Information Notice 1992-65, Safety System Problems Caused by Modifications That Were Not Adequately Reviewed and Tested: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:v)UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:v)
                                  UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION_
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION_
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 6 September
                            WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 6 September 3, 1992          -
                                                        7    '
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-65:    SAFETY SYSTEM PROBLEM flCAUSED BY MODIFICATIONS


3, 1992 -7 'NRC INFORMATION
THAT WERE NOT ADEQUATE-V REVIEWED AND TESTED
 
NOTICE 92-65: SAFETY SYSTEM PROBLEM flCAUSED BY MODIFICATIONS
 
THAT WERE NOT ADEQUATE-V
 
REVIEWED AND TESTED


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
licenses or construction


permits for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
to problems caused by inadequate
 
review and testing of safety system modifications.
 
It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities'and
 
consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
The following
 
describes
 
two examples of safety system design errors that went undetected
 
since construction, because design changes were not thoroughly
 
reviewed and tested.On October 10, 1991, during post overhaul testing, personnel
 
at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, observed that one of the high-pressure
 
safety injection (HPSI) pumps was losing its lubricating


oil at a rate of more than 15 gallons per hour as a result of oil spraying from the bearings.
notice to alert addressees to problems caused by inadequate review and testing


The licensee found that the oil would always leak at this 'rate during emergency
of safety system modifications. It is expected that recipients will review


operation
the information for applicability to their facilities'and consider actions, as


because of excessive
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in


oil pressure caused by the simultaneous
this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific


operation
action or written response is required.


of two oil -pumps that-served
==Description of Circumstances==
The following describes two examples of safety system design errors that went


the HPSI pump. This condition
undetected since construction, because design changes were not thoroughly


had-existed
reviewed and tested.


since the plant began operation.
On October 10, 1991, during post overhaul testing, personnel at Arkansas


The bearings for each of the HPSI pumps are supplied with lubricating
Nuclear One, Unit 1, observed that one of the high-pressure safety injection


oil by two oil pumps, one attached directly to the HPSI pump itself and the other a separate electric backup pump. Originally
(HPSI) pumps was losing its lubricating oil at a rate of more than 15 gallons


the electric oil pumps were intended to be used during start up of a HPSI pump or to replace a malfunctioning
per hour as a result of oil spraying from the bearings. The licensee found


attached oil pump. The electric oil pumps could be started manually and would start automatically
that the oil would always leak at this 'rate during emergency operation because


when the oil pressure decreased
of excessive oil pressure caused by the simultaneous operation of two oil -
pumps that-served the HPSI pump. This condition had-existed since the plant


below a certain point. The licensee continues
began operation.


to use this method of control when the HPSI pumps are used for normal reactor water makeup. However, during construction, the licensee decided that the HPSI pumps would be more reliable if the electric lubricating
The bearings for each of the HPSI pumps are supplied with lubricating oil by


oil pumps ran continuously
two oil pumps, one attached directly to the HPSI pump itself and the other a


during emergency operation.
separate electric backup pump. Originally the electric oil pumps were


Consequently, the licensee modified the emergency
intended to be used during start up of a HPSI pump or to replace a


controls to keep 9208280105
malfunctioning attached oil pump. The electric oil pumps could be started
?DR J4E fltc6-S-O c a0 7 0-3 W I


IN 92-65 September
manually and would start automatically when the oil pressure decreased below a


3, 1992 the electric oil pumps-operating
certain point. The licensee continues to use this method of control when the


whenever an emergency
HPSI pumps are used for normal reactor water makeup. However, during


safety features actuation
construction, the licensee decided that the HPSI pumps would be more reliable


system (ESFAS) signal was present. Anticipating
if the electric lubricating oil pumps ran continuously during emergency


that the simultaneous
operation. Consequently, the licensee modified the emergency controls to keep


operation
9208280105      ?DR J4E              fltc6-S-O


of both oil pumps could cause excessive
c a0 7 0-3            WI


oil pressure, the licensee added an oil- pressure relief valve to the oil system. However, the relief valve settings were not appropriately
IN 92-65 September 3, 1992 the electric oil pumps-operating whenever an emergency safety features


selected to prevent oil spraying from the bearings.In September
actuation system (ESFAS) signal was present. Anticipating that the


1991, the Gulf States Utilities
simultaneous operation of both oil pumps could cause excessive oil pressure, the licensee added an oil- pressure relief valve to the oil system. However, the relief valve settings were not appropriately selected to prevent oil


Company, licensee for the River Bend Station, discovered
spraying from the bearings.


that the outlet valves for the hydrogen mixing system would immediately
In September 1991, the Gulf States Utilities Company, licensee for the River


close if an operator attempted
Bend Station, discovered that the outlet valves for the hydrogen mixing system


to start up the system by opening these valves when a loss-of-coolant
would immediately close if an operator attempted to start up the system by


accident (LOCA) signal was present. An interlock
opening these valves when a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) signal was


prevented
present. An interlock prevented the mixing system fans from operating with


the mixing system fans from operating
the outlet valves closed. Consequently, the hydrogen mixing system would have


with the outlet valves closed. Consequently, the hydrogen mixing system would have been inoperable
been inoperable if a LOCA signal were present. This condition had existed


if a LOCA signal were present. This condition
since the plant was constructed.
 
had existed since the plant was constructed.


The River Bend Station is a boiling water reactor with a Mark III containment
The River Bend Station is a boiling water reactor with a Mark III containment


structure.
structure. This containment structure consists of two chambers, a large outer


This containment
primary containment and a drywell which is inside the primary containment and


structure
surrounds the reactor vessel. This system suppresses the steam pressure


consists of two chambers, a large outer primary containment
released during a LOCA by directing the steam through the suppression pool


and a drywell which is inside the primary containment
water into the primary containment. After the initial pressure suppression is


and surrounds
complete following a LOCA, hydrogen created by the zirconium-water reaction


the reactor vessel. This system suppresses
would be mainly concentrated in the drywell. The hydrogen mixing system is


the steam pressure released during a LOCA by directing
provided to reduce the concentration of the hydrogen in the drywell by moving


the steam through the suppression
it into the primary containment where it is diluted and reduced in


pool water into the primary containment.
concentration by the hydrogen recombiners.


After the initial pressure suppression
The redundant hydrogen mixing systems each have two lines penetrating the


is complete following
drywell; an outlet line having a recirculating fan to draw suction from the


a LOCA, hydrogen created by the zirconium-water
drywell and an inlet line that allows diluted air to reenter the drywell.


reaction would be mainly concentrated
Each of these lines has two isolation valves which are normally closed during


in the drywell. The hydrogen mixing system is provided to reduce the concentration
plant operation. In 1983, during construction, the licensee added a LOCA


of the hydrogen in the drywell by moving it into the primary containment
interlock to the hydrogen mixing system that would automatically close all


where it is diluted and reduced in concentration
eight of the mixing system valves upon receiving a LOCA signal. In 1984, the


by the hydrogen recombiners.
licensee revised the control logic for the mixing system valves to


The redundant
automatically override a LOCA signal when the operator opened the drywell


hydrogen mixing systems each have two lines penetrating
inlet valves. However, the licensee did not provide this LOCA override


the drywell; an outlet line having a recirculating
capability for the outlet line valves.


fan to draw suction from the drywell and an inlet line that allows diluted air to reenter the drywell.Each of these lines has two isolation
Discussion


valves which are normally closed during plant operation.
In both of these cases, the licensee changed the design with the intention of


In 1983, during construction, the licensee added a LOCA interlock
increasing the reliability of safety systems. However, because the licensees


to the hydrogen mixing system that would automatically
did not adequately review and test the designs, these changes introduced


close all eight of the mixing system valves upon receiving
errors that could have prevented the systems from performing their safety


a LOCA signal. In 1984, the licensee revised the control logic for the mixing system valves to automatically
functions as intended.


override a LOCA signal when the operator opened the drywell inlet valves. However, the licensee did not provide this LOCA override capability
At Arkansas Nuclear One, the licensee intended to increase the reliability of


for the outlet line valves.Discussion
the HPSI system by causing both HPSI oil pumps to operate simultaneously when


In both of these cases, the licensee changed the design with the intention
an ESFAS signal was present. However, the oil pumps had apparently never been


of increasing
run simultaneously for any extended period untiltthe recent overhaul test.


the reliability
IN 92-65 September 3, 1992 The licensee routinely conducted the' required periodic pump surveillance tests


of safety systems. However, because the licensees did not adequately
with the HPSI operating in the normal-reactor makeup'mode with only one oil


review and test the designs, these changes introduced
pump running at a time. The licensee tested the effectiveness of the


errors that could have prevented
ESFAS signal during each refueling outage. However, the test only required


the systems from performing
verification that the test signal would actuate the HPSI system and did not


their safety functions
result in the simultaneous operation'of the two oil pumps for an extended


as intended.At Arkansas Nuclear One, the licensee intended to increase the reliability
time. As a result, neither of these tests revealed the oil leakage problem.


of the HPSI system by causing both HPSI oil pumps to operate simultaneously
The licensee estimated'that a HPSI 'pump would have performed satisfactorily


when an ESFAS signal was present. However, the oil pumps had apparently
for only 80 minutes without-operator action to replenish the oil or to stop


never been run simultaneously
the electric oil pumps. With an ESFAS signal present, the electric oil pumps


for any extended period untiltthe
cannot be stopped from the control room,'but must be'stopped by opening local


recent overhaul test.
power supply breakers.


IN 92-65 September
The licensee has modified the oil pressure relief'valve settings to minimize


3, 1992 The licensee routinely
the oil leakage. Procedures were established that instruct the operators to


conducted
stop the electric oil pumps 15 minutes after an ESFAS actuation of the pumps.


the' required periodic pump surveillance
At River Bend, the control logic to automatically close all of the mixing


tests with the HPSI operating
system valves was provided to ensure that the drywell integrity would be


in the normal-reactor
restored if a LOCA occurred during a mixing system test with the valves open.


makeup'mode
Apparently, the LOCA override for the inlet valves was provided later to


with only one oil pump running at a time. The licensee tested the effectiveness
permit the drywell to be depressurized to clear a false LOCA signal that might


of the ESFAS signal during each refueling
be caused by a loss of offsite power. The false LOCA signal could be


outage. However, the test only required verification
generated by the drywell pressure rise that would accompany a loss of drywell


that the test signal would actuate the HPSI system and did not result in the simultaneous
cooling. Since the drywell could be depressurized without opening the outlet


operation'of
valves, the LOCA override was not provided for these valves. The need to open


the two oil pumps for an extended time. As a result, neither of these tests revealed the oil leakage problem.The licensee estimated'that
the outlet to operate the hydrogen mixing was apparently not considered for


a HPSI 'pump would have performed
this change. Normal surveillance testing did not reveal this design error


satisfactorily
because it was never conducted with a LOCA signal present.


for only 80 minutes without-operator
When the licensee discovered this design error, it declared both hydrogen


action to replenish
mixing trains inoperable and commenced shutting down the reactor. The


the oil or to stop the electric oil pumps. With an ESFAS signal present, the electric oil pumps cannot be stopped from the control room,'but
licensee then developed a LOCA bypass procedure for the hydrogen mixing


must be'stopped
system.


by opening local power supply breakers.The licensee has modified the oil pressure relief'valve
These events highlight the importance of thoroughly reviewing any safety- related design change, including considering the effect of the change on all


settings to minimize the oil leakage. Procedures
related systems. The events also show the need for completely testing the


were established
systems affected by the design change under conditions that simulate as nearly


that instruct the operators
as possible those conditions that are expected to exist when the systems are


to stop the electric oil pumps 15 minutes after an ESFAS actuation
needed.


of the pumps.At River Bend, the control logic to automatically
IN 92-65 September 3, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


close all of the mixing system valves was provided to ensure that the drywell integrity
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


would be restored if a LOCA occurred during a mixing system test with the valves open.Apparently, the LOCA override for the inlet valves was provided later to permit the drywell to be depressurized
-the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear


to clear a false LOCA signal that might be caused by a loss of offsite power. The false LOCA signal could be generated
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


by the drywell pressure rise that would accompany
harles E. Rossi, Director'
                                    Division of-Operational Events Assessment


a loss of drywell cooling. Since the drywell could be depressurized
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


without opening the outlet valves, the LOCA override was not provided for these valves. The need to open the outlet to operate the hydrogen mixing was apparently
Technical contact:  Thomas F. Westerman, RIV


not considered
(817) 860-8145 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


for this change. Normal surveillance
V)Attachment
 
testing did not reveal this design error because it was never conducted
 
with a LOCA signal present.When the licensee discovered
 
this design error, it declared both hydrogen mixing trains inoperable
 
and commenced
 
shutting down the reactor. The licensee then developed
 
a LOCA bypass procedure
 
for the hydrogen mixing system.These events highlight
 
the importance
 
of thoroughly
 
reviewing
 
any safety-related design change, including
 
considering
 
the effect of the change on all related systems. The events also show the need for completely
 
testing the systems affected by the design change under conditions
 
that simulate as nearly as possible those conditions
 
that are expected to exist when the systems are needed.
 
IN 92-65 September
 
3, 1992 This information


notice requires no specific action or written response.
IN 92-65 September 3, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


If you have any questions
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


about the information
Information                                    Date of


in this notice, please contact-the technical
Notice No.              Subject                Issuance    Issued to


contact listed below or the appropriate
92-64          Nozzle Ring Settings            08/28/92    All holders of OLs or CPs


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.harles E. Rossi, Director'Division of-Operational
on Low Pressure Water-                      for nuclear power reactors.


===Events Assessment===
Relief Valves
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
92-63          Cracked Insulators in          08/26/92    All holders of OLs or CPs


contact: Thomas F. Westerman, RIV (817) 860-8145 Attachment:
ASL Dry Type Transformers                    for nuclear power reactors.
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices
Manufactured by Westing- house Electric Corporation


V)Attachment
92-62          Emergency Response              08/24/92    All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory


IN 92-65 September
Information Require-                         Commission licensees.


3, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
ments for Radioactive


NOTICES Information
Material Shipments


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 92-64 Nozzle on Low Relief Ring Settings Pressure Water-Valves 92-63 92-62 92-61 60 92-59 92-58 Cracked Insulators
92-61           Loss of High Head              08/20/92     All holders of OLs or CPs


in ASL Dry Type Transformers
Safety Injection                            for nuclear power reactors.


Manufactured
60          Valve Stem Failure              08/20/92    All holders of OLs or CPs


by Westing-house Electric Corporation
Caused by Embrittlement                      for pressurized water


Emergency
reactors (PWRs).


Response Information
92-59          Horizontally-Installed          08/18/92    All holders of OLs or CPs


Require-ments for Radioactive
Motor-Operated Gate                          for nuclear power reactors.


Material Shipments Loss of High Head Safety Injection Valve Stem Failure Caused by Embrittlement
Valves


Horizontally-Installed
92-58          Uranium Hexafluoride            08/12/92    All Fuel Cycle Licensees.


Motor-Operated
Cylinders - Deviations


===Gate Valves Uranium Hexafluoride===
in Coupling Welds
Cylinders


-Deviations
92-57            Radial Cracking of-            08/11/92    All holders of OLs or CPs


in Coupling Welds 08/28/92 08/26/92 08/24/92 08/20/92 08/20/92 08/18/92 08/12/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Shroud Support Access                        for boiling water reactors


Commission
Hole Cover Welds                            (BWRs).


licensees.
92-56            Counterfeit Valves in          08/06/92    All holders of OLs or CPs


All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized
the Commercial Grade                        for nuclear power reactors.


water reactors (PWRs).All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All Fuel Cycle Licensees.
Supply System


92-57 Radial Cracking of-Shroud Support Access Hole Cover Welds 08/11/92 All holders for boiling (BWRs).of OLs or CPs water reactors 92-56 92-55 Counterfeit
92-55          Current Fire Endurance          07/27/92   All holders of OLs or CPs


Valves in the Commercial
Test Results for                            for nuclear power reactors.


Grade Supply System Current Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermo-Lag
Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier


Fire Barrier Material 08/06/92 07/27/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating
Material


License CP = Construction
OL = Operating License


Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:21, 24 November 2019

Safety System Problems Caused by Modifications That Were Not Adequately Reviewed and Tested
ML031200373
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/03/1992
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-065, NUDOCS 9208280105
Download: ML031200373 (5)


v)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION_

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 6 September 3, 1992 -

7 '

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-65: SAFETY SYSTEM PROBLEM flCAUSED BY MODIFICATIONS

THAT WERE NOT ADEQUATE-V REVIEWED AND TESTED

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to problems caused by inadequate review and testing

of safety system modifications. It is expected that recipients will review

the information for applicability to their facilities'and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in

this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

The following describes two examples of safety system design errors that went

undetected since construction, because design changes were not thoroughly

reviewed and tested.

On October 10, 1991, during post overhaul testing, personnel at Arkansas

Nuclear One, Unit 1, observed that one of the high-pressure safety injection

(HPSI) pumps was losing its lubricating oil at a rate of more than 15 gallons

per hour as a result of oil spraying from the bearings. The licensee found

that the oil would always leak at this 'rate during emergency operation because

of excessive oil pressure caused by the simultaneous operation of two oil -

pumps that-served the HPSI pump. This condition had-existed since the plant

began operation.

The bearings for each of the HPSI pumps are supplied with lubricating oil by

two oil pumps, one attached directly to the HPSI pump itself and the other a

separate electric backup pump. Originally the electric oil pumps were

intended to be used during start up of a HPSI pump or to replace a

malfunctioning attached oil pump. The electric oil pumps could be started

manually and would start automatically when the oil pressure decreased below a

certain point. The licensee continues to use this method of control when the

HPSI pumps are used for normal reactor water makeup. However, during

construction, the licensee decided that the HPSI pumps would be more reliable

if the electric lubricating oil pumps ran continuously during emergency

operation. Consequently, the licensee modified the emergency controls to keep

9208280105 ?DR J4E fltc6-S-O

c a0 7 0-3 WI

IN 92-65 September 3, 1992 the electric oil pumps-operating whenever an emergency safety features

actuation system (ESFAS) signal was present. Anticipating that the

simultaneous operation of both oil pumps could cause excessive oil pressure, the licensee added an oil- pressure relief valve to the oil system. However, the relief valve settings were not appropriately selected to prevent oil

spraying from the bearings.

In September 1991, the Gulf States Utilities Company, licensee for the River

Bend Station, discovered that the outlet valves for the hydrogen mixing system

would immediately close if an operator attempted to start up the system by

opening these valves when a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) signal was

present. An interlock prevented the mixing system fans from operating with

the outlet valves closed. Consequently, the hydrogen mixing system would have

been inoperable if a LOCA signal were present. This condition had existed

since the plant was constructed.

The River Bend Station is a boiling water reactor with a Mark III containment

structure. This containment structure consists of two chambers, a large outer

primary containment and a drywell which is inside the primary containment and

surrounds the reactor vessel. This system suppresses the steam pressure

released during a LOCA by directing the steam through the suppression pool

water into the primary containment. After the initial pressure suppression is

complete following a LOCA, hydrogen created by the zirconium-water reaction

would be mainly concentrated in the drywell. The hydrogen mixing system is

provided to reduce the concentration of the hydrogen in the drywell by moving

it into the primary containment where it is diluted and reduced in

concentration by the hydrogen recombiners.

The redundant hydrogen mixing systems each have two lines penetrating the

drywell; an outlet line having a recirculating fan to draw suction from the

drywell and an inlet line that allows diluted air to reenter the drywell.

Each of these lines has two isolation valves which are normally closed during

plant operation. In 1983, during construction, the licensee added a LOCA

interlock to the hydrogen mixing system that would automatically close all

eight of the mixing system valves upon receiving a LOCA signal. In 1984, the

licensee revised the control logic for the mixing system valves to

automatically override a LOCA signal when the operator opened the drywell

inlet valves. However, the licensee did not provide this LOCA override

capability for the outlet line valves.

Discussion

In both of these cases, the licensee changed the design with the intention of

increasing the reliability of safety systems. However, because the licensees

did not adequately review and test the designs, these changes introduced

errors that could have prevented the systems from performing their safety

functions as intended.

At Arkansas Nuclear One, the licensee intended to increase the reliability of

the HPSI system by causing both HPSI oil pumps to operate simultaneously when

an ESFAS signal was present. However, the oil pumps had apparently never been

run simultaneously for any extended period untiltthe recent overhaul test.

IN 92-65 September 3, 1992 The licensee routinely conducted the' required periodic pump surveillance tests

with the HPSI operating in the normal-reactor makeup'mode with only one oil

pump running at a time. The licensee tested the effectiveness of the

ESFAS signal during each refueling outage. However, the test only required

verification that the test signal would actuate the HPSI system and did not

result in the simultaneous operation'of the two oil pumps for an extended

time. As a result, neither of these tests revealed the oil leakage problem.

The licensee estimated'that a HPSI 'pump would have performed satisfactorily

for only 80 minutes without-operator action to replenish the oil or to stop

the electric oil pumps. With an ESFAS signal present, the electric oil pumps

cannot be stopped from the control room,'but must be'stopped by opening local

power supply breakers.

The licensee has modified the oil pressure relief'valve settings to minimize

the oil leakage. Procedures were established that instruct the operators to

stop the electric oil pumps 15 minutes after an ESFAS actuation of the pumps.

At River Bend, the control logic to automatically close all of the mixing

system valves was provided to ensure that the drywell integrity would be

restored if a LOCA occurred during a mixing system test with the valves open.

Apparently, the LOCA override for the inlet valves was provided later to

permit the drywell to be depressurized to clear a false LOCA signal that might

be caused by a loss of offsite power. The false LOCA signal could be

generated by the drywell pressure rise that would accompany a loss of drywell

cooling. Since the drywell could be depressurized without opening the outlet

valves, the LOCA override was not provided for these valves. The need to open

the outlet to operate the hydrogen mixing was apparently not considered for

this change. Normal surveillance testing did not reveal this design error

because it was never conducted with a LOCA signal present.

When the licensee discovered this design error, it declared both hydrogen

mixing trains inoperable and commenced shutting down the reactor. The

licensee then developed a LOCA bypass procedure for the hydrogen mixing

system.

These events highlight the importance of thoroughly reviewing any safety- related design change, including considering the effect of the change on all

related systems. The events also show the need for completely testing the

systems affected by the design change under conditions that simulate as nearly

as possible those conditions that are expected to exist when the systems are

needed.

IN 92-65 September 3, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

-the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

harles E. Rossi, Director'

Division of-Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Thomas F. Westerman, RIV

(817) 860-8145 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

V)Attachment

IN 92-65 September 3, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

92-64 Nozzle Ring Settings 08/28/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

on Low Pressure Water- for nuclear power reactors.

Relief Valves

92-63 Cracked Insulators in 08/26/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

ASL Dry Type Transformers for nuclear power reactors.

Manufactured by Westing- house Electric Corporation

92-62 Emergency Response 08/24/92 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Information Require- Commission licensees.

ments for Radioactive

Material Shipments

92-61 Loss of High Head 08/20/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Safety Injection for nuclear power reactors.

60 Valve Stem Failure 08/20/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Caused by Embrittlement for pressurized water

reactors (PWRs).

92-59 Horizontally-Installed 08/18/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Motor-Operated Gate for nuclear power reactors.

Valves

92-58 Uranium Hexafluoride 08/12/92 All Fuel Cycle Licensees.

Cylinders - Deviations

in Coupling Welds

92-57 Radial Cracking of- 08/11/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Shroud Support Access for boiling water reactors

Hole Cover Welds (BWRs).

92-56 Counterfeit Valves in 08/06/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

the Commercial Grade for nuclear power reactors.

Supply System

92-55 Current Fire Endurance 07/27/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Test Results for for nuclear power reactors.

Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier

Material

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit