Information Notice 1996-06, Design & Testing Deficiencies of Tornado Dampers at Nuclear Power Plants: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:Nf UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:Nf


COMMISSION
UNITED STATES


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 25, 1996 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE 96-06: DESIGN AND TESTING DEFICIENCIES
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION


OF TORNADO DAMPERS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 25, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-06:    DESIGN AND TESTING DEFICIENCIES OF TORNADO
 
DAMPERS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power


licenses or construction
reactors.
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
to the potential
 
for inoperability
 
of tornado dampers because of either inadequacies
 
in damper testing or deficiencies
 
in damper design. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
On March 2, 1994, the licensee for South Texas Project, Unit 1, reported a condition
 
to the NRC that could result in the rapid depressurization
 
of heating, ventilation
 
and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and buildings


in the event of a tornado (Licensee
notice to alert addressees to the potential for inoperability of tornado


Event Report No. 94-003). The licensee discovered
dampers because of either inadequacies in damper testing or deficiencies in


an interference
damper design. It is expected that recipients will review the information for


between the plant exhaust vent tornado damper and a gusset (duct work stru,..turdi
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to


stiffener).
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information


The gusset limited the closing travel of the damper linkage in one damper section to 40 percent of full stroke, thus preventing
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written


the damper from closing completely.
response is required.


===The interference===
==Description of Circumstances==
was discovered
On March 2, 1994, the licensee for South Texas Project, Unit 1, reported a


during stroke testing in response to an NRC inspector observation
condition to the NRC that could result in the rapid depressurization of


that there was no testing evidence to show that tornado dampers would actuate as required.
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and buildings in the


In response to that observation, the licensee initiated
event of a tornado (Licensee Event Report No. 94-003). The licensee


changes to existing preventive
discovered an interference between the plant exhaust vent tornado damper and a


maintenance
gusset (duct work stru,..turdi stiffener). The gusset limited the closing


work instructions
travel of the damper linkage in one damper section to 40 percent of full


for all tornado dampers (15 per unit) to include manual stroking on a periodic basis.Only one of the 30 dampers subsequently
stroke, thus preventing the damper from closing completely. The interference


tested was found to be inoperable.
was discovered during stroke testing in response to an NRC inspector


The originally
observation that there was no testing evidence to show that tornado dampers


planned periodic maintenance
would actuate as required. In response to that observation, the licensee


of tornado dampers at 10-year intervals
initiated changes to existing preventive maintenance work instructions for all


did not include any stroke or motion testing.South Texas stated that rapid depressurization
tornado dampers (15 per unit) to include manual stroking on a periodic basis.


could result in the collapse of the HVAC duct work and could prevent cooling of safety-related
Only one of the 30 dampers subsequently tested was found to be inoperable.


equipment.
The originally planned periodic maintenance of tornado dampers at 10-year


The rapid depressurization
intervals did not include any stroke or motion testing.


could also cause unanalyzed
South Texas stated that rapid depressurization could result in the collapse of


internal pressure differential
the HVAC duct work and could prevent cooling of safety-related equipment. The


conditions
rapid depressurization could also cause unanalyzed internal pressure


that might result in damage to safety-related
differential conditions that might result in damage to safety-related


structures, systems, or components.
structures, systems, or components.


PDfJR A _oo o1 6 s 9601190306
PDfJR                             A _oo             6 o1s
&H b l aog3t 21 IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 The licensee revised the preventive


maintenance
9601190306  aog3t


program to require preventive
&H    b      l                    21


maintenance
IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 The licensee revised the preventive maintenance program to require preventive


on the tornado dampers every 2 years or at each refueling
maintenance on the tornado dampers every 2 years or at each refueling outage, depending on the specific damper function. The 2 year or refueling outage


outage, depending
check includes inspection, cleaning, lubricating, and stroking of the damper


on the specific damper function.
while taking dynamometer measurements of the spring forces.


The 2 year or refueling
On October 22, 1993, the licensee for the River Bend Station reported a design


outage check includes inspection, cleaning, lubricating, and stroking of the damper while taking dynamometer
condition to the NRC (Licensee Event Report No. 93-020) that could result in


measurements
loss of ventilation to several buildings after passage of a tornado. The


of the spring forces.On October 22, 1993, the licensee for the River Bend Station reported a design condition
licensee determined through static pressure testing, that the air-exhaust


to the NRC (Licensee
dampers for several buildings would not reopen after passage of a tornado.


Event Report No. 93-020) that could result in loss of ventilation
The failure to reopen results from inadequate spring force on dampers to


to several buildings
overcome exhaust fan shutoff pressure. This condition was applicable to the


after passage of a tornado. The licensee determined
diesel generator building, the auxiliary building, the control building, the


through static pressure testing, that the air-exhaust
fuel building, and the standby cooling tower.


dampers for several buildings
The licensee evaluation at the River Bend Station revealed that the postulated


would not reopen after passage of a tornado.The failure to reopen results from inadequate
tornado event could cause loss of offsite power and could prevent the


spring force on dampers to overcome exhaust fan shutoff pressure.
air-intake dampers for the diesel generator from reopening. Other plant areas


This condition
were less susceptible to damage because of design features and/or alarms, followed by operator actions that could mitigate the consequences. The


was applicable
air-exhaust tornado dampers in the diesel generator building were modified by


to the diesel generator
blocking them open. The licensee evaluated the equipment in the diesel


building, the auxiliary
generator building and concluded that it would not be affected by


building, the control building, the fuel building, and the standby cooling tower.The licensee evaluation
depressurization resulting from the tornado.


at the River Bend Station revealed that the postulated
The licensee purchase specification for dampers required the dampers to be


tornado event could cause loss of offsite power and could prevent the air-intake
capable of automatically returning to their normal operating position (open)
after the tornado passed. However, the specification did not specify the


dampers for the diesel generator
design-bases conditions on the inlet side of the exhaust tornado dampers. The


from reopening.
static pressure that the damper counterweights would have to overcome was not


Other plant areas were less susceptible
specified.


to damage because of design features and/or alarms, followed by operator actions that could mitigate the consequences.
Discussion


The air-exhaust
Equipment such as tornado dampers may have been overlooked in development of


tornado dampers in the diesel generator
surveillance testing programs as tornado dampers are not generally considered


building were modified by blocking them open. The licensee evaluated
part of the HVAC system in which they are required to function. Tornado


the equipment
dampers are more likely to be considered part of the structure in which they


in the diesel generator
are installed. Surveillance tests in the technical specifications may involve


building and concluded
damper operations during HVAC systems testing. However, specific NRC


that it would not be affected by depressurization
requirements or guidelines for damper testing in general are limited and do


resulting
not extend to tornado dampers. Likewise, industry standards and guidelines


from the tornado.The licensee purchase specification
for testing of tornado dampers are also limited. Unlike other active safety- related dampers that are generally tested along with the HVAC system in which


for dampers required the dampers to be capable of automatically
they function, the licensees considered tornado dampers as passive devices


returning
until they were called upon to perform their function.


to their normal operating
'wO  IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 When called on, certain dampers must close to prevent rapid depressurization


position (open)after the tornado passed. However, the specification
within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado a


did not specify the design-bases
passes. In cases for which no redundancy exists, a single failure of of safety


conditions
tornado damper to perform  its safety  function could result  in a loss


on the inlet side of the exhaust tornado dampers. The static pressure that the damper counterweights
for


would have to overcome was not specified.
system function. Therclore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing


Discussion
tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.


Equipment
If


such as tornado dampers may have been overlooked
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. contact


in development
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please of


of surveillance
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office


testing programs as tornado dampers are not generally
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


considered
4ennr . CrutCoto      d rector


part of the HVAC system in which they are required to function.
Division of Reactor rogram Management


Tornado dampers are more likely to be considered
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


part of the structure
Technical contacts:  William T. LeFave, NRR


in which they are installed.
(301) 415-3285 Internet:wtllenrc.gov


Surveillance
Thomas Koshy, NRR


tests in the technical
(301) 415-1176 Internet:txk@nrc.gov


specifications
Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


may involve damper operations
tr                                      -;1


during HVAC systems testing. However, specific NRC requirements
\  E


or guidelines
Attachment


for damper testing in general are limited and do not extend to tornado dampers. Likewise, industry standards
IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


and guidelines
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


for testing of tornado dampers are also limited. Unlike other active safety-related dampers that are generally
Information                                    Date of


tested along with the HVAC system in which they function, the licensees
Notice No.              Subject                Issuance    Issued to


considered
96-05          Partial Bypass of Shutdown    01/18/96  All holders of OLs or LPs


tornado dampers as passive devices until they were called upon to perform their function.
Cooling Flow from the                      for boiling water reactors


'wO IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 When called on, certain dampers must close to prevent rapid depressurization
Reactor Vessel


within the structures
96-04          Incident Reporting Require-    01/10/96  All radiography licensees


and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for which no redundancy
ments for Radiography                      and manufacturers of radio- Licensees                                graphy equipment


exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.
96-03          Main Steam Safety Valve        01/05/96    All holders of OLs or CPs


Therclore, absence of appropriate
Setpoint Variation as a                    for nuclear power reactors


surveillance
Result of Thermal Effects


testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.This information
96-02          Inoperability of Power-        01/05/96    All holders of OLs or CPs


notice requires no specific action or written response.
Operated Relief Valves                      for PWRs


If you have any questions
Masked by Downstream


about the information
Indications During Testing


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
96-01          Potential for High Post-      01/03/96    All holders of OLs or CPs


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Accident Closed-Cycle                      for PWRs


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.4ennr .C r u t Coto d rector Division of Reactor rogram Management
Cooling Water Temperatures


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
to Disable Equipment
Technical


contacts:
Important to Safety
William T. LeFave, NRR (301) 415-3285 Internet:wtllenrc.gov


Thomas Koshy, NRR (301) 415-1176 Internet:txk@nrc.gov
95-58          10 CFR 34.20; Final            12/18/95    Industrial Radiography


Attachment:
Effective Date                            Licensees
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices tr -;1
95-57          Risk Impact Study Regarding    12/18/95    All holders of OLs or CPs
\ E Attachment


IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
Maintenance During Low-Power              for nuclear power reactors.


NOTICES Information
Operation and Shutdown


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 96-05 96-04 96-03 Partial Bypass of Shutdown Cooling Flow from the Reactor Vessel Incident Reporting
OL - Operating License


Require-ments for Radiography
CP - Construction Permit


Licensees Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Variation
IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 When called on, certain dampers must close to prevent rapid depressurization
 
as a Result of Thermal Effects 01/18/96 01/10/96 01/05/96 All holders of OLs or LPs for boiling water reactors All radiography
 
licensees and manufacturers
 
of radio-graphy equipment All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors 96-02 Inoperability
 
of Power-Operated Relief Valves Masked by Downstream
 
Indications
 
During Testing 01/05/96 All holders for PWRs of OLs or CPs 96-01 95-58 95-57 Potential
 
for High Post-Accident Closed-Cycle
 
===Cooling Water Temperatures===
to Disable Equipment Important
 
to Safety 10 CFR 34.20; Final Effective


Date Risk Impact Study Regarding Maintenance
within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado


During Low-Power Operation
passes. In cases for which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a


and Shutdown 01/03/96 12/18/95 12/18/95 All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs Industrial
tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety


Radiography
system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for


Licensees All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL -Operating
tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.


License CP -Construction
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


Permit
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 When called on, certain dampers must close to prevent rapid depressurization
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of


within the structures
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for which no redundancy
original signed by


exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director


Therefore, absence of appropriate
Division of Reactor Program Management


surveillance
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.This information
Technical contacts:                William T. LeFave, NRR


notice requires no specific action or written response.
(301) 415-3285 Internet:wtl1@nrc.gov


If you have any questions
Thomas Koshy, NRR


about the information
(301) 415-1176 Internet:txk@nrc.gov


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Attachment:          List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Tech Editor Reviewed 10/05/95 DOCUMENT NAME:            96-06.IN              *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.original signed by Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
To receive a copy of this document, hIdicate In the box: wC" - Copy without enclosures 'E' - Copy with enclosures "N" - No copy


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
OFFICE        SPLB/DSSA                    PECB/DRPM              C/PECB:DRPM
Technical


contacts:
INAME          WTLeFave*                  ITKoshy*                  AChaffee*                  Dtfkidhfield          I
William T. LeFave, NRR (301) 415-3285 Internet:wtl1@nrc.gov


Thomas Koshy, NRR (301) 415-1176 Internet:txk@nrc.gov
DATE          10/11/95                    01/04/96                01/17/96                  01/9/96                  01/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


Attachment:
IN 96-xx
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices Tech Editor Reviewed 10/05/95 DOCUMENT NAME: 96-06.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
January xx, 1996 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures


To receive a copy of this document, hIdicate In the box: wC" -Copy without enclosures
and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for


'E' -Copy with enclosures "N" -No copy OFFICE SPLB/DSSA
which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform


PECB/DRPM
its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.


C/PECB:DRPM
Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampers


INAME WTLeFave*
could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
ITKoshy* AChaffee*
Dtfkidhfield


I DATE 10/11/95 01/04/96 01/17/96 01/9/96 01/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


IN 96-xx January xx, 1996 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


within the structures
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of


and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for which no redundancy
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.Therefore, absence of appropriate
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director


surveillance
Division of Reactor Program Management


testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.This information
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


notice requires no specific action or written response.
Technical contacts:      William T. LeFave, NRR


If you have any questions
(301) 415-3285 Internet: wtl1@nrc.gov


about the information
Thomas Koshy, NRR


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
(301) 415-1176 Internet: txk@nrc.gov
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts:
William T. LeFave, NRR (301) 415-3285 Internet:
wtl1@nrc.gov
 
Thomas Koshy, NRR (301) 415-1176 Internet:  
txk@nrc.gov


Attachment:
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
        List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP


OFFICE 1SPLB/DSSA
OFFICE 1SPLB/DSSA       E ISC:SPLB/DSSA I N lADM:PUB* I N IBC:SPLB/DSSA I C        RIV/DS      Ns


E ISC:SPLB/DSSA
,
IJAMF    IWTIPFavp*      IGHubbard *          ITECH EDIBCalurelmcLracten *        I  .I' W/rt l/L/r


I N lADM:PUB*
DATE    110/11/95        110/11/95            j 10/05/95      i10/12/95              / /95 V 7 I
I N IBC:SPLB/DSSA


I C RIV/DS Ns , IJAMF IWTIPFavp*
_--I _
IGHubbard
nFFTCF  IPECR/DRPM I E ISC:PECB/DOPS I E ICiPLCIB:UV I      IU/UKIM        I


* ITECH EDIBCalurelmcLracten
NAME    ITKoshy    - IEGood-win e-        IAChaffee        IDCrutchfield


* I .I' W/rt l/L/r DATE 110/11/95
DATE   101/A/96         01/5 /96       e     01/17 /96     e 01/ /96
110/11/95 j 10/05/95 i10/12/95
            - bee previous Concurrence
/ /95 V 7_---I _ I nFFTCF IPECR/DRPM
 
I E ISC:PECB/DOPS
 
I E ICiPLCIB:UV
 
I IU/UKIM I NAME ITKoshy -I EGood-win
 
e- I AChaffee IDCrutchfield
 
DATE 101/A /96 01/ 5 /96 e 01/17 /96 e 01/ /96-bee previous Concurrence


OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


I i;IN 96-xx January xx, 1996 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization
I     i;
                                                                                                                  IN 96-xx


within the structures
January xx, 1996 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures


and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for which no redundancy
and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for


exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.Therefore, absence of appropriate
which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform


surveillance
its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.


testing for tornado dampe could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.This information
Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampe


notice requires no specific action or written r onse. If you have any questions
could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.


about the information
This information notice requires no specific action or written r onse. If


in this notice, p ase contact one of the technical
you have any questions about the information in this notice, p ase contact


contacts listed below or the appropria
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropria Office of


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Cr c hfield, Director Division of eactor Program Management
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


===Office of uclear Reactor Regulation===
Dennis M. Cr chfield, Director
Technical


contacts:
Division of eactor Program Management
William T. LeFave, RR (301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, R (301) 415-117 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Info ation Notices N NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP


/nnri imrm S.wxua^u .OFFICE SPLB/DSSA
Office of uclear Reactor Regulation


I E SC:SPLB/D
Technical contacts:                   William T. LeFave,              RR


A I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA
(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy,            R


I C IRIV/DRS I N I NAME WTLeFave*
(301) 415-117 Attachment:
GHubbardJ
                List of Recently Issued NRC Info ation Notices


TECH ED/BCalure
nnri


CMcCracken
S.wxua^u


* l DATE 10/11/95 10/11/9 1 10/05/95 10/12/95 / /95----- s ---* --I I ., .%.I I 1 nrgFTrr DFIRlnRPM
imrm .   N


I F ImIPFCrBinnPS
NAME:    G:\IN\IN-DAMP                          /
  OFFICE          SPLB/DSSA I E SC:SPLB/D A I N                            ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C                      IRIV/DRS I N I


I E IC/IEILKMUS
NAME              WTLeFave*              GHubbardJ                      TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *                    l


I I UIUKUM l 1l%PI a -%0r I vamp -I -------* _ __ ._. _, Ad NAME TKoshy* X EGoodn* AChaffee DCrutchfield
DATE            10/11/95                10/11/9                      1 10/05/95                  10/12/95                / /95
                  -           -   --                 s- - - *  -I                      I . , .   %.I            I 1 nrgFTrr


DATE 11/29/95 4 10/12A5 5 01/ /96 01/ /96* See previous G currence OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
%PI a


IN 95-xx December xx, 1995 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization
DFIRlnRPM


within the structures
I  vamp  -
                                II F


and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for which no redundancy
-
                                        ImIPFCrBinnPS


exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.Therefore, absence of appropriate
- - - - - - *        _
                                                                I E IC/IEILKMUS


surveillance
-%0r_.  __ _,
                                                                                        I Ad


testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.This information
I UIUKUM                l


notice requires no specific action or written response.
.


If you have any questions
1l


about the information
NAME              TKoshy* X              EGoodn*                      AChaffee              DCrutchfield


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
DATE              11/29/95 4          10/12A55                      01/    /96              01/          /96


contacts listed below or the appropriate
* See previous G currence


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
IN 95-xx
Technical


contacts:
December xx, 1995 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures
William T. LeFave, NRR (301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR (301)415-1176 Attachments:
1. Referenced


Codes and Standards 2 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for


Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP
which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform


OFFICE SPLB/DSSA
its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.


l E SC:SPLB/DSSA
Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampers


N ) ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA
could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.


I C IRIV/DRS I N NAME WTLeFave*
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
GHubbard


* TECH ED/BCalure
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


CMcCracken
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of


*DATE 10/11/95 110/11/95
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
10/05/95 10/12/95 / /95 OFFICE .EBDRML SOCB/OPSIE


CB/DOP I l I C/EBDOS I l P I NAME TKoshy* EGoodwin*
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director


===Rbe ssel AChaffee DCrutchfield===
Division of Reactor Program Management
DATE 11/29/95 ' 10/12/95 / 1 / /95 / /95* See previous Concurrence


I OFFICIAL RECORD COPY zmy-2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


are referenced
Technical contacts:      William T. LeFave, NRR


in the information
(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR


notice.
(301)415-1176 Attachments:
        1. Referenced Codes and Standards2
        2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


IN 95-xx December xx, 1995 depressurization
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP


within the structures
OFFICE  SPLB/DSSA  l E SC:SPLB/DSSA      N )ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C IRIV/DRS I N


and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases which no redundancy
NAME    WTLeFave*        GHubbard *          TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *
DATE    10/11/95        110/11/95              10/05/95        10/12/95              / /95 OFFICE .EBDRML          SOCB/OPSIE            CB/DOP  I  lIC/EBDOS I      l    P        I


exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.
NAME    TKoshy*        EGoodwin*          Rbe ssel        AChaffee        DCrutchfield


Therefore, absence of appropriate
DATE    11/29/95  '    10/12/95              /            1 / /95              / /95


surveillance
* See previous Concurrence                                I


testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.This information
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY        zmy-
              2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are


notice requires no specific action or written response.
referenced in the information notice.


If you have any questions
IN 95-xx


about the information
December xx, 1995 depressurization within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
the tornado passes. In cases which no redundancy exists, a single failure of


contacts listed below or the appropriate
a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
safety system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.
Technical


contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR (301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, (301)415-1176 NRR Attachments:
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
1. Referenced


Codes and Standards 2 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of


OFFICE jSPLB/DSSA
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


I E SC:SPLB/DSSA
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director


I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA
Division of Reactor Program Management


I C RIV/DRS I N NAME WTLeFave*
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
GHubbard


* TECH ED/BCalure
Technical contacts:                William T. LeFave, NRR


CMcCracken
(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR


*DATE 10/11/95 10/11/95 10/05/95 10/12/95 I /95-__ _ __ .-I _ ,21. I. pfi a Ip I I.I nFFTrF DFrR/nfPM
(301)415-1176 Attachments:
                  1. Referenced Codes and Standards2
                  2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


I F ISC-nFrR/nflfPS
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP


I F IOnFrmOps-14 N IC/UELvL WIUI I I UIUKFPM I lI va ruv>- _ w.w_w__ __ ^_ ._____ ._ _ r._ _,. , NAME E TKoshy* EGoodwin*
OFFICE jSPLB/DSSA I E SC:SPLB/DSSA I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C                                              RIV/DRS I N
IRKteiJl IAChaffee


jDCrutchfield
NAME                WTLeFave*                GHubbard *              TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *
DATE                10/11/95                10/11/95                10/05/95            10/12/95                I  /95
                                                    _
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DATE 11/29/95 I10/12/95
nFFTrF
/ /95 \ / /95 5 I / /95_* See previous Concurrence


C)FFICIAL RECORD COPY 2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards
_va


are referenced
ruv>-  __ ^_.


in the information
w.w_w__    _____
                      DFrR/nfPM


notice.
. _ _    r._ _,.


I ..i-A -a -.1-IN 95-xx October xx, 1995 depressurization
I -F ISC-nFrR/nflfPS I, F                      IC/UELvL  WIUII    I UIUKFPM        I lI


within the structures
NAMEE              TKoshy*                EGoodwin*            IRKteiJl          IAChaffee            jDCrutchfield


and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases which no redundancy
DATE                11/29/95              I10/12/95                / /95      \        / /95    5  I    /  /95_


exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.
* See previous Concurrence


Therefore, absence of appropriate
C)FFICIAL RECORD COPY


surveillance
2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are


testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.This information
referenced in the information notice.


notice requires no specific action or written response.
I .       .i                          -A -a                                      -. 1- IN 95-xx


If you have any questions
October xx, 1995 depressurization within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after


about the information
the tornado passes. In cases which no redundancy exists, a single failure of


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of


contacts listed below or the appropriate
safety system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
Technical


contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR (301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR (301)415-1176 Attachments:
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
1. Referenced


Codes and Standards 2 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of


Notices OFFICE SPLB/DSSA
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


E SC:SPLB/DSSA
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director


I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA
Division of Reactor Program Management


I C RIV/DRS I N NAME jWTLeFave*
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
GHubbard


* TECH ED/BCalure
Technical contacts:                  William T. LeFave, NRR


CMcCracken
(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR


*DATE 110/11/95
(301)415-1176 Attachments:
10/11/95 10/05/95 10/12/95 I /95I_--_ -- _ _ Ac _ _- Am- __- _ Ac ._- A m Am __ m _-- A 9 11 OFFICE PECB/DRPM-I
          1. Referenced Codes and Standards2
          2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


E ISC:OECB/DOPS
OFFICE    SPLB/DSSA        E SC:SPLB/DSSA I N              ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C              RIV/DRS I N


I E I1ECB/DOPS
NAME    jWTLeFave*                GHubbard *              TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *
  DATE    110/11/95                10/11/95                  10/05/95              10/12/95          I     /95I_
    -  - _    --      _  _ Ac_  _-    Am-    __-  _ Ac


I N IC/OECB:DOPS
. _-      A  m Am __ m _--                A            9
11 OFFICE      PECB/DRPM-I E ISC:OECB/DOPS I E I1ECB/DOPS            I N IC/OECB:DOPS I        ID/DRPM        I I


I I D/DRPM I I NAME TKoshy dtL l EGoodwin*  
NAME     TKoshy dtL       l EGoodwin* .           I RKWib!el       IAChaffee              lDCrutchfield   l
.I RKWib!el I AChaffee lDCrutchfield


lDATE nI29i 95 10/12/95 11&& L /91S I / /95 4%, I / /95* See previous Concurrence
DATE            nI29i 95       10/12/95 11&& L               /91S     I / /95 4%, I / /95


OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards
* See previous Concurrence


are referenced
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


in the information
2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are


notice.}}
referenced in the information notice.}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 03:32, 24 November 2019

Design & Testing Deficiencies of Tornado Dampers at Nuclear Power Plants
ML031060290
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 01/25/1996
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-96-006, NUDOCS 9601190306
Download: ML031060290 (10)
v • d • e


Nf

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 25, 1996 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-06: DESIGN AND TESTING DEFICIENCIES OF TORNADO

DAMPERS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to the potential for inoperability of tornado

dampers because of either inadequacies in damper testing or deficiencies in

damper design. It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to

avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On March 2, 1994, the licensee for South Texas Project, Unit 1, reported a

condition to the NRC that could result in the rapid depressurization of

heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and buildings in the

event of a tornado (Licensee Event Report No.94-003). The licensee

discovered an interference between the plant exhaust vent tornado damper and a

gusset (duct work stru,..turdi stiffener). The gusset limited the closing

travel of the damper linkage in one damper section to 40 percent of full

stroke, thus preventing the damper from closing completely. The interference

was discovered during stroke testing in response to an NRC inspector

observation that there was no testing evidence to show that tornado dampers

would actuate as required. In response to that observation, the licensee

initiated changes to existing preventive maintenance work instructions for all

tornado dampers (15 per unit) to include manual stroking on a periodic basis.

Only one of the 30 dampers subsequently tested was found to be inoperable.

The originally planned periodic maintenance of tornado dampers at 10-year

intervals did not include any stroke or motion testing.

South Texas stated that rapid depressurization could result in the collapse of

the HVAC duct work and could prevent cooling of safety-related equipment. The

rapid depressurization could also cause unanalyzed internal pressure

differential conditions that might result in damage to safety-related

structures, systems, or components.

PDfJR A _oo 6 o1s

9601190306 aog3t

&H b l 21

IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 The licensee revised the preventive maintenance program to require preventive

maintenance on the tornado dampers every 2 years or at each refueling outage, depending on the specific damper function. The 2 year or refueling outage

check includes inspection, cleaning, lubricating, and stroking of the damper

while taking dynamometer measurements of the spring forces.

On October 22, 1993, the licensee for the River Bend Station reported a design

condition to the NRC (Licensee Event Report No.93-020) that could result in

loss of ventilation to several buildings after passage of a tornado. The

licensee determined through static pressure testing, that the air-exhaust

dampers for several buildings would not reopen after passage of a tornado.

The failure to reopen results from inadequate spring force on dampers to

overcome exhaust fan shutoff pressure. This condition was applicable to the

diesel generator building, the auxiliary building, the control building, the

fuel building, and the standby cooling tower.

The licensee evaluation at the River Bend Station revealed that the postulated

tornado event could cause loss of offsite power and could prevent the

air-intake dampers for the diesel generator from reopening. Other plant areas

were less susceptible to damage because of design features and/or alarms, followed by operator actions that could mitigate the consequences. The

air-exhaust tornado dampers in the diesel generator building were modified by

blocking them open. The licensee evaluated the equipment in the diesel

generator building and concluded that it would not be affected by

depressurization resulting from the tornado.

The licensee purchase specification for dampers required the dampers to be

capable of automatically returning to their normal operating position (open)

after the tornado passed. However, the specification did not specify the

design-bases conditions on the inlet side of the exhaust tornado dampers. The

static pressure that the damper counterweights would have to overcome was not

specified.

Discussion

Equipment such as tornado dampers may have been overlooked in development of

surveillance testing programs as tornado dampers are not generally considered

part of the HVAC system in which they are required to function. Tornado

dampers are more likely to be considered part of the structure in which they

are installed. Surveillance tests in the technical specifications may involve

damper operations during HVAC systems testing. However, specific NRC

requirements or guidelines for damper testing in general are limited and do

not extend to tornado dampers. Likewise, industry standards and guidelines

for testing of tornado dampers are also limited. Unlike other active safety- related dampers that are generally tested along with the HVAC system in which

they function, the licensees considered tornado dampers as passive devices

until they were called upon to perform their function.

'wO IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 When called on, certain dampers must close to prevent rapid depressurization

within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado a

passes. In cases for which no redundancy exists, a single failure of of safety

tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss

for

system function. Therclore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing

tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.

If

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. contact

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please of

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

4ennr . CrutCoto d rector

Division of Reactor rogram Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR

(301) 415-3285 Internet:wtllenrc.gov

Thomas Koshy, NRR

(301) 415-1176 Internet:txk@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

tr -;1

\ E

Attachment

IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

96-05 Partial Bypass of Shutdown 01/18/96 All holders of OLs or LPs

Cooling Flow from the for boiling water reactors

Reactor Vessel

96-04 Incident Reporting Require- 01/10/96 All radiography licensees

ments for Radiography and manufacturers of radio- Licensees graphy equipment

96-03 Main Steam Safety Valve 01/05/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Setpoint Variation as a for nuclear power reactors

Result of Thermal Effects

96-02 Inoperability of Power- 01/05/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Operated Relief Valves for PWRs

Masked by Downstream

Indications During Testing

96-01 Potential for High Post- 01/03/96 All holders of OLs or CPs

Accident Closed-Cycle for PWRs

Cooling Water Temperatures

to Disable Equipment

Important to Safety

95-58 10 CFR 34.20; Final 12/18/95 Industrial Radiography

Effective Date Licensees

95-57 Risk Impact Study Regarding 12/18/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

Maintenance During Low-Power for nuclear power reactors.

Operation and Shutdown

OL - Operating License

CP - Construction Permit

IN 96-06 January 25, 1996 When called on, certain dampers must close to prevent rapid depressurization

within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado

passes. In cases for which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a

tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of safety

system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for

tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

original signed by

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR

(301) 415-3285 Internet:wtl1@nrc.gov

Thomas Koshy, NRR

(301) 415-1176 Internet:txk@nrc.gov

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Tech Editor Reviewed 10/05/95 DOCUMENT NAME: 96-06.IN *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

To receive a copy of this document, hIdicate In the box: wC" - Copy without enclosures 'E' - Copy with enclosures "N" - No copy

OFFICE SPLB/DSSA PECB/DRPM C/PECB:DRPM

INAME WTLeFave* ITKoshy* AChaffee* Dtfkidhfield I

DATE 10/11/95 01/04/96 01/17/96 01/9/96 01/ /96 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN 96-xx

January xx, 1996 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures

and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for

which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform

its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.

Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampers

could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR

(301) 415-3285 Internet: wtl1@nrc.gov

Thomas Koshy, NRR

(301) 415-1176 Internet: txk@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP

OFFICE 1SPLB/DSSA E ISC:SPLB/DSSA I N lADM:PUB* I N IBC:SPLB/DSSA I C RIV/DS Ns

,

IJAMF IWTIPFavp* IGHubbard * ITECH EDIBCalurelmcLracten * I .I' W/rt l/L/r

DATE 110/11/95 110/11/95 j 10/05/95 i10/12/95 / /95 V 7 I

_--I _

nFFTCF IPECR/DRPM I E ISC:PECB/DOPS I E ICiPLCIB:UV I IU/UKIM I

NAME ITKoshy - IEGood-win e- IAChaffee IDCrutchfield

DATE 101/A/96 01/5 /96 e 01/17 /96 e 01/ /96

- bee previous Concurrence

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

I i;

IN 96-xx

January xx, 1996 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures

and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for

which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform

its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.

Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampe

could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.

This information notice requires no specific action or written r onse. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, p ase contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropria Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Dennis M. Cr chfield, Director

Division of eactor Program Management

Office of uclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, RR

(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, R

(301) 415-117 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Info ation Notices

nnri

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NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP /

OFFICE SPLB/DSSA I E SC:SPLB/D A I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C IRIV/DRS I N I

NAME WTLeFave* GHubbardJ TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken * l

DATE 10/11/95 10/11/9 1 10/05/95 10/12/95 / /95

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DATE 11/29/95 4 10/12A55 01/ /96 01/ /96

  • See previous G currence

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN 95-xx

December xx, 1995 They must then close to prevent rapid depressurization within the structures

and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after the tornado passes. In cases for

which no redundancy exists, a single failure of a tornado damper to perform

its safety function could result in a loss of safety system function.

Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance testing for tornado dampers

could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR

(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR

(301)415-1176 Attachments:

1. Referenced Codes and Standards2

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP

OFFICE SPLB/DSSA l E SC:SPLB/DSSA N )ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C IRIV/DRS I N

NAME WTLeFave* GHubbard * TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *

DATE 10/11/95 110/11/95 10/05/95 10/12/95 / /95 OFFICE .EBDRML SOCB/OPSIE CB/DOP I lIC/EBDOS I l P I

NAME TKoshy* EGoodwin* Rbe ssel AChaffee DCrutchfield

DATE 11/29/95 ' 10/12/95 / 1 / /95 / /95

  • See previous Concurrence I

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY zmy-

2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are

referenced in the information notice.

IN 95-xx

December xx, 1995 depressurization within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after

the tornado passes. In cases which no redundancy exists, a single failure of

a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of

safety system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance

testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR

(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR

(301)415-1176 Attachments:

1. Referenced Codes and Standards2

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\IN-DAMP

OFFICE jSPLB/DSSA I E SC:SPLB/DSSA I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C RIV/DRS I N

NAME WTLeFave* GHubbard * TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *

DATE 10/11/95 10/11/95 10/05/95 10/12/95 I /95

_

__ . _

- IIOnFrmOps-14 ,21.N I. apfiIp I I.I

nFFTrF

_va

ruv>- __ ^_.

w.w_w__ _____

DFrR/nfPM

. _ _ r._ _,.

I -F ISC-nFrR/nflfPS I, F IC/UELvL WIUII I UIUKFPM I lI

NAMEE TKoshy* EGoodwin* IRKteiJl IAChaffee jDCrutchfield

DATE 11/29/95 I10/12/95 / /95 \ / /95 5 I / /95_

  • See previous Concurrence

C)FFICIAL RECORD COPY

2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are

referenced in the information notice.

I . .i -A -a -. 1- IN 95-xx

October xx, 1995 depressurization within the structures and HVAC ductwork and then reopen after

the tornado passes. In cases which no redundancy exists, a single failure of

a tornado damper to perform its safety function could result in a loss of

safety system function. Therefore, absence of appropriate surveillance

testing for tornado dampers could lead to multiple failures in safety systems.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: William T. LeFave, NRR

(301) 415-3285 Thomas Koshy, NRR

(301)415-1176 Attachments:

1. Referenced Codes and Standards2

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

OFFICE SPLB/DSSA E SC:SPLB/DSSA I N ADM:PUB* I N BC:SPLB/DSSA I C RIV/DRS I N

NAME jWTLeFave* GHubbard * TECH ED/BCalure CMcCracken *

DATE 110/11/95 10/11/95 10/05/95 10/12/95 I /95I_

- - _ -- _ _ Ac_ _- Am- __- _ Ac

. _- A m Am __ m _-- A 9

11 OFFICE PECB/DRPM-I E ISC:OECB/DOPS I E I1ECB/DOPS I N IC/OECB:DOPS I ID/DRPM I I

NAME TKoshy dtL l EGoodwin* . I RKWib!el IAChaffee lDCrutchfield l

DATE nI29i 95 10/12/95 11&& L /91S I / /95 4%, I / /95

  • See previous Concurrence

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

2 See Exhibit 24 for the format to be used when codes or standards are

referenced in the information notice.


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