ML19115A318

302 Retake ADAMS-2B Final Exam Items Normal Release

ML19115A318
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	04/25/2019
From:	NRC/RGN-II/DRS/OLB
To:	Progress Energy Carolinas
References
50-261/16-302 50-261/OL-16
Download: ML19115A318 (113)

Text

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-2RT-1 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 160726 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training

PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 16-2RT TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-2RT-1

REFERENCES:

1. GP-005, Power Operation (Rev 129)

2. OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (Rev 112)

3. AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control (Rev 20)

4. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits. (Amendment 176)

5. AOP-022, Loss of Service Water (Rev 35)

6. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS), (Amendment 176)

7. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, (Amendment 176)

8. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating (Amendment 203)

9. AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage (Rev 23)

10. Technical Specification LCO LCO 3.4.13, Operational Leakage (Amendment 212)

11. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 7)

12. FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation - ATWS (Rev 22)

13. EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (Rev 6)

Validation Time: 102 minutes

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 37% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the West at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-D8, RHR PIT A HI TEMP, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 N/A R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 I-RO Pzr Pressure Control PC-444J Control Band Shift I(TS)-SRO 3 2 C-BOP South Service Water leak At Intake C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-RO RCS Leakage in Containment C(TS)-SRO 5 4 M-RO ATWS / Cold Leg SBLOCA M-BOP M-SRO 6 5 C-RO Phase A Containment Isolation Fails to AUTO ACTUATE 7 6 C-RO Loss of Emergency Bus E2

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 H B Robinson 2016-2RT NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 37% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the West at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2 ACTION A. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-D8, RHR PIT A HI TEMP, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Upon taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using GP-005, Power Operation, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Following this, the Pressurizer Pressure Controller, PC-444J will experience a control band shift (controller will act to control pressure at 1950 psig). The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control to take manual control of the Pressure Controller and restore RCS pressure to the normal control band. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Next, the South Service Water Header will experience a break at the intake structure on the SW piping downstream of SW-5, SW Pump A Discharge Tee. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, to realign the Service Water System and isolate the leak. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS), Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, and LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating. The A EDG will be declared inoperable. Station Management will directed that power be held at the current power until further direction.

After this, a 35 gpm RCS leak will occur in the Containment. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, Operational leakage.

The RCS leakage will degrade to the point where a Reactor trip will be required. The Reactor will fail to TRIP manually from the RTGB (also automatic trips are failed) (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, and attempt to manually trip the reactor.

When this fails the operator will enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation -

ATWS The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and direct emergency boration of the RCS.

The RCS leakage will evolve into a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA (over a total of 10 minutes) on the C Loop. Simultaneously, Phase A Containment Isolation will fail to actuate automatically, and the operator will need to manually actuate Phase A Containment Isolation. Upon completion of FRP-S.1 the operator will transition back to EOP-E-0.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Upon the transition to EOP-E-1, a loss of Emergency Bus E2 will occur due to the Normal Supply breaker, 52/28B tripping open. The operator will be required to manually re-start ECCS equipment.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 The scenario will terminate at Step 11 of EOP-E-1, after the operator has determined that ECCS flow cannot be terminated.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control PC-444J and close the PZR Spray valves before the plant trips on OTT.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions (Rods are in manual for the power ascension),

failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operators failure to insert negative reactivity.

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)

NOTE: This may not be a valid critical task if subcooling does NOT reach 13°F. Observe RCS subcooling closely, as it closely approaches this setpoint.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

Close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each critical Phase A penetration within 20 minutes of the Phase A isolation signal (EOP Based)

Safety Significance: Closing at least one containment isolation valve on each critical. Phase A penetration, under the postulated plant conditions and when it is possible to do so, constitutes a task that is essential to safety, because its improper performance or omission by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 of the plant. In particular, the operator has failed to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release. In this case, the containment barrier is needlessly left in a degraded condition.

Failure to perform the critical task leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the auxiliary building. High radiation in the auxiliary building can lead to increased doses to personnel. Failure to perform the critical task also constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump after power is restored to the ESF Bus in E-1. (EOP Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room.

Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 800 T = 0 Malfunctions:

A SI Pump Pump OOS:

irf EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT (A SI Pump OOS)

PLACE Red Cap over A SI Pump Control Switch PLACE Green Cap over C SI Pump Control Switch IAW OMM-048-1, Attachment 15 TI-471 PRT Temperature OOS IOR aoPRTAOD030A f:50 Place WHITE DOT on TI-471 RTGB Annunciator APP-010-DE8 failed ON IMF ANNXN10D08 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-010-D8 Insert the following:

IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN,BOTH (ATWS on SBLOCA)

IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN,BOTH (ATWS on SBLOCA)

IMF MSC04A f:FAILURE_TO_ACTIVATE (Phase A CI Fails to AUTO actuate)

IMF MSC04B f:FAILURE_TO_ACTIVATE (Phase A CI Fails to AUTO actuate)

$008_PHASE_A_MAN DMF MSC04A (Allows operator to Manually actuate Phase A CI)

$008_PHASE_A_MAN DMF MSC04B (Allows operator to Manually actuate Phase A CI)

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

Copy of GP-005 marked up for power increase Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At examiner direction of Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-2RT-1.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Event 1 Raise Power At direction of examiner NA Event 2 At examiner direction of PC-444J Pressurizer Pressure Controller Control Band Shift IMF PRS06 r:01:00 f:-

300 Event 3 South Service Water leak At Intake At direction of examiner IMF SWS03A f:20000 Event 4 At direction of examiner RCS Leakage in Containment IMF RCS09E r:1:00 f:42 MMF RCS09E r:5:00 f:1000 Event 5 While responding to ATWS increased IMF RPS01A RCS leakage f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 BOTH IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH Ramps in during the Event 6 RCS Cold Leg C SBLOCA NA performance of FRP-S.1 NOTE: Failure is inserted and ramping in 5 minutes after RCS leakage began Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Phase A Containment Isolation Fails to AUTO IMF MSC04A, ACTUATE f:FAILURE_TO_

ACTIVATE NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 IMF MSC04B f:FAILURE_TO_

ACTIVATE

$008_PHASE_A_MAN DMF MSC04A

$008_PHASE_A_MAN DMF MSC04B Upon transition to Event 8 Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal Supply IMF EPS05B EOP-E-1 NOTE: Failure is inserted when the crew transitions from EOP-E-0 to EOP-E-1.

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 57 Event

Description:

Raise Power Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using GP-005, Power Operation, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments GP-005, POWER OPERATION RO (From Pre-Brief, IAW GP-005 Section 6.4, NOTE: The Control Rods will NOTE prior to Step 39) Maintain Tave within be in MANUAL.

5°F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes.

OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.

RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to NOTE: The RO will determine add to the RCS and if applicable, the that several 200-300 gallon expected change in RCS temperature AND batches of water must be Reactor Power. added, from the turnover information.

RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.

RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 57 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.

RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.

RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.

RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service NOTE: Two Orifices will be in and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, service.

THEN RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.

RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.

RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

Unanticipated Rod Motion Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:

FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes.

FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 57 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops.

The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.

RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO.

PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position.

Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.

RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.

GP-005, POWER OPERATION CRS (Step 14) IF all indications of Reactor Power agree within 5% of each other OR management approval has been obtained AND EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN perform the following:

BOP Adjust the SETTER indication using the REF or REF pushbuttons to obtain 50% Reactor Power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 57 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Use the GO, HOLD, REF , and REF pushbuttons as necessary to continue raising load until the highest indication is 47% to 50% Reactor Power.

RO (Step 15) WHEN Reactor power is between 40% to 45%, THEN check Reactor Trip Block P-8 permissive EXTINGUISHED.

CRS (Step 16) IF all indications of Reactor Power NOTE: Turbine Control is in agree within 5% of each other OR OPER AUTO management approval has been obtained AND Turbine Control is in TURB MANUAL, After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 57 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Controller, PC-444J Control Band Shift Following this, the Pressurizer Pressure Controller, PC-444J will experience a control band shift (controller will act to control pressure at 1950 psig). The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control to take manual control of the Pressure Controller and restore RCS pressure to the normal control band.

The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF PRS06 r:01:00 f:-300 Indications Available:

RTGB Annunciator APP-003-C7, PZR PRESS CONTROLLER HI OUTPUT PC-444J Controller Output at 100%

PCV-455A & PCV-455B, PZR SPRAY VALVES full OPEN Lowering Trend on PR-444, PZR PRESS NR & RCS PRESS WR Recorder Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-003-C7, PZR PRESS CONTROLLER HI OUTPUT RO (Step 1) IF alarm is due to instrument failure, NOTE: The alarm is NOT due THEN refer to AOP-025, RTGB Instrument to RTGB Instrument Failure.

Failure.

RO (Step 2) IF alarm is due to controller failure, NOTE: The RO and CRS will THEN refer to AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS recognize that it is the Pressure Control System. controller that failed and proceed to AOP-019.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AOP-019 based on the failure of the Controller.

AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL NOTE: Steps 1, 2,and 3 are Immediate Action Steps RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming NOTE: The LTOPP Arming Switches Selected To NORMAL switches are in NORMAL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 14 of 57 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Controller, PC-444J Control Band Shift Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:

a. Check PZR pressure LESS THAN NOTE: RCS pressure is less 2335 PSIG than 2335 PSIG and lowering.

b. ENSURE Both PZR PORVs CLOSED RO (Step 3) Control The Normal PZR Spray NOTE: The RO will place PC-Valves AND PZR Heaters To Restore RCS 444J in Manual and reduce the Pressure To The Desired Control Band controllers output to close the PZR Spray Valves Examiner Note: This is an opportunity for a crew alignment brief following the verification of immediate operator actions.

CRS (Step 4) Make PA Announcement For NOTE: The BOP will likely Procedure Entry make this announcement.

RO (Step 5) Check PZR Pressure UNDER NOTE: This is a Continuous OPERATOR CONTROL Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

The RNO is to Trip the Reactor and Go To EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection if a Reactor Trip Setpoint is approached Critical Task:

Manually control PC-444J and close the PZR Spray valves before the plant trips on OTT.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 15 of 57 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Controller, PC-444J Control Band Shift Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6) Check Pressurizer Pressure NOTE: The failure is the Transmitter PT444 OR PT445 FAILED. controller, NOT a Pressure Transmitter CRS (Step 6 RNO) IF PT444 OR PT445 FAIL, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN Go to AOP025, RTGB Instrument Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Failure Go To Step 8 RO (Step 8) Check PC444J, PZR PRESS NOTE: This is at the time of OPERATING PROPERLY IN AUTO the failure, and will be answered NO, it was NOT operating properly in AUTO.

RO (Step 8 RNO) Perform the following:

a. Place PC444J, PZR PRESS, in MAN. NOTE: This was performed during the immediate actions Step 3.

b. IF PC444J is operating properly in NOTE: PC-444J is operating manual, THEN Go To Step 10. properly in Manual. The CRS will continue with Step 10.

RO (Step 10) Perform the following:

a. Check PZR SPRAY VALVE Controllers NOTE: The PZR SPRAY IN AUTO VALVE controllers are in AUTO

b. Check PZR Heaters IN NORMAL NOTE: For the conditions at CONFIGURATION turnover, PZR Heaters are in a NORMAL CONFIGURATION

c. Manually adjust PC444J to maintain PZR pressure.

d. Check PZR pressure UNDER CONTROL

e. Go To Step 30

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 16 of 57 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Controller, PC-444J Control Band Shift Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 30) Implement The EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 31) Contact I&C To Make Repairs To NOTE: The CRS will call the The PZR Pressure Control System WCC SRO to contact I&C.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC SRO.

CRS (Step 32) Refer To ITS For Applicable LCOs LCO 3.4.11, PZR PORV TRM 3.4, PZR Spray T LCO 3.4.4 AND 3.4.5, RCS Loops LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure LCO 3.4.9, PZR Level CRS (Step 33) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:

a. Pressurizer pressure 2205 psig; CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 NOTE: Pressurizer pressure limit does not NOTE: These conditions do apply during: not exist, therefore the

a. THERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP per pressure limit DOES APPLY.

minute; or

b. THERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 17 of 57 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Controller, PC-444J Control Band Shift Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered. It is likely that the ACTION already will be COMPLETE and that they can exit as well.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore RCS DNB parameter(s) to within limit. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> RCS DNB parameters not within limits.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 18 of 57 Event

Description:

South Service Water leak At Intake Next, the South Service Water Header will experience a break at the intake structure on the SW piping downstream of SW-5, SW Pump A Discharge Tee. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, to realign the Service Water System and isolate the leak. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS), Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, and LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating.

The A EDG will be declared inoperable. Station Management will directed that power be held at the current power until further direction.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF SWS03A f:20000 Indications Available:

RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F7, SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F7, NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS RTGB Annunciator APP-008-E7, S SW HDR STRAINER PIT HI LEVEL PI-1616, North SW Header pressure indicates 16 psig PI-1684, South SW Header pressure indicates 18 psig APP-002-A8 through D8, HVH-1(2-4) WTR OUTLET LO FLOW A SW Booster Pump remains running Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-022, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER BOP (Step 1) Check the following alarms - Immediate Action EXTINGUISHED APP-008-E7, S SW HDR STRAINER PIT HI LEVEL APP-008-E8, N SW HDR STRAINER PIT HI LEVEL BOP (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action Close the following SW X-CONN Valves:

V6-12B V6-12C CRS Go To Section F Examiner Note: This is an opportunity for a crew brief following the verification of immediate operator actions.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 19 of 57 Event

Description:

South Service Water leak At Intake Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-022, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER SECTION F, SERVICE WATER PITS FLOODING IN INTAKE AREA CRS (Step 1) Verify PA Announcement for NOTE: The BOP will most Procedure Entry Performed likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 2) Verify SW X-CONN Valves -

CLOSED V6-12B V6-12C NOTE (Step 3) The source of flooding in the Intake Structure may be Service Water, Fire Water, or Intake Structure leakage.

BOP/ (Step 3) Evaluate Control Room Indications NOTE: The CRS will dispatch CRS AND Perform Local Inspections to Determine an AO to the Intake.

Source of Flooding Prior to Continuing If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 3 minutes that the SW leak is at the Discharge Tee of SW Pump A.

BOP (Step 4) Check Source of Flooding -

SERVICE WATER BOP (Step 5) Check Service Water Leak Location

- ON SOUTH HEADER BOP (Step 6) Verify the following:

SW PUMP C - RUNNING SW PUMP D - RUNNING NOTE: The D SW Pump will be started.

SW PUMP A - STOPPED NOTE: The A SW Pump will be stopped.

SW PUMP B - STOPPED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 20 of 57 Event

Description:

South Service Water leak At Intake Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 7) Evaluate SW Header Pressure Indications as Follows:

Check South SW Header pressure on PI-1684 - LOWERING Check North SW Header Pressure on PI-1616 - STABLE OR RISING NOTE (Step 8) With Service Water Pumps "A" AND "B isolated, EDG "A" is inoperable. ITS 3.8.1 requires SR 3.8.1.1 to be performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

BOP (Step 8) Close V6-12A, SW SOUTH HDR ISO NOTE (Step 9) SW-851 and SW-857, SOUTH SW HEADER CHEMICAL INJECTION, are located above the South SW Strainer Pit on the South side.

BOP (Step 9) Verify the following Valves at the NOTE: The CRS will contact Intake Structure - CLOSED the AO at the Intake.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that these valves are CLOSED.

SW-851, SOUTH SW HEADER CHEMICAL INJECTION SW-857, SOUTH SW HEADER CHEMICAL INJECTION CAUTION (Step 10) Confined Space entry requirements must be observed to access the South SW Strainer Pit.

NOTE (Step 10) SW-187, SOUTH HDR SUPPLY TO SCRN WASH & CW PMP GLAND SEAL, is located in the South SW Strainer Pit.

BOP (Step 10) Check Flooding Status - NOTE: The CRS will contact STOPPED the AO at the Intake.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the inrush of water has stopped but the Pit is full of water.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 21 of 57 Event

Description:

South Service Water leak At Intake Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11) Check North SW Header Pressure on PI-1616 - GREATER THAN 40 PSIG CRS/ (Step 12) Remove Control Power Fuses from NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP the following Breakers at 480V Bus E-1: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF EPSV480E1_126 f:RACK_OUT IRF EPSV480E1_127 f:RACK_OUT Report after 2 minutes that the control power fuses have been removed.

SERVICE WATER PUMP A (CMPT-20B)

SERVICE WATER PUMP B (CMPT-19C)

CRS (Step 13) Go To Step 21 BOP (Step 21) Determine if A SW Booster Pump NOTE: The crew may have should be Started: started the SW Booster Pump IAW APP-002-A8, B8, C8 &

D8, when they addressed the annunciator procedure. (not scripted)

Check SW Booster Pumps - ALL STOPPED BOP (Step 21.a RNO) Verify only One SW Booster Pump running.

CRS Go To Step 22.

BOP (Step 22) Check Circulating Water Pump Status - ANY RUNNING BOP (Step 23) Determine if Adequate Seal Water is Available to Circulating Water Pumps as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 22 of 57 Event

Description:

South Service Water leak At Intake Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-008-E4, CW PMP A SEAL WTR LOST - EXTINGUISHED AND APP-008-E5, CW PMP B SEAL WTR LOST - EXTINGUISHED AND APP-008-E6, CW PMPC SEAL WTR LOST - EXTINGUISHED CAUTION (Step 24) CCW temperature is limited to 105°F when any of the following equipment is in service: Post Accident Sampling Heat Exchanger, and Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger.

RO (Step 24) Determine Maximum Allowable CCW Temperature as follows:

Check RCS temperature - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 350°F RO (Step 24.a RNO) Maintain CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature indicated on TI-607 less than or equal to 105°F CRS GO To Step 29.

CRS (Step 29) Perform the following:

Inspect the area of the leak Report finding to the Control Room Identify and isolate the source of the SW leak CRS (Step 30) Contact Maintenance to Install NOTE: The CRS may call Temporary Pumps to Dewater Service Water WCC/Maintenance to address Pits the piping failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Maintenance.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 23 of 57 Event

Description:

South Service Water leak At Intake Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 31) Contact Engineering to Perform the NOTE: The CRS may call following: WCC/System Engineer to address the piping failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/System Engineer.

Evaluate operability of equipment affected by flooding Provide corrective actions for flooding CRS (Step 32) Refer to Technical Specification NOTE: The CRS will address 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS) Technical Specifications.

CRS (Step 33) Implement the EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 34) Return to Procedure and Step in Effect TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS)

CRS LCO 3.7.7 Two SWS trains and the Turbine Building loop isolation valves shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, 3 and 4.

CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered, and that TS LCO 3.8.1 must be addressed as well.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 24 of 57 Event

Description:

South Service Water leak At Intake Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SWS train A.1 NOTES:

inoperable Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by SWS.

Restore SWS train to OPERABLE status. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS CRS LCO 3.6.6 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION C.1 and D.1 was entered when the four flow alarms were LIT on the HVH Fans, and exited when flow was restored.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One C.1 Restore containment cooling train to OPERABLE 7 days containment status. AND cooling train inoperable. 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO D. Two D.1 Restore one containment cooling train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> containment OPERABLE status.

cooling trains inoperable.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING (ON NEXT PAGE)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 25 of 57 Event

Description:

South Service Water leak At Intake Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE The qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite emergency AC Electrical Power Distribution System Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the onsite emergency power distribution subsystem(s).

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that A EDG is inoperable and that ACTION B.1, B.2 and B.3.1 or B.3.2.1 and B3.2.2.2 must be entered; as well as B.4.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One DG B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuit 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND inoperable AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter B.2 Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.

AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> B.3.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG OR B.3.2.1 Determine OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to common cause failure. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> AND B.3.2.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status 7 days AND 8 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO EXAMINER NOTE: This in an opportunity to conduct a crew brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 26 of 57 Event

Description:

RCS Leakage in Containment After this, a 35 gpm RCS leak will occur in the Containment. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, Operational Leakage.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF RCS09E r:1:00 f:35 MMF RCS09E d:5:00 r:5 f:250 Indications Available:

VCT level is lowering Containment pressure is rising Containment Sump level is rising RTGB Annunciator APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD (~12 Minutes delayed)

R-11 Containment Gas Rad Monitor is in alarm (~12 Minutes Delayed)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will transition to AOP-016.

AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE RO (Step 1) DETERMINE If Reactor Trip Needed as follows:

CHECK RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG CHECK the following:

PZR Level - LESS THAN 14% AND LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR RCS Subcooling - LESS THAN 18°F RO (Step 1.b RNO) IF PZR Level can NOT be NOTE: This is a Continuous maintained greater than 14% OR Subcooling Action. The CRS will make can NOT be maintained greater than 18°F, both board operators aware.

THEN trip the Reactor and GO TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CRS GO TO Step 2.

CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of NOTE: The BOP will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 27 of 57 Event

Description:

RCS Leakage in Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) CONTROL Charging Flow to Maintain Desired RCS Level.

RO (Step 4) CHECK VCT Level - LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES RO (Step 4 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 12.5 inches, THEN OBSERVE the Note Action. The CRS will make prior to Step 5 AND PERFORM Step 5. both board operators aware.

CRS GO TO Step 6.

RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Pump Status - NOTE: Two Charging Pumps LESS THAN TWO RUNNING are running.

CRS (Step 6 RNO) GO TO Step 11 RO (Step 11) PLACE Running Charging Pump Speed Controller(s) In MAN AND ADJUST Output to Maximum RO (Step 12) CHECK RCS Level - LOWERING Examiner NOTE: Depending IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER on the crews progression thru the procedure, and the RCS break size increasing, the crew may NOT yet determine RCS level is lowering in an Uncontrolled Manner. IF that is the case, continue with Step 20 (Step 12 RNO), on Page 28 RO (Step 13) CHECK Any Letdown - IN NOTE: Normal letdown is in SERVICE service.

RO (Step 14) ENSURE All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated As Follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 28 of 57 Event

Description:

RCS Leakage in Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP Valves NOTE: These are the only CLOSED valves in the step that the operator will actually have to close. All others are already in the required position.

HIC142, PURIFICATION FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO 0%

HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO 0%

CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP CLOSED RO (Step 15) CHECK RCS Level LOWERING Examiner NOTE: If the crew IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER has reached this point in the AOP, the break size is now large enough that this answer will always be yes.

RO (Step 16) CHECK RCS Pressure -

GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG RO (Step 17) TRIP The Reactor AND GO TO Examiner NOTE: Proceed to EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Events 5-7 on Page 30.

Examiner NOTE: IF RCS level was NOT lowering in an UNCONTROLLED MANNER, THEN the Step 12 RNO, GO TO Step 20 applied, CONTINUE FOLLOWING HERE.

RO (Step 20) CONTROL Charging Flow to Maintain Desired RCS Level RO (Step 21) MONITOR Leakage as follows:

CHECK RCS Level - LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RO (Step 21 RNO) IF RCS Level - LOWERS IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER, THEN GO TO Step 1.

CRS GO TO Step 22.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 29 of 57 Event

Description:

RCS Leakage in Containment Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 22) IMPLEMENT ITS LCO 3.4.13 NOTE: The CRS may address Technical Specifications, or acknowledge that TS LCO 3.4.13 is NOT met.

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may not be able to address Technical Specifications before a reactor trip is required. If NOT, evaluate Technical Specifications upon completion of the scenario, and proceed to Events 5-7.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE CRS APPLICABILITY:MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCS operational A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE When RCS Leakage exceeds C/A Step 1 and a Reactor Trip is required, move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 30 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power The RCS leakage will degrade to the point where a Reactor trip will be required. The Reactor will fail to TRIP manually from the RTGB (also automatic trips are failed)

(ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails the operator will enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation - ATWS The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and direct emergency boration of the RCS. The RCS leakage will evolve into a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA (over a total of 10 minutes) on the C Loop. Simultaneously, Phase A Containment Isolation will fail to actuate automatically, and the operator will need to manually actuate Phase A Containment Isolation. Upon completion of FRP-S.1 the operator will transition back to EOP-E-0.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. After the crew has reset SI, a loss of Emergency Bus E2 will occur due to the Normal Supply breaker, 52/28B tripping open. The operator will be required to manually re-start ECCS equipment.

The scenario will terminate at Step 11 of EOP-E-1, after the operator has determined that ECCS flow cannot be terminated.

Booth Operator Instructions: None, Failures inserted at T=0 Indications Available:

Manual Rx Trip Attempted, without Rx Trip Rx Trip First Out LIT, without Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED RO (Step 1 RNO) Manually TRIP Reactor Immediate Action IF reactor power is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5% OR Intermediate Range SUR is positive, THEN GO TO FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation 0 ATWS, Step 1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 31 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will transition to FRP-S.1.

FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS CAUTION (Step 1) RCPs should NOT be tripped with reactor power GREATER THAN 5%.

NOTE (Step 1) Steps 1 and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.

RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED Neutron flux - LOWERING RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action Manually TRIP Reactor.

IF Reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT Control Rods.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 32 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions (Rods are in manual for the power ascension), failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operators failure to insert negative reactivity.

BOP DISPATCH operator to locally open the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch following breakers: both the Inside and Outside AO.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as each AO, and report after 2 minutes use:

IRF EPSV480B3_104 f:RACK_OUT IRF EPSV480B2B_097 f:RACK_OUT and report that the Rx has been locally tripped.

Reactor Trip breakers Reactor Trip Bypass breakers BOTH MG Set Generator Output breakers BOTH MG Set Motor Input breakers BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 33 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CLOSE MSR Purge and Shutoff valves BOP (Step 3) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps -

BOTH RUNNING CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels -

TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

BOP/ (Step 3b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level CRS lowers to less than 16% on two S/Gs THEN PERFORM Step3.c.

CONTINUE WITH Step 4.

BOP/ (Step 4) INITIATE Emergency Boration:

RO START two Charging Pumps at maximum speed ALIGN Boration Flow Path:

OPEN MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT BOP/ (Step 4.b.2) START Boric Acid Pump RO ALIGNED for BLEND BOP/ (Step 4.b.3) CHECK for Boric Acid flow on RO FI-110 BOP/ (Step 4.c) ALIGN Charging flow path:

RO OPEN CVC-310B, LOOP 2 COLD LEG CHG Valve ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection and MAXIMUM Charging flow:

Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 34 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller Seal Water Flow Control Valves MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm and 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated MAINTAIN Charging flow on FI-122A -

GREATER THAN BORIC ACID FLOW CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG BOP/ (Step 5) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation RO Valves - CLOSED BOP/ (Step 6) CHECK NO SI Signal Exists NOTE: Depending on the RO timing of the crews progression and the leak rate ramp, SI may occur before transitioning back to EOP-E-0.

If that is the case, then the RNO applies and the CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform Attachment 3, Auto Action Verification.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action, the CRS will make the crew aware If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 3.

Other Examiners follow FRP-S.1 Actions, Step 7, on Page 38.

FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION ATWS ATTACHMENT 3, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 35 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A NOTE: Containment Isolation ACTUATED Phase A has NOT actuated.

BOP (Step 4.a RNO) Manually ACTUATE BOTH NOTE: If NOT done already, trains of Containment Isolation Phase A. the BOP will manually actuate Containment Isolation Phase A.

Critical Task:

Close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each critical Phase A penetration within 20 minutes of the Phase A isolation signal (EOP Based)

Safety Significance: Closing at least one containment isolation valve on each critical.

Phase A penetration, under the postulated plant conditions and when it is possible to do so, constitutes a task that is essential to safety, because its improper performance or omission by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. In particular, the operator has failed to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release. In this case, the containment barrier is needlessly left in a degraded condition. Failure to perform the critical task leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the auxiliary building. High radiation in the auxiliary building can lead to increased doses to personnel. Failure to perform the critical task also constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

BOP (Step 4.b) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 36 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING CHECK SW Booster Pumps - BOTH RUNNING CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 37 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG] Numbers will not be required.

CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] Numbers will not be required.

BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 38 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may contact Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary the Inside AO.

(38 KW each): Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report which air compressors are running.

Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

Attachment completion Manual actions taken Failed equipment status SW status per Step 7.c Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION ATWS RO (Step 7) CHECK IF the Following Trips Have Occurred:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 39 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Reactor - TRIPPED Turbine - TRIPPED RO (Step 8) CHECK IF Reactor is Subcritical:

a. Power Range channels - LESS THAN 5%

b. Intermediate Range channels -

NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE

c. OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 18 and GO TO Step 18 CAUTION (Step 18) Boration should continue to obtain adequate shutdown margin during subsequent actions.

RO (Step 18) CHECK ARPI - LESS THAN TWO RODS STUCK OUT RO (Step 19) STOP RCS Boration:

a. CHECK MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT - CLOSED (Step 19.a. RNO) CLOSE MOV-350

b. (Step 19.b.) CHECK Boric Acid Pump Control Switch aligned for blend - IN AUTO

c. CHECK Emergency Boration -

PERFORMED USING MOV-350 FLOWPATH

d. NOTIFY Engineering to evaluate Booth Instructor:

the following to determine if RCP Acknowledge as engineering to evaluate the data and seal inspection is required:

determine if RCP seal RCP Bearing temperatures inspection is required.

No.1 Seal Leakoff temperatures No.1 Seal Leakoff flowrates

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 40 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

e. CHECK BOTH of the following conditions - EXIST:

Emergency Boration performed using RWST flowpath AND Charging Pump suction aligned to the VCT is desired (Step 19.e RNO) GO TO Step 19.i.

(Step 19.1) REDUCE Charging Pump speed as desired RO/ (Step 20) PERFORM the following:

CRS RESET SPDS RETURN TO Procedure AND Step in Effect NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-0.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION NOTE (Step 1) Steps 1 through 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.

RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 41 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action RO CHECK if SI is actuated:

SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR SI equipment AUTO STARTED RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

SI Pumps TWO RUNNING RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA Examiner NOTE: Depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the RCP trip criteria may or may not be met. See Critical Task on Page 49.

FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 42 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Examiner NOTE: The CRS Action Verification, While CONTINUING may assign the BOP to WITH This Procedure perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow EOP-E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 46.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

SI Pumps TWO RUNNING RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A NOTE: Containment Isolation ACTUATED Phase A has NOT actuated.

BOP (Step 4.a RNO) Manually ACTUATE BOTH NOTE: If NOT done already, trains of Containment Isolation Phase A. the BOP will manually actuate Containment Isolation Phase A.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 43 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Close containment isolation valves such that at least one valve is closed on each critical Phase A penetration within 20 minutes of the Phase A isolation signal (EOP Based)

Safety Significance: Closing at least one containment isolation valve on each critical.

Phase A penetration, under the postulated plant conditions and when it is possible to do so, constitutes a task that is essential to safety, because its improper performance or omission by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. In particular, the operator has failed to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release. In this case, the containment barrier is needlessly left in a degraded condition. Failure to perform the critical task leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the auxiliary building. High radiation in the auxiliary building can lead to increased doses to personnel. Failure to perform the critical task also constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

BOP (Step 4.b) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 44 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING CHECK SW Booster Pumps - BOTH RUNNING CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG] Numbers will not be required.

CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] Numbers will not be required.

BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 45 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 46 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may contact Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary the Inside AO.

(38 KW each): Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report which air compressors are running.

Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

Attachment completion Manual actions taken Failed equipment status SW status per Step 7.c Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner NOTE: RCS Subcooling MAY be lost on this event.

The six minute Clock to stop the RCPs will start WHEN subcooling is 13°F and the C SI Pump is running.

Record Time: __________

RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps BOTH RUNNING CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels -

TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

BOP (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c.

CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 7

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 47 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:

AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING CAUTION (Step 8) During this procedure if Offsite Power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.

RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

RESET SI CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact NOTE: Adverse Containment S/G Narrow Range level between Numbers will not be required.

9%[18%] AND 50%

CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action Step, the CRS will make the RO aware.

CHECK Containment Pressure HAS NOTE: Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG has remained < 10 psig.

CHECK CV Spray - NOT ACTUATED RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm EXTINGUISHED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 48 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OR Seal Injection flow - ADEQUATE Seal Injection flow - GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP OR Thermal Barrier Ps - GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures: NOTE: The LOCA may be causing a cooldown. If so, the RNO will be performed.

Otherwise proceed to Step 12.

With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:

STOP dumping steam.

IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.

MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER NOTE: Adverse Containment THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Numbers will not be required.

Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G.

IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 49 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CHECK SI Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]

STOP ALL RCPs EXAMINER NOTE:

Depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the RCP trip criteria may or may not be met.

Critical Task:

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied:

SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. EXAMINER NOTE: The booth operator will be closely monitoring RCS Subcooling. Subcooling very closely approaches 13°F, but if the value is not exceeded, this critical task is NOT valid.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

Record Pump Stop Time: __________

Subtract time recorded at time of the SI Pump running/loss SCM on Page 46 _____ = _____

minutes.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 50 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED CRS (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact::

Secondary Radiation Monitors - HAVE REMAINED NORMAL R-15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS R-19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation R-31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs CRS (Step 16) CHECK If RCS Is Intact:

CV radiation - NORMAL R-2, CV AREA R-32A, CV HIGH RANGE R-32B, CV HIGH RANGE CV pressure - NORMAL NOTE: CV Pressure and Sump level will be above normal.

CV Sump level - NORMAL CRS (Step16 RNO) PERFORM the following:

a. RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

b. GO TO EOP-E-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant, Step 1.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 51 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Booth Instructor: Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 will occur IMF EPS05B Critical Task:

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump after power is restored to the ESF Bus in E-1. (EOP Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

Examiner NOTE: The Loss of power to E-2 will require the RO to restore ECCS Pumps that did not restart if SI has been reset. The following loads will need restarting:

SI C RHR B HVH-3 HVH-4 Examiner NOTE: When the EDG restores power to E-2, the crew will need to take action to control AFW to the S/Gs, as the MDAFWs will restart and AFW valves will realign.

EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT RO/ FOLDOUT PAGE:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA Examiner NOTE: Depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the RCP trip criteria may or may not be met. See Critical Task on Page 49.

SI TERMINATION CRITERIA SI REINITIATION CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 52 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA EOP-E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Examiner NOTE: Depending Stopped: on the timing of mitigation actions, the RCP trip criteria may or may not be met. See Critical Task on Page 49.

a. CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

b. CHECK SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW

c. CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Examiner NOTE: The booth Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F] operator is closely monitoring RCS subcooling. IF RCS subcooling is LESS THAN 13°F, THEN the crew will STOP ALL RCPS in Step 1.d.

See Critical Task on Page 49.

CRS (Step 1.a RNO) GO TO Step 2.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Intact S/G Levels: NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will NOT be required.

NOTE: This is a continuous action step, the CRS will make the board operators aware.

CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 53 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 9% [18%] AND 50%

CAUTION (Step 4) During this procedure if Offsite Power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.

RO (Step 4) RESET SI RO (Step 5) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A BOP (Step 6) CHECK Secondary Radiation:

CHECK Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs PERFORM the following: NOTE: The CRS may call Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

REQUEST Chemistry periodically sample ALL S/Gs for activity.

Secondary sample results NORMAL (WHEN RESULTS AVAILABLE)

CAUTION (Step 7) If ANY PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, Step 7.b should be repeated AFTER pressure lowers to LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

RO (Step 7) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:

CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 54 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED CHECK PZR PORV Block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN RO (Step 8) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 8.a RNO) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The RO will contact the Instrument Air Compressor(s) as necessary Inside AO.

(38 KW each): If so, Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187 f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

WHEN Instrument Air is established, THEN PERFORM Steps 8.b and 8.c.

CONTINUE WITH Step 9.

(Step 8.b) RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV CHECK IA PCV1716 OPEN BOP (Step 9) CHECK Power Supply To Charging NOTE: The CRS may contact Pumps OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE WCC and ask about restoration of E-2 normal power.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge WCC and inform them that Electrical and I & C are investigating.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 55 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 10) CHECK If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

CHECK Charging Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:

START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:

Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated RO (Step 11) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:

CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core NOTE: Adverse Containment Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 18°F Numbers will not be required.

[37°F]

CHECK Secondary Heat Sink:

Total AFW flow to Intact S/G(s)

GREATER THAN 300 GPM OR S/G Narrow Range level in at least NOTE: Adverse Containment one Intact S/G GREATER THAN Numbers will not be required.

9% [18%]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 56 of 57 Event

Description:

ATWS/ SBLOCA RCS Cold Leg C/ PHASE A CI fails to AUTO INITIATE/ Loss of Emergency Bus E-2 Normal power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK RCS pressure:

Pressure GREATER THAN 1650 NOTE: Adverse Containment PSIG [1725 PSIG] Numbers will not be required.

Pressure STABLE OR RISING CRS (Step 11.c RNO) GO TO Step 12. NOTE: This is a continuous action step, the CRS will make the board operators aware.

Examiner NOTE:

Containment Spray has not been initiated during the event, continue in EOP-E-1 until EOP-ES-1.2 is selected as the recovery procedure.

Otherwise, terminate the exam.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16-2RT-1 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 37.1%

c) Turbine Load: 227 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 1572 ppm e) Rod Height: 155 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 32.5 %

h) Xenon: Building in

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description ITS 3.5.2 CONDITION A

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The A SI Pump is OOS due to a broken oil sight glass discovered at the end of last shift. Mechanical maintenance has informed you that repairs will be completed within this shift.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) C SI Pump b) HVH-6B

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-010-D8, RHR PIT A HI TEMP, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (Not Protected)

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Continue GP-005, POWER OPERATION, Raise power to 100%.

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the West at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

b) HDT Suspended Solids are less than 25 ppb.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) will be available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 6300 gallon dilution, made in several separate 200-300 gallon batch dilutions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100% power d) Raise power at 1%/Minute and IAW GP-005. Maintain Tave as close to Tref as possible using Control Rods in Manual IAW GP-005 and dilutions IAW OP-301

11. RISK a) YELLOW (Planned Power Increase)

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-2RT-2 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 160726 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training

PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 16-2RT TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-2RT-2

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 203)

2. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE (Rev 24)

3. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, (Amendment 176)

4. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation, (Amendment 225, 187)

5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation, (Amendment 225)

6. AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage (Rev 23)

7. AOP-035, S/G TUBE LEAK (Rev 29)

8. Technical Specification LCO LCO 3.4.13, Operational Leakage (Amendment 212)

9. AOP-038, Rapid Downpower (Rev 3)

10. AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System (Rev 20)

11. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 7)

12. EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE (Rev 9)

Validation Time: 109 minutes

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the West at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been since the last shift. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE within this shift. LI-924, B SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-E7, CST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 I-BOP Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 2 2 C-RO Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 3 N/A R-RO Load Reduction N-BOP N-SRO 4 3 I-RO T-Ref Fails LOW I-SRO 5 4 M-RO A Steam Generator Tube Rupture M-BOP M-SRO 6 5 C-RO A SI Pump fails to Auto Start 7 6 C-RO SI-870A and SI-870B Fails to Open Automatically

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 H B Robinson 2016-2RT NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the West at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been since the last shift. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE within this shift. LI-924, B SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-E7, CST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW.

The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will restore all Steam Generators to the programmed level with Feed Reg Valves in manual. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP), and restore the Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control.

The operator will address 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Following this, a 5 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will develop in the A Steam Generator.

The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System, AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage and/or AOP-035, S/G Tube Leak. The operator will initiate a load reduction in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage.

During the downpower, T-ref will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

Subsequently, the Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade rapidly to a Rupture (in 1 minute).

Additionally, upon either the automatic or manual Safety Injection, the A SI Pump will fail to automatically start and the operator will be required to manually start this pump. Furthermore, both SI-870A & SI-870B (BIT OUTLET valves) will fail to open automatically on SI, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the A Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS.

The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps.

Critical Tasks:

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before RCS pressure lowers to less than the shutoff head of the pump (1500 PSIG as read on PT-511BA, RVLIS RCS WR PRESS). (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room.

Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG within 30 minutes and before ruptured SG Pressure lowers below 500 PSIG, requiring a transition ECA-3.1 (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes an increased release of radioactivity from the affect SG to the environment. Accident analysis in UFSAR 15.6.3.2.1 assume that for the SGTR the affected SG is isolated within 30 minutes. AP-025, Operator Time Critical Action Program, further identifies that this is a 30 minute time requirement.

Additionally the failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines (If above 100% WR level see Simulator Variable THLECELL 191 to determine). (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 801 T = 0 Malfunctions:

SDAFW Pump OOS:

irf EPSMCC5_189 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8A, A S/G supply to SDAFW) irf EPSMCC6_226 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8B, B S/G supply to SDAFW) irf EPSMCC6_227 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8C, C S/G supply to SDAFW)

PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):

A MDAFW RTGB Switch B MDAFW RTGB Switch AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch Protected Switchyard LI-924, B SI Accumulator Level OOS IOR aoSISAOD019A f:0 Place WHITE DOT on LI-924 RTGB Annunciator APP-006-E7 failed ON IMF ANNXN06E07 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-006-E7 Insert the following:

IRF SIS028 f:NO_AUTO (A SI PUMPS Fails to AUTO start)

IRF SIS034 f:NO_AUTO (SI-870A Fails to OPEN in AUTO)

IRF SIS035 f:NO_AUTO (SI-870B Fails to OPEN in AUTO)

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

a. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

b. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

c. Provide the crew with the following:

OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

d. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At examiner direction of Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-2RT-2.

Event 1 Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 At direction of examiner fails LOW IMF ICO TURXMTPT_447 r:30 f:0 Event 2 Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam At examiner direction of Generator IMF SGN02D r:01:00 f:5 Event 3 Load Reduction When directed by AOP-035 NA Event 4 At direction of examiner T-Ref Fails LOW IMF CRF08 f:547 Event 5 At direction of examiner A Steam Generator Tube Rupture MMF SGN02D r:1:00 f:500 Post-Rx Trip Event 6 A SI Pump fails to Auto Start IRF SIS028 f:NO_AUTO NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Post-Rx Trip Event 7 SI-870A and SI-870B Fails to Open Automatically IRF SIS034 f:NO_AUTO IRF SIS035 f:NO_AUTO NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 56 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Shortly after taking the watch, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will restore all Steam Generators to the programmed level with Feed Reg Valves in manual. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP), and restore the Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF ICO TURXMTPT_447 r:30 f:0 Indications Available:

RTGB Annunciator APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD PT-447, 1st Stage Pressure starts to lower PT-446, 1st Stage Pressure remains constant S/G Narrow Range levels will lower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section E of AOP-025.

TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE, (PT-446, 447) - SECTION E AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE NOTE (Step 1)

Steps 1 through 4 are Immediate Action Steps.

A 100% load rejection can be distinguished from a turbine first stage pressure failure by zero MW net generation and S/G PORV operation during a 100% load rejection.

BOP (Step 1) CHECK Turbine Load Rejection Immediate Action IN PROGRESS OR HAS OCCURRED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 56 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 3. Immediate Action BOP (Step 3) CHECK S/G Level Trend Immediate Action CONTROLLING IN AUTO TO 39%

RO (Step 4) CONTROL Reactor Power: Immediate Action PLACE rod bank selector switch in M (Manual)

OPERATE rods to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%

Examiner NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct a brief, following verification of Immediate Action Steps.

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The OATC will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) PERFORM The Following:

CHECK S/G Level STABILIZED BETWEEN 39% AND 52%

BOP (Step 6.a RNO) WHEN S/G level is stabilized between 39% and 52%, THEN CONTINUE WITH Step 6.b.

BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK FRV Controllers ALL IN NOTE: All FRV controllers are MAN: expected to be in AUTO.

FCV478 FCV488 FCV498 BOP (Step 6.b RNO) PLACE all FRV controllers in NOTE: The BOP will place all MAN. FRVs in MANUAL.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 56 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 7) SELECT Alternate Channel For 1st Stage Pressure Input:

Failed Channel - PT-447, Alternate Channel - PT-446 BOP (Step 8) ADJUST Each S/G Level To NOTE: The BOP will need to Program Level restore S/G levels to 52%.

RO (Step 9) ADJUST Tavg To Within 1.5 TO NOTE: The RO may need to

+1.5°F Of Tref adjust control rods and/or boron concentration to restore Tavg-Tref deviation.

RO (Step 10) CHECK Reactor Power GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%

BOP (Step 11) RESTORE Each S/G FRV To NOTE: The BOP will need to Automatic: restore S/G levels to 52%.

CHECK S/G level WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL BOP (Step 11 RNO) WHEN S/G level is within NOTE: The BOP will place all

+/-1% of programmed level, THEN PLACE FRVs in AUTO.

affected controller in AUTO.

CRS GO TO Step 12.

RO (Step 12) RESTORE Rod Control To NOTE: Since the power Automatic: increase is suspended, the RO/CRS may discuss placing the control rods back in AUTO, if not already there.

CHECK Tavg WITHIN 0.5 to +0.5°F OF Tref.

Place Rod Control Selector Switch in AUTO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 56 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 13) REMOVE Affected Transmitter From Service Using OWP033:

Channel - PT-447, OWP-FSP-2 NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-033.

Examiner NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct a brief, for the OWP and status of the plant.

OWP-033, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE (FSP)

FSP-2, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-447 CRS Address FSP-2 RO Place the STEAM DUMP MODE SELECTOR NOTE: APP-006-F5 STEAM SWITCH in the STEAM PRESSURE DUMP ARMED will alarm.

CONTROL position.

BOP Place the 1ST STAGE PRESSURE SELECTOR SWITCH 446/447 in the 446 position.

BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE: The CRS will dispatch the BOP to the Hagan Racks.

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN IRF BST100 f:TRIP IRF BST092 f:TRIP IRF BST017 f:TRIP IRF BST019 f:TRIP IRF BST021 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED B/S 447-2 HAGAN RACK #25 (70% NOTE: B/S STATUS LIGHT TURBINE LOAD LIMIT) TURB POW LOAD LIMIT PC-447-E2 will ILLUMINATE.

B/S 447-1 HAGAN RACK #25 NOTE: B/S STATUS LIGHT (PERMISSIVE P-7) TURBINE POWER P-7 PC-447-E1 will ILLUMINATE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 12 of 56 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments B/S 475, HAGAN RACK #24 (LOOP 1 HI NOTE: B/S STATUS LIGHT STM FLOW) LOOP 1 HI STM FLOW FC-475 will ILLUMINATE.

B/S 485 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 2 HI NOTE: B/S STATUS LIGHT STM FLOW) LOOP 2 HI STM FLOW FC-485 will ILLUMINATE.

B/S 495 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 3 HI NOTE: B/S STATUS LIGHT STM FLOW) LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW FC-495 will ILLUMINATE.

BOP Place AMSAC Bypass Switch POWER 2, NOTE: The CRS will dispatch PROCESSOR A, and AMSAC Bypass the BOP.

Switch POWER 2, PROCESSOR B in the BYPASSED position. Booth Instructor: Coordinate with BOP to re-position switches using:

IRF RPS012 f:BYPASS NOTE: APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD will ILLUMINATE.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 14) CHECK TS LCO 3.3.1 And 3.3.2 NOTE: The CRS will address For Applicability Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 13 of 56 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 17.e (Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 Input is affected; and that Action T.1 or T.2 is required.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME T. One channel T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE 2. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.

CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that Functions 1.f (SI-High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines),

1.g (SI- High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low),

4.d (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low), are affected; and that Actions D.1, or D.2.1 and D.2.2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 14 of 56 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One channel NOTE: For Function 4.c, a channel may be taken out of inoperable the trip condition for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for maintenance.

D.1 Place channel in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 4 Refer to LCO (Safety Injection), is affected, 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation, which requires the Action of

" Function 1, for LCO 3.3.2.

all initiation functions and requirements.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 15) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 15 of 56 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect EXAMINER NOTE: This is an opportunity for an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 16 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Following this, a 5 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will develop in the A Steam Generator. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System, AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage and/or AOP-035, S/G Tube Leak. The operator will initiate a load reduction in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF SGN02D r:01:00 f:5 Indications Available:

RTGB Annunciator APP-036-C7, R-24 MONITOR HI R-24A, Steam Line Rad Monitor, in ALARM R-15, Air Ejector Rad Monitor, in ALARM (~3 minutes)

R-31, S/G Blowdown Rad Monitor, rises (~7 minutes)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-036-C7, R-24 MONITOR HI BOP (Step 1) OBSERVE monitor trends for leak rate AND evidence of short term spiking.

BOP (Step 2) IF short term spiking is evidenced, THEN.

CRS (Step 3) IF trends from R-15 OR R-19 NOTE: The CRS will transition confirm evidence of primary to secondary to AOP-035.

leakage, THEN REFER to AOP-035.

Examiner NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct a brief, for procedure entry and mitigation strategy.

AOP-035, S/G TUBE LEAK RO (Step 1) DETERMINE If Reactor Trip Needed As Follows:

CHECK the following:

PZR Level LESS THAN 7%

OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 17 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RCS Subcooling LESS THAN 18°F RO (Step 1 RNO) IF PZR level can NOT be NOTE: This is a Continuous maintained greater than 7% OR subcooling Action. The CRS will make can NOT be maintained greater than 18°F, both board operators aware.

THEN PERFORM the following:

TRIP the Reactor.

INITIATE SI.

GO TO EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CRS GO TO Step 2.

CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The BOP will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

NOTE (Step 3) Use of the RWST for RCS Makeup will add negative reactivity.

RO (Step 3) CHECK VCT Level LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES RO (Step 3 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 12.5 inches, THEN PERFORM Step 4. Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS GO TO Step 5.

RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR Level LOWERING IN Examiner NOTE: The RO AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER may answer this in the positive even though Charging Pump speed has been manually adjusted to stabilize Pzr level. If so, the CRS may read steps 5-12.

Otherwise proceed to step 12 on Page RO (Step 6) ADJUST Charging Flow As Follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 18 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO a. CHECK Charging Pump Status AT NOTE: Two charging pumps LEAST TWO RUNNING are already running.

RO b. PLACE running Charging Pumps Speed Controllers in MAN AND ADJUST output to maximum RO (Step 7) CHECK PZR Level LOWERING IN Examiner NOTE: After AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER manually raising charging pump speed the operator will have control of PZR level and this will be a Negative answer.

CRS (Step 7 RNO) GO TO Step 12.

RO (Step 12) CONTROL Charging Flow To NOTE: The RO may take Maintain PZR Level Between 22% And 53% Charging Pump speed control to Manual.

RO (Step 13) CHECK RCS Leakage LESS NOTE: This is a Continuous THAN RUNNING CHARGING FLOW Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS/ (Step 14) NOTIFY Chemistry Personnel To NOTE: The CRS may call BOP Periodically Sample All S/Gs For Activity And WCC/Chemistry to address Boron Concentration the sampling requirements.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

CRS (Step 15) CHECK Assistance To Open S/G Sample Valves REQUESTED CRS (Step 15 RNO) WHEN assistance to open NOTE: This is a Continuous S/G Sample valves is requested, THEN Action. The CRS will make OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 16 and both board operators aware.

GO TO Step 16.

OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 17 and GO TO Step 17.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 19 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE (Step 17) Radiation Monitor R24 does not provide an accurate determination of leakage until S/G samples have been obtained and the monitor has been calibrated for the optimal node for leakage location.

CRS/ (Step 17) DETERMINE Leak Rate Using At RO Least One Of The Following Methods:

R24 Recorder PERFORM OST051, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation PERFORM a Charging versus Letdown NOTE: The crew will most balance likely attempt to stabilize PZR Level and conduct an inventory balance; and determine that the SGTL is approximately 5 gpm.

NOTIFY Chemistry personnel to perform isotopic analysis of S/G samples for leak rate determination MONITOR R15 for low level Primary toSecondary leakage using the OP 504, Condenser Air Removal section "Using R15 to Monitor for Low Level Primary to Secondary Leakage" USE CP014 Conversion Factors to correlate R15 to leakage CRS (Step 18) CHECK Leak Rate Determination COMPLETE NOTE (Step 19)

ITS LCO 3.4.13 provides a primary to secondary leakage limit of 75 gpd through any one S/G.

Total leakage is assumed to be coming from a single S/G when unable to determine leakage from the individual S/Gs.

Normally performed steps in GP0061 or AOP038, Rapid Downpower, such as placing S/G Blowdown to the Flash Tank may require Release Permits.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 20 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 19) CHECK Leak Rate GREATER NOTE: The SGTL is greater THAN OR EQUAL TO 100 GPD FOR A than 100 GPD.

SINGLE S/G Examiner NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct a brief.

NOTE (Step 20) It is important to perform GP-006-1 or AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, and AOP-035 concurrently to the extent possible in order to minimize secondary contamination.

CRS (Step 20) PERFORM The Following Power Reduction:

NOTIFY Chemistry that a PSAL3 event NOTE: The CRS may call has occurred WCC/Chemistry to address the sampling requirements.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

CHECK Reactor Status MODE 1 OR MODE 2 INITIATE Plant Shutdown To Mode 3 NOTE: The CRS will likely Using GP0061, Normal Plant choose AOP-038 to conduct Shutdown From Power Operation To the downpower.

Hot Shutdown, OR AOP038, Rapid If NOT, Booth Instructor as Downpower, While Continuing With This WCCS/Station Management Procedure call the Control Room and direct the CRS to reduce power at 1%/Minute using AOP-038 until reactor power is

< 50%.

ADHERE to the following time limits:

Be less than 50% power within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of declaring PSAL3 Be in Mode 3 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of declaring PSAL3 OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 24 and GO TO Step 24 NOTE (Step 24) Radiation Monitor R24 does not provide an accurate determination of leakage until S/G samples have been obtained and the monitor has been calibrated for the optimal node for leakage location.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 21 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS/ (Step 24) IDENTIFY Leaking S/G Using At NOTE: There are sufficient BOP Least One Of The Following Methods: indications to identify the A S/G as the leaking S/G.

EVALUATE indications on R24 Recorder OR EVALUATE indications on RI19A, RI 19B, and RI19C, STM GEN BLOW DN Radiation Monitors OR EVALUATE indications on R31A, R 31B, and R31C, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs OR Chemistry analysis of S/G samples for boron and activity CRS (Step 25) IMPLEMENT The EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 26) REVIEW Technical Specification Examiner NOTE: The CRS LCOs may address Technical ITS LCO 3.4.13 Specifications, however it is more likely that because of ITS LCO 3.4.18 transitory nature of the event, ITS LCO 3.7.15 these Tech Specs will need to ITS LCO 3.6.3 be evaluated after the Scenario.

Examiner NOTE: The power reduction to meet the PSAL-3 time requirement dictates that AOP-038 becomes the priority, however AOP-035 is concurrent use IAW OMM-022, EOP USERS GUIDE The steps scripted from here on in AOP-035 may be addressed by the CRS as the scenario progresses. Follow AOP-038 on Page 22.

BOP (Step 27) INITIATE Monitoring RCS Leak Rate As Follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 22 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP a. CHECK Radiation Monitor R24 IN SERVICE (Step 1.a. RNO) GO TO Step 27.d.

BOP (Step 27.d.) CHECK RCS Leak Rate - LESS NOTE: The leak rate is THAN 10 GPM approx. 13 GPM.

(Step 27.d. RNO) LOG RCS leakage estimates at 15 minute intervals.

GO TO Step 28.

CRS (Step 28) CONTACT An Operator To Bypass The Condensate Polishers As Follows:

PLACE the SECONDARY BYPASS Switch to the OPEN position DEPRESS the OFF pushbutton for each in service demineralizer CRS (Step 29) PERFORM Attachment 4, Controlling Secondary Contamination, While Continuing With This Procedure CRS (Step 30) ISOLATE Nonessential Flowpaths From The Affected S/G Using Attachment 1, Local S/G Isolation, While Continuing With This Procedure Examiner NOTE: Follow AOP-038 here.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER CRS (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The BOP will most Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page likely make this System announcement.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 23 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST 947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min Target Power Level ___

Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 130 Steps. (These values will vary if the crew calculates the target power level to 50%

initially) [~144 steps to 50%]

Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 300 gallons. (These values will vary if the crew calculates the target power level to 50%

initially) [~146 gal to 50%]

CRS (Step 3) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:

Reason for downpower Target Power Level Target Rod Height Rate of load reduction Amount of boric acid addition RO (Step 4) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A PZR HTR BACK -UP GROUP B RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control IN AUTO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 24 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6 RNO) PERFORM one of the NOTE: Control Rods are in following: AUTO to begin with and should remain in AUTO.

Booth Instructor: Take NOTE of the status of the Control Rods (Auto or Manual)

BEFORE inserting Event 4 PLACE Rod Control Switch in AUTO.

OR POSITION Control Rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg within 5°F of Tref.

RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action.

RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 22.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.

NOTE (Step 3) Due to RCS leak rates, batch additions may NOT be possible. FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, may be adjusted to compensate for RCS leakage.

RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 25 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:

FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure CHECK EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:

CHECK IMP IN ILLUMINATED SELECT the desired Load Rate SET desired load in the SETTER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 26 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct a brief, prior to going to GO on the turbine for the first time.

DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Examiner NOTE: This is a Tavg Within 5°F Of Tref Using One Of The continuous action step, the Following: CRS will provide the board operators the direction to continue with throughout the load reduction.

ADJUST Load Rate OR DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons NOTE (Step 10) Four hour NRC notification is only required if the Shutdown was required by ITS.

CRS/ (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The NOTE: The CRS may ask BOP Following: SM/WCC/Communicator to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge.

Load Dispatcher of load reduction E&C to control secondary chemistry RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection NRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> NOTE: This is required due to the SGTL requiring the shutdown.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 27 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers AT LEAST ONE OPERATING BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is NOTE: The BOP will dispatch required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least an AO.

one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY Booth Instructor HEATING SYSTEM. acknowledge as AO.

RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg WITHIN 5°F OF NOTE: This is a continuous Tref action step, the CRS will make the board operators aware.

NOTE (Step 13) Termination of the load reduction is not necessary due to Axial Flux Distribution deviation from the target band. Axial Flux Distribution will be restored in Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower.

RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution NOTE: This is a continuous WITHIN TARGET BAND action step, the CRS will make the board operators aware.

BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM NOTE: This is a continuous DUMP ARMED EXTINGUISHED action step, the CRS will make the board operators aware.

RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following NOTE: This is a Continuous Conditions MET: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

Target load/power has been reached Load reduction is no longer required CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower CRS (Step 15 RNO) WHEN any of the following conditions are met:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 28 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Target load/power has been reached Load reduction is no longer required CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction THEN STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower.

CRS GO TO Step 16.

RO (Step 16) CHECK Reactor Power LESS NOTE: This is a HOLD step.

THAN 85% The CRS will ONLY continue with Step 17 when Reactor Power is LESS THAN 85%.

BOP (Step 17) CHECK Heater Drain Pumps TWO RUNNING STOP one Heater Drain Pump RO (Step 18) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN 70%

CRS (Step 19) CHECK Plant Shutdown - NOTE: The plant shutdown is REQUIRED required due to the ITS 3.4.13 LCO limit for SG leakage being exceeded.

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may address Technical Specifications, however it is more likely that because of transitory nature of the event, these Tech Specs will need to be evaluated after the Scenario. If so, proceed to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 29 of 56 Event

Description:

Steam Generator Tube Leak in A Steam Generator Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: 75 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).

CRS APPLICABILITY:MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B.1 and B.2 must be entered.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and associated B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Completion Time of Condition A not met.

OR AND Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists.

OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> Primary to secondary LEAKAGE not within limit.

EXAMINER NOTE: This is an opportunity to conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 30 of 56 Event

Description:

T-REF Fails LOW Once the downpower is initiated, T-ref will fail LOW (If the Control Rods are in AUTO) or control rods will continuously insert when inward rod motion is initiated in MANUAL. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CRF08 f:547 Indications Available:

RTGB Annunciator APP-003-D4, TAVG-TREF DEV Tref indicates 547°F on TR-408 Rod Inward Arrow LIT Control Rods moving inward in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM NOTE (Step 1) Steps 1 through 3 are Immediate Action Steps.

RO (Step 1) Check Unexpected Rod Motion IN Immediate Action PROGRESS RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power GREATER Immediate Action THAN 15%

BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Load Immediate Action CONTROL RODS STEPPING IN AND UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION IN PROGRESS OR UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION HAS OCCURRED RO (Step 3 RNO) Attempt To Stop Rod Motion Immediate Action As Follows:

IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch NOTE: When the RO places position in A (AUTO), THEN Place the control rods in MANUAL, the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M rod motion will stop.

(Manual)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 31 of 56 Event

Description:

T-REF Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M (Manual) OR Individual Bank Select, THEN Place the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in A (Auto).

IF Rod Motion does NOT stop, THEN

...

CRS Go To Step 5.

Examiner NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct a brief, following verification of Immediate Action Steps.

CRS (Step 5) Make PA Announcement For NOTE: The BOP will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) Go To Section C, Continuous Rod NOTE: The CRS will go to Motion Section C of AOP-001.

AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM SECTION C, CONTINUOUS ROD MOTION RO (Step 1) Check ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch Position When Problem Occurred INDIVIDUAL BANK SELECT CRS (Step 1 RNO) Go To Step 4.

RO (Step 4) Stop Any Boron Dilution In Progress NOTE: An RCS Boration is in progress for the Rapid Downpower.

RO (Step 5) Check APP005B5, ROD BANKS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 6) Check Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 32 of 56 Event

Description:

T-REF Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE (Step 7) IF Manual Rod Control will NOT function, THEN turbine load adjustment will be required to maintain Tavg within 1.5 to +1.5°F of Tref.

RO (Step 7) Check Rod Bank Selector Switch NOTE: The Control Rods are Position AUTO in MANUAL.

RO/ (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:

BOP Maintain Tavg within 1.5 to +1.5°F of NOTE: The RO will continue Tref using Manual Rod Control. the downpower with the Control Rods in MANUAL.

OR Maintain Tavg within 1.5 to +1.5°F Tref by adjusting Turbine load using Attachment 1, Turbine Load Adjustment.

CRS (Step 8) Contact I&C and Reactor NOTE: The CRS may call Engineering to troubleshoot and correct the WCC/I&C to address the Tref problem. failure (or Rod Control failure).

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

CRS (Step 9) Implement the EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 10) Review Technical Specifications NOTE: The CRS may To Assure All Applicable LCO requirements address Technical Have Been Met: Specifications.

ITS 3.1.4 Rod Alignment ITS 3.1.5 Shutdown Bank RIL ITS 3.1.6 Control Bank RIL and overlap ITS 3.1.7 IRPI ITS 3.2.1 Fq(Z)

ITS 3.2.2 Fh

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 33 of 56 Event

Description:

T-REF Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments ITS 3.2.3 AFD ITS 3.2.4 QPTR ITS 3.3.1 NIS CRS (Step 11) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect EXAMINER NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct an Alignment Brief, and continue with the actions of AOP-035/AOP-038.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 34 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Subsequently, the Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade rapidly to a Rupture (in 1 minute). The operator will recognize the degrading conditions and the need for a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. Additionally, upon either the automatic or manual Safety Injection, the A SI Pump will fail to automatically start and the operator will be required to manually start this pump. Furthermore, both SI-870A & SI-870B (BIT OUTLET valves) will fail to open automatically on SI, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the A Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps.

Booth Operator Instructions: MMF SGN02D r:1:00 f:500 Indications Available:

RCS pressure is lowering PZR Level Lowering beyond capacity of Charging Pumps A SG Level rise with reduction in Feed Flow RTGB Annunciator APP-036-C7, R24 MONITOR HIGH R24 Leakage Recorder indicating S/G leakage greater than TS Limit Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: The CRS may have the crew return to AOP-035, Continuous Action Step 13 RNO, IF RCS Leakage exceeds Charging flow, THEN return to Step 6, which will progress the crew through Step 11 of AOP-035 and direct a TRIP at that time.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 35 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated:

SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED NOTE: The crew will likely have manually actuated SI when they tripped the Reactor.

OR SI equipment AUTO STARTED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated:

SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR SI equipment AUTO STARTED CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

SI Pumps TWO RUNNING RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING Examiner NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct a brief, following verification of Immediate Action Steps.

RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 36 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 41.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

SI Pumps TWO RUNNING NOTE: The A SI Pump failed to AUTO start.

RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as NOTE: The BOP should start necessary. the A SI Pump and inform the crew at Step 18 when the attachment is complete.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper NOTE: The SI-870A & SI-Emergency Alignment 870B valves are not in proper alignment.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually ALIGN valve(s) as NOTE: The BOP should open necessary. the misaligned SI-870A & B valves and inform the crew at Step 18 when the attachment is complete.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 37 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before RCS pressure lowers to less than the shutoff head of the pump (1500 PSIG as read on PT-511BA, RVLIS RCS WR PRESS). (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 38 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG OR High steam flow with:

S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR Tavg LESS THAN 543°F BOP (Step 6.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING CHECK SW Booster Pumps BOTH RUNNING CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 39 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 40 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may (If the Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary LOOP has occurred) contact (38 KW each): the Inside AO.

If so, Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_187 f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_218 f: RACK_IN Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

Attachment completion Manual actions taken Failed equipment status SW status per Step 7.c If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 41 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps BOTH RUNNING CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump NOTE: The SDAFW Pump is RUNNING OOS.

RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper NOTE: The RO/BOP may Emergency Alignment: take a Prudent Action (OMM-

22) to throttle AFW flow to the A S/G and control Narrow Range level between 9-50%.

AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING CAUTION (Step 8) During this procedure if Offsite Power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.

RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

RESET SI NOTE: This action may have been previously performed to allow the RO/BOP to throttle AFW flow to the A S/G.

CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 42 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG CHECK CV Spray NOT ACTUATED RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm EXTINGUISHED OR Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE Seal Injection flow GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP OR Thermal Barrier Ps GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F OR With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 43 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CHECK SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F[32°F]

CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:

Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 44 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments S/G levels NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER CRS (Step 15 RNO) PERFORM the following: NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-3.

RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

GO TO EOPE3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1.

Examiner NOTE: This is an opportunity for the CRS to conduct a brief, for the procedure transition.

EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE NOTE (Step 1)

FOLDOUT for EOP-E-3 is in effect.

Step 1 RCP Trip criteria applies UNTIL an operator controlled RCS Cooldown is initiated.

RO/ (Foldout Page)

BOP SI REINITIATION CRITERIA SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be NOTE: Subcooling should be Stopped: sufficient to maintain the RCPs running.

This is a continuous action step and the CRS will make the board operators aware.

CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CHECK SI Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 45 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]

CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.

BOP (Step 2) IDENTIFY Ruptured S/G(s): NOTE: The crew will identify the A S/G as the ruptured S/G.

CHECK for ANY of the following indications:

Unexpected rise in ANY S/G Narrow Range level OR R31s Steamline Radiation Monitors ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION OR R19s SG Blowdown Radiation ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION OR High radiation reported from ANY S/G sample CONTACT Chemistry to periodically NOTE: The CRS may call sample ALL S/Gs for activity. WCC/Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

CAUTION (Step 3)

If the Steam Driven AFW Pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the Steam Driven AFW Pump should be maintained from at least one S/G.

At least one S/G must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

BOP (Step 3) ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured S/G(s):

ADJUST Ruptured S/G(s)Steam Line PORV Controller to 1060 psig

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 46 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Line PORV CLOSED RV11 NOTE: The crew will ensure that the A S/G PORV is CLOSED.

CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves:

V18A NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED.

Locally CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s)Bypass Drn AND Warmup Line To AFW Pump Valve(s)While CONTINUING WITH this procedure:

MS20 (S/G A)(Pipe Jungle NOTE: The CRS will dispatch above/right of V18A) an AO. This may have been performed earlier in AOP-035 Attachment 1.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the MS-20 is CLOSED.

IRF MSS047 f:0 CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) S/G Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves CLOSED CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves:

S/G A:

V13A MS353A CAUTION (Step 4) If ANY Ruptured S/G is Faulted, feed flow to that S/G should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions UNLESS needed for RCS cooldown.

BOP (Step 4) CHECK Ruptured S/G CHECK Ruptured S/G FAULTED CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 47 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CAUTION (Step 5) If Offsite Power is lost AFTER SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.

BOP (Step 5) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Level:

CHECK S/G Narrow Range level GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

RO RESET SI STOP feed Flow to ruptured S/G(s):

CLOSE Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valve(s):

V214A CLOSE AFW Header Discharge Valve(s):

V216A PERFORM Supplement D, NOTE: The BOP will use Deenergizing AFW Valves For Attachment D, and call AO for AFFECTED S/G local Actions.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that actions are complete.

IRF EPSMCC5_189 f:

RACK_OUT IRF EPSMCC9_255 f:

RACK_OUT IRF EPSMCC10_262 f:

RACK_OUT IRF EPSMCC10_264 f:

RACK_OUT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 48 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG within 30 minutes and before ruptured SG Pressure lowers below 500 PSIG, requiring a transition ECA-3.1 (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes an increased release of radioactivity from the affect SG to the environment. Accident analysis in UFSAR 15.6.3.2.1 assume that for the SGTR the affected SG is isolated within 30 minutes. AP-025, Operator Time Critical Action Program, further identifies that this is a 30 minute time requirement. Additionally the failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure GREATER THAN 500 PSIG BOP (Step 7) CHECK The Following Valves For Ruptured S/G CLOSED MSIVs MSIV Bypass Valves S/G Steam Line PORVs Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves CAUTION (Step 8) If RCPs are NOT running, the following steps may cause a false CSF4, Integrity Status Tree, indication for the Ruptured Loop. Disregard the Ruptured Loop Tcold indication UNTIL after performing Step 31.

NOTE (Step8) Main Steam Line Isolation may occur if the high steam flow setpoint is exceeded.

The RCS cooldown should be continued using the S/G Steam Line PORV(s) if MSIV closure occurs.

BOP (Step 8) INITIATE RCS Cooldown:

DETERMINE required Core Exit NOTE: The CRS will temperature: determine the Target temperature to ~513°F.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 49 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments DUMP steam to Condenser from intact S/G(s) at MAXIMUM rate:

CHECK Condenser AVAILABLE PLACE STEAM DUMP MODE Control Switch in STEAM PRESS position ADJUST PC-464B, STEAM HEADER PRESS Controller as necessary to initiate AND maintain RCS cooldown BOP (Step 8.c-f) CHECK RCS Tavg LESS THAN 543°F Momentarily PLACE STEAM DUMP MODE Control Switch to BYPASS TAVG INTLK position CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP NOTE: Due to the PT-447 ARMED alarm ILLUMINATED Failure earlier, when RCS Temp lowers below 543°F, MSIVs isolation will occur (Steam Dumps not available).

CHECK Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE BOP (Step 8.f RNO) WHEN Core Exit T/Cs are LESS THAN required temperature, THEN PERFORM Steps 8.g and 8.h.

CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 9.

BOP (Step 9) CHECK Intact S/G Levels:

CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels NOTE: Narrow Range levels GREATER THAN 9%[18%] may be greater than 9%. If so, perform Step 9.b.

BOP (Step 9.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%

[18%] in at least one S/G.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 50 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 9.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 21%

[21%] AND 50%

CAUTION (Step 10) If ANY PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, Step 10.b should be repeated AFTER pressure lowers to LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.

RO (Step 10) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:

CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED CHECK PZR PORV Block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN CAUTION (Step 11) If Offsite Power is lost AFTER SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.

RO (Step 11) RESET SI RO (Step 12) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 13 RNO) PERFORM the following:

Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument NOTE: If not already done, the Air Compressor(s)as necessary (38 KW BOP will contact the Inside each): AO. (No loss of power, should not be required)

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M) IRF EPSMCC5_ 187 f: RACK_IN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 51 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G) IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN WHEN Instrument Air is established, THEN PERFORM Steps 13.b AND 13.c.

CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 14.

RO (Step 13.b-c) RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV CHECK IA PCV1716 OPEN RO (Step 14) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

CHECK RHR Pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST CHECK RCS pressure:

Pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

Pressure STABLE OR RISING STOP RHR Pumps CHECK RCS pressure remains GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

RO (Step 15) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:

CHECK Charging Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING CRS (Step 15.a RNO) IF CCW flow to RCP(s)

Thermal Barrier is lost, THEN GO TO Step 16.

RO (Step 15.b) ALIGN Charging Pump suction to RWST:

OPEN LCV115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 52 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CLOSE LCV115C, VCT OUTLET Valve PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Control Switch to STOP ESTABLISH MAXIMUM charging flow:

START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND MAXIMUM Charging flow:

Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated BOP (Step 16) CHECK If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:

CHECK Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED CORE EXIT T/C TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 8 STOP RCS cooldown MAINTAIN Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 53 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red path Limit) (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

BOP (Step 17) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure STABLE OR RISING RO (Step 18) CHECK RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 38°F

[57°F]

RO (Step 19) DEPRESSURIZE RCS To MINIMIZE Break Flow AND Refill PZR:

CHECK Normal PZR Spray AVAILABLE ESTABLISH MAXIMUM available PZR Spray UNTIL ANY of the following conditions satisfied:

BOTH of the following:

RCS pressure LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE PZR level GREATER THAN 14% [31%]

OR BOTH of the following:

RCS pressure WITHIN 300 PSI OF RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 54 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments PZR level - GREATER THAN 44% [50%]

OR PZR level GREATER THAN 73%

[66%]

OR RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 18°F [37°F]

CLOSE Normal PZR Spray Valve(s):

Normal PZR Spray Valves -

CLOSED PERFORM the following if Aux PZR NOTE: Normal spray was Spray used: used.

OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 22 AND GO TO Step 22 RO/ (Step 22) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be BOP Terminated:

CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 18°F

[37°F]

CHECK Secondary Heat Sink:

Total feed flow to S/G(s)

GREATER THAN 300 GPM AVAILABLE OR S/G Narrow Range level in at least one Intact S/G GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

CHECK RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING CHECK PZR level GREATER THAN 14% [31%]

RO (Step 23) STOP SI Pumps

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-2RT Scenario # 2 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Page 55 of 56 Event

Description:

A SGTR/ A SI Pump Fails to AUTO Start/ SI-870A & SI-870B Fail to AUTO OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines (If above 100% WR level see Simulator Variable THLECELL 191 to determine). (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16-2RT-2 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: MOL b) Reactor Power: 100%

c) Turbine Load: 770 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 853 ppm e) Rod Height: 218 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 53.3 %

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 A Restore AFW pump or flow path(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days AND 8 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) SDAFW Pump for an oil change

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A MDAFW Pump and flowpath b) B MDAFW Pump and flowpath c) C AFW Pump

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-924, B SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating) b) RTGB Annunciator APP-006-E7, CST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating)

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the West at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions

11. RISK a) GREEN