Information Notice 1992-17, NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed at Nuclear Power Plants in Response to Generic Letter 89-10

NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed at Nuclear Power Plants in Response to Generic Letter 89-10

ML031200576
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	02/26/1992
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
GL-89-010 IN-92-017, NUDOCS 9202190371
Download: ML031200576 (16)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 26, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-17: NRC INSPECTIONS OF PROGRAMS BEING DEVELOPED

AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN RESPONSE TO

GENERIC LETTER 89-10

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice

to alert addressees to the general conclusions derived from the NRC inspections

of the programs being developed at nuclear power plants in response to

Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and

Surveillance." It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to

avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

Background

In GL 89-10 (June 28, 1989), the NRC staff requested that holders of nuclear

power plant operating licenses and construction permits ensure the capability

of motor-operated valves (MOVs) in safety-related systems by reviewing MOV

design bases, verifying MOV switch settings initially and periodically, testing

MOYs under design basis conditions where practicable, improving evaluations of

MOV failures and necessary corrective action, and determining trends of MOV

problems. The NRC staff requested that licensees complete the GL 89-10 program

by the end of the third refueling outage or 5 years from the issuance of the

generic letter, whichever is later. On June 13, 1990, the NRC staff issued

Supplement 1 to GL 89-10 to provide detailed information on the results of

public workshops held to discuss the generic letter. On August 3, 1990, the

NRC staff issued Supplement 2 to GL 89-10 to allow licensees additional time to

review and to incorporate the information provided in Supplement 1 into their

programs in response to the generic letter. Upon reviewing the results of

NRC-sponsored MOV tests, the NRC staff issued Supplement 3 to GL 89-10 on

October 25, 1990, which requested licensees of boiling water reactor (BWR)

nuclear plants to take action in advance of the GL 89-10 schedule to resolve

concerns about the capability of MOYs used for containment isolation in the

steam supply line of the high pressure coolant injection and reactor core

isolation cooling systems, in the supply line of the reactor water cleanup

system, and in other systems directly connected to the 'reactor vessel. In

4 ek219371 t= v dsO]- qWog Xe

IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 Supplement 4 to GL 89-10, the NRC staff indicated that BWR licensees need not

address inadvertent MOY operation in their GL 89-10 programs. The NRC staff is

considering whether or not similar actions should be taken regarding the need

for licensees of pressurized-water reactor (PWR) nuclear plants to address the

inadvertent operation of MOVs in their programs to respond to GL 89-10.

Description of Circumstances

The NRC staff has conducted inspections at more than 30 nuclear power plant

sites of programs being developed by, licensees in response to GL 89-10. The

reports of those inspections are available in the NRC Public Document Room. In

performing the inspections, the NRC staff has followed Temporary Instruction

(TI) 2515/109 of January 14, 1991, Inspection Requirements for

Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Sur- veillance.' Part 1 of TI 2515/109 provides guidance for reviewing the program

being established.by theLlicensee. in response to GL 89-10, and.Part 2 provides

guidance for reviewing program implementation. The NRC has focused these

inspections on reviewing the GL 89-10 programs (Part 1 of TI 2515/109). The

staff is issuing this information notice to provide the more significant

results of those NRC inspections.

In GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested that licensees prepare descriptions of

their programs established in response to GL 89-10 within 1 year after the

generic letter was issued or by the first refueling outage after

December 28, 1989, whichever was later. The NRC staff's response to

Question 44 in Supplement 1 to GL 89-10 provided guidance on information

expected in the program descriptions. The NRC inspectors found-some licensees

to have program descriptions that are thorough while other licensees did not.

Attachment 1 Is a discussion of the inspection findings pertaining to the

recommendations of GL 89-10.

Related Generic Communications

In addition to NRC Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve

Testing and Surveillance," and its supplements, the NRC has addressed.this and

related topics in NRC Information Notices.89-88, "Recent NRC-Sponsored Testing

of Motor-Operated Valves;" 90-40,."Results of NRC-Sponsored Testing of

Motor-Operated Valves;" 90-72, "Testing of Parallel Disc Gate Valves in

Europe;" and 91-61, "Preliminary Results of Validation Testing of Motor- Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment.".

IN 92X17 February 26, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the Information in this notice, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

arIes E. Ross D rec o

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR

(301) 504-2794 Attachments:

1. Inspection Findings Pertaining to the Recommendations Contained In

Generic Letter 89-10

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 INSPECTION FINDINGS PERTAINING

TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN GENERIC LETTER 89-10

Administration

Some licensees have not ensured adequate management oversight and direction for

the motor-operated valve (MOY) program. One licensee had contracted an

internal audit that revealed problems with the MOY program similar to those

found subsequently during the NRC inspection, but the licensee had not taken

action to correct the deficiencies. The safety significance of the MOV program

and the extensive resources needed to develop and implement the program make it

imperative that licensee's management closely monitor its staff's activities.

Scope

In issuirng Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, the NRC staff intended that the scope

include all safety-related MOVs and other MOVs in safety-related systems. In

Supplement 1 to GL 89-10, the NRC staff limited the scope of GL 89-10 to

safety-related MOYs and other MOVs that are position-changeable in safety- related piping systems, as well as safety-related MOVs that might be in

nonsafety-related piping systems. The NRC staff's response to Questions 3-13 in Supplement 1 to GL 89-10 provided further guidance on the scope of GL 89-10.

For example, in the NRC staff's response to Question 4 in Supplement 1, the

staff defined "position-changeable" as any MOV in a safety-related piping

system that is not blocked from inadvertent operation from the control room.

In Supplement 4 to GL 89-10, the NRC staff indicated that licensees for boiling

water reactor (BWR) plants need not address inadvertent MOV operation in their

GL 89-10 programs. The NRC staff is considering whether or not similar actions

should be taken regarding the need for the licensees of pressurized-water

reactor (PWR) plants to address inadvertent MOV operation in their programs to

respond to GL 89-10.

The NRC inspectors found most licensees to be establishing the scope of their

GL 89-10 programs consistent with the recommendations of the generic letter.

However, some licensees needed to improve the documentation of their justifi- cation for excluding particular MOVs from the GL 89-10 program.

Design-Basis Reviews

In recommended action "a" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested the licensees to

review and document the design basis for operating each MOV within the generic

letter program to determine the maximum differential pressure and flow (and

other factors) expected for both normal operations and abnormal conditions.

The NRC staff's response to Questions 14 to 18 and 36 in Supplement 1 to

GL 89-10 provides guidance on performing design-basis reviews under GL 89-10.

Many licensees are appropriately reviewing plant documentation such as the

final safety analysis report and the technical specifications as part of their

design-basis reviews. However, some licensees had failed to identify

worst-case conditions for various design-basis scenarios. Some licensees have

's.- Attachment 1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 assumed nominal reactor pressure for differential pressure across MOVs in lines

directly connected to the reactor vessel without evaluating whether this

differential pressure bounds the worst-case MOV design-basis differential

pressure. At certain facilities, the licensee found errors in the previous

design basis determinations for many MOVs that would have affected the cap- ability of the MOVs to perform their safety function if called upon under

design-basis conditions.

Some licensees focused on differential pressure and had not adequately ad- dressed other design-basis parameters such as flow, fluid temperature, ambient

temperature, and the effects of seismic and dynamic events. Although differen- tial pressure is the primary design-basis parameter used to predict the thrust

requirements in the industry's equations, the other design-basis parameters are

needed to ensure that the test results demonstrate that the MOV would operate

under design-basis conditions. Some licensees have not ensured that generic

studies of design-basis differential pressure apply to specific plants.

MOY Sizing and Switch Settings

In recommended action "b" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested licensees to

review and revise, as necessary, the methods for selecting and setting all MOV

switches. The NRC staff's response to Questions 19-21 in Supplement 1 to

GL 89-10 provides guidance on selecting and setting MOV switches.

The recommendations of GL 89-10 for selecting and setting MOV switches apply to

switches for torque, torque bypass, limit, and thermal overload. The licensees

are using various methods to determine the proper size of MOVs and their

appropriate torque switch settings. Some licensees have increased the valve

factors assumed in the industry's equations used to predict the thrust required

to operate the valves to reflect experience throughout the industry and at

their specific plant. However, other licensees continue to use old guidance

from valve vendors and manufacturers in estimating the thrust requirements that

may be found inadequate during design-basis tests.

The NRC inspectors found that licensees for various facilities had not done the

following when establishing methods to size MOVs and set their switches:

(1) Provide justification for assumptions regarding stem friction coefficients

and changes in stem friction over the lubrication interval

(2) Consider effects that can reduce the thrust delivered by the motor opera- tor under high differential pressure and flow conditions in relation to

the thrust delivered under no-load conditions

(3) Consider the effects of ambient temperature on motor output and thermal

overload sizing

(4) Demonstrate applicability of industry's databases in predicting thrust

requirements

(5) Consider inertia in establishing the maximum settings for torque switches

Attachment 1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 (6) Demonstrate applicability of contractors' studies of actuator capability

(7) Demonstrate applicability of generic motor curves for specific motors

(8) Provide justification for removing conservatisms (such as the application

factor) from the industry's standard sizing calculations

(9) Consider torque switch repeatability

(10) Consider uncertainties regarding the accuracy of MOV diagnostic equipment.

Some licensees have had problems in performing MOV sizing and switch setting

calculations because of (1) incorrect spring packs installed in MOVs,

(2) incorrect MOV data on the motor or actuator nameplates and in the procure- ment documents from the vendor, and (3) spring packs with different performance

characteristics from different manufacturers, but with the same part number.

One licensee determined that the MOV sizing and switch setting activities to

establish motor operator capability had not adequately addressed the effect of

those activities on other MOY safety functions. These activities had hindered

the ability of the clutch of certain MOYs to be released to enable the MOV to

be manually operated in the event of an evacuation of the control room.

Many licensees are updating their degraded voltage studies to ensure that the

worst-case minimum voltage available at the motor has been determined for each

MOV. Some licensees had not ensured that their assumptions of minimum voltage

available at the MOYs were consistent with their licensing commitments in

safety analyses. Some licensees did not justify the assumptions for the

starting point for the degraded voltage calculations, current used to calculate

cable losses, losses caused by the resistance of thermal overload devices in

the circuit, or the effects on MOV stroke time under degraded voltage condi- tions. Of particular significance, the inspectors found one licensee to be

assuming an excessively small locked-rotor power factor (0.2) in the motor for

use in the calculation of voltage drop from the motor control center to the

MOV. The licensee's selection of this power factor was based on guidance in an

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' standard that was not

applicable to the size of motors typically used to operate valves in nuclear

power plants. The assumption of an excessively small power factor causes an

underestimation of the cable voltage drop and may result in the overestimation

of MOV capability under design-basis conditions.

Licensees are improving their documentation of current and required MOV switch

settings, but some weaknesses remain. For example, one licensee had simplified

its control over changes to torque switch settings to expedite the process but, In so doing, caused the concern that the quality assurance department may not

participate adequately in accepting those changes. Some of the weakness in

documenting torque switch settings appears to result from the difficulty in

reading the switches. Some licensees have raised torque switch settings for

MOVs above the manufacturer's maximum specified value without performing an

adequate safety analysis in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59.

-'- Attachment 1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 Design-Basis Differential Pressure and Flow Testing

In recommended action "c" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested

test MOVs within the generic letter program in situ under licensees to

differential pressure and flow conditions. The NRC staff their design-basis

methods to be used to demonstrate the capability of the allows alternate

MOV if testing in situ

under those conditions is not practicable. The NRC staff

licensees follow a two-stage approach for a situation in suggested that the

testing in situ is not practicable and the licensees couldwhich design-basis

not justify an

alternate method of demonstrating MOV capability. In performing

approach, a licensee would evaluate the capability of the the two-stage

data available and then would obtain applicable test data MOV using the best

of the generic letter. The NRC staff's response to Questionswithin the schedule

Supplement 1 to GL 89-10 provides guidance on design-basis 22-32 and 37 in

two-stage approach. testing and the

Many licensees have committed to test MOVs within the scope

program under design-basis conditions, where practicable. of their GL 89-10

Some

indicated that most MOVs can be tested at or near design-basis licensees have

Other licensees (primarily those of BWR plants) estimate conditions.

that a much smaller

percentage of MOVs can be tested at or near design-basis

conditions. These

licensees have not thoroughly evaluated the dbility to conduct

design-basis or maximum achievable conditions. MOV tests under

Licensees who have begun differential pressure and flow testing

MOYs to require more thrust to operate than predicted by have found some

dard equation with typical valve factors (such as 0.3 for the industry's stan- flexible wedge gate

valves) assumed in the pdst. For example, the Alabama Power

licensee of the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, found less Company, the

than half of the

55 flexible wedge gate valves tested under differential pressure

conditions to have their thrust requirements bounded by the and flow

equation with a 0.3 valve factor. The industry's test results industry's standard

conclusions of NRC-sponsored MOV research that the industry's confirm the

determining the size of MOYs and setting their torque switches past methods of

for some MOVs. were inadequate

The NRC staff has found weaknesses in the licensees' procedures

the differential pressure and flow tests, the acceptance criteriafor conducting

in evaluating the capability of the MOV to perform its safety for the tests

design-basis conditions, and the process for incorporating function under

into the methodology used by the licensee in predicting MOY the test results

thrust require- ments. The NRC regulations and the plant's technical specifications

establish requirements for licensees' actions and reporting (TS)

equipment is determined to be, or has been, unable to perform when safety-related

functions. Some licensees did not appear aware of their its safety

MOV operability following testing performed under their obligations to address

response to GL 89-10. For example, some licensees have notprograms established in

results of MOV tests to verify the capability of the tested been evaluating the

their safety functions under design-basis conditions and MOYs to perform

adequacy of their methodology to size and set other MOYs. to evaluate the

appeared to discard test data as suspect without careful Some licensees

evaluation. The NRC

Attachment 1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 staff has also found a lack of coordination among licensees in disseminating

and using MOV test data. For example, some licensees are not considering tests

conducted by other licensees which might reflect on the adequacy of their

assumptions in predicting thrust requirements.

For MOVs that cannot be tested under design-basis differential pressure and

flow conditions, the NRC inspectors have found that some licensees are not

following their commitments to the two-stage approach (discussed in

Supplement 1 to GL 89-10) to test those MOVs at the maximum differential

pressure and flow achievable. If the test pressure and flow are near to the

design-basis conditions, the licensee may be able to Justify extrapolating from

the test results to demonstrate the capability of the MOY to perform its safety

function under design-basis conditions. Where the MOV cannot be tested near

design-basis conditions, the licensee can use the results of the test at

maximum achievable conditions to help confirm valve factor assumptions in its

sizing and switch setting methodology and to set the MOV using the best avail- able data. The licensee may also find TS actions and reporting requirements

that take effect as a result of tests of MOVs at less than full design-basis

differential pressure and flow conditions if those tests reveal that the MOYs

could not perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions.

Testing MOVs at maximum achievable conditions is especially helpful in estab- lishing a plant-specific database if the licensee estimates that only a small

percentage of 14OVs can be tested at or near design-basis conditions.

Some licensees who, in their initial response to GL 89-10, committed to imple- ment the recommendations of GL 89-10 to test MOYs where practicable have

indicated an interest in grouping certain MOVs to reduce the amount of testing

(although testing of those MOVs would be practicable). Item 1. of GL 89-10

states that licensees shall submit any changes to scheduled commitments, and

that revised schedules or alternative actions may be implemented without NRC

approval with justification retained on site.

In their initial responses to GL 89-10, some licensees stated that they would

attempt to group MOVs to limit the extent of design-basis testing. The prelim- inary results of design-basis tests at several plants (for example, Catawba, Farley, Oconee and Surry) Indicated that apparently identical MOYs performed

significantly different uider high differential pressure and flow conditions.

This could cause difficulty in grouping MOVs in such a manner that a small

sample of MOV tests can be used to demonstrate that all MOVs can perform their

safety functions under design-basis conditions.

The motor operators for most gate valves are set to close on torque to provide

adequate leakage control. Licensees are attempting to develop a method to

ensure that MOVs closed using the limit switch meet the requisite leakage

limitations in safety analyses without causing an MOV overstress condition.

Periodic Verification of MOV Capability

In recommended action 'Id"of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested that licensees

prepare or revise procedures to ensure that adequate MOV switch settings are

Attachment 1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 determined and maintained throughout the life of the plant.

of GL 89-10, the NRC staff recommended that the surveillance In paragraph "ij

on (1) the safety importance and (2) the maintenance and interval be based

the MOV, but that the interval not exceed 5 years or 3 performance history of

refueling outages, whichever is later. Further, the staff stated that the

capability

should be verified if the MOV Is replaced, modified, or overhauled of the MOY

that the existing test results do not represent the MOV. to an extent

response to Questions 33-35 and 38 in Supplement 1 to GL The NRC staff's

89-10 provides

guidance on periodically verifying MOY switches and performing

completing maintenance. tests after

The recommendation of GL 89-10 for verifying periodically

switch settings includes torque, torque bypass, limit, and the adequacy of MOV

Many licensees have stdted that they will attempt to use thermal overloads.

tests of MOVs with

diagnostic equipment under zero differential pressure and

(static conditions) to demonstrate the adequacy of torque flow conditions

the continued capability of MOYs to perform their safety switch settings and

design-basis conditions. However, to date, none of those functions under

licensees have pro- vided justification for applying the results of tests conducted

conditions to demonstrate design-basis capability. These under static

licensees appear to

be waiting on yet to be developed generic justification for

differential pressure and flow testing. static or low

At least one licensee indicated an intent to clean and lubricate

before performing periodic verification testing. This would the valve stem

with demonstrating that the MOV had been set adequately be inconsistent

performing its function at the end of the test interval. and was capable of

In GL 89-10, the NRC staff stated that testing at design-basis

not be repeated unless the MOV is replaced, modified, or conditions need

extent that the licensee considers that the existing test overhauled to the

representative of the MOV in its modified configuration. results are not

Many

improving their methods to demonstrate that the MOVs are capable licensees are

their safety functions under design-basis conditions following of performing

maintenance.

MOV Failures, Corrective Actions, and Trending

In recommended action "h" of GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested

analyze or justify each MOV failure and corrective action. that licensees

requested that the documentation include the results and The staff also

history

as-found deteriorated condition, malfunction, test, inspection, of each

repair, or alteration. The staff noted that the licensee analysis, report all documentation in accordance with the plant's must retain and

staff also suggested that the material be examined every requirements. The

2 years or after each

refueling outage after the program is Implemented as part

of the monitoring and

feedback effort to establish trends of MOV operability.

provide the basis on which the licensee can revise the These trends could

testing frequency

established to verify periodically that the MOV has adequate

NRC staff indicated that the system should be well-structured capability. The

capture, and share history datd on individual components. and should track, response to Questions 39 and 40 in Supplement 1 to GL 89-10 The NRC staff's

on identifying trends of MOV problems. provides guidance

Attachment 1 IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 The NRC inspectors have found some licensees to have weaknesses in evaluating

MOV failures and deficiencies (such as the operability effects of spring pack

relaxation). Some licensees have not been thorough in performing root cause

analyses of MOY problems. Most licensees are attempting to improve their

methods for identifying trends in MOY problems.

Schedule

In GL 89-10, the NRC staff requested that, by June 28, 1994, or by the third

refueling outage after December 28, 1989, whichever is later, licensees com- plete all design-basis reviews, analyses, verifications, tests, and inspections

that were initiated in order to satisfy the actions recommended in the generic

letter. The NRC staff's response to Question 41 in Supplement 1 to GL 89-10

provides guidance on the schedule for implementing these actions specified in

GL 89-10.

Some licensees have not made adequate progress for resolving the MOV issue for

their facilities within the recommended schedule of GL 89-10. The findings of

licensees as they begin to initiate their programs in response to GL 89-10 and

the results of the NRC inspections of GL 89-10 programs reinforce the impor- tance of promptly resolving this safety-significant issue. The NRC staff has

accepted limited extensions of the GL 89-10 schedule for particular licensees

who have provided Justification.

I emnt2 February 26. 1992 Pap 1 of I

LIST OF RECEITLY ISSUED

NRCIIIFORITION NOTICES

Information Date of

notice No.. Subject Issuance Issued to

92-16 Loss of Flow from the 02/25192 All holders of OLs or CPs

Residual Heat Removal for nuclear power reactors.

Pump during Refueling

Cavity Dr"indown

92-15 Failure of Primary System 02/24/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Compression Fitting for nuclear power reactors.

92-14 Uranium Oxide Fires at Fuel 02/21/92 All fuel cycle and uranium

Cycle Facilities fuel research and development

licensees.

92-02. RelapS/Hod3 Computer Code 02/19/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. I Error Associated with the for nuclear power reactors.

Conservation of Energy

Equation

92-13 Inadequate Control Over 02/18/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Vehicular Traffic at' for nuclear power reactors.

Nuclear Power Plant Sites

92-12 Effects of Cable Leakage 02/10/92. All holders of OLs or CPs

Currents on Instrument for nuclear power reactors.

Settings and Indications

92-11 Soll and hater Contamina- 02/05/92 All uranium fuel fabrica- tion at Fuel Cycle Facil- tion and conversion facil- ities ities.

92-10 8rachytherapy Incidents 01/31/92 AlI luclear Regulatory Com- Involving Irdium-192 Wire - mission (NRC) licensees

Used i Endobronchisl authorized to use

Treatments iridium-192 for brachy- therapyi manufacturers and

distributors of iridiu-I92 wire for use in brachy- therapy.

OL

• Operating License

CP

• Construction Permit

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION POSTAGE FEES PAID

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 UMNO

nIEM No. 0J

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

IN 92-17 February 26, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR

(301) 504-2794 Attachments:

1. Inspection Findings Pertaining to the Recommendations Contained In

Generic Letter 89-10

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION RESULTS IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

• C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger

02/11/92

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *C/EMEB:DET:NRR*D/DET:NRR '*RPB:ADM

RJKiessel TGScarbrough JANorberg JERlchardson TechEd

01/14/92 01/09/92 01/13/92 01/29/92 01/14/92

IN 92-XX

February xx, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR

(301) 504-2794 Attachments:

1. Inspection Findings Pertaining to the Recommendations Contained In

Generic Letter 89-10

2. Inspection Findings Pertaining to Other MOY Areas

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION RESULTS IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR *C/OGCB:DOEA:NR11! -

CERossi CHBerlinger -0

02/ /92 01/31/92 A

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *C/EMEB:DET:NRR*D/DET:NRR *RPB:ADM

RJKiessel TGScarbrough JANorberg JERichardson TechEd

01/14/92 01/09/92 01/13/92 01/29/92 01/14/92

IN 92-XX

January xx, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR

(301) 504-2794 Attachments:

1. Inspection Findings Pertaining to the Recommendations Contained In

Generic Letter 89-10

2. Inspection Findings Pertaining to Other MOV Areas

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION RESULTS IN

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES ---- -'11/

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:N Zg;

CERossi HBerlinger to

01/ /92 / 0lL1/92

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR *EMEB:DET:NRR *C/EMEB:DET:NRR D/DE tAJg*RPF.ADM

RJKiessel TGScarbrough JANorberg JER i d d q TechEd

01/14/92 01/09/92 01/13/92 Ad 01// 01/14/92

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR

(301) 504-2794 Attachments:

1. Inspection Findings Pertaining to the Recommendations Contained In

Generic Letter 89-10

2. Inspection Findings Pertaining to Other MOV Areas

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION RESULTS IN

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CERossi CHBerlinger

Ol/ /92 01/ /92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR EMEB:DET:NRR C/EMEB:DET:NRR D/DET: NRR RPB:ADM

RJKiessel TGScarbrough JANorberg JERichardson TechEd 1Miain 91

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Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR

(301) 504-2794 Attachments:

1. Inspection Findings Pertaining to the Recommendations Contained In

Generic Letter 89-10

2. Inspection Findings Pertaining to Other MOV Areas

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: GL 89-10 INSPECTION RESULTS IN

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CERossi CHBerlinger

01/ /92 01/ /92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR EMEB:DET:NRR C/EMEB:DET:NRR D/DET:NRR RPB:ADM

RJKiessel L TGScarbrough JANorberg JERicharoson TechEd JIMahl97

01/fl/ 92 01/ /92 01/ /92 01/ /92 01//q/92