L-2017-074, Redacted - St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 10, Steam and Power Conversion System

Redacted - St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 10, Steam and Power Conversion System

ML17298A050
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	05/03/2017
From:	Florida Power & Light Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17172A000	List: L-2017-074, Redacted - St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 10, Steam and Power Conversion System L-2017-074, Redacted - St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 11, Radioactive Waste Management System L-2017-074, Redacted - St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 12, Radiation Protection L-2017-074, Redacted - St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 2, Site Characteristics L-2017-074, Redacted - St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 6, Engineered Safety Features L-2017-074, Redacted - St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 8, Electric Power L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 1, Introduction and General Description of Plant Site Characteristics L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 13, Conduct of Operations L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 14, Initial Test Program L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 15, Accident Analysis L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 16, Technical Specifications L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 17, Quality Assurance L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 18, Aging Management Programs and Time-Limited Aging Analyses Activities L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 2, Site Characteristics L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 5, Reactor Coolant System L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Controls L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 9, Auxiliary Systems L-2017-074, St. Lucie, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment No. 28, Chapter 9.5, Fire Protection Program Report ML17132A382 ML17171A239 ML17171A240 ML17171A244 ML17171A247 ML17171A249 ML17171A250 ML17171A256 ML17171A257 ML17171A258 ML17171A259 ML17171A261 ML17171A262 ML17298A046 ML17298A047 ML17298A048 ML17298A049 ML17298A050 ML17298A051
References
L-2017-074
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CHAPTER 10 LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd)Table Title Page 10A-8 Rockshaft and Tail Link Sleeves - Combined 10A-32 Effects of Pre and Post Impact 10A-9 Comparisons of 3-D Shell and Axi-Symmetric 10A-33 Results at Time 0.0043 Sec. After Impact for Unmodified MSIV/MSCV 10-iv Am. 3-7/85 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM CHAPTER 10 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE TITLE 10.1-1a Flow Diagram Main Steam System - Sheet 1

10.1-1b Flow Diagram Main Steam System - Sheet 2

10.1-1c Flow Diagram Extraction Steam System - Sheet 1

10.1-1d Flow Diagram Extraction Steam System - Sheet 2 10.1-1e Flow Diagram Auxiliary Steam System 10.1-1 Flow Diagram Air Evacuation System

10.1-2a Flow Diagram Condensate System - Sheet 1 10.1-2b Flow Diagram Condensate System Sheet 2 10.1-2c Flow Diagram Feedwater and Condensate System - Sheet 3

10.1-2d Flow Diagram Feedwater and Condensate System - Sheet 4 10.2-2e Flow Diagram Main Feedwater

10.1-3 Flow Diagram Heater Drain and Vent System

10.1-4 Heat Balance

10.2-1 Turbine Overspeed Protection Electro-Hydraulic System

10.2-2 Not used 10.2-3 Flow Diagram Turbine Lube Oil System - Sheet 2 10.2-4 Flow Diagram Turbine Lube Oil System - Sheet 3

10.3-1 Flow Diagram Main Steam

10.3-2 MSIV Assembly, Sheet 1

10.3-3 Flow Diagram Secondary Side Wet Layup System Feedwater Heaters Tube Side 10.3-4 Flow Diagram Secondary Side Wet Layup System Feedwater Heaters Shell Side

10-v Amendment No. 26 (11/13)

TABLE 10.1-1 (Cont'd)Design duty, Btu/hr 5.850 x 10 9 Heat transfer area, ft 2 546,000 Design pressures psig Shell: 15 psig and 30 in. Hg vacuum Water Box: 25 Condenser Flow, max.

guaranteed, lb/hr 7,820,492 Condenser Flow, max.

expected, lb/hr 8,212,960 8,234,551***

Material Shell ASTM A-285, Gr C Tubes ASTM-B-338 titanium Grade 2

throughout the condenser Tube Sheets ASTM B-171 (Alloy 614)

Codes Heat Exchanger Institute Standards

for Steam Surface Condensers 1965

7. Steam Jet Air Ejector

a. Inter-Condenser Type single pass Heat Transfer Area, ft 2 415 Design Pressure Tube side, psig 750 Shell side, psig 25 Material Shell ASTM-A285, Gr C Tubes 316 S.S. ASTM A249 Tube Sheets 316 S.S. ASTM A240

• • • Cycle 15 with Replacement Steam Generators - 0% Plugging @ 2713.84 MW 10.1-7 Amendment No. 16, (1/98)

TABLE 10.1-1 (Cont'd)

g. Steam Flow Elements (FE-8011, FE-8021)

Number 2 Type Venturi Pipe I.D., inches 31.50 Venturi Throat I.D., inches 20.757 Diameter Ratio 0.659 Area Ratio 0.434 Materials Pipe ASTM A-155, GR KC-65 Class I Venturi ASTM A-240 TP 304 at Throat ASTM A-515 GR 55 at inlet &

outlet Code ANSI B31.7 Class II, 1969 10.1-12

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYFLOW DIAGRAM FEEDWATER &

CONDENSATE SYSTEMS SHEET 3Amendment No. 15 (1/97)

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYFLOW DIAGRAM FEEDWATER &

CONDENSATE SYSTEMS SHEET 4Amendment No. 15 (1/97)

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYFLOW DIAGRAMHEATER DRAIN AND VENT SYSTEMAmendment No. 19 (10/02)

10.2 TURBINE-GENERATOR 10.2.1 DESIGN BASES The turbine-generator is intended for load following operation and is designed for load changes from 15 to 100 percent power and 100 to 15 percent power at a maximum rate of 5 percent per minute and at greater rates over smaller load change increments, up to a step change of 10 percent. However, it is acceptable to operate as a base load unit. The turbine-generator has a guaranteed gross rating of 1080 MWe and 1200 Mva. Table 10.1-1 lists other pertinent performance characteristics.

The turbine-generator is not designed for operation under the stresses that could be imposed by the operating basis earthquake (OBE) or the design basis earthquake (DBE). However, the turbine-generator is designed to function under the thermal stresses which could be imposed due to upset conditions, emergency conditions and faulted conditions as defined in Section 2 of N18.2, Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Stationary Pressurized Water Reactor Plants, January 1972.

10.

2.2 DESCRIPTION

The turbine is a Siemens Energy Inc., tandem-compound, four-flow exhaust, 1800 rpm unit, and has moisture separation and reheat between the high pressure and the two low pressure elements. The ac generator and brushless-type exciter are direct-connected to the turbine-generator shaft. The turbine consists of one double-flow high pressure element in tandem with two double-flow low pressure elements.

There are four horizontal-axis, cylindrical-shell, combination moisture-separator/reheater (MSR) assemblies located alongside the low pressure elements on the turbine building operating floor. This equipment receives steam fr om the exhaust of the high pressure turbine element. Internal manifolds in the lower section of these assemblies distribute the wet steam and allow it to rise through a chevron type moisture-separator where the moisture is removed. Steam extracted from the main steam line, upstream of the turbine, enters each MSR assembly, passes through the reheater tube bundle and leaves as condensate. The steam leaving the separator rises past the reheater tube bundle where it is reheated to approximately 510F when operating at full power; the steam is reheated to approximately 280F at 25 percent power. This reheated steam passes through nozzles in the top of the assemblies, flows to the low pressure turbine elements, and finally exhausts to the condenser (see Figures 10.1-1a and 10.1-1b

). The turbine is equipped with two electronic, triple redundant online testable emergency trip systems that trip the stop and control valves to a closed position in the event of turbine overspeed, low bearing oil pressure, low vacuum, or thrust bearing failure. Three electric solenoid trip valves for each trip system are provided for remote manual trips and for various automatic trips. In addition, a turbine trip initiates a main generator lockout to prevent generator damage. The turbine control system is discussed in Section 7.7.1.4. Upon occurrence of a turbine trip, a signal is supplied to the reactor protective system to trip the reactor. The logic-circuitry for this trip function is discussed in Section

7.2.

10.2-1 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)

The turbine generator is provided with three overspeed protection systems (see Figure 10.2-1): a) Overspeed protection controller (OPC) b) Two electronic, triple redundant overspeed protection systems.

The OPC system and the primary electronic overspeed system do not share any sensing devices.

Overspeed Protection Control (OPC) System The OPC system is an electrohydraulic control system that controls turbine overspeed in the event of a complete loss of load and if the turbine reaches or exceeds 103 percent of rated speed. It trips the turbine at 111 percent of rated speed.

Turbine input power is a function of intermediate pressure (IP) exhaust pressure; a pressure transducer provides IP exhaust pressure. A three phase watt transducer provides generated KW information. These quantities are compared; if they differ by a preset amount, protective logic is activated. The signals from the transducers are checked against high and low reference voltages to determine when a transducer fails high or low. Overspeed information (in rpm) is supplied by active (powered) pick-ups coupled magnetically to a notched wheel on the turbine rotor. These pick-ups generate pulses which are fed to the Digital Electro-Hydraulic (DEH) cabinet to form speed channels: a control speed channel and an OPC speed channel.

The output of the control speed channel cards is compared to an overspeed setpoint. The resulting signal indicates when the speed is above the setpoint. If the speed is above the setpoint, a signal is generated for use by the overspeed protection controller (OPC) circuitry. It is also checked against a high and low limit. If either limit is exceeded, corresponding failure signals are generated.

The OPC continuously monitors the protection system inputs and outputs to notify the control room operators when equipment failures are encountered.

Upon complete loss of load the mismatch of IP pressure and megawatts occurs, and the breaker opens, this condition is detected as a complete load loss. When the generator breaker opens, the Load Drop Anticipation (LDA) is set, requesting OPC action. All governor and interceptor valves are then rapidly closed. Load drop reset time is fixed at 4 sec. LDA load loss circuits are inoperable below 30 percent load.

OPC action also occurs when turbine speed is equal to, or greater than, 103 percent of rated speed. Governor and interceptor valves are closed until the speed drops below 103 percent. In addition, the redundant electronic emergency trip system will de-energize triple redund ant solenoids which will cause all turbine valves to trip if the turbine speed reaches 111 percent of rated speed (see Figure 10.2-1). An air pilot valve used to vent control air to close the extraction steam non-return valves is also triggered by the trip systems.

10.2-2 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)

Electronic Overspeed Protection System Two independent, triple redundant electronic emergency trip systems replace the original mechanical overspeed protection system. Both systems independently release the control oil pressure, tripping all turbine valves when the turbine reaches an 111 percent overspeed condition. Therefore, all valves capable of admitting steam into the turbine will close. The primary protection system uses triple redundant passive speed sensors to monitor turbine speed. The redundant protection system shares the triple redundant active (powered) speed sensors with the OPC controller. Turbine speed is also built f(communication with the electronic emergency trip system controllers is not required). The resulting overspeed protection is therefore, redundant and diverse.

Protective functions of th e original auto-stop oil system are integrated into the primary electronic overspeed trip system. The turbine is tripped when any one of the pressure status manifolds detect a trip condition. Protecti on parameters, such as the low bearing oil pressure and low vacuum are monitored by pressure status manifolds equipped with triple redundant smart pressure transmitters. The thrust bearing is also monitored by triple redundant proximity probes. The primary protection system trips the turbine when any of these parameters exceed a setpoint specified by the turbine manufacturer. The primary protection system also provides a trip signal monitored by the redundant protection system. This results in a turbine trip from the redundant protection system. Additionally, protective logic in the original auto-stop oil systems are into each of the triple redundant solenoid trip circuits. (See Figures 10.2-3 and 10.2-4.)

Each triple redundant electronic emergency trip system uses a testable dump manifold (TDM) to interface with the control oil system. The 2-out-of-3 solenoid logic used to provide a protective trip also provides a means to test the system automatically while on-line.

The solenoids are tripped one at the time and installed test pressure transmitters monitor the manifold for a detectable pressure change. The operator has a graphic window on the Turbine Trip Status Display graphic where he can modify the Overspeed Trip #2 Setpoint. It is normally set at 1998 rpm. During turbine run-up, a test mode can be entered which changes the overspeed trip setpoint to 1799 rpm. This test mode provides the ability to test overspeed trip capability without stressing the turbine by overspeeding.

The Overspeed Trip #2 Setpoint is reset and test results are reported to the operator after completion of the test.

A turbine lube oil system supplies oil for lubricating the turbine-generator and exciter bearings. A bypass stream of turbine lubricating oil flows continuously through an oil conditioner to remove water and other impurities.

The generator is a hydrogen-cooled, rotor-and-stator unit rated at 1200 mva with the capability to accept the gross rated output of the turbine at rated steam conditions. The generator shaft seals are oil sealed to prevent hydrogen leakage. An alarm indicates any leakage of hydrogen into the exciter.

The main , extraction, and auxiliary steam system drawings are shown on Figures 10.1-1a through 10.1-1e.

The heating steam for the feedwater heaters is extracted from the turbine as follows: Extractions for the high pressure heaters (5A & 5B) and low pressure heaters (4A & 4B) are from the high pressure turbine element; the extractions for the remaining low pressure heaters (1A & 1B, 2A & 2B, 3A & 3B) are from the low pressure turbine elements. High pressure heaters 5A and 5B are drained into low pressure heaters 4A and 4B; the drains from the low pressure heaters 4A and 4B are directed to the drain coolers. The condensate accumulated in the drain coolers is then pumped by the two heater drain pumps back to the condensate and feedwater heaters and ultimately to the condenser.

Alternate drains are also provided to automatically drain all the heaters directly to the condenser when a condition of high heater water level occurs. In addition, heaters 5A and 5B collect the drains from the reheater drain collectors and heaters 4A and 4B collect the drains from the moisture-separator drain pots.

10.2-3 Amendment No. 26 (11/13) 10.2.3 TURBINE MISSILES A discussion and analysis of potential turbine missiles is provided in Section 3.5.2.2 and 3.5.3.2.

10.2.4 EVALUATION

The turbine-generator unit as well as other steam handling components of the steam and power conversion system are not expected to contain significant radioactive concentrations. Refer to Table 10.2-1 for expected radioactivity concentrations in the system.

Refer to Sections 11.2.5 and 11.3.5 for discussion of radiation concentrations and expected releases of radioactivity during operation. The anticipated operating radioactive concentrations in the system do not require shielding or access control in the turbine building.

Inservice inspection of the turbine-generator unit consists of periodic visual examinations. Other nondestructive testing includes magnafluxing of the rotors and blades. An ultrasonic examination of the low pressure turbine rotor discs is required at approximately 100,000 operating hour intervals provided no cracks are detected. Inspection intervals shall not exceed 1 2 years to allow adjustments for operating cycles based on Siemens Energy Inc. recommendations.

Refer to Section 3.5.3.2 for a discussion on the justification for the 100,000 hr inspection interval.

10.2-4 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)

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• Corrosion Products

Refer to Figure 7.3-18 for the MSIS logic diagram. The MSIS will override the open and close solenoids, and associated test solenoids during testing. Open and close solenoid valves will be energized upon receipt of

MSIS whether they are in "Test" or in normal operating configurations.

During hot standby when the turbine stop valves are closed, the main steam isolation actuation devices and valves may be individually tested at approximate operating pressure and temperature by inputting an MSIS to each valve. The closure time for each valve can be precisely obtained from the computer-based

sequence-of-events recorder.

The main steam isolation valve specification specifies that the stop and check valves shall be capable of stopping steam flow against full differential pressure of 1000 psi. The actual maximum differential being 900

psi. The vendor's instruction manual also indicates that the stop and check valve as a single unit is capable

of stopping flow in either direction against full differential pressure. In order to open the valve once having

closed it against full differential pressure it is necessary that the pressure on both sides of the valves be

nearly equal. This is done by opening the 3 inch motor operated bypass valve. When the pressure on both sides of the tripped disc is nearly equa l , the air pressure in the pneumatic cylinder opens the valve.

Testing of the isolation valve closure provides assurance that the valve will operate when called upon to do

so, and that the closure time is within specified limits. Assurance of the ability to function is tested by actually tripping the valve.

Testing valve closure at the hot shutdown cooling steam flow condition provides adequate confirmatory data.

The program for testing of these valves is as follows:

Fu ll closure testing shall be performed by verifying full closure within 6.0 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program.10.3-5 Amendment No. 17 (10/99)

The removal of oxygen from the secondary waters is also essential in reducing corrosion. Oxygen dissolved in water causes corrosion that can result in pitting of ferrous metals, particularly carbon steel. Oxygen is removed from the steam cycle condensate in the main condenser deaerating section. Additional oxygen

protection is obtained by chemical injection of an oxygen scavenger into the condensate stream.

Maintaining a residual level of oxygen scavenger in the feedwater also ensures that any dissolved oxygen not removed by the main condenser is scavenged before it can enter the steam generator.

The presence of free hydroxide (OH) can cause rapid caustic stress corrosion if it is allowed to concentrate in a local area. Free hydroxide is avoided by maintaining proper pH control, and by minimizing impurity

ingress into the steam generator.

Zero solids treatment is a control technique whereby both soluble and insoluble solids are excluded from the steam generator. This is accomplished by maintaining strict surveillance over the possible sources of feed

train contamination (e.g.: main condenser cooling water leakage, air inleakage and subsequent corrosion

product generation). Solids are also excluded by injecting only volatile chemicals to establish conditions which reduce corrosion and, therefore, reduce the transport of corrosion products into the steam generator.

In addition to minimizing the sources of contaminants entering the steam generator, continuous blowdown, described in Section 10.4.7 and condensate polishing described in Section 10.3.5.5, are employed to

minimize their concentration. With the low solid levels which result from employing the above procedures, the accumulation of scale and deposits on steam generator heat transfer surfaces and internals is limited.

Scale and deposit formations can alter the thermal hydraulic performance in local regions to such an extent

that they create a mechanism which allows impurities to concentrate to high levels, and thus could possibly cause corrosion. Therefore, by limiting the ingress of solids into the steam generator, the effect of this type

of corrosion is reduced.

Because they are volatile, the chemical additives will not concentrate in the steam generator, and do not represent chemical impurities which can themselves cause corrosion.

10.3.5.3 Chemistry Control Effects on Iodine Partitioning System design and operating practices are directed towards the goal of corrosion protection which at the same time provides an excellent environment for the suppression of iodine emissions in steam. Secondary

water chemistry will suppress the formation of volatile species of iodine in the steam generators and convert

volatile iodine that may be carried over via primary to secondary leakage to non-volatile iodine compounds.

As demonstrated in CE Topical Reports entitled "Iodine Decontamination Factors During PWR Steam

Generation and Steam Venting" (References 1 and 2), iodine carryover in the steam generators is a function

of moisture separator performance.

This report supports C-E's position on iodine decontamination factors in C-E designed and fabricated steam generating equipment. As a direct result of this work, steam generator iodine decontamination factors

should not be lower than a value of 400 for design basis studies or less than 1000 for normal operation

studies.

10.3-8 Amendment No. 18, (04/01)

TABLE 10.3-2DELETED 10.3-13Amendment No. 21 (12/05)

TABLE 10.3-3DELETED 10.3-13aAmendment No. 21 (12/05)

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYMSIV ASSEMBLY, SH.1Amendment No. 15 (1/97)

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYFLOW DIAGRAM CONDENSATE POLISHER FILTER DEMINERALIZERAmendment No.

16 (1/98)

10.4.7.4 System Evaluation Radiological evaluations of normal gaseous and liquid are provided in Sections 11.2 and 11.3. The process streams are required if a coincidence of failed fuel level, primary to secondary leakage and

blowdown rate are such that activity levels in the blowdown stream reach a level exceeding that

allowable for direct release to the discharge canal. Should this occur three 100 percent separate

process streams (40 gpm or greater/stream) are available. Thus, sufficient redundancy is provided to

ensure the availability of the process stream as required to support normal plant operations. There are

no safety related functional considerations associated with this system.

10.4.7.5 Instrumentation Instruments are provided as required to monitor system operation. The number, type and location are shown on Figures 10.4-1 and 10.4-2. The sampling capability discussed in Section 10.4.7.3 is available

to supplement process instrumentation data.

10.4.7.6 Testing and Inspection The process streams are required from time to time during plant operation thereby providing an opportunity to periodically monitor process stream performance.

10.4-9

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYFLOW DIAGRAM STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN PROCESS SYSTEMAmendment No.

16, (1/98)

10.5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 10.5.1 DESIGN BASES The function of the Auxili ary Feedwater System (AFWS) is to ensure a sufficient supply of cooling water to the steam generators when main feedwater is not available. Motor operated valve actuator capabilities for MV-09-09, 10, 11 and 12 have been reviewed in accordance with the re quirements of Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety Related Motor Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance", as noted in Section 3.9.2.4 and Table 3.9-6.

The AFWS design bases are as follows: (a) Provide cooling water to either one or both steam generators during nor mal shutdown and accident conditions to ensure the following:

1. Provide sufficient capability for the removal of sensible and decay heat from the reactor coolant system (RCS) during forced or natural circulation cooldown, assuming a single active failure c oncurrent with a loss of offsite power2. Provide sufficient capacity to reduce RCS temperature to 325F (Entry conditions for the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) under normal conditions), assuming a single active failure and loss of offsite power.(b) Deliver a uxiliary feedwater flow against the maximum steam generator pressure.(c) Store sufficient demineralized water, in the seismic Category I Condensate Storage Tank, such that during normal operation the AFWS can cooldown the RCS (at 75 F/hr) to the SDCS entry t emperature. Refer to Subsection 9.2.8.(d) Operate automatically upon receipt of a low steam generator level signal , with loss of either offsite or onsite ac power, with no operator action required outside of the Control Room.(e) Ensure system performance with redundant and diverse power sources, i.e., with two ac-powered motor-driven pumps and one steam turbine-driven pump.(f) Preclude hydraulic instabilities; e.g., waterhammer (g) Perform its design function following design basis natural phenomena (i.e., followin g a hurricane, tornado, or a safe shutdown earthquake).(h) Withstand pipe rupture effects, including pipe whip and jet impingement forces.

10.5-1 Amendment No. 17 (10/99)

(i)Perform its function assuming a main feedwater line break concurrent with a loss of offsite power and a single active failure in the AFWS.(j) Provide sufficient feedwater capability to maintain the RCS in hot standby conditions following a high energy break in the AFWS concurrent with a si ngle active failure. (The AFWS was not categorized as a high energy system as part of original licensing. This bases is in accordance with the acceptance criteria invoked by Standard Review Plan 10.4.9 Rev. 1 and Branch Technical Position ASB 10-1 Rev. 1

).10.5.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The major active components of the system consist of one greater than full flow capacity and two full flow capacity auxiliary feedwater pumps. The larger pump is driven by a noncondensing steam turbine.

The turbine receives steam from the main steam lines upstream of the isolation valves and exhausts to atmosphere. The two motor driven pumps are powered from the emergency generators in case of loss

of normal power. The pumps take suction from the condensate storage tank and discharge to the steam generators. Refer to Figure 10.5-2.

The turbine-driven pump is capable of supplying auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators for the total expected range of steam generator pressure (985 psig to 50 psig) by means of a variable speed

turbine driver controlled by a variable speed hydraulic governor. The turbine operates through a speed

range of 3600 to 2000 rpm when supplied with saturated steam from 985 to 50 psig, respectively. The turbine-driven pump relies solely on a dc power supply; the valves associated with the turbine-driven

pumps also are powered from a dc source. Each motor-driven pump generally supplies feedwater to

one steam generator. A cross connection has been provided to enable the routing of the flow of the two

motor-driven pumps to one steam generator. The turbine-driven pump supplies feedwater to both steam

generators by means of two separate lines each with its own control valve. The control of auxiliary feedwater flow and steam generator level is normally accomplished by means of control-room operated

control valves each sized to pass the full flow. A local control station is provided to facilitate shutdown if

the control room is not accessible.

During normal operation, feedwater is supplied to the steam generators by the feedwater system. If this system is unavailable due to loss of feedwater pumps or offsite power, steam generator feedwater levels

will decrease. The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system is provided with complete sensor and control

instrumentation to enable the system to automatically respond to a loss of steam generator inventory.

Should the steam generator level decrease to the low steam generator level trip setpoint, an alarm is

sounded in the control room and an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) time delay is

actuated. Actuation of the AFW system is delayed for a pre-selected period of time. If the steam

generator water level increases to reset the low level actuation bistable before the AFAS time delay expires, the time delay will reset and the AFW system will not actuate. If the AFAS time delay expires

while the steam generator level is below the AFAS low level actuation bistable (first) reset, then the AFW system will receive an AFAS.

10.5-1a Amendment No. 17 (10/99)

This page has been deleted.

10.5-2a Amendment No. 17 (10/99)

The single failure analysis for the failure of the 125V dc A bus is based on the following assumptions:a)Steam generator B is the faulted steam generator,b) The AB electrical systems are initially aligned to the A supply, c) A seismic event and station blackout accompany the faulted condition, d)The single failure is postulated to be the A 125V dc battery.Before proceeding, it should be noted as a point of clarification that the motor operated valves, shown onFigure 10.5-2 are labeled to designate their respective bus and power supply. The ac powered valves are powered by 480V ac whereas the dc powered valves are powered by 125V dc.The Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) direct the operator to status essential systems andcomponents and important parameters after a plant trip. One of the first steps after a reactor trip requires the control room operator to verify that the AB DC bus is aligned to an energized power supply. Other EOP's also direct the operator to verify power to the AB DC bus in the event AFW flow is lost. The operator would identify that the AB DC bus is aligned to the failed battery. The operator then transfers the AB DC bus from supply A to supply B from the control room. Refer to Figure 10.5-3 depicting the 125V dc bus transfer circuit capability in the control room. The changeover requires the following operator action:a)Transfer of 125V dc AB bus - Four control switches with key locks are switched from theA-AB (AB-A) positions to the B-AB (AB-B) positions. The design of the key locks (key removable in open-reset position only) precludes cross connecting of power sources.

When the transfer is complete, two misalignment alarms will be annunciated indicating improper alignment of 4160 and 480 volt buses.b)Observes that AFAS time delay has expired and the AFAS automatically opens the AFWsteam admission valves (MV-08-3, 13 and 14) and the appropriate 1C AFW pump discharge valves (MV-09-11 or 12) then verifies that the 1C AFW pump is delivering flow to the unaffected S/G(s).c)The 1C AFW pump and associated motor operated valves can be placed in servicewithout 480V or 4160V ac power, therefore, realignment of these ac buses would not be required to establish the required AFW flow.It can be concluded from the above described action that auxiliary feedwater flow can be initiated within 10 minutes.The operator actions described above demonstrate that the time required to perform the necessaryswitching is within the analysis time limit (within 10 minutes) for auxiliary feedwater initiation, to ensure adequate heat removal and safe plant shutdown. It is concluded, therefore, that the operator has sufficient time to initiate auxiliary feedwater flow.10.5-3aAmendment No. 21 (12/05)

The initial conditions for the current limiting analysis are listed in Table 10.5-4 and the analysis assumptions are presented in Table 10.5-5, and the transient results are shown in Figures 10.5-4 through

10.5-7. The event is initiated by a total loss of all main feedwater. The reactor tripped on low SG level. Subsequent to reactor trip, the turbine tripped and the main steam safety valves opened briefly to relieve the secondary side pressure. The steam bypass control system controlled the steam generator pressure in automatic mode. The auxiliary feedwater from one motor driven pump injected water into one generator after the AFAS time delay.

Early in the event, the flow from the single AFWS pump was not adequate to remove decay heat and pump heat. This resulted in a slow decrease in the SG liquid inventory as the SBCS steam flow required to remove decay heat exceeded the AFWS pump flow. As the steam generators approach dryout, the steam generators pressures fall below the MSIS setpoint, thereby closing the MSIVs. Following closure of the MSIVs, RCS temperature rises, and steam pressure in the SG fed by the single operating AFWS pump slowly rises until it reaches the MSSV setpoint. Once the steam generators dry out, the RCS temperature increases, thereby increasing RCS pressure until reaching the pressurizer spray setpoint. Thirty minutes after loss of all MFW, operators trip all RCPs, and the decreased heat load slows the RCS temperature increase. RCS temperature continues to rise until decay heat decreases to the point that AFWS pump flow is adequate to remove the decay heat. RCS temperature stabilizes, and then slowly decreases as decay heat continues to decrease. Eventually, decay heat decreases to the point that the AFWS pump is able to begin recovery of the fed SG liquid inventory and level.

The analysis performed with degraded AFW system capacity and biased reactor trip and AFW actuation setpoints demonstrates that the degraded AFW system is adequate to maintain primary-to-secondary heat transfer such that the plant can be stabilized and brought to a safe shutdown in a controlled manner.

Adequate cooling was maintained through the vaporization of the AFW and pressurizer steam space was preserved. There was no significant heatup of the primary system.

The primary temperature is controlled by the actuation of the steam dump and bypass system until closure of the MSIVs, and by the MSSVs following closure of the MSIVs. The acceptance criteria for this event (no loss of primary subcooling margin and pressurizer level < 100% of the total pressurizer volume) are met. Condition B - High energy line break at "B" pump discharge concurrent with single active failure.

For this case the operators have sufficient time to initiate AFW flow, via the turbine, by transferring electrical AB dc loads from the dead "A" bus to the energized "B" bus. This transfer, as presented earlier in this Section is conservatively assumed to take less than 10 minutes. The analysis for this case, where no AFW is made available to the steam generators, demonstrates that the operators will have 10 minutes to initiate AFW flow to remove decay heat and place the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The plant initial conditions and analysis assumptions are presented in Tables 10.5-6 and 10.5-7, respectively.

Figures 10.5-19 through 10.5-35 show the transient results.

Plant cooldown is accomplished for condition A and B using either motor driven pump or turbine driven pump.

Feedwater Line Break Decay Heat Removal

The FWLB Event is defined as a major break in a main feedwater line that is sufficiently large to prevent maintaining the secondary side water inventory in the affected steam generator. A feedwater line break between the SG and an upstream feedwater line check valve is the worst case, as blowdown of the steam generator secondary side water cannot be isolated. Depending on the size of the break, all feedwater may be lost to the affected steam generator, including auxiliary feedwater. The hydraulic resistances in the feedwater piping network determine the extent to which the unfaulted steam generator is deprived of feedwater.

The analysis was performed assuming that a double-ended guillotine break of the largest pipe downstream of the check valve, i.e., the feedwater nozzle, occurred. All main feedwater was instantaneously lost to both steam generators upon occurrence of the FWLB. One motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was assumed to be available for delivery to the unfaulted steam generator following the actuate signal and associated delays.

UNIT 1 10.5-5 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

10.5.4 TESTING AND INSPECTION Auxiliary feed pumps are tested with cold water at the manufacturer's shop, in the presence of the purchaser's inspector, to demonstrate successful operation and performance of the equipment.

Performance tests are governed by the provisions of the ASME Power Test Codes for Centrifugal Pumps (PTC 8.2) and the Hydraulic Institute Test Code for Centrifugal Pumps.

Pumps casings receive hydrostatic

tests at 150 percent of maximum operating head.

The auxiliary feedwater pump and noncondensing turbine manufacturers supply calculations which substantiate that the equipment will not suffer loss of function due to design bases earthquake loadings.Both motor-driven pumps and associated controls were given preoperational tests after erection and before plant start-up. All three of the auxiliary feed pumps can be tested during normal operation by recirculating to the condensate storage tank though miniflow lines. The system will be tested periodically as described in the Technical Specifications.

Monitoring of fluid conditions within the AFW system is performed on a regular basis to preclude a steam binding condition. Should such a condition exist additional procedures are provided to restore the AFW system to operable status. These inspections and procedures are provided in accordance with I&E Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Aux Feedwater P umps".10.5.5 INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION Refer to Section 7.4 for a description of the auxiliary feedwater system controls and instrumentation required for safe plant shutdown.

The controls and instrumentation for this system are shown in the system P&ID, Figure 10.5-2, and tabulated in Table 10.5-2.

10.5-6 Amendment No. 17 (10/99)

TABLE 10.5-2AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION Indication Alarm (1) NormalControlInstrumentOperatingInstrumentSystem Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording (1) Control Function

Range (4)

Range Accuracy (4)Condensate Storage Tank * * * *Regulates flow from

>185,000demineralized water gallons Level (2)system to maintainminimum condensate tank level.Aux. Feedwater Pumps1.Steam pressure atturbine inlet (3) * *985 - 50 psig2.Pump suction pressure *

• 11.5 psig3.Pump discharge pressure * *1200 psig Motor driven

250 gpm4.Pump discharge flow

• Flow is manually regulated from control room.5.Pump speed (3)

• 3600 - 2000 rpm (1)All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated.

(2)Low-low, low and high level alarms are provided in control room: high & low level alarms provided on water treatment panel. Redundant safety relatedindicators on RTGB-102 are shown in Table 7.5-2.(3) For turbine driven pump only.

(4)Instrument ranges are selected in accordance with standard engineering practices. Instrument accuracies are selected such that existing instrument loopperformance and safety analysis assumptions remain valid. Where applicable, instrument accuracies are also evaluated for their impact on setpoints inaccordance with the FPL Setpoint Methodology.10.5-11Amendment No. 20 (4/04)

TABLE 10.5-3 (Continued)

3. General Design Criterion 5, as related to the capability of shared systems and components important to safety to perform required safety functions.

3. The SL-1 AFWS has no structures, systems or components important to safety which are shared with Unit

2. However, a Condition of License for SL-1 includes a commitment to provide an inter

-tie with the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CST). Thus, the only component in the AFWS is the Unit 2 CST (capacity 400,000 gal.). A connection from the Unit 2 CST will be provided to the suction of the Unit 1 AFWS pumps for the unlikely event that a tornado missile penetrates the top of the Unit 1 CST and destroys that source of water. The connection for Unit 1 is of sufficiently high elevation up the Unit 2 tank to assure an adequate condensate supply for Unit 1 (150,400 gal.), while providing Unit 2 with a sufficient quantity (150,400 gal.) to safely shutdown also, assuming a hypothetical loss of the Unit 1 CST to a tornado missile.

3. The Unit 2 CST inter

-tie is required only in the event that a tornado missile somehow penetrates the top of the Unit 1 CST (which is protected on all sides by a 2

-foot thick concrete tornado missile barrier to a height of 30 feet) and penetrates through the CST water and penetrates the CST tank wall. This scenario is highly unlikely.

4. General Design Criterion 19, as related to the design capability of system instrumentation and controls for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor and potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown. 4. Adequate instrumentation and controls are provided to assure the plant is brought to a hot standby condition and subsequent cold shutdown during both normal operation and under accident conditions, including a LOCA. The control of AFWS flow and SG level is accomplished by control room operated valves; however, local control stations are also provided, instrumentation is also provided at the remote Hot Shutdown Panel, as indicated at Subsection 7.4.1.8, which provided capability for a prompt hot shutdown and capability for subsequent cold shutdown using appropriate procedures.

4. The augmented AFWS will be designed such that an Automatic Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS) automatically starts all three AFWS pumps and opens the valves for both trains to both SGs. In the event of a Main Feedwater line rupture, or an AFWS line break, the AFAS will automatically isolate the affected SG and will automatically feed to the intact SG(s).

UNIT 1 10.5-12a Amendment No. 27 (04/15)

TABLE 10.5-3 (Continued) 8.Regulatory Guide 1.26, as related in the quality group classification of system components.

8.The AFWS is designed Quality Group C in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.26.

8.These port ions of the AFWS connected to the Main Feedwater line are Quality Group B to the isolation valve(s).9.Regulatory Guide 1.29, as related in the seismic design classification of system components.

9.The AFWS is designated seismic Category I in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29.

10.Regulatory Guide 1.62, as related to design provisions made for manual initiation of each protective action.

10.The AFWS will meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.62. The operator may manually initiate the Automa tic water Actuation Signal (AFAS) from an easily accessible location in the control room.

Manual initiation ensures that protective action goes to completion.

11.Regulatory Guide 1.102, as restructures, systems, and components important to safety from the effects of flooding.

11.All AFWS components are located above the maximum probable flood level.

12.Regulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the protection of structures, systems and components important to safety from the effects of tornado missiles.12.The AFWS is protected from the effects of tornado missiles as described in item 2 and in the Safety Evaluation.

12.See position of 2 SRP 10.4.9 above.13.Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1 and MEB 3-1, as related to breaks in high and moderate energ y piping systems outside containment.

13.The SL-1 AFWS was not categorized or licensed as a high-energy system; nonetheless the AFWS meets these criteria.

13.See position 5 of BTP ASB 10-1, which is part of this Table.

14. Branch Technical Positions ASB 10-1, as related to auxiliary feedwater pump drive and power supply diversity

.14.The augmented AFWS will have the turbine-driven train wholly independent of ac power.

14.Refer to lineup given for BTP ASB 10-1, which is part of this Table.10.5-12c Amendment No. 17 (10/99)

TABLE 10.5-3 (Continued) 1.The auxiliary feedwater system should consist of at least two full-capacity, independent systems that include diverse power sources.

1.The Auxilia ry Feedwater System (AFWS) consists of two full-capacity motor-operated pumps in one train and another redundant full-capacity turbine driven pump in the other system. One system is ac powered and the other is steam/dc power.

1.The augmented AFWS will po wer the steam inlet valves and AFW turbine pump flowpath outlet valves by dc power, thus being independent of ac power.

2.Other powered components of the auxiliary feedwater system should also use the concept of separate and multiple sources of motive en ergy. An example of the required diversity would be two separate auxiliary feedwater trains, each capable of removing the afterheat load of the reactor system, having one separate train powered from either of two ac sources and the other train wholly powe red by steam and dc electric power.

2.The motor driven system (pumps, valves) is powered by the ac system whereas the turbine driven system (pumps, valves) will be wholly powered by the dc system and steam.

Either train provides sufficient capability of cooling the RCS to the temperature and pressure required for initiation of shutdown cooling.

2.Analyses performed by the reactor vendor demonstrate that one motor driven pump, with an installed capacity of over 350 gpm, is capable of removing reactor deca y heat.3.The piping arrangement, both intake and discharge, for each train should be designed to permit the pumps to supply feedwater to any combination of steam generators. This arrangement should take into account pipe failure, active component failu re, power supply failure, or control system failure that could prevent system function. One arrangement that would be acceptable is crossover piping containing valves that can be operated by remote control from the control room, using the power diversity principle for the valve operators and actuation systems.

3.The piping arrangement, both intake and discharge, permits feedwater to any combination of SGs. SL-1 uses the crossover piping scheme, so as to withstand single active component failure, where th e flow path will be arranged by remote control from the control room which will use the power diversity principle. Local control provisions enable system function upon loss of control failure. For power supply failure the design will provide diversity by having ac powered and dc/steam powered trains.

Additionally, upon loss of offsite power, ac power is supplied by the diesel generators

.3.Power diversity is arranged such that motor-driven AFWS train "A" is powered by ac safety bus "SA" which is automat ically loaded on diesel generator 1A; the similar train "B" is on bus "SB" and loaded on DG 1B. The turbine-driven pump 1C is on dc swing bus "AB" and can be aligned to either "SA" or "SB". The augmented AFWS will have dc power to all valves is the turbi ne-driven flow path. Pipe failure of the AFWS is addressed in position 5 below.

10.5-12d Amendment No. 17 (10/99)

Table 10.5-4 Plant Initial Conditions for Loss of Feedwater Analysis With Degraded Auxiliary Feedwater Flow (Offsite Power Available)

Parameter Value Core Power 3 029.06 MWt Core Inlet Temperature 55 1 F Pressurizer Pressure 2250 psia Pressurizer Liquid Level 65.6% Reactor Vessel Flow Rate 410 , 922 gpm Moderator Temperature Coefficient

+2.0 pcm/ F Doppler Coefficient

-0.80 pcm/ F Steam Generator Pressure 851 psia Steam Generator Liquid Level 64.9% Narrow Range Steam Generator Secondary Total Mass Inventory 12 7 , 000 lbm Main Steam Flow 1 3.26 x 10 6 lbm/hr Steam Generator Blowdown Flow 120 gpm each Auxiliary Feedwater Temperature 111.5 F Total RCS Pump Heat 14.6 MWt

UNIT 1 10.5-13 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

Table 10.5-6 Plant Initial Conditions for Loss-of-Feedwater With No AFW PARAMETER VALUE Core Power 3029.06 MWt

Core Inlet Temperature 551 oF Pressurizer Pressure 2250 psia Pressurizer Liquid Level 65.6%

Primary System Loop Flow Rate 410,922 gpm Moderator Temperature Coefficient

+2.0 PCM/oF Doppler Coefficient -0.8 PCM/oF Steam Generator Pressure 850 psia Steam Generator Liquid Level 6 4.9% Narrow Range Steam Generator Secondary Mass Inventory 127, 000 lbm Auxiliary Feedwater Temperature 111.5 oF* Reactor Coolant Pump Heat (4 pumps) 14.6 MWt Steam Generator Blowdown Flow 120 gpm per SG

• AFW is not initiated.

UNIT 1 10.5-15 Amendment No. 2 7A (01/16)

TABLE 10.5-9 Sequence of Events for Feedwater Line Break (Heat-Up Analysis) Offsite Power Available Case Time (s) Event 0 Double-ended guillotine break of MFW nozzl e occurred, resulting in assumed instantaneous loss of MFW to both SGs 7.8 Trip signal on low steam generator level 8.7 Reactor trippe d 372 Auxiliary feedw ater to intact S G began 9 09 A ll RCPs trippe d by operato r 26 10 AFW heat remo val matched core decay heat and peak RCS temperature occurred; subcooling as 7°F 4 000 Calculation termi n ated

TABLE 10.5-10 Sequence of Events for Feedwater Line Break (Heat-Up Analysis) Loss of Offsite Power Case Time (s) Event 0 Double-ended guillotine break of MFW nozzle occurred, resulting in assumed instantaneous loss of MFW to both SG s 7.8 Trip signal on low steam generator leve l 8.7 Reactor tripped, all RCPs tripped on loss of offsite powe r 3 7 1 Auxiliary feedwater to intact S G bega n 2408 AFW heat removal matched core decay heat and peak RCS temperature occurred; subcooling a s 34°F 3000 Calculation terminated

UNIT 1 10.5-16b Amendment No. 2 7A (01/16)

OUTSIDE CONT AI NMENT I NSIDE CONTA I NME NT b ,------------!

L.0. _ (AFAS 1) 1-MV-0 9-07 l-MV-09-0 80 MAIN FEE D WATER (RTGB-1 02) MAIN F EEDWATE R (RTGB-1 0 2) Fl-09-2 A --T -----F E UR-09-1 -_: Fl-09-2( --T----: -FE R-09-2C @---: (PAP A) (PAP B) l.C. TO UN IT 2 AFW z L.0. 1-M V-08-13 ** Z Lo . l-M V-08-03 ' (D C) ST EA M T UR BINE AUX. FE ED PUM P (RTGB-10 2) FE -'----r --@ Fl-09-2 8 : _ -- UR-0 9-3 (PA P B} Note: Ch eck v alve in te r nals re mo ved. Plant procedu r es p revent i nadvertent drain i ng of Unit 2 CST to Unit 1 CST. FL ORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY S T. L UCI E PLANT UNI T 1 AUXILLIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM SCHEMATIC FIGURE 10.5-2 Amendm e nt No. 28 (05/17)

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYSCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 125V DC BATTERY SYSTEMAmendment 15 , (1/97)

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_....... == 0 ...... LL. LL. < c w w Q a:: ::)* < VI* a:: "' CJ w w a: c 0. -a: s: w 0 N -...... a: LL. ::) a: ""* w "' I-w < a: == CL. c w w LL. LL. 0 "" "' 0 ...... 0 0 0 ('1') CIJ i... :::l V'l Vl <lJ i... 0... ...... CIJ N "i:: :::l Vl Vl <lJ ..... 0... I 0 0 0 0 I.Ii 0 N N 0 0 Lt") ..... 0 0 0 .--0 0 0 0 ..-0 0 0 ....... 0 0 ..... 0 ...-aJ nssaJd J azp nssaJd FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLO W (DEGRADED AFW F LOW) FIGURE 10.5-7 -Vl .._. Q) E ;;:;: Amendment No. 27A (01/16) i 0 .... LL LL c c w 0 \I') ;=: \!1 ow .... 0 LI. -Q. Oo 0 ..... .... LI. "" a: uw a: f-; c w w LI. LL 0 \I') Vt 0 .... 0 0 0 0 \0 N N ........ .-<( a:J <( CD .-.-N N 0.. 0. 0. 0.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...J _J ...J ...J 0 00 I I I I . I : I 0 0 0 0 1' 00 I 0 0 0 0 ........ 0 0 0 ........ 0 0 0 ...--........ FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 RCS LOOP FLOWS LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-8 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

O* ... u. 0

: LLI Vl z LLI o. z 0 u 0 ..... a.. :E ::> c *-:= g u. := u. c( c LLI c <( a:: CJ LLI c -:= 0 ... I.I. = LLI ..... <( ;: c LI.I LLI I.I. I.I. 0 v. 0 ...I a 0 0 M 0 w.. (]) > . ('Cl > Q. E ::::::i Cl I 0 0 l() N a a a 0 0 0 0 10 0 N .-.-(:Ja$/Wql) a4eH aA l e/\ dwno a 0 LO a a a 0 a ..-0 a a -VI -(LI 0 E 0 i= ..-a ..-

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 DUMP TO CONDENSER FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-9 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

I I ' I 0 0 ,_ -0 0 --0 .... LI. 3: LI. cC -3: ' 0 c "' 0 0 ,_. V) -0 w I ...... ..J c

• u.. c:( a: I-a: w " z UJ w c ........ c -Vi ;: -z QJ 0 0 0 E .... ._ -0 f.= v LI. -0 0: .... w .... < < << 3: . a. Q > a:. UJ w LI. 0 LI. r' ...... 0 " V\ ui 0 ...I I I ' I ...... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V1 v r'f) N .--

I)

MOl:::t aAll?A ssed,{9 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 BYPASS TO CONDENSER FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-10 Amendment No. 27A (01/16) i 0 .... u. 3C u. LU c( a: c ::> w "' 0 vi .,,,, LU...._ cc: cc: c.. cc c o-== ....... 0 cc .... u. LU CC: CJ LU :E ca: =:::.. w t-c "' Hi u. u. 0 Ul "' 0 .... 0 LI) N .--................

..............

0 0 0 .--.--N I I l? l? V) V) I i ---..... ........ 0 0 0 0 .-0 0 0 -(e!sd) a.mssaJd Jo:ieJaua9 weais FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-11 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

I i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N ----...........

_ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 \0 ..... . ..__ ...........

0 0 0 0 0 N 0 0 0 0 .--0 0 0 ..-. 0 0 ..... F 0 .--(qi) sse1AJ p!nbn Jo+eJaua9 wea+s FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR LIQUID MASS LOSS OF F EE DWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-12 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

I . I . " I ,.... N I I l? l? V") V") I i

• I I 0 0 -0 0 0 0 -0 ..... L--------------------------------. -. I I I 0 0 0 0 0 I.I) 0 lf) M N N ..... -0 ..... ! I ..... 0 0 0 0 lf) ...... FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-13 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

-0 N I ' co r--I I I I I 0 0 _o 0 , ............................

iiiiliii9.

_iiiiiiia_tiiiiiil_iiiiiii9:

_____ iiiiiiiiii>_iiiiiiim_miiliil

• til 0

• 0 I -o .-* ' ' ' ' \0 N 0 t""""" ,...-........ .-I co ' .-\0 ..;t N 0 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 STEAM GENERATOR SLOWDOWN FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-14 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

-3t 0 ...I u. s: s: Oc ...I UJ u. c > <C V) a: V) " :i w a: c Si <C 0 a: ...I w LL. z a: UJ .... UJ " <C ..::; == < c**. UJ I-w V\ t! LL. 0 V\ V) 9 0 0 co 0 0 0 0 IC 0 0 N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 r-'" -I/) -(I) o E F 0 MOl:J ASSlN FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 STEAM GENERA TOR MSSV FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-15 Amendment No. 27A (01/16) c -O'l i: ,_ 0 ::e: ....... O'l LL. c s: 0 0 u.. u c .D :::I Q V'l LU O'l z Q Q) -< _J "' +-' a: 0 a: " I < LU I :e c "' -3: z -0 ....... 0 ....... LL. 0 er: u LU co !;: ::> "' 3: Q LU LU LL. LL. 0 VI 0 ....... 0 0 0 0 ..-0 0 0 ..-,...--.., I/) -.._.,. QJ 0 E 0 t= ..-0 ..-t:i 6aa) 6u1100) qns 6a1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SUBCOOLING MARGIN LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-16 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

-s: 0 .... u.. 3: LL < Vl c I-ffi < z a: Q. w :e e 0 3t UO i: .... ... u.. > a: -**1 I--u l-e( < LU 3: a: c w w u.. u.. 0 ..,, Vl 0 .... 0 N. I

• I * ' I I

• I ' ' I ' * ' 0 0 * -------,---0 N I . *---.. ---.. -----*------.. 0 00 I 0 0 -I 0 0 0 0 0 0 a r-($)

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PL A NT UNIT 1 REACTIVITY COM P ON E NTS LO SS OF F EE D WATER FL OW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) F IGURE 10.5-17 Am e ndment No. 27A (01/16)

I -. -3t 0 ...I u.. :: LL. -cs: :: c -LU 0 c . ...;.t <C u.. er: > C:J <C w a:: c -"' 3t a:: 0 w N ...I --u.. a:: a:: :> w V\ .... V') <C Q) w i: ...... a: l\l Q er: w w 0 LL. u... u.. >-0 0. V\ VI "' 0: 0 N a.. ...I I I 0 0 0 IJ') """ (1') ' I I 0 N ., 0 0 -. 0 0 ...... * -= 0 -0 0 ...... ,....,, V') '"""" Q) 0 E -0 i= r--*<:::::: -0 ...... ..... 0 0 ...... FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER SPRAY FLOW LOSS OF FE E DWATER FLOW (DEGRADED AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-18 Amendment No. 27A (01/16) 0 I . I i 0 ! I \0 0 0 -;: 0 ** ..... u.. = ;: w u.. 0 as: < -0 0 0 a. z = -4 0 == I-0 v ..... -< u.. 0 Vl -w = Cl) = w E c ..... i= w 0 I-;= ct v c ... w o_ 0 c w 0 z u.. N -u.. 0 4 ' V1 V1 0 ..... 0 l I i ! I 0 -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N 0 00 \0 ""1" N ...... (dltJ %) .JaMOd FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 INDICATED REACTOR POWER LOSS OF FEEDWATER F LOW (NO AFW FL OW) FIGURE 10.5-19 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

-w 3: a:: 0 ::> .... l-LL. < == a:: w LL. 0.. < :2 0 w z l--I-== z 0 < .... ..... LL. 0 a:: 0 w u I-ui < u 3: a:: 0 0 w w w l-LL. < LL. u 0 ... c ui z ui 0 ...I 0 .--...--.....-..-...-...--.--.--.--.----.--....-.--.--.-

.........

_,..__,._,,.__,___,___,___,,...._,_...., 0 0 0 r-... 0 LI) \0 0 0 \() 0 .I; I-tj) > <( '"'O (LI ....... ro u :.a c -t -0 0 r-: tj) > <( '"'O w ..... ro u :.a c: -I * ! ' ., > "' I-tj) > <( '"'O (I) ....... 1n u :.a c -* + I 0 l.t) l.t) '° 0 0 -V) . .._, (LI E f= 0 0 N 0 0 0 0 I,{) LI) FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 INDICATED RCS COOLANT TEMPERATURE L OSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FL OW) FIGURE 10.5-20 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

-3: 0 ...... LI.. 3: LI.. ..J 0 w > z -w == ...... er:: 0 w ..J N LI.. -0:: er:: :::> w I/) I-I/)* w == cr:: c.. c w w LI.. LI.. 0 I/) I/) 0 ..J 0 0 <<::t' ,...._ VI -(]) E i= 0 0 "" (u e ds %) 1aAa1 p1nb11 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PL ANT UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER LEVEL LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-21 Amendment No. 27A (01/16) 0 0 I,/') N 0 0 0 ..-0 0 "° 0 0 0 0 N 0 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-22 Amendment No. 27A (01/16) i 0 ...I LL. ;: LL. c:C "' 0 ;: !. 0 ;: ...I 0 LL. a. ii 0 a: Ow v:. v 3: a: Q w w u. u. 0 U") V\ 0 ...I 0 0 0 IJ1 ....-0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 'i:::t ('/"\ N ....-.-,.... 0 0 0 0 0 0 '("!""'" 0 ....-<( co <( co .--....., N N 0.. 0.. 0.. 0.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 __J .....J __J. __J r r 0 0 0 O'\ . ... I I I 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 f'.., "° 0 0 0 IJ"I 0 0 \D 0 0 'i:::t 0 0 N 0 (Jast1ql) elE'H MOid ssew FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 RCS LOOP FLOWS LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-23 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

-3: 0 ...I u.. 3: Ocs: it 0 er:: z w-V) == Zo w ...I Q u.. z er:: Ow u .... a. c ::> u. cu.. 0 V) V) g 0 0 0 M t 0 0 0 0 0 0 IJ") '0 1.11 N N 0 0 0 0 0 IJ") r--0 0 0 l.O 0 0 "'1" 0 0 N 0 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 DUMP TO CONDENSER FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-24 Amendment No. 27A (01/16) 0 ' ' : ' I I I 0 ID I

• s 0 u.. u ClJ -> :: 0 V\ 0 ...I V\ ro u.. 0.. :: >. o:::i 0 u.. t 1* 0 ....I ti( -0 u.. '<:!" a:: 0 w z IJ U') -z :: w 0 Q ...I 4J -z u.. CIJ 0 a:: E u w t= I-0 ti( 1* I-U') VI Q < w -.og Q. w N > u.. a) u.. 0 1* U') VI 0 ...I 4 * ** ( ' ' ' I I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I.I') 0 I/) 0 I.I') 0 I.I') f°' I.I') N 0 f°' I.I') N ...... ....... .-.-(J&S/wql) e+l?B MOl:J 9AIE1/\ ssedJ\g FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 BYPASS TO CONDENSER FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-25 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

,.... N I l l...'J l...'J V'l V1 t f 0 0 0 .-0 0 I,/") (e!sd) ;:unssaJd 0 !J"\ N 0 0 0 oq-0 0 N FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 STEAM GENERA TOR PRESSURE LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-26 Amendment No. 27A (01/16) 0 ...J (/) u.. (/) <( u.. :i <( 5!o :>Z ::i a=O ...J 0 u.. I-* <( c:: c:: w z<C e>C :i U.l w u.. lno (/) (/) 0 ...J 0 0 0 t t 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N 0 00 ..... 0 ..,...... Cu ql} ssew 0 0 0 0 \0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 q-N 0 0 0 N 0 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PL A NT UNI T 1 STE AM GENE RAT OR LIQUID MASS LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGU RE 10.5-27 Am e ndment No. 27A (01/16) 0 I I I I 0 \0 0 --0 I.I') .........

.-N $ I I 0 l? l? LL.. Vl Vl 0 $; ._ I I -0 LL.. I "'t" :s: <( I 0 0 -Z u...-.... $ 0 re-$ i: 0 3 "O Q) Q) Q) ..... ,_ -0 E Q) ttl M u... ?; >-"O ..... Q) Q) :-= u... x-::i re <e: E ..... 0 0 z ,_ -0 ..... N 0 II'> ti! 0 ......l 0 ,_ -0 ..... l I I I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ll'l "'t" ('('} N ..... ()as;wql) all?tf MOl:J J aleMpaa:i A-lenixny FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 AUXILIARY FEED WAT ER FLO W LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLO W (NO AFW FLO W) FIGURE 10.5-28 Amendment No. 26 (11/13) 0 N .-N I I t9 t9 Vl Vl t T .............

-... -.................

.. *--*--**-**

r..t') 0 ..... 0 0 0 "i.'f' 0 0 N 0 (:>as/u ql) a1eci MOl.::J ssew UMOpMOIS FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 STEAM GENERA TOR SLOWDOWN FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-29 Amendment No. 27A (01/16)

-3: 0 ..... LL ::: u. <C z -0 CJ z a: -< ::: :E 0 ..... z u. ..... a:: 0 w I-0 <( u == m :::> Q V') w w LL LL 0 V) "' 0 ..... a N c O'l ,_ (ti 2 O'l c -0 0 v ..Q ::s Vl O'l (lJ .....I +"" 0 I t 0 0 0 N 0 0 0 '° 0 0 o::t* 0 0 N 0 -Vl ........ (l) 6 t=: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SUBCOOLING MARGIN LOSS OF FEE DWAT ER FL OW (NO AFW F LOW) FIGURE 10.5-31 Amendment No. 27A (01/16 i 0 .... u.. U1 ;:: .. u.. < wO zz c.. ;:: :E 0 0 .... u u.. > a: t-w -t-> < -3: ti Q <w WW a: u.. u.. 0 U1 "' 0 .... 0 \0 I -0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I I r i I I !'::. i + I r t d : I I r r t t I + : I I

• I *

• I ; : I j I 0 0 ""' 0 -o N ------------------,-------, -----0 q 0 c:) N l I ($) Al!A!Pt?atf

,.... q 0 0 \0 cri 0 I I T'""" I FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 REACTIVITY COMPONENTS LOSS OF FEE DWAT ER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) F IGURE 10.5-32 Amendment 27A (01/16) 0 I I ' ' 0 \0 -!; it 0 0 u.. >.. ..J ttz LI. a. it I.I') it 0:: LI. N 0 0 cC -0... -0 ..J 0 T <<:l" LL. z > . .__. cC it a:: Q. 0 .........

..J Vi V'l .__, LL. QJ a:: a: E w N w ........ ..... a: ; :::> V'l V'l c w w 0 a: w --0 Q. LL. N LL. 0 V'l V'l 0 ..J 4. I I ' ' 0 0 0 0 0 0 l/') <<:l" C'l"'l N .--(:>as/u ql) oll?bl MOI;:{ ..\eJdS ..1azpnssaJd FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER SPRAY FLOW LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW (NO AFW FLOW) FIGURE 10.5-33 Amendment No. 27A (01/16) 0 "Tl "Tl

--10m m --i m "Tl -u r O c; om:2: c ::2: G') :t> AJ m --i --i ::J m ;::omm Cl. ..... :t> s: ::::0 3 o <-ur CD * "'-' m -::J 01 ....... ::::0 z ...... w r=:x:-m .i:o. J> --i OJ OJ c ::::0 r ::::0 m m m :t> ()en;;;>\

,..-.... :t> o en m ...... 0 ::::0 cnol :-1 :t> r -u cO Q ::2: I mm "'O ::::0 r Ro l>r z---i G') CI z --i -i 0 ..... s: "'U )> z -< 680 670 660 650 640 -M-630 -(1.1 lo.. ::::l +.-620 ro ..... (1.1 0. E 610 (I) !-600 590 580 570 560 ll 0 FEEDWATER LINE BREAK HOT LEG TEMPERATURES (OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE CASE) .....

/--* r11../ / / // // l' /' / I l ... / ,/' -* 500 1000 -+-Saturation

• • • • • • • • • HL-1 (faulted)

--+--HL-2 1500 Tlme(s) 2000 2500 3000 r 0 en I Tl cnom 0-i m -n Tl rm 2 -o < G> Tl G) )> )> c Tl -I -I 3 :::o cnmm <D m::is::::o ....... m iJ r 3 ?-um z m Cf'o:::Om ;a. z m c ;:::o o ;:o ;:o m . )>

)> (/) -m 0 _. Tl r 0 ;:o (/) 0 ;-i )> r iJ cO iii m "'O ;:o r Qo l>r z-i G) CI z-i i Q ....... s: "U )> z -< FE.EDWATER LINE BI REAK HOT LE.G TEMPERATURES (LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER CASE) 680 ...---....---.,.---..,,------..,---..,.--_,..--_,.--...,.--

--r-----r--

---s 670 660 650 640 f 630 -:,., 620 .... w 0. E 610 w I-600 590 580 570 .............

-........ -*-*-*-*-* ,,,,...,,.*. --*--**-, ------/\ /. -*----. ' . . . .w------/ -I '-/ ______ _.. '" e-Saturation

• • • • • • • • • HL-1 (faulted) . I t ' 'l I I I I I I . I --+--HL-2 ./ "

o 500 1 000 1500 2000 2500 3000 _. -9 T im e(s)

APPENDIX 10A ANALYSIS OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES

NOTE: Appendix 10A has been retained for historical information. The system was re-analyzed for stretch power and the rupture discs have been replaced by 600 psia rupture discs to increase fatigue life and decrease impact force.

For EPU, the MSIVs were modified to reduce the disc impact velocity and increase the fatigue life due to the decreased impact force. The MSIV modification replaced each air driven actuator with a gas/hydraulic unit capable of a relatively constant spindle velocity, replaced the MSIV spindle, the MSIV H-Link and pins, MSIV rockshaft bearings, the MSIV tail link, and MSIV disc. The MSIV modification also replaced the MSIV cover with a more robust cover to maintain the pressure boundary integrity following a spurious closure.

10A-i Amendment No. 26 (11/13)

TABLE OF CONTENTS APPENDIX 10A

Section Page I INTRODUCTION 10A-1 II GENERAL DESCRIPTION 10A-2 A. PURPOSE 10A-2 B. RESULTS 10A-2 III ANALYSIS 10A-5 A. VELOCITY CALCULATIONS 10A-5 1. Velocity Calculations - Spurious Signal 10A-5 2. Velocity Calculations - Rupture 10A-9 B. COMPUTER MODELING 10A-9 1. Valve Body, Seat and Disc 10A-9 2. Tail Link 10A-12 3. Rockshaft 10A-13 C. AIR CYLINDER 10A-14 1. Air Cylinder 10A-14 2. Linkages - Piston to Tail Link 10A-14

10A-ii TABLE OF CONTENTSAPPENDIX 10ASection PageIINTRODUCTION 10A-1IIGENERAL DESCRIPTION 10A-2A.PURPOSE10A-2B.RESULTS10A-2IIIANALYSIS10A-5A.VELOCITY CALCULATIONS10A-51.Velocity Calculations - Spurious Signal10A-52.Velocity Calculations - Rupture10A-9B.COMPUTER MODELING 10A-91.Valve Body, Seat and Disc10A-92.Tail Link10A-123.Rockshaft10A-13C.AIR CYLINDER 10A-141.Air Cylinder10A-142.Linkages - Piston to Tail Link10A-1410A-ii

(1)

)

TABLE 10A-7AGEOMETRICAL AND MATERIAL PROPERTIES OF THE ROCKSHAFT ELEMENTSRockshaft-Elements 1 through 5E, psi 27E6!y, ksi 150S, psi 0.1 EBearing Surface-Elements 6 through 9See Table 10A-5Tail Link - Elements 10 through 12E, psi 27E6!y, ksi 28.1S, psi 0.0 ESleeve - Elements 13 through 15E, psi 27E6!y, ksi62S, psi 0.0 EMass Center - Node 13 MSIV1/2 wt, lbs.

461Displacement, inches 0.339Time displacement, sec.045 MSCV1/2 wt- lbs 431displacement, inches 0.206time of displacement, secs

.0293410A-31 TABLE 10A-8 ROCKSHAFT AND TAILLINK SLEEVES - COMBINED EFFECTS OF PRE AND POST IMPACTElementElement Node Node Post Imp Rockshaft Pre Imp.Post Imp.Pre Imp.Post Imp.E p (%)E t (%)E p + E t (%)E u (%)MSIV 1 1 2 2 1.6375 0.352 1.9395 14.0 MSCV 1 2 1 2 0.6797 0.89 1.5697 14.0 Fail Link Sleeve MSIV 15 26 10 153.29951.11404.4135 15.0 MSCV 15 26 10 15 1.490.2871.779 15.0 10A-32

FLORIDA POWER /l. LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT 1 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE FIGURE lOA-1 8770 -M-268 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT 1 NEW CISC FOR MSIV FIGURE lOA-2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UHIT I NEW SEAT F::>R MSI V AND MSCV FIGURE lOA-3

1'1J ano -M-261 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT 1 ROCKSHAFT FOR MSIV AND MISCV FIGURE 1 OA-4 8770 -M-256 FLORIDA POWER /. LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLA.HT UHIT 1 I MSIV SECTIONS AND DETAILS FIGURE lOA-5 8770 -M*269 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT 1 NEW DISC FOR MSCV FIGURE lOA-6 8770 -M-264 FLORIDA POWER II LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT 1 NEW T All LINK FOR MSIV FIGURE IOA-7

' 'I llJj 8770 -M-265 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UHIT 1 NEW TAIL LINK FOR MSCV FIGURE lOA-8

• *

• 8770 -M-267 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 MSIV AND MSCV STUDS FIGURE lOA-9

• *

• FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SYSTEM FREE BODY DIAGRAM FIGURE lOA-10

• *

• FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 MEOiANICAL MODELS FOR VELOCITY CALCULATIONS FIGURE lOA-11 Ci w .........

... ... iJ 0 ... ... > w > ... -c > 19 18 17 16 15 " 13 12 II 10 0

.......

........

0.0 D.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 O.lll 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.42 U4 0.46 0.48 0.5 TIME FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 MSI V SPURIOUS SIGNAL VELOCITY FIGURE lOA-12 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 u w 100 I-II.. >-90 I-0 0 80 ..I w > 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 6 I I 8 10 12 14 16 ISOLATION VALVE 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 TIME (Mrseq FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UHIT 1 MSCV RUPTURE VELOCITY PROFILE FIGURE lOA-13 "6ii ELI IA.l!i 2!4:.+ 30.S:: l!i'-t.Ei

+At... .... ... "' " .D FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT 1 FINITE ELEMENT MESH FOR AXISYMMETRIC VALVE BODY FOR REGIOl'l 0, ri FIGURE IOA-14 22 20 ,I 19 17 *' 16 l.'t-*' f\. I 12 *'* l.l. . 9 ,H . L,U .L,:>. .!1 * .1. *-r.c r-r ..... .:. .LU.i!'i \I I EXISTING CARBO ,,,._STEEL DISC \I \I \1 \I I I S/S DISC I f-t1 -/-Kl VJ IHSER r""-'> FIGUR \ I -J HEW SIS SEAT * .,. ::1 :3_9 .:::>..:::>.

H ERT TOH E IOA-14 .CJ FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 FINI TE EL EME'lT MESH OF DISC, SEAT AND VALVE BODY FIGURE 1 OA-15 l.S:. 1 H:s 13. '+-7 I'\ '+-9 '+-!! s:o 13. 1:2. 1:2. 11.. l.l.. I :rw :tlf S:l. S::2 S:3 S:'+-s:s: S:6 S:7 S:I! S:9 60 61. 6:2 63 6'+-6S: 66 t:.7 61! 69 70 71. 7:2 73 7'+-SLIP AND GAP 7S: 76 17 71! 79 l!O l'!!!l'.l.

1'!!!1:2 1'!!!13 A& ELEMENTS as:I 1'!!!161 1'!!!171 i!l'!!!ll 1!91 901 91.I 9:21 93 9'+-1 9S:I 961 971 91'!!!1 l.6 l. WELD/NONWELD OISCONTINUETIES (GAPS) I:2.'f --12;9 l..3.'t l..3.i!!!i l..'t.3 l..'t.i!!!i l..S:.2 16.2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANl UNIT I FINITE ELEMENT MESH OF SEAT AREA FIGURE IOA*l6 cs $! .,. z ::c Di: I-"' Q w N :i < Di: w z w C> .or I i .o+a

/_..,--* **-// / _ .. -** ____ ,., ... ,.,.--

---/ / /J ,/ D ,J. .

l ,/ ' , / /

f" _,,,,.---1 /

I / ,., I ,..y.* . I / // , . .

i I /...-: / / I //

/

/ ,/;. I /I ,* / ,// )"" ! },/ / , .02ro ;J .1 / I (/(!/

I I/) f 1 UJI .a"f',f /'

/// _,.., .. 1. PRINTOUT SHOWS MAXIMUM STRAIN OH ELEMEtlT 46 TO BE 10.9 PERCENT AT .00073 SEC t *--

___ .._.

I I l S:l!'l '+6 S:f! S::2 S:'t 0.0 I .000086 .000172 .000258 .000344 .00043 TIME (SEC) FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT 1 GENERALIZED STRAIN FOR RUPTURE CASE POST IMPACT FIGURE lOA-17

.,. z :cc IX .... .,, 0 w N :::i < IX w z w " r.l a a .a / ,./ *' ,/ / /" / _,/ I / /// .!"..;::::.-'

..

/ .*:/ I ,.r; I ,/ / ,./ ....... / ,./_, ...... -/ l i-** I J ;* ;' / ,. / ,.:l' . *' r;,,..., *" / 1. PRINTOUT SHOWS MAXIMUM STRAIN OH ELEMENT 50 TO BE 11.8 PERCENT AT .00083 SEC 2. PRINTOUT SHOWS MAXIMUM STRAltl OH ELEMENT 47 TO BE 10.7 P ERCEHT AT .00083 SEC S:CI 71f-4f 61!5 1'C1

......

.......

...... -0.0 .000086 .000172 .000258 .000344 .00043 TIME (SEC) FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PUNT UNIT 1 GENERALIZED STRAIN FOR RUPTURE CASE -POST IMPACT FIGURE lOA-18

.ir;:o I t .l.iD + z < "" I-,O"tS: "' 0 w N :::; <( "" .CdaO w z w Cl 0.0 .000086

/ /

---,,./_....

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// . ,,,,.,;. :;:..--as: 91 93 .000172 .000258 .000344 .00043 TIME (SEC) FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLAHT UHIT I GENERALI ZED SlRAIN FOR RUPTURE CASE -POST IMPACT FIGURE lOA-19

.l.!fO +

I .l.+S: I 0 t g *I* :z: '.;( IX I .... ' "' .D"tS: Cl I w N :::; I < IX w .cic :z: w Cl I I .cits: .C3C .Cl.S: o.o .000086 .000172 .000258 TIME (SEC) 1.0T l.CE l.l.2 .000344 .00043 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UHIT l GENERALIZED STRAIN FOR RUPTURE CASE -POST IMPACT FIGURE lOA-20

.0025:0 .OC.E2S: .DCEDC JJDr 0 I \ (\ ::= .oc* s:o .,. :z; < Ill: I-.,, .DD Cl w N I I I J II '\ \ U I \ :::i < Ill: w :z; w Cl I V JIJ

/II/ \ \ 0.0 .000086 .000172 (I \ \ I I r\/ \\ I,,...........

\ I JI v .000258 .000344 TIME (SEC) 'l ""'""' .00043 s:o 613 70 72 7'+ FLORIDA POWER & L GHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UHIT 1 GENERALIZED STRAIN FOR SPURIOUS SIGNAL -POST IMPACT FIGURE lOA-21 0 g *I* :z 13' ... "' Q w N :::; < 13' w :z w C> .OD'tOD .001560 .DD:EDO 0.0 .000086 .000172 BS: ,,, '\ *-89 .000258 .000344 .00043 TIME (SEC) FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE UHIT 1 GENERALIZED STRAIN FOR SPURIOUS SIGNAL -PO!T IMP ACT FIGURE lOA-22

• I* :z :c "' ... .,, 0 w N :'.'.j o= w :z: w Cl .iJC:i56D

.001520 .rxJrD .rn:::::E'tD .DC16D r,r, .1-'L-l 0.0 / \ ,I \ I \ I \ .000086 .000172 TIME (SEC) I \ I JI \ '\ \ .000258 .0003<< / l .00043 l0::3 ll2 llD lDS: 107 FLORIDA POWER &

COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLi.HT UHIT 1 GENERALIZED STRAIN FOR SPURIOUS SIGNAL -POST IMPACT FIGURE lOA-23 0.145833' 0.270833' O

• ELEMENT

• NODE NUMBERS 0.208333' 0.270833' ROCKSHAFT BEAM z 18 ay=: ') \:::J v::.;;

.. x ,, rti\

... Z2 0.4479' @ 1.0833' 241 @ FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PUHT UHIT 1 PLAST

-'ASIV RUPTURE CASE -POST IMPACT FIGURE lOA-24

• *

• 4 1/2" 4 3/8" . * . * . . . . . /@ . * . . . . . . .. @ . . . . * . . ..... . . . ------------L---

---

.---@ '@ FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 MSIV -PLAST MODEL GRAPHIC FIGURE 1 OA-25

• *

• 15 V19 = 537.28 ------21 v21 = 1199.44 --------22 v22 = 1461.78 -----------

23, 24 V23 = V24,., 1999.068 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 MSIV -VELOCITY PROFILE ON-SEC) FIGURE lOA-26 0.145833'

\ 0.270833' 0

• ELEMENT NUMBERS

• NOOE NUMBERS I .,, 0.145833' 0.270833 'Z 11 ..... *........-

',..... ....... ::>' "A u \;;.I .. x 22' , 'o' I 0.46614' **1. '* 'f "'

• \< FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 PLAST MODEL -MSCV RUPTURE CASE POST IMPACT FIGURE 10-'-27 r '

15 V19*464.134 r---....... -e24 V24 .. 748.01 1------1...,.20 V20c 918.049 1-------... 21 V21=1371.964 1---------

.........

22,23 V22 = V23 = 2137.068 '---------------

.........

25 V25 = 3526.125 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 MSCV -VELOCITY PROFILE (IN-SEC) FIGURE l OA-28 I a.25" i1.1s" I 2.5* I 2.s" I 2.5.. I .. *1* )1C tC _.,., ._ jA '© M [V(t)J 2 R L ' ; SECTION A-A ROCK SHAFT SLEEVE TAIL LINK FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UHIT 1 ROCKSHAFT RJPTURE CASE -PRE-IMPACT FIGURE lOA-29

• SLIDERS

• CENTER OF MASS

• x FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 MSIV -AIR CYLINDER LINKAGE MODEL FIGURE lOA-30

• * * (*d*)I) OO!i Ml e (S331i!l:l0) 31!lMY 0 I 0 0 ;; 0 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UHIT 1 RUPTURE CASE MSIV VALVE OPENING ANGLE AND FORCE ON AIR CYLINDER STEM VERSUS TIME FIGURE 10A*31

• * * -r 5.5" O:A. _l__ 127 ROCKSHAFT -TAIL LINK TAIL LINK END VIEW LOOKING DOWNSTREAM ROCK SHAFT MODEL 91 ISOMETRIC VIEW LOOKING DOWNSTREAM NODE 20 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 VIEWS OF DISK, TAIL LINK AND ROCKSHAFT 3-D FINITE ELEMENT MODEL FIGURE lOA-32

• *

• SEAT VALVE BODY ISOMETRIC LOOKING UPSTREAM*

NODE 210 LUMPED MASS OF VALVE RIGID NOOE 302 ELE. SEAT *DOWNSTREAM WITH RESPECT TO THE BLOW DOWN FLOW . VALVE BODY ISOMETRIC LOOKING DOWNSTREAM*

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 ISOMETRIC VIEWS OF SEAT-VALVE RODY 3--D FINITE EL EM ENT MODEL FIGURE 10A*33 Ill 0 0 -<0 I 1111 .... Q_Z " --n-t Cl c:>* m c: zcn :;:o )>-mm m r:r>r -tm -n 3:: o :r> m > 0 zz l,., -t .i::.. (5<3:: c:r>m ;orcn )>--r-.,, c:o mm "ti '° r-po >r :z --t c:> c: :::i: :z -t -n -t 0 -3:: .,, z -< fi)' w :c t) 2 24.4 22.2 20.0 w 17.8 t-2 0 a: 0 8 15.6 N 13.4 11.2 2 6 3 7 4 8 5 9 *

• 10 14 18 11 15 19 12 16 20 13 17 21 CARBON STEEL DISC EXISTING S/S SEAT J no 2.2 4.4 6.6 8.8 11.0 13.2 15.4 17.6 19.8 R -COORDINATE (INCHES)

Ci) w :i: CJ w I-<I: z Ci a: 0 0 CJ N 14.5 13.9 13.3 12.7 12.1 SLIP AND GAP ELEMENTS 11.4 10.8 10.2 9.6 9.0 11.0 11.6 12.2 12.8 13.4 14.1 14.7 15.3 15.9 16.5 R -COORDINATE (INCHES) FLORIDA POWER & L GHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UMIT 1 FINITE ELEMENT MESH OF SEAT ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION FIGURE