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| issue date = 01/10/1994 | | issue date = 01/10/1994 | ||
| title = Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/93-21. Corrective Actions:Surveillance Tests Necessary to Verify Load Shedding Capability from Emergency Buses Performed & Procedure Revised | | title = Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/93-21. Corrective Actions:Surveillance Tests Necessary to Verify Load Shedding Capability from Emergency Buses Performed & Procedure Revised | ||
| author name = | | author name = Mecredy R | ||
| author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. | | author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = Johnson A | ||
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR) | | addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR) | ||
| docket = 05000244 | | docket = 05000244 |
Revision as of 03:38, 19 June 2019
ML17263A526 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Ginna ![]() |
Issue date: | 01/10/1994 |
From: | Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
To: | Andrea Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
NUDOCS 9402010169 | |
Download: ML17263A526 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1993021
Text
ttl'igRP jfpVEZE ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
~89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y..14649-0001
ROBERT C MECREDY Vice President@irma Nuclear Production
T Et.E PHONE AREA CODE 71B 546 2700 January 10, 1994 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Attn: Allen R.Johnson Project Directorate
I-3 Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subject: Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection
Report No.50-244/93-21, dated December 10, 1993 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 Dear Mr.Johnson: During an NRC inspection
conducted on October 4, 1993 to October 13, 1993, a violation of NRC requirements
was identified.
In accordance
with the"General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement
Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below: "Plant technical specification 4.6.1.e.3.a
requires that at least once per 18 months during shutdown, each emergency diesel generator shall be demonstrated
to be operable by simulating
a loss of offsite power in conjunction
with a safety injection test signal and verifying de-energization
of the emergency buses and load shedding from the emergency buses." Contrary to the above, on October 11, 1993, it was determined
that testing to verify load shedding from the emergency buses was not performed during the 18 month surveillance
testing.(1)the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation:
Rochester Gas&Electric Corporation (RG&E)accepts the violation.
We acknowledge
that plant procedures
did not adequately
test the bus undervoltage
logic, as required by Technical Specification (TS)4.6.1.e.3.(a).
Lettex: Page 2 Subject: Violation Response 93-21-01 Date: January 10, 1994 The reason for the violation, as stated in LER 93-005 (Docket Number 50-244, LER 93-005, dated November 10, 1993)was a mis-interpretation
of TS surveillance
requirements.
The load shedding requirement
of TS 4.6.1.e.3.{a)
was interpreted
as the shedding of non-essential
loads powered from the emergency buses.The shedding of non-essential
loads had been tested by simulating
a safety injection (SI)signal during performance
of procedures
RSSP-2.1 (Safety Injection Functional
Test)and RSSP-2.1A.(Safety Injection Functional
Test Alignment/Realignment), which are performed each refueling outage.The need to verify load shedding capabilities
of safeguards
loads, with undervoltage
and SI present, had not been considexed.
(2)the corrective
steps that have been taken and the results achieved: The immediate corrective
action was to perform the surveillance
tests necessary to verify load shedding capability
from the emergency buses.A procedure change notice (PCN)was developed for each associated
PT-9.1 procedure (monthly surveillance
test procedures
for testing undervoltage
protection
for 480 volt safeguards
busses 14, 16, 17, and 18).Testing was started on October 11, 1993, and was completed on October 12, 1993, within twenty-four
hours of discovery.
Details of this testing and test methodology
are discussed in Attachment
l.(To perfoim this testing, individual
components
were declared inoperable, one at a time, fox brief periods.No more than one component was inoperable
at a given time, and the diesel generators (DGs)were maintained
operable during the entire testing pexiod.)The guidance of NRC Generic Letter{GL)87-09, entitled"Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS)on the Applicability
of Limiting Conditions
for Operation and Surveillance
Requirements", was followed.Both the"A" and"B" DGs were available to perform all intended functions throughout
the discovery and surveillance
testing period.This testing demonstrated
end-to-end
operability
of the under-voltage protection
system.It verified undervoltage
signals to safeguards
components, and undervoltage
in conjunction
with SI signal to the Component Cooling'ater (CCW)pumps.Initial testing of the"B" CCW pump undervoltage
/SI trip logic was indeterminate.
At that time, the"B" CCW pump was declared inoperable, until further testing was conducted.
The pump was subsequently
verified to be fully operable, and was returned to service approximately
twelve hours later.The testing conducted on October 11-12, in combination
with the surveillance
tests conducted during the 1993 outage, met the requixements
of TS 4.6.1.e.3.(a), and verified that the safeguards
functions would have performed as required.
Letter: Page 3 Subject: Violation Response 93-21-01 Date: January 10, 1994 RG&E personnel subsequently
reviewed the requirements
of TS 4.6.1, and compared these requirements
with surveillance
proce-dures.No other noncompliances
were identified.
(3)the corrective
steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
0 A review of Section 4 of the Ginna TS will be performed to ensure that there are implementing
procedures
for every surveillance
required by TS.This review will be completed prior to completion
of the next scheduled refueling outage.Results of a preliminary
review of Section 4 have determined
that there are sufficient
procedural
controls for implementing
Section 4 requirements.
0 0 A review of the identified
implementing
procedures
will be performed to ensure that these procedures
do, in fact, implement the TS requirements.
This review will be completed prior to completion
of the next scheduled refueling outage.Procedures
that verify load shedding capability
will be upgraded to include safeguards
loads, for conditions
of undervoltage
and SI, prior to completion
of the next scheduled refueling outage.(4)the date when full compliance
will be achieved: Full compliance
with TS 4.6.1.e.3.(a)
was achieved on October 12, 1993, at the completion
of surveillance
testing.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: Mr.Allen R.Johnson (Mail Stop 14D1)PWR Project Directorate
I-3 Washington, DC 20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector
Attachment
1 PT-9.1 Series Test Details The purpose of this test was to verify undervoltage
safeguards
load shedding capability.
Monthly TS surveillance
testing currently ensures each safeguards
breaker can be stripped from the bus using the trip coil.To verify the undervoltage
stripping capability, all that was necessary was to verify the integrity of the undervoltage
logic contacts and associated
circuitry, to the trip coils.Jumpers were used to simulate SI for the CCW pumps because their breakers trip on undervoltage
coincident
with SI signal.Testing Sequence: 1~Manipulate
test switches and develop an undervoltage
condition using test equipment.
2~Verify auxiliary output relays energize to cause the trip function, initiated by appropriate
operation of the intermediate
digital control logic circuitry.
3~4~5.6.Return test switches to normal and remove test equipment.
Verify component being tested is not, in service.Measure the continuity
of wiring between the undervoltage
auxiliary relays and the breaker switchgear, using DC voltage measurements
to ground.)t Verify normally open output relay contacts using resistance
measurements.
7~8.Locally trip the associated
auxiliary relay and verify proper indicator lamp response and relay contacts indicate closed by resistance
measurement.
Reset the auxiliary relay and verify relay contacts indicate open by resistance
measurement.
9.Repeat steps 1-8 for all four channels (27/X, 27/BX, 27D/X, and 27D/BX).One test anomoly was identified, as noted in the violation response.Relay 86-16B, associated
with the"B" CCW pump breaker, failed to meet the specified resistance
acceptance
criteria.Emergency Maintenance
procedure EM-778 was performed to verify the contact did in fact trip the breaker.After being verified, the contact was reworked by simple burnishing
of exposed contact surfaces.~~~v
~'i 0
ACCELERATED
DISTRIBUTION
DEMONSTRATION
SYSTEM REGULATORY
INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM (RIDS)CCESSION NBR:9402010169
DOC.DATE'4/01/10
NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50-244
Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
MECREDY,R.C.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
JOHNSON,A.R.
Project Directorate
I-3 I SUBJECT: Responds to violations
noted in insp rept 50-244/93-21.
Corrective
actions:surveillance
tests necessary to verify load shedding capability
from emergency buses performed&procedure revised.DISTRIBUTION
CODE: IE01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR
2 ENCL SIZE: TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice
of Vi&o ation Response NOTES:License
Exp date in'ccordance
with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
DOCKET 05000244 D$/05000244 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 PD INTERNAL: AEOD/DEIB AEOD/DS P/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DRCH/HHFB
NRR/DRSS/PEPB
NRR/PMAS/ILPB2
~BI~REG FILM 02 RGNT FILE Ol EXTERNAL EG&G/BRYCE
i J H~NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/DSP/ROAB
AEOD/TTC NRR/DORS/OEAB
NRR/DRIL/RPEB-
NRR/PMAS/ILPB1
NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
OGC/HDS1 RES/HFB NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D R D S NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
D D PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P 1-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION
LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEEDI OTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 22 ENCL 22
t"'l'i"~lliPjt'I
/'l'gjll,"i,",iiel't
I t,/f//IP'(/
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
ROBERT C.MECREDY Vice Ptesident Ctnna Nuetear Ptoduetion
,/net~~~VA~~G ToAtt II F I$Tate~89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER N.Y.14649.OO0'I
TELEPHONE AREA CODE 716 546'2700 January 10, 1994 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Attn: Allen R.Johnson Project Directorate
I-3 Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Subject: Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection
Report No.50-244/93-21, dated December 10, 1993 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 Dear Mr.Johnson: During an NRC inspection
conducted on October 4, 1993 to October 13, 1993, a violation of NRC requirements
was identified.
In acccrdance
with the"General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement
Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below: "Plant technical specification 4.6.l.e.3.a
requires that at least once per 18 months during shutdown, each emergency diesel generator shall be demonstrated
to be operable by simulating
a loss of offsite power in conjunction
with a safety injection test signal and verifying de-energization
of the emergency buses and load shedding from the emergency buses." Contrary to the above, on October 11, 1993, it was determined
that testing to verify load shedding from the emergency buses was not performed during the 18 month surveillance
testing.(1)the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation:
Rochester Gas&Electric Corporation (RG&E)accepts the violation.
We acknowledge
that plant procedures
did not adequately
test the bus undervoltage
logic, as required by Technical Specification (TS)4.6.1.e.3.(a).gw~I To iQ'.9402010169
940110 PDR ADOCK 05000244 9 PDR
0'
Letter: Page 2 Subject: "Violation
Response 93-21-01 Date: January 10, 1994 The reason for the violation, as stated in LER 93-005 (Docket Number 50-244, LER 93-005, dated November 10, 1993)was a mis-interpretation'of
TS surveill'ance
requirements.
The load shedding requirement
of TS 4.6.1.e.3.(a)
was interpreted
as the shedding of non-essential
loads powered from ,the emergency buses.The shedding of non-essential
loads had been tested by.simulating
a safety injection (SI)signal.during performance
of procedures
RSSP-2.1 (Safety Injection Functional
Test)and RSSP-2.1A (Safety Injection Functional
Test Alignment/Realignment), which are performed each refueling outage.The need to verify load shedding capabilities
of safeguards
loads, with undervoltage
and SI present, had not been considered., l (2)the corrective
steps that have been taken and the results achieved: The immediate corrective
action was to perform the surveillance
tests necessary to verify load shedding capability
from the emergency buses.A procedure change notice (PCN)was developed for each associated
PT-9.1 procedure (monthly surveillance
test procedures
for testing'undervoltage
protection
for 480 volt safeguards
busses 14, 16, 17, and 18).Testing was started on October 11, 1993, and was completed on October 12, 1993, within twenty-four
hours of discovery.
Details of this testing and test methodology
are discussed in Attachment
1..(To perform this testing, indiyidua2.
components
were declared inoperable, one at a time, for brief periods.No more than one component was inoperable
at a given time, and the diesel generators (DGs)were maintained
operable during the entire testing period.)The guidance of.NRC Generic Letter (GL)87-09, entitled"Sections 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS)on the Applicability
of Limiting Conditions
for Operation and Surveillance
Requirements", was followed.,Both the"A" and"B" DGs were available to perform all intended functions throughout
the discovery.
and surveillance
testing period.This testing demonstrated
end-to-end
operability
of the under-voltage protection
system.It verified undervoltage
signals to safeguards
components, and undervoltage
in conjunction
with SI signal to the Component Cooling Water (CCW)pumps.Initial testing of the"B" CCW pump undervoltage
/SI trip logic was indeterminate.
At that time, the"B" CCW pump was declared inoperable, until further testing was conducted.
The pump was subsequently
verified,to
be fully operable, and was returned to service approximately
twelve hours later.The testing conducted on October 11-12, in combination
with the surveillance
tests conducted during the 1993 outage, met the requirements
of TS 4.6.1.e.3.(a), and verified that the safeguards
functions would have performed as required.
Letter: Page 3 Subja't: Violation Response 93-21-01 Date: January 10, 1994 RG&E personnel subsequently
reviewed the requirements
of TS 4.6.1, and compared these requirements
with surveillance
proce-dures.No other noncompliances
were identified.
(3')the corrective
steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
0 0 0 A review of Section 4 of the Ginna TS will be performed to ensure that there are implementing
procedures
for every surveillance
required by TS.This review will be completed prior to completion
of the next scheduled refueling outage.Results of a preliminary
review of Section 4 have determined
that there are sufficient
procedural
controls for implementing
Section 4 requirements.
A review of the identified
implementing
procedures
will be performed to ensure that these procedures
do, in fact, implement the TS requirements.
This review will be completed prior to completion
of the next scheduled refueling outage.Procedures
that verify load shedding capability
will be upgraded to include safeguards
loads, for conditions
of undervoltage
and SI, prior to completion
of the next scheduled refueling outage.(4)the date when full compliance
will be achieved: Full compliance
with TS 4.6.1.e.3.(a)
was achieved on.October 12, 1993, at the completion
of surveillance
testing.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: Mr.Allen R.Johnson (Mail Stop 14D1)PWR Project Directorate
I-3 Washington, DC 20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector
Attachment
1 PT-9.1 Series Test Details The purpose of this test was to verify undervoltage
safeguards
load shedding capability.
Monthly TS surveillance
test'ing currently ensures each safeguards
breaker can be stripped from the bus using the trip coil.To verify the undervoltage
stripping capability, all that was necessary was to verify the integrity of the undervoltage
logic contacts and associated
circuitry, to the trip coils.Zumpers were used to simulate SI for the CCW pumps because their breakers trip on undervoltage
coincident
with SI signal.Testing Sequence: 1~Manipulate
test switches and develop an undervoltage
condition using test equipment.
2~Verify auxiliary output relays energize to cause the trip function, initiated by appropriate
operation of the intermediate
digital control logic circuitry.
3~4~5.Return test switches to normal and remove test equipment.
Verify component being tested is not in service.Measure the continuity
of wiring between the undervoltage
auxiliary relays and the breaker switchgear, using DC voltage measurements
to ground.6.Verify normally open output relay contacts using resistance
measurements.
7~8.Locally trip the associated
auxiliary relay and verify proper indicator lamp response and relay contacts indicate closed by resistance
measurement.
Reset the auxiliary relay and verify relay contacts indicate open by resistance
measurement.
9.Repeat steps 1-8 for all four channels (27/X, 27/BX, 27D/X, and 27D/BX).One test anomoly was identified, as noted in the violation response.Relay 86-16B, associated
with the"B" CCW pump breaker, failed to meet the specified resistance
acceptance
criteria.Emergency Maintenance'rocedure
EM-778 was performed to verify the contact did in fact trip.the breaker.After being verified, the contact was reworked by simple burnishing
of exposed contact surfaces.
~l