40 gpm is established.

Risk Significance:

  • Risk important components out of service: CS P-012, HPSI P-017
  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of Vital Inverters
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: SBO with Loss of Reactivity Control
  • Risk significant operator actions: Establish Non-Critical Loop CCW flow Vital AC power restoration Establish boration flowpath SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SONGS 2007 Facility NRC Initial License Examination Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 2 MACHINE OPERATORS INSTRUCTIONS SETUP IC: Use IC #XXX and see attached Event File for NRC Scenario #2.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 28 of 68 Event

Description:

Dilution and Power Ascension in Progress at 10%/hr Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: EXECUTE IC #XXX and NRC Scenario #2 SETUP file to align components.

ALIGN both Pressurizer Spray Valves to Automatic.

ENSURE Control Board Tags are hung on P-012 and P-017.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags #029 (CVCS) and #005-4 (CVCS Ion Exchanger) reflect the scenario boron concentration.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on the RO desk:

- Copy of SO23-5-1.7 open to Step 6.3.14, 50-80%

Reactor Power.

- Copy of SO23-3-2.2 with Steps 6.6.1 through 6.6.5 checked off.

- Copy of SO23-3-1.10 open to Section 6.2, Forcing Pressurizer Sprays.

VERIFY that dilution is in progress then PLACE in FREEZE.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm at 70%:

57A52 - CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYS TRAIN A INOPERABLE DIRECT performance of SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations,

+1 min CRS SO23-3-2.2, Makeup Operations, and SO23-10-1, Main Turbine Operations.

RO VERIFY Batch Counter and Makeup Integrator settings.

RO VERIFY dilution valve alignment.

  • FV-9253 open and FIC-0210X in AUTO.
  • HS-0210 selected to DILUTE.

RO VERIFY Tcold changing as dilution progresses.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 29 of 68 Event

Description:

Dilution and Power Ascension in Progress at 10%/hr Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior MAINTAIN Tcold within required band by raising Main

+15 min BOP Generator load using HS-2210, Main Turbine Speed Load Control to RAISE.

When power has been raised 3 to 5%, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 30 of 68 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.

- RC24A @ 80%, Pressurizer Spray Valve fails open Indications available:

50A14 - PZR PRESS HI/LO (+90 seconds from event initiation)

NOTE: Because both Spray Valves will be open during the power ascension, PV-100A is failed 80% open. This is equivalent to a 40% open failure when not forcing sprays with all heaters energized.

+2 min RO REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RECOGNIZE PZR Pressure Control failure and INFORM the RO CRS AOI SO23-13-27 entry required.

DIRECT performance of SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure CRS and Level Malfunction.

RO START PZR Backup and Proportional Heaters.

DETERMINE Pressurizer Pressure channel is NOT between RO/CRS 2225 and 2275 psig.

RO/CRS DETERMINE Pressurizer Pressure is NOT stable.

OBSERVE PV-0100B, Pressurizer Spray Valve from Loop 1B, RO is failed ~60% open.

M.O. Cue: Closely MONITOR pressure and REDUCE malfunction RC24A to 60%

once identified (this will allow pressure to stabilize and avoid a plant trip).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 31 of 68 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Spray Valve Fails Open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DIRECT an ARO to fail closed PV-0100A, PZR Spray Valve, by CRS removing the connector block at Cabinet L-138, SPEC 200 Power Supply Cabinet, Nest 2, Slot 10. (HC-0100A)

M.O. Cue: REDUCE malfunction RC24A to 0% and REPORT to the Control Room that the connector block at Cabinet L-138, SPEC 200 Power Supply Cabinet, Nest 2, Slot 10 was removed.

RO/CRS DETERMINE Pressurizer pressure is recovering.

RO VERIFY the Pressurizer Pressure signal has not failed high.

VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure Control System is operating RO properly in automatic.

VERIFY Pressurizer Spray was not initiated with delta RO temperature > 180°F.

+10 min CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION A - Restore Pressurizer pressure to within limit within two (2) hours.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 32 of 68 Event

Description:

Toxic Gas Isolation Signal Due to Chlorine Tank Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

- CH01, Trains A & B Toxic Gas Isolation Signal Indications Available:

60B12 - TGIS - A ACTIVATION 60B20 - TGIS - B ACTIVATION

+30 sec BOP REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RECOGNIZE TGIS actuation and INFORM the CRS ARP and BOP AOI SO23-13-1 entry required.

M.O. Cue: REPORT to the Control Room as the Security Shift Supervisor that a rail car chlorine tank has ruptured.

Floor Cue: If asked, REPORT a faint smell of chlorine in the Control Room.

CRS DIRECT performance of SO23-13-1, Local Area Evacuation.

EVALUATE necessity of Control Room personnel donning self-CRS contained breathing apparatus.

ENSURE secured 2/3MA-207, Control Room Emergency Vent BOP Supply Unit Train A.

ENSURE closed 2/3FV-9761, Control Room Emergency Vent BOP Supply Train A.

ENSURE secured 2/3MA-206, Control Room Emergency Vent BOP Supply Unit Train B.

ENSURE closed 2/3FV-9742, Control Room Emergency Vent BOP Supply Train B.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 33 of 68 Event

Description:

Toxic Gas Isolation Signal Due to Chlorine Tank Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS INITIATE a local area evacuation using public address system.

NOTIFY Emergency Preparedness to provide assistance in CRS isolating toxic gas source.

DIRECT initiation of S023-3-2.22, Engineered Safety Features CRS Actuation System Operation, Attachment for CRIS/TGIS Actuation Verification.

PERFORM S023-3-2.22, Attachment for CRIS/TGIS Actuation

+3 min BOP Verification.

DISPATCH an operator to ensure the Control Room Envelope BOP Doors are closed.

DETERMINE E-418, Control Room Emergency Air BOP Conditioning Unit is not started and manually START unit.

REPORT to the CRS that the Control Room Emergency Air BOP Conditioning Unit was manually started.

CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • LCO 3.7.11.A, Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS).
  • ACTION A - One CREACUS train inoperable; Restore CREACUS train to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

When Technical Specifications have been addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 34 of 68 Event

Description:

Bus 2A04 Overcurrent Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.

- ED03A, Bus 2A04 overcurrent Indications Available:

63B05 - 2A04 VOLTAGE LO 63B06 - 2B04 VOLTAGE LO 63B25 - 2A04 SUPPLY BREAKER 2A0418 OC

+30 sec RO/BOP REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RECOGNIZE low bus voltage and INFORM the CRS AOI RO/BOP SO23-13-26 entry required.

DIRECT performance of SO23-13-26, Loss of Power to an AC CRS Bus.

CRS DIRECT aligning of Train B CCW and SWC.

Within ten (10) minutes from loss of flow to the CCW Non-Critical Critical Task Loop and prior to exceeding RCP operating limits, restore flow Statement to the NCL from any available CCW train.

Elapsed Time: _____________

+1 min BOP START the Train B CCW Pump.

CRITICAL TASK

  • TRANSFER the Non-Critical Loop to Train B.
  • TRANSFER the Letdown Heat Exchanger to Train B.

RO START Charging Pump P-192.

VERIFY loss of the 1E 4 kV Bus is NOT due to a fire in the 1E BOP Switchgear Room.

DETERMINE overcurrent annunciators are alarming on Bus BOP 2A04.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 35 of 68 Event

Description:

Bus 2A04 Overcurrent Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DIRECT initiation of SO23-6-9, 6.9 kV, 4 kV and 480V Bus and CRS Feeder Faults, to return Bus 2A04 to service.

DIRECT initiation of Equipment Actions for Loss of the 1E 4 kV CRS Bus 2A04.

STOP G002 Diesel Generator by placing in MAINTENANCE

+5 min BOP LOCKOUT.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, DIRECT performance of SO23-3-3.23, CRS Attachment for AC Sources Verification, for both Units.

SELECT HS-0210, Makeup Mode Selector Switch to MANUAL RO and PLACE a Caution Tag at the switch to prevent inadvertent dilution.

CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • LCO 3.0.3, Due to loss of two 1E Battery Chargers.
  • ACTION - Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, place the Unit in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

M.O. Cue: When directed, EXECUTE the following Remote Functions:

RP51 = OPEN (PPS Door Open Annunciator 56B46)

RP52C = BYPASS (Channel A Hi Local Power)

RP52D = BYPASS (Channel A Low DNBR)

Delete RP51 (PPS Door Open Annunciator 56B46)

RO VERIFY the Trip Channel Bypassed Annunciator alarms.

  • 56A29 - PPS CHANNEL 1 TRIP BYPASSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 36 of 68 Event

Description:

Bus 2A04 Overcurrent Lockout Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS DIRECT Bypassing Channel A DNBR and LPD trips.

+15 min DIRECT setting CEAC 2 INOP Flags in all CPCs by changing CRS each CPC Addressable Constant Point ID 062 to 2.

When Technical Specifications have been addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Events 5, 6, and 7.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 5, 6, and 7.

- TU-08, Turbine Trip

- PG24, Loss of Offsite Power

- RD8802/8902/9002/9102, Stuck CEAs

- EG08B, 2G003 EDG Mechanical Failure (+1 minute)

- PG57, Loss of SDGE Switchyard (+5 minutes)

Indications available:

Numerous Loss of Offsite Power related alarms

+10 secs RECOGNIZE Reactor trip and Loss of Offsite Power and RO/BOP INFORM the CRS SO23-12-11 entry required.

DIRECT performance of SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip CRS Actions.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • VERIFY Reactor Power lowering and Startup Rate -

negative.

  • VERIFY maximum of one full length CEA - NOT fully inserted.

NOTE: The following Critical Task cannot be performed until power is available later in the scenario.

CRITICAL [RNO] When available, COMMENCE emergency boration at RO TASK greater than 40 gpm.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

o HP and LP Stop and Governor valves - closed.

  • VERIFY both Unit Output Breakers - open.

CRS INITIATE Administrative Actions:

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

  • INITIATE Attachment 4, Worksheet.
  • INITIATE Attachment 5, Administrative Actions.

BOP DETERMINE Vital Auxiliaries NOT functioning properly:

  • DETERMINE both 1E 4 kV Buses A04 and A06 de-energized.
  • [RNO] PLACE DG G003 in Maintenance Lockout.
  • [RNO] INITIATE Attachment 2, Diesel Generator Failure Follow-Up Actions for Bus 2A06.
  • DETERMINE both 1E 480 V Buses B04 and B06 de-energized.
  • VERIFY all Class 1E DC Buses - energized.
  • DETERMINE all 6.9 kV and Non-1E Buses de-energized.
  • [RNO] ENSURE MSIVs - closed.
  • [RNO] OPERATE any ADVs to maintain 1000 PSIA.
  • DETERMINE CCW Train NOT operating and NOT aligned to Non-Critical Loop (NCL) and Letdown Heat Exchanger.

M.O. Cue: If directed to investigate 2G003, WAIT 3 minutes and REPORT it is shutdown and there is a large amount of oil on the DG Room floor.

RO DETERMINE RCS Inventory Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE PZR level between 10% and 70% and NOT trending to between 30% and 60%.
  • VERIFY Core Exit Saturation Margin - greater than or equal to 20°F:

RO DETERMINE RCS Pressure Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE PZR pressure (WR and NR) between 1740 PSIA and 2380 PSIA and NOT controlled AND trending to between 2025 PSIA and 2275 PSIA.

RO DETERMINE Core Heat Removal criteria is NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE no RCPs are operating.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

  • VERIFY Core Exit Saturation Margin 20°F.

BOP DETERMINE RCS Heat Removal criteria NOT satisfied:

  • VERIFY both SGs level - greater than 21% NR.
  • VERIFY both SGs level - less than 80% NR.
  • VERIFY heat removal adequate:
  • TC - less than 555°F.
  • SG pressures - approximately 1000 PSIA.

RO VERIFY Containment Isolation criteria satisfied:

  • VERIFY Containment pressure - less than 1.5 PSIG.
  • DETERMINE some Containment Area Radiation Monitors energized and NOT alarming or trending to alarm.
  • DETERMINE some Secondary Plant Radiation Monitors energized and NOT alarming or trending to alarm.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 DETERMINE Containment Temperature, Pressure and RO Combustible Gas Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE Containment average temperature - greater than 120°F.
  • [RNO] ENSURE proper functioning of Normal Containment Cooling.
  • VERIFY Containment pressure - less than 1.5 PSIG.

+15 min CRS DIAGNOSE Event in Progress:

  • DETERMINE all safety function criteria are NOT met per Attachment 4, Worksheet.
  • [RNO] COMPLETE Attachment 1, Recovery Diagnostics.
  • [RNO] DIAGNOSE loss of Reactivity Control and Station Blackout.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE all RCPs stopped.
  • DIRECT initiating steps 12 through 15.

ACO INITIATE steps 12 through 15.

M.O. Cue: If SC&E GCC is contacted for grid status, REPORT that cause of grid loss is unknown and field crews are investigating. No estimate on time to restore a line.

M.O. Cue: If Unit 3 status is requested, REPORT that Bus 3A06 is energized from EDG 3G003 and Bus 3A04 is energized from EDG 3G002.

CRS DIRECT performance of SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery.

M.O. Cue: When SO23-12-9 is initiated, CALL as SDG&E GCC and REPORT that SONGS Switchyard appears to have several faults and will not be available until a crew can be dispatched to determine the problem.

CRS VERIFY Functional Recovery diagnosis:

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

  • INITIATE SO23-12-10, Safety Function Status Checks.
  • INITIATE Foldout Page.
  • DIRECT performance of FS-3, Monitor Natural Circulation.
  • DIRECT performance of SO23-12-11, Attachment 19, Non-1E DC Load Reduction.
  • DIRECT performance of SO23-12-11, Attachment 20, Class1E Battery Load Reduction.
  • DIRECT performance of FS-18, Secondary Plant Protection.
  • DIRECT performance of SO23-12-11, Attachment 24, Supply 1E 4 kV Bus with Opposite Unit Diesel.
  • DIRECT performance of SO23-12-11, Attachment 6, Diesel Generator Failure Follow-up Actions.
  • DIRECT Chemistry to sample both SGs for radioactivity and boron.

M.O. Cue: If directed to sample SGs, WAIT 10 minutes and REPORT that E088 and E089 sample lines were frisked, and both have activity near background. If the SG sample valves are closed, REPORT that you are unable to establish sample flow.

M.O. Cue: When directed to initiate Non-1E DC Load Reduction, ACKNOWLEDGE and STATE you will report when complete.

M.O. Cue: When directed to initiate Class 1E Battery Load Reduction, ACKNOWLEDGE and STATE you will report when complete.

DIRECT performance of SO23-12-11, Attachment 24, CRS Supplying 1E 4 kV Bus with Opposite Unit Diesel.

CRS DETERMINE Train B is available.

OBTAIN approval of Shift Manager to cross connect Train B CRS using 10 CFR 50.54(x) on both units to supply 1E 4 kV Bus 2A06 with the opposite unit Diesel Generator.

CRS REQUEST SM initiates NRC notification within one hour SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 regarding actions per this attachment.

NOTIFY opposite unit SRO that automatic sequencing of ESF CRS loads onto opposite Unit 1E 4kV Bus 3A06 will be blocked.

ENSURE 1E 4kV Bus Tie breaker AUTO/MANUAL transfer BOP switches selected to MANUAL.

BOP ENSURE 1E 4kV Bus Tie breakers open.

  • 2A0619 and 3A0603.

ENSURE 2G003 Diesel Generator selected to MAINTENANCE BOP LOCKOUT.

DIRECT performance of Train B Diesel Generator Cross-Tie CRS Permissive switch alignment on 50' Elevation.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CONTACT the PPEO and INITIATE Unit 2 Train A Diesel BOP Generator Cross-Tie Permissive switch alignment on 50' Elevation.

  • VERIFY feeder faults NOT indicated by relay flags on:
  • 2A0616 - Unit Aux Transformer
  • 2A0618 - Reserve Aux Transformer
  • 2A0619 - 2A06 Bus Tie
  • 2A0613 - 2G003 EDG M.O. Cue: When asked, REPORT no feeder faults on breakers.

DIRECT the PPEO to SELECT both Unit 2 Train B Diesel BOP Generator Cross-Tie Permissive switches on Fire Isolation Panel 2L-413 to 50.54X.

  • 2HS-5054XA2 and 2HS-5054XB2 M.O. Cue: When directed, PERFORM remote functions EG62A and EG62B and REPORT that the Unit 2 50.54X switches have been aligned.

CONTACT the PPEO and INITIATE Unit 3 Train B Diesel BOP Generator Cross-Tie Permissive switch alignment on 50' Elevation.

  • VERIFY feeder faults NOT indicated by relay flags on:
  • 3A0603 - 3A06 Bus Tie M.O. Cue: When asked, REPORT no feeder faults on breakers.

DIRECT the PPEO to SELECT both Unit 3 Train B Diesel BOP Generator Cross-Tie Permissive switches on Fire Isolation Panel 3L-413 to 50.54X.

  • 3HS-5054XA2 and 3HS-5054XB2 M.O. Cue: When directed PERFORM remote functions EG62C and EG62D and REPORT that the Unit 3 50.54X switches have been aligned.

BOP VERIFY 3G003 Diesel Generator loading less than 3.4 MW.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 BOP VERIFY Bus 2A06 NOT energized.

BOP VERIFY Unit 2 overcurrent/ground alarms reset.

  • 63C15 SUPPLY BKR A0616 OC
  • 63C25 SUPPLY BKR A0618 OC VERIFY 1E DC bus voltages 2D2 and 3D2 greater than BOP 108 VDC.

M.O. Cue: When asked, REPORT 3D2 voltage at 129 VDC.

BOP ESTABLISH final Train B configuration.

BOP ENSURE 1E 4kV Bus 2A06 supply breakers open.

  • 2A0616 - Unit Aux Transformer
  • 2A0618 - Reserve Aux Transformer
  • 2A0613 - 2G003 EDG BOP ENSURE 1E 4kV Bus A06 tie breakers open.
  • 2A0619 - 2A06 Bus Tie
  • 3A0603 - 3A06 Bus Tie BOP ENSURE 1E 4kV Bus 2A06 load breakers open.
  • Emergency Chillers
  • SWC Pumps BOP VERIFY Train B Diesel Generator Cross-Tie Permissive SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 switches on both units are in the 50.54X position..

BOP CLOSE Unit 3 Bus Tie breaker 3A0603.

VERIFY Unit 3 Diesel Generator 3G003 output breaker remains BOP closed.

Restore power to at least one 1E 4kv Bus prior to any of the following:

Critical Task

  • Loss of the affected EDG on mechanical fault due to Statement operation with no cooling (i.e., no EDG auxiliaries), or
  • Battery depletion and loss of associated 1E 125VDC Bus.

CRITICAL TASK BOP CLOSE Unit 2 Bus Tie breaker 2A0619.

BOP VERIFY Unit 2 1E buses 2A06 and 2B06 energized.

BOP START CCW Pump P-026 on Train B.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Within 10 minutes of Reactor trip with failure of 2 or more Full Critical Task Length CEAs to fully insert, perform an emergency boration (or Statement some other alignment which adds boric acid from either the BAMU Tanks or RWST at 40 gpm or more).

CRITICAL Establish Reactivity Control (> 2 FLCEAs Not Fully Inserted &

RO TASK No SIAS)

START Charging Pump P-192 on Train B and COMMENCE RO boration at >40 gpm.

  • OPEN HV-9245 and HV-9240 Gravity Feed Valves.

+35 min

  • CLOSE LV-227B VCT Outlet Block Valve.

When power is restored to Bus 2A06 and emergency boration is started, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, TERMINATE the scenario.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: San Onofre Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

  • Reactor Critical at 2.5x10E-4% power BOC - RCS Boron is 2038 ppm (by sample)
  • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service
  • Condenser Air Ejector Low Range Radiation Monitor (RM-7818) OOS Turnover: Power increase in progress to ~ 2% power; Mini-purge & PMW sampling in progress.

Critical Tasks:

  • Restore CCW Critical Loop flow.
  • Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
  • Manually initiate Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 R (RO) Rod withdrawal and power increase in progress to ~2% power.

+ min N (BOP, CRS) 2 CV12 C (RO, CRS) Inadvertent Reactor Coolant System dilution.

+ min 3 SG03C TS (CRS) Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter (PT-1023-3) fails low.

+ min 4 RPK624A C (BOP, CRS) Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal (EFAS-1) partial actuation.

+ min TS (CRS) 5 RC18B C (RO, CRS) Pressurizer Safety Valve (PSV-0201) leak less than Charging

+ min TS (CRS) Pump capacity.

6 RC18A M (ALL) Pressurizer Safety Valves (PSV-0200 and PSV-0201) fail open.

+ min RC18B 7 CC06B C (BOP) Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) trip on SIAS.

+ min CC06D Train B Component Cooling Water Pump (P-026) trip on SIAS.

8 RPS LP I (RO) Containment Isolation Actuation System fails to actuate.

+ min

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC #3 The crew will assume the watch with the Reactor critical at ~3x10-4% power. The crew will raise power using rod withdrawal per SO23-5-1.3.1, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load. A Containment Mini-Purge is in service and sampling of the Primary Water Makeup Tank is being performed at the time of turnover.

With the plant stable at 1% to 2% power, an inadvertent dilution event will occur. The crew will respond per Abnormal Operating Instruction (AOI) S023-13-11, Emergency Boration of the RCS

/ Inadvertent Dilution or Boration. The event is terminated when the inadvertent dilution is recognized and isolated. The crew will be required to maintain power level as the diluted water enters the RCS from the VCT throughout the scenario.

When steps of AOI SO23-13-11 are complete, a Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter will fail low. The crew will determine pressure instrument failure per Annunciator Response Procedures, enter SO23-13-18, Reactor Protection System Failure and be required to bypass the failed signal using SO23-3-2.38, Digital Control System Operation. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications. The next event is a Partial ESFAS Actuation. The crew will restore Auxiliary Feedwater flow per ARPs and/or AOI SO23-13-24, Feedwater Malfunctions. The CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications.

The next event is a Pressurizer Safety Valve leak greater than 10 gpm but less than Charging Pump capacity. The crew will respond per the ARPs and AOI SO23-13-14, Reactor Coolant System Leak. The RO will be required to secure the Containment Mini-Purge and the CRS will evaluate Technical Specifications and determine that a plant shutdown per the AOI is required.

Once the requirement to shutdown is determined, a Pressurizer Safety Valve will fail open. The crew will initiate a plant trip and perform Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI) SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

Train A and B Component Cooling Water Pumps will trip upon receipt of an SIAS signal. The BOP must manually start the standby CCW Pump (P-024). A Containment Isolation Actuation Signal fails to actuate and must be manually initiated by the RO.

Scenario is terminated when a transition to EOI SO23-13-3, Loss of Coolant Accident is entered and a plant cooldown is in progress.

Risk Significance:

  • Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Inadvertent dilution Loss of AFW flow
  • Risk significant core damage sequence: LOCA with CCW and CIAS failure
  • Risk significant operator actions: Restore Critical Loop CCW flow Manually actuate CIAS SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SONGS 2005 Facility NRC Initial License Examination Simulator Scenario Setup Scenario 3 MACHINE OPERATORS INSTRUCTIONS SETUP IC: Use IC #XXX and see attached Event File for NRC Scenario #3.

SONGS-12-2007-DRAFT-SCENARIOS.doc

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 50 of 68 Event

Description:

Rod Withdrawal and Power Increase in Progress to ~2% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: EXECUTE IC #XXX and NRC Scenario #3 SETUP file to align components.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags #029 (CVCS) and #005-4 (CVCS Ion Exchanger) reflect the scenario born concentration.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on the RO desk:

- Copy of SO23-5-1.3.1 completed through Step 6.4.

ENSURE that Control Rods are in the appropriate position.

PLACE the MOC Operations Physics Summary Book on the RO Desk.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm at 3x10-4%:

50A02 - COLSS ALARM 50A07 - SBCS DEMAND PRESENT 52A12(17) - FWCS SG2 E088 (SG1 E089) AUTO XFR TO MANUAL 53A03 - MFWP TURBINE K006 TRIP 53A27 - MFWP P062 DISCH PRESS LO 53A28 - MFWP P062 FLOW LO 53A47 - 3rd POINT HEATER DRAIN TANK LEVEL HI/LO 53B03 - MFWP TURBINE K005 TRIP 53B27 - MFWP P063 DISCH PRESS LO 53B28 - MFWP P063 FLOW LO 56A30/40/50/60 - LOSS OF LOAD CHANNEL 1/2/3/4 TRIP DISABLED 63E10 - SCE CB TRIP 99A02 - EMERGENCY PUSHBUTTON TURBINE TRIP 99A24 - TURBINE TRIP RELAY TRIPPED 99B01 - GENERATOR TRIP 99B19 - VACUUM PROTECTION PLC TROUBLE 99B41(42) - AVR CH A(B) FAULT DIRECT performance of SO23-5-1.3.1, Plant Startup from Hot

+1 min CRS Standup to Minimum Load.

REFER to LCS Figure 3.1.102-1 and commence maintaining RO the Control Rods in the proper sequence of overlap.

RO POSITION Group Select switch to the CEA Group 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 51 of 68 Event

Description:

Rod Withdrawal and Power Increase in Progress to ~2% power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior POSITION Mode Select Switch to MG (Manual Group) or MS RO (Manual Sequential).

When directed by the CRS, WITHDRAW Control Rods as RO/CRS required.

When CEA positioning is complete, PLACE the Mode Select RO Switch to OFF.

+15 min MAINTAIN Tcold within required band by monitoring the Steam BOP Bypass Control System operation.

When power has been raised to ~2%, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 52 of 68 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Reactor Coolant System Dilution Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2.

- CV12, Inadvertent RCS dilution Indications Available:

FQIS-0210, Blended Makeup Total Flow clicking VCT level rising FIC-0210X, Flow Controller indicates ~35 gpm FI-7171, PMW Flow indication @ 35 gpm DETERMINE an inadvertent dilution by observing FQIS-0210,

+1 min RO Blended Makeup Total Flow clicking, FIC-0210X, Flow Controller indication, and FI-7171, PMW Flow indication.

INFORM CRS of inadvertent dilution and INFORM the CRS RO SO23-13-11, Emergency Boration of the RCS / Inadvertent Dilution or Boration entry required.

CRS DIRECT placing Makeup Mode Selector to MANUAL.

RO PLACE Makeup Mode Selector to MANUAL.

CRS DIRECT stopping Primary Makeup Water Pump.

RO STOP Primary Makeup Water Pump.

ENSURE Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature is RO maintaining at 120°F with TIC-0223, CCW Temperature Controller in AUTO.

RO PLACE T-0224B, CVCS Ion Exchanger in BYPASS.

RO VERIFY Deborating Ion Exchange not in service.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 53 of 68 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Reactor Coolant System Dilution Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO ENSURE dilution flow paths isolated.

ENSURE FIC-0210X, PMW Flow Controller, and FIC-0210Y, RO BAMU Flow Controller, are set for correct blended makeup per SO23-3-2.2, Section to Establish Automatic Makeup Mode.

RO VERIFY RCS and VCT boron samples within 7 ppm.

M.O. Cue: When directed to perform RCS and VCT boron samples, REPORT the VCT is 5 ppm less than the RCS.

+10 min CRS EVALUATE inadvertent dilution event terminated.

When plant conditions have been restored to normal, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 54 of 68 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3.

- SG03C, PT-1023-3, SG E088 Pressure Transmitter fails low Indications Available:

52A13 - FWCS TROUBLE 56A41 - SG2 E088 PRESS LO CHANNEL TRIP 56A44 - SG1 E089 PRESS > SG2 E088 ESFAS CH TRIP 56A51 - SG2 E088 PRESS LO PRETRIP 56A54 - SG1 E089 PRESS > SG2 E088 PRETRIP 56B26 - PPS CHANNEL 3 TROUBLE

+30 sec CO/ACO REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Steam Generator E088 pressure instrument ACO failed low and INFORM the CRS SO23-13-18, Reactor Protection System Failure entry required.

REFER to Attachment 5 and DETERMINE PT-1023-3 is CRS Functional Unit affected.

PLACE the affected Functional Unit in BYPASS per CO SO23-3-2.12, Section for Bypass Operation of Trip Channels.

VERIFY that the same bistable is not in bypass on any other CO Channel.

M.O. Cue: When directed, EXECUTE remote functions RP51, 53G, 53I, 53U, and 54N to bypass Steam Generator PT-1023-3 trips, then DELETE remote function RP51.

M.O. Cue: When directed, EXECUTE the following Remote Functions:

RP51 = OPEN (PPS Door Open Annunciator 56B46)

RP52C = BYPASS (Channel A Hi Local Power)

RP52D = BYPASS (Channel A Low DNBR)

Delete RP51 (PPS Door Open Annunciator 56B46)

Use above format for shaded area corrections OBSERVE annunciator 56A49 - PPS CHANNEL 3 TRIP CO BYPASS goes into alarm.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 55 of 68 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CONFIRM failure does NOT affect RPS/ESFAS Matrix Logic, CRS RPS/ESFAS Initiation Logic, RTCBs, RPS/ESFAS Manual Trip, or ESFAS Actuation Logic.

CRS CONFIRM failure affects the Feedwater Digital Control System.

RECOGNIZE Steam Generator E089 level instrument failed ACO low and INFORM the CRS SO23-3-2.38, Digital Control System Operation entry required.

DIRECT performance of Section 6.6, Bypassing Selected CRS Feedwater Control Signals.

ACCESS the PCS Console for the Digital Feedwater Control ACO System.

ACO ACCESS the Selected Signals screen for SG E088.

ACO VERIFY SG E088 Channel D signal is valid.

ACO SELECT BYPASS for the Channel C level instrument.

ACO VERIFY the Channel C level instrument indicates BYPASS.

ACO VERIFY the Channel D is not in BYPASS.

+5 min ACO VERIFY the Selected Signal output looks valid.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 56 of 68 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Pressure Transmitter Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

+10 min CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION A - One or more functions with one automatic RPS trip channel inoperable; Place Channel in bypass or trip within one (1) hour.
  • 3.3.5.B, ESFAS Instrumentation.
  • ACTION B - One automatic trip channel inoperable for SG Pressure-Low or SG Pressure Difference-High for the EFAS function; Place Channel in bypass or trip within one (1) hour.

When the SG pressure instrument is bypassed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 57 of 68 Event

Description:

EFAS-1 Partial Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4.

- RPK624A, Partial EFAS-1 Actuation Indications available:

57A11 - ESFAS TRAIN A PARTIAL ACTUATION Increase in AFW flow due to AFW Valve 2HV-4713 failing open AFW Flow indication is off-scale high on Steam Generator E089 SG E089 level increase due to the Partial ESFAS

+1 min RO/BOP REFER to Annunciator Response Procedure.

RO/BOP REFER to Plant Monitoring System Alarm Page.

DETERMINE that a Partial ESFAS Actuation has occurred and RO/BOP INFORM the CRS.

DIRECT BOP to override and close AFW Valves and/or STOP CRS P-141.

CLOSE AFW Valve HV-4731 and/or STOP P-141 by BOP DEPRESSING the STOP pushbutton.

DIRECT performance of SO23-3-2.22, Engineering Safety CRS Features Actuation System Operation to determine valves that may have operated.

CRS/RO RESTORE feedwater flow as required.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 58 of 68 Event

Description:

EFAS-1 Partial Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Note: The crew may use any or all of the following procedures to aid in identifying the failed relay:

SO23-3.2.22, ESFAS Operation, Attachment 14 SO23-3-3.43, ESF Subgroup Relays Test, Attachment 3 SO23-3.3.43.33, ESF Subgroup Relay K-624A Test, Section 6.5

+10 min CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

  • ACTION H - An automatic valve in any flow path incapable of closing upon receipt of a Main Steam Isolation Signal; Close the affected valve or its block valve within four (4) hours.

When feedwater flow is controlled, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Event 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 59 of 68 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Safety Valve Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5.

- RC18B @ 8%, PZR Safety Valve leak Indications available:

57B17 - PZR RELIEF VALVE OPEN Identified RCS leakrate 10 gpm Charging flow > Letdown flow with plant conditions stable

+1 min RO REFER to Annunciator Response Procedures.

RECOGNIZE RCS leak and INFORM the CRS AOI SO23 RO 14 entry required.

CRS DIRECT performance of SO23-13-14, RCS Leak.

+3 min RO VERIFY Pressurizer level lowering.

RO ENSURE Charging Pumps start to maintain Pressurizer level.

RO/BOP DETERMINE RCS leakrate.

VERIFY VCT level is being maintained within programmed

+5 min RO band.

RO OPERATE Blended Makeup System to maintain VCT level.

RO VERIFY Pressurizer level - NOT LOWERING.

RO VERIFY Pressurizer Level - STABLE or RISING.

QUANTIFY RCS leakage by Charging and Letdown mismatch CREW and REPORT leakage rate to the Shift Manager.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 60 of 68 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Safety Valve Leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

ACTION A - RCS leakage not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary leakage; Reduce leakage to within limits within four (4) hours.

CREW DETERMINE source of leak:

  • INSPECT Charging and Letdown Systems.
  • MONITOR Radiation Monitors.
  • SAMPLE Containment Atmosphere.

CONFIRM Radiation Monitors and Containment Atmosphere CREW samples indicate RCS leak is in Containment.

VERIFY that RCS Leakage exceeds ten (10) gpm and the CREW source of the leakage is identified.

DIRECT a Plant Shutdown to be in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

+10 min CRS per SO23-5-1.7, Power Descension.

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, PROCEED to Events 6, 7, and 8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, and 8 Page 61 of 68 Event

Description:

ESDE on SG E089 Inside Containment / MSIS Fails to Actuate / HPSI Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Machine Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 6, 7, and 8.

- RC18A @ 100%, PZR Safety Valve (PSV-0200) fails open

- RC18B @ 100%, PZR Safety Valve (PSV-0201) fails open

- CC06B, Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) trip

- CC06D, Component Cooling Water Pump (P-026) trip

- RPS LP, CIAS fails to actuate Indications Available:

50A01 - QUENCH TANK PRESS HI 50A11 - QUENCH TANK LEVEL HI/LO 50A21 - QUENCH TANK TEMP HI 50A31 - PZR RELIEF VALVE OUTLET TEMP HI

+30 sec CREW RECOGNIZE RCS pressure decreasing rapidly.

VERIFY Reactor trip and DIRECT crew to perform actions of CRS SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip:

  • VERIFY Reactor Power lowering and Startup Rate -

negative.

  • VERIFY maximum of one full length CEA - NOT fully inserted.

BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip:

o HP and LP Stop and Governor valves - closed.

  • VERIFY both Unit Output Breakers - open.

CRS INITIATE Administrative Actions:

  • INITIATE Attachment 4, WORKSHEET.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, and 8 Page 62 of 68 Event

Description:

ESDE on SG E089 Inside Containment / MSIS Fails to Actuate / HPSI Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • INITIATE Attachment 5, ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS.

BOP VERIFY Vital Auxiliaries functioning properly:

  • VERIFY both 1E 4 kV Buses A04 and A06 - energized.
  • VERIFY both 1E 480 V Buses B04 and B06 - energized.
  • VERIFY all Class 1E DC Buses - energized.
  • VERIFY all 6.9 kV and Non-1E Buses - energized.
  • DETERMINE no CCW Trains - operating AND aligned to Non-Critical Loop (NCL) and Letdown Heat Exchanger.

Within five (5) minutes of initiating CCW supported ESFAS Critical Task equipment operation without CCW flow, take action to restore Statement CCW Critical Loop flow to at least one train of operating ESF pumps and Emergency Cooling Units.

CRITICAL [RNO] DETERMINE no CCW Trains are operating and START BOP TASK CCW Pump P-024.

RO DETERMINE RCS Inventory Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE PZR level NOT between 10% and 70% AND NOT trending to between 30% and 60%.
  • VERIFY Core Exit Saturation Margin 20°F:

RO DETERMINE RCS Pressure Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE PZR pressure (WR and NR) NOT between 1740 PSIA and 2380 PSIA AND NOT controlled AND NOT trending to between 2025 PSIA and 2275 PSIA.
  • Is NOT trending to between 2025 psia and 2275 psia.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, and 8 Page 63 of 68 Event

Description:

ESDE on SG E089 Inside Containment / MSIS Fails to Actuate / HPSI Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • If PZR pressure less than PZR pressure control system setpoint and lowering, then ENSURE Normal and Auxiliary Spray Valves - closed
  • If PZR pressure (WR) is less than 1740 psia, ENSURE SIAS actuated.

CRS RECORD time of SIAS.

Within ten (10) minutes of a loss of CCW the affected RCP(s) will Critical Task be stopped.

Statement Elapsed Time: __________

RO DETERMINE Core Heat Removal criteria is NOT satisfied:

CRITICAL TASK

  • STOP all RCPs due to CIAS.
  • VERIFY Core Exit Saturation Margin 20°F.

BOP DETERMINE RCS Heat Removal criteria NOT satisfied:

  • VERIFY at least one SGs level between 21% and 80% NR.
  • DETERMINE TC less than 545°F and NOT controlled.
  • DETERMINE heat removal NOT adequate:
  • [RNO] TC - less than 545°F.
  • [RNO] ENSURE SBCS valves closed.
  • [RNO] ENSURE ADVs closed.
  • [RNO] ENSURE SG Blowdown valves closed.
  • E-088 - HV-4054
  • E-089 - HV-4053
  • [RNO] ENSURE Main Steam to Reheaters valves closed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, and 8 Page 64 of 68 Event

Description:

ESDE on SG E089 Inside Containment / MSIS Fails to Actuate / HPSI Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • HV-2703 or HV-2704; HV-2721; HV-2751
  • VERIFY SG pressures - greater than 740 PSIA.

RO DETERMINE Containment Isolation criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE Containment pressure - greater than 1.5 PSIG.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE Containment pressure > 3.4 PSIG.
  • [RNO] ENSURE SIAS, CCAS, and CRIS actuated.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE CIAS NOT actuated.

Within 5 minutes of automatic actuation failure, crew manually initiates Containment Isolation. Initiation may be accomplished Critical Task by either manual actuation from the control boards, manual Statement actuation or opening of trip path breakers from L034/L035, or operation of individual components to their CIAS actuated position.

CRITICAL TASK RO Manually INITIATE Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.

  • VERIFY Containment Area Radiation Monitors energized RO AND NOT alarming or trending to alarm.
  • VERIFY Secondary Plant Radiation Monitors energized AND NOT alarming or trending to alarm.

CRS RECORD time of SIAS, CIAS, CCAS, CRIS.

DETERMINE Containment Temperature, Pressure and RO Combustible Gas Control criteria NOT satisfied:

  • DETERMINE Containment average temperature > 120°F.
  • DETERMINE Containment pressure > 1.5 PSIG.
  • [RNO] ENSURE proper functioning of the Normal Containment Cooling.
  • [RNO] ENSURE at least one Containment Dome Air

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, and 8 Page 65 of 68 Event

Description:

ESDE on SG E089 Inside Containment / MSIS Fails to Actuate / HPSI Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Circulator operating.

  • [RNO] DETERMINE Containment pressure > 3.4 PSIG.
  • [RNO] ENSURE all RCPs stopped.
  • [RNO] ENSURE all available Containment Emergency Cooling Units operating.
  • VERIFY Containment pressure < 14 PSIG.

CRS DIAGNOSE event in progress:

  • DETERMINE all safety function criteria are NOT met per Attachment 4, Worksheet.
  • [RNO] COMPLETE Attachment 1, Recovery Diagnostics.
  • [RNO] DIAGNOSE event as LOCA inside Containment.
  • [RNO] DETERMINE all RCPs stopped.
  • DIRECT initiating steps 12 through 15.

BOP INITIATE steps 12 through 15.

CRS DIRECT performance of SO23-12-3, LOCA.

  • RECORD time of EOI entry.

+15 min CRS VERIFY LOCA diagnosis:

  • INITIATE SO23-12-10, LOCA Safety Function Status Checks.
  • INITIATE Foldout Page.
  • DIRECT initiation of FS-7, HPSI Throttle/Stop.
  • DIRECT initiation of Attachment 22, Non-Qualified Loads Restoration.
  • VERIFY LOCA diagnosis, using Figure 1, Break Identification Chart.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, and 8 Page 66 of 68 Event

Description:

ESDE on SG E089 Inside Containment / MSIS Fails to Actuate / HPSI Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

M.O. Cue: If directed to sample SGs, WAIT 10 minutes and then REPORT that E088 and E089 both have activity near background, and normal boron levels. If the SG sample valves are closed, REPORT unable to establish sample flow.

CRS INITIATE Administrative actions:

  • NOTIFY Shift Manager/Operations Leader of SO23-12-3, Loss of Coolant Accident initiation.
  • IMPLEMENT Placekeeper.

RO VERIFY ESF actuation.

  • VERIFY SIAS actuation required.
  • PZR pressure less than SIAS setpoint.

OR

  • Containment pressure > 3.4 PSIG.
  • ENSURE the following actuated:

BOP STOP unloaded Diesel Generators.

INITIATE SO23-12-11, Attachment 22, Non-Qualified Load BOP Restoration.

M.O. Cue: When directed to restore non-qualified loads, WAIT 2 minutes, then EXECUTE ED85, Non-Qualified Loads Restoration. INFORM the Control Room that you have restored non-qualified loads.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, and 8 Page 67 of 68 Event

Description:

ESDE on SG E089 Inside Containment / MSIS Fails to Actuate / HPSI Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO ESTABLISH Optimum SI Alignment:

  • ESTABLISH two train operation.
  • All Charging Pumps operating.
  • Two HPSI trains and two LPSI trains operating.
  • All Cold leg flow paths aligned.
  • VERIFY SI flow required:
  • SI flow indicated.
  • DETERMINE FS-7, VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Criteria is RO NOT satisfied.

RO VERIFY PZR pressure:

  • DETERMINE RCP NPSH requirements of SO23-12-11, Attachment 29 NOT satisfied.
  • [RNO] VERIFY all RCPs stopped.
  • [RNO] INITIATE FS-3, Monitor Natural Circulation.

RO VERIFY Letdown isolated.

VERIFY outside Containment radiation alarms - NOT alarming RO or trending to alarm.

VERIFY outside Containment sump levels - NOT abnormally RO rising.

VERIFY RCS sample valves, RCS and PZR head vents are RO closed.

RO VERIFY CCW parameters are normal.

CRS/RO DETERMINE PZR safety valves are NOT closed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6, 7, and 8 Page 68 of 68 Event

Description:

ESDE on SG E089 Inside Containment / MSIS Fails to Actuate / HPSI Pump Start Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • Request Shift Manager/Operations Leader evaluate lowering PZR pressure to aid in resetting the safety valves.
  • [RNO] Maintain core exit saturation margin greater than or equal to 20°F.

DETERMINE rate of RCS inventory and pressure loss greater CRS/RO than available charging pump capacity.

+30 min CRS DIRECT initiation of RCS cooldown.

When the RCS cooldown is initiated, or at Lead Evaluators discretion, TERMINATE the scenario.

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