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| {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001November 14, 1995NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 95-52: FIRE ENDURANCE TEST RESULTS FOR ELECTRICALRACEWAY FIRE BARRIER SYSTEMS CONSTRUCTED FROM3M COMPANY INTERAM FIRE BARRIER MATERIALS | | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY |
| | |
| | COMMISSION |
| | |
| | ===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION=== |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 14, 1995 NRC INFORMATION |
| | |
| | NOTICE 95-52: FIRE ENDURANCE |
| | |
| | ===TEST RESULTS FOR ELECTRICAL=== |
| | RACEWAY FIRE BARRIER SYSTEMS CONSTRUCTED |
| | |
| | FROM 3M COMPANY INTERAM FIRE BARRIER MATERIALS |
|
| |
|
| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors. | | All holders of operating |
| | |
| | licenses or construction |
| | |
| | permits for nuclear power reactors. |
|
| |
|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice to inform addressees of the results of recent fire endurance tests forelectrical raceway fire barrier systems constructed from 3M Company Interamfire barrier materials. It is expected that recipients will review theinformation for applicability to their facilities and consider thisinformation, as appropriate, in their review of Interam fire barriers.BackaroundOn April 20, May 17, and July 7, 1995, the NRC staff visited Omega PointLaboratories (OPL), San Antonio, Texas, to witness full-scale fire endurancetests for electrical raceway fire barrier systems constructed from 3M CompanyInteram fire barrier materials. These tests were sponsored by Peak SealsCorporation (Peak Seals). Peak Seals informed the NRC staff that the testspecimens included in this test program were intended to represent genericInteram fire barrier systems and that these test programs were conducted inaccordance with Generic Letter (GL) 86-10, Supplement 1, 'Fire Endurance TestAcceptance Criteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used To Separate Redundant SafeShutdown Trains Within the Same Fire Area." The following information isbased on observations made by the NRC staff who witnessed these fire tests.The NRC staff has not reviewed the test reports. | | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory |
| | |
| | Commission (NRC) is issuing this information |
| | |
| | notice to inform addressees |
| | |
| | of the results of recent fire endurance |
| | |
| | tests for electrical |
| | |
| | raceway fire barrier systems constructed |
| | |
| | from 3M Company Interam fire barrier materials. |
| | |
| | It is expected that recipients |
| | |
| | will review the information |
| | |
| | for applicability |
| | |
| | to their facilities |
| | |
| | and consider this information, as appropriate, in their review of Interam fire barriers.Backaround |
| | |
| | On April 20, May 17, and July 7, 1995, the NRC staff visited Omega Point Laboratories (OPL), San Antonio, Texas, to witness full-scale |
| | |
| | fire endurance tests for electrical |
| | |
| | raceway fire barrier systems constructed |
| | |
| | from 3M Company Interam fire barrier materials. |
| | |
| | These tests were sponsored |
| | |
| | by Peak Seals Corporation (Peak Seals). Peak Seals informed the NRC staff that the test specimens |
| | |
| | included in this test program were intended to represent |
| | |
| | generic Interam fire barrier systems and that these test programs were conducted |
| | |
| | in accordance |
| | |
| | with Generic Letter (GL) 86-10, Supplement |
| | |
| | 1, 'Fire Endurance |
| | |
| | Test Acceptance |
| | |
| | Criteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used To Separate Redundant |
| | |
| | Safe Shutdown Trains Within the Same Fire Area." The following |
| | |
| | information |
| | |
| | is based on observations |
| | |
| | made by the NRC staff who witnessed |
| | |
| | these fire tests.The NRC staff has not reviewed the test reports.Description |
| | |
| | of Circumstances |
| | |
| | 1-Hour Fire Endurance |
| | |
| | Tests The first test assembly included nominal 24-inch and 6-inch-wide |
| | |
| | steel cable trays; 1-inch, 2-inch, 3-inch, and 5-inch-diameter |
| | |
| | steel conduits; |
| | a 2-inch diameter air drop; each was arranged in a U-shaped configuration; |
| | and a 12-inch by 12-inch by 8-inch steel junction box. With regard to the 2-inch-diameter steel conduit, the Junction box was installed |
| | |
| | in one of its vertical runs and the 2-inch diameter air drop was installed |
| | |
| | in the other. These test specimens |
| | |
| | did not include cable fill and were supported |
| | |
| | by a common trapeze 9511080324- K4 //6t~zEzt-0 |
| | t f51(14 IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 support. They were protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interam E53A fire barrier mat material. |
| | |
| | Each layer was 7.6 mm [0.3 inch] thick.On April 20, 1995, OPL subjected |
| | |
| | the test assembly to the test fire specified in American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction |
| | |
| | and Materials," for 1 hour. After the fire exposure, the test specimens |
| | |
| | were subjected |
| | |
| | to a fog-nozzle |
| | |
| | hose stream test.The 24-inch-wide |
| | |
| | cable tray; the 3-inch-, 2-inch-, and 1-inch-diameter |
| | |
| | conduits; |
| | and the air drop exceeded the temperature |
| | |
| | rise acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria of GL 86-10, Supplement |
| | |
| | 1, near the end of the 1-hour fire exposure. |
| | |
| | None of the barriers burned through during the fire exposure nor were they breached by the hose stream. Table 1 (see Attachment |
| | |
| | 1) summarizes |
| | |
| | the test specimen and fire barrier configurations |
| | |
| | and the results of the April 20, 1995, test.The second test assembly included a 24-inch-wide |
| | |
| | steel cable tray, 1-inch- and 5-inch-diameter |
| | |
| | steel conduits, and a 2-inch-diameter |
| | |
| | air drop. These test specimens |
| | |
| | did not contain cables and were protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interam E54A fire barrier mat material. |
| | |
| | Each layer was 10 mm [0.4 inch]thick.On May 17, 1995, OPL subjected |
| | |
| | the test assembly to the test fire specified |
| | |
| | in ASTM Standard E-119 for 1 hour. After the fire exposure, it subjected |
| | |
| | the test specimens |
| | |
| | to a fog-nozzle |
| | |
| | hose stream test. These 1-hour test specimens met the acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria of Supplement |
| | |
| | 1 to GL 86-10. Table 2 (see Attachment |
| | |
| | 1) summarizes |
| | |
| | the test specimen and fire barrier configurations |
| | |
| | and the results of the May 17, 1995, test.3-Hour Fire Endurance |
| | |
| | Test The third test assembly included nominal 24-inch- and 6-inch-wide |
| | |
| | steel cable trays; nominal 1-inch-, 3-inch-, and 5-inch-diameter |
| | |
| | steel conduits; |
| | a 2-inch-diameter air drop; each was arranged in a U-shaped configuration; |
| | and a nominal 12-inch by 12-inch by 8-inch steel junction box. The cable trays were filled with a single layer of mix cables. The cable trays, the 1-inch- and 3-inch-diameter |
| | |
| | steel conduits, and the air drop were protected |
| | |
| | with five layers of Interam E54A fire barrier mat material. |
| | |
| | The 5-inch-diameter |
| | |
| | conduit and the Junction box were protected |
| | |
| | with six layers of Interam E54A fire barrier mat material. |
| | |
| | Each layer was 10 mm [0.4 inch] thick.On July 7, 1995, OPL subjected |
| | |
| | the test assembly to the test fire specified |
| | |
| | in ASTM Standard E-119 for 3 hours. After the fire exposure, it subjected |
| | |
| | the test specimens |
| | |
| | to a fog-nozzle |
| | |
| | hose stream test. The barriers did not burn through during the fire exposure, nor were they breached by the hose stream.There was no visible damage to the test specimen cables. However, all of the test specimens |
| | |
| | exceeded the temperature |
| | |
| | rise acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria of GL 86-10, Supplement |
| | |
| | 1. Table 3 (see Attachment |
| | |
| | 1) summarizes |
| | |
| | the test specimen and fire barrier configurations |
| | |
| | and the results of the July 7, 1995 test.Discussion |
| | |
| | Section 50.48 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations |
| | |
| | requires that each operating |
| | |
| | nuclear power plant must have a fire protection |
| | |
| | plan that |
| | |
| | IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 satisfies |
| | |
| | General Design Criterion (GDC) 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.Fire protection |
| | |
| | features required to satisfy GDC 3 include features to ensure that one train of systems necessary |
| | |
| | to achieve and maintain shutdown conditions |
| | |
| | is free of fire damage. One means of satisfying |
| | |
| | this requirement |
| | |
| | is to separate one safe shutdown train from its redundant |
| | |
| | train with a fire-rated barrier. The level of fire resistance |
| | |
| | required of the barrier, 1 hour or 3 hours, depends on the other fire protection |
| | |
| | features in the fire area.The NRC issued guidance on acceptable |
| | |
| | methods of satisfying |
| | |
| | the regulatory |
| | |
| | requirements |
| | |
| | of GDC 3 in Branch Technical |
| | |
| | Position (BTP) Auxiliary |
| | |
| | and Power Conversion |
| | |
| | Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, 'Guidelines |
| | |
| | for Fire Protection |
| | |
| | for Nuclear Power Plants"; Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1; BTP Chemical Engineering |
| | |
| | Branch (CMEB) 9.5-1, "Fire Protection |
| | |
| | for Nuclear Power Plants"; and GL 86-10,"Implementation |
| | |
| | of Fire Protection |
| | |
| | Requirements." These guidance documents state that the fire resistance |
| | |
| | ratings of fire barriers should be established |
| | |
| | in accordance |
| | |
| | with National Fire Protection |
| | |
| | Association (NFPA) Standard 251,"Standard |
| | |
| | Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction |
| | |
| | and Materials" (1975), by subjecting |
| | |
| | a representative |
| | |
| | test specimen to a standard fire exposure.On March 25, 1994, the NRC issued Supplement |
| | |
| | 1 to GL 86-10 to (1) clarify the applicability |
| | |
| | of the test acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria in GL 86-10 to raceway fire barrier systems, (2) specify a set of fire endurance |
| | |
| | test acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria that are acceptable |
| | |
| | for demonstrating |
| | |
| | that fire barrier systems can perform the required fire-resistive |
| | |
| | function and maintain the protected |
| | |
| | safe shutdown train free of fire damage, (3) specify acceptable |
| | |
| | options for hose stream testing, and (4) specify criteria for cable functionality |
| | |
| | testing when a deviation |
| | |
| | is necessary, such as when the fire barrier temperature |
| | |
| | rise criteria are exceeded or the test specimen cables sustain visible damage.These positions |
| | |
| | are incorporated |
| | |
| | by the NRC staff in its review and evaluation |
| | |
| | of the adequacy of fire endurance |
| | |
| | tests and fire barrier systems proposed by licensees |
| | |
| | or applicants |
| | |
| | to satisfy existing NRC fire protection |
| | |
| | rules and regulations. |
| | |
| | Some temperatures |
| | |
| | observed during the tests exceeded the maximum allowable temperature |
| | |
| | acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria of Supplement |
| | |
| | 1 to GL 86-10. In accordance |
| | |
| | with this supplement, an engineering |
| | |
| | evaluation |
| | |
| | could be performed |
| | |
| | to determine |
| | |
| | the acceptability |
| | |
| | of an in-plant Interam fire barrier that was bounded by a deviating |
| | |
| | test specimen configuration. |
| | |
| | Information |
| | |
| | about such evaluations |
| | |
| | can be found in Enclosure |
| | |
| | 2 of Supplement |
| | |
| | 1 to GL 86-10. By letter dated August 7, 1995 [accession |
| | |
| | number 9509050173 |
| | ], Peak Seals submitted |
| | |
| | to the NRC staff additional |
| | |
| | documentation |
| | |
| | relating to the thermal performance |
| | |
| | of the 3-hour fire barrier test specimens |
| | |
| | for information. |
| | |
| | 1 NFPA adopted ASTM Standard E-119 as NFPA Standard 251. |
| | |
| | IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.fiel rector Division of Reactor Pr ram Management |
| | |
| | ===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: |
| | Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 Attachments: |
| | 1. Tables 1, 2, and 3, Summaries |
| | |
| | of Endurance |
| | |
| | Tests 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices |
| | |
| | K>_Att__Lament |
| | |
| | 1 IN 9-5-52 November 14, 1995 Tnhla 1 mnrmarv nf Anril 20. 1995 Fire Endurance |
| | |
| | Test Peak Seals -3M Company 1-Hour Interam Fire Barriers Allowable |
| | |
| | single point unexposed-side |
| | |
| | temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | -399 F'Allowable |
| | |
| | average unexposed-side |
| | |
| | temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | -324 OF (Shading shows temperatures |
| | |
| | that exceeded, acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria of GL 86-10 Supplement |
| | |
| | 1)TEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLE |
| | |
| | AVERAGE MAXIMUM REMARKS ILOCATIONS (OF)(F)}6" Cable tray Front side rail 262 338 Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interam E53A.Rear side rail J 262 337 Copper conductor Ila Met acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria.24" Cable tray Front side rail Rear side rail Copper conductor Protected |
| | |
| | with four layers of Interam E53A.Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 50X minutes and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 54X minutes.______________ |
| | .4 5" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 1 277 1 370 I 217 275 3" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 2" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 1- Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 2" air drop Copper conductor Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interam E53A.Met acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria.Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interarn E53A.Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 59 X minutes and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 53 X minutes.Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interam E54A.Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 55X minutes and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 55 minutes.Protected |
| | |
| | with two layers of Interam E53A and an outer layer of Interam E54A.Exceeded maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 49X minutes and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 52 minutes._________________________________ |
| | I Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interam E54A.Exceeded average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 59 minutes._______ .-Junction box 2S7 311 Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interam E54A.Met acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria.'Temperatures |
| | |
| | measured during testing and the acceptance |
| | |
| | temperatures |
| | |
| | are presented |
| | |
| | in aF in all Tables of this attachment |
| | |
| | to minimize error and confusion. |
| | |
| | Att.,,_ment |
| | |
| | 1 IN 95;-52 November 14, 1995 Table 2. Summary of May 17, 1995 Fire Endurance |
| | |
| | Test Peak Seals -3M Company 1-Hour Interam Fire Barrier Allowable |
| | |
| | single point unexposed-side |
| | |
| | temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | .405 OF Allowable |
| | |
| | average unexposed-side |
| | |
| | temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | -330 OF TEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLE |
| | |
| | AVERAGE MAXIMUM REMARKS LOCATIONS (OF) (OF'24" Cable tray Front side rail 290 389 Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of 3M Interam E54A Rear side rail 301 354 Met acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria.Copper conductor |
| | |
| | 22265 l_______________ |
| | 5' Conduit Conduit surface 224 251 Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of E54A.Copper conductor |
| | |
| | 217 244 Met acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria.1" Conduit Conduit surface 308 374 Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of E54A.Copper conductor |
| | |
| | 286 346 Met acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria.2" Air drop Copper conductor |
| | |
| | 242 279 Protected |
| | |
| | with three layers of Interam E54A.Met acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria. |
| | |
| | At lament 1 IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 Table 3. Summary of July 7. 1995 Fire Endurance |
| | |
| | Test Peak Sea Allowable |
| | |
| | single ;Allowable |
| | |
| | averal (Shading shows temperature |
| | |
| | ===TEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLE=== |
| | LOCATIONS 6" Cable tray Front side rail Rear side rail Copper conductor 24" Cable tray Front side rail Rear side rail Copper conductor 5" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 3' Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 1" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 2" Air drop Copper conductor Junction box Metal surface Is- 3M Company 3-Hour Interam Fire Barrier piInt unexposed-side |
| | |
| | temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | -407 OF ge unexposed-side |
| | |
| | temperature |
| | |
| | criterloon |
| | |
| | -332 OF a that exceeded acceptance |
| | |
| | criteria of GL 86-10. Supplement |
| | |
| | 1).AVERAGE ([F)I MAXIMUM (1F)I REMARKS Protected |
| | |
| | with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 158 minutes and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 166 minutes.301 343 406 243 334 Protected |
| | |
| | with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 176 minutes and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 167 minutes.Protected |
| | |
| | with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 161 minutes and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 178 minutes..Protected |
| | |
| | with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 148 minutes and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 152 minutes.Protected |
| | |
| | with six layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | at 126 minutes and the sversge temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 167 minutes..Protected |
| | |
| | with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature |
| | |
| | criterion |
| | |
| | and the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 152 minutes..Protected |
| | |
| | with six layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the average temperature |
| | |
| | rise criterion |
| | |
| | at 165 minutes. |
| | |
| | < ~tachment |
| | |
| | 2 IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION |
| | |
| | NOTICES Information |
| | |
| | Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 95-51 95-50 95-49 95-48 95-47 95-46 95-12, Supp. 1 95-45 95-44 Recent Incidents |
| | |
| | Involving Potential |
| | |
| | Loss of Control of Licensed Material Safety Defect in Gammamed 12i Bronchial |
| | |
| | Catheter Clamping Adapters Seismic Adequacy of Thermo-Lag |
| | |
| | Panels Results of Shift Staffing Study Unexpected |
| | |
| | Opening of a Safety/Relief |
| | |
| | Valve and Complications |
| | |
| | Involving Suppression |
| | |
| | ===Pool Cooling Strainer Blockage Unplanned, Undetected=== |
| | Release of Radioactivity |
| | |
| | from the Exhaust Ventilation |
| | |
| | System of a Boiling Water Reactor Potentially |
| | |
| | ===Nonconforming=== |
| | Fasteners |
| | |
| | Supplied by A&G Engineering |
| | |
| | II, Inc.American Power Service Falsification |
| | |
| | of American Society for Nondestructive |
| | |
| | Testing (ASNT) Certificates |
| | |
| | Ensuring Compatible |
| | |
| | ===Use of Drive Cables Incorporating=== |
| | Industrial |
| | |
| | Nuclear Company Ball-Type |
| | |
| | ===Male Connectors=== |
| | 10/27/95 10/30/95 10/27/95 10/10/95 10/04/95 10/06/95 10/05/95 10/04/95 09/26/95 All material and fuel cycle licensees. |
| | |
| | All High Dose Rate Afterloader (HDR) Adapters.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All Radiography |
| | |
| | Licensees. |
| | |
| | OL = Operating |
| | |
| | License CP = Construction |
| | |
| | Permit |
| | |
| | IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 This information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by DNCrutchfield |
| | |
| | Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management |
| | |
| | ===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 Attachments: |
| | 1. Tables 1, 2, anm 2. List of Recentl, AWAS4 3, Summaries |
| | |
| | of Endurance |
| | |
| | Tests Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices&&I--6'zp "'Ilke4-TechEd reviewed this document on 9/11/95 DOCUMENT NAME: 95-52.IN To ,eceive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: *C' a Copy Without attachientenctoSurM |
| | |
| | IE -Copy with attachmentlwclosure |
| | |
| | IN' -No copy iOFFICE PECB:DRPM* |
| | l C:PECB/DRPM* |
| | I D/DRPV1J-n,1 A i NAME IJCarter IAEChaffee |
| | |
| | DMCruVif!el |
| | |
| | d DATE 09/28/95 11/02/95 111/ /95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY |
| | |
| | IN 95-xx November xx, 1995 This Information |
| | |
| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
| | |
| | If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about the information |
| | |
| | in this notice, please contact one of the technical |
| | |
| | contacts listed below or the appropriate |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management |
| | |
| | ===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: |
| | Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 Attachments: |
| | 1. Tables 1, 2, and 3, Summaries |
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| | of Endurance |
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| | Tests 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information |
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| | Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\3MIN |
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| | To mcev. a copy of Weh docunnt. inducate I the box: IC' -Copy without attachment/encloss |
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| | OFFICE SPLB:DSSA* |
| | I ADM:PUB* PECB:DRPM* |
| | I C:PER RRPM NAME ASingh Tech Editor JCarter/RLD |
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| | A~hOW DATE 09/28/95 109/11/95 l09/28/95 ti/2/g§PL3 OFFICE ID:DRPM/NRR |
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| | I II.N. .No copy!NAME 1DPMCrutchfield |
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| | JDATE I1 4 ! !J5I~~OFFICIAL RECORD COPY |
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| | IN 95-xx September |
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| | xx, 1995 This information |
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| | notice requires no specific action or written response. |
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| | If you have any questions |
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| | about the information |
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| | in this notice, please contact one of the technical |
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| | contacts listed below or the appropriate |
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| | Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management |
| | |
| | ===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation=== |
| | Technical |
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| | contacts: Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 Attachments: |
| | 1. Tables 1, 2, and 2. List of Recently 3, Summaries |
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| | of Endurance |
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| ==Description of Circumstances==
| | Tests Issued NRC Information |
| 1-Hour Fire Endurance TestsThe first test assembly included nominal 24-inch and 6-inch-wide steel cabletrays; 1-inch, 2-inch, 3-inch, and 5-inch-diameter steel conduits; a 2-inchdiameter air drop; each was arranged in a U-shaped configuration; and a12-inch by 12-inch by 8-inch steel junction box. With regard to the 2-inch-diameter steel conduit, the Junction box was installed in one of its verticalruns and the 2-inch diameter air drop was installed in the other. These testspecimens did not include cable fill and were supported by a common trapeze9511080324- K4 //6t~zEzt-0 t f51(14 IN 95-52November 14, 1995 support. They were protected with three layers of Interam E53A fire barriermat material. Each layer was 7.6 mm [0.3 inch] thick.On April 20, 1995, OPL subjected the test assembly to the test fire specifiedin American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E-119, "FireTest of Building Construction and Materials," for 1 hour. After the fireexposure, the test specimens were subjected to a fog-nozzle hose stream test.The 24-inch-wide cable tray; the 3-inch-, 2-inch-, and 1-inch-diameterconduits; and the air drop exceeded the temperature rise acceptance criteriaof GL 86-10, Supplement 1, near the end of the 1-hour fire exposure. None ofthe barriers burned through during the fire exposure nor were they breached bythe hose stream. Table 1 (see Attachment 1) summarizes the test specimen andfire barrier configurations and the results of the April 20, 1995, test.The second test assembly included a 24-inch-wide steel cable tray, 1-inch- and5-inch-diameter steel conduits, and a 2-inch-diameter air drop. These testspecimens did not contain cables and were protected with three layers ofInteram E54A fire barrier mat material. Each layer was 10 mm [0.4 inch]thick.On May 17, 1995, OPL subjected the test assembly to the test fire specified inASTM Standard E-119 for 1 hour. After the fire exposure, it subjected thetest specimens to a fog-nozzle hose stream test. These 1-hour test specimensmet the acceptance criteria of Supplement 1 to GL 86-10. Table 2 (seeAttachment 1) summarizes the test specimen and fire barrier configurations andthe results of the May 17, 1995, test.3-Hour Fire Endurance TestThe third test assembly included nominal 24-inch- and 6-inch-wide steel cabletrays; nominal 1-inch-, 3-inch-, and 5-inch-diameter steel conduits; a 2-inch-diameter air drop; each was arranged in a U-shaped configuration; and anominal 12-inch by 12-inch by 8-inch steel junction box. The cable trays werefilled with a single layer of mix cables. The cable trays, the 1-inch- and3-inch-diameter steel conduits, and the air drop were protected with fivelayers of Interam E54A fire barrier mat material. The 5-inch-diameter conduitand the Junction box were protected with six layers of Interam E54A firebarrier mat material. Each layer was 10 mm [0.4 inch] thick.On July 7, 1995, OPL subjected the test assembly to the test fire specified inASTM Standard E-119 for 3 hours. After the fire exposure, it subjected thetest specimens to a fog-nozzle hose stream test. The barriers did not burnthrough during the fire exposure, nor were they breached by the hose stream.There was no visible damage to the test specimen cables. However, all of thetest specimens exceeded the temperature rise acceptance criteria of GL 86-10,Supplement 1. Table 3 (see Attachment 1) summarizes the test specimen andfire barrier configurations and the results of the July 7, 1995 test.DiscussionSection 50.48 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires thateach operating nuclear power plant must have a fire protection plan that
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| IN 95-52November 14, 1995 satisfies General Design Criterion (GDC) 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.Fire protection features required to satisfy GDC 3 include features to ensurethat one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain shutdownconditions is free of fire damage. One means of satisfying this requirementis to separate one safe shutdown train from its redundant train with a fire-rated barrier. The level of fire resistance required of the barrier, 1 houror 3 hours, depends on the other fire protection features in the fire area.The NRC issued guidance on acceptable methods of satisfying the regulatoryrequirements of GDC 3 in Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary and PowerConversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, 'Guidelines for Fire Protection forNuclear Power Plants"; Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1; BTP Chemical EngineeringBranch (CMEB) 9.5-1, "Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants"; and GL 86-10,"Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements." These guidance documentsstate that the fire resistance ratings of fire barriers should be establishedin accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 251,"Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials"(1975), by subjecting a representative test specimen to a standard fireexposure.On March 25, 1994, the NRC issued Supplement 1 to GL 86-10 to (1) clarify theapplicability of the test acceptance criteria in GL 86-10 to raceway firebarrier systems, (2) specify a set of fire endurance test acceptance criteriathat are acceptable for demonstrating that fire barrier systems can performthe required fire-resistive function and maintain the protected safe shutdowntrain free of fire damage, (3) specify acceptable options for hose streamtesting, and (4) specify criteria for cable functionality testing when adeviation is necessary, such as when the fire barrier temperature risecriteria are exceeded or the test specimen cables sustain visible damage.These positions are incorporated by the NRC staff in its review and evaluationof the adequacy of fire endurance tests and fire barrier systems proposed bylicensees or applicants to satisfy existing NRC fire protection rules andregulations.Some temperatures observed during the tests exceeded the maximum allowabletemperature acceptance criteria of Supplement 1 to GL 86-10. In accordancewith this supplement, an engineering evaluation could be performed todetermine the acceptability of an in-plant Interam fire barrier that wasbounded by a deviating test specimen configuration. Information about suchevaluations can be found in Enclosure 2 of Supplement 1 to GL 86-10. Byletter dated August 7, 1995 [accession number 9509050173 ], Peak Sealssubmitted to the NRC staff additional documentation relating to the thermalperformance of the 3-hour fire barrier test specimens for information.1 NFPA adopted ASTM Standard E-119 as NFPA Standard 251. | | Notices.or DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\3M I.I ( 'ff-To rete a copy o o docunwra j2 box: 'C' -Copy wfthout anachmnten |
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| IN 95-52November 14, 1995 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.fiel rectorDivision of Reactor Pr ram ManagementOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Patrick M. Madden, NRR(301) 415-2854Amarjit Singh, NRR(301) 415-1237Attachments:1. Tables 1, 2, and 3, Summaries of Endurance Tests2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
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| K>_Att__Lament 1IN 9-5-52November 14, 1995 Tnhla 1 mnrmarv nf Anril 20. 1995 Fire Endurance TestPeak Seals -3M Company 1-Hour Interam Fire BarriersAllowable single point unexposed-side temperature criterion -399 F'Allowable average unexposed-side temperature criterion -324 OF(Shading shows temperatures that exceeded, acceptance criteria of GL 86-10 Supplement 1)TEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLE AVERAGE MAXIMUM REMARKSILOCATIONS (OF)(F)}6" Cable trayFront side rail262338Protected with three layers ofInteram E53A.Rear side rail J 262 337Copper conductorIlaMet acceptance criteria.24" Cable tray Front side railRear side railCopper conductorProtected with four layers ofInteram E53A.Exceeded the maximum single pointtemperature criterion at 50X minutesand the average temperature risecriterion at 54X minutes.______________ .45" ConduitConduit surfaceCopper conductor1 277 1 370I2172753" Conduit Conduit surfaceCopper conductor2" Conduit Conduit surfaceCopper conductor1- Conduit Conduit surfaceCopper conductor2" air drop Copper conductorProtected with three layers ofInteram E53A.Met acceptance criteria.Protected with three layers ofInterarn E53A.Exceeded the maximum single pointtemperature criterion at 59 X minutesand the average temperature risecriterion at 53 X minutes.Protected with three layers ofInteram E54A.Exceeded the maximum single pointtemperature criterion at 55X minutesand the average temperature risecriterion at 55 minutes.Protected with two layers ofInteram E53A and an outer layer ofInteram E54A.Exceeded maximum single pointtemperature criterion at 49X minutesand the average temperature risecriterion at 52 minutes._________________________________ IProtected with three layers ofInteram E54A.Exceeded average temperature risecriterion at 59 minutes._______ .-Junction box2S7311Protected with three layers ofInteram E54A.Met acceptance criteria.'Temperatures measured during testing and the acceptance temperatures are presented in aF inall Tables of this attachment to minimize error and confusion.
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| Att.,,_ment 1IN 95;-52November 14, 1995 Table 2. Summary of May 17, 1995 Fire Endurance TestPeak Seals -3M Company 1-Hour Interam Fire BarrierAllowable single point unexposed-side temperature criterion .405 OFAllowable average unexposed-side temperature criterion -330 OFTEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLE AVERAGE MAXIMUM REMARKSLOCATIONS (OF) (OF'24" Cable tray Front side rail 290 389 Protected with three layers of 3MInteram E54ARear side rail 301 354Met acceptance criteria.Copper conductor 22265 l_______________5' Conduit Conduit surface 224 251 Protected with three layers of E54A.Copper conductor 217 244 Met acceptance criteria.1" Conduit Conduit surface 308 374 Protected with three layers of E54A.Copper conductor 286 346 Met acceptance criteria.2" Air drop Copper conductor 242 279 Protected with three layers ofInteram E54A.Met acceptance criteria.
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| At lament 1IN 95-52November 14, 1995 Table 3. Summary of July 7. 1995 Fire Endurance TestPeak SeaAllowable single ;Allowable averal(Shading shows temperatureTEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLELOCATIONS6" Cable tray Front side railRear side railCopper conductor24" Cable tray Front side railRear side railCopper conductor5" Conduit Conduit surfaceCopper conductor3' Conduit Conduit surfaceCopper conductor1" Conduit Conduit surfaceCopper conductor2" Air drop Copper conductorJunction box Metal surfaceIs- 3M Company 3-Hour Interam Fire BarrierpiInt unexposed-side temperature criterion -407 OFge unexposed-side temperature criterloon -332 OFa that exceeded acceptance criteria of GL 86-10. Supplement 1).AVERAGE([F)IMAXIMUM(1F)IREMARKSProtected with five layers ofInteram E54A. Exceeded themaximum single point temperaturecriterion at 158 minutes and theaverage temperature rise criterion at166 minutes.301 343406243 334Protected with five layers ofInteram E54A. Exceeded themaximum single point temperaturecriterion at 176 minutes and theaverage temperature rise criterion at167 minutes.Protected with five layers ofInteram E54A. Exceeded themaximum single point temperaturecriterion at 161 minutes and theaverage temperature rise criterion at178 minutes..Protected with five layers ofInteram E54A. Exceeded themaximum single point temperaturecriterion at 148 minutes and theaverage temperature rise criterion at152 minutes.Protected with six layers ofInteram E54A. Exceeded themaximum single point temperaturecriterion at 126 minutes and thesversge temperature rise criterion at167 minutes..Protected with five layers ofInteram E54A. Exceeded themaximum single point temperaturecriterion and the average temperaturerise criterion at 152 minutes..Protected with six layers ofInteram E54A. Exceeded the averagetemperature rise criterion at 165minutes.
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| < ~tachment 2IN 95-52November 14, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to95-5195-5095-4995-4895-4795-4695-12,Supp. 195-4595-44Recent Incidents InvolvingPotential Loss of Controlof Licensed MaterialSafety Defect in Gammamed12i Bronchial CatheterClamping AdaptersSeismic Adequacy ofThermo-Lag PanelsResults of Shift StaffingStudyUnexpected Opening of aSafety/Relief Valve andComplications InvolvingSuppression Pool CoolingStrainer BlockageUnplanned, UndetectedRelease of Radioactivityfrom the Exhaust VentilationSystem of a Boiling WaterReactorPotentially NonconformingFasteners Supplied byA&G Engineering II, Inc.American Power ServiceFalsification of AmericanSociety for NondestructiveTesting (ASNT) CertificatesEnsuring Compatible Use ofDrive Cables IncorporatingIndustrial Nuclear CompanyBall-Type Male Connectors10/27/9510/30/9510/27/9510/10/9510/04/9510/06/9510/05/9510/04/9509/26/95All material and fuelcycle licensees.All High Dose RateAfterloader (HDR) Adapters.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All Radiography Licensees.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
| | I NAME ASingh ) A Tech Editor IJZarter RJKi I.fT AChaffee DATE m 95 109/11/95 |
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| IN 95-52November 14, 1995 IN 95-xxNovember xx, IN 95-xxSeptember xx, 1995
| | ===I I NAME DMCrutchfleld=== |
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Fire Endurance Test Results for Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems Constructed from 3M Company Interam Fire Barrier MaterialsML031060151 |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
11/14/1995 |
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From: |
Crutchfield D M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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GL-86-010 IN-95-052, NUDOCS 9511080324 |
Download: ML031060151 (11) |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 14, 1995 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 95-52: FIRE ENDURANCE
TEST RESULTS FOR ELECTRICAL
RACEWAY FIRE BARRIER SYSTEMS CONSTRUCTED
FROM 3M COMPANY INTERAM FIRE BARRIER MATERIALS
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to inform addressees
of the results of recent fire endurance
tests for electrical
raceway fire barrier systems constructed
from 3M Company Interam fire barrier materials.
It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider this information, as appropriate, in their review of Interam fire barriers.Backaround
On April 20, May 17, and July 7, 1995, the NRC staff visited Omega Point Laboratories (OPL), San Antonio, Texas, to witness full-scale
fire endurance tests for electrical
raceway fire barrier systems constructed
from 3M Company Interam fire barrier materials.
These tests were sponsored
by Peak Seals Corporation (Peak Seals). Peak Seals informed the NRC staff that the test specimens
included in this test program were intended to represent
generic Interam fire barrier systems and that these test programs were conducted
in accordance
with Generic Letter (GL) 86-10, Supplement
1, 'Fire Endurance
Test Acceptance
Criteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used To Separate Redundant
Safe Shutdown Trains Within the Same Fire Area." The following
information
is based on observations
made by the NRC staff who witnessed
these fire tests.The NRC staff has not reviewed the test reports.Description
of Circumstances
1-Hour Fire Endurance
Tests The first test assembly included nominal 24-inch and 6-inch-wide
steel cable trays; 1-inch, 2-inch, 3-inch, and 5-inch-diameter
steel conduits;
a 2-inch diameter air drop; each was arranged in a U-shaped configuration;
and a 12-inch by 12-inch by 8-inch steel junction box. With regard to the 2-inch-diameter steel conduit, the Junction box was installed
in one of its vertical runs and the 2-inch diameter air drop was installed
in the other. These test specimens
did not include cable fill and were supported
by a common trapeze 9511080324- K4 //6t~zEzt-0
t f51(14 IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 support. They were protected
with three layers of Interam E53A fire barrier mat material.
Each layer was 7.6 mm [0.3 inch] thick.On April 20, 1995, OPL subjected
the test assembly to the test fire specified in American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction
and Materials," for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. After the fire exposure, the test specimens
were subjected
to a fog-nozzle
hose stream test.The 24-inch-wide
cable tray; the 3-inch-, 2-inch-, and 1-inch-diameter
conduits;
and the air drop exceeded the temperature
rise acceptance
criteria of GL 86-10, Supplement
1, near the end of the 1-hour fire exposure.
None of the barriers burned through during the fire exposure nor were they breached by the hose stream. Table 1 (see Attachment
1) summarizes
the test specimen and fire barrier configurations
and the results of the April 20, 1995, test.The second test assembly included a 24-inch-wide
steel cable tray, 1-inch- and 5-inch-diameter
steel conduits, and a 2-inch-diameter
air drop. These test specimens
did not contain cables and were protected
with three layers of Interam E54A fire barrier mat material.
Each layer was 10 mm [0.4 inch]thick.On May 17, 1995, OPL subjected
the test assembly to the test fire specified
in ASTM Standard E-119 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. After the fire exposure, it subjected
the test specimens
to a fog-nozzle
hose stream test. These 1-hour test specimens met the acceptance
criteria of Supplement
1 to GL 86-10. Table 2 (see Attachment
1) summarizes
the test specimen and fire barrier configurations
and the results of the May 17, 1995, test.3-Hour Fire Endurance
Test The third test assembly included nominal 24-inch- and 6-inch-wide
steel cable trays; nominal 1-inch-, 3-inch-, and 5-inch-diameter
steel conduits;
a 2-inch-diameter air drop; each was arranged in a U-shaped configuration;
and a nominal 12-inch by 12-inch by 8-inch steel junction box. The cable trays were filled with a single layer of mix cables. The cable trays, the 1-inch- and 3-inch-diameter
steel conduits, and the air drop were protected
with five layers of Interam E54A fire barrier mat material.
The 5-inch-diameter
conduit and the Junction box were protected
with six layers of Interam E54A fire barrier mat material.
Each layer was 10 mm [0.4 inch] thick.On July 7, 1995, OPL subjected
the test assembly to the test fire specified
in ASTM Standard E-119 for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. After the fire exposure, it subjected
the test specimens
to a fog-nozzle
hose stream test. The barriers did not burn through during the fire exposure, nor were they breached by the hose stream.There was no visible damage to the test specimen cables. However, all of the test specimens
exceeded the temperature
rise acceptance
criteria of GL 86-10, Supplement
1. Table 3 (see Attachment
1) summarizes
the test specimen and fire barrier configurations
and the results of the July 7, 1995 test.Discussion
Section 50.48 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
requires that each operating
nuclear power plant must have a fire protection
plan that
IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 satisfies
General Design Criterion (GDC) 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.Fire protection
features required to satisfy GDC 3 include features to ensure that one train of systems necessary
to achieve and maintain shutdown conditions
is free of fire damage. One means of satisfying
this requirement
is to separate one safe shutdown train from its redundant
train with a fire-rated barrier. The level of fire resistance
required of the barrier, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, depends on the other fire protection
features in the fire area.The NRC issued guidance on acceptable
methods of satisfying
the regulatory
requirements
of GDC 3 in Branch Technical
Position (BTP) Auxiliary
and Power Conversion
Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, 'Guidelines
for Fire Protection
for Nuclear Power Plants"; Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1; BTP Chemical Engineering
Branch (CMEB) 9.5-1, "Fire Protection
for Nuclear Power Plants"; and GL 86-10,"Implementation
of Fire Protection
Requirements." These guidance documents state that the fire resistance
ratings of fire barriers should be established
in accordance
with National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Standard 251,"Standard
Methods of Fire Tests of Building Construction
and Materials" (1975), by subjecting
a representative
test specimen to a standard fire exposure.On March 25, 1994, the NRC issued Supplement
1 to GL 86-10 to (1) clarify the applicability
of the test acceptance
criteria in GL 86-10 to raceway fire barrier systems, (2) specify a set of fire endurance
test acceptance
criteria that are acceptable
for demonstrating
that fire barrier systems can perform the required fire-resistive
function and maintain the protected
safe shutdown train free of fire damage, (3) specify acceptable
options for hose stream testing, and (4) specify criteria for cable functionality
testing when a deviation
is necessary, such as when the fire barrier temperature
rise criteria are exceeded or the test specimen cables sustain visible damage.These positions
are incorporated
by the NRC staff in its review and evaluation
of the adequacy of fire endurance
tests and fire barrier systems proposed by licensees
or applicants
to satisfy existing NRC fire protection
rules and regulations.
Some temperatures
observed during the tests exceeded the maximum allowable temperature
acceptance
criteria of Supplement
1 to GL 86-10. In accordance
with this supplement, an engineering
evaluation
could be performed
to determine
the acceptability
of an in-plant Interam fire barrier that was bounded by a deviating
test specimen configuration.
Information
about such evaluations
can be found in Enclosure
2 of Supplement
1 to GL 86-10. By letter dated August 7, 1995 [accession
number 9509050173
], Peak Seals submitted
to the NRC staff additional
documentation
relating to the thermal performance
of the 3-hour fire barrier test specimens
for information.
1 NFPA adopted ASTM Standard E-119 as NFPA Standard 251.
IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.fiel rector Division of Reactor Pr ram Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 Attachments:
1. Tables 1, 2, and 3, Summaries
of Endurance
Tests 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
K>_Att__Lament
1 IN 9-5-52 November 14, 1995 Tnhla 1 mnrmarv nf Anril 20. 1995 Fire Endurance
Test Peak Seals -3M Company 1-Hour Interam Fire Barriers Allowable
single point unexposed-side
temperature
criterion
-399 F'Allowable
average unexposed-side
temperature
criterion
-324 OF (Shading shows temperatures
that exceeded, acceptance
criteria of GL 86-10 Supplement
1)TEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLE
AVERAGE MAXIMUM REMARKS ILOCATIONS (OF)(F)}6" Cable tray Front side rail 262 338 Protected
with three layers of Interam E53A.Rear side rail J 262 337 Copper conductor Ila Met acceptance
criteria.24" Cable tray Front side rail Rear side rail Copper conductor Protected
with four layers of Interam E53A.Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 50X minutes and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 54X minutes.______________
.4 5" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 1 277 1 370 I 217 275 3" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 2" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 1- Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 2" air drop Copper conductor Protected
with three layers of Interam E53A.Met acceptance
criteria.Protected
with three layers of Interarn E53A.Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 59 X minutes and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 53 X minutes.Protected
with three layers of Interam E54A.Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 55X minutes and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 55 minutes.Protected
with two layers of Interam E53A and an outer layer of Interam E54A.Exceeded maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 49X minutes and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 52 minutes._________________________________
I Protected
with three layers of Interam E54A.Exceeded average temperature
rise criterion
at 59 minutes._______ .-Junction box 2S7 311 Protected
with three layers of Interam E54A.Met acceptance
criteria.'Temperatures
measured during testing and the acceptance
temperatures
are presented
in aF in all Tables of this attachment
to minimize error and confusion.
Att.,,_ment
1 IN 95;-52 November 14, 1995 Table 2. Summary of May 17, 1995 Fire Endurance
Test Peak Seals -3M Company 1-Hour Interam Fire Barrier Allowable
single point unexposed-side
temperature
criterion
.405 OF Allowable
average unexposed-side
temperature
criterion
-330 OF TEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLE
AVERAGE MAXIMUM REMARKS LOCATIONS (OF) (OF'24" Cable tray Front side rail 290 389 Protected
with three layers of 3M Interam E54A Rear side rail 301 354 Met acceptance
criteria.Copper conductor
22265 l_______________
5' Conduit Conduit surface 224 251 Protected
with three layers of E54A.Copper conductor
217 244 Met acceptance
criteria.1" Conduit Conduit surface 308 374 Protected
with three layers of E54A.Copper conductor
286 346 Met acceptance
criteria.2" Air drop Copper conductor
242 279 Protected
with three layers of Interam E54A.Met acceptance
criteria.
At lament 1 IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 Table 3. Summary of July 7. 1995 Fire Endurance
Test Peak Sea Allowable
single ;Allowable
averal (Shading shows temperature
TEST SPECIMEN THERMOCOUPLE
LOCATIONS 6" Cable tray Front side rail Rear side rail Copper conductor 24" Cable tray Front side rail Rear side rail Copper conductor 5" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 3' Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 1" Conduit Conduit surface Copper conductor 2" Air drop Copper conductor Junction box Metal surface Is- 3M Company 3-Hour Interam Fire Barrier piInt unexposed-side
temperature
criterion
-407 OF ge unexposed-side
temperature
criterloon
-332 OF a that exceeded acceptance
criteria of GL 86-10. Supplement
1).AVERAGE ([F)I MAXIMUM (1F)I REMARKS Protected
with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 158 minutes and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 166 minutes.301 343 406 243 334 Protected
with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 176 minutes and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 167 minutes.Protected
with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 161 minutes and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 178 minutes..Protected
with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 148 minutes and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 152 minutes.Protected
with six layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
at 126 minutes and the sversge temperature
rise criterion
at 167 minutes..Protected
with five layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the maximum single point temperature
criterion
and the average temperature
rise criterion
at 152 minutes..Protected
with six layers of Interam E54A. Exceeded the average temperature
rise criterion
at 165 minutes.
< ~tachment
2 IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 95-51 95-50 95-49 95-48 95-47 95-46 95-12, Supp. 1 95-45 95-44 Recent Incidents
Involving Potential
Loss of Control of Licensed Material Safety Defect in Gammamed 12i Bronchial
Catheter Clamping Adapters Seismic Adequacy of Thermo-Lag
Panels Results of Shift Staffing Study Unexpected
Opening of a Safety/Relief
Valve and Complications
Involving Suppression
Pool Cooling Strainer Blockage Unplanned, Undetected
Release of Radioactivity
from the Exhaust Ventilation
System of a Boiling Water Reactor Potentially
Nonconforming
Fasteners
Supplied by A&G Engineering
II, Inc.American Power Service Falsification
of American Society for Nondestructive
Testing (ASNT) Certificates
Ensuring Compatible
Use of Drive Cables Incorporating
Industrial
Nuclear Company Ball-Type
Male Connectors
10/27/95 10/30/95 10/27/95 10/10/95 10/04/95 10/06/95 10/05/95 10/04/95 09/26/95 All material and fuel cycle licensees.
All High Dose Rate Afterloader (HDR) Adapters.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All Radiography
Licensees.
OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
IN 95-52 November 14, 1995 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by DNCrutchfield
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 Attachments:
1. Tables 1, 2, anm 2. List of Recentl, AWAS4 3, Summaries
of Endurance
Tests Issued NRC Information
Notices&&I--6'zp "'Ilke4-TechEd reviewed this document on 9/11/95 DOCUMENT NAME: 95-52.IN To ,eceive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: *C' a Copy Without attachientenctoSurM
IE -Copy with attachmentlwclosure
IN' -No copy iOFFICE PECB:DRPM*
l C:PECB/DRPM*
I D/DRPV1J-n,1 A i NAME IJCarter IAEChaffee
DMCruVif!el
d DATE 09/28/95 11/02/95 111/ /95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 95-xx November xx, 1995 This Information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts:
Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 Attachments:
1. Tables 1, 2, and 3, Summaries
of Endurance
Tests 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\3MIN
To mcev. a copy of Weh docunnt. inducate I the box: IC' -Copy without attachment/encloss
'Ew
- Copy with attachmentoneloesure
OFFICE SPLB:DSSA*
I ADM:PUB* PECB:DRPM*
I C:PER RRPM NAME ASingh Tech Editor JCarter/RLD
A~hOW DATE 09/28/95 109/11/95 l09/28/95 ti/2/g§PL3 OFFICE ID:DRPM/NRR
I II.N. .No copy!NAME 1DPMCrutchfield
JDATE I1 4 ! !J5I~~OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 95-xx September
xx, 1995 This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
contacts listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Patrick M. Madden, NRR (301) 415-2854 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 Attachments:
1. Tables 1, 2, and 2. List of Recently 3, Summaries
of Endurance
Tests Issued NRC Information
Notices.or DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\3M I.I ( 'ff-To rete a copy o o docunwra j2 box: 'C' -Copy wfthout anachmnten
cosL 'E' -Copy with atchmentlenciosure
-No copy OFFICE SPLB:DSS\A
1, ] 'I ADM:PUB* I IP fTRPM I PECB/DRPM
Z I I C:PECB/DRPM
I NAME ASingh ) A Tech Editor IJZarter RJKi I.fT AChaffee DATE m 95 109/11/95
/95 O&5 OFFICE D:DRPM/NRR
I I NAME DMCrutchfleld
DATE 09/ /__ 95_I OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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list | - Information Notice 1995-01, DOT Safety Advisory: High Pressure Aluminum Seamless and Aluminum Composite Hoop-Wrapped Cylinders (4 January 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems With General Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks In Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems With General Electric Cr2940 Contact Blocks In Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems with General Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks in Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-03, Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Potential Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition (18 January 1995, Topic: Packing leak)
- Information Notice 1995-04, Excessive Cooldown and Depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System Following Loss of Offsite Power (11 October 1996, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Shutdown Margin, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Troxler Moisture Density Gauge)
- Information Notice 1995-05, Undervoltage Protection Relay Settings Out of Tolerance Due to Test Equipment Harmonics (20 January 1985)
- Information Notice 1995-06, Potential Blockage of Safety-Related Strainers by Material Brought Inside Containment (25 January 1995, Topic: Foreign Material Exclusion)
- Information Notice 1995-07, Radiopharmaceutical Vial Breakage During Preparation (27 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-08, Inaccurate Data Obtained with Clamp-On Ultrasonic Flow Measurement Instruments (30 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-08, Inaccurate Data Obtained With Clamp-On Ultrasonic Flow Measurement Instruments (30 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-09, Use of Inappropriate Guidelines and Criteria for Nuclear Piping and Pipe Support Evaluation and Design (31 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-10, Potential for Loss of Automatic Engineered Safety Features Actuation (3 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-11, Failure of Condensate Piping Because of Erosion/Corrosion at Flow-Straightening Device (24 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-12, Potentially Nonconforming Fasteners Supplied by A&G Engineering II, Inc (21 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-13, Potential for Data Collection Equipment to Affect Protection System Performance (24 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-14, Susceptibility of Containment Sump Recirculation Gate Valves to Pressure Locking (28 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-15, Inadequate Logic Testing of Safety-Related Circuits (7 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-16, Vibration Caused by Increased Recirculation Flow in a Boiling Water Reactor (9 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-17, Reactor Vessel Top Guide and Core Plate Cracking (10 March 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1995-18, Potential Pressure-Locking of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves (15 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-19, Failure of Reactor Trip Breaker to Open Because of Cutoff Switch Material Lodged in the Trip Latch Mechanism (22 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-20, Failures in Rosemount Pressure Transmitters Due to Hydrogen Permeation Into Sensor Cell (22 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-21, Unexpected Degradation of Lead Storage Batteries (20 April 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-22, Hardened or Contaminated Lubricant Cause Metal-Clad Circuit Breaker Failures (21 April 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-23, Control Room Staffing Below Minimum Regulatory Requirements (24 April 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-24, Summary of Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection Program Findings (25 April 1995, Topic: Job Performance Measure, License Renewal)
- Information Notice 1995-25, Valve Failure During Patient Treatment with Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery Unit (11 May 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-26, Defect in Safety-Related Pump Parts Due to Inadequate Treatment (31 May 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-27, NRC Review of Nuclear Energy Institute, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation Methodology Plant Screening Guide. (31 May 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier, Exemption Request, Fire Protection Program)
- Information Notice 1995-28, Emplacement of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations at Reactor Sites (5 June 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Tornado Missile, Safe Shutdown Earthquake, Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1995-29, Oversight of Design and Fabrication Activities for Metal Components Used in Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems (7 June 1995, Topic: Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1995-30, Susceptibility of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection Valves to Pressure Locking (3 August 1995, Topic: Hydrostatic, Power-Operated Valves)
- Information Notice 1995-31, Motor-Operated Valve Failure Caused by Stem Protector Pipe Interference (9 August 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-32, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Flame Spread Test Results (10 August 1995, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1995-33, Switchgear Fire and Partial Loss of Offsite Power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3 (23 August 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-34, Air Actuator and Supply Air Regulator Problems in Copes-Vulcan Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (25 August 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-35, Degraded Ability of Steam Generators to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation (28 August 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-36, Potential Problems with Post-Fire Emergency Lighting (29 August 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Emergency Lighting, Exemption Request)
- Information Notice 1995-37, Inadequate Offsite Power System Voltages During Design-Basis Events (7 September 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-38, Degradation of Boraflex Neutron Absorber in Spent Fuel Storage Racks (8 September 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-39, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Treatment Planning Errors (19 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-40, Supplemental Information to Generic Letter 95-03, Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes. (20 September 1995, Topic: Hydrostatic, Nondestructive Examination, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-41, Degradation of Ventilation System Charcoal Resulting from Chemical Cleaning of Steam Generators (22 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-42, Commission Decision on Resolution of Generic Issue 23, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure. (22 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-43, Failure of Bolt-Locking Device on Reactor Coolant Pump Turning Vane (28 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-44, Ensuring Compatible Use of Drive Cables Incorporating Industrial Nuclear Company Ball-Type Male Connectors (26 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-45, American Power Service Falsification of American Society for Nondestructive Testing Certificates (4 October 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-46, Unplanned, Undetected Release of Radioactivity from the Exhaust Ventilation System of a Boiling Water Reactor (6 October 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-47, Unexpected Opening of a Safety/Relief Valve & Complications Involving Suppression Pool Cooling Strainer Blockage (30 November 1995)
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