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{{#Wiki_filter:P 1-2 Note: 1. 2. 3. A 7. 5. 6. 7.* 8. 9. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable WA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (Le,, except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each WA category shall not be less than two). The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by It1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points. Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate WA statements.
{{#Wiki_filter:P                                                                                                 1-2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable WA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (Le,, except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each WA category shall not be less than two).
selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
: 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
Absent a plant-specific priority, only those WAS having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by It1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and WA categories The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D. 1. b of ES-401 for the applicable WAS On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals
: 3. Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate WA statements.
(#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above:
A
if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note  
: 7.                                            S edoti;:ic;nszs possible; s ~ i i i p l e Sclcct t ~ p i c sfrom as many S ~ S % ~and                                      e\ieiji system iji evijfuiiofi in the giijup befoie selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
#I does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the WA catalog, and enter the WA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals
: 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those WAS having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
(#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to WAS that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43. Sclcct t~pics from as many S~S%~S and edoti;:ic;ns zs possible; s~iiiple e\ieiji system iji evijfuiiofi in the giijup befoie 2009 WF.? MRC Written Outline, re co IC i d co 03 s 0 ar: z 0 2 cn 0 0 N N I N 9 2 W N N (? 9 P a m Y W 7 X X X X X X N Q =I Y . 2 c K 0 - 0 B c v) -I N N 0 0 0 0 8 - 2 c 0 0 K ._ c N .- - .- o cn c m 0 . a 3 l! Y 2 m - - 0 Ln 0 0 0 0 0 ___ - m 0 . a 3 Y L m P a, m -l 7 7.- 0 0 0 0 v- . z a m N 0 0 0 0 - iD N 0 0 0 0 x X ';f . t ...d 5 2 -0 al U C ._ Lc m -1 W 0 W 8 $ X I a, W z a r b 8 2 -1 % . L a, +. 3 0 Y 0 m C 0 c VI m m In 0 0 0 0 .- Lc L Ei .- 0 0 W . t a 0 n 8 z u- VI _1 In 0 0 0 0 m m I m N F N N N 2 N 2 X X I X X m . - d i5 2 a, c % E cr 9 m (u - c E 9 0, in 0 0 0 0 N . d . 5 8 tic > u) a, U S 0 0 0 u) _1 in 0 0 0 0 v_ 8 7- m Y a, _I a, 23 3 . L c E a, (3 5 tj t. 0 0 0 0 m .r- . U 0 CL - e .'- 0 -0 I2 CL 0 e n m 0 0 0 0 0 ln N W N b N x X X X In 2, . c .- en 4- S _. t- 0 0 VI VI -I E c - =t 2 m (D 0 0 0 0 d 0) . t; t. (0 . E % 3 E E 0) H lx 6 a v- W 0 0 0 0 C 0 0 .- - 2 6 v) 0 lx .-- T 4 w 0 m N N m m m u7 m 0 m : x : a, c m N 9 .r a m 9 Y F CD 9 i2 X X X x X x m 0 ._ m 0 E [Ir' I m a, I m 3 v fn a, Ln 0 0 - ._ K - - Q 5 a c c m 0 0 0 0 m - L +- N Y m 0 0 W 0 0 N d i-- m 0 d 9 m rr C a, c c z 0, 0 0 N I b I cn m c) X x F R Y - N 9 2 - ?-- 9 2 F 9 2 X X Yb X X x E a 0 c a, .- E m 0 0 ul N 0 c __ - C 0 a, . c 2 a 8 I m N N O T-is) d N m m v) 00 ';t x 0 .- -c( m e+, 0 .. m 2 N T- N Y : N z Y N 9 2 2 X X X X I k c k c f 0 $ W S IT: 0 I3 .- c 0 L3 L e v) ._ - m ti .- I c _. 8 Y w m (D 0 
: 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and WA categories 7.* The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D. 1.b of ES-401 for the applicable WAS
: 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above: if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #I           does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
: 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the WA catalog, and enter the WA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to WAS that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
2009 WF.? MRC Written Outline, re


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0 F 9 2 (v 0 F 3 .- m S 0 c.' 0-l 0 0 N I cc, N I ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Revision 2 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Examination Level:
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RO Operating Test Number:
I X
1  Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Code* Describe activity to be performed A1 Conduct of Operations K/A Importance:
X
4.3 S, D 2.1.23, Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. Calculate Shutdown Margin and Volume of Primary Makeup Water for Dilution to the Volume Control Tank. A2 Conduct of Operations K/A Importance:
  .
3.6 R, M 2.1.18, Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports. Complete OP-004-005, Core Operating Limits Supervisory System Operation, Attachment 11.6, Calculation of Charging and Letdown Parameters.
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A3 Equipment Control K/A Importance:
              .
3.7 R, N 2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures Complete surveillance OP-903-008, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Leakage Test, Attachment 10.11 for SI-329 A. A4 Radiation Control K/A Importance:
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3.2 R, N 2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal and emergency conditions. Calculate stay time to perform a tagout verification in the Regen Heat Exchanger Room. Room dose rate & operator's yearly dose provided.
5 I
Emergency Plan Not selected NOTE: All items (5 total are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
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* Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
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ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Revision 1 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Examination Level:
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SRO Operating Test Number:
2 N
1  Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Code* Describe activity to be performed A5 Conduct of Operations K/A Importance:
X X
4.4 R, N 2.1.23, Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. Verify Core Protection Calculator, Plant Protection System, and Calorimetric power are within limits during power ascension in accordance with OP-010-004 Power Operations, and OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs. A6 Conduct of Operations K/A Importance:
I                  X X
4.6 R, M 2.1.20, Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps Perform SM/CRS review OP-901-501, PMC or Core Operating Limit Supervisory System Malfunction, Attachments 1, 2, and 3 following a PMC failure. A7 Equipment Control K/A Importance:
                    .
4.7 R, N 2.2.40, Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. Review surveillance OP-903-008, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Leakage Test, Attachment 10.11 for SI-329 A. A8 Radiation Control K/A Importance:
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3.7 R, N 2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal and emergency conditions. Calculate dose and assign non-licensed operators to vent Safety Injection piping in Safeguards Room A. Given dose rate with and without shielding installed, time to install shielding, and job completion time using 1 operator or using 2 operators, determine proper job assignment. A9 Emergency Plan K/A Importance:
    .
4.6 S, M 2.4.41, Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. Determine appropriate Emergency Plan EAL. NOTE: All items (5 total are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
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* Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)  
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ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 1 Revision 2 Facility: WATERFORD 3  Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one): RO   Operating Test No.:
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1 Control Room Systems
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@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1 001 Control Rod Drive; ATC Operator Immediate Operator Actions on 2 Dropped CEAs from OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction Fault: The first and second reactor trip options do not function, requires performance of the 2 nd reactor trip contingency from EOP OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. A, S, D 1 S2 004 Chemical and Volume Control; VCT Makeup Using the Dilute makeup Mode Fault: PMU-144, Primary Makeup Water Control Valve, will not auto close when Primary Makeup Water Batch Counter counts down to zero. A, L, S, M 2 S3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure. L, P, S, EN, D 3 S4 005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, to secure LPSI Pump B. A, L, S, M 4 - P S5 022 Containment Cooling System; Perform OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Verification S, D 5 S6 062 AC Electrical Distribution System, Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power This task will re-energize the 3A Bus with EDG A powering the 3A Bus using OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B. L, S, D 6 S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service. Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback. A, S, M 7 S8 029 Containment Purge System; Secure Containment Purge using OP-002-010, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC and Containment Purge  S, D 8 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 2 Revision 2 In-Plant Systems
X X
@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)
X
P1 061 Emergency Feedwater; Transfer EFW Pump Suctions to Wet Cooling Tower after Condensate Storage Pool Depletion using EOP OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 10  E, L, R, D 4 - S P2 064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an overspeed trip with a LOOP. Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8. E, L, R, D 6 P3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification. Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.
    .
A, R, M 2 @ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
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* Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank  9 /  8 /  4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant  1 /  1 /  1 (EN)gineered safety feature -  /  /   1 (control room system) (L)ow-Power / Shutdown  1 /  1 /  1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)  2 /  2 /  1 (P)revious 2 exams  3 /  3 /  2 (randomly selected) (R)CA  1 /  1 /  1 (S)imulator
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ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 3 Revision 2 Facility: WATERFORD 3  Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one): SRO - I Operating Test No.:
m    0      N  m  u7 N    m      m  m  m
1 Control Room Systems
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@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
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System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1 001 Control Rod Drive; ATC Operator Immediate Operator Actions on 2 Dropped CEAs from OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction Fault: The first and second reactor trip options do not function, requires performance of the 2 nd reactor trip contingency from EOP OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions. A, S, D 1 S2    S3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure. L, P, S, EN, D 3 S4 005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, to secure LPSI Pump B. A, L, S, M 4 - P S5 022 Containment Cooling System; Perform OP-903-037, Containment Cooling Fans Operability Verification S, D 5 S6 062 AC Electrical Distribution System, Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus from Offsite Power This task will re-energize the 3A Bus with EDG A powering the 3A Bus using OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B. L, S, D 6 S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service. Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback. A, S, M 7 S8 029 Containment Purge System; Secure Containment Purge using OP-002-010, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC and Containment Purge  S, D 8 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 4 Revision 2 In-Plant Systems
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@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)
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P1 061 Emergency Feedwater; Transfer EFW Pump Suctions to Wet Cooling Tower after Condensate Storage Pool Depletion using EOP OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 10  E, L, R, D 4 - S P2 064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an overspeed trip with a LOOP. Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8. E, L, R, D 6 P3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification. Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.
F Y
A, R, M 2 @ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
X X
* Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank  9 /  8 /  4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant  1 /  1 /  1 (EN)gineered safety feature  - /  -  /  1 (control room system) (L)ow-Power / Shutdown  1 /  1 /  1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)  2 /  2 /  1 (P)revious 2 exams  3 /  3 /  2 (randomly selected) (R)CA  1 /  1 /  1 (S)imulator
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ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 5 Revision 2 Facility: WATERFORD 3  Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one): SRO - U  Operating Test No.:
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1 Control Room Systems
C a,
@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
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System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1    S2    S3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure. L, P, S, EN, D 3 S4 005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction,  to secure LPSI Pump B. A, L, S, M 4 - P S5    S6    S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service. Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback. A, S, M 7 S8 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 6 Revision 2 In-Plant Systems
0, 0
@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)
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P1    P2 064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an overspeed trip with a LOOP. Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8. E, L, R, D 6 P3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification. Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.
I b
A, R, M 2 @ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
cn m                        I x
* Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank  9 /  8 /  4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant  1 /  1 /  1 (EN)gineered safety feature  -  /  -  /  1 (control room system) (L)ow-Power / Shutdown  1 /  1 /  1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)  2 /  2 /  1 (P)revious 2 exams  3 /  3 /  2 (randomly selected) (R)CA  1 /  1 /  1 (S)imulator
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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1 Rev 2 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.:
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Operators:
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Initial Conditions:  100%, MOC, AB buses aligned to "B" side.
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Protected Train is B Turnover: Maintain 100 % power Continue with Surveillance OP-903-094, section 7.20 Event No. Malf. No.
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Event Type*  Event Description 1 Di08A04S08-1 N - BOP TS - SRO Perform surveillance OP-903-094, section 7.20. BD-103B fails to close.
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ES-301                              Administrative Topics Outline                      Form ES-301-1 Facility:    WATERFORD 3                            Date of Examination:        October 5, 2009 Examination Level:      RO                          Operating Test Number:      1 Administrative Topic          Type                    Describe activity to be performed (see Note)            Code*
2.1.23, Ability to perform specific system and A1                  S, D          integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.
Conduct of Operations Calculate Shutdown Margin and Volume of Primary Makeup Water for Dilution to the Volume Control K/A Importance:                          Tank.
4.3 A2                  R, M          2.1.18, Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise Conduct of Operations                        logs, records, status boards, and reports.
Complete OP-004-005, Core Operating Limits K/A Importance:                          Supervisory System Operation, Attachment 11.6, 3.6                                Calculation of Charging and Letdown Parameters.
A3                  R, N          2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures Equipment Control Complete surveillance OP-903-008, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Leakage Test, Attachment 10.11 for K/A Importance:                          SI-329 A.
3.7 A4                  R, N          2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under Radiation Control                          normal and emergency conditions.
Calculate stay time to perform a tagout verification in K/A Importance:                          the Regen Heat Exchanger Room. Room dose rate &
3.2                                operators yearly dose provided.
Emergency Plan                            Not selected NOTE:        All items (5 total are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
* Type Codes & Criteria:          (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs;      4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
Revision 2
 
ES-301                              Administrative Topics Outline                      Form ES-301-1 Facility:    WATERFORD 3                            Date of Examination:        October 5, 2009 Examination Level:      SRO                        Operating Test Number:      1 Administrative Topic          Type                    Describe activity to be performed (see Note)            Code*
A5                                2.1.23, Ability to perform specific system and R, N          integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant Conduct of Operations operation.
K/A Importance:
Verify Core Protection Calculator, Plant Protection 4.4                                System, and Calorimetric power are within limits during power ascension in accordance with OP-010-004 Power Operations, and OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs.
A6                                2.1.20, Ability to interpret and execute procedure R, M          steps Conduct of Operations Perform SM/CRS review OP-901-501, PMC or Core K/A Importance:
Operating Limit Supervisory System Malfunction, 4.6                                Attachments 1, 2, and 3 following a PMC failure.
A7                                2.2.40, Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a R, N          system.
Equipment Control Review surveillance OP-903-008, Reactor Coolant K/A Importance:
System Isolation Leakage Test, Attachment 10.11 for 4.7                                SI-329 A.
A8                                2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under R, N          normal and emergency conditions.
Radiation Control Calculate dose and assign non-licensed operators to K/A Importance:
vent Safety Injection piping in Safeguards Room A.
3.7                                Given dose rate with and without shielding installed, time to install shielding, and job completion time using 1 operator or using 2 operators, determine proper job assignment.
A9                                2.4.41, Knowledge of the emergency action level S, M          thresholds and classifications.
Emergency Plan Determine appropriate Emergency Plan EAL.
K/A Importance:
4.6 NOTE:        All items (5 total are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.
* Type Codes & Criteria:          (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)
Revision 1
 
ES-301                            Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline                    Form ES-301-2 Facility:      WATERFORD 3                                  Date of Examination:        October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one):          RO                        Operating Test No.:          1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title                              Type Code*      Safety Function S1    001 Control Rod Drive; ATC Operator Immediate Operator Actions              A, S, D          1 on 2 Dropped CEAs from OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction Fault: The first and second reactor trip options do not function, requires performance of the 2nd reactor trip contingency from EOP OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.
S2    004 Chemical and Volume Control; VCT Makeup Using the Dilute              A, L, S, M        2 makeup Mode Fault: PMU-144, Primary Makeup Water Control Valve, will not auto close when Primary Makeup Water Batch Counter counts down to zero.
S3    006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on              L, P, S, EN, D      3 RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.
S4    005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown                  A, L, S, M      4-P Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, to secure LPSI Pump B.
S5    022 Containment Cooling System; Perform OP-903-037,                          S, D            5 Containment Cooling Fans Operability Verification S6    062 AC Electrical Distribution System, Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus          L, S, D          6 from Offsite Power This task will re-energize the 3A Bus with EDG A powering the 3A Bus using OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B.
S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine              A, S, M          7 Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service.
Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback.
S8    029 Containment Purge System; Secure Containment Purge using                  S, D            8 OP-002-010, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC and Containment Purge 1                                        Revision 2
 
ES-301                              Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline                    Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)
P1    061 Emergency Feedwater; Transfer EFW Pump Suctions to Wet                    E, L, R, D      4-S Cooling Tower after Condensate Storage Pool Depletion using EOP OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 10 P2    064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an                    E, L, R, D        6 overspeed trip with a LOOP.
Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8.
P3    006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB                  A, R, M          2 for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification.
Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.
@        All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
* Type Codes                              Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path                                      4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank                                        9/  8/    4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant                                    1/  1/    1 (EN)gineered safety feature                        - / - /    1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown                                        1/  1/    1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)                              2/  2/    1 (P)revious 2 exams                              3/    3/    2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA                                              1/  1/    1 (S)imulator 2                                            Revision 2
 
ES-301                            Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline                    Form ES-301-2 Facility:      WATERFORD 3                                  Date of Examination:        October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one):          SRO - I                    Operating Test No.:          1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title                              Type Code*      Safety Function S1    001 Control Rod Drive; ATC Operator Immediate Operator Actions              A, S, D          1 on 2 Dropped CEAs from OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction Fault: The first and second reactor trip options do not function, requires performance of the 2nd reactor trip contingency from EOP OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.
S2 S3    006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on              L, P, S, EN, D      3 RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.
S4    005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown                  A, L, S, M      4-P Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, to secure LPSI Pump B.
S5    022 Containment Cooling System; Perform OP-903-037,                          S, D            5 Containment Cooling Fans Operability Verification S6    062 AC Electrical Distribution System, Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus          L, S, D          6 from Offsite Power This task will re-energize the 3A Bus with EDG A powering the 3A Bus using OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B.
S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine              A, S, M          7 Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service.
Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback.
S8    029 Containment Purge System; Secure Containment Purge using                  S, D            8 OP-002-010, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC and Containment Purge 3                                        Revision 2
 
ES-301                            Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline                      Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)
P1    061 Emergency Feedwater; Transfer EFW Pump Suctions to Wet                    E, L, R, D          4-S Cooling Tower after Condensate Storage Pool Depletion using EOP OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 10 P2    064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an                    E, L, R, D            6 overspeed trip with a LOOP.
Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8.
P3    006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB                  A, R, M              2 for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification.
Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.
@          All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
* Type Codes                                  Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path                                                            4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank                                                              9/    8/    4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant                                                1/    1/    1 (EN)gineered safety feature                                                  - / - /    1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown                                                          1/    1/    1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)                                    2/    2/    1 (P)revious 2 exams                                                  3/    3/    2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA                                                                          1/    1/    1 (S)imulator 4                                                Revision 2
 
ES-301                            Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline                    Form ES-301-2 Facility:      WATERFORD 3                                  Date of Examination:        October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one):          SRO - U                    Operating Test No.:          1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
System / JPM Title                              Type Code*      Safety Function S1 S2 S3    006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on              L, P, S, EN, D      3 RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.
S4    005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown                  A, L, S, M      4-P Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, to secure LPSI Pump B.
S5 S6 S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine              A, S, M          7 Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service.
Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback.
S8 5                                          Revision 2
 
ES-301                            Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline                      Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)
P1 P2    064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an                    E, L, R, D            6 overspeed trip with a LOOP.
Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8.
P3    006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB                  A, R, M              2 for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification.
Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.
@          All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
* Type Codes                                  Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path                                                            4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank                                                              9/    8/    4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant                                                1/    1/    1 (EN)gineered safety feature                                                  - / - /    1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown                                                          1/    1/    1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)                                    2/    2/    1 (P)revious 2 exams                                                  3/    3/    2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA                                                                          1/    1/    1 (S)imulator 6                                                Revision 2
 
Appendix D                            Scenario Outline                      Form ES-D-1 Facility:      WATERFORD 3            Scenario No.: 1      Op Test No.:    NRC Examiners:                                      Operators:
Initial Conditions:      100%, MOC, AB buses aligned to B side.
Protected Train is B Turnover:                Maintain 100 % power Continue with Surveillance OP-903-094, section 7.20 Event      Malf. No. Event                            Event No.                    Type*                        Description 1     Di08A04S08-1  N - BOP    Perform surveillance OP-903-094, section 7.20.
TS - SRO BD-103B fails to close.
2    RC15-A1        I - ATC    Pressurizer level instrument RC-ILI-0110-X fails I - SRO    high TS-SRO 3    CC12-E2        I - BOP    Component Cooling Water Surge Tank level TS - SRO instrument CC-ILS-7013A fails low 4    FW21-A        R- ATC      Main Condenser leak with lowering Main N-BOP      Condenser vacuum requiring a Rapid Plant Power Reduction N-SRO 5    RC23B          M-All      Small Break LOCA, SIAS and CIAS CC12-E2        C-ATC      Secure Reactor Coolant Pumps due to the C - SRO    combination of event 3 and event 5.
6    SI02          C - BOP    Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A fails to auto start on SIAS requiring manual start 7    CS01-A        C-BOP      Containment Spray Pump A trip, OP-902-008, C-SRO      Safety Function Recovery Procedure Alignment of LPSI Pump A to replace CS Pump A
    *  (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,  (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario 1 Rev 2
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain 100% power.
Surveillance procedure OP-903-094, ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test - Operating, is in progress. The previous crew stopped at section 7.20, Train A Position 44, Relay K310 (BD-103B). This crew should resume testing. The BOP will secure Blowdown flow for Steam Generator #2 and test BD-103B, which will fail to close. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.6.3.
After briefing the failure, Pressurizer level instrument RC-ILI-0110X fails high. Due to the failure, Letdown flow goes to maximum flow of approximately 125 gpm and all Pressurizer Heaters energize. The SRO should enter OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction. The crew should utilize sub section E1, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Malfunction. The ATC should take manual control of Pressurizer level and select the non-faulted channel. Using Tech Specs and OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, the SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.3.5, a 7 day action requirement, and determine Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 entry is not required since QSPDS is operable and meeting the Pressurizer level channel check. SPDS indication of Pressurizer level is affected by this failure.
After briefing the failure, Pressurizer level instrument RC-ILI-0110X fails high. Due to the failure, Letdown flow goes to maximum flow of approximately 125 gpm and all Pressurizer Heaters energize. The SRO should enter OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction. The crew should utilize sub section E1, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Malfunction. The ATC should take manual control of Pressurizer level and select the non-faulted channel. Using Tech Specs and OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, the SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.3.5, a 7 day action requirement, and determine Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 entry is not required since QSPDS is operable and meeting the Pressurizer level channel check. SPDS indication of Pressurizer level is affected by this failure.
After the non-faulted channel is selected and Tech Specs are addressed, Component Cooling Water Surge Tank level instrument CC-ILS-7013A fails low. CCW Dry Cooling Tower A will bypass due to the failure. CCW Headers A and B will split, and CCW Loop AB supply and return from the A Header will close. The SRO should enter OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction. The BOP should use Attachment 1 to diagnose which instrument is failed. The crew should verify Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump A starts and control CCW system temperature with ACC-126 A. CCW Train A should be declared inoperable and 72 hour action Tech Spec 3.7.3 entered as well as cascading Tech Specs. The SRO should address the need to accomplish surveillance OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Checks, within 1 hour to comply with Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.b. They must also address the need to accomplish the requirements of Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.d within 2 hours.
After the non-faulted channel is selected and Tech Specs are addressed, Component Cooling Water Surge Tank level instrument CC-ILS-7013A fails low. CCW Dry Cooling Tower A will bypass due to the failure. CCW Headers A and B will split, and CCW Loop AB supply and return from the A Header will close. The SRO should enter OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction. The BOP should use Attachment 1 to diagnose which instrument is failed. The crew should verify Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump A starts and control CCW system temperature with ACC-126 A.
After the crew has addressed Tech Specs, a leak in the Main Condenser develops and Main Condenser vacuum begins to drop. Off normal procedure OP-901-220, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, should be entered. Main Condenser vacuum will drop below 25 inches, requiring a rapid plant power reduction. The SRO should enter OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction. Vacuum will drop below 25 inches but remain above 20 inches, the procedure trigger for tripping the Reactor. For the power reduction, the ATC will perform direct Boration to the RCS as well as ASI control with CEAs and Pressurizer boron equalization. The BOP will manipulate the controls to reduce Main Turbine load.  
CCW Train A should be declared inoperable and 72 hour action Tech Spec 3.7.3 entered as well as cascading Tech Specs. The SRO should address the need to accomplish surveillance OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Checks, within 1 hour to comply with Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.b. They must also address the need to accomplish the requirements of Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.d within 2 hours.
After the crew has addressed Tech Specs, a leak in the Main Condenser develops and Main Condenser vacuum begins to drop. Off normal procedure OP-901-220, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, should be entered. Main Condenser vacuum will drop below 25 inches, requiring a rapid plant power reduction. The SRO should enter OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction. Vacuum will drop below 25 inches but remain above 20 inches, the procedure trigger for tripping the Reactor. For the power reduction, the ATC will perform direct Boration to the RCS as well as ASI control with CEAs and Pressurizer boron equalization. The BOP will manipulate the controls to reduce Main Turbine load.
Scenario 1 Rev 2


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Scenario 1 Rev 2 Once the crew has commenced the power reduction and lowered power to ~ 90%, or at the lead examiner's discretion, a small break loss of coolant accident will occur. The crew should diagnose Pressurizer level dropping with all available Charging Pumps operating, trip the Reactor, and initiate Safety Injection Actuation (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation (CIAS). Because of the earlier CCW level instrument failure, all CCW flow will be lost to the Reactor Coolant Pumps; the pumps must be manually secured within 3 minutes of the loss of CCW flow. When Containment Spray is actuated, either manually or automatically, CS-125B will fail to automatically open and will not open using the control switch. This does not create a need for action at this time, but Containment Spray flow will only be provided from Train A with CS-125B failed closed. Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A will fail to automatically start on SIAS, requiring the BOP operator to manually start LPSI Pump A.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Once the crew has commenced the power reduction and lowered power to ~ 90%, or at the lead examiners discretion, a small break loss of coolant accident will occur. The crew should diagnose Pressurizer level dropping with all available Charging Pumps operating, trip the Reactor, and initiate Safety Injection Actuation (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation (CIAS). Because of the earlier CCW level instrument failure, all CCW flow will be lost to the Reactor Coolant Pumps; the pumps must be manually secured within 3 minutes of the loss of CCW flow. When Containment Spray is actuated, either manually or automatically, CS-125B will fail to automatically open and will not open using the control switch. This does not create a need for action at this time, but Containment Spray flow will only be provided from Train A with CS-125B failed closed. Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A will fail to automatically start on SIAS, requiring the BOP operator to manually start LPSI Pump A.
After the crew completes OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnoses into OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery, Containment Spray Pump A will trip, resulting in no Containment Spray flow. The crew should recognize that they are not meeting the Safety Function Status Checklist of OP-902-002 and transition to OP-902-008, Safety function Recovery Procedure.
After the crew completes OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnoses into OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery, Containment Spray Pump A will trip, resulting in no Containment Spray flow. The crew should recognize that they are not meeting the Safety Function Status Checklist of OP-902-002 and transition to OP-902-008, Safety function Recovery Procedure.
Prioritization in OP-902-008 should result in Containment Isolation being priority 1 and Containment Temperature and Pressure Control being priority 2. The crew should address Containment Isolation by overriding CS-125A closed. The crew should address Containment Temperature and pressure Control by aligning Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A to replace the failed Containment Spray Pump A. It is acceptable to pursue these tasks in parallel, since establishing flow with LPSI A to the Containment Spray header will also satisfy Containment Isolation concerns.
Prioritization in OP-902-008 should result in Containment Isolation being priority 1 and Containment Temperature and Pressure Control being priority 2. The crew should address Containment Isolation by overriding CS-125A closed. The crew should address Containment Temperature and pressure Control by aligning Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A to replace the failed Containment Spray Pump A. It is acceptable to pursue these tasks in parallel, since establishing flow with LPSI A to the Containment Spray header will also satisfy Containment Isolation concerns.
The scenario can be terminated after Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is aligned for Containment Spray, or after the CRS gives the order to perform that alignment, at the lead examiners discretion.  
The scenario can be terminated after Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is aligned for Containment Spray, or after the CRS gives the order to perform that alignment, at the lead examiners discretion.
Scenario 1 Rev 2


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Scenario 1 Rev 2 Critical Tasks
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Critical Tasks
: 1. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
: 1. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of loss of CCW flow. This task is set up by the failure of CC-ILS-7013 A. The required task becomes applicable after SIAS is initiated following event 5. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the RCP operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.
This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of loss of CCW flow. This task is set up by the failure of CC-ILS-7013 A. The required task becomes applicable after SIAS is initiated following event 5. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the RCP operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.
: 2. Establish Containment temperature and pressure control.
: 2. Establish Containment temperature and pressure control.
This task is satisfied by aligning LPSI Pump A to replace CS Pump A prior to exiting the Containment Temperature and Pressure Control safety function in OP-902-008. This task becomes applicable following the failure of Containment Spray Pump A in event 7. The Functional Recovery procedure utilized following this failure will direct this activity to satisfy the Containment Pressure and Temperature Control safety function.  
This task is satisfied by aligning LPSI Pump A to replace CS Pump A prior to exiting the Containment Temperature and Pressure Control safety function in OP-902-008. This task becomes applicable following the failure of Containment Spray Pump A in event 7. The Functional Recovery procedure utilized following this failure will direct this activity to satisfy the Containment Pressure and Temperature Control safety function.
Scenario 1 Rev 2


Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 Rev 1 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.:
Appendix D                               Scenario Outline                     Form ES-D-1 Facility:       WATERFORD 3               Scenario No.: 2     Op Test No.: NRC Examiners:                                         Operators:
NRC Examiners:
Initial Conditions:     100%, MOC, AB buses aligned to B side.
Operators:
Protected Train is B Emergency Diesel Generator A is tagged out for planned maintenance.
Initial Conditions: 100%, MOC, AB buses aligned to "B" side.
Turnover:               Maintain 100 % power Event       Malf. No. Event Type*                       Event No.                                                    Description 1                   C- ATC         Swap Charging Pump using OP-002-005.
Protected Train is B Emergency Diesel Generator A is tagged out for planned maintenance. Turnover: Maintain 100 % power Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*
C - SRO        Charging Pump A develops oil leak.
Event Description 1 C- ATC C - SRO TS - SRO Swap Charging Pump using OP-002-005. Charging Pump A develops oil leak.
TS - SRO 2       RC22 B1     I - BOP         Pressurizer narrow range safety pressure I - SRO        instrument RC-IPI-0101 B fails high TS - SRO 3       SG05 B       I - BOP         Steam Generator #2 level instrument, I - SRO        SG ILR1106, fails low.
2 RC22 B1 I - BOP I - SRO TS - SRO Pressurizer narrow range safety pressure instrument RC-IPI-0101 B fails high 3 SG05 B I - BOP I - SRO Steam Generator #2 level instrument, SG ILR1106, fails low.
4       TPR13, 14   R - ATC         Main Generator Stator Coil Water temperature N - BOP        high, normal plant downpower N - SRO 5       TU01A, D,   M - All         Main Turbine High Vibration and Reactor Trip R
4 TPR13, 14 R - ATC N - BOP N - SRO Main Generator Stator Coil Water temperature high, normal plant downpower 5 TU01A, D, R M - All Main Turbine High Vibration and Reactor Trip 6 RD11A-10 RD11A-22 C-ATC C - SRO 2 CEAs stuck out requiring Emergency Boration 7 ED01 A, B, C, D M-All Loss of Off Site Power 8 EG08B C- BOP C - SRO EDG B fails to auto-start  
6       RD11A-10     C-ATC           2 CEAs stuck out requiring Emergency Boration RD11A-22    C - SRO 7       ED01         M-All           Loss of Off Site Power A, B, C, D 8       EG08B       C- BOP         EDG B fails to auto-start C - SRO
* (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor
    *   (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor Scenario 2 Rev 1


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Scenario 2 Rev 1 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain 100% power. OP-903-003, Charging Pump Operability Check is scheduled for night shift.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain 100% power.
The shift manager has instructed the control room supervisor to swap Charging Pumps leaving Charging Pump A running and Charging Pump AB secured and in auto. After starting Charging Pump A, the watchstander will call and report an oil leak, recommending Charging Pump A be secured. With Charging Pump A control switch in off and inoperable, the SRO should recognize that Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 is not met. Additionally, TRM 3.1.2.4 must be entered. Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 is a 72 hour action and TRM 3.1.2.4 is a 7 day action. With the AB Safety Bus aligned to Train B, credit can not be taken for Charging Pump AB and Tech Spec and TRM 3.1.2.4 can not be exited.
OP-903-003, Charging Pump Operability Check is scheduled for night shift.
After the ATC aligns Charging Pump AB or at the lead examiners direction, Pressurizer narrow range safety pressure instrument RC-IPI-0101 B fails high. After identifying the failure, the SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1. The BOP should be directed to bypass the PPS bistables for High Pressurizer Pressure, Low DNBR, and High LPD within 1 hour. After the crew bypasses the appropriate bistables, Steam Generator #2 level instrument, SG ILR1106, Steam Generator 2 Downcomer Level (red pen), fails low. The controllers for Main Feedwater Regulating Valve 2, Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 2, and Main Feedwater Pump B transfer to manual. The crew should enter OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction. No Tech Spec entries are required and no actions by the Balance of Plant operator are necessary at this time.
The shift manager has instructed the control room supervisor to swap Charging Pumps leaving Charging Pump A running and Charging Pump AB secured and in auto. After starting Charging Pump A, the watchstander will call and report an oil leak, recommending Charging Pump A be secured. With Charging Pump A control switch in off and inoperable, the SRO should recognize that Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 is not met.
Additionally, TRM 3.1.2.4 must be entered. Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 is a 72 hour action and TRM 3.1.2.4 is a 7 day action. With the AB Safety Bus aligned to Train B, credit can not be taken for Charging Pump AB and Tech Spec and TRM 3.1.2.4 can not be exited.
After the ATC aligns Charging Pump AB or at the lead examiners direction, Pressurizer narrow range safety pressure instrument RC-IPI-0101 B fails high. After identifying the failure, the SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1. The BOP should be directed to bypass the PPS bistables for High Pressurizer Pressure, Low DNBR, and High LPD within 1 hour.
After the crew bypasses the appropriate bistables, Steam Generator #2 level instrument, SG ILR1106, Steam Generator 2 Downcomer Level (red pen), fails low.
The controllers for Main Feedwater Regulating Valve 2, Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 2, and Main Feedwater Pump B transfer to manual. The crew should enter OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction. No Tech Spec entries are required and no actions by the Balance of Plant operator are necessary at this time.
After the crew has completed their brief, PMC alarms will come in for Main Generator Stator Coil Water hose temperatures. The crew should enter OP-901-211, Generator Malfunction. Using Attachment 1, SCW High Temperature, the crew will determine the need to commence a normal plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005. Due to the earlier Steam Generator level instrument failure, the BOP operator will have to control Steam Generator level in manual for Steam Generator #2. The ATC will perform direct Boration to the RCS as well as ASI control with CEAs and Pressurizer boron equalization. The BOP will manipulate the Main Turbine controls to reduce load.
After the crew has completed their brief, PMC alarms will come in for Main Generator Stator Coil Water hose temperatures. The crew should enter OP-901-211, Generator Malfunction. Using Attachment 1, SCW High Temperature, the crew will determine the need to commence a normal plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005. Due to the earlier Steam Generator level instrument failure, the BOP operator will have to control Steam Generator level in manual for Steam Generator #2. The ATC will perform direct Boration to the RCS as well as ASI control with CEAs and Pressurizer boron equalization. The BOP will manipulate the Main Turbine controls to reduce load.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Scenario 2 Rev 1 Once the crew has commenced the power reduction and lowered power to ~ 90%, or at the lead examiner's discretion, high vibration alarms will come in on the Main Turbine. Using annunciator response procedure OP-500-001, Control Room Cabinet A, and OP-901-210, Turbine Trip, the SRO should direct a Reactor trip. The crew should enter OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, and work this procedure concurrent with the Turbine Trip off normal procedure. OP-901-210 will direct breaking Main Condenser vacuum. On the Reactor Trip, 2 CEAs will stick out, requiring the ATC operator to Emergency Borate. The BOP will have to establish Feedwater Control Reactor Trip Override conditions manually on Steam Generator #2 due to the earlier level instrument failure. The SRO should direct the BOP to continue with the actions to break Main Condenser vacuum. The crew should diagnose into OP-902-006, Loss of Main Feedwater Recovery, and secure 2 Reactor Coolant Pumps. After 2 RCPs are secured and the BOP has commenced breaking vacuum, a loss of off site power occurs. Emergency Diesel Generator B will fail to auto-start on the LOOP and the BOP will be required to start EDG B. The crew will transition to OP-902-003, Loss of Off Site Power/Loss of Forced Flow Recovery procedure. During the scenario, environmental conditions will have rain occurring. After the LOOP, the high level alarms will come in for Dry Cooling Tower 1 and 2 Sumps. The CRS will direct the performance of OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 20, Operation of DCT Sump Pumps.
Scenario 2 Rev 1
The scenario can be terminated after the CRS orders the performance of OP-902-009 Appendix 20 or at the lead examiners discretion.


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Scenario 2 Rev 1 Critical Tasks
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Once the crew has commenced the power reduction and lowered power to ~ 90%, or at the lead examiners discretion, high vibration alarms will come in on the Main Turbine.
Using annunciator response procedure OP-500-001, Control Room Cabinet A, and OP-901-210, Turbine Trip, the SRO should direct a Reactor trip. The crew should enter OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, and work this procedure concurrent with the Turbine Trip off normal procedure. OP-901-210 will direct breaking Main Condenser vacuum. On the Reactor Trip, 2 CEAs will stick out, requiring the ATC operator to Emergency Borate. The BOP will have to establish Feedwater Control Reactor Trip Override conditions manually on Steam Generator #2 due to the earlier level instrument failure.
The SRO should direct the BOP to continue with the actions to break Main Condenser vacuum. The crew should diagnose into OP-902-006, Loss of Main Feedwater Recovery, and secure 2 Reactor Coolant Pumps. After 2 RCPs are secured and the BOP has commenced breaking vacuum, a loss of off site power occurs. Emergency Diesel Generator B will fail to auto-start on the LOOP and the BOP will be required to start EDG B. The crew will transition to OP-902-003, Loss of Off Site Power/Loss of Forced Flow Recovery procedure. During the scenario, environmental conditions will have rain occurring. After the LOOP, the high level alarms will come in for Dry Cooling Tower 1 and 2 Sumps. The CRS will direct the performance of OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 20, Operation of DCT Sump Pumps.
The scenario can be terminated after the CRS orders the performance of OP-902-009 Appendix 20 or at the lead examiners discretion.
Scenario 2 Rev 1
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Critical Tasks
: 1. Establish reactivity control.
: 1. Establish reactivity control.
This task is satisfied by establishing Emergency Boration prior to completing Standard Post Trip Actions Reactivity Control verification. The required task becomes applicable after the Reactor is tripped and 2 CEAs remain stuck out following event 5.
This task is satisfied by establishing Emergency Boration prior to completing Standard Post Trip Actions Reactivity Control verification. The required task becomes applicable after the Reactor is tripped and 2 CEAs remain stuck out following event 5.
: 2. Energize at least one vital electrical AC bus.
: 2. Energize at least one vital electrical AC bus.
This task is satisfied by starting Emergency Diesel Generator B. This task becomes applicable following the loss of off site power triggered in event 7.  
This task is satisfied by starting Emergency Diesel Generator B. This task becomes applicable following the loss of off site power triggered in event 7.
Scenario 2 Rev 1


Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 Rev 2 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.:
Appendix D                                 Scenario Outline                     Form ES-D-1 Facility:       WATERFORD 3                 Scenario No.: 3       Op Test No.: NRC Examiners:                                           Operators:
NRC Examiners:
Initial Conditions:       1.2 % Power Power ascension is being held pending Main Feedwater Pumps governor adjustment Preparations are being made to start Main Feedwater Pump A AB Bus is aligned to the A side Turnover:                 OP-903-052 for CVAS Train A will go late this shift. Complete OP-903-052, section 10.1.
Operators:
Initial Conditions: 1.2 % Power Power ascension is being held pending Main Feedwater Pumps governor adjustment Preparations are being made to start Main Feedwater Pump A AB Bus is aligned to the A side Turnover: OP-903-052 for CVAS Train A will go late this shift. Complete OP-903-052, section 10.1.
OP-007-004, attachment 11.4 is in the field to discharge Waste Condensate Tank A.
OP-007-004, attachment 11.4 is in the field to discharge Waste Condensate Tank A.
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*
Event         Malf. No.       Event Type*                       Event No.                                                        Description 1       DI-18A4s27-1       N - BOP           During performance of OP-903-052, CVAS N - SRO          Fan A will fail to start.
Event Description 1 DI-18A4s27-1 N - BOP N - SRO TS - SRO During performance of OP-903-052, CVAS Fan A will fail to start.
TS - SRO 2       AO-04A3a12c-3       C - ATC           Waste Condensate Tank A flow controller C - SRO          LWM-IFIC-0647 output fails high 3       CH08-A1             I - BOP           Containment pressure instrument I - SRO           CB-IPT-6701-SMC fails high TS - SRO 4       RX14-A             I - ATC           Pressurizer pressure instrument I - SRO           RC-IPR-0100 X fails low 5       RX06-D1             C - BOP           Steam Bypass Valve MS-320 A fails open C - SRO 6       FW38-B             M - ALL           Main Feedwater line break in Containment.
2 AO-04A3a12c-3 C - ATC C - SRO Waste Condensate Tank A flow controller LWM-IFIC-0647 output fails high 3 CH08-A1 I - BOP I - SRO TS - SRO Containment pressure instrument CB-IPT-6701-SMC fails high 4 RX14-A I - ATC I - SRO Pressurizer pressure instrument RC-IPR-0100 X fails low 5 RX06-D1 C - BOP C - SRO Steam Bypass Valve MS-320 A fails open 6 FW38-B M - ALL Main Feedwater line break in Containment.
7       RP08G               C - BOP           Main Feedwater Isolation Valve #1 FW-184A C - SRO          fails to automatically close on MSIS.
7 RP08G C - BOP C - SRO Main Feedwater Isolation Valve #1 FW-184A fails to automatically close on MSIS.
8       RP09D               C - ATC           RC-606 and FP-601 B fail to auto close on C - SRO          CIAS.
8 RP09D C - ATC C - SRO RC-606 and FP-601 B fail to auto close on CIAS. * (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor
    *   (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,     (M)ajor Scenario 3 Rev 2


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Scenario 3 Rev 2 The crew assumes the shift at 1.2 % power. Reactor Engineer has completed Low Power Physics Testing. I&C Techs are making adjustments to Main Feedwater Pumps A & B governors based on vendor recommendations. The estimated time to completion is less than 60 minutes. When this is complete, Main Feedwater Pump A will be started and power ascension will commence.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 The crew assumes the shift at 1.2 % power. Reactor Engineer has completed Low Power Physics Testing. I&C Techs are making adjustments to Main Feedwater Pumps A & B governors based on vendor recommendations. The estimated time to completion is less than 60 minutes. When this is complete, Main Feedwater Pump A will be started and power ascension will commence.
Last shift, it was discovered that OP-903-052, CVAS Operability Test, will exceed its Tech Spec late date this shift. You have been directed to start CVAS Train A in accordance with OP-903-052. This surveillance will have the BOP operator secure RAB Normal Supply and Normal Exhaust Fans A and start CVAS Fan A. After securing both normal ventilation fans, CVAS Fan A will fail to start. This will require entering Tech Spec 3.7.7, a 7 day action requirement. RAB Normal Supply and Normal Exhaust Fans A will have to be re-started.
Last shift, it was discovered that OP-903-052, CVAS Operability Test, will exceed its Tech Spec late date this shift. You have been directed to start CVAS Train A in accordance with OP-903-052. This surveillance will have the BOP operator secure RAB Normal Supply and Normal Exhaust Fans A and start CVAS Fan A. After securing both normal ventilation fans, CVAS Fan A will fail to start. This will require entering Tech Spec 3.7.7, a 7 day action requirement. RAB Normal Supply and Normal Exhaust Fans A will have to be re-started.
After the failure of CVAS Fan A, the RCA watch will call and report that he has completed his lineup and is ready for the ATC to perform his actions to discharge Waste Condensate Tank A and is ready for the ATC to continue with step 6.10.7. When the ATC initiates flow on step 6.10.10, LWM-IFIC-0647 will fail high, raising flow in excess of 50 gpm, the discharge permit limit. The ATC should close LWM-441 and LWM-442 from CP-4 to terminate the release.
After the failure of CVAS Fan A, the RCA watch will call and report that he has completed his lineup and is ready for the ATC to perform his actions to discharge Waste Condensate Tank A and is ready for the ATC to continue with step 6.10.7. When the ATC initiates flow on step 6.10.10, LWM-IFIC-0647 will fail high, raising flow in excess of 50 gpm, the discharge permit limit. The ATC should close LWM-441 and LWM-442 from CP-4 to terminate the release.
After the release is secured, Containment pressure instrument CB-IPT-6701 SMC fails high. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and the BOP should bypass PPS bistables 13 and 16.
After the release is secured, Containment pressure instrument CB-IPT-6701 SMC fails high. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and the BOP should bypass PPS bistables 13 and 16.
After the appropriate bistables are bypassed, Pressurizer pressure instrument RC-IPR-0100 X fails low. This causes Pressurizer Backup and Proportional heaters to energize. The SRO should enter OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. The ATC will select the non-faulted Pressurizer pressure channel.
After the appropriate bistables are bypassed, Pressurizer pressure instrument RC-IPR-0100 X fails low. This causes Pressurizer Backup and Proportional heaters to energize.
The SRO should enter OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. The ATC will select the non-faulted Pressurizer pressure channel.
After the Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel Y is selected, Steam Bypass valve MS-320A controller will begin to fail high. The crew should respond to the cooldown and reactivity effects by taking manual control of MS-320 A and closing it.
After the Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel Y is selected, Steam Bypass valve MS-320A controller will begin to fail high. The crew should respond to the cooldown and reactivity effects by taking manual control of MS-320 A and closing it.
After MS-320 A is closed, a Main Feedwater line break occurs in Containment. If the control room supervisor directs a reactor trip based on the un-controlled power rise, then the trigger for the Main Feedwater line break will be inserted while the crew is performing their standard post trip actions. After the malfunction is inserted, the Main Feedwater Isolation Valve #1 fails to automatically close on the MSIS and must be closed manually by the BOP operator. RC-606 and FP-601 B fail to automatically close on the CIAS and must be manually closed by the ATC and BOP operators. The crew should enter OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery.
After MS-320 A is closed, a Main Feedwater line break occurs in Containment. If the control room supervisor directs a reactor trip based on the un-controlled power rise, then the trigger for the Main Feedwater line break will be inserted while the crew is performing their standard post trip actions. After the malfunction is inserted, the Main Feedwater Isolation Valve #1 fails to automatically close on the MSIS and must be closed manually by the BOP operator. RC-606 and FP-601 B fail to automatically close on the CIAS and must be manually closed by the ATC and BOP operators. The crew should enter OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Scenario 3 Rev 2 Actions to address pressurized thermal shock should be taken when CET temperature and Pressurizer pressure start to rise. This can be accomplished using OP-902-009, Appendix 13 or with OP-902-004, based on whether or not the crew has diagnosed into OP-902-004 before those parameters start to rise. The scenario can be terminated after PTS actions have been accomplished or at the lead examiners discretion.
Scenario 3 Rev 2
The conditions in this scenario do not warrant declaration of any Emergency Plan Classification.  
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Actions to address pressurized thermal shock should be taken when CET temperature and Pressurizer pressure start to rise. This can be accomplished using OP-902-009, Appendix 13 or with OP-902-004, based on whether or not the crew has diagnosed into OP-902-004 before those parameters start to rise. The scenario can be terminated after PTS actions have been accomplished or at the lead examiners discretion.
The conditions in this scenario do not warrant declaration of any Emergency Plan Classification.
Scenario 3 Rev 2


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Scenario 3 Rev 2 Critical Tasks
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Tasks
: 1. Establish Containment Isolation This task is satisfied by taking action to close FW-184 A.
: 1. Establish Containment Isolation This task is satisfied by taking action to close FW-184 A.
: 2. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
: 2. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of CSAS initiation.
This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of CSAS initiation.
: 3. Establish RCS temperature control This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of the RCS P/T curve using ADV #1 and establishing EFW flow to Steam Generator #1. Action to address this task should commence within 10 minutes after the applicable parameters begin to rise.
: 3. Establish RCS temperature control This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of the RCS P/T curve using ADV #1 and establishing EFW flow to Steam Generator #1. Action to address this task should commence within 10 minutes after the applicable parameters begin to rise.
: 4. Establish RCS pressure control This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS pressure within the limits of the RCS P/T curve and additionally maintain RCS pressure within 1500-1600 psid of the faulted steam generator. Action to address this task should commence within 10 minutes after the applicable parameters begin to rise.  
: 4. Establish RCS pressure control This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS pressure within the limits of the RCS P/T curve and additionally maintain RCS pressure within 1500-1600 psid of the faulted steam generator. Action to address this task should commence within 10 minutes after the applicable parameters begin to rise.
Scenario 3 Rev 2


Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 Rev 2 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.:
Appendix D                                   Scenario Outline                       Form ES-D-1 Facility:       WATERFORD 3                 Scenario No.: 4       Op Test No.:   NRC Examiners:                                             Operators:
NRC Examiners:
Initial Conditions:       37% Power on RCS chemistry hold Main Feedwater Pump B is running Turnover:                 Hold power until directed by plant management Start ACCW Pump A for chemical mixing Event         Malf. No.       Event                             Event No.                          Type*                           Description 1           CC02A               C - BOP       Start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump C - SRO        A for chemical mixing. ACCW Pump A will trip following start.
Operators:
TS - SRO 2           SG11C               I - BOP       Steam Generator Level #2 level instrument SG-TS - SRO      ILT1123 C fails low 3           CV05B2             C - ATC       Letdown Backpressure Control Valve CVC-C - SRO        123B, fails closed 4                               R - ATC       Direction given to raise power to < 50% using N - BOP        OP-010-004, Power Operations.
Initial Conditions: 37% Power on RCS chemistry hold Main Feedwater Pump B is running Turnover: Hold power until directed by plant management Start ACCW Pump A for chemical mixing Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 CC02A C - BOP C - SRO TS - SRO Start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump A for chemical mixing. ACCW Pump A will trip following start.
N - SRO 5           RP04A3, RP04B3     I - BOP       Inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation Signal, DI-08A03s14-1                      secure Containment Spray Pumps I - SRO DI-08A03s07-1 6                               M - All       Manual Reactor trip 7           DI-08A07S26-1       I - ATC       CC-641 will fail to reopen, Secure all Reactor I - SRO        Coolant Pumps on loss of Component Cooling Water flow 8           SG01A               M - All       Steam Generator #1 tube rupture ramps in over 3 minute period following reactor trip 8                               C - BOP       Isolate Steam Generator #1 when < 520 &deg;F hot C - SRO        leg temperature 8                               C - ATC       Reduce RCS pressure using Auxiliary Spray C - SRO        while maintaining sub-cooled margin.
2 SG11C I - BOP TS - SRO Steam Generator Level #2 level instrument SG-ILT1123 C fails low 3 CV05B2 C - ATC C - SRO Letdown Backpressure Control Valve CVC-123B, fails closed 4 R - ATC N - BOP N - SRO Direction given to raise power to < 50% using OP-010-004, Power Operations.
*       (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,     (M)ajor Scenario 4 Rev 2
5 RP04A3, RP04B3 DI-08A03s14-1 DI-08A03s07-1 I - BOP I - SRO Inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation Signal, secure Containment Spray Pumps 6 M - All Manual Reactor trip 7 DI-08A07S26-1 I - ATC I - SRO CC-641 will fail to reopen, Secure all Reactor Coolant Pumps on loss of Component Cooling Water flow 8 SG01A M - All Steam Generator #1 tube rupture ramps in over 3 minute period following reactor trip 8 C - BOP C - SRO Isolate Steam Generator #1 when < 520 &deg;F hot leg temperature 8 C - ATC C - SRO Reduce RCS pressure using Auxiliary Spray while maintaining sub-cooled margin.  
* (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Scenario 4 Rev 2 The crew assumes the shift at 37% power with instructions to maintain power.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 The crew assumes the shift at 37% power with instructions to maintain power.
The crew is directed to start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump A for basin chemical mixing. After the start, ACCW Pump A will trip. The SRO should declare ACCW Pump A inoperable and enter a 72 hour action for Tech Spec 3.7.3 as well as cascading Tech Specs. The SRO should address the need to accomplish surveillance OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Checks, within 1 hour to comply with Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.b. They must also address the need to accomplish the requirements of Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.d within 2 hours.
The crew is directed to start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump A for basin chemical mixing. After the start, ACCW Pump A will trip. The SRO should declare ACCW Pump A inoperable and enter a 72 hour action for Tech Spec 3.7.3 as well as cascading Tech Specs.
The SRO should address the need to accomplish surveillance OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Checks, within 1 hour to comply with Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.b. They must also address the need to accomplish the requirements of Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.d within 2 hours.
After Tech Specs have been addressed, Steam Generator #2 Level instrument SG-ILT-1123 C fails low. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. PPS bistables for Channel C Steam Generator Level Low, Steam Generator Level High, and Steam Generator Differential Pressure for Steam Generator #2 should be placed in bypass within 1 hour.
After Tech Specs have been addressed, Steam Generator #2 Level instrument SG-ILT-1123 C fails low. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. PPS bistables for Channel C Steam Generator Level Low, Steam Generator Level High, and Steam Generator Differential Pressure for Steam Generator #2 should be placed in bypass within 1 hour.
After the appropriate bistables have been bypassed, CVC-123B, Chemical and Volume Control Backpressure Control Valve B will fail closed. Letdown flow will go to 0 gpm. The SRO should enter OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, and transition to sub-section E2, Letdown Malfunction. The ATC operator should place the standby Letdown Backpressure Control Valve in service and restore Letdown flow.
After the appropriate bistables have been bypassed, CVC-123B, Chemical and Volume Control Backpressure Control Valve B will fail closed. Letdown flow will go to 0 gpm. The SRO should enter OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, and transition to sub-section E2, Letdown Malfunction. The ATC operator should place the standby Letdown Backpressure Control Valve in service and restore Letdown flow.
After Letdown has been restored, the SRO will be given direction to raise power to 50% for placing Main Feedwater Pump A in service. The SRO should use OP-010-004, Power Operations to direct the power ascension. The ATC operator will add Primary Makeup Water to the Volume Control Tank and the BOP operator will raise Main Turbine load.
After Letdown has been restored, the SRO will be given direction to raise power to 50% for placing Main Feedwater Pump A in service. The SRO should use OP-010-004, Power Operations to direct the power ascension. The ATC operator will add Primary Makeup Water to the Volume Control Tank and the BOP operator will raise Main Turbine load.
At the direction of the lead examiner, an inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation Signal will be generated. The SRO should enter OP-901-504, Inadvertent ESFAS Actuation. The BOP should be directed to secure Containment Spray Pumps A and B. The BOP operator will be directed to restore CCW flow to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. CC-641, RCP Inlet Outside Isolation will fail to reopen when attempted by the BOP operator. The SRO should direct the ATC to trip the reactor and secure Reactor Coolant Pumps.
At the direction of the lead examiner, an inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation Signal will be generated. The SRO should enter OP-901-504, Inadvertent ESFAS Actuation. The BOP should be directed to secure Containment Spray Pumps A and B. The BOP operator will be directed to restore CCW flow to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. CC-641, RCP Inlet Outside Isolation will fail to reopen when attempted by the BOP operator. The SRO should direct the ATC to trip the reactor and secure Reactor Coolant Pumps.
A Steam Generator tube rupture ramps in for Steam Generator #1 during the Containment Spray actions. The crew should diagnose into OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery. The SRO will direct a rapid RCS cooldown to < 520 &deg;F hot leg temperature. Following the rapid cooldown, the BOP should be directed to isolate Steam Generator #1 and the ATC operator should be directed to lower RCS pressure using Auxiliary Spray within the RCS temperature and pressure limits.
A Steam Generator tube rupture ramps in for Steam Generator #1 during the Containment Spray actions. The crew should diagnose into OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery. The SRO will direct a rapid RCS cooldown to < 520 &deg;F hot leg temperature.
The scenario can be terminated after Steam Generator #1 is isolated and the crew has taken action to reduce RCS pressure.  
Following the rapid cooldown, the BOP should be directed to isolate Steam Generator #1 and the ATC operator should be directed to lower RCS pressure using Auxiliary Spray within the RCS temperature and pressure limits.
The scenario can be terminated after Steam Generator #1 is isolated and the crew has taken action to reduce RCS pressure.
Scenario 4 Rev 2


Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Scenario 4 Rev 2 Critical Tasks
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Critical Tasks
: 1. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
: 1. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.
This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of CSAS initiation.
This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of CSAS initiation.
: 2. Prevent opening the Main Steam Safety valves on Steam Generator #1 This task is satisfied by taking action lower RCS pressure to < 945 PSIA.
: 2. Prevent opening the Main Steam Safety valves on Steam Generator #1 This task is satisfied by taking action lower RCS pressure to < 945 PSIA.
: 3. Isolate Steam Generator #1 This task is satisfied by isolating Steam Generator #1 in accordance with step 17 after RCS T HOT is reduced below 520 &deg;F.}}
: 3. Isolate Steam Generator #1 This task is satisfied by isolating Steam Generator #1 in accordance with step 17 after RCS THOT is reduced below 520 &deg;F.
Scenario 4 Rev 2
                                      }}

Revision as of 19:33, 13 November 2019

WT-2009-10-Final Objectives
ML101270496
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/05/2009
From: Brian Larson
NRC Region 4
To:
References
Download: ML101270496 (49)


Text

P 1-2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable WA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (Le,, except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each WA category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by It1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate WA statements.

A

7. S edoti;:ic;nszs possible; s ~ i i i p l e Sclcct t ~ p i c sfrom as many S ~ S % ~and e\ieiji system iji evijfuiiofi in the giijup befoie selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those WAS having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and WA categories 7.* The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the WA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D. 1.b of ES-401 for the applicable WAS
8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above: if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #I does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the WA catalog, and enter the WA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to WAS that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

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ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Examination Level: RO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

2.1.23, Ability to perform specific system and A1 S, D integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

Conduct of Operations Calculate Shutdown Margin and Volume of Primary Makeup Water for Dilution to the Volume Control K/A Importance: Tank.

4.3 A2 R, M 2.1.18, Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise Conduct of Operations logs, records, status boards, and reports.

Complete OP-004-005, Core Operating Limits K/A Importance: Supervisory System Operation, Attachment 11.6, 3.6 Calculation of Charging and Letdown Parameters.

A3 R, N 2.2.12, Knowledge of surveillance procedures Equipment Control Complete surveillance OP-903-008, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Leakage Test, Attachment 10.11 for K/A Importance: SI-329 A.

3.7 A4 R, N 2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under Radiation Control normal and emergency conditions.

Calculate stay time to perform a tagout verification in K/A Importance: the Regen Heat Exchanger Room. Room dose rate &

3.2 operators yearly dose provided.

Emergency Plan Not selected NOTE: All items (5 total are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

Revision 2

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Examination Level: SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

A5 2.1.23, Ability to perform specific system and R, N integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant Conduct of Operations operation.

K/A Importance:

Verify Core Protection Calculator, Plant Protection 4.4 System, and Calorimetric power are within limits during power ascension in accordance with OP-010-004 Power Operations, and OP-903-001, Technical Specification Surveillance Logs.

A6 2.1.20, Ability to interpret and execute procedure R, M steps Conduct of Operations Perform SM/CRS review OP-901-501, PMC or Core K/A Importance:

Operating Limit Supervisory System Malfunction, 4.6 Attachments 1, 2, and 3 following a PMC failure.

A7 2.2.40, Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a R, N system.

Equipment Control Review surveillance OP-903-008, Reactor Coolant K/A Importance:

System Isolation Leakage Test, Attachment 10.11 for 4.7 SI-329 A.

A8 2.3.4, Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under R, N normal and emergency conditions.

Radiation Control Calculate dose and assign non-licensed operators to K/A Importance:

vent Safety Injection piping in Safeguards Room A.

3.7 Given dose rate with and without shielding installed, time to install shielding, and job completion time using 1 operator or using 2 operators, determine proper job assignment.

A9 2.4.41, Knowledge of the emergency action level S, M thresholds and classifications.

Emergency Plan Determine appropriate Emergency Plan EAL.

K/A Importance:

4.6 NOTE: All items (5 total are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

Revision 1

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one): RO Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1 001 Control Rod Drive; ATC Operator Immediate Operator Actions A, S, D 1 on 2 Dropped CEAs from OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction Fault: The first and second reactor trip options do not function, requires performance of the 2nd reactor trip contingency from EOP OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

S2 004 Chemical and Volume Control; VCT Makeup Using the Dilute A, L, S, M 2 makeup Mode Fault: PMU-144, Primary Makeup Water Control Valve, will not auto close when Primary Makeup Water Batch Counter counts down to zero.

S3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on L, P, S, EN, D 3 RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.

S4 005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown A, L, S, M 4-P Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, to secure LPSI Pump B.

S5 022 Containment Cooling System; Perform OP-903-037, S, D 5 Containment Cooling Fans Operability Verification S6 062 AC Electrical Distribution System, Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus L, S, D 6 from Offsite Power This task will re-energize the 3A Bus with EDG A powering the 3A Bus using OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B.

S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine A, S, M 7 Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service.

Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback.

S8 029 Containment Purge System; Secure Containment Purge using S, D 8 OP-002-010, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC and Containment Purge 1 Revision 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 061 Emergency Feedwater; Transfer EFW Pump Suctions to Wet E, L, R, D 4-S Cooling Tower after Condensate Storage Pool Depletion using EOP OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 10 P2 064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an E, L, R, D 6 overspeed trip with a LOOP.

Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8.

P3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB A, R, M 2 for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification.

Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator 2 Revision 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one): SRO - I Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1 001 Control Rod Drive; ATC Operator Immediate Operator Actions A, S, D 1 on 2 Dropped CEAs from OP-901-102, CEA or CEDMCS Malfunction Fault: The first and second reactor trip options do not function, requires performance of the 2nd reactor trip contingency from EOP OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions.

S2 S3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on L, P, S, EN, D 3 RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.

S4 005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown A, L, S, M 4-P Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, to secure LPSI Pump B.

S5 022 Containment Cooling System; Perform OP-903-037, S, D 5 Containment Cooling Fans Operability Verification S6 062 AC Electrical Distribution System, Energize 4.16 KV Safety Bus L, S, D 6 from Offsite Power This task will re-energize the 3A Bus with EDG A powering the 3A Bus using OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 12-B.

S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine A, S, M 7 Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service.

Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback.

S8 029 Containment Purge System; Secure Containment Purge using S, D 8 OP-002-010, Reactor Auxiliary Building HVAC and Containment Purge 3 Revision 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 061 Emergency Feedwater; Transfer EFW Pump Suctions to Wet E, L, R, D 4-S Cooling Tower after Condensate Storage Pool Depletion using EOP OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Attachment 10 P2 064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an E, L, R, D 6 overspeed trip with a LOOP.

Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8.

P3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB A, R, M 2 for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification.

Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator 4 Revision 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Date of Examination: October 5, 2009 Exam Level (circle one): SRO - U Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1 S2 S3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System; BOP Operator Actions on L, P, S, EN, D 3 RAS This is a time critical task performed in EOP OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery Procedure.

S4 005 Shutdown Cooling System / 0025 E/APE Loss of Shutdown A, L, S, M 4-P Cooling; Place Shutdown Cooling Train B in Service Fault: After LPSI Pump B is running, SI-405 B will fail closed, requiring the operator to take immediate operator actions IAW OP-903-130, Shutdown Cooling Malfunction, to secure LPSI Pump B.

S5 S6 S7. 012 Reactor Protection System; Remove Reactor Trip on Turbine A, S, M 7 Trip from Service using OP-004-015, Reactor Power Cutback System, and place Reactor Power Cutback in Service.

Fault: When Reactor Power Cutback is placed in service, a Reactor Power Cutback will occur. The student will then need to take the immediate operator actions for Reactor Power Cutback.

S8 5 Revision 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 P2 064 Electrical Diesel Generators, Reset EDG A following an E, L, R, D 6 overspeed trip with a LOOP.

Reset is accomplished with OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Section 8.8.

P3 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Align HPSI Pump AB A, R, M 2 for performance of OP-903-030, Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification.

Fault: Reach rod for SI-208 A will bottom out during valve alignment, requiring contingencies of EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator 6 Revision 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100%, MOC, AB buses aligned to B side.

Protected Train is B Turnover: Maintain 100 % power Continue with Surveillance OP-903-094, section 7.20 Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 Di08A04S08-1 N - BOP Perform surveillance OP-903-094, section 7.20.

TS - SRO BD-103B fails to close.

2 RC15-A1 I - ATC Pressurizer level instrument RC-ILI-0110-X fails I - SRO high TS-SRO 3 CC12-E2 I - BOP Component Cooling Water Surge Tank level TS - SRO instrument CC-ILS-7013A fails low 4 FW21-A R- ATC Main Condenser leak with lowering Main N-BOP Condenser vacuum requiring a Rapid Plant Power Reduction N-SRO 5 RC23B M-All Small Break LOCA, SIAS and CIAS CC12-E2 C-ATC Secure Reactor Coolant Pumps due to the C - SRO combination of event 3 and event 5.

6 SI02 C - BOP Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A fails to auto start on SIAS requiring manual start 7 CS01-A C-BOP Containment Spray Pump A trip, OP-902-008, C-SRO Safety Function Recovery Procedure Alignment of LPSI Pump A to replace CS Pump A

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario 1 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain 100% power.

Surveillance procedure OP-903-094, ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test - Operating, is in progress. The previous crew stopped at section 7.20, Train A Position 44, Relay K310 (BD-103B). This crew should resume testing. The BOP will secure Blowdown flow for Steam Generator #2 and test BD-103B, which will fail to close. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.6.3.

After briefing the failure, Pressurizer level instrument RC-ILI-0110X fails high. Due to the failure, Letdown flow goes to maximum flow of approximately 125 gpm and all Pressurizer Heaters energize. The SRO should enter OP-901-110, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction. The crew should utilize sub section E1, Pressurizer Level Control Channel Malfunction. The ATC should take manual control of Pressurizer level and select the non-faulted channel. Using Tech Specs and OP-903-013, Monthly Channel Checks, the SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.3.5, a 7 day action requirement, and determine Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 entry is not required since QSPDS is operable and meeting the Pressurizer level channel check. SPDS indication of Pressurizer level is affected by this failure.

After the non-faulted channel is selected and Tech Specs are addressed, Component Cooling Water Surge Tank level instrument CC-ILS-7013A fails low. CCW Dry Cooling Tower A will bypass due to the failure. CCW Headers A and B will split, and CCW Loop AB supply and return from the A Header will close. The SRO should enter OP-901-510, Component Cooling Water System Malfunction. The BOP should use Attachment 1 to diagnose which instrument is failed. The crew should verify Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump A starts and control CCW system temperature with ACC-126 A.

CCW Train A should be declared inoperable and 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action Tech Spec 3.7.3 entered as well as cascading Tech Specs. The SRO should address the need to accomplish surveillance OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Checks, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to comply with Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.b. They must also address the need to accomplish the requirements of Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.d within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

After the crew has addressed Tech Specs, a leak in the Main Condenser develops and Main Condenser vacuum begins to drop. Off normal procedure OP-901-220, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, should be entered. Main Condenser vacuum will drop below 25 inches, requiring a rapid plant power reduction. The SRO should enter OP-901-212, Rapid Plant Power Reduction. Vacuum will drop below 25 inches but remain above 20 inches, the procedure trigger for tripping the Reactor. For the power reduction, the ATC will perform direct Boration to the RCS as well as ASI control with CEAs and Pressurizer boron equalization. The BOP will manipulate the controls to reduce Main Turbine load.

Scenario 1 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Once the crew has commenced the power reduction and lowered power to ~ 90%, or at the lead examiners discretion, a small break loss of coolant accident will occur. The crew should diagnose Pressurizer level dropping with all available Charging Pumps operating, trip the Reactor, and initiate Safety Injection Actuation (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation (CIAS). Because of the earlier CCW level instrument failure, all CCW flow will be lost to the Reactor Coolant Pumps; the pumps must be manually secured within 3 minutes of the loss of CCW flow. When Containment Spray is actuated, either manually or automatically, CS-125B will fail to automatically open and will not open using the control switch. This does not create a need for action at this time, but Containment Spray flow will only be provided from Train A with CS-125B failed closed. Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A will fail to automatically start on SIAS, requiring the BOP operator to manually start LPSI Pump A.

After the crew completes OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions and diagnoses into OP-902-002, Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery, Containment Spray Pump A will trip, resulting in no Containment Spray flow. The crew should recognize that they are not meeting the Safety Function Status Checklist of OP-902-002 and transition to OP-902-008, Safety function Recovery Procedure.

Prioritization in OP-902-008 should result in Containment Isolation being priority 1 and Containment Temperature and Pressure Control being priority 2. The crew should address Containment Isolation by overriding CS-125A closed. The crew should address Containment Temperature and pressure Control by aligning Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A to replace the failed Containment Spray Pump A. It is acceptable to pursue these tasks in parallel, since establishing flow with LPSI A to the Containment Spray header will also satisfy Containment Isolation concerns.

The scenario can be terminated after Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A is aligned for Containment Spray, or after the CRS gives the order to perform that alignment, at the lead examiners discretion.

Scenario 1 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Critical Tasks

1. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.

This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of loss of CCW flow. This task is set up by the failure of CC-ILS-7013 A. The required task becomes applicable after SIAS is initiated following event 5. The time requirement of 3 minutes is based on the RCP operating limit of 3 minutes without CCW cooling.

2. Establish Containment temperature and pressure control.

This task is satisfied by aligning LPSI Pump A to replace CS Pump A prior to exiting the Containment Temperature and Pressure Control safety function in OP-902-008. This task becomes applicable following the failure of Containment Spray Pump A in event 7. The Functional Recovery procedure utilized following this failure will direct this activity to satisfy the Containment Pressure and Temperature Control safety function.

Scenario 1 Rev 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100%, MOC, AB buses aligned to B side.

Protected Train is B Emergency Diesel Generator A is tagged out for planned maintenance.

Turnover: Maintain 100 % power Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 C- ATC Swap Charging Pump using OP-002-005.

C - SRO Charging Pump A develops oil leak.

TS - SRO 2 RC22 B1 I - BOP Pressurizer narrow range safety pressure I - SRO instrument RC-IPI-0101 B fails high TS - SRO 3 SG05 B I - BOP Steam Generator #2 level instrument, I - SRO SG ILR1106, fails low.

4 TPR13, 14 R - ATC Main Generator Stator Coil Water temperature N - BOP high, normal plant downpower N - SRO 5 TU01A, D, M - All Main Turbine High Vibration and Reactor Trip R

6 RD11A-10 C-ATC 2 CEAs stuck out requiring Emergency Boration RD11A-22 C - SRO 7 ED01 M-All Loss of Off Site Power A, B, C, D 8 EG08B C- BOP EDG B fails to auto-start C - SRO

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario 2 Rev 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 The crew assumes the shift at 100% power with instructions to maintain 100% power.

OP-903-003, Charging Pump Operability Check is scheduled for night shift.

The shift manager has instructed the control room supervisor to swap Charging Pumps leaving Charging Pump A running and Charging Pump AB secured and in auto. After starting Charging Pump A, the watchstander will call and report an oil leak, recommending Charging Pump A be secured. With Charging Pump A control switch in off and inoperable, the SRO should recognize that Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 is not met.

Additionally, TRM 3.1.2.4 must be entered. Tech Spec 3.1.2.4 is a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action and TRM 3.1.2.4 is a 7 day action. With the AB Safety Bus aligned to Train B, credit can not be taken for Charging Pump AB and Tech Spec and TRM 3.1.2.4 can not be exited.

After the ATC aligns Charging Pump AB or at the lead examiners direction, Pressurizer narrow range safety pressure instrument RC-IPI-0101 B fails high. After identifying the failure, the SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1. The BOP should be directed to bypass the PPS bistables for High Pressurizer Pressure, Low DNBR, and High LPD within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

After the crew bypasses the appropriate bistables, Steam Generator #2 level instrument, SG ILR1106, Steam Generator 2 Downcomer Level (red pen), fails low.

The controllers for Main Feedwater Regulating Valve 2, Startup Feedwater Regulating Valve 2, and Main Feedwater Pump B transfer to manual. The crew should enter OP-901-201, Steam Generator Level Control Malfunction. No Tech Spec entries are required and no actions by the Balance of Plant operator are necessary at this time.

After the crew has completed their brief, PMC alarms will come in for Main Generator Stator Coil Water hose temperatures. The crew should enter OP-901-211, Generator Malfunction. Using Attachment 1, SCW High Temperature, the crew will determine the need to commence a normal plant shutdown in accordance with OP-010-005. Due to the earlier Steam Generator level instrument failure, the BOP operator will have to control Steam Generator level in manual for Steam Generator #2. The ATC will perform direct Boration to the RCS as well as ASI control with CEAs and Pressurizer boron equalization. The BOP will manipulate the Main Turbine controls to reduce load.

Scenario 2 Rev 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Once the crew has commenced the power reduction and lowered power to ~ 90%, or at the lead examiners discretion, high vibration alarms will come in on the Main Turbine.

Using annunciator response procedure OP-500-001, Control Room Cabinet A, and OP-901-210, Turbine Trip, the SRO should direct a Reactor trip. The crew should enter OP-902-000, Standard Post Trip Actions, and work this procedure concurrent with the Turbine Trip off normal procedure. OP-901-210 will direct breaking Main Condenser vacuum. On the Reactor Trip, 2 CEAs will stick out, requiring the ATC operator to Emergency Borate. The BOP will have to establish Feedwater Control Reactor Trip Override conditions manually on Steam Generator #2 due to the earlier level instrument failure.

The SRO should direct the BOP to continue with the actions to break Main Condenser vacuum. The crew should diagnose into OP-902-006, Loss of Main Feedwater Recovery, and secure 2 Reactor Coolant Pumps. After 2 RCPs are secured and the BOP has commenced breaking vacuum, a loss of off site power occurs. Emergency Diesel Generator B will fail to auto-start on the LOOP and the BOP will be required to start EDG B. The crew will transition to OP-902-003, Loss of Off Site Power/Loss of Forced Flow Recovery procedure. During the scenario, environmental conditions will have rain occurring. After the LOOP, the high level alarms will come in for Dry Cooling Tower 1 and 2 Sumps. The CRS will direct the performance of OP-902-009, Standard Appendices, Appendix 20, Operation of DCT Sump Pumps.

The scenario can be terminated after the CRS orders the performance of OP-902-009 Appendix 20 or at the lead examiners discretion.

Scenario 2 Rev 1

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Critical Tasks

1. Establish reactivity control.

This task is satisfied by establishing Emergency Boration prior to completing Standard Post Trip Actions Reactivity Control verification. The required task becomes applicable after the Reactor is tripped and 2 CEAs remain stuck out following event 5.

2. Energize at least one vital electrical AC bus.

This task is satisfied by starting Emergency Diesel Generator B. This task becomes applicable following the loss of off site power triggered in event 7.

Scenario 2 Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 1.2 % Power Power ascension is being held pending Main Feedwater Pumps governor adjustment Preparations are being made to start Main Feedwater Pump A AB Bus is aligned to the A side Turnover: OP-903-052 for CVAS Train A will go late this shift. Complete OP-903-052, section 10.1.

OP-007-004, attachment 11.4 is in the field to discharge Waste Condensate Tank A.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 DI-18A4s27-1 N - BOP During performance of OP-903-052, CVAS N - SRO Fan A will fail to start.

TS - SRO 2 AO-04A3a12c-3 C - ATC Waste Condensate Tank A flow controller C - SRO LWM-IFIC-0647 output fails high 3 CH08-A1 I - BOP Containment pressure instrument I - SRO CB-IPT-6701-SMC fails high TS - SRO 4 RX14-A I - ATC Pressurizer pressure instrument I - SRO RC-IPR-0100 X fails low 5 RX06-D1 C - BOP Steam Bypass Valve MS-320 A fails open C - SRO 6 FW38-B M - ALL Main Feedwater line break in Containment.

7 RP08G C - BOP Main Feedwater Isolation Valve #1 FW-184A C - SRO fails to automatically close on MSIS.

8 RP09D C - ATC RC-606 and FP-601 B fail to auto close on C - SRO CIAS.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario 3 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 The crew assumes the shift at 1.2 % power. Reactor Engineer has completed Low Power Physics Testing. I&C Techs are making adjustments to Main Feedwater Pumps A & B governors based on vendor recommendations. The estimated time to completion is less than 60 minutes. When this is complete, Main Feedwater Pump A will be started and power ascension will commence.

Last shift, it was discovered that OP-903-052, CVAS Operability Test, will exceed its Tech Spec late date this shift. You have been directed to start CVAS Train A in accordance with OP-903-052. This surveillance will have the BOP operator secure RAB Normal Supply and Normal Exhaust Fans A and start CVAS Fan A. After securing both normal ventilation fans, CVAS Fan A will fail to start. This will require entering Tech Spec 3.7.7, a 7 day action requirement. RAB Normal Supply and Normal Exhaust Fans A will have to be re-started.

After the failure of CVAS Fan A, the RCA watch will call and report that he has completed his lineup and is ready for the ATC to perform his actions to discharge Waste Condensate Tank A and is ready for the ATC to continue with step 6.10.7. When the ATC initiates flow on step 6.10.10, LWM-IFIC-0647 will fail high, raising flow in excess of 50 gpm, the discharge permit limit. The ATC should close LWM-441 and LWM-442 from CP-4 to terminate the release.

After the release is secured, Containment pressure instrument CB-IPT-6701 SMC fails high. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 and the BOP should bypass PPS bistables 13 and 16.

After the appropriate bistables are bypassed, Pressurizer pressure instrument RC-IPR-0100 X fails low. This causes Pressurizer Backup and Proportional heaters to energize.

The SRO should enter OP-901-120, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction. The ATC will select the non-faulted Pressurizer pressure channel.

After the Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel Y is selected, Steam Bypass valve MS-320A controller will begin to fail high. The crew should respond to the cooldown and reactivity effects by taking manual control of MS-320 A and closing it.

After MS-320 A is closed, a Main Feedwater line break occurs in Containment. If the control room supervisor directs a reactor trip based on the un-controlled power rise, then the trigger for the Main Feedwater line break will be inserted while the crew is performing their standard post trip actions. After the malfunction is inserted, the Main Feedwater Isolation Valve #1 fails to automatically close on the MSIS and must be closed manually by the BOP operator. RC-606 and FP-601 B fail to automatically close on the CIAS and must be manually closed by the ATC and BOP operators. The crew should enter OP-902-004, Excess Steam Demand Recovery.

Scenario 3 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Actions to address pressurized thermal shock should be taken when CET temperature and Pressurizer pressure start to rise. This can be accomplished using OP-902-009, Appendix 13 or with OP-902-004, based on whether or not the crew has diagnosed into OP-902-004 before those parameters start to rise. The scenario can be terminated after PTS actions have been accomplished or at the lead examiners discretion.

The conditions in this scenario do not warrant declaration of any Emergency Plan Classification.

Scenario 3 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Tasks

1. Establish Containment Isolation This task is satisfied by taking action to close FW-184 A.
2. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.

This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of CSAS initiation.

3. Establish RCS temperature control This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS temperature within the limits of the RCS P/T curve using ADV #1 and establishing EFW flow to Steam Generator #1. Action to address this task should commence within 10 minutes after the applicable parameters begin to rise.
4. Establish RCS pressure control This task is satisfied by taking action to stabilize RCS pressure within the limits of the RCS P/T curve and additionally maintain RCS pressure within 1500-1600 psid of the faulted steam generator. Action to address this task should commence within 10 minutes after the applicable parameters begin to rise.

Scenario 3 Rev 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: WATERFORD 3 Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 37% Power on RCS chemistry hold Main Feedwater Pump B is running Turnover: Hold power until directed by plant management Start ACCW Pump A for chemical mixing Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 CC02A C - BOP Start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump C - SRO A for chemical mixing. ACCW Pump A will trip following start.

TS - SRO 2 SG11C I - BOP Steam Generator Level #2 level instrument SG-TS - SRO ILT1123 C fails low 3 CV05B2 C - ATC Letdown Backpressure Control Valve CVC-C - SRO 123B, fails closed 4 R - ATC Direction given to raise power to < 50% using N - BOP OP-010-004, Power Operations.

N - SRO 5 RP04A3, RP04B3 I - BOP Inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation Signal, DI-08A03s14-1 secure Containment Spray Pumps I - SRO DI-08A03s07-1 6 M - All Manual Reactor trip 7 DI-08A07S26-1 I - ATC CC-641 will fail to reopen, Secure all Reactor I - SRO Coolant Pumps on loss of Component Cooling Water flow 8 SG01A M - All Steam Generator #1 tube rupture ramps in over 3 minute period following reactor trip 8 C - BOP Isolate Steam Generator #1 when < 520 °F hot C - SRO leg temperature 8 C - ATC Reduce RCS pressure using Auxiliary Spray C - SRO while maintaining sub-cooled margin.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario 4 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 The crew assumes the shift at 37% power with instructions to maintain power.

The crew is directed to start Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Pump A for basin chemical mixing. After the start, ACCW Pump A will trip. The SRO should declare ACCW Pump A inoperable and enter a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action for Tech Spec 3.7.3 as well as cascading Tech Specs.

The SRO should address the need to accomplish surveillance OP-903-066, Electrical Breaker Alignment Checks, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to comply with Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.b. They must also address the need to accomplish the requirements of Tech Spec 3.8.1.1.d within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

After Tech Specs have been addressed, Steam Generator #2 Level instrument SG-ILT-1123 C fails low. The SRO should enter Tech Spec 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. PPS bistables for Channel C Steam Generator Level Low, Steam Generator Level High, and Steam Generator Differential Pressure for Steam Generator #2 should be placed in bypass within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

After the appropriate bistables have been bypassed, CVC-123B, Chemical and Volume Control Backpressure Control Valve B will fail closed. Letdown flow will go to 0 gpm. The SRO should enter OP-901-112, Charging or Letdown Malfunction, and transition to sub-section E2, Letdown Malfunction. The ATC operator should place the standby Letdown Backpressure Control Valve in service and restore Letdown flow.

After Letdown has been restored, the SRO will be given direction to raise power to 50% for placing Main Feedwater Pump A in service. The SRO should use OP-010-004, Power Operations to direct the power ascension. The ATC operator will add Primary Makeup Water to the Volume Control Tank and the BOP operator will raise Main Turbine load.

At the direction of the lead examiner, an inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation Signal will be generated. The SRO should enter OP-901-504, Inadvertent ESFAS Actuation. The BOP should be directed to secure Containment Spray Pumps A and B. The BOP operator will be directed to restore CCW flow to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. CC-641, RCP Inlet Outside Isolation will fail to reopen when attempted by the BOP operator. The SRO should direct the ATC to trip the reactor and secure Reactor Coolant Pumps.

A Steam Generator tube rupture ramps in for Steam Generator #1 during the Containment Spray actions. The crew should diagnose into OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery. The SRO will direct a rapid RCS cooldown to < 520 °F hot leg temperature.

Following the rapid cooldown, the BOP should be directed to isolate Steam Generator #1 and the ATC operator should be directed to lower RCS pressure using Auxiliary Spray within the RCS temperature and pressure limits.

The scenario can be terminated after Steam Generator #1 is isolated and the crew has taken action to reduce RCS pressure.

Scenario 4 Rev 2

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Critical Tasks

1. Trip any RCP not satisfying RCP operating limits.

This task is satisfied by securing all RCPs within 3 minutes of CSAS initiation.

2. Prevent opening the Main Steam Safety valves on Steam Generator #1 This task is satisfied by taking action lower RCS pressure to < 945 PSIA.
3. Isolate Steam Generator #1 This task is satisfied by isolating Steam Generator #1 in accordance with step 17 after RCS THOT is reduced below 520 °F.

Scenario 4 Rev 2