ML110480054

Notification of Potential Part 21 Reportable Condition: Crack Indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades

ML110480054
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch, Monticello, Dresden, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Perry, Oyster Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Pilgrim, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Duane Arnold, Clinton, Quad Cities, FitzPatrick
Issue date:	02/15/2011
From:	Porter D GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
46348, MFN 11-023
Download: ML110480054 (13)

Text

0211512011 U.S. NuclearRegulator, Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Paae I General Information (PAR) Event# 46348 Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY Notification Date /Time: 10/20/2010 12:54 (EST)

Supplier: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY Event Date / Time: 10/20/2010 (EDT)

Last Modification: 12/01/2010 Region: 1 Docket #:

City: WILMINGTON Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: NC NRC Notified by: DALE PORTER Notifications: MARIE MILLER RIDO HQ Ops Officer: ERIC SIMPSON RANDY MUSSER R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY STEVE ORTH R3DO 10 CFR Section: VIVIAN CAMPBELL R4DO 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH PART 21 GP VIA EMAIL PART 21 - CRACK INDICATIONS IN MARATHON CONTROL ROD BLADES The following was received via facsimile:

"A recent inspection of near 'End-of-Life' Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWR/6 has revealed crack indications. The CRB assemblies in question were manufactured in 1997. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) continues to investigate the cause(s) of the crack indications. Once the cause of the crack indications is determined, GEH will evaluate the nuclear and mechanical lifetime limits of the Marathon Control Rod Blade design in light of the new inspection data, and make revised lifetime recommendations, if necessary.

"This 60-day interim notification, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), is sent for all plants that are D lattice, BWR/2-4 or S lattice, BWR/6 plants. Since there have been no reported cracking occurrences in C lattice assemblies to date, these CRBs are tentatively eliminated from the investigation. C lattice, BWR/4-5 plants have been included on Attachment 2 for identification. Should the results of the investigation implicate the C lattice plants, the final resolution to this 10CFR Part 21 evaluation will include the C lattice plants."

The D lattice and S lattice plants in the US that are affected by this notification include Nine Mile Point, Unit 1; Millstone, Unit 1; Fitzpatrick; Pilgrim; Vermont Yankee; Grand Gulf; River Bend; Clinton; Oyster Creek; Dresden, Unit 2; Dresden, Unit 3; Peach Bottom, Unit 2; Peach Bottom, Unit 3; Quad Cities, Unit 1; Quad Cities, Unit 2; Perry, Unit 1; Duane Arnold; Cooper; Monticello; Brunswick, Unit 1; Brunswick, Unit 2; Hatch, Unit 1; Hatch, Unit 2; Browns Ferry, Unit 1; Browns Ferry, Unit 2; and Browns Ferry, Unit 3.

• *

• UPDATE FROM DALE PORTER TO ERIC SIMPSON VIA FAX AT 1556 ON 12/1/2010 * * *

"In August 2010, GE Hitachi (GEH) performed the planned inspection of four near 'End-of-Life' CRBs at 'Plant 0.'

02/15/2011 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Pa_-e 2 General Information (PAR) Event# 46348 The inspection revealed crack indications on all four Control Rod Blades (CRBs). The observed cracks are much more numerous, and have more material distortion than previously observed. Further, the cracks occur at a much lower reported local B-10 depletion than previously observed, with cracking predominantly starting at approximately 40% local depletion, whereas previous inspections observed cracking only above 60% local depletion.

"The cracks at 'Plant 0' are also more severe, in that they resulted in missing capsule tube fragments from two of the inspected CRBs. A lost parts analysis performed for 'Plant 0' determined that there is no negative affect on plant performance due to the missing tube fragments.

"At this point in the investigation, no causal or contributing factors unique to the 'Plant 0' CRBs, nor their operation, has been identified.

"Including the inspections at 'Plant 0,' GEH has now completed the visual inspection of 97 irradiated Marathon CRBs, with 10 showing crack indications. As 'Plant 0' is an S lattice design, all crack indications are still confined to D and S lattice applications, with no crack indications on C lattice designs. When considering only D and S lattice applications that are near 'End-of-Life' depletion limits, 10 of 23 control rod inspections have revealed crack indications."

Notified R1 DO (Schmidt), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Ring), R4DO (Powers) and Part 21 Group.

• *

• UPDATE FROM DALE PORTER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER VIA FACSIMILE AT 0934 EST ON 02/15/2001 ***

Subject:

Part 21 Reportable Condition Notification: Design Life of D and S Lattice Marathon Control Blades "GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) has completed its evaluation of the cracking of Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWR/6. This issue was initially reported on October 20, 2010 as GEH letter MFN 10-327 (Reference 1). Additional information was provided on December 1, 2010 as GEH letter MFN 10-351 (Reference 2).

"GEH has determined that the design life, of D and S lattice Marathon Control Blades may be less than previously stated. The design life if not revised, could result in significant control blade cracking and could, if not corrected, create a Substantial Safety Hazard and is considered a reportable condition under 10 CFR Part 21.21 (d).

Marathon C lattice Control Blades are not affected by this condition. The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from GEH's investigation of this issue."

Notified R1 DO (Ferdas), R2DO (McCoy), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Group.

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:34:05 a.m. 02-15-2011 HITACHI GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Dale E. Porter GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC Safety Evaluation Program Manager 3901 Castle Hayne Rd.,

Wilmington, NC 28401 USA February 15, 2011 T910 819.4491 Dale.Porter@GE.Com MFN 11-023 Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Part 21 Reportable Condition Notification:

Design Life of 0 and S Lattice Marathon Control Blades GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) has completed its evaluation of the cracking of Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWRI6. This issue was initially reported on October 20, 2010 as GEH letter MFN 10-327 (Reference 1). Additional information was provided on December 1, 2010 as GEH letter MFN 10-351 (Reference 2).

GEH has determined that the design life, of D and S lattice Marathon Control Blades may be less than previously stated. The design life if not revised, could result in significant control blade cracking and could, if not corrected, create a Substantial Safety Hazard and is considered a reportable condition under 10CFR Part 21.21(d). Marathon C lattice Control Blades are not affected by this condition. The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from GEH's investigation of this issue.

Please contact me ifthere are any questions on this information.

If you haveany questions, please call me at (910) 819-4491.

Sincerely, Dale E. Porter Safety Evaluation Program Manager GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:34:43a.m. 02-15-2011 2/11 MFN 11-023 Page 2 of 2

References:

1. Letter from Dale E. Porter (GEH) to Document Control Desk (US NRC),

Subject:

Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Crack Indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades, October 20, 2010, MFN 10-327.

2. Letter from Dale E. Porter (GEH) to Document Control Desk (US NRC),

Subject:

Update to MFN 10-327: Crack Indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades, December 1,2010, MFN 10-351.

Attachments:

1. GEH Evaluation

2. Notification Information Required by 21.21 (d)(4)

3. US Plants Potentially Affected cc: S. S. Philpott, USNRC S. J. Pannier, USNRC

0. Tabatabai-Yazdi, USNRC J. F. Harrison, GEH J. G. Head, GEH P. L. Campbell, GEH Washington A. A. Lingenfelter, GNF PRC File DRF Section No. 0000-0129-4275

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:35:08 a.m. 02-15-2011 3/11 MFN 11-023 Attachment 1 Page 1 of 2 Attachment 1 - Description of Evaluation

Background

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) manufactures Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) for D lattice, BWR/2-4 plants, S lattice, BWRJ6 plants, and C lattice, BWR/4-5 plants, as well as for other reactor vendor plants with similar configurations. GEH maintains a continuous surveillance program to monitor Marathon CRB performance in the BWR fleet as required by the NRC Safety Evaluation NEDE-31758P-A. This surveillance program primarily consists of visual inspections of highly irradiated near "End-of-Life" Marathon CRBs. The most recent update report for the Marathon surveillance program was issued to the BWR fleet in May 2010 (Report # 0000-0071-8269-R2). Since that update was issued GEH has completed the planned visual inspection of four discharged CRBs at an international BWR/6, identified as "Plant 0" in the surveillance report. The visual inspection of these assemblies has revealed cracks on all four CRBs. Some of the cracks were larger than those previously observed and reported in the surveillance report. The cracks were more numerous and occur at locations of lower reported local B10 depletion than previously documented.

Investigation The investigation into the cause of CRB tube cracking has been completed. The investigation has identified an additional cause for concern associated with cracking of high depletion Marathon Control Rod Blades used in D and S lattice type BWR plants.

A rapid thermal transient, with cold-water injection resulting from actuation of the Automatic Depressurization System specific to Plant "0"has been determined to be a significant contributor to the extent of cracking seen on the Marathon Control Blades. The extent of cracking seen on Marathon CRBs at Plant '0" has been determined to not represent a condition anticipated to occur at other plants with Marathon CRBs unless a similar or more severe thermal transient should occur. The cause of cracking of CRB tubes is Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking (IASCC). The IASCC results from susceptible material from irradiation, aggressive environment from oxidizing BWR water and excessive tensile stress caused from B4C swelling.

ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:35:55 a.m. 02-15-2011 4/11 9106024965 MFN 11-023 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2 As a result of this investigation GEH recommends a Marathon lifetime reduction as follows.

The recommended Marathon CRB lifetime reduction imposes a 60% local B10 depletion limit, or 54% for D lattice 1/4 segment and 55% for S lattice 1/4 segment lifetime limit.

Some D & S lattice Marathon CRBs manufactured after 2006 have an improved square geometry and their lifetime is greater than stated above. Lifetimes of these specific blades will be updated and maintained in GEH Marathon CRB lifetime document. GEH will update and maintain the GEH BWR Control Rod Lifetime document NEDE-30931-12-P, Table 3-3 with revised "End-of-Life" 1/4 Segment and 4 Segment Average B10 depletions for all applicable control blades.

These revised lifetime depletion limits are higher than those previously communicated that were bounding values for planning purposes. The values stated above are based on the final evaluation of all technical data.

The new lifetime limits will substantially reduce the likelihood of CRB operation with excessive cracking and will assure the CRBs will perform their required safety functions.

ABWR and ESBWR Design Certification Documentation Applicability The issues described above have been reviewed for applicability to documentation associated with IOCFR 52 and it has been determined that there is no affect on the technical information contained in either the ABWR certified design or the ESBWR design in certification.

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10: 36:3 2 a.m. 02-15-2011 5/11 MFN 11-023 Attachment 2 Page 1 of 6 Attachment 2 (i) Name and address of the Individual or individuals Informing the Commission.

Dale E. Porter GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Safety Evaluation Program Manager 3901 Castle Hayne Road, Wilmington, NC 28401 (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The basic component that contains a defect is Marathon Control Rod Blades for D and S lattice plants. The following part numbers identify these CRBs:

PLANT PROJECTIPLANT QTY SHIP YEAR Part Number#

TYPE S CLINTON 13 2002 107E1425G001 S CLINTON 4 2002 107E1425G001 S CLINTON 12 2004 107E1425G001 S CLINTON 12 2005 107E1425G001 S CLINTON 4 2007 105E3995G001 S GRAND GULF 8 2007 105E3995G001 S GRAND GULF 12 2008 105E3995G001 S GRAND GULF 11 2010 105E3995G001 S PERRY 4 1992 107E6101G001 S PERRY 9 1993 107E6121G001 S PERRY 5 1999 107E1425G001 S PERRY 6 2001 107E1425G001 S PERRY 25 2003 107E1425G001 S PERRY 10 2005 107E1425G001 S PERRY 10 2005 107E1425G001 S PERRY 10 2006 107E1425G001 S PERRY 15 2008 105E3995G001 S RIVER BEND 9 2001 107E1425G001 S RIVER BEND 2 2004 107E1425G001 S RIVER BEND 9 2007 105E3995G001 S RIVER BEND 5 2007 105E3995G001 S RIVERBEND 9 2009 105E3995G001

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10: 37:14 a.m. 02-15-2011 6/11 MFN 11-023 Attachment 2 Page 2 of 6 PLANT PL PROJECTIPLANT QTY SHIP YEAR Part Number#

TYPE S RIVERBEND 11 2010 105E3995G001 D BROWNS FERRY 27 2002 107E1421G001 D BROWNS FERRY 5 2002 107E1421G001 D BROWNS FERRY 8 1998 107E1421G001 D BROWNS FERRY 9 1998 107E1421G001 D BROWNS FERRY 29 1999 107E1421G001 D BROWNS FERRY 8 1998 107E1421G001 D COOPER 25 1991 103E1697G007 D COOPER 12 1995 107E6120G002 D COOPER 6 2003 107E1421G001 D COOPER 6 2004 107E1421G001 D COOPER 4 2006 105E3991G001 D COOPER 6 2008 105E3991G001 D COOPER 12 2009 105E3991G001 D COOPER 18 2009 105E3991G001 D DRESDEN 4 2001 107E1421G001 D DRESDEN 18 2002 107E1421G001 D DRESDEN 18 2003 107E1421G001 D DRESDEN 10 2004 107E1421G001 D DRESDEN 1 2005 107E1421G001 D DRESDEN 9 2007 107E1421G001 D DRESDEN 10 2010 105E3991G003 D DRESDEN 9 2009 105E3991G003 D DUANE ARNOLD 10 2005 107E1421G001 D DUANE ARNOLD 1 2009 105E3991G003 D FITZPATRICK 4 1991 103E1697G008 D FITZPATRICK 15 1996 107E6120G006 D FITZPATRICK 14 1998 107E1421G002 D FITZPATRICK 8 2008. 105E3991G003 D FITZPATRICK 8 2010 105E3991G003 D FITZPATRICK 5 2000 107E1421G002 D FITZPATRICK 6 2002 107E1421G002 D FITZPATRICK 4 2002 107E1421G002 D FITZPATRICK 8 2004 107E 1421 G002 D HATCH 5 2004 107E1421G004 D MONTICELLO 8 2003 107E1421G003 D MONTICELLO 12 2005 107E1421G003

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:38:02 a~m. 02-15-2011 7/11 MFN 11-023 Attachment 2 Page 3 of 6 PROJECTIPLANT QTY SHIP YEAR TYPE Part Number#

D MONTICELLO 16 2006 105E3991G002 D MONTICELLO 12 2009 105E3991G002 D OYSTER CREEK 1 1988 103E1076G009 D OYSTER CREEK 4 1990 103E1076G010 D OYSTER CREEK 12 1994 107E6120G004 D OYSTER CREEK 1 2000 107E1421G001 D OYSTER CREEK 12 2004 107E1421G001 D OYSTER CREEK 10 2006 107E1421G001 D OYSTER CREEK 2 2006 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 13 2000 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 9 2001 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 7 2002 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 11 2003 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 9 2004 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 4 2005 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 2 2007 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 4 1992 107E6035G002 D PEACH BOTTOM 18 1998 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 24 1999 107E1421G001 D PEACH BOTTOM 2 2008 105E3991G003 D PEACH BOTTOM 2 2010 105E3991G003 D PEACH BOTTOM 5 1995 107E6120G002 D PEACH BOTTOM 12 1997 107E1421G001 D PILGRIM 3 2003 107E1421G003 D PILGRIM 10 2004 107E1421G003 D PILGRIM 8 2009 105E3991G002 D QUAD CITIES 2 2000 107E1421G001 D QUAD CITIES 8 2002 107E1421G001 D QUAD CITIES 10 2002 107E1421G001 D QUAD CITIES 18 2004 107E1421G001 D QUAD CITIES 13 2005 107E1421G001 D QUAD CITIES 1 2006 107E1421G001 D QUAD CITIES 4 2007 105E3991G003 D QUAD CITIES 13 2007 105E3991G003 D QUAD CITIES 14 2007 107E1421G001 D QUAD CITIES 7 2009 105E3991G003 D QUAD CITIES 10 2010 105E3991G003

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:38:50 a.m. 02-15-2011 8/11 MFN 11-023 Attachment 2 Page 4 of 6 PLANT PL PROJECT/PLANT QTY SHIP YEAR Part Number#

TYPE D VERMONT YANKEE 8 1990 103E1076G012 D VERMONT YANKEE 4 1991 103E1697G007 D VERMONT YANKEE 4 1993 107E6120G002 D VERMONT YANKEE 6 1994 107E6120G002 D VERMONT YANKEE 4 1996 107E6120G002 D VERMONT YANKEE 4 1997 107E1421G001 D VERMONT YANKEE 1 1999 107E1421G001 D VERMONT YANKEE 4 2001 107E1421G001 D VERMONT YANKEE 8 2004 107E1421G002 D VERMONT YANKEE 4 2008 105E3991G003 (iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (Iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which Is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Marathon Control Rod Blades have the potential to develop significant cracks on the absorber tubes that contain boron carbide capsules.

Significant cracking of the absorber tubes could result in loss of boron carbide that could affect Control Blade Reactivity Worth Requirements.

(v) The date on which the Information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

A Potential Reportable Condition Evaluation, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21, was initiated on August 24, 2010. A 60-day interim notification was issued on October 20, 2010 to extend the evaluation period.

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:39:29 a.m. 02-15-2011 9/11 MFN 11-023 Attachment 2 Page 5 of 6 (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components In use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

The population for Marathon Control Rod Blade with the potential for cracking includes all Marathon Control Rods Blades installed in BWR/2-4, D lattice plants and BWRI6, S lattice plants. Marathon C lattice Control Blades are not affected. A list of all US plants that have been supplied these Marathon Control Rod Blades is provided in Attachment 3 of this document. A list of all part numbers and quantities sold is listed in the table in question ii.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, Is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.

GEH is reducing the "End-of-Life" depletion limits of its Marathon CRBs used in D and S lattice plants. The current 100% local BID depletion limit is reduced to a 60% local Bi' depletion limit, or 54% D lattice 1/4 segment and 55% S lattice 1/4 segment lifetime limit.

Some D & S lattice Marathon CRBs manufactured after 2006 have an improved square geometry and their lifetime is greater than stated above. Lifetimes of these specific blades will be updated and maintained in the GEH BWR Control Rod Lifetime document, NEDE-30931-12-P. GEH will update and maintain Table 3-3 of the lifetime document with revised "End-of-Life" Quarter Segment and 4 Segment Average B1 0 Depletions for all applicable control blades.

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:40:09 a.m. 02-15-2011 10/11 MFN 11-023 Attachment 2 Page 6 of 6 (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

For all plants containing D and S lattice Marathon Control Blades, remove Marathon CRBs from service prior to exceeding the revised lifetime limits.

If any Marathon CRB is in service and exceeds the new recommended lifetime limit, continue operating those blades while monitoring reactor coolant boron and tritium per normal plant procedures. If no significant increase in boron and/or tritium is observed, continue operation until the end of the cycle. If a significant increase in reactor coolant boron and/or tritium is detected, contact GEH. Continued monitoring for reactor coolant boron and/or tritium concentrations is recommended to detect cracking of any design CRB.

Continue to support the GEH Marathon CRB surveillance program as directed by NEDE-31758P-A.

(Ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

This is not an early site permit concern.

9106024965 ATC 2nd FLOOR 10:40:40 a.m. 02-15-2011 11/11 MFN 11-023 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 1 Atahment3- USPlants PotentiallyAffected D&S Lattice C Lattice Plants Plants Utility Plant X Constellation Nuclear Nine Mile Point 1 X Constellation Nuclear. Nine Mile Point 2 X Detroit Edison Co. Fermi 2 X Dominion Generation Millstone 1 X Energy Northwest Columbia x Entergy Nuclear Northeast FitzPatrick x Entergy Nuclear Northeast Pilgrim x Entergy Nuclear Northeast Vermont Yankee x Entergy Operations, Inc. Grand Gulf x Entergy Operations, Inc. River Bend x Exelon Generation Co. Clinton x Exelon Generation Co. Oyster Creek x Exelon Generation Co. Dresden 2 & 3 X Exelon Generation Co. LaSalle 1 & 2 X Exelon Generation Co. Limerick 1 & 2 Exelon Generation Co. Peach Bottom 2 & 3 Exelon Generation Co. Quad Cities 1 & 2 x FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. Perry 1 x FPL Energy Duane Arnold x Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Xcel Energy Monticello x X PPL Susquehanna LLC. Susquehanna I & 2 x Progress Energy Brunswick I & 2 x __ Southern Nuclear Operating Co. Hatch 1 & 2

__ Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry 1 - 3