ML18018B070

Nine Mile Point Unit 1 - Responses to Questions Relating to Changes to the Technical Specifications

ML18018B070
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	11/23/1973
From:	Niagara Mohawk Power Corp
To:	US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
References
Download: ML18018B070 (248)

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CONTENTSPAGENO.Question1Question2Question3Question4RegulatoryGuide1.22RegulatoryGuide1.23RegulatoryGuide1.24RegulatoryGuide1.25RegulatoryGuide1.26RegulatoryGuide1.27RegulatoryGuide1.28RegulatoryGuide1.29RegulatoryGuide1.30RegulatoryGuide1.31RegulatoryGuide1.32RegulatoryGuide1.33RegulatoryGuide1.34RegulatoryGuide1.35...,Regulatory-.Guide-l.36RegulatoryGuide1.37RegulatoryGuide1.38RegulatoryGuide1.39RegulatoryGuide1.40RegulatoryGuide1.41RegulatoryGuide1~42RegulatoryGuide1.43RegulatoryGuide1.44RegulatoryGuide1.45RegulatoryGuide1.46RegulatoryGuide1.47RegulatoryGuide1.48RegulatoryGuide1.49RegulatoryGuide1.50RegulatoryGuide1.51RegulatoryGuide1.52RegulatoryGuide1.53RegulatoryGuide1.54RegulatoryGuide1.55RegulatoryGuide1.56RegulatoryGuide1.57RegulatoryGuide1.58RegulatoryGuide1.59Question5Question6Question7Question8.~~~~~~~1579.1012131415161718202122232425"26272829303132333435363738394041424445464749515354576062 Hl$'i PAGENO.Question9Question10QuestionllQuestion12Question13Question14~~~~0~~~~~~~s~~0~~~~~~~0~~~\~0~~~~~~~t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~04~~~~~~~~636572768189 C

QUESTIONSincetheTechnica1SpecificationsappendedtoProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-l7willbereissued.atthetimeofconversion,theproposed.changestotechnicalspecificationsshouldbesubmittedassoonaspossibleforourreview.Therefore,pleaseprovidealistingofa11changestotheTechnicalSpecificationsforNineMilePointUnit1(MMP-1)otherthanthoseidentifiedhereinthatyouwiU.considerinconnectionwiththelicenseconversion.Includeadequatesupportinginformationforchanges'beingproposed..RESPONSETheproposedmodificationstotheTechnical-Specificationsfallintotwocategories(a)thoserequestedinlettersalreadysubmittedand(b)thoseproposedtobemadeatthetimeoflicenseconversion.SinceTechnicalSpecificationChangeNo.9therehavebeenotherproposedchangessubmittedtotheAECwhichhavenotyetbeenactedupon.Theyareasfollows:a.ProposedchangestoSpecificatjoy3.3.6,"VacuumRelief";havebeensubmittedintwoletters.b.--"Proposed'environmentaltechriicalspecifications.c.Reloadfuelapp)icationconcerningrodblockandpeakingfactorfor8x8fuel.d.Proposedchangestospecifications3.1.1and3.6.2concerningthereanalysisoftheroddropaccidentandtheAPRMrodblocksys-tem.OtherareaswherechangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.areappropriatearediscussedbelow:a.Specification3.2.5-changeprimarymethodofleakdetectiontotherateofrisemonitoringinsumplevel.AsdescribedinresponsetoRegulatoryGuide1.45amoresensitivemethodofmonitoringprimarysystemleakdetectionhasbeeninstalled.Thissystemwilldetecta0.2gpmchangeinflowintherangeof0-1gpmflowanda0.5gpmchangeforinflowsof1-5gpm.1LetterdatedMarch26,1973fromR.R.SchneidertoD.J.Skovholt.2LetterdatedJuly20,1973fromR.R.SchneidertoD.J.Skovholt.3LetterdatedOctober4,1973fromP.D.RaymondtoD.R.Muller4LetterdatedOctober16,1973fromP.D.RaymondtoA.Giambusso.5LetterdatedNovember15,1973fromR.R;SchneidertoMr.A.Giambusso.

b.Specification4.2.2-changewithdrawlscheduletomeetthefollowing:Firstcapsule-onefourthservicelife.Secondcapsule-threefourthservicelife.Thirdcapsule-standbyIntheeventthesurveillancespecimensatonequarterofthevesselsservicelifeindicateshiftofreferencetemperaturegreaterthanpredictedthescheduleshallberevisedasfollows:Secondcapsule-onehalfservicelife..This:dr.capsule-."standby.TheaboveisamodificationtoASTMStandardRecommendedPracticeforSurveillanceTestsforNuclearReactorVessels.Itwillassurethatthereisadequatemarginsofsafetyagainstfracturethroughtthevesselservicelife.c.Specification3.6.2,Tables3.6.2band4.6.2bThesetpointsforthehighareatemperaturefortheclean-upandshutdowncoolingsystemisolationshouldbechangedtoread190Fand170Frespectively.Duetothefactthatthemonitorsareatceilinglevelandgoodcirculationofairthroughtheseroomsdoesnotexist,normal""ambient-temperatureshaveranged-from140Fto160F.d.Proposedtechnicalspecificationforthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemispresentedhere.'newspecification(3.1.8)willbeaddedasfollows:3.1.8HIGHPRESSURECOOLANTINJECTIONAppliestotheoperationalstatusofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystem.~Ob'ctive:Toassurethecapabilityofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemtocoolreactorfuelintheeventofaloss-of-coolant.accident.aeDuringthepoweroperatingconditionwheneverthereactorcoolantpressureisgreaterthan110psigandthereactorcoolanttemperaturegreaterthansaturationtemperature,thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemshallbeoperableexceptedasspecifiedinSpecification"b"below.b.Ifaredundantcomponentofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystembecomesinoperablethehighpressure

coolantinjectionshallbeconsideredoperableprovidedthatthecomponentisreturnedtoanoperableconditionwith15daysandtheadditionalsurveillancerequiredisperformed.c~Ifspecification"a",and"b"arenotmet,anormalorderlyshutdownshallbeinitiatedwithinonehourandreactorcoolantpressureandtemperatureshallbereducedtolessthan110psigandsaturationtemperaturewithin24hours.4.1.8HIGHPRESSURECOOLANTINJECTIONAppliestotheperiodictestingrequirementsforthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystem.~OB'ective:Toverifytheoperabilityofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystem.Thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsurveillanceshallbe.-performed'"as"indicate'd"bel'ow:a.Atleastonceperoperatingcycleautomaticstart-upofthehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemshallbedemonstrated.b.Atleastonceperquarterpumpoperabilityshallbedetermined.c.Surveillance,withInoerableComonentWhenacomponentbecomesinoperableitsredundantcomponentshallbedemonstratedtobeoperableimmed-iatelyianddailythereafter.Bases:TheHighPressureCoolantInjectionSystem(HPCI)isprovidedtoensureadequatecorecoolingintheunlikelyeventofasmallreactorcoolantlinebreak.TheHPCISystemisrequiredforlinebreakswhichexceedthecapabilityoftheControlRodDrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowfastenoughde-pressurizationforcorespraytobeeffective.Onesetofhighpressurecoolantinjectionpumpsconsitsofacondensatepump,afeedwaterboosterpumpandamotordrivenfeedwaterpump.Onesetofpumpsiscapableofdelivering3,800gpmtothereactorvesselatreactorpressure.TheperformancecapabilityofHPCIaloneandinconjunctionwithothersystemstoprovideadequatecorecoolingforaspectrumofline-breaksisdiscussedintheFifthSupplementoftheFSAR.3

IndeterminingtheoperabilityoftheHPCISystemtherequiredperformancecapabilityofvariouscomponentsshallbeconsidered.a0TheHPCISystemshallbecapableofdeliveryrateof3,800gpm.b.Themotordrivenfeedwaterpumpshallbecapableofautomaticinitiationuponreceiptofeitheranautomaticturbinetripsignalorreactorlow-,water-levelsignal.cTheCondenserhot.welllevelshallnotbelessthan48inches(75,000gallons).d.TheCondensatestoragetankinventoryshallnotbelessthan105,000gallons.Duringreactorstart-up,operationandshutdownthecondensateandfeedwaterboosterpumpsareinoperation.Atreactorpressuresupto450psig,thesepumpsarecapableofsupplyingtherequired3,800gpm.Above450psigamotor-driven-feedwaterpumps,isnecessarytoprovidetherequiredflowrate.Thecapabilityofthecondensate,feedwaterboosterandmotordrivenfeed-waterwaterpumpswillbedemonstratedbytheiroperationaspartofthefeed-watersupplyduringnormalstationoperation.Stand-bypumpswillbeplacedinserviceat.leastquarterlytosupplyfeedwatexduringstationoperation.Anautomaticsysteminitiationtestwillbeperformedatleastonceperoper-atingcycle.Thiswillinvolveautomaticstartingofthemotordrivenfeed-waterpumpsandflowto.thereactorvessel..Specification3.6.2kwillbeaddedasfollows:E~k.HihressureCoolantIn'ectionInitiation-Thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemshallbeconsideredinoperableandspecification3.1.8cshallbeapplied.Othertechnicalspecificationchangesarediscussedinanswertoquestions2,3,7ofthissubmittal.

Tables3.6.2kand4.6.2kvillbeaddedasfollovssABE62kad462kPSEChE03.6.2kLinitinSConditionforOperation4i6.2kSurveillanceRequireuentpsraueterMininunNo.oiTrippedorOperableriSsceneMininunNo.ofOperableInstrunentChannelsper0arable1SstSet~nReactorModeSvitchpositioninWhichFunctionMustSeeablSensorCheckInstrunentChannelTestInstrunentCharms1~Cllbti(1)LouReactor'MaterLevel(2)AutonaticTurbineTrip1ft.belouvaterlevelatEl.302'-5uShutdovnRefuelStartsRunXXXXXXXXOn<<eperdayhoneOncepernonthEachOper-~tinSCycleOnceper3conths

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASESICont'd.lS.2.SREACTORCOOIAVTSYSTEMIEAKACERATEC.2.SREACZORCOOIAVTSYSTESIIEALACERATE~ll~'UAppliestotheI(nitsonreactorcoolantsystenleak-agerateAppliestothcnonitoringofreactorcoolantsystcnlcakagc.Obective:ToassurethatthenakeupcapabilityprovidedbythecontrolroddriveFunplsnotexceeded.Todeteznlnethcreactorcoolantsystcnleakagerateandassurethatthclea'kagcllnitsarenotexceeded.cification:~SillIAnytineIrradiatedfuellslnthereactorvesselandreactorcoolanttnapcraturelsabove2IIF~reactorcoolantleakageintotheprlnazycontalnaentfrowunidentifiedsourcesshallnotexceedSgpn.Inaddition,thetotalreactorcoolantsystcnleakageintotheprlnazycoats(anentshallnotexceed25gpn.Iftheseconditionscannotbenet,thereactorvillbeplacedlnthecoldshutdownconditionwithintenhours.Acheckofreactorcoolantsystcnleakageshallbenadcatleastoncepcrday.Allowableleakageratesofcoolantfrerethereactorcoolantsystcnhavebeenbasedonthepredictedandcxperlnentallyobservedbehaviorofcrackslnpipesandontheabilitytonakeupcoolantsystcnleakagelnthceventoflossofoffsltea-cpower.Thenoznallyexpectedbaclgroundleakageduetoequipaentdesignandthcdetectioncapabilityfordctezulningcoolantsystenlea'kagewerealsoconsideredlnestablishingthellnlts.ThebehaviorofcrackslnpipingsystenshasbeenexperlaentallyandanalyticallyinvestigatedaspartoftheIISAECsponsoredReactorprinaryCoolantSystenRuptureStudy(thepipeRuptureStudy).workutllltlngthedataobtainedinthisstudyindicatesthatleakagefranacrackcanbedetectedbeforethecrackgrowstoadangerousorcriticalsizebynechanlcallyorther-nallyinducedcyclicloading,orstresscorrosioncrackingorsonsothernechanisacharacterizedbygradualcrackgrcwth.Thisevidencesuggeststhatforlea'kagescuewhatgreaterthanthellnltspecifiedforunideatlfiedleakage,theprobabilitylsswellthatinperfectlonsorcracksassociatedwithsuchleakagewouldgrowrapidly.However,theestabllshtentofallowableunidentifiedleakagegreaterthanthatgivenIn$.2.$onthebasisofthedatapzesentlyavailablewouldbeprenaturebecauseofuncertaintiesassociatedwiththcdata.ForleakageoftheorderofSgpaasspecifiedin$.2.S,theexperinentalandanalyticaldatasuggestareasonablenarginofsafetythatsuchIcakagcnsgnitudewouldnotresultfrowacrackapproachingthecriticalsizeforrapidpropagation.leakageofthenagnitudespecifiedcanbedetectedreasonablyinanatterofafewhoursutilizingtheavailableleakagedetectionschenes,andlftheorigincannotbedetezninedlnareasonablyshorttinetheplantshouldbeshutdowntoallowfurtherinvestiga-tionand<<orrectlveaction.Atotalleakageof2Sgpnlswellwithinthecapacityofthecontrolroddrivesystennakeupcapability(pageIll-7oftheFirstSuppleuent).eAsdiscussedInS.I.Oabove,forleakageswithinthisnakeupcapabllltythecorewillrcaaincoveredandautonatlcpressureblowdownwillnotbcactuated.eFSAR.4T

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASES(Cont'd.)sheprxaaxyscansofdetexainingthereactorcoolantleakagerateisbyaonitoringtherateofriseinthelewisofthedxywllflooranxeguipeentdrainlines.Dailychecksvillhesadethatnoalaxaehavebeenactuatedduetohighleak-age.rorcuspinfloveofonagpachangesontheoxderof0.2gpacanhedetectedvithin40ainutes.Atinfloweba-tveenoneandfivegpachangesontheorderofO.Sgpacanbedetectedineightainutes.leakageisdetectedbyhavingallunidentifiedleakageroutedtothedrywallfloordralatank,andidentlficdleakagerouteddirectlytothedrywallequlpscntdraintanks.identifiedleakageincludessuchlteasasreclrculaticupuapsealleakageandrecirculationpuapsuctionanddischargevalvepackingleakoff.Anotheraethcdvillaonitortheth>>requiredtofillthetanksbetweentvoaccuratelyde-texaincdlevels.Whenthelevellnthetankreachesthelov-levelsvitchsetting,atiacrvillstartandoperateforapresettineinterval.ifthetlaerresetsbeforethehigh-levelsvltchsettinglsreachedin-dicatingaleakageratevithinallowableliaits,noaction<<illresult,andthesystca"resetsforthenextfillingandtiningcycle.lftheleakagelshighenoughtocausetheleveltoreachthehighlevelswitchsettingbeforethetiacrresetsautoaatlcally,analazalsactuatedindicatingaleakrateabovethepredetexalncdllalt(FirstandFifthguppies>>nts).Additionallnfozxatlonlsavailabletotheoperatorwhichcanbeusedforthodailyleakagecheck1fthedrywallsuspslevelelratsareoutofservice.lheintegratedflovpuapedfroathesuapstothevestadisposalsysteacsnbechecked.Qualitativeinfozaatlonlsalsoavailabletothaoper-atorlnthefoxaofindicationofdryvellataospheric<<ondltions.Continuousleakagefroathepriaarycool-antsysteavouldcauseanincreaselndrywalltesper-ature.Anyleakageinexcessoflggpaofsteaavouldcausescontinuingincreaselndxywellpressurevlthresultingscras(FirstSupplcaent).Reactorcoolantsystealeakdetectionvillbefurtherstudiedduringthefirstyearofoperationofthefacility.lftheresultsindicatethatsignificantiaprovcaentslnaonitoringcapabilitycsnbareallyachievedonapracticalbasis,suchisprovcaentswillbeinpleaented.

Tables3.6.nd4.2.6bINSTRUMENTATIONTHATINITIATES.PRIMARYCOOLANTSYSTEMORCONTAINMENTISOLATION3.6.2b-LinutinConditionforeration4.6.2b-SurveillanceReuirementParameterMinimumNo.ofTrippedorOperableTriSstemsMinirnurnNo.ofOperableInstrumentChannelsperOperableTriSstemSetPointShutdownRefuelStartuRunReactorModeSwitchPositionInWhichFunctionMustBe0erableSensorCheckInstrulnentChannelTestInstrumentChannelCalibrationPRIMARYCOOLANTISOLATION(MainSteam,Cleanup,andShutdown)(I)Low-LowReactorWaterLevelS5ftbelowminimumXnormalwaterlevelatElevation302'-9"XXXOnce/dayOnceperOncepermonth3months(2)ManualMAINSTEAMLINEISOLATIONXXXOnceduriageachmajorrefueHagoutage(3)HighSteamFlowMain-SteamIdncSl05psidXXOnce/dayOnceperOncepermonth3months(4)HighRalliationMain-StealnLine<5tilnesnormalbackgroundXXOnce/shiftOnce/weekOnceper3monthS(5)LowReactorPressure>850psigXOnce/dayOnceperOncepermonth3months(6)Low-Low-LowCondenserVacuum(7)HighTemperatureMain-Steam-LineTunnelCLEANUPSYSTEMISOLATION>7in.mercuryvacUuln<200F(a)(a)XXXXNoneNoneOnceduringeachmajorrefueliagCUtagcOncedurlageachmajorrefuelingoutageOnceduringeachmajorrefuelingoutageOnceduringlnajorrefueHngCUtagc(8)HighAreaTemperature(S190rXXXOnce/weekOnceduringeachmajorrefuelingoutageOnceduringeachmajorrefuelingCUtagcl00

Tables3.6.2band..6b(cont.)INSTRUMENTATIONTHATINITIATESPRIMARYCOOLANTSYSTEMORCONTAINMENTISOLATION3.6.2b-LimitinConditionfor0eration4.6.2b-SurveillanceReuirementParameterMinixnuxnNo.ofTrippedorOperableTriSstemsMinimuxnNo.ofOperableInstrumentChannelsperOperableTriSstemSetPointReactorModeSwitchPositionInWhichFunctionMustBe0erableShutdownRefuelStartuRunSensorCheckInstrumentInst~eatChannelChannelTestCalibrationSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEMISOLATION(9)HighAreaTexnperaturei<170rXXXOnce/weekOnceduringeachmajorrefuelingoutageOnceduringeachmajorrefuelingoutageCONTAINMENTISOLATION(IO)Low-Low'eactorWaterLevel<5ftbelowxninimuxnXnormalwaterlevelatElevation302'-9"XXOnce/dayOnceperxnouthOnceper3months(11)HighDrywellPressure53.5psig(b)X(b)(b)Once/dayOncepermonth0ncepex'months(I2)ManualXXOnceduringeachoperat-ingcycleNotesforTables3.6.2band4.2.6b(a)Maybebypassedintherefuelandstartuppositionsofthereactormodeswitchwhenreactorpressureislessthan600psi.(b)Maybebypassedwhennecessaryforcontainmentinerting.

h 2.UESTIONCertaintechnicalspecificationsapplicabletocontainmentwillberequired.tobechanged.;thesearediscussed.below:GeneralDesignCriteriaNos.55,56,and.57specifyrequire-mentsforparticularclassesofprimarycontainmentpenetrations.Youpresentgeneralinformationtoshowconformancetotheserequirementsinyourreport,"TechnicalSuaplementtoPetitionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFull-TermOperatingLicense"(Application).Pleaseprovideatabulation.ofisolation,valvearrangementandfunction-onallfluid.line'penetrationsoftheR&-1primarycontainment.Thistabulationistobeincorporated.inTable3.3.4oftheTechnicalSpecifications.IncludeintheabovetabulationadesignationofallvalveswhicharedefinedtobeprimarycontainmenttestablepenetrationsforpurposesofSection4.3.3.e(l)oftheTechnicalSpecifications.CeIngenera1,theprimarycontainmentleakageratetestingspeci-ficationsaretobeupdatedtobeconsistentwiththerequirementsofAppendixJto10CFRPart50.Inparticular,Section4.3.3.d(3)istoberevised.tospecifythatasetofthreeintegratedleakratetests(TypeA)shallbeperformed.atapproximatelyequal..,mnterva1sMuring.each.ten-.year,.serviceperiod..Thethird.test-ofeachsetshallbeconductedwhenIMP-1isshutdownfortheten-yearplantinserviceinspection.d.Similarly,TechnicalSpecification4.3.3.e(2)istoberevised.tospecifythatthepersonnelairlockdoorsealsshallbetested.,aftereachopeningwhenthereactorisinapoweroperatingcondition,atapressureof10psigandtheleakrateextrapolatedto35psig.Theleakrateshallnotexceed5$ofLa.Airlocksshallbeleakratetested,atapressureof35psigatsix-monthintervals.e.CSection4.3.3.e(4)istoberevised.tospecifythattestingofmainsteamlineisolationvalvesistobeperformed,at35psiginaccordancewithAppendixJof10CFR50.RESPONSEa,bProposedrevisionstoTechnicalSpecification3.3.4isattachedandnotedbymarginalmarkings.c,d,ePrimarContainmentLeakaeRateTestinProposedchangestoTechnicalSpecification4.3.3tobringitintoconformancewithlOCFRSOAppendixJareattached.Changestopages65,66and67oftheTechnicalSpecificationsandBaseswouldberequired.

Asaresultofthefirstprimarycontainmentleakratetest,theratioofL(22)/L(35)wasdeterminedtobe0.735.ThisresultsinatestleakrateequationfromAppendixJ,whichisthesameasthecurrentspecification4.3.3b(2).ThetestfrequencyrequirebythecurrentTechnicalSpecif--icationsisnotthesameasthatcontainedinAppendixJof10CFR50.Changesareproposedintheattachedspecification4.3.3.d.Threeprimarycontainmentleaktestshavebeenperformedasfollows:1.Testat35and22psig(August1969).2.Testat22psig(June1970).3.Testat22psig(May1972).Changesarealsoproposedforspecification4.3.3.e.(2)ande.(4)toallowtestingofairlocksandmainsteamisolationvalvesinconformancewithAppendixJof10CFR50.

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASESICont'd.)3.$.4PRIlQRTCCÃTAIhsKVTISOIATICIIVALVES4.3.4FRIMARYOavTAIbOKITISOIATIOXVALVESb~\blllAppliestothcoperatingstatusofthesystcaofisolationvalvesonlinesopentothefreespaceofthepriaarycontainaent.~bbbillAppliestotheperiodictestingrequiresentsofthepriaarycontainnentisolationvalvesystcn.Toassurethatpotentialleakagepathsfroatheprl-nsrycontainsentLntheevcatofaloss-of-coolantaccidentarealniaited.a<<lblIIthcneverthereactorcoolantsystceteaperaturelsgreaterthan2ISF,allcontaitsseatisolationvalvesonlinesopeatothefreespaceofthepriaatycontainaentshallbeoperableexceptasspecltiedin$.$.4bbelov.b.Intheeventanyisolationvalvebccoaesinoperablethesysteashallbeconsideredoperableprovidedatleastonevalveineachlinehavinganlnoperawevalvelslathenodecorrespondingtotheisolatedcondition.c.IfSpecifications$.3.4aandbarenotaet,thereactorcoolantsysteatcaperatureshallbere-ducedtoavaluelessthan21SFvlthlntenhours.ebbToassuretheaural'IlltynrthcprivacycontainscntisolationwivestoliaittbotentialIesiareoathsfrouthecontalnaentInthecwntoeslose-oe-cnn)antaccident..~SIlllIhepriaarycontslnaentisola'tlonvalvessurveillanceshallbepcrforaedasindicated(seeTable3.3.4).a.Atleastonceperoperatingcycletheoperableisolationvalvesthatarepowroperatedandautoastlcallyinitiatedshallbetestedforauto-asticinitiationandclosuretines.b.AtleastonceperquarterallnornaIIyopenpoveroperatedIsolationvalvesshallbefully-closetsndreopened.c.Atleastonceperoperating<<ycle.eachInstrument-lineflowcheckvalvewillbetestedforoperability;Doubleisolationvalvesaraprovidedonlinespenetratingthaprlaaryocntalnaentandopentothetreespaceotthecontainaent.Closureotoneofthevalvesineachlinevouldbasuttlcieattonaintainthaintegrityotchepressuresuppressionsystea.Sxceptvherecheckvalvesareusedasoneorbothofasetofdoubleisolationvalves,theIsolationclosuretiaesarepresantaiinrebel3.34.Isolationvalvearrangeaentsonlinesnotopeningtothefreespaceofthacon-tainnentarealsopresentedlnTable3.3.4.Autoaatlcinitiationisrequiredtoainlaixethepotentialleakagepathstreethecontainsentlntheawntotalosswf-coolantaccident.bstailsoftheisolationvalwearadiscussedinSectionVI%.~rorallovableleakageratespeclticattonsbseeSection3.3.3above.AsIllustratedinFigureE-$4ofAppendixE'uelrodperforationdoesnotoccuruntilabout1$0secondsfollovingtheloss-of-coolantaccident.Arequiredclosingtineof60secondsforallpriaarycontainaentIsolationvalvesvillbeadequatetopreventfissloaproductreleasethroughlinesconnectingtotheprivacycontaiteent.Forreactorcoolantsysteatcaperatureslessthan$12F,theContain-seatcouldnotbeccaepressurltedduetoaloss-of-coolantaccident.The2)SFliaitIsbasedonpreventingpressuritationofthereactorbuildingandruptureoftheblnvoutpanels.Thetestintervalofonceperoperatingcycleforptcaaticlnltla-tionresultslnafailureprobabilityofI.Ix10thatalinevillnotisolate(FifthSuppleaent,.p.IIS).Herefrequenttestingforvalveoperabilityresultsinanorereliablesystcn.InadditiontoroutinesurveillancessoutlinedlnFirstAddenbhsstoTechnicalSupplesenttoPetitiontoIncreasePoverLevel,eachlast-ruaent-lineflovcheckvalvevillbetestedforoperability.AllinstruaentsonsgivenlinevillbeisolatedateachInstrusent.Thelinevillbepurgedbyisolatingthefleecheckvalve,openingthebypassvalves,andopeningthedrainvalvetotheequlpaentdraiatank.shenpurgiaglssufficienttoclearthelineofnon-conden-siblesandcrudtheflcv-checkvalvevillbecutIntoservicesndthobypassvalveclosed.Theaainvalvevillagainbeopenedandtheflov-checkvalvea)lovedtoclose.theflov-checkvalvevillberesetbyclosingthedrainvalveand.openingthebypassvalvedepressurizingpartofthesystes.Instruaentsvillbecutintoserviceafterclosingofthebypassvalve.RepressurltingofthelndlvldualInstrusentsassuresthatfloe-checkvalveshaveresettotheopenposltlon.Issued&CO-TI'FSAR68

LLfITI:1'tCotZ)III(CXPCROFIRAII(tTable336PRL6'dtYCHAI:X'TISOLTIC:VALVESDellVcncdPureCoancct1onOneLineAfrConncctfott(OneLine)t~atiotRclatfcNo.otValvestoPrfnsryOutsideOutsldcOutsideOutsideNorJPotftfo;Closed(a)Closed(a)Closed(a)Closed(a)vJtfveFevercP.o.F.oVJsfnuOper.Ifac60606060AcCfonoaInftiatfng~llCloseCloseCloseCloseIn1cfat1ngSignalAllValvesHaveRcaoteManualgac'EuReactorvateslevellovlovordryvellhighpressureSvcessionChanberVent6FvreNConnectionOneioeAirConnection(OneLine)DrywllNIM~akeu'(ttwT~aeOutsideOutsideOutsideOutsideOvicideClosed(a)Closed(a)Closed(4)Closed(a)Closed(b)F.o.F.o.F.o.F.o.P.o.6060606060CloseCloseCloseCloseCloseRcaccorvaterlevellov-lovordrywllhighpressureReactorvacerlevellov-lovordryvcllhighpressureNIMakeup(OacLinc)llufntDrainLine(OncLine)(OneLine)urectionhanberttstcrEcu(onsLfae)OvteideInsideOutsideInsideOutsideOutsideOutsideClosed(b)OpctlOpenOpenOpenClosed(b)F.o.F.o.P.oF.o.F.o.F.O.SellAct.Ck.eo60eo6060CloseCloseCloseCloseCloseReactorvacerlevellov-lovordrywffhighpressureReactorvatcrlevellov-lovordrywllhighpressureReaocenanw1AtaosphcretoPressureSuppressionSysc<<a(ThreeLines)ReactorCleaaupSysceaRelictValveDfschae(OneLinetoSupprcssioaCbaaberSaapliagDrZyell(IhreeLiaes)u(oneLine)OutsideOCsfdeOucsfdeOucsfdeOutsideClosedClosed(b)Closed(b)F.o.SellAcc.Ck,SeltActCk.F.o.F.o.6060OpenCloseCloseNegativeprcssurerelativecoatnosphere!RcaccorvaccrlevelIttcIovorhighdryvellpressureNotcst(a)Thesevalvesaaybeopenforcoatafnacnctillvfthnitrorcn.(b)Ihcsevalvesvillperiodicallybeopenedforsanplfngornftrogeaaaltcup.(c)P.o.-PovcrOperated.1m'CO7169 I

LIMITINCCONDITIO~vOROPERATIONTable3.3.4ntinuedPRIM'RTCONIAItDKhTISOIATIONVALVESRF.EPAF.NTAK~ne~itKNo.ofValves~Esct+~cLocationRelativetoPrfuarya{weHomalMaxfnunMotiveOper.TineActiononInitiattngInitiatingSignalAslave.essku~Co~Srs(d)~PnS~ut(FoutLinesfroaSupp.Chan.)OutsideACHotor90Rcnotcannual~PG.b(I'oTestLfnestoSupp.Chan,)OutsideClosedACMotorMsx,90CloseReactorvsterlevellov-lovDveilVent6NConnection(OacLine)~alCcf(OacLine)OutsideOutstdeOutsideOutsideClosedClosedClosedClosedAir/DCSol.ACHotorAir/DCSol,ACHotorMsx.60Hax,60Hsx.60Hsx.60CloseCloseCloseCloseReactorvaterlevellov-lov,ordryvellhighpressureRectr.Pu=pCooltngdVieQSuSupplyLineReturnLfncOutsideOutsideOpenOpenSelfhct.Ck.DCMotorMax+30.Recetensnua1.ve11CnoleMatSu1'(d)SupplyLfaeReturnLtneOutsideOutsideOpenOpenSelfhct,CkiDCMotorHex'0Rcnotenanua1uue11sn~51(PLt~)INEWOutsideF.E0A1'OpenAir/DCSol.Msx,60OpenReactorlevellov-lovandhighdryvellpressureuIIIIh(FourLtacs)cistCbecbrBranch(OneBranchforEachSystcn)u~ScnnSuesto~Chaebc(FourLines)OutsideOutsfdeOutsideSelfhct.Ck,Selfhct.Ck,OpenACPtor60Resotensaualvalveineachseparatelineandoaevalveineachcocoonline.(d)Iheseareclassifiedssnot-testablevalvesandpenatratfonsi

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASESICont'd.I3.3.3LEAKAGERATE4.3.3LEAKAGERATEAliAppliestotheallowableleakagerateoftheprimarycontalnmentsystem.Appliestotheprimarycontalnmcntsystemleakagerate,ObectlvetObective:ToassurethecapabilityofthccontainmentinlimitingradiationexposuretothepublicfromexceedingvaluesspecifiedinIOCFRIOOIntheeventofaloss-of-coolantaccidentaccompaniedbysignificantfuelcladdingfailureandhydrogengenrratlonfromametal<<sterreaction.Toverifythattheleakagefromtheprimarycontainment~ystemlsmaintained<<ithinspecifiedvalues.Wheneverthereactorcoolantsystemtemperaturelsabove215Fthcprimarycontainmentleakagerateshallbe<<ithlnthelimitsof4.S.3.b.a.IntcratedPrimerContainmcntLeakseRateTest(I)IntegratedleakratetestsshallbeperformedpriortoItdt(alStationoperationatthetestpressureof35pslg(Pp)andthetestpressure(Ptlof22psigtoobtaintherespectivemeasuredleakratesLm(35)andLm(22).(2)Subsequentleakageratetestsshallbeperformed<<ithoutpreliminaryleakdetectionsurveysorleakrepairsimmediatelypriortoorduringthetest.ataninitialprcssureofapproximately22psig.(3)Leakrepairs.IfnecessarytopermitIntegratedleakageratetesting,shallbeprecededbylocalleakagemeasurements.Theleakageratediffer-ence.priortoandaRerrepairwhencorrectedtoPtshallbeaddedtothefinalintegratedlca'kagerateresult.(4)Closureofthecontainmentisolationvalvesforthepurposeofthetestshallbeaccomplishedbythemeansprovidedfornormaloperationofthevalves.~(5)Thetestdurationshallnotbelessthan24hoursforintegratedleakratemeasurements.butshallbeextendedtoasufficientperiodoftimetoveri-fy.bymeasuringthequantityofairrequiredtoreturntothestartingpoint(orothermethodsofequivalentscnsltivhy).thevalidityandaccuracyofthelea'kagerateresults.TheprimarycontalnmcntpreoperationaltestpressuresarebaseduponthecalculatedprimarycontainmentpressureresponseIntheeventofaloss-of-coolantaccident.Thepeakdry<<ellpressure<<ouldbe35psigwhich<<ouldrapidlyredoceto22pslgwlthln100secondsfollowingthepipebrea'k.Thetotaltimethedrywallpressurewouldbeabove22pslglscal-culatedtobeabout10seconds.Followingthepipebreak.thesuppressionchamberpressurerisesto22pslgwltldn10seconds,cquallscs<<ithdrywellpressureandthereafterrapidlydecayswiththedry<<ellpressuredecay.(I)Thedesignpressuresofthedrywallandabsorptionchamberare62pslgandS5pslg.respectively.(2)Thedesignleakratels0.5~A/dayatapressureof35pslg.Aspointedoutabove.thepressureresponseofthedry<<ettandsuppressionchamberfollowinganaccident<<outdbethesameafterabout10seconds.Basedonthecalculatedprimarycontainmentpressureresponsediscussedaboveandthe'suppressionchatnberdesignpressure,primarycontainmentpreoperationaltestpressureswerechosen.Also.basedontheprimarycontainmentpressureresponseandthefactthatthcdrywallandsuppressioncharnbcrfunctionasaunit.theprimarycontainmentwillbetestedasaunitratherthantestingtheIndividualcomponentsseparately.Thedesignbasisloss-of-coolantaccidentwasevaluatedattheprimarycontainmentmaximumallowableaccidentleakrateof).9yA/dayat35pslg.Theanalysisshowedthatwiththisleakrateandastandbygastreatmentsystemfitter.efficiencyof40percentforhalogens.95percentforparticulates.andassumingthefissionproductreleasefractionsstatedInTID-14844.themaximumtotalwholebodypassingclouddoselsabout6.0remandthemaximumtotalthyroiddoselsabout150rematthesheboundaryconsideringfumigationconditions(I)AppendixE.FSAR(2)VolumeI.SectionVI.FSARIsauodO~-71 4

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIRBhENTBASES(Con)'d)b.AcestanceCriteria(I)Themaximumallowabletea4xerateLpshallnotexceedI.5<<eightpercentofthccontainedairper24hoursatthetestpressureof35psig(Pp).(2)Theallo<<abletestleakrateLt(22)shallnotexceedthevalueestablishedasfolloweri,t(22)~1.5i,m(22)/Im(35)(3)Theallo<<ableoperationalleakrate.Lto(22)<<hichshallbemetpriortoresumptiono(po<<eroperationfolio<<lngatest(eitherasrncasuredorfolio<<ingrepairsandretestlshallnotexceed0.75Lt(22).c.CorrectiveActionIfleakrepairsarenecessarytomeettheallo<<ableoperationalleakrate.theintegratedleakratetestneednotbcrepeatedprovidedlocallca4gemeasure-mentsarcconducted.andtheleakratedifferencespriortoandafterrepairs.<<hencorrectedtoPtanddeductedfromthcintegratedleakratemeasure-rnent.yieldalea4geratevaluenotinexcessoftheallo<<ableoperationalleakrateLt(22).tothreeintegratedleakratetestsshallheperfor<<edatapproxinatelyequaiintervalsduringeach10-yearserviceperiodwiththethirdtestineachten~earintervalcorrespondingwiththeten~srscheduledin-serviceInspectionshutdovn.overanexposuredurationoftwohours.TheresultantdoseswouldoccurforthedurationoftheaccMentatthelowpopulationdistanceofcmllesarelowerthanthosestatedduetothevari-abilityofmeteorologicalconditionsthatwouldbeexpec*dtooccurovera30-dayperiod.Thus.thedosesreportedarethemaximumthat<<ouldbeexpectedlntheunlikelyeventof~designbasisloss.of-coolantaccMent.Thesedosesarealsobasedontheassumptionofnoholdupinthesecondarycontainmentre-sultinginadirectreleaseoffissionproduct~fromtheprimarycontainmentthroughthcfiltersandstacktotheenvirons.There-fore,thespeci((edprltnarycontainmentleakrateandfilterefficiency(Specificationc.c.<)areconservativeandprovidemarginbet<<ecnexpectedoffsltedosesandIOCFR)00guidelineIfm)ts.Themaximumallowabletestleakrateasspecifiedln4.3~3bis1.5%/dayatapressureof35pslg.Thisvalueforthetestcondition<<asderivedfromthemaximumallowableaccidentleakrateofabout1.9%/daywhencorrectedfortheeffectsofcontainmentenvironmentunderaccidentandtestconditions.Intheaccidentcase.thecontainmentatmospherelnltlallywouMbecomposedofsteamandhotairdepletedofoxygen<<hereasundertestconditionsthetestmediumwouldbeairornitrogenatambientconditions.ConsMerlngthedifferencesinmixturecompositionandtemperatures,theappropriatecorrectionfactorapplied<<as0.8anddeterminedfromtheguideoncontainmenttesting.(3)Althoughthedosecalculationssuggestthattheallowabletestleakratecouldbeallo<<edtoincreasetoabout3.0%/daybeforetheguidelinethyroiddoselimitgivenlnIOCFRIOOwouldbeexceeded.establishingthet(m(tat1.5%/dayprovidesanadequatemarginofsafetytoassurethehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.Itisfurtherconsideredthattheallowableleakrateshouldnotdeviatesignificantlyfromthecontalnmcntdesignvaluetotakeadvantageofthedesignleak-tightnesscapabilityofthestructureoveritsservicelifetime.Addft)ona(margintomaintainthecontainmentinthe"asbuilt"conditionlsachievedbyestablishingtheallo<<ableoperationalleakrate.Theoperationallimitisderivedbyrnultlplyingtheallowabletestleakrateby0.75therebyprovidinga25%margintoallowforleakagedeterioration<<hichmayoccurduringthepcrfedbet<<ceoteakratetests~TheprimarycontainmentleakratetestfrequencyI~basedonmaintainingadequateassurancethattheleakrateremainswithinthespecification.TheleakratetestfrequencylsbasedontheAECguidefordevelopingleakratetestingandsurveillanceofreactorcontainmentvessels.()(3)TID-20583.LeakageCharacteristicsofSteelContalntnentVesselsandtheAnalysisofLeakageRat~Determinations.(c)locttt50appendixJ,Reactorcontain<<antLeakageTestfngforIwatercooledrovertteactors.Issued tl LIMITINGCONOITIONfOROPERATIONSURVEILI.ANCEREQUIREMENTBASESICont'd.Ie.LocalLeakRateTests(I)primarycontainmenttestablepenetrationsandisolationvalvesshallbetestedatapressureof35pslgeachmajorrefuelingoutageexceptbolteddoublegaskecedsealsshallbetested<<henevertheseallsclosedaHerbeingopened.andatleastateachrefuelingoutage.(I)Personnelairlockdoorscaleshallbetestedaftereachopening<<henthereactorisinaposeroperatingoonditioa,atapressureof10pslgandtheleakrateextrapolatedto35Psig.airlocksshallalsobeleakratstestedatapressureof3$psigatsixaonthintervals.In44ehtest.ChsIeskr4teCnrreetedto35psigshallnotexceed5percentofL.(5)Containmentcomponentsnotincludedin(I)and-(2)<<hichrequiredteakrepairsfollowinganyintegratedleakageratesinordertornecttheallowableleakagerateunitLtshallbesubjectedtolocalleaktestsat4pressureof35psigateachrefuelingoutage.(S)gheaalnsteaalineisolationvalvesaretobeSeatedat4pressureof35psiildtiriag44threfuelingoutage.f.CorrectiveAction(I)lfthetotalleakagerateslistedbelowasadjustedtoatestpressureof22pslg,areexceeded.re-pairsandretcstsshallbeperformedtocorrectthecondition.(a)double-gasketedsealsl0Lt(22lThepenetratioaandairpurgepipingleakagetestfrequency,along<<,iththecontainmentleakratetests.Isadequateto4llowdetectionofleakagetrends.Whencvcradouble-gasketedpanetratlon(primarycontainmentheadequipmcnthatchesandthesuppressionchamberaccesshatch)isbrokenandremade.the~pacebet<<eenthegasketsispressurizedtodeterminethatthesealsareperformingproperly.Thetestpressureof35pslgisconsisteatwiththeaccidentanalysesandthemaxlcnumpreop-cratlonalleakratetestpressure.Iclsexpectedthatthemajor)tyoftheleakagefromvalves.penetrationsandseals<<ouldbeIntothereactorbuilding.However.itispossiblethatleakageIntootherpartsofthefacilitycouldoccur.Suchleakagepathsthatmayaffectsignificantlytheconsequencesofaccidentsaretobeminimised.Iftheleakageratesofthedouble-gasketedsealpenetrations.testablepenetrationisolationvalves.contalnmeatairpurgeinlet~andoutletsandthevacuumreliefvalvesareatthemaximumspecified.they<<illtotal90percentoftheallowedleakrate.(5)Hence.10percentmarginisleftlorleakagethrough<<elisanduntestedcomponents.Monitoringthenitrogenmakeuprequirementsofthelnertlngsystemprovidesamethodofobservingleakratetrendsandwoulddetectgrosslea'ksinaveryshorttime.Thisequip-mentmustbeperiodicallyremovedfromservicefortestaadmaintenance.butthisout-of-servicetimewillbekepttoapracticalminimum.(b)(I)testablepenetrations30>>Lco[22)andisolationvalves(t)anyonepenetrationor5>>vLto(22)IsolationvaIvs(c)primirycontalamentairpurgepenetrationsandreactorbuildingtotorusvacuumreliefvalves50"Io(22)g.ContinuousLeakRateMonitor(I)WhencheprimarycontainmentisinertedtheconCalnmentshallbecontinuouslymonitoredforgrossleakagebyreviewoftheinertingsystemmakeuprequirements.(t)Thismonitoringsystemmaybetakenoutofserviceforthepurposeofmaintenanceortcstlngbutshallbereturnedtoserviceassoonaspractical.IssuedTheaccessibleinteriorsurfacesofthedrywallshallbevisuallyInipcctedeachoperatingcycleforevidenceofdeterioration.(5)Volumei.SectionVI.FSAR67 I,LII

~UESTZONCertainothertechnica1specificationswillberequiredtobechangedinadditiontoincludingrequirementsnotpresentlyspecified.Thesearediscussed.'below:Concurrentmaintenanceinvolvingremovalofccntrolrod.drivesand.drainingofthetorushasbeenrequiredpreviouslyontwooccasions.TheTechnicalSpecificationsshould'berevised.topermitthistypeofconcurrentmaintenanceandtospecifytheapplicablecontrols.Your"an~sis'ofa'nticipatedtransientswithoutscramindicatesthattherecirculationpumpswould'betrippedwheneverreactorvesselpressureisequaltoorgreaterthan1150psia.Youarerequestedtoproposeappropriatetechnicalspecificationstoreflectthisrequirementifthetri~ingoftherecirculationpumpsis,infact,whatyouareproposing.Inthisregard,youstatethattheinstallationofthesetripswould.bedonebytheendofthefirstrefuelingoutage.c~InSection3.2.3.coftheTechnicalSpecifications,thebasisforallowingnigherchlorideionconcentrationandconductivityathighsteamingratesistheloweroxygenlevelsanticipatedathighsteamingrates,andthedatashowninFigure3.2.3.Thereferenced"Corrosionand$learHandbook"fromwhichthisfigureistakenstatesthatdataweretaken,onU-bendspecimensofsevera1stainlesssteels,primarilytype347,at500F,inpH-10;6watercontaining50cpmPOg,exoosed.inthesteamphasewithintermittentwetting.Theoriginalfiguretitlestates:"Curveisbased.onobservationsmadeunderspecificconditions,(and)thereforeisnotintended.forgeneraluse."Therefore,webelieveFigure3.2.3isanunacceptablebasisfortechnicalsoecificationsofchloridelevelsinneutral,phosphate-freewaterat600FinPrrRsmadeoftype304stainlesssteel.Tnerefore,Section3.2.3.cshouldbedeletedfromtheTechnica1SpecificationsorrevisedtoconformwithTable2ofRegulatoryGuide1.56,"MaintenanceofMaterPurityinBoilingMaterReactors",whichgives5umho/cmynd0.5cpmchlorideasacceptablelimitsatsteamingratesP10~lb/hrforaB!Rwithafreshwater-cooledcondenser.TheSurveillanceRequirementspecifiedinSection4.2.3oftheTechnicalSpecificationsshouldberevisedtodefinea"shorttermspike"andtoindicateactionstobetakenwhenthecontinuousconductivitymonitorisinoperable.Amaximumtimefor.operationoftheplantwithoutthecontinuousconductivitymonitorsbeingoperableshouldbespecified.

RESPONSEa.ProposedrevisionstoTechnicalSpecifications3.1.4and3.3.7isattachedandnotedbymarginalmarkings.b.SincethetimeoftheTechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConver-sionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFullTermOperatingLi-censeanumberofchangeshavetakenplacewith,regardtoAnticipatedTransientsWithoutScram..Oneimportantchangehasbeentheeffectontransientsofarevisedscramreactivitycurve.Thesecondchangerelatestothestaffreviewandconclusison,includedin"TechnicalReport.onTransientsWithoutScramforWaterCooledReactors"."Wearecurrentlyreviewingouranalysi'san'dconclusionagainstthestaffpositiondescribedinthatreport.InformationconcerningthisrevisedanalysisandproposedchangestotheTechnicalSpecificationswillbediscussedinourresponsetotheAECrequestofOctober19,1973.c.ProposedrevisionstoTechnicalSpecification3.2.3isattachedandnotedbymarginalmarkings.1LetterdatedOctober19,1973fromMr.A.GiambussotoMr.P.D.Raymond

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASES(COIIt'd.I3.1.4CORESPRAYSYSTtzt4.1.4CORKSPIIAYSYSTOt~lrblaAppliaatotheoperatingstatusoftbecorespraysysteasAppliestotheperiodictestingzequirencatsforthecozespraysystcas.Toassurethecapabilityofthecorespraysysteastocoolreactorfueliatheeventofalossof-coolantaccident.a>~bToverifytheoperabilityofthecorespraysysteas.~5<<!fl1a.Wheneverirradiatedfuelisinthereactorvessel,eachofthetwocorespraysystemsshallbeoper-ableexceptasspecifiedinSpecificationsb,candd,below.b.Ifaredundantcoraponeatofacorespraysystembecomesinoperable,thatsystemshallbeconsidaredoperablaprovidedthatthecomponentisreturnedtoanoperableconditionwithin15daysandtheadditionalsurveillancerequiredisperfozmed.c.Ilaredundantcomponentineachoithecotesptaysystemsbecomesinoperable,bothsystemsshallbeconsidezedoperablepzovidedthatthecomponentisrctuznedtoanoperableconditionwithinTdaysaadtheadditionalsurveillancerequiredisper-lormcd.d.Ilacorespraysystembecomesinoperableandallthecomponentsareoperableintheothersystem,thereactormayremaininoperationforaperiodnottoexceedIdays.e.IfSpecificationsa,b,canddarenotmet,anormalorderlyshutdowashallbeinitiatedvrithinonehourandthereactorshallbeinthecoldshutdowncondi-tionwithintenhours.Ifbothcorespraysysteaebecca>ainoperablethereactorshallbeinthecoldsbutdcvnconditionvithinteahoursandnovork(exceptasspecifiedlnfbelov)shallbepezforacdonthezeactozoritsconnectedsystaasvhichcauldrea>ltinloverinythereactorvaterleveltoserethansevenfeetelevenInchesbolovalai>usanoraallevel.Thecorespraysysteasurveillanceshallbepcrforaedasindicatedbelov.a.Ateachas]orrefuelingoutageAutoataticstartupofoaesetofIxzapsineachcorespraysysteashallbedcaonstrated.b.Atleastonceperquarterpuapoperhbilltyshallbedecked.c.Atleastonceperquartertheoperabilityofpoveroperatedvalvesrequiredforpropersys-tcaoperationshallbechecked.d.CorespravheaderpInstruacntationcheckOnce/daycalibrateOnce/3aonthstestOnce/Isenthse.SurvelIlanceelahIncrgbleConantsshenacceprmentorsystcabccoaesinoperableitsredundantcoaponcntorsystcashallbcdeaonstratcdtobeopera!lclracdiarclyanddailythereafter.Thecorespraysysteaconsistsoltvoautonatlcally~ctuated,independent,douMe-capacitysystaascapaMeofcooliagreactorfuelfor~rangeofloss-ol-coolantaccidents.Forthevorstliaebrcak,aloss-of-coolantaccldcnt~acoresprayofatleast$400gpnisrequiredvithinSIsecond>>toprovidefuelstabilitysufficientlytoassureeffectivecorecooling.Eachcorespraysysteahas100percentcoolingcapacityfreeeathsprayheaderaadeachsupplypuapaet.Thus>specifyingbothsysteastobefullyoperationalvill~asurcto~highdegreecorecoolingcapabilityifthecorespraysystealsrequired.AllovableouragesarespecifiedtoaccountforccraponcntsthatbecoaeInoperableinbothsysteasandforserethanonecoaponeatinssystea.gothcorespraycyst>ascontainredundantsupplypvrapsetsandblockingvalves.Operationofoaepuapset~ndblockiagvalvelssufficienttoestablishrequireddeliveryrateandflovpath.Therefore,evenviththelossoloneofthereduadsatcoupoacats~asystemis~tillcapableofperforaiagitsintendedfunction.If~rcdbadantcouponeatisfouadtohavefailed,correctiveaaiotensncevillbeginproeptly.Nearlysllnainteaaacecanbecoupletedvlthin~fevdays.Infrequently>hov-ever>aa]oraalatenaacenightberequired.Replace>>eatofprincipalsysteacouponcntscouldnecessitateoutagcsinexcessofthosespecified.Inspiteofthebesteffortsoftheoperatortozeturaequlpaenttoservice,soaeaaintensncecouldrequireupto6aonths.lndctcruiaiagtheoperabilityofacorespraysysteatherequiredperfomaacecapabilityofitsvariouscor>ponentsshallbeconsidered.Eozexaaplerl.Thedeliveryratefretsonecorespraypuapandtoppingpuapshallnotbelesschan3400gpa~t~coubinedpuapdevelopedheadof691feetofvster.Atthisdeliveryrateadequatecorecoolingisprovidedtopreventfuelwelting.(SectionVII)'TSAR32

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASESICont'd.)f.Workaaybepextoxaedoncontrolxoddrivesattimeswhenvaterfsnotfntheeuppressfcncham-berandthecoresprayeyateashallbeconsideredoperableprovidedthatthefollowingareaetx1.woaoxethanonecontrolxoddrivehousingortrnapenetrationvill1>>openedatanytim>>.2.Ablindtfancevillbeinstalledontheocntrolzo4drivehousfncvheneveracontxolxoddrivohasbeenreaoccdtoxmaintenance.3~workvillnotbopeztozae4xnthereactorvesselvhlle~controlzoddrivehousfnofsopen.4.Acontxolroddrivevillnotberemoveditthebackseatseal4oeenotfunction.5.Aafniauaconfensatestororevolumeof300,000qallonsandaafniauahotwellstoragevolumeofCO,OOOValfonsvillboaaintaine4dvzforthepczfodthatthetoruswaterlevolfabelovthatcorrespcodfxvftoainfxsasargyxequircaent.6.Thecontrolzoddriveremovalan4frxxcreplaces>>ntshallnotbeconcurrentitems.Thepuwpshallbecapableofautcaaticinitiationfromufow-fowwaterlevelsignalinthereactorvesselorahighcontainmentpressuresignal.Theblockingvalvesshallbe<<apableofautoaaticallyopeningfreeeitherslow-lowvatersignalorhighcontainmentpressuresignalsimultaneouswithlowreactorprcssurepczaissivcsignal.(SectionVil)'Thecorespraydeliveryrateof3400gpashallbeavailableatthecorespraynoxlesinsidethere-actorvesselvlthin33seconds.6.backupdieselgeneratorpovershallbeavaflabl~to~llmotoroperatedcomponents.geforethefirstmajorrefuelingoutage,instrumenta-tionvillbeinstalledtomonitorthefntegrltyofthccorespraypipingvithinthereactorpressurevessel.Followinginstallationofthisfnstriacntatfcn,therequirementsstatedinspecificationC.l.s4shallbofolfowd.Thetestingspecifiedforeachaajorrefuelingoutagevilldemonstratecomponentresponseuponautomaticmystesinitiation.Forexaxple,puapsotstarting(lov-lowlevelorhighdzyvcllpressure)andvalveopening(lowlowlevelorhighdryvellpressureandlowreactorpressure)mastfunction,undersimulatedconditionsinthesaneaannerasthesysteasarerequiredtooperateunderactualconditions.Theonlydifferencesvillbethatdcaincrallxcdvatcrratherthansuppressionchamberwaterwillbepuapedtothereactorvesselandthereactorvillbeatatmosphericprcssure.Thecorespraysysteasaredesignedsuchthatdcainerallxedwaterlsavailablctothesuctionofonesetofpumpslneachsystea(SectionVlfFigureVlf-l).Thesystcatestintervalbetvecnoperatingcyclesresultsinasystemfailureprobabilityof1.1x106(FifthSupplcaent,page113)andisconsistentvithpracticalconsiderations.Thenorefrequentcoaponenttestingresultsinaacrereliablesystem.wAtquarterlyintervals,'tartupofcorespraypumpswilldemonstratepumpstartingandoperability.Ãoflowwilltakeplacetothereactorvesselduetothelackofafow-prcssurepermissivesignairequiredforopeningoftheblockingvalves.Flow,insteadwillbere-cycledtothesuppressionchaaberviaatestloop.Anorificehasbeenprovidedinthetestloopwhichvillsimulatethepressurelossduringemergencyoperationofthesystca.Inaddition,thenoxasllyclosedpoweroperatedblockingvalveswillbeaanuallyopenedandre-closedtodemonstrateoperability.Theintentofspeciticatfon3.1ctfmtoallovcontxolxoddxfveaalntenanceandtrxccreplacementatthetfs>>thatthosuppressionchamberfsunwateredandtopertoxanormalfuelaovcaentactlv-iticsfntherefuolaudevithanunwateredsuppressioncf>>aber.Xiascdontheliaitcdtfaefnvolvedinpertoxacnceofthecon-currentaaintenancetasks,proceduralcontrolstoainiaizethepotentialanfdurationotfeakaoetrnathecontrolro4drivehousfnoorfpkwpenetrationan4availablecoolantaakrxppzcvfdesadequateprotectionacafnstdrafnaqeofthevesselwhilethesuppressioncheaterfedrain<<d.33 l

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASES(Cont'd.)3.3.7coztalzmbtsrzarsrgtgxg.3.7CONTAINMENTSPRAYSYSTEMAppliestotheoperatingstatvaOfthecontalnnentsprs)svstenAppliestothetestingofthecontainmentspra'ysystem.Obective:toassurethecapabilityofthecontainoentspraysysteztoit>>itcontainzentpressureandteoperatureIntbeeventofaloss-of-coolantaccident.Toverifytheoperabilhyofthecontainmentspraysystem.Duringallreactoroperatingconditionswheneverreactorcoolanttemperaturei~greaterthan215Pandfuelisinthereactorvessel:eachofthetwocontainmentspraysystemsandtheassociatedrawwatercoolingsystemsshallbeoperableexceptasspecifiedin3.3.7.b.b.Ifaredundantcomponentofacontainmentspraysystembecomesinoperable.Specification3~3.7.a.shallbeconsideredfulfilled,providedthatthe<<omponentisreturnedtoanoperableconditionwithin15daysandthattheadditionalsurveillancerequiredisperformed.c.IfaredundantcomponentineachofthecontainmentspraysystemsortheirassociatedrawwatersystemsbecomeInoperable,bothsystemsshallbeconsideredoperableprovidedthatthecomponantisreturnedtoanoperablecondition>>qthin7daysandthattheadditionalsurveillancerequiredisperformed.d.Ifacontainmentspraysystemoritsassoclmedrawwatersystembecomesinoperableandailthecomponentsareoperableintheothersystems.thereactormayremaininoperationforaperiodnottoexceed7days.e.IfSpecificationsaorbarenotmet,shutdownshallbeginwithinonehourandthereactorcool-antshallbebelow215Fwithintenhours.lfbothcontafnooncspraysystcnsbecnneinoper-ablethereactorshallbeinthecoldshutdownconditionwithintcnhoursandnollork(exceptasspecifiedinfbelov)shallbeperforsedonthereactorvblchcouldresultinleertrv)thereactorvaterlevoltonotrethansevenfeeteleveninchesbelovnozuallevel,(Elevation302').Thecontainmentspraysystemsurveillanceshallbeper!ormedasIndicatedhalo>>ua.ContainmentSprayPumps(I)AtleastoncePvroperatingcycloautomaticstartupofthecontainmentspraypumpshallhedemonstrated.(2)Atleastonceeruarter.pumpoperabilityshallbechecked.b.NozzlesAt1<<astonceperoperatingcycle.anairtestshallbeperformedonthesprayheadersandnozzles.c.RawWaterCoolingPump>>AtleastonceperquarterntanualstartupandoperabllRyofthera>>watercoolingpumpsshallbedetttnnstrattvl.d.Surveillance<<IthinoperableI',orv~ncntttzhcnacoaponcntorsystcn)<<coorsinoperableitsredundantcooooncntorzyztceshallIeJcnonstratctltobeoperableiswcdiztcl>>and~tallyt!<<rczftcr.Forreact<<rcoolanttcnpcratvreslessthan215Fnot<<notghsteanIsgeneratedduringaloss.of.coolestaccidenttoprcssurltcthecontalnnent.Infact.forcoolantteuperaturesupto312F~theresultantloss-of-coolantaccidentpressurevouldnotexceedthedesignpressersof35pslg.op<<ratiosofonlyonecoatainoentspraypooplssufficientcoprovM<<therequiredcont<<inn<<acsprayflow.tbespecifiedflowof3000gpn(approxinetcly9Spercenttothedrywallandtbebalancetotbesuppressionchaober)issufflcfenttorewovepostsc<<identcorecoergyreleasesincludingasub-stantialcbcuicalreactionInvolvinghydrogengenerationandvillalsolint<<preset.reandteoperstureriseslntbepressuresuppressionsystcutobelovdesignvalues(AppendixE-II2.2.3p.g-)dandtheFifthSupple>>eat).'achcontain>>antspraysystcuiseonsldcrcdopcraMevhenbochp4npzareCapableofdeltveringatless<<3000gpnat~~ptztpdevelopedheadof3)Sfactofvatcrat50F.ReqidrlnbochFunpslnbochsystcooop<<table(400percent4ndancy)villassuretbeavailabilityofcbecontatnzentsprs't'rst<<it~'11IovablcoutogtcOr4Ape<<iflcdtoaccountforconponentsthatI<<concinopcraitlclnIoths)>>terszndfornorethanoneccepon-clt'IInasystctt~Thecorrespondingraveatercoolingsystcelsdcslgncdtostztntalncontalnoentsprayvatercusp<<recurenogreatertbsnIAOI'tndcrtbcsesclinitingop<<racingconditions.thecontalnoentspratravvat<<rcoolingsysteuiscon-OMeredoperablevbenthefloeratelsnotlessthan3000zpnatapepdevelopedheadof540feetofvater.Thtspvnpdevelopedbeadutilnalntalnahigherpressureontherauvotersidestthehestcxchangersthanonthecontatnoencsidesothatanyleakagevillbeintothecontalnnentspraysystez.Electricalpoverforallsstewconponcntsisnomsliy~vallablefrostcbcreservetransfer>>srEpotilossofthisservicetbepuupingrcqutreoentvillbesuppliedfroathedieselrcnerator.AtleastonedieselgeneratorshallalwaysbeavallsMetoprovidebac'kup~lectrlcalpeerforonecontalnnentspraysystcn.correspondingravwatercoollnxsystenandassociated~lectroniccquip-eentrequiredforancona<<les!stcuinitiation.73

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASESIG)nt'd.)Worknaybeperfumedoncontxolxoddrivesattinesvhenvatcrisnotinthesuppressioncfvxsber.'thecontaineentspraystatenshallbeconsfdemdoperablepmvfdedthefollovingarenett1.Nonorethanonecontxolzo4driwhousingorlplotpenetrationvillbeopenedatanycine.2.Ablindflangevillbeinstalledonthecon-trolzo4drivehousingvbcneveracontrolzcddrivehasbeenzeaovcdfoznaintenance.3.Norkvillnotbeperfozxedlnthereactorvesselvhileacontrolroddrivehousinglsopen.Acontxolxoddrivevillnotberescuedifthebackseatsealdoesnotfunction.$~Anfnfnuncondensatestorageveloceof300,000gallonsandanfninunhotvalistoragevoluneot40,000gallonsvillbenalntaine4dazingtheperfodthatthetorusvaterlewlisbelovthatoorxespondingtonininunNRSHrequfreeent.Autonaticinitiationofthecontainventspraysystenassuresthatthecontainnentvillcotb>>overpressuriteddwtohydrogengeneration.Thisautonaticfeaturevouldonlyberequiredifallcorespraysystcvsnaltunctfoncdandeigni'fcantnatal-vatcrreactionoccurred.yorthenoraslopxrstingconditionof90ysuppressionchanbcrvaterandtvopsigcontafrxscntpressure,coctainnentsprayactwtionvovldnotbenecessaryforabout1$ninutcs.Ravvatercoolingaffectsthetcnperatureofthesprayvaccrandthesuppressionchanberpool.Takingintoaccountthereducedsteancondensationcapabilitysndincreasedsuppressionchastervaporpressure.Cheravvatcrcooliogvouldnotberequiredfornorethan20ninutesforinitialsuppressionchaebertcvperaturesupto110y.Thisassuuesthatallcorespraysystcesfail.Therefore,nanwlinitiationoftheravvatersystcnisacceptable.Nearlyallnaintenancecanbeccopletedvithin~fevdays.Infrequently,hovever,na)ornalntenancenfghtberequired.Rcplaccnentofprincipalsystencoepooentscouldnecessitateoucaccsofnorethan1$days.InspiteofthebesteffortsOftheOperaCOrCOCCCurnequipnentCOSeluic~sSanenafntenancecouldrequireupto6nonths.6~Thecontxolrc4drivercnovalandfpRNreplaceaentshallnotbeconccxzwtfteea.Incon)unctionwithcontainmentspraypumpoperationduringeachoperatingcycle.therawwaterpumpsandassociatedcoolingsystemperformancewillbeobserved.Thecontainmentspraysystemshaflbecapableofauto-maticinitiationfromsimultaneouslow-lowreactorwaterlevelandhighcontainmentpressure.TheassociatedrawwatercoolingsystemshaBbecapableofmanualactuation.Operationofthecontainmentspraysysteminvolvessprayingwaterintotheatmosphcrcofthecontalnmcnt.Therefore,periodicsystemtestsarenotpractical.Insteadseparatetestingofautomaticcontainmentspraypumpstartupwfllbcperformedduringeachoperatingcycle.Duringpumpoperationwaterwillberecycledtothesuppressionchamber.Airteststodetermineflowstosprayheaderswillalsobeperformedatthistimeandcomparedtoinitialpre-operationalairtesting,verifyingthatpipingandiornoscleconditionshavenotchangedsignificantly.DesignfeaturesarediscussedinVolumeI,SectionVIIB.Z.0ipageVII-19e).Thevalvesinthecontainmentspraysystemarenormallyopenandarenotrequiredtooperatewhenthesystemiscafledupontooperate.ThetesClntcrvalbetweenoperatingcyclesresultslnasystemfaflureprobabflityof1.Ix106IpffthSupplement.page11$e)andlsconsistentwithpracticalconsiderations.Pumpoperabflitywiflbedemonstratedonamorcfrequentbasisandwfllprovideamorereliablesystem.Theintentofspecification3.3.2fistoallovcontrolrcddrivenafntenanceadfpRNreplacesentatthetinethatthesuppressionchasberisunvatere4an4toparfumnoxnalfwlnovenentactiv-itiesintherefwlnodevithanunenteredsuppressionchsaber.basedonthelinitedtineinvolvedinpertoxnanceotthecon-currentnaintenancetasks,pxoceduraloontrolstoninhaixethepotentialuddurationotleakagefronthecontrolroddrivehousingorcpRNpenetrationan4availablecoolantnakeuppm-vidcsadequateprotectionagainstdrainageotthevesselvhilethesupprecsionchauberisdrained.74 I

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASES(Cont'd.)3.2.3COOIAuTOIDIISTRY4.2.3COOLAITs3lfuISTRYaafffbbflbffffApp)ics.tothereactorcoolantsystenchsaicslrequire-ments.Obective:ufffbillAppliestotheperiodictestingrequirencntsofthereactorcoolantchenistry.Toassurethechcaicalpurityofthereactorcoolantvatcr.Todcterainethechcnicalpurityofthereactorcoolantvater.a.Thereactorcoolantvatershallnotexceedthefollowinglinitsvithstcaaingrateslessthanl00,000poundsperhourexceptasspecifiedin3.2.3bsConductivityIChlorideionSafnho/caO.SISaac.ThereactorcoolantwatershallnotexceedthefollowingIinitswithsteauingratesgreaterthanorequalto100,000poundspcrhour.ConductivityChlorideionIOxnho/ca1.0ppad.IfSpeclflcatlons3.2.3.a,b,andcarenotnet,nozaslorderlyshutdofnashallbeinitiatedvithinonehoursndthereactorshallbeinthe<<oldshut-doffnconditionvithintenhours.b.Forreactorstartupsthemaximumvalueforcon-ductivityshallnotexceedIOxmho/cmandthemaxi-momvalueforchlorideionconcentrationshallnotexceed0.Ippm.forthefirst24hoursafterplacingthereactorInthepoffferoperatingcondition.f~lf\*lSasnlcsshallhetakenatleastevczv96hoursandanaivzsdforconductivityandchlorideioncontent.Inaddition,IfthecondwtivityIsconesabnosvai(otherthanshorttrnasnlkcs)ssindicatedhvthecontinuousconducitivityaoni-tor,sannlcaslsllIetHenandanalvzcd.!whenthecontinuousconductivityaonitorieinoperable,areactorooolantsfffapleshallbetakenatleastdailyandanalyxsdforccfxluctivityandchlorideioncontent.Ãaterialsinthepriaarysysteaarepriaarily304stain-lesssteelandthezircaloyfuelclaMinu.TbereactorvatercheaistryIiaitsareestabllshe4topreventdaa-aqetotheseaaterials.tdaitsareplace4onchlorideconcentrationandcoxluctivity.TheasstIafpoztantllaitisthatplacedonchlorideconcentrationtopre-ventstressoorzosioncrackkwzofthestainlesssteel.whenthesteafaln9rateislessthan100,000poundsperboursfaaorsrestrictivelialtof0.1ppahasbeenes-tablished.Atsteaainuratesofatleast100,000poundsperhour,boikinuoccurscausinudeaerationofthere-~ctorvater,thusaaintaininuoxygenconcentrationatlovlevels.AshortteraspikeisdefinedasariseinconductivitysuchasthatvhichcouldarisefroaInfectionofaddit-ionalfeedvaterflowforadurationofapproxiaately30ainutesintine.!e.Iftbecontinuousoonductlvltyaonitorisinoperablefornorethan7daysthereactorshouldbeplacedlnthecolds.'futdovnccsbditionvithin2Sbours.Ihenconductivityisinitspropernozaalrange,pNandchlorideandotherlapuritiesaffectingconductiv-ityaustalsobevithintheirnozaalrange.Whenandifconductivitybeconesabnozasl,thenchlorideaeasure-sentsareasdetodetezainevhetherornottheyarealsocutoftheirnomaloperatingvalws.Thisvouldzxftnecessarilybethecase.Conductivitycoul4behighduetothepresenceofaneutralsalt,e.g.,Ica2304,vhichwouldnothaveanaffectonpNorchloride.Insuchacase,highconductivityaloneisnotacauseforshutdcwn.Insoaetypesofwater-cooie4reactors,con-ductlvitiesareinfacthighduetopurposefuladditionofadditives.InthecaseofSvg's,hovever,wherenoadditivesareusedandwhereneutzslpNisaaintained,conductivityprovidesaverygoodaeasureofthequality43 1

Llt>IITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASES(Cont'd.lofthereactorvater.Significantchangesthereinpro-videtheoperatorwithavarningaechanisasohecaninvestigateandrcaedythecondittoncausingthechangebeforeliaitingconditions,withrespecttovariablesaffectingtheboundariesofthereactorcoolant,areexceeded.scethodsavailabletotheoperatorforcorrect-ingtheoff-standardconditioninclude,operationofthereactorclean-upsysten,reducingtheinputofta-purttiesandplacingthereactorinthecoldshutdowncondition.Theastorbenefitofcoldshutdovnlstoreducethetenperaturedependentcorrosionratesandprovidetinefortheclean-upsysteatore.establishthepurityofthcreactorcoolant.Durtngstart-upperiods,whicharetnthecategoryoflessthanl00.000poundsperhour,conductivityaayexceed2uaho/cabecauseoftheinitialevolutionofgasesandtheini-tialadditionofdissolvedactals.Ouringthisperiodoftine,vhentheconductivityexceeds2unhototherthanshortteraspikes).saaplesvillbotakentoassurethatthechlorideconcentrationislessthanO.lppa.Theconducttvityatthereactorcoolantlsconttnuouslyaonttored.Thesaaplesofthecoolantvhlcharetakeneveryo6hoursvillserveasareferenceforcalibrationoftheseaonttorsandtsconsideredadequatetoassureaccuratereadingsoftheaonltors.Ifconductivityisvithtnttsnoraalrange,chloridesandotherlapurltiesvillalsobewithintheirnoraalranges.Thereactorcoolantsanptesvillalsobeusedtodcterainethechlorides.Therefore,thesawpllngfrequeacylsconsideredadequatetodetectlong-tatachangeslnthechlorideloacontent.Hovever,lftheconductivitychangessignificantly,chlorideacasure-nentsvillbeaadetoassurethatthechlorideliaitsofSpecification3.2.3arenotexceeded.

4.~UES1lONProvideanassessmentoftheconformanceofNMP-1designand.operationwiththecurrentRegulatoryGuidesofDivision1extendingthedescriptionoftheApplicationfromGuideNo.3..21throughNo.3..59.Inthisregard,thoseRegulatoryGuidesaddressedinresponsetoparticularinquirieshereinneed.notberepeated..RESPONSETheconformanceofNineNilePointUnit1withregulatoryguides1.22through1.59follow.

REGULATORYGUIDE1.22-PERIODICTESTINGOFPROTECTIONSYSTEMACTUATIONFUNCTIONSTheNineMilePointUnit1protectionsystemisdesignedtopermitperiodictest-ingtoextendtoandincludetheactuationdevicesandactuatedequipment.Thereactorprotectionsystemautomaticallyinitiatesareactorscramtopreventexceedingestablishedlimits.Inaddition,otherprotectiveinstrumentationisprovidedtoinitiateactionwhichmitigatestheconsequencesofaccidentsorterminatesoperatorerror.1AdetaileddescriptionofthesystemisavailableintheFSARandadescriptionofthecapabilityoftestingsensors,channelsandchannelcalibrationshasalsobeenpreviouslypresented.As.presently,.designed,the,protectionsystemperiodictestsduplicate,ascloselyaspracticable,theperformancethatisrequiredoftheactuationdevicesintheeventofanaccident.Theprotectionsystemandthesystemswhoseoperationitinitiatesaredesignedtopermittestingoftheactuationdevicesduringreactoroperation.Testingofactuationdevicesandactuatedequipmentisperformedonanindividualbasisorinselectedgroupsdependingupontheparticularsystemdesign.Forexample:Atleastonceperoperatingcycle,power-operatedisolationvalves(exceptfeedwaterandmainsteam.)arefullyclosedandreopened.And,atleasttwiceperweek,thefeedwaterandmainsteamlinepower-operatedisolationvalvesareexercisedbypartialclosureandsubsequentreopening.Adetaileddescription..ofa3.l,testing.forthe,.protection.systemandthesystemswhoseoperationitinitiates,duringreactoroperation,isavailableinTables3.6.2a-jand4.6.2-jintheTechnicalSpecifications.Whenasensorcheckisshown,itindicatesindividualtesting.Achanneltestindicatesagroup.Wheretheabilityofasystemtorespondtoabonafideaccidentsignalisin-tentionallybypassedforthepurposeofperformingatestduringreactoroper-ation:a.Key-lockbypassswitchesareprovidedforhighdrywellpressureandhighwaterlevelscramdischargevolume.Allothersaread-ministrativelycontrolled.Thisisprovidedtopreventexpansionofthebypassconditiontoredundantordiversesystems.b.Eachbypassconditionisautomaticallyandindividuallyindicatedtothereactoroperatorbymeansofannunciatorslocatedinthemaincontrolroom.Actuatedequipmentofthesystemsinitiatedbytheprotectionsystemaretestedperiodicallyduringreactoroperationandinamannerthatdoesnotadverselyaffectthesafetyoroperabilityoftheplant.However,insomecasesfullin-itiationofthesystemisnotpractical.Forexample,thecontainmentspray1NineMilePointUnit1,FSAR,SectionVIII2NineMilePointUnit1,TechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFullTermOperatingLicense.

systemusesanairtestandtheliquidpoisonisrecirculatedtoatesttank.Testingofsensorsintheareaofmainsteamlineisolationvalvescanonlybedoneduringperiodsofstationshutdownbecauseofhighradiationlevels.Test-ingofscram,associatedwithshutdownpositionofthemodeswitchalsocanonlybedoneinperiodsofshutdownsinceitalwaysinvolvesascram.TheprobabilitythattheprotectionsystemwillfailtoinitiatetheoperationoftheactuateequipmentisverylowasindicatedonpageIII-12oftheTechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFull-TermOperatingLicense.Thefailureprobabilitiesarelowbecauseallprotectiveinstrumentationhasthecapabilityofbeingtestedandcalibratedandhasthecap-abilityofsensorchecks.

REGULATORYGUIDE1.23-ONSITEMETEOROLOGICALPROGRAMS~~~Awindspeedanddirectionsensorispresentlyinserviceatopthereactorbuilding.Readoutforthissensorisprovidedonastripchartrecorderinthecontrolroom.A200foothighmeteorologicaltowerequippedwithwindspeedanddirectionandtemperaturesensorsispresentlybeinginstalledatalocationapproximately3000feetwestoftheUnit1StationandatabaseelevationapproximatelythesameasUnit1grade.Temperatureandwindsensorsarelocatedat36,100,and200footelevationsandrelativehumiditysensorsarelocatedatthe36and200footelevations.AsdiscussedinVolumeIIAppendixAoftheFSAR,windspeedchangeswithheight.Therefore,toestimatewhatitwould.be.atthe350.stack.heightia.powerlaw.approximationper'extrapolationhasbeenandwillbeusedtoobtainwindspeedatstackheight.Bothanaloganddigitalrecordingwillbeprovidedatthetowersiteforallsensors.Temperaturewillberecordedasambientat36feetanddifferentialfrom36to100and36to200feet.Inaddition,stripchartrecordersinthecontrolroomwillprovideanalogrecordsofthetemperatureand.differentialtemperatureandthewinddatafromthe36and200footelevations.Allwindinstrumentswillhaveadirectionalaccuracyofatleast+5degreesandawindspeedaccuracyof+0.5mphwithastartingspeedofapproximately1mph.Znaddition,alowthresholdwindmeasuringsystemwillbeinstalledatthe36footelevationwhichwillprovideanaccuracyof+0.13knots(0.15mph)or1percentwithastartingspeedof0.5knots(0.6mph).Temperatureanddifferentialtemperaturesensorswillhaveanaccuracy,,ofQess,than,,0,.5C.-.Relative.humidity~saccurateto+'3percent.from15to95percentrelativehumidity.Continuoussurveillanceoftheremoterecordersinthecontrolroomandweeklyinspectionoftherecordersatthetowersitewillassurepromptserviceandhighreliabilityofthemeteorologicalinstrumentation.Semiannualcalibrationcheckswillbemadetoassureaccuracy.Monthlyandsemiannualjointfrequencydistributionswillbemaintainedofwindspeedanddirectionbyatmosphericstabilityclass.AreportingformatwillbeestablishedonabasisacceptablebytheAEC.

REGULATORYGUIDE1.24-ASSUMPTIONSUSEDFOREVALUATINGTHEPOTENTIALRADIOLOGICALCONSEQUENCESOFAPRESSURIZED>1ATERREACTORGASSTORAGETANKFAILUREThisguideisnotapplicabletoNineMilePointUnit1,whichusesaboilingwaterreactor.13

REGULATORYGUIDE1.25-ASSKIPTIONSUSEDFOREVALUATINGTHEPOTENTIALRADIOLOGICALCONSEQUENCESOFAFUELHANDLINGACCIDENTINTHEFUELHANDLINGANDSTORAGEFACILITYFORBOILINGANDPRESSURIZED3/ATERREACTORSThefuelhandlingaccidentasdescribed.intheFSARforNineMilePointUnit1isthedroppingofafuelbundleintothecorefrom30feet,themaximumallowedbytherefuelingequipment.Theexpected.numberoffailedrodsislessthan76.FortheFSARanalysis,thereactorwasassumed.tobeoperatingat18/0hirefor1000daysupto24hoursbeforethefuelassemblydrop.ApeakingfactoroflOwasassumed.inthatcalculation.Thedepthofwaterabovethecoreisgreaterthanthe23feetspecifiedintheguide.Thisguideassumestotalreleaseisovera,2hourperiodwhereaswehaveconsideredboth2hourand.~$0'day'do'se"althoughmostof'%heactivi'ty'isrelease'dimmediately.Table1.25-1belowcomparesthedosesobtainedusingtheassumptionsofthisguidewiththosepreviouslypresented.Ineithercase,theresultsarewithinthelimitsof10CFR100.Table1.25-2givescomparisonsoffissionproductsreleasefractionsandtrans-portMeteorlogicalanddoseconversionfactorsaregiveninTable1.25-3.TheeffectsthatthesefactorshaveinthecalculationsareillustratedbyTable.Asdescribed.inVolumeIIoftheFSARthefiltersystemforNineMilePointUnit1wassizedforthedesignbasisaccident.14

TABLEl.25-.1FUELHANDLINGACCIDENTDOSES(REM)SafetyGuide(2hr@0.78mi.)TechnicalSupplement(2hr80.'78mi.)0gThyroidWholeBody1.1x1021x10

TABLE1'.25"2FISSIONPRODUCTRELEASEASSUMPTION'SSafetyGuidelg'(3QK-'85)'NobelGasesTechnicalSQolementl.g10$9975$0.25$85$None133forinorganic1fororganicIodines(total)InorganicOrganicFilterReductionReactorBuildingMixingRetentionofIodineinFuelPool0.5joYes100effectivedecontaminationfactor100

TABLE1.25-3ATMOSPHERICDISPERSIONANDDOSECONVERSIONFACTORSSafetyGuideActualStack3."47xlom/sec,43ReleaseHeightBreathingRateTechnicalSulementActualStack4.33.47xl0m/secIodineDoseConversionInfiniteCloud(CenterlineConc.)0-2hrs(9.5xlO5funigation)Factors(ICRPCommitteeII-l959)WholeBodyDose.x/Q,.Factors(SiteBoundry)SameInfiniteCloud.(CenterlineConc.)0-30days1.25x10

TABLE1.25-4EFFECTONDOSEOFFACTORSUSEDINTHECALCULATIONS~Thaid'(2hr'O'O."78'mi.')1.31512.5.75IAirborneActivityFilterefficiencyReactor'buildingholdupMeteorologyWholeBod(2hr60.78mi.)17512575

REGULATORYGUIDE1.26-QUALITYGROUPCLASSIFICATIONSANDSTANDARDSAlistingofthesystemswhichfallintothethreequalitygroupsdescribedbythisguideisincludedinTable1.26-1.'ThecodesapplicabletoNineMilePointUnit1componentsatthetimeofconstructionaregiveninresponsetoRegulatoryguide1.48.Anyfuturemodificationswillbeinaccordancewithstandardsappli-cabletothequalityg'oupasclassifiedhere.15

TABLE1.26-1UALITYGROUPCLASSXFICATXONSQualitGrouoBQualityGrounCQualitGrouDReactorrecirculationMainsteamLowandHighPressurefeedwaterCondensateControlrod.driveCoresprayLiquidPoisonShutdowncoolingHead.sprayEmergencyCondenserContainmentsprayReactorbldg.emergencyventilationReactorinstrumentationReactorventanddrainFuelpoolfilteringand.coolingReactorCleanupReactorGWastebldg.closedloopcoolingServiceWaterRadioactivewastedisposalOff-gasDieselgeneratorfueloil,startingair,andcoolingwaterInstrumentandbreathingairDrywellventandpurgeControlroomventilationDrywellandtoresvacuumreliefDrywellInstrumentationandleakmonitoringFireprotection(foam6water)DrywellsumppumppipingResintransfer6regenerationSulphuricacidtransferHydropumpdischargeTurbinebldg.closedloopcoolingScreenwashingHouseserviceair-RoofandfloordrainsCitywater

REGULATORYGUIDE1.27-ULTIMATEHEATSIlKTheultimateheatsinkforNineMilePointUnitNo.1isLakeOntario.ThisincludestheprimaryandsecondaryforebaysasshowninFiguresIII-16,17ofVolumeIoftheFSAR.Thefollowingsystemsobtainwaterfromthisheatsink.1.Maincondenser8cCirculatingwater2.Servicewater3:Firepumps4.ContainmentSprayrawwaterpumps5.DieselgeneratorcoolingwaterpumpsIncaseofblockageofoneentrancetotheforebayanotherentranceexists'toa11owwaterinfromtheLake.Thevolumeofwateravailablefromthelakeisvirtuallyinexhaustableandissufficienttolastlongerthantherequired.30days.Asdiscussedinresponsetoregulatoryguide1.59,floodingispossiblebutthiswouldnothaveanyadverseeffectontheultimateheatsink.Otherphenomenasuchasearthquakesoflargeenoughproportionstoemptythelakearenotconsideredcredible.Shouldanabnorma1occurrenceassociatedwiththelakearise,thefollowingTechnicalSpecificationswouldbeapplied:'pecificationSpecificationSpecification3.1.3-EmergencyCoolingSystem,3.3.7-ContainmentSpray3.6.3-EmergencyPowerSourcesThesespecificationsgiveappropriateactionto'betaken.16

REGULAEOREGUIDEI.28-QUALIEEASSURANCEPROGRAMREQUIREMENTSDESIGNANDCONSTRUCTiONItistheintentoftheNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationtocomplywithlOCFR50Appendix3,QualityAssuranceCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlantsand.FuelReprocessingPlants.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationsQualityAssuranceYwnualsarecurrentlybeingrevised.tocomplywithANSI-45.2-1971.17

REGULATORYGUIDE1.29-SEISMICDESIGNCLASSIFICATIONSThestructures,systemsandcomponents,includingtheirfoundationsandsupportsdesignatedasClassIintheFSARSecondSupplementaredesignedtoremainfunc-~tional*followingtheMaximumCredibleEarthquakeoutlinedinthe(PHSR)Prelimin-areyHazardsSummaryReport,VolumeII,"EngineeringSeismology."Thesestructures,systemsandcomponentsarelistedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSecondSupple-ment.Thecriteriaofthisguidearemetwiththefollowingexceptions:(1)Structures:ThespentfuelstoragepoolfuelracksarenotspecificallydesignedtoresisteqrthquakeforcesandaxenotlistedasClassIcomponents.ThefalseceilingandlightsinthecontrolroomarenotdesignatedasClassIcomponentsandarenotdesignedtoresistearthquakeforces.TheprimarycontainmentisdesignatedaClassIsystemandstressesresultingfromvariousloadingconditionscombinedwithearthquakeforcesmeetcoderequirements.However,thesuppressionchambercolumnswerenotallowedthe1/3stressincrease.(2)~sstems:"'ThreepipingsystemswerenotdesignedtoClassIcriteriaassetforthinthisregulatoryguide.Theseare:(a)Mainstream-afterisolationvalves(b)Reactorheadspray(c)Reactorclean-up(3)Electrical:Allcontxolboards,equipmentanddevicesmountedonthecontrolboardsweredesignedtoremainoperableduringandafteraseismicdisturbanceofthein-tensitydescribedbelow.Thedesignissuchthatnocontroldeviceorrelayshallmalfunctioncausinganyinadvertentoperationbecauseofsuchseismicdisturbance.Themaximumgroundmotionaccelerationforthedesignseismicdistrubanceiselevenpercentofgravityandthemaximumresultingresponseaccelerationisforty-fivepercentofgravityforoscillatorsintheperiodrangeof0.2to0.3seconds.Thedieselgeneratorsaswel3.astheemergencyserviceportionoftheA-Cpowerdistributionsystemaredesigned.and.builttomeetthesamedesigncriteriaasmentionedabove..Miscellaneouselectricalcomponents(limitswitches,localstarters,localcontroLpanels,etc.)werenotspeciallydesignedtowithstand.theeffectsofanearthquake.18

However,thesecomponentsareeitherlocated.inClassIstructuresorareidenticaltoClassIEcomponentsthataredocumented.tocomplywiththeseismicdesigncriteriastated.above.Thesystemscontainingthesecomponentsare:(a)FeedwaterSystemintheTurbineBuilding(b)SpentFuelPoolCoolingControlPanellocatedintheReactorBuilding(c)PortionsofradioactiveWasteSystemlocatedintheHasteandTurbineBuildings."Ele'ctrical'cab1esasso'ciatedwiththeprotectionsystemandtheemergencyserviceportionoftheA-Cdistributionsystem,includingtheonsiteelectricalpowersources,arerouted.incabletrayslocatedintheturbinebuilding

REGULATORYGUIDE1.30-UALITvASSURANCEREQUIREMENTSFORTHEINSTALLATIONINSPECTIONANDTESTINGOFINSTRUMENTATIONANDELECTRICEUIPIKNTAdequacyrelevantto.IEEE-336-1973.hasbeendiscussed.previouslyinthe"Technica1SupplementtoPetitionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFullTermOperatingLicense"onpagesIII-60,61.Toassurethequalityoftheinstrumentationandelectricalequipmentthefollowingwereapplied..(1)Detailedspecificationswereissued.(2)Selected.shopsurveillance,(.3).Field.inspections,,andtests(4)Fieldqua1itycontrolchecks(5)Installationinaccordancewithapproved.drawingsandinstructions(6)PreoperationaltestingSincethistimeIEEE-336-1971hasbeenincorporatedasANSIN45.2.4"Installation,Inspection,andTestingRequirementsforInstrumentationandElectricEquipmentDuringtheConstructionofNuclearPowerGeneratingStations".ThiswillbeusedasaguideinconformingwithANSIN45.2".QualityAssuranceProgramRequirementsforNuclearPowerPlants".20

REGULATORYGUIDE1.31-CONTROLOFSTAINLESSSTEELWELDINGWeldmaterialmettherequirementsofSectionIIIoftheASMECode.Ferritecontentwascontrolledinthefillermetalitselfsothatasmallamountofferritewaspresentincompletedwelds.Experiencehasshownthatthesecontrolsareadequateforproducingsatisfactoryweldsinausteniticstainlesssteelwithoutanyproblemoffissuringorhot.:cracking.Exceptforrepairweldsinpumpandvalvecastings,ferriteweldingcontrolwasaccomplishedbyeithermainta'iningaminimumof5percentferriteinthefillermaterialorachromiumtonickelratioofatleast1.9to1.Thechromiumtonickelratiowasalsousedtocontrolferritecontentofthecastingsthemselves.Heatinputduringweldingwasspecifiedin.termsofamperage,voltageandinter-passtemperaturelimits.Theaboveprocedurewasfeltadequatetocontrolstainlesssteelweldingtopre-vent.fissuringorhotcracking.21 0

'EGUIATORYGUIDE1:32-USEOFIEEESTD308-171CRITERIAFORCIASS1EELECTRICSYSTEMSFORItUCLWRPOLYGZiP~BATDlGSTATIONSAdeauacyrelativetoIEEEStd.308-1971hasbeenaddressed.onpagesIII-50thru56ofthe"TechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFullTermOperatingLicense."ThisregulatoryguideidentifiestwopotentialconflictsbetweenIEEEStd.308-1973.andGeneralDesignCriterion17ofAppendixAto10CFR50.ThedesignofNineMilePointUnit1complieswiththeregulatoryposition.NineMilePointUnit1hastwoindependentcircuitsnorae1lyavailable.from.the,transmissionnetwork.Also,-the.'battery-chargersupplycapacityforNineMilePointUnit1isbased.onthelargestcombined.demandsofthevarioussteadystateloads.Theyarealsocapableofsupplyingsufficientcapacitytorestorethebatteriesfromthedesignminimumchargetotheirfully-chargedstatewhilesupplyingnormalsteadystateloads.'22

REGULATORYGUIDE1.33-UALITYASSURANCEPROGRAMREUIREMENTS(OPERATION)Aresponsetotheregulatorypositionasstatedinthisguideis,includedintheresponsetoaJuly26,1973,letterfromtheAEC.Thisisincludedasresponsenumber8intheattachmenttotheletterfromMr.P.D.RaymondtoMr.A.GiambussodatedNovember16,1973.23

'IREGULATORYGUIDE3..34-CONTROLOFELECTROSLAGklELDPROPERTIESTheelectroslag~fieldingprocessvasnotusedforcomponentsimooranttosafetyatBineNilePointUnit1.24

REGULATORYGUIDE1.35-INSERVECESURVEILLANCEOFUNGROUTEDTENDONSINPRESTRESSEDCONCRETECONTADTbKNTSTRUCTURESThisguideisnotapplicabletoNineMilePointUnit1whichusesasteelprimarycontainment.25

REGULATORYGUIDE1.36-NON-METALLICTHERMALINSULATIONFORAUSTENETICSTAINLESSSTEELThenon-metallicinsulationusedatNineMilePointUnit1wasmanufacturedbyPittsburgCorningCorporation.TheinsulationconformstoMilitarySpeci-ficationMXL-I-278IDasdescribedunder1.2ClassificationGradeIX.ClassCandGradeIII,ClassF.Inaddition,"Unebestos"insulationiscoveredbytheDepartmentoftheNavyinPittsburgh,PennsylvaniaunderQPL-2781.Certifiedchemicalanalysistestswereperformedon6samplesunderMIL-1-24244.Theresultsofthesetestsshowedthatleachablechloridesrangedfrom86-102ppm,andthatleachablesodiumplussilicaterangedfrom135,000to150,000ppm.'ThisanalysisCal'ls'intheacceptablerangeasshownonfigure1oftheguide.Xnaddition,thetestsresultsdidnotvaryby50percentfromoneanother.26

REGULATORYGUIDE1.37-UALITYASSURANCEREUIREMENTSFORCLEANINGOFFLUIDSYSTEMSANDASSOCIATEDCOMPONENTSOFHATER-COOLEDNUCLEARPOWERPLANTSThecleaningprocessatNineMilePOintUnit1forthereactorvesselandprimarysystemconsistedofusing0.5percenttrisodiumphosphateheatedto180F.Chloridecontentwaskepttolessthan10ppm.The-systemwasthenflushedwithdemineralizedwaterequalinqualitytothatusedduringopera-tion.Proceduresarepresentlybeingdevelopedat,NineMilePOintUnit.lusingANSIN45.2.1asaguideline.27

REGULATORYGUIDE1.38-UALITYASSURANCEREUIREMENTSFORPACKAGING,SHIPPING,RECEIVING,STORAGE,ANDHANDLINGOFITEMSFORWATER-COOLEDNUCLEARPOWERPLANTSProceduresarebeingdevelopedatNineMilePointUnit1tocomplywiththisguide.ANSIN45.2.2-1972isbeingusedasaguideintheirpreparation.28

REGULATORYGUIDEl-39-HOUSEKEEPINGREUIREMENTSFORWATER-COOLEDNUCLEARPOWERPLANTSProceduresarepresentlyunderdevelopmenttocontrolworkactivities,conditionsandenvironmentsatNineMilePointUnitNo.lusingANSIN45.2.3-l973asaguidefortheirpreparation.29

REGVIATORYGVIDE1.40-QUALIFICATION1ESTSOFCONTINUOUSDU1YROTORSINSTALLEDINSIDETHECONTKIRKNTOFHATER-COOLEDNUCLEARPO)/ERPLAVZSAdequacyrelativetoIEEE-334hasbeendiscussedonpageIII-59oftheTechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConversionFromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFull-TermOperatingLicense.WerearenocontinuousdutyClass-Imotorsinstalledinthecontainment.Therefore,Regulatoryguide1.40doesnotapplytoNineMilePointUnitl.30

REGULATORYGUIDE1.41-PREOPERATIONALTESTINGOFREDUNDANTON'-SITEELECTRICPONrRSYSTEMSTOVERIFYPROPER-LOADGROUPASSIGNIKNTSArigorouspreoperationaltestwasperformedfortheon-siteelectricpowersystem.Theisolationwaseffectedbydirectactuationof'heundervoltagesensingrelaysonPowerBoards102and,103.Eachon-siteelectricpowersystem(D.G.1025103,PowerBoards102and103,andallredundantengineered.safeguardload.groupsfedfromthesepowerboards)wastestedindependentlyandeachtestincluded.thefollowing:(1)Injectionofsimulatedaccidentsigna1s.'(2)'Startupofthe'dieselgenerator(3)Startupofandsequencingofredundantloadgroupundertest(4)FunctionalperformanceoftheloadsThedurationofeachtestpermitted.thesystemtoachievestableoperatingconditionsandnoadverseconditionsweredetected.DuringeachtesttheD-Candon-siteA-Cbusesandrelatedloadsnotundertestwerenotrequiredtobedisconnected.31

REGULATORYGUIDE1.42-INTERIMLICENSINGPOLICYONASLOWASPRACTICABLEFORGASEOUSRADIOIODINERELEASESFROMLIGHT-WATER-COOLEDNUCLEARPOWERREACTORSArevisedoff-gassystemisbeinginstalledatNineMilePointUnit1.Thisupgradedsystemwillreducetheoff-siteexposuretolessthan0.025mr/yr.Thissystemprovides20daysholdupforXenonand33hoursforKryptons.AflowchartforthesystemispresentedonpgIII-27oftheTechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFullTermOperatingLicense.Inaddition,valveleakoffhoodshavebeenplacedonvalvesin,areaswheretherehavebeenhighradiationlevels.Thesehoodsventdirectlytotheventi3;-lation,.system.ThetyroiddosetoachildfromradioiodineintakeviathemilkpathwayhasbeencalculatedusingtheassumptionsasoutlinedinAppendixAofthisguide.Assuminganannualreleaseof0.38CiofI-131,thedoseconversionfactorsofAppendixCofthisguideandtakingintoaccountthatthenearestdairyfarmwhichis0.64misouthwestofthestation,theresultantdoseis3mr/yr.,ThisisbasedonaX/Qof4x10-8secs/mandanoffgasreleaserateofuci/rec3after30minutesdecay.AnenvironmentalmonitoringprogramasdescribedinSection4.3ofthePreparedEnvironmentalTechnicalSpecificationswilllimitthedosetoachildsthyroidtolessthan15mrec/yrfortheentiresite.1.Letter'fromMr.P.D.RaymondtoMr.DanielR.MullerdatedOctober4,1973.32

REGULATORYGUIDEL.II3-COIIEROLOFSTAINLESSSEEELIIELDCLADDDlGOFLOSALLOYSTEELCOMFOli~TSTlierearenostainlesssteelcladdingwelded.tolow-a1loysteelcomponentsimportanttosafetyatNineMilePointUnit1.33

REGULATORYGUIDE1.44-CONTROLOFTHEUSEOFSENSITIZEDSTAINLESSSTEELTheunstabilized,austeniticstainlesssteeloftheAISIType3xxseriesusedinthesystemsmentionedintneguidewasallsolutionannealedpertheASTMstandardsatthetimeoforder.MaterialwastestedtoASTMA262-70tode-terminethedegreeofsensitization.ThematerialusedatNineMilePoint,Unit1is304stainlessandisfurnacesen-sitized.No"L"gradematerialwasusedatNineMilePointUnit1.Onmaterialotherthanwelded,testingwasperformedtoASTMA-262ormaterialwasresolutionheattreated.Nodemonstrationastosusceptibilitytointergrannularstresscorrosionwasprovided...Thecleaning.processinvolvedtheuseof0.5percentTSPsolutionwhichwascirculatedandheatedto180F.Chloridecontentwaskeptto~10ppm.Asde-scribedintheSixthSupplementtotheFSARsystemscleanedwithTSPandthenflushedwithdemineralizedwateracttoinhibitchlorideattack.Weldingpracticesweresuchastopreventexcessivesensitization.34

REGULATORYGUIDE1.45-REACTORCOOLANTPRESSUREBOUNDARYLEAKAGEDETECTIONSYSTEMSTherearetwosystemswhichcollectleakageinthedrywellatNineMilePoint~~Unit1.Onesystem,classifiedasidentifiedleakage,collectsleakagefromdrywellequipmentdrains.Thiscandetectachangeofapproximately1gpminthe8-10gpmflowrangein20minutes.Unidentifiedleakageismeasuredbytherateofriseofsumpwaterlevelinthe'rywell.Forsumpinflowsofonegpm,changesintheorderof0.2gpmcanbedetectedwithin40minutes.Atinflowsbetweenoneandfivegpm,changesintheorderof0.5gpmcanbedetectedineightminutes.Asecondtypeofunidentifiedleakdetectionsystemmonitorsairborneparticulates.Thiswouldindicateanyleakagefromtheprimarysystembyshowingariseinactivity.Athird,methodemployedistheanalysisofisotopiccompositionofeffluentsfromthedrywellaircoolers,thecleanupsystem,orwaterfromcondensedreactorsteam.Inaddition,drywelltemperature,humidityanddewpointaremonitoredwhichwouldalerttheoperatorofabnormalleakageconditions.Alarmsinthecontrolroomindicateabnormalleakage.TheTechnicalSpecificationsdefinethelimitsforunidentifiedleakageas5gpmandtotalleakageas25gpm.TheleakdetectionsystemsalthoughnotdesignedasseismicclassIarelocatedinseismicclassIstructureswhoseintegritywillremainduringearthquakeconditions.

REGULATORYGUIDE1.46-PROTECTIONAGAINSTPIPEIrHiIPINSIDETHEPRIMARYCONTAIiSKNT~Aspresentedintheanswertoquestion10,thereisadequateredundancytomaintaincorecoolingcapability.Ananalysismadetodeterminetheeffectontheprimarycontainmentshowsthatadeformationcanoccurandinonecaseexceed50percentofthe'ltimatestrain.Theonlycaseinwhichthiscanoccurisforoneoftherecirculationloops.Thiswillbeprotectedbyappropriatepipewhiprestraints.36

REGULATORYGUIDE1.47-BYPASSEDANDINOPERABLESTATUSINDICATIONFORNUCLEARPOWERPLANTSAFETYSYSTEMSThereactorprotectionsystemconsistsoftwoindependentlypoweredlogicchannels.Eachlogic.channelconsistoftwoindependenttriplogicchannels.Thisarrangementiscommonlycalledoneoutoftwotakentwicelogic.Thesystemasdesignedisnormally"energized.Itisdesignedtotripwhende-energizedandfailsafeonlossofelectricpower.Duringnormaloperationofthestation,operatingbypasseswhichareautomaticallyordeliberatelyinducedareindicatedinthecontrolroom.Reactorpressurebelow600psiautomaticallybypassesmainsteamlineisolationvalveclosurescramandlowcondenser-vacuumscram.Controlroomindicationis"CondenserVacBypass."Reactorpressurelessthan850psiisbypassedtopreventmainsteamisolationinallreactoroperatingmodesexcept"Run".Controlroomindicationis"ReactorPressLow.".Reactorscramasaresultofaturbinetripisbypassedbelow40percentpower.Controlroomindicationis"Turbine1stStatePressLow"Otherbypassesareoperatedfromthecontrolroom.Controlroomindicationof"CRDScramDischargeVolumeBypassed"iskeyoperatedbutonlyoperatesinshutdownorrefuelmodes.Controlroomindicationof"DryWellPressBypassed"isalsokeyoperated.EmergencyVentilationSystemoperationischangedduringtherefuelingmodesothatoperationisfrom.radiationmonitoringontherefuelingplatform,""Emergency"Vent-'System'Bypassed,Refueling'Mode".'Thisprovidesmoresensitivemonitoringduringrefuelingoperations.Bypassswitchesonneutronmonitoringsystemsarenotalarmedsincetheswitchesarelocatedontheoperatingconsoleunderthevisualcontroloftheoperator.Visualsurveillanceoftheconsolecandeterminewhichneutronsystemsareby-passed.Engineeredsafeguardssuchascoresprayandcontainmentsprayhavenobypassesintheircontrolcircuits.Breakermotorcontrol'voltageismonitoredandalarmedincontrolroom.Duringthesurveillancetestingofthereactorprotectionsystem,deliberatebypassingofsomesensorsarenecessarytoperformtherequiredtests.Thebypassingofrequiredsensorscanonlybeaccomplishedbyisolationofsuchdevicesoroftheattachmentswhichblockorpreventtheactuationofsignals.Thisprocedureisunderthecontrolofthecontrolroomoperators.Surveillancetestproceduresdescribethemeansforbypassingwhenrequired.Althoughaparticularsensorina.'.logicchannelmaybebypassedduringtestingotherprocesssensorsinthesamelogicchannelarefullyoperableandcapableofperformingtheirintendedfunction.Aredundantsensorintheredundantlogicchannelisoperableandcapableofperformingtheintendedfunctionofthesensorbeingtestedshouldtherequirementariseduringthetest.Duringsurveillancetestingonlyonesensoristestedatatime.37

REGULATORYGUIDE1.48-DESIGNLIMITSANDLOADINGCOMBINATIONSFORSEISMICCATEGORYIFLUIDSYSTEMCOMPONENTSThefollowingcodeswereusedinthedesignoftheNineMilePointUnit1seismicClassIsystemsimportanttosafety.a)ANSI-B31.1-1955b)ANSI-B16.5-1955Inaddition,tothesecoderecpxirementsvariousotheritemssuchasseismicandthermalanalyseswereperformed.Ultrasonicandradiographicexaminationsweremade.AnindependentthirdpartyreviewofcalculationswasperformedbyTeledyneMaterialsResearchandwerefoundacceptable.38

REGUIATORYGUIDE1.50-CONTROLOFPREHEATTEMPERATUREFORWELDINGOFLOW-ALLOYSTEELTherearenostructuresorcomponentsimportanttosafetywhichuselowalloysteel.40

REGULATORYGUIDE1.51-INSERVICEINSPECTIONOFASMECODECLASS2AND3NUCLEARPOWERPLANTCOMPONENTSResponsetothepositionofthisguideiscoveredinanswertoQuestion9ofthissubmittal.41 1

REGULATORYGUIDE152DESIGNTESTINGpANDMAINTENACECRITERIAFORATMOSPHERECLEANUPSYSTEMAIRFILTRATIONANDABSORPTIONUNITSOFLIGHT-WATER-COOLEDNUCLEARPOWERPLANTSAtNineMilePointUnit1thereactorbuildingemergencyventilationsystemmini-mizestheradioactivityreleasedfromthereactorbuilding.Theentiresystemislocatedwithintheturbineandreactorbuilding.Thesystemisdesignedtooperateunderthemostsevereoverallbuildingenvironmentof150F,100relativehumidyand+0.5psig.TheemergencyventilationsystemisdesignedtohandlesourcetermscomparabletothoseofRegulatoryGuides1.3and1.25.Thesystemisredundantandconsistsofinletductworktakingsuctionfromthenormalreactorbuildingdischarge.Therearedualbanksoffiltersforremovalofparticulatesandhalogenswithamotordrivenblowerineach.Also,thereareredundantflowcontrollers,indicatorsandexhaustductingtothestack.TheflowdiagramforthesystemiscontainedintheSixthSupplementtotheFSAR.ThesystemhasbeendesignedtoseismicClassIstandardsandishousedinseismicClassIandClassIIstructures,thereactorandturbinebuildings.Foreachofthetwoloopspositionofinletandoutletvalves,dischargeflowrateandlowflowareindicated'inthecontrolroom.Highdifferentialpressureacrossthefiltersisindicatedinthecontrolroomalso.A10kwheaterisplacedbeforeeachfiltertraintolowertherelativehumidityfrom100percentto70percent.Thereisalsoprovisionfor60cfmofturbinebuildingairtocoolfiltersduetofissionproductdecayheat.Thisflowlimitstemperatureto200Fforthedesignbasisaccident.Eachsystemiscapableof1600cfmflowratewhichcanholdthereactorbuildingatanegativepressureof0.25inchwatergagetokeepbuildingexfiltrationtoaminimum.Allmaterialsassociatedwiththesystemincludingfiltersweredesignedtoper-formtheirrequiredfunctionevenunderthepossibleradiationeffectsassociated...withthedesignbasisaccident.Thepowertothesyst:emisfromredundantpowerboards,onesupplytoeachfiltertrain.TheseareinaccordancewithIEEE-308.InstrumentationisinaccordancewithIEEE-279.Therearenobypasseswhichallowunfilteredairfrombypassingthefiltertrain.Inaddition,nooutdoorairintakeopeningsexistforthissystem.ThehighefficiencyparticulatefiltersareCambridgefilterssuitableforairtemperatures-upto550F..Thefiltermediaisglassasbestoswithaluminumsep-arators.Thefilterelementsareinzincplatedcarbonsteelandthefilterhousingisgalvanizedsteel.Theelementsareofsuchasizeastobedisposableina55gallondrum.Thecharcoalfiltertrainconsistsofsixtrays,eachofwhichare20incheswide,31incheslongand7.5inchesdeep.Eachbedis2inchesdeepandhasaflowareaof4.36squarefeetwithadwelltimeof0.3seconds.Thefiltercasingsaretype304stainlesssteelandtheunithousingsareofgalvanizedsteel.42

Thesystemwastestedatdesignflowandeachfiltertraintestedindividually.Penetrationoftheparticulatefiltersrangedfrom0.002to0.022percentpenetra-tion.Thecharcoalfilterstestedat99.9percentefficiency.Thecharcoalfiltersare.MSA85851.Thesystemisdesignedforeaseofmaintainanceandtestability.Boltedcoverscloseoffthefilteraccessopenings.Thehousingsareeasilyaccessiblefromthesidesincethebanksarestackedontopofeachother.Thefiltersthemselvesareeasilydisposablein55gallondrums.Specialtoolsforfilterremoval,re-placementandtestingareprovided.Atleast2inchesofclearanceexistsbe-tweenfilterelements.Thefiltersareinrigidhousingseliminatinganyspecialalignmentprocedures.Therearepermanenttesttapsforperformingtherequiredtesting.Electrical,waterandcompressed.airareavailableoutsidethefilterhousing..Thereisnolightinginsidethefilterhousings.Theparticulatefilterswerealsoshoptestedforminimumefficiencyof99.97percentwithdioclylphthalatebeforetheirinstallation.TechnicalSpecificationshavebeendeveloped,limitingconditionforoperation3.4.4andSurveillanceRequirements4.4.4coversystemoperabilityandtestingrequirementstoassurethatitperformsitsintendedfunctionwhencalledupon.43

REGULATORYGUIDE1.53-APPLICATIONOFTHESINGLE-FAILURECRITERIONTONUCLEARPOWERPLANTPROTECTIONSYSTEMSTheprimeobjectivesinthedesignoftheNineMilePointUnit1reactorprotectionsystemwere:(1)Componentorchannelfailuredoesnot.interferewiththeproperoperationofitsredundantcounterpart.(2)Allpotentialsinglefailuresaredetectablefailureseitherbyperiodictests,anamolousindications,orbyalarms.AnorderlysinglefailureanalysiswasperformedontheNineNilePointUnit1reactorprotectionsystempriortopreoperationaltesting.Potentialundetectablefailureswereidentifiedandassumedtobeintheirfailedmodeinthisanalysis.ThespecifiedsurveillancerequirementsintheTechnicalSpecificationsdefinesthetestingproceduretoincludethefinalrelayactionresultingfromsensorandinstrumentchanneltesting.TheoperatingmodeswitchatNineMilePointUnit1doesprovidesignalstoredundantprotectivechannels.Theredundantcircuitsaresuppliedfrominde-pendentswitchsectionswhichareseparatedbybakelitebarriersontheswitchitself.Thecollectiveprotectionsystemandlogic-actuatorsystemhasbeenanalyzedforsingle-failuremodeswhichcoulddisablecontrolpowerforonechannelandfortheredundantactuatorcircuit.ThisconditiondoesnotexistfortheNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit.gl.~~~~:The..single--failureanalysisincludeda.systematicinvestigationofpotentialfaultsandfailuresonaperchannelbasis.Itwasdeterminedthatthesystemcouldwithstandthelossofaredundantchannelandstillperformitsprotectivefunction.Interconnectionsbetweenchannelswereanalyzedanditwasdeterminedthat,nocomponentfailure>shortcircuit,opencircuitorgroundcouldcausethelossofaprotectivefunction.Thelogicsystemwasanalyzedforsinglefailureinamannersimilartothesinglefailureanalysisperformedonthechannels.Nosinglefailuresinthesystemlogiccausedmultiple=failuresinthechannelsoractuatorcircuitsthatwouldviolatethesingle-failurecriterion.Asinglefailureanalysiswasalsoperformedontheactuatorcircuits.Theanalysisassuredthatnosinglefailurecouldcauseasignificantlossoffunctionduetoanimproperconnectionoftheactuatorstoasourceofenergy.Thelocationandarrangementofprotectionsystemequipmentwereanalyzedanditwasdeterminedthatanacceptabledegreeofseparationandindependenceexiststopreventlossofaprotectivefunctionduetomissiles,fire,flooding,earthquake,temperatureandchemicals.~Itwasdeterminedthatastackfailureintherightdirectioncouldcauselossoftheemergencybuses,thenormalA-CsupplytothesebusesandtheemergencyonsiteA-Csupplytothesebuses.Intheoverallsystem-failureanalysis,interconnectionswereanalyzedtoshowthatasinglefailureofachannel,componentoractuatorwouldstillresultintheremainderoftheprotectionsystemmeetingthesinglefailurecriterion.44

REGULATORYGUIDE1.54-UALZTYASSURANCEREQUIREMENTSFORPROTECTIVECOATINGSAPPLIEDTOWATER-COOLEDNUCLEARPOWERPLANTSProceduresarepresentlybeingdevelopedatNineMilePointUnit1tocontroltheuseofprotectivecoatings.TheproceduresarebeingpreparedusingANSIN101.4-1972asaguide.

0 REGULATORYGUIDE1.55-CONCRETEPLACEbZNTINCATEGORYISTRUCTURESThedesignofNineMilePointUnit1wasperformedbytheNiagaraMohawkSystemProjectEngineeringDepartment.CommunicationbetweentheNiagaraMohawkdesignofficeandthefieldconstructorwasdirect.TheNiagaraMohawkdesignofficehada'ieldrepresentativewhowasliaisonbetweentheofficeandtheconstructor.ThisliaisonassistedinthecommunicationofideasbetweenOfficeandConstructor.TheNiagaraMohawkdesignofficesentspecifications,drawjngs,revisionsofthese,plusanyotherinstructions,totheconstructorwithacopytotheNiagaraMohawkfieldrepresentative.Thus,thecontractorhadtwosourcesforconsultationordirection.TheNiagaraMohawkdesignpersonnelvisitedtheworksiteonafrequentscheduleandhaddirecttelephonecommunicationviacompanytie-lineamongallpartiesconcerned..Tne.SystemProjectEngineering:Department-wasresponsibleforalldesignanddrawingsofClassIreinforcedconcrete,structures.ThedesignanddrawingswerepreparedinaccordancewiththeACIcodes,applicable,atthattime.TheprimarycodewhichappliedwasACI318-63BuildingCodeReauirementsforReinforcedConcrete.Controlofdesigndrawingsconsistedofadesignprogresssystemshowingcurrentprogressandcheckoffoftherequiredapprovals(ResponsibleDesignEngineer,ChiefMechanical.and/orChiefElectricalEngineer,andtheChiefStructuralEngineer).AllstructuraldesignswerereviewedbytheChiefStructuralEngineerorhisassistant.Placementofreinforcing,watersteps,embedments,constructionjoints,congestionofreinforcingandotherembeddeditemswereshowninconsiderabledetailonthedrawings.Largescalesketchesdevelopedthemorecongestedareastoassureproperplacement.ManufacturersreinforcingdetaildrawingswerecompletelycheckedforcompliancewithNiagaraMohawkdesignrequirements.Thetypeand.requiredstrengthofconcretewasstatedonthedrawings.Designpersonnelhadconsiderableexperienceintheuseofmassconcreteinpriordesigns.Therequirementsandtechniquesnecessaryforplacinglargecomplicatedconcretepourswascontinuallyreviewed.Priortothestartofconcretinginanysegmentofthework,theConstructorwoulddiscusstheworkatmeetingswiththevariouscontractors(piping,electricaletc.)and.withhisfieldengineerandinspectors.Thecontractoralsohad~ediateaccesstodesignpersonnel,ifdesignchangeswererequiredduetofieldconditions.Acheck-outroutineforeachitemascompletedconsistedofaninspectionreportcardwheresignaturesofboththeforemanforthecontractorandtheassignedinspectorwereenteredaftercompletionandapproval.Finalsign-offwasbytheChiefFieldEngineer.Checkitemsincluded:(1)Preparationofsurfacestoreceiveconcrete(2)Formwork-forlineandgrade(3)Formwork-construction(4)Installationofreinforcingsteel,embeddeditems,box-outs,piping,electrical,etc.(5)Finalclean-upinpreparationforconcreteBeforeconcretingcommenced,theconstructor's(inspector)revieweddetailsoftheconcretesuchas:(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6')Classconcretespecified-(strength,slump,etc.)ReadinessofconcreteplantSuitableequipmentfordeliveringandhandlingconcretePlacementtechniquePr'eparationforprotectingconcreteduringplacementPreparationandmaterialforcuringconcrete 0

REGULATORYGUIDE1.56-VAINTENANCEOFWATERPURITYINBOILINGWATERREACTORSThecondensatedemineralizersatNineMilePointUnit1havebeendeisgned.andoperatedtopermitanorder~shutdownofthereactorincaseofhighcoolantconductivitylevels.Alsosufficientinstrumentationavailabletomonitorthefollowing:1)Conductivityofcondensate2)Availablecapacityofthedemineralizers*3)PurityofdemineralizereffluentMaximumlimitsonthereactorcoolantcompositionandconductivityhavebeensetasoutlinedinSpecification3.2.3oftheStation'sTechnical-Specifications.They-areasTollows:TABLEl.56-1TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSConductivitChloride10umho/cmO.lppmSteamingrateg100,0000Seeeming'rene)100;000lb/hrlb/hr2umho/cm.5umho/cm0.1ppm0.5ppmTheseratesreflectthepreparedchangesmadetotheTechnicalSpecificationsinresponsetoQuestion3c.REGULATORYGUIDE1.56Start-upSteamingrates(100,000lb/hrSteamingrates+100,000lb/hr10umho/cm5umho/cm5umho/cm0.1ppm0.1ppm0.5ppmArecordingconductivitymeterwitharangeof0-10umho's/cmislocatedbetweenthehotwellouletand.theinlettothedemineralizers.Thismeteriscalibrated.usingcertified.conductivitysolutions..Arecordingflowmeterisalsoused.tomeasureflowratethrougheachdemineralizer.Therearethreeconductivitymeterswhichmonitorfeedwaterconditionsasfollows:(1)Outletofeachdemineralizer(0-lumho/cm)(2)Outletofeachdemineralizer(0-10umho's/cm)(3)Upstreamoffeedwaterisolationvalves(0-20umho's/cm)47 0

Theserecording"conductivitymetersalarminthecontrolroom.Initialexchangecapacitiesofresinsarenotmeasuredand.totalcapacitiesarenotdeterminedafteroperation.However,theregenerationcycleiscloselymonitored.$lhenaresinbatchdoesnotrinsedownproperlyafterregeneration,itisreplaced..Thisisdoneinplaceofreconditioningtheresin.Resinreplacementisatsucharatethat,theaveragelifeofaresinbatchisfiveyearsandassuchprecludessignificantlossofexchangecapacity.Totalflowand.operatinghoursareused.asthecriteriaforregeneratingthedemineralizers.Theminimumresidualdemineralizercapacityisnotdetermined.Duetothewaterpurityrequired.foroperationand.theuseofhighflowratecondensatedemineralizers,qualityofdemineralizerinfluentwi11have,a.largeeffectonthedemineralizer.-effluentqualitylongbeforeresidualcapacityisexhausted.Therefore,thedemineralizersarenormallyregenerated.'beforetheyreachaminimumexchangecapacitywhichwould.requireregeneration.Becauseofthewaterqualityrequiredand.theuseofhighflowratedemineralizers,achangeinconductivityofthedemineralizereffluentisamoresignificantfactorthanionbreakthrough.Therefore,thereisnoneedtodeterminethequantityofprincipalions.Duetothenormaloperatingrangeofcondensatepuritythedemineralizersareregenerated'basedonthroughputlongbeforeresidual.capacitywouldeffectquality.,Chlorideconcentrationis.determinedbyASTMStandardMethodD512-67,ReferenceMethodC.Toensurethatconductivityandchloridesareattheirlowestpracticallevel,concentrationsatthedemineralizersoutletarenormalitymaintained.atthelevelsshownbelow;ConductivityO.lumhoicmChloride10ppbThereactorwaterisnormallymaintainedataconductivityof(1.0~mho'sandachlorideconcentrationof(0.1ppm(10percentoftheTechnicalSpecificationlimit)forsteamingrates)100,000lb/hr.Forrateslessthan100,000lb/hrtheconductivityismaintainedat(2p.mho'sandchlorideof~0.1ppm(sameasTechnicalSpecificationlimit).48

REGULATORYGUIDE1.57-DESIGNLIMITSANDLOADINGCOMBINATIONSFORMETALPRIMARYREACTORCONTAINYiENTSYSTEMCOMPONENTSTheNiagaraMohawkspecificationfortheNineMilePointUnit1ContainmentdatedSeptember10,1964withrevision1onNovember25,1964definestherequirementsforthereactorcontainmentsystem.ThemandatorycodeaddendumistheMinter1973AddendumtoSectionIII-oftheASMEcode.Thel963Coderequiresthatstresslevelsduringtestcannotexceed90percent.ofthetabulatedyieldstrengthattesttemperatureforaprimarymembrarestressintensity.Furthermore,theprimarymembraneplusprimarybendingstressintensityshallnotexceed125percentofthetabulatedyieldstrengthattesttemperature.Themembranestressesin,theNineMilePointUnit1containmenthavebeenlimitedto1.15timesthebasic.Codeallowables.ThisissubstantiallylowerthanthosestresslevelspermittedbyNE-6222andNE-6322.Loadingconditionsforwhichthecontainmentfunctionisrequiredtosustain,incombinationwithspecificseismicevents,thatis1/2S.S.E.andS.S.E.werenotdefinedinthel963code.Theconservatismofthatcodeandtheeffectofchangesinthetechnologyofseismicanalysis,enhancethepossibilitythatthisvesselwouldmeetthecurrentcode.HForthepurposeofdeterminingtheeffectofjetimpingement,theChicagoBridgeandIronCo.hasgeneratedareportentitled"Loads'nSphericalShells"datedAug.1964.,Fortheportionbacked'yconcr'etewitha2inchairspacebetweentheshellandconcrete,.a.600,jetforcewasapplied.resultinginamaximumdisplacementequalto3incheswithoutrupture.Inadditi,on,GeneralElectricCompanyhasgeneratedatopicalreportentitled,"JetLoadinginPrimaryContainmentVessel",byV.R.NetzelandJ.P.Brackton,datedApril,1972.hisreportwasintendedtoanalyzetheshellwhensubjectedtojetimpingementloadsand-todeterminethattheshellwouldnotrupture.Thereportdemonstratesthecapabilityofthecontainmentvesseltowithstandjetforces.Thevesselshell,wherenotback-japbyconcrete,isdesignedtoresist'thesejetloadswithmaximumallowablestressvalueslimitedto90percentoftheyieldofthematerialattemperatureinaccordancewiththeallowablestresses.Forthatpartofthevesselthathasa2inchairspace,theallowablestraininthesteelstructuremaybeconservativelybasedonthefatiguecriteriaofSectionIIIofASME.TheevaluationofallowablestrainisbasedonFigure1-9-1ofthe1971issueofthisCode.Forcarbonsteelmaterialbasedon10cyclesoffatigueloading,thequartercycleallowablestrainisshowntobeatleast3.9percent.Theresultsofthereportindicatethatthemaximumstraintobefoundisapproximately3.3percentandthereforewithintheASMEcriteria.FATIGUEEVALUATIONParagraphNB3222.4(d)definesvariouscriteriabywhichitcanbeshownthatthevesselisexemptfromafatigueanalysis.,AlthoughtherearenocalculationsintheStressReporttosubstantiatethatthisvesselqualifiedfortheexemptionseveralsimilarvariousBWRtypecontainmentvesselswhichhavehadfatiguecalcu-lationsindicatethatthevesselqualifiesforthisexemption.TheSummer1972AddendumtoASMEIII,ParagraphNE-3131(d)indicatesthatthefatigueanalysisdoesnothavetoincludecyclicactivityduetoearthquake.ParagraphNE-3222.4(d)49

ofSectionIIIofASMEdefinessignificantcyclesasthosewhichwillprovideastresslevelto3S.NoneoftheearthquakestresscycleswouldprovideastresslevelgreaterthanSmandtherefore,noneoftheearthquakecyclesarenormally.considered.tobesignificant.EXPANSIONBELLOWSThecontainmenthas10-90inchexpansionbellowsconnectingtheventlinestothesuppressionchamber.Theseexpansionbellowsarepositionedinsideofthechamberandaredesignedforanexternalpressureof35psi.AtthetimeoffabricationoftheNineMilePointUnit1containmenttheCodedidnotincludeanydesigncriteriaforexpansionbellows.RecentAddendaincludecriteriaforestablishingminimumburst~ressure,meridionalpermanentstrain,ananalysistodetermineinstability,andadefiniteprogrambywhicheachofthesewillbedemon-strated.ParagraphNE-3810alsoincludesarequirementforacycliclifedetermination.Thiscriteriadidnotexistatthetimethisvesselwasdesigned.50

REGULATORYGUIDE1.58-UALIFICATIONOFNUCLEARPOWERPLANTINSPECTIONSANDTESTINGPERSONNELTheformalindoctrinationalandtrainingprogramforpersonnelperformingqualitycontrolrelatedactivitiesconsistsof:Familiarizationwiththecontentof:a)RegulatorycriteriasuchasAppendixBto10CFR50;b)NiagaraMohawkQualityAssuranceManuals6Procedures;c)NiagaraMohawkQualityControlProcedures;d)RegulatoryGuides;-e')Safety'AnalysisReports;f)FilesofQualityControlTypeRecords;g)EngineeringcodessuchasANSIandANSIStandards2~On-The-JobTraininPersonnelperformingQualityControlrelatedactivitiesareassignedresponsibilitieswithinanactiveproject.TheiractivitiesarereviewedbyasupervisororotherexperiencedmemberoftheQualityAssurance/QualityControlorganization.On-the-jobtrainingincludes:a)Auditing,i.e.planning,preparation,conduct,reporting,respondingandfollow-up;b)ReviewingofpurchasedocumentsfortheadequacyofQualityAssurancecontent;c)PreparationorrevisionofdetailedproceduresimplementingtheNineMilePoint,-JamesA.FitzPatrickSiteQualityControlProcedures;d)'reparationofresponsestoinquiriesfromRegulatoryAgenciesregard-ingQualityControl/QualityAssurance;e)Evaluationofvendor'sQualityControl.programsandmanuals;f)ObservationofskilledQualityControl/QualityAssuranceconsultantsandinspectionpersonnelinsideandoutsideNiaqaraMohawk;g)UseoffilescontainingQualityControltyperecords/3~Provisionforparticipationincollegelevelcoursesinvariousspecialprocesses,metallurgy,non-destructivetesting,etc.4.TheprovisionoftextsandperiodicalsconcerningQualityControlrelatedactivities.Inadditiontotheforegoing,theQualityAssurancewillconductmeetingsandseminarstoincludeasaminimumthefollowing:a)ThehistoryofQualityAssurance;b)TheneedforQualityAssurance;c)ThefunctioningofaQualityAssuranceSystem;d)DetailedexplanationsofallQualityAssurance/QualityControlpolicies,proceduresandinstructions;e)Applicationofvariousregulations,standards,codesandguides;f)TheroletobeperformedbyallpersonnelperformingactivitiessubjecttoQualityAssuranceCoverage,includingengineering,plantoperatingandmaintenance,purchasingandstoreroom.51

Thepurposeofaudits,toinsurethatthesystemisfunctioningandtorecommendimprovements.5.Theformal-indoctrinationandtrainingofpersonnelinvolvedverifyconformanceofworkactivitiestoinspection,examinationandtestingtovariouscodesandstandards;a)Trainingcourseswillbescheduledonaperiodicbasis;b)Non-destructivetestingprogrammedinstructionmanualsproducedbyGeneralDynamics,willbeusedforinstruction.c)Onthejobparticipationshallalsobeincludedintrainingprogram.d)Specificrequiredcapabilitiesforinspection,examinationandtestpersonnelare-presentlymaintainedintheQualityControlInspectionfile,suchas:personnelvisionrequirements.e)TheNon-destructivetestingprogramwillmeettherequirementsoftheAmericanSocietyofNon-destructivetestingrecommendedpracticeSNTTC1Aandsupplements.f)ProficiencytestingoftrainingshallbeinaccordancewithSNTTEClAandsupplements.6.Inadditiontotheabove,indoctrinationalandtrainingprogramproce-dures,arecurrentlybeingdevelopedatNineMilePointUnit1,usingANSIN45.2andthisguideasguidelines.52

REGULATORGUIDE1.5-DESIGNBASISFLOODSFORNUCLEARPOWERPLANTSAdiscussionofthedesignbasisflood.isgiveninSections2.3.3and.12.3.7oftheNineMilePointUnit2PSAR.Theworstsiterelated.floodatNineMilePointwould.resultinascreen-wellflood.levelatelevation2/2.gfeet.Thisi"sbased:onamaximumprobablesetupofLakeOntarioof4.1f'eetabovemeanlakelevelandamaximumprobablerainfallof0.35feet.Themaximumwaverunupassociatedwiththatfloodleveliselevation263fee~.Topreventtheuni<frombeingaffectedastonefaced.dikewithatopelevationof263feetwillbeconstructedinLakeOntarioextendingfromtheexistingdikeinfrontofUnit1onthewestand.totheeasternpartofthesitewheretheground.risestoelevation263feet.Thequestionsofmaximumprobableflood.leveland.required.protectionarecurrentlybeingresolved,withtheAECStaffduringthelicensingreviewofNineMilePointUnit2(Docket50-410).Thefina1resolutionwillalsoapp+toUnitl.53

5.~UESNIONProvideasummarydescriptionofthecurrentstatusofmodifi-cationswhichyoustated.~could,becompleted.atthetimeofthefirstmajorrefuelingoutagethatbeganinApril1973.includeadiscussionofthedesignchangesthatweremadetoKP-1sincesubmitta1oftheApplication.RESPONSEThefollowingisasummarydescriptionofthestatusmodificationspre-.'sentedinthe"TechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConversionfromPro-visonalOperatingLicensetoFullTermOperatingLicense"whichweretobecompletedbytheend'fthe'irst'efuel'ingoutage.a.VibrationMonitorinAcommittmentwasmadeforinstallingarudimentaryimpactsystematNineMilePointUnitNl.Sincethistime,GeneralElectricinconnectionwithEmpireStateElectricEnergyResearchCorporationhasbeendevelopingaplanforinstallationofaprototypevibrationmonitoringsystem.Thepresentscheduleisto'installthissystemattheJamesA.FitzPatrickplantin1975.NiagaraMohawkbeingamemberofEmpireStateElectricEnergyResearchCorporationwillhaveaccesstoallresultsfromthisprogram.b.RecirculaticuP~umTriAtripoftherecirculationpumpsonhighpressurewasdiscussedintheTechnicalSupplement.ThestatusofthischangeisincludedintheresponsetoRequest3b.c.HihPressureCoolantInsectionSstem-Thehighpressurecoolantinjectionsystemservestocoolthereactorcoreforsmalllinebreaksandbacksup,thecoresprayandauto&epress-urization.Thissystemhasbeenoperablesincethefirstrefuelingoutage.AproposedchangetotheStatusTechnicalSpecificationisincludedinresponsetorequest1.d.InstrumentationforMonitorinDrwellConditions-Pressureandtemperatureinstrumentationwereinstalledbeforeinitialoperation.Additionalwiderangedrywellpressureinstrumentswereinstalledpriortothefirstrefuelingoutage.Thesehavearangeof0-75psigwithindicationinthecontrolroom.SinceJuly,1973,severalotherdesignchangesweremadetostationoper-atingequipmentandsystemstofurtherenhancethesafeandefficientop-erationoftheplant.Insummary,theyareasfollows:1NineMilePointUnit1,TechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFullTermLicense.54

a.DelltoSuressionChamberVacuumBreakersLeverarmmodificationsweremadetoimprovetheclosingtorqueonthevalves.Thesemodificationsenhancetheclosingofthevalvefollowingtestsoractualoperationbyprovidingamoreconstanttor-quethroughtoutthevalvecycle.Inaddition,lowhysterisisindi-catingswitcheswereinstalledtodetect'penpositionslessthanthemaximumallowablebypassareaon,eachvalve.b.SuressionChamberBafflesAllsuppressionchamberbafflingwasremovedtoimprovethedischargeflowpatternfromtheelectromaticreliefvalvesduringtheiroper-ate:on.Itwaspossibleforhydraulicforcesandlocalhotspotstodeveloponindividualbaffles.Therefore,toimprovethesafeoper-ationofthesystemallbafflingwasremovedand"ramshead"dischargeinstalled.Thebraketimingrelaywasreducedfrom1.0secondsto0.5secondsandthecontrolcircuitwasreconnectedsuchthathoistspeedwilldropinstantaneouslytoonehalfspeedwhenlimitswitchesopenthecontrolcircuit.Inaddition,asecondupperlimitswitchwasinstalledtoopencontactsintheprimarymotorleads,andrepositioningoftheloadcellwasperformed.Thismodificationwillaccomplishsmootherbrakingofthegrapple.d.ReactorProtectionSstemSnchronizationHPanelmounteddialindicatorswereinstalledtoprovidesensitiveinstrumentationforsynchronizingReactorProtectionSystembusses162and172andcomputerbus167toandfromthemaintenancebus.Thisdesignchangeeliminatesthepossibilityoftrippingtheunitduringtransferstoandfromthemaintenancebus.e.EmerencDieselGeneratorModeSwitchTheemergencydieselgeneratormodeswitchwasatwopositiontoggleswitchlocatedatthediesellocalcontrolpanel.Thisallowedanoperatortodefeattheautomaticstartinglogicofadieselgeneratorformaintenancepurposes.Therewasnoindicationinthecontrolroomoftheswitchposition.Amechanicallockwasplacedonthisswitchtoensurethatitalwaysremainintheautomaticposition.Controlproceduresweresetupformaintenanceonthediesels.f.CondensatePumRoomProtectionThecondensatepumpswereprotectedfromfloodingbyaddingbulkhead..doorstothepumproomsandsealingtheopeningaroundthelines.ThiswasdonetoprovideprotectionoftheHighPressureCoolantInjectionSystemfromfloodingduetoabreakinthecirculatingwaterlines.ThisanalysiswasattherequestoftheAECinaletterdatedAugust3,1972fromMr.D.J.SkovholttoMr.T.J.Brosnan.55

g.SnubbersonblainSteamLineDifferentialPressuremonitorsPulsationdampeningsnubbershavebeeninstalledonthesteamflowdifferentialpressureswitchlinestoenhancethefeedwatercontrol.Avalvehasbeenadded-tothedischargelineoftheliquidpoisonpumpsothatthesystemcanbetestedatdesignpressure.i.Leak-offLinesfromRecirculationValvePackin-Valves'havebeenpla'cedintheleak-offlineswhichgototheequip-mentdraintanks.Thismodificationwillallowthesecondandthirdsetsofpackingsinseriestoseeserviceandminimizeleakagetothedraintanks.j.FeedwaterControlPowerSu1Thischangeinvolvedtheseparationofpowersupplychannels.Re-dundancyofpowersuppliesisaccomplishedbyusingdifferentbusesforeachfeedwatertrain.k.AnticiatinTriTestCircuitrWiththeinitialdesignitwasimpossibletotestthescramlogicat'ful'1'designratingwithoutscramingofthereactor.Originally,twostopvalveshadtobeoperated.Achangewasmadetomonitorthecurrentinthecircuitwhenstrokingonevalve.Thisallowedtestingofonevalveatatimesothatnoscramresults.1.ElectromaticReliefValveTestCircuitrOriginally,yhenthevalveswereenergizedandsubsequentlyde-ener-gized,thesolenoidswouldnotfullyresetduetoasmallcurrentflowthroughthecontactmonitoring.lights.Atimedelay.dropoutrelaywasinstalledtoeliminatecurrentflowthroughthelightsuntilthesolenoidisde-energizedandreturnedtothefullyde-energizedposition.56

6.~UES1IONThefollowingadditionalinformationregardingthecontainmentatmospheredilutionsystemisrequired:a.Providecurvesoftheoxygenconcentrationversustimeinthedrywellandsuppressionchamberfollowingaloss-of-collantaccident(LOCA)assumingnodilutionbysteam.b.includeacurveofcontainmentpressureasafunctionoftimeassumingzerocontainmentleakage.c.Also,provideacurveofnitrogenadditionrequirementsfordilutionsasafunctionoftimeusingtheassumptionsgivenina.and.b.above.d.TheACRShasrecommendedforothersimilarplantsthatthepeakcontainment,repressurizationlevelbelimitedtoavaluesubstantiallybelowitsdesignpressure.DefineandjustifytherepressurizationlimitforIRK-1.identify'equired.purgerates,initiationtime,andradiologicaldosesatthesiteboundaryduet0purgingoe.Providediscussionandanalysestosupporttheadequacyofthedesignbasesforthecontainmentatmosoheredilution(CAD)systemanddiscusshowthesystemwillbeoperated.Thediscussionshouldincludethefollowing:(1)Thesamplingequipment,principles,design,operatingprocedures,equipmentqualificationforLOCAservice,timetosampleormonitor,locationofsamplingpointsincontainment,locationofmeasurementreadout,samplingerrorsand,stratificationconsiderations.(2)Thepreoperationalcheckoutandevaluationofthesamplingand.CADsystemsand.thetestingproceduresand.frequencyforthesesystemsduringtheplantlifetime.(3)RelatethemaximumrequiredrateofnitrogenmakeuptothedesignflowrateoftheCADsystem.Specifythecapacityof'heCADsystemnitrogentankandtheprovisionsformonitoringthenitrogenlevelinthetank.(4)ThedesignpressurelimitationsofCADsystemcomponentsandpiping,deliverycapabilityoftheCADsystemagainstpressurehead.ofthecontainment,andmakeuplimitationsduetoinadequacyofonsitenitrogeninventoryortimetoobtainoffsitemakeup(specify).57

HYDRO%ENANDOXYGENCONCENTRATIONSINCONTAINMENTFOLLOWINGLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT15DRYWELL~100-cL5SUPPRESSIONCHAMBERN2INJECTIONBEGINS0.1SUPPRESSIONCHAMBER1.010TIMEAFTERACCIDENT(DAYS)100C)I-2CLDRYllELLNJECTIONBEGINS0.11.010TINEAFTIACCIDENT(DAYS)100Fiure6-1

CONTAINMENTPRESSUREWITHCONTAINMENTATMOSPHERICDILUTIONOPERATION.ZEROCONTAINMENTLEAKAGE4030200.20406080100TIMEAFTERACCIDENT(DAYS).Fiure6-2

NITROGENADDEDBYCONTAINMENTATMOSPHERICDILUTION,OPERATIONFOLLOWINGLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT500400CDCDg300200C)100C)l-20406080100TINEAFTERACCIDENT(DAYS)I.igure6-3

onacontinuousbasistominimizestratificationandsamplingerrors.Thesemonitorswillbecapableofmeetingthemostsevereenviron-mentalconditionsfollowinganaccident.ThelocationofsamplingpointsisshownonFigure6-5.Readoutwillbeinthecontrolroom.Equipmentwillbedesignedtooperateinthemostsevereenvironmentalconditions.Themaximumrequiredrateofnitrogenmake-upcomesinthefirst20daysfollowinganaccidentandamountsto7scfm.Thedesignflowrateoftheventsystemis0-100scfm.Thestoragetankholdsapproxi-mately1,100,000cubicfeetofnitrogen.Approximately600,000cubic.feet,.arerequiredtoinertthe,drywell,sothatintheunlikelyeventthattheaccidentoccurred,therewouldbesufficientcapacityforover2monthsofContainmentAtmosphericDilutionsystemoperation.Deliveryofnitrogencanbecontinuedforcontainmentpressuresinexcessof40psig.Designpressurelimitswillbe350psig.Levelmonitoringofthenitrogentankwillbeinthecontrolroom.PipingwillmeettherequirementsofASMESectionIIIClass2.Pre-operationalandoperatingprocedureswillbedevelopedcommensuratewithprogressinsystemcompletion.Inadditiontechnicalspecificationswhichwillincludetestfrequenciesandprocedureswillbedevelopedonanappropriatetimescale.'he:onlysourceswhichcouldpotentiallycontributeoxygentothecon-tainmentfollowingalossofcoolantaccidentareoxygenentrainedinthecoolantandleakagefromairsupplysystems.Themaximumamountofoxygenentrainedinthereactorcoolantis0.0043lb-moles.Thisisbasedonamaximumcoolantconcentrationof3ppmasdescribedinthebasestotheTechnicalSpecifications(3.2.3).Thereareserviceairandbreathingairconnectionswhicharevalvedclosedduringnormaloperation.However,leakageontheorderof0.1scfhcouldbepossible.The0.0043lbmolesfromthereactorcoolantandthe0.001lbmolesfromvalveleakageisnegligibleincomparisontothe8lb-molesofoxygengeneratedinthefirst16hoursduetoradiolyticdecomposition.Figures6-4and6-5showthecontainmentatmospheredilutionsystemwithback-upventingandthecontainmentgasanalysissystem.respec-tively.ThedottedlinesonFigure6-4showthelineswhichareusedforcon-tainmentatmospheredilutionandventing.Thesystemalsoutilizestheexistingstoragefacilities(withadditionalstorageadded),vapor-izer,isolationvalvesandemergencyventilationfiltersandfans.Thecontainmentatmosphericdilutionsystemincludingnitrogenstoragetanks,vaporizors,pipingandvalvesisanengineeredsafeguardssystemandisbeingdesignedtomeetseismicClassIrequirements.Thesystem.willbedesignedinaccordancewiththefollowingcodesandstandards:(1)USAECRegulatoryGuides1.7and1.26(2)AS&IESectionIIIClass2(3)IEEE-279

STACKTURBINEBUILDINGREPBV8'EACTORBUILDINGEXHAUSTFANSIVTURBINEBUILDINGDUCTWORKENERGEttCYVENTILATIOHFANSDRYWELLVENTANDPURGEFAHBVBV~IV"~iVABSOLUTEBVCHARCOALWBVgDUCTHTRlttTANKABSOLUTECOttDEttSERFILTERSl-~IlIVAPORIZERIFEFCVWIN2Cgw~wrsmssraceBVISTORAGREACTORBUILDINGREACTORBUILDINGVEttTDUCTNORMALSYSTEI4NEyRppENIMAKE-UPMIVIVEL315.0'TMOSPHERE-~lMAM'VBVlmlIVttIVIaIV'IIVIlIIIlIDRYWELLBVIVIVTORUSNORMALM-MANUALLYOPERATEDNITROGEN---CADSYSTEMFLOWLINESMAKE-UP1lTORUSCONTAINMENTATMOSPHEREDILUTIONSYSTEMWITHBACK-UPVENTINGFigure6-4

CONTAINMENTGAS(H2AND02)ANALYZERSYSTEMRMCJH25ARPLKWL~IIC"AlWVIN,P9CtlCTCNOg~INC~CIS

UESTIONToassurethatferriticmaterialsofpressureretainingcomponentsofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarywillhaveadequatefracturetoughnessduringservicehydrostaticand.leaktests,providerevisedtemperatureand.pressurelimitationsestablishedbyusingtherequirements-.ofAppendixG2000oftheSummer1972AddendatoSectionIIIoftheASMEBoilerand.PressureVesselCodeasaguide.Also,providethetemperaturelimitationsforcoreoperationspecifiedbytherecentlyrevisedandissuedAppendixGof10CFR50(PublishedintheFederalHeisteronJuly3.7,1973).Indicatetheoperatinglimitationsonheatupand.cooldownplustheaboveinformationthatwi.llbeincludedinproposedchangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.RESPONSEtAfracturetoughnessanalysishasbeencompletedfortheNineMilePointUnitNlpressurevessel.Theanalysisindicatedthatthepresentl00F/hzlimitonnormalheat-upandcool-downareacceptablethroughoutthelifeoftheplant.Operatinglimitsonreactorvesselpressureandtemperatureduringnormalheat-upandcool&own,andduringinservicehydrostatictestinghavebeenestablishedusingAppendix"G"ofSectionIIIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,1971Editionasaguide.Theseoperatinglimitsassurethatalazgepostulatedsurfaceflaw,havingadepthofone-quarterofthematerialthickness,canbesafelyaccommodatedinregionsofthevesselshellremotefromd'scontinuities.Forthepurposeofsettingtheseoperatinglimitsthereferencetemperature,RTNDTwasdeterminedfromtheimpacttestdatatakeninaccordancewithre-quirementsoftheASMECodetowhichthisvesselwasdesignedandmanufact-ured.IfthedropweightNilDuctilityTransitionTemperatureisknown,thereferencetemperaturetobeusedwouldbetheNilDuctilityTransitionTem-perature.IfthedzopweightNilDuctilityTransitionTemperatureisnotknown,RTNwouldbetakenasthelowesttemperatureatwhichtheminimumCodeallowRleCharpyV-notch,energyrequirementwouldbeexpectedtooccuronthebasisofreportedCharpyV-notchtestdata.Thehighestreferencetemperatureofanypartofthereactorpressurevessel,pressureboundarymaterialisusedasthereferencetemperatureforcalcu-latingonesetofoperatingtemperatureandpressurelimitsfortheshellremotefromthecorebeltlineregion.Asecondsetoftemperatureandpres-surelimitsforthecorebeltlineregionhavebeencalculatedbasedonthecorebeltline,regionmaterialreferencetemperatureappropriatelyadjustedforirradiationshiftwithvesselneutronexposure.TherequirementsoftheCodetowhichthevesselwasdesignedandmanufacturedresultsinathirdsetofvesselshelltemperaturepressurelimits.TheseareNilDuctilityTransitionTemperature+60ForCharpyV-notch+60Fatpressuregreaterthan20percentofpreoperationalsystemhydrostatictestpressure.Themostconservativeoftheabovethreelimitswasusedtosetpressureandtemperaturelimitsforthevesselshell.60

Figure7-1givesthetemperatureandpressurelimitsforinservicehydro-statictesting.TheuppercurvewillbelimitinguntilthepredictedNilDuctilityTemperatureshiftreaches30F.Figure7-2givesthechangesinCharpyV-notchtemperatureshiftasafunctionofneutronfluence.Thiscurvewillbeusedtodeterminetheshiftduringvessellife.AproposedchangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsisattachedasarevisiontoSpecification3.2.2andbases.

PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSFORINSERVICEHYDROSTATICTESTING20015010050rr~REACTORPRESSUREVESSELSHELLRENTE.FROHCOREBELTLIHEREGIOHREACTORPRESSUREVESSELSHELLCOREBELTLIHEREGIOH0600800100012001400INSERVICEHYDROSTATICTESTPRESSURE(PSIG)MEASUREDINTOPDOME1600Figure-1

THEEFFECTOFIRRADIATIONONVARIOUSHEATSOFA302B/A533B-CL'ASSTEEL'600500400300I200100001610171018101910201021INTEGRATEDNEUTRONDOSAGE(>1MeV)(<t),nvtFigure7-2

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASES(Cont'd.)$.2.2NINONREACTORVESSELTDO'ERAIUREMRPRESSURIIATICeI4.2.2NININNIREACIORVESSEI.TENPERATUREFORPRESSURIATIOVf~lfflffIIAppliestotheninisacsvesseltcnperaturerequiredforvesselpressurization.Appliestotherequiredvesseltcnperatureforpressurization.~fffToassurethatnosubstantialprcssureisinposedcmthereactorvesselunlessitstenperatureisconsider-ablyaboveitsNilDuctilityTransitionTexperature(NUIT).ToassurethatthevesselisnotsubjectedtoanysubstantialpressureunlessitstcnperatureisgreaterthanitsNUTI.~Slflla.thereactorvesselshallbaventedandshallnotbeinthepaveroperatingoonditionwheneverthepressurevesseltexperatureislessthanNnxrplus60raeshovninPleura3.2.2a.b.IhoreactorvesselheadboltingstudsshallnotbeundertensionunlessthotcnperatureofthevesselheadflangeandtheheadareequaltoorgreaterthanIOOF.~Slfl\a.Reactorvesseltesperatureandpressureshallbenonitoredandcontrolledtoassurethatthepres-suresndteeperaturelinitsarenet.b.Neutronfluxnonitorsinstalledinthcreactorvesseladjacenttothevesselvalistcore~Id-planelevelshallberenovcdandtestedatthefirstrefuelingoutage.c.Naterialsexples,installedinthestean,stean/water,andvaterIeueesinsidethereactorpressurevassal,usedtononitorthasensitizedstainlessstealshallbeinspectedonthefollowingschedulesFigures3.2.2aani3.2.2bplotrespectivelythepressurevs.tesperatuzeIinitsanithachangein30ft.-lb.Chaxpyv-notchcapabilityvs.integratedneutzondossage.Vbabasicdatafozfigure3.2.2btorA302n/AS330-class1steelsisbasedce30ft.-lb.CharpyV-notchenergytransitiontem-peratureswhichhavebeencorrelatedvithdropveightspec-lnennilductilitytransitionforthissteel.Atthedesignexposureofsx1012notthechangeinNUITis6sp.Firstcapsule-onatouzthservicelifesecondcapsule-threefourthserviceliteThirdcapsulestandbyIntheeventthesuxveillancespecinansatonequarterofthevesselscervioelifeindicate~shittofrefezencetcnpsraturegreaterthanpredictedthascheduleshallbexevisedasfollovsxgeconicapsule-onebaltservicelifeThirdcapsulestandbythereactorvesselheadflangeandthovesselflangeinccebinatlonwiththadouble'xy'ingtypesealarede-signedtoprovidealeaktightsealwhenboltedtogether.thenthevesselheadisplacedonthereactorvessel,onlythatportionoftheheadflangeneartheinsideofthcvesselrestsonthevesselflange.Astheheadboltsarereplacedandtensioned,thevesselheadisflexedslightlytobringtogethertheentirecontactsurfacesadjacenttothe'xy'ingsoftheheadandvesselflange.goththeheadandvesselflangehaveaAUTtesperatureof40Fandtheyarenotsubjecttoanyappreciableneutronradiationexposure.Therefore,thenininunvesselheadandheadflangetceperstureforboltingtheheadflangeandvesselflangeIsestablisheds>>40e60ForlOOF.TheintegratedneutronfluxatthevesselvaliiscalenlacedfreecorephysicsdataandwillbeneasuredusingfluxnonitorsInstalledinsidethcvessel.Thisneasuredfluxvillbeusedtocheckandifnecessarycorrectthecalculateddatatodetexuineanaccurateflux.FranthisdataaccesexvativeNUITtenperaturecanbedetexuined.SincenoshiftvilloccuruntilsnintegratedfluxofIOIPnvtisreachedtheconfir-naticecsnbesadevaliinadvanceofanyshift.

LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTBASES(Cont'd.)Vesselsaterialsurveillancesaaplesarelocatedvlthinthecoreregiontopcrsitperiodicaonitoringofex-posureandsaterialpropertiesrelativetocontrolsaaples(Vol.IV,SectionI-D.p.I-24).~Inaddition.sasplesvillalsobeinstalledtoaonlrtorthesensititedstainlesssteelcosponents.Sasplcsconsistingofsensltltedstainlesssteelforgingsandstripsandannealedaaterlalvillbelocatedinthestean,a{xture,andvaterphasesinsidethere~ctorvessel.Detailedlaboratoryexaainationofthesesasplesvouldberequiredifinspectionsand/oranalysesofotherconditlons,e.g.~substantialdeviationsInprisarycoolantchesistry,indicatethatstresscorrosioncrackingofthesensititedstainlesssteeloccurred.'FSAR.41

PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSFORINSERVICEHYDROSTATICTESTING200150LLJI-10050REACTORPRESSUREVESSEl.SHELLREHOTEFROHCOREBELTLINEREGION~REACTORPRESSUREVESSELSHELLCOREBELTLINEREGION0600.8001000,12001400INSERYICEHYDROSTATICTESTPRESSURE(PSIG)MEASUREDINTOPDOMlE1600Fig3.2.2.a

THEEFFECTOFIRRADIATIONONVARIOUSHEATSOFA302B/A533B-CLASS1STEEL"'600500400lD300I2001000lpl61017lpl81019'020INTEGRATEDNEUTRONDOSAGE(>1MeY)(<t),nvtFigure3.2.2.b

8.QUESTIONProvidetheproposedsurveillancecapsulewithdrawalscheduleand,indicatethedegreethatKP-1cancomplywiththerecentlyrevised.AppendixHto10CFR$0(publishedintheFedere1~ReisteronJnIF17.1973)~RESPONSE.Thesurveillance..capsule.withdrawalscheduleforNineMilePointUnit1willcomplywithSectionIIC.3aofrevised.AppendixHtolOCPR$0datedJuly17,1973.Reportswillbesubmitted.pursuanttothisAppendix.ThepresentTechnicalSpecificationswillberevisedtoreflectthischange.62

9.~UES1IONProvidesufficientinformationaboutyourinserviceinspectionprogramforengineeredsafetyfeaturestoindicatethattheprogramprovidesadegreeofassuranceofsystemintegritycomparabletotheprogramrecoaunendedinRegu1atoryGuide1.51,"lnserviceInspectionofASIDECodeClass2and3NuclearPowerPlantComponents",May1973,withinthelimitsofaccessibilitydesignedintoRP-l.Znc3udethecorrespondingrevisions,asappropriate,intheproposed.changestotheTechnicalSpecifications.RESPONSENineMilePointUnit1componentsweredesignedtotheANSIB31.1andB16.5codes.ThosesystemswhichwouldbeincludedasASMECodeClass2and3componentsifbeingdesignedpresentlyare:ASMECODECLASSClass2SstemsClass3Sstems*Reactorrecirculation*Mainsteam*LowandHighPressurefeedwater*CondensateControlroddrive*CoresprayLiquidPoisonShutdowncoolingHeadspray*EmergencyCondenserContainmentsprayReactorbldg.emergencyventilationReactorinstrumentationReactorventanddrainFuelpoolfilteringandcoolingReactorCleanupReactorandHastebldg.closedloopcoolingServiceWaterRadioactivewastedisposalOff-gasDieselgeneratorfueloil,startingair,andcoolingwater.InstrumentandbreathingairDrywellventandpurgeControlroomventilationDxywellandtorusvacuumreliefDrywellandInstrumentationandleakmonitoring*PRIMARYCOOLANTSYSTEMPresently,theinserviceinspectionprogramcoverstheprimarycoolantsys-tem,thoseengineeredsafeguardsconcernedwithemergencycorecoolingandthemaincoolantpiping.TheguidecallsforadditionalareasforinspectiontoincludeallthosesystemsasclassifiedasASMECodeClass2and3components.

ProceduresarecurrentlyunderdevelopmentatNineMilePointUnit1whichwillupdatethepresentinserviceinspectionprogram.RegualtoryGuide1.51willbeusedasaguideintheirpreparation.ThisrevisedprogramwillincludeallareaswhichwouldbeAS'odeClass2and3componentsifbeingdesignedtoday.AppropriateTechnicalSpecificationchangeswillalsobesubmitted.64

10.UESTIONTheresponseonpageIII-2oftheApplicationtoshowconformancetoCriterion4bystatingthatadequatebracingisprovidedtopreventpipewhipisnotconsistentwiththeFSARinformation.ItisourunderstandingthatprotectionagainstpipewhipwasnotincludedinthedesignofNMP-l.Therefore,todeterminefeasiblemeanstoprotectthecontainment,theprimarysystemandengineeredsafetyfeaturesagainsttheadverseeffectsofpipewhipintheunlikelyeventofapiperuptureinsidecontainment,providethefollowinginformationregardinghighenergylinesinsidetheNMP-1containment:a.Anevaluationdescribingthosesystemsthataread'equatelyprotectedagainsttheeffectsofpipewhipduetoeitherofthefollowing:'(1)Theuseoftwoindependentredundantsystemswhereonlyoneneedbeprotectedbyaugmentedinserviceinspectionorpiperestraints,or(2)Sufficientspatialseparationorstructuralseparationexiststoprotectalltrainsoraredundantsystemfrombeingaffectedbyasinglepiperupture.b.Whereanaugmentedinserviceinspectionprogramisindicated,itwillfollowtheguidanceofEnclosure1attachedhereto.c.Wherestructuraldesigncriteriaareindicatedtoprovidetheprotectivestructures,thecriteriaofEnclosure2attachedheretowillbefollowed.RESPONSEa.SUMMARYAllhighenergylinesinsidetheprimarycontainmentofNineMilePointUnitNo.1havebeenanalyzedfortheeffectsofpipewhip.Inallcases,thecapabilityofcorecoolingismaintained.Table10-1listsallthehighenergysystemsinsidetheprimarycontainment.Ithasbeenassumedthatanyoneoftheselinescanbreakanywhereinsidetheprimarycontainment.Ifalinebreakoccurredallthesystemslistedintable10-1couldbeaffected.However,becauseofredundancyandseparation,theengineeredsafeguardsystemswouldstillperformtheirintendedfunctions.Aninvestigationintotheirimpactingthewallsoftheprimarycontainmentwasalsoperformed.ThisanalysisshowedthatPgpostulatedbreaksandresultingimpact,thecontainmentwouldnotlose,itsintegrityandwouldsuffernolossoffunction.b.CONTAINMENTINTEGRITYANALYSISAreviewofthepipingsystemsinsidethedrywellwasmadetodeterminewhichsystemscould,ifpostulatedtofail,impactthecontainmentwithsufficientenergytocauseconcern.Thethreesystemsconsideredascontainingsufficient65

TABLE10-1HighEnergySystems(1)mainsteam(2)feedwater(3)reactorrecirculation(4)corespray(5)containmentspray(6)emergencycondensersupplyandreturn(7)controlroddrivehydraulic(8)liquidpoison(9)reliefvalvedischarge(XO)shutdowncooling(ll)headspray(12)clean-up

energyuponimpacttorepresenttheworstcasesare:(1)ReactorRecirculation(2)MainSteam(3)FeedwaterThefluidforcesgeneratedbythebreakhavebeencalculatedandaredis-cussed.below.Theseloadsarethenappliedtoamodelofthepipeandtheim-pactvelocityat,thecontainmentisobtained.Thestressesinthecontainmentarecalculatedbymodelingthecontainment,airgap,concrete,andimpactingmisslewiththeappropriate.massand.velocity.FLUIDFORCESRecirculationLooTheforceatthebreakrisesfromavalueequaltotheproductofpressuretimesareatoabout1.125timesthatvalueinashorttime,thendecaysslowly.However,duetotheproximityofthebreaktothereactorpressurevesselnozzle,someconservatismwasaddedtocoverpossibleimpingementeffectsofthejetescapingfromthenozzle.Theactualloadappliedtothepipingsystemwas1.5timestheproductofpressureandarea.MainSteamTheforceatthebreakrisesfromaninitialvalueequaltopressuretimespipecrosssectionalaretoamaximumof1.26thatvaluein0.052seconds.FeedwaterTheforceatthebreakrisesfromaninitialvaluee'qualtoamaximumof1.125thatvaluein0.068seconds.JetIminementForceAsaresultofbreakintheRecirculationSystematthevesselnozzleajetisgeneratedwhichcanimpingeonthecontainmentvessel.Thejetpressureis40psioveranareaof26,300squareinches.ImactVelocitiesandEffectsThevelocitiesofthepipesandbeamswhichhavebeenanalyzedforimpactonthecontainmentvesselaregivenbelow:~SstemImactVelocit(ft/sec)RecirculationMainSteam115100Feedwater89StructuralBeam(lOWF33)11566

Thebreakinthemainsteamsystemrepresentsabreakatthevesselnozzle.Forabreaknearthemainsteampenetration,thesteamlinecannotreachthecontainmentvesselwithoutstrikingthefeedwatersystem.Thiswouldreducethevelocityofthesteamlinesignificantly.Assumingthatthesteamlinedidnotstrikethefeedwaterline,animpactvelocityof270ft/secwouldre-,sult.Theallowablestraininthecontainmentvesseldemonstratestheadequacyofthestructureagainstimpactsresultingfrompipebreakandassociatedwhip.Theultimatestrainofthecontainmentvesselis10percent.Thecalculatedaccumulativestrainsfortheconditionsanalyzedaregivenbelow:ConditionVesselThickness(in)StrainRecirculationLoopElbowRecirculationLoopElbowStructuralBeam(12WF40)StructuralBeam(12WF40)1.5'768.7681.56.1percent9.2percent4.0percent1.1percentWithrespecttothestructural'beams,thehighestvelocity(115ft/sec)occursforthe10WF33beam.Forconservatism,theanalysesusedaheavier12WF40beamIwithavelocityof115ft/secratherthantheactualvelocityof60ft/sec.c.SstemDescritions(1)MainSteamThemainsteamlinesdischargefromthevesselatElevation310feetandatthe90and270rediallocationsanddescend.Inthisareatherearetwo10inchemergencycondenserlinesatthe67.5and292'radiallocations.Theselinesareseparatedatgreatenoughdistancessoasnottobeeffectedbyanybreakofthemainsteamlines.ThemainsteamlinesproceeddownwardthroughElevation295feetwheretheypassbysome1inchinstrumentpigingatthe90radiallocationandacontrolroddriveexhaustlineatthe270radiallocation.ContinuingondownfromElevation295feettoElevation264feet,thesteamlinespassbycontainmentspraysparagers,feedwaterlinesoneachsideofthesteamlines,reliefvalvedischargelines,shutdowncooling,reactorrecircu-,lation,coresprayandroddriveexhaust.Allcouldberupturedexceptfortherecirculationlinesbecauseoftheirlargersize.Fromthispoint,thesteam0lineshealtoward180andexistthedrywelladjacenttothetwo18inchin-comingfeedwaterlines.Therequiredsystemsforcorecoolingandsafeshutdowninthecaseofamainsteamlinebreakarethecontainmentspray,corespray,andfeedwater.Allofthesesystemshavetherequiredredundancyorbackupasdiscussedinparagraphd.below.67

(2)FeedwaterThetwo18inchfeedwaterlinesentertheprimarycontainmentatElevation263feetadjacenttothetwo24inchmainsteamlines.Atthispointthelinescurvearoundto90and270radialdirections.At+45degreesoneachsideoftheselines,two10inchlinesproceedinwardandthenascendvertically.Inthisrunthefeedwaterlinespassbysome12inchcorespraylines,14inchshutdowncoolinglines,6inchcontainmentspraylinesand6inchcleanupsystemlines.ProceedingupwardtoElevation295,feet,thefeedwaterlinesenterthereactorvesselatthe45,135,225and315radiallocations.Duringthisascensiontheypassbythe12inchcorespraylinesandcontainmentspraysparagers,and'a'lbinch'liqui'd'poison'line.Theonlydamagewhichcouldoccuristooneoftheredundantcontainmentspraysandtotheliquidpoisonlines.becauseoftheirsize.Asdiscussedinpara-graphd.below,thissystemhasadequateredundancyevenintheeventthatonesystemisincapacitated.Theliquidpoisonsystemisabackupsystemonly.Theprimarymeansofshuttingdownthereactoristhecontrolroddrivesystem.(3)ReactorRecirculationSystemTherearefiverecirculationpumpseachofwhichhasasuctionanddischargeline.Theselinesareatthe0,42,73o,114144,186,216,258,288an'd'330radiallocationsbetweenElevations225feetto275feet.Theseare28inchand26inchdiameterlinesforthesuctionanddischargerespectively.Otherlinesintheareaoftheserecirculationlinesare:.(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h)10and12inch-EmergencyCondensers4and6inchContainmentspray(0to10and18inchfeedwater(288,25812inchCoreSpray(258,115)14inchReliefvalvedischarge(288,6inchclean-up(42)24inchMainsteam(258,216,18614inchShutdownCooling(330)(330,0)360o,)216,144,114)216o)144,114)Thefirstfoursystems(a,b,c,andd)mayberequiredfollowingabreakintherecirculationsystem.Allhavetherequiredredundancyorbackup.(4)ContainmentSprayDuetothesmallsizeofthecontainmentspraylinesandthefactthattheyarenotpressurizedduringnormaloperation,rupturewouldnotcausedamagetoanyotherofthelinesbecauseoftheirlargersize.(5)LiquidPoisonTheliquidpoisonlineduetoitssmallsizewouldnotimpartdamageonanyothersystem.(6)EmergencyCondensersThe10inchemergencycondensersupplylinesarelocatedintheareabetweenIP68

270and90radiallyatElevation306feet.Inthisareathereareonlysomesmall'nstrumentlines,a2inchheadspraylineandsome14inchcontainmentsprayheaders.Thesupply"linesleavethedrywellandthe10inchreturnlinesenteratElevation269feet.Inthistherearefourlines:'a)6inchclean-up(b)6inch,8inch,and12inchcontainmentsprayTheonlyrequiredlinesintheeventofabreakofanemergencycondenserlinearethecontainmentspray.Thesearesupplylinestosparagersanddamagingonewouldnotrenderthesystemunoperablesince,therearefoursparagers.Onlyonesparagercouldbedamagedbythebreakofanyoneemergencycondenserline.(7)ControlRodDriveDischargeDuetothesmallsizeofthedischargepipinginrelationtotheotherlinesnootherdamagewouldbeimpartedduetoaruptureofthisline.(8)CoreSprayTherearetwo12inchcorespraylineswhichenterthecontainmentat240feetatabout,45oneachsideofthe180direction.Theonelineinthequadrant0~0from180to270passesbythefollowinglinesandthenrisesvertically:00(a)10and18inchfeedwater(b)24inchmainsteam(c)'4inchreliefvalvedischarge(d)6inchcontainmentsprayTheotHercorespraylineinthequadrantfrom90to180entersthedrywellandthenrunsnorthtothe0-90quadrantwhereitrisesvertically.Thislinepassesbythefollowinglines:~(a)10and18inchfeedwater(b)14inchreliefvalvedischarge(c)6and8inchcontainmentsprayBothlinesrisetoElevation295feetwheretheyenterthereactorvessel0180apart.Intheirrisetheypassby10inchfeedwaterliensandsomesmallcon-tainmentsprayheaders.Theonlylineswhichthecorespraycoulddamagearethefoursmallerfeedwaterlinesandthefourcontainmentspraylinestosparagers.(9)ReliefValveDischargeIneach180radialsegmentofthedrywell,thatisfrom0-180and180-360therearethree14inchdischargelines.Inthe0-180osectortherearethefollowinglines.(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)6inchclean-up10and18inchfeedwater12inchcorespray6,-8and12inchcontainmentspray24inchmainsteamInthe180-360segmenttherearethefollowinglines:69

(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)14inchshutdowncooling10and18inchfeedwater12inchcorespray6,8and12inchcontainmentspray24inchmainsteamThelineswhichcouldbedamagedbythereliefvalvedischargethatarerequiredforcorecoolingarethecorespray,containmentsprayandfeedwaterlines.Nosinglereliefvalvedischargelinefailurecouldeliminateredundancytothe'ointwherethesafeguardsfunctionisinadequate.(10)ShutdownCoolingInthe'270'to0'radiallocationthereare14inchsupplyandreturnlinestotheshutdowncoolingsystematElevation270feet.Inthisareatherearethefollowingsystems:(a)(b)(c)(d)10inchfeedwaterline6and12inchcontainmentspray14inchreliefvalvedischarge3inchexhaustfromthecontrolroddriveThefirstthreesystemsmayberequiredfollowingashutdowncoolingsystemlinebreak.However,nolinebreakinthissystemcouldresultinlossofredundancyinthoserequiredsystemstothepointwherethesafeguardsfunctionisinadequate.(11)Clean-UpSystemInthe0to90radiallocationa6inchlinecomesoutofoneoftherecircu-0lationlinesatElevation263feetcleavesthedrywell,thenre-entersatEleva-tion263'eetandgoesbackintotherecirculationlineagain.Theonlylinesinthatareaare:(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)10inchfeedwater12inchcorespray10inchemergencycondenserreturnline14inchsafetyvalvedischarge6and12inchcontainmentsprayDue.tothelargesizesoftheselinestherewouldbenoeffectonthembecauseofaruptureoftheclean-upsystem.(12)HeadSprayDuetoitslocationonthevesselhead,therearenolinesimportanttosafetyintheareaofthelinenorcoulditbedamagedbyanyoftheotherlines.d.ENGINEEREDSAPEGUARDSPROTECTIONThepreceedinganalysisshowthatengineeredsafeguardsystemscouldbedamagedasaresultofpipewhip.However,innocaseisthedamage,extensiveenoughtoresultinlossofcorecooling,asafeshutdowncapability.70

Asdescirbedinparagraphcabove,thefeedwatersystem(highpressurecoolantinjection)couldbedamagedasaresultofaruptureinthemainsteam,recircu-lating,corespray,reliefvalvedischargeortheshutdowncoolingsystemlines.Inanyeventsincetherearetwofeedwaterlineswhicharephysicallyseparatedintheareasofconcernonlyonecouldbedamaged.Inaddition,coresprayandautodepressurizationaretheprimesourcesofcorecooling.Highpressurecoolantrejectionisonlyabackupsystem.Thereisnosinglepiperupturewhichcouldresultinlossoffeedwaterandbothcorespraysystems.Therearetwoindependentcorespraylines,180degreesapart.Thesecouldbedamagedbyruptureofeithertherecirculationorreliefvalvedischargelines.However,because'ofredundancyandphysical'separationonlyonelinecouldbedamaged.Highpressurecoolantinjectionservesasabackup.Thecontainmentspraysystemcouldbedamagedasaresultofaruptureinthefollowingsystems:(1)reactorrecirculation(2)feedwater(3)mainsteam(4)emergencycondensers(5)corespray(6)reliefvalvedischarge(7)shutdowncoolingTherearetwocontainmentspraysystemseachoneconsistingofasupplyandsetofsparagersinsidethecontainment.Bothsetsofcontainmentspraysystemscouldbedamagedasaresultofasinglelinebreakduetocloseproximityofthesparagers.ThiswouldnotresultinalossofcontainmentcoolingsincethesuppressionchamberwaterwouldstillbecirculatedthroughthecontainmentsprayBeatexchangers.Degradationofsprayefficiencycouldoccurandwoulddependontheextentofsparagerdamage':Inanyevent,somesprayefficiencywouldremain.Theemergencycondenserssupplyandreturnlinesonbothsystemscouldbedamagedbyaruptureofthemainsteamorreactorrecirculationsystemlines.However,thissystemisnotrequiredtomaintaincorecooling.Feedwater,'corespray,andautodepressurizationprovidethecorecoolingfunctionintheeventofalinerupturewithinthedrywell.Thecontrolroddrivehydraulicsystemcouldbedamagedbyaruptureinthemainsteam,reliefvalvedischargeorreactorrecirculationsystem.However,souldtheselinesbedamagedtherodswouldscramonreactorpressure.Theliquidpoisonsystem,whichservesasabackuptothecontrolrodsystemisnotsubjecttodamagebythesamelines.Theonlylinewhoserupturecoulddamagetheliquidpoisonsystemisalineinthefeedwatersystem.However,theliquidpoisonsystemisnotnormallyused.Itisonlyabackuptothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichisnotsubjecttodamagebyarupturedfeed-waterline.71

11.UESTIONThefollowingadditionalinformationregardingelectricalandinstrumentation.systemsisrequired.:a.ParagraphsevenofSectionIII.C.3..aoftheApplicationdoesnotclearlyidentifythesystems(reactortrip,emergencycorecooling,etc.)thatsatisfytherequirementsofthesecriteria.includethisinformationinthisparagraph.b.YoursystemdescriptioninSectionIII.C.l.boftheApplication.doesnot.clear~1.describehowyourdesignsatisfiestherequirementsofSection4.4,4.5,4.6,4.15,4.17,andthe4.21ofIEEE-279.ProvideadiscussioninmoredetailoftheseIEEErequirementsinSectionIII.C.l.b.c.ThedescriptionofhowyourdesignsatisfiestherequirementofSection5.2.3(5)ofIEEE-308isnotincluded.inSectionIII.C.2.boftheA~lication.Includethisinformationinthisparagraph.d.ArecentincidentoccurringinaBURresulted.intemperatureinsidetheprimarycontainmentexceedingthosetemperaturesspecifiedinthedesignofequipmentrequired.forsafetyandlocatedinsidethecontainment.Providetheresultsofenviron-mentalqualificationtypetestsfora11electricalClassIEequipment,includingelectricalpenetrationassemblies'and.connections,located.insidetheprimarycontainmentthatarerequired.forsafety.IncludethisinformationinSectionIII.C.3and.8oftheApplication.RESPONSEThesystemsthatsatisfytherequirementsdescribedinparagraph7ofSectionIIIC.l.a.oftheTechnicalSupplementtoPetitionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFullTermOperatingLicensearelistedbelow:(1)Class1Eelectricalsystemsincluding:(a)(b)(c)StationbatterysystemsEmergencydieselgeneratorsystemsEmergencyserviceportionoftheplantservicea-cpowerdistributionsystem.(2)ReactorProtectionSystemincludingpowersupplies.(3)EngineeredSafeguardsincluding:(1)CoreSpraySystem(2)ContainmentSpraySystem(3)LiquidPoisonSystem4)ContainmentInerting5)EmergencyVentilation72

(6)AutomaticDepressurizationSystem(7)Contro3.Rod.DriveSystem(8)EmergencyCondensers(9).Containmentand.PrimarySystemIsolationValves(3.0)ContainmentVacuumRelief(11)HighPressureCoolantInjectionSystemb.Forprotectionsystemcomponents,vendor'scertified,designdatasheetsareavailable.Theseverifythatsystemequip-mentis'adequateforachievingsystemperformancerequirements.Verificationofadequacyonacontinuingbasisisavailableinpreoperationaltest.results.andtheresultsofprotectionsystemsurveillance.ThetestingrequirementsarecontainedintheTechnicalSpecifications.Theprotectionsystemdesignincorporatesdualindependenttrippingchannelswith'eachchannelcontainingtwoindependentinstrumentchannels.Thetrippinglogicofthetotalsystemisreferredtoasaoneoutoftwotakentwice.Thissystemwillaccommodateanysinglefailureandstillperformitsin-tended.functionandinaddition,provideprotectionagainstspuriousscrams.ForfurtherdesigndetailsrefertoVolumeI,SectionVIIIAoftheFSAR.AllprotectionsystemchannelsaredesignedtomaintainnecessaryJunctionalcapaoilityunderextremesofconditionsrelatingtoenvironment,energysupply,malfunctionsa'ndaccidents.Channelsthatprovidesignalsforthesameprotectivefunctionarefunctionallyandphysicallyseparated..Thisresultsindecouplingofanyadverseeffectsofaccidents,electrictran-sientsand.resultingenvironment.Theprotectionsystemdesigndoesprovidepositivemeansofassuringthatamorerestrictivesetpointisusedwhereitisapplicable.Positivemeansofassuranceareobtainedbytheuseofoperationproceduresand.,checklistsduringplantstartup,poweroperation,shutdownandrefueling.AnexampleofthiswouldbetoswitchIntermediateRangeMonitorinservicebeforeSourceRangeMonitor'sreachedfullscaleduringstationstart-up.Itisinherentinthereactorprotectionsystemdesignthatanactiononceinitiatedatthesystemlevelwillgotocompletion.Theentiresystemisdesignedtobefailsafe.Initiationofaprotectiveactioninanyoneofthefoursub-channels,willcauseahalf-trip.Acoincidentprotectiveactioninitiationintheproperredundantchannelwillcauseafulltrip.De-liberateoperatoractionisrequiredtoacknowledgetheprotectiveactionandreturntheprotectionsystemtooperation.73

Theprotectionsystemincludesmeansformanualinitiationofprotectiveactionatthesystemlevel.ThemanualinitiationcapabilityisdescribedintheReferenceVolumeI,SectionVIIIAoftheFSAR.Itisinherentinthereactorprotectionsystemdesignthatnosinglefailurewithinthemanual,automaticorcommonportionsoftheprotectionsystem,preventsinitiationofaprotectiveaction.Manualinitiationisprovidedfor:(l)Reactortrip(2)MainSteamisolation(3)ReactorCleanupisolation(4)ReactorShutdowncoolingisolation(5)ContainmentIsolation(6)StartCoreSprayPumps(7)OpenCoreSprayDischargeValves(8)ContainmentSprayPumps(9)ContainmentSprayDischargeValves(10)LiquidPoisonSystem(11)ContainmentInerting(12)EmergencyVentilation(13)ControlRodDriveSystem(14)ContainmentVacuumRelief'heprotectionsystemisdesignedtoacilitatetherecognition,location,replacement,repairoradjustmentofmalfunctioningcomponentsormodules.Manualbypassesareincorporatedforuseduringmaintenance.Systemprotectiveactionsarealarmedbothonthestationannunciatorsystemandthestationcomputer.Thepreferredpowersupplyportionofthestationdistribution,systemsismonitoredinthecontrolroomasfollows:C(1)115KVBusVoltage(2)115KVBreakerStatusIndication(3)Breakerstatusfor4160VsupplybreakersR1012and.R1013.(4)Powerboard.102and.103busvoltage(5)Powerboard.102and.103frequencyEnvironmentalQualificationsThefollowingenvironmentaltypetestswereperformed.onClass'EelectricalequipmentatNineMilePointUnitNo.1.(1)Electricalpenetrations-Thesepenetrationsweretestedforleaktightnessunderthefollowingaccidentenvironmentalconditions:74

TemperatureContainmentReactorbuildingPressureRelativeHumidity310F50-150F62psig100percent(2)LimitorguevalveoperatorsTheseoperatorswereexposed.tosaturatedsteamatpressuresupto90psigandtemperaturesrangingfrom250Fto335F.Theoperatorsperformedsatisfactorily.(3)ElectromaticreliefvalvesThesevalvesweretested.for10hoursat62psigand.300F.Thevalvewascapableofperformingitsrequiredfunctionduringthistime.(4)ControlCableHightemperaturecross-linked,polyethylene(Vulkene)cablewasused.,whichiscapableofwithstanding340Fforaperiod.ofonemonth.75

12.~UEST10NTheadditionalinformationregardingtheupgradedradwastesystemforNMP-1asidentifiedbelo~isrequired:Asrequired.byGeneralDesignCriterion64in10CFRPart50,AppendixA,indicateprovisionsmadetomonitora11normalandpotentialpathwaysforreleasetotheenvironmentofradio-activematerialinliquidandgaseouseffluents.b.Fortheproposedsystemmodificationtoreturnequipmentdrainliquid.wastetothecondenserhotwellwithouttreatmentinthewastecollectorsubsystemprovide:(1)Descriptionoftheequipmentand.pipingmodificationswhichwild.berequired.(2)Criteriaand.meanstobeused.todeterminewhethertheequipmentdrainliquidwastewillbereturneddirectlytothecondenserhotwell.c~Fortheupgradedoff-gasradwastetreatmentsystem,analyzetheconsequencesofama1functionorfailureofessentialcomponentsand-estimate%heresultingdosestoplantpersonnel.deForthesolidwastedatapointslistedintheEnvironmentalReportTab3.e3.6-2asnumbers25and.35,identifyand.quantifythemajorradioisotopesexpectedfromthesesources.e.Providethedesigncodesand.standardsforthenewwasteconcentrator,thenewwasteconcentratorstoragetank,andtheneweauipmentandprocessinglinesforreroutingofliquidwastes~RESPONSEa0As'describedonpageIII-22oftheTechnicalSupplementtoPe-titionforConversionfromProvisionalOperatingLicensetoFullTermOperationLicense,provisionshavebeenmadetomonitorthefollowingreleases:(l)(2)(3)(4)GaseousreleasesfromthestackLiquiddischargestothecirculatingwatertunnelReactorbuildingventilationWastebuildingventilationInaddition,bothon-siteandoff-sitemonitorsassociatedwiththeenvironmentalmonitoringprogramareusedtotracetheeffectsofradioactivereleases.76

RESPONSE(cont'd)b.Theequipmentdrainswhichhavebeenmodifiedtoreturndirectlytothecondenserhotwellcontainonlycondensedsteamfromthreesourcesintheoff-gassystem.Theyinclude(l)condensedsteamfromtheoff-gaspreheater(2)condensatefromtheoff-gascon-denserand(3)condensatefromtheoff-gasventcooler.Allofthesesourcesoriginatefrommainsteamanddonotcontainsig-nificant.amountsofcontaminants.This'llowsthecondensatetobereturneddirectlytothemaincondenserhotwellwithoutany,processing.Thecriterionusedtodeterminewhetherthedrainsarereturnedtothehotwellisthattheconductivitybelessthanlpmho/cm.Thisconductivityismonitoredandifthelevelreacheslgmho/cm,analarmsoundsinthecontrolroomandthecondensatecanthenberoutedtotheturbinebuildingequipmentdraintank.c.l.IntroductionThepressureboundaryoftheentireupgradedoff-gassystem'sdesignedtowithstandahydrogendetonation.Inaddition,itisalsodesignedtowithstandacompletevacuum.Redundancyexistsinallmajorsystemcomponentsexceptthemixingnozzle,preheater,andcharcoaladsorbers.Alltheselatterthreecomponentshavenomovingparts.Thepreheaterisonlyneededduringstartupofthesystemtoensurethatthetemperatureoftheinletgasandsteammixtureattherecombinerisat350P.Undertheseconditions,thesteamissuperheatedtopreventsaturatedsteamfromenteringthere-combiner.Normally,themixingnozzlesteamwillprovidesufficientsuperheat.Wettingofthecatalystisnotaseriousproblembutcancausephysicaldamagetothecatalystbycrack-ingthepellets.Electricheatersareprovidedineachrecom-binertopreventwettingofthecatalystevenintheeventofamalfunctionordangertothepreheaterduringthesystemstartup.Thechillersorfreeze-outheatexchangersareprovidedinthesystemtolowerthedewpointofthegasenteringthepreadsorbersandthecharcoaladsorbers.Thelowerdewpointenhancestheper-formanceofthecharcoaladsorbers.Thechillersoperatebycoolingthegasasitpassesthroughtheheatexchanger.Coolingisprovidedbyafreonsystem.Anyleakageatthislocationwouldbefromthefreonsidetotheoff-gassideofthesystemsincepressureishigheronthefreonside(about45psia)thanontheoff-gasside(aboutl2psia).Leakageisdetectedandalarmedinthesystem.Freondoesnothindertheperformanceofthecharcoal.Thethreechillersinthesystemperformonatimedcycleofaboutsixhours.Normally,oneunitisinservice,anotherisonstandby,whiletheotherunitisdeicing.Deicingrequiresaboutonehourperunit.Thesixhourin-servicecycleisinterruptedifthedesigndewpointof--4Fisreachedbeforetheprescribed77

timecycleterminates.Thissituationwouldputthestandbyunitimmediatelyintooperationautomatically.Thepreadsorber,whichhasaredundant,counterpartactsasanexpendablecharcoalbed.Itcollectsparticulatedaughterproductsthatresultfromradioactivedecay.Provisionshavebeenmadetoreplacethespentpreadsorbercharcoal.Thiscanbedonewiththesystemfullyoperatedsincetheredundantpro-.ceduresaresegregatedbyshieldwalls.Thecharcoaladsorbersdonothaveredundancybutthecharcoaladsorbers(6)canbevalvedsuchthattheycanbedeividedinto"two'banks'of'threeeach.Intheeventofaproblemthatiscon-finedtothefirstadsorber,thefirstthreeadsorberscanbevalvedoutofserviceleavingtheremainingthreeoperational.Temperatureismonitoredatthreedifferentlocationsoneachpreadsorberandcharcoal'dsorber.Thesemonitoredpointswillgiveanaccuratemeasurementofthecharcoaloperatingtemper-atureforperformancecalculation.Thetemperaturepointsalsogiveindicationand,alarmintheeventofrisingtemperatureintheadsorbers.Eitheroftworedundentvacuumpumpsdrawsaslightvacuumontheentiresystembacktothemixingnozzleifthepumptrippedoff,thepressureintheentiresystemwouldslowlybegintorise.hAnalarmonthesuctionsideofthevacuumpumpwouldgiveanindicationthatthevacuumpumpwasnotfunctioning.Thestand-byunitcouldbeputintoservicetopreventafurtherpressurerise.Electricalpowersuppliesforthesystemaredesignedsuchthatallredundantcomponents,exceptthechillersrequiringpower,aresuppliedfromdifferentpowerboards.,Thechillersareallpoweredthroughthesameboard,butthereisabackuppowersourceintheunlikelyeventthatthemainpowersourcefails.MalfunctionsTable12-1liststhemajorcomponentsintheoff-gassystem.Thetablealsoincludesmodesofdamageormalfunction,actionrequiredandconsequencesoftheindicateddamageormalfunction.Forexample,ifthereisalossofdilutionsteamtothemixingnozzle,decreasesintemperatureandinflowdownstreamofthecomponentoccur.Theseresultinanalarmandtheeffectisrecorded.Ifthemalfunctioncannotbecorrectedbyopeningthevalvetoallowsteamormoredilutionsteamtopass,thenthesystemwouldbeshutdownandrepaired.Thismalfunctionresultsinnoreleasetotheplantevenifnoactionisinit-iated.Therecombinerstillfunctionsevenifthereisnodilutionsteamavailable.78 0

)ASLSliI~ItclrCCICNAAALISISSAIlctKC1stIODICAICD5IAICSACllcllltACCICD15ISI)IAIIDItACIICS15DtfCAcaressestIsltlsttvIIIXIICIxtlitlesssteevt41s)tireLeslosoIKO~IrMsCecel)rc)oIroast)lrsllstLessof)evslfelosselDoellssfolossef5lessfoisclrsMlaDrtlMrtlaIKlttMlsflrvDsccersela1levIKM4Mla~less~LesssftcoftLAOoftff.fatlorS4I~I)IKlMMla~CI)5)Aires~tlat~ecOltecet4IXSc444~1ttei~iaeC~swSisterCKttCCNsIIverCleatrlesMfe)IOKDetr-lreseco)IreetslesMce)IMCDstrIOOM'I~)lsacIcwtkws5)sleeIx-+sxZ<')XIx<')ZIZXZxIIIIXIXIIZZZIt'IIIAZ55)AIA)CCSX(I)tcraertetlrttcVlletla~Crtc<<rtSets4alfsAettfetttfftlt~VM14Ml)CeSeclle\ltlaAslOO4t444ettleaCKVIC44leAKSVOSOftttCSCIM,(I)ticsrtolcvoreclosevillrescereo)steeloMcMl.())tolvtevt4fstlvfco~cslsaA)witiaMteIM(c)lsassseIs)(I)~fiscAleeAslcosl~4MCMCOcollat'Mlvr4oecofsettler

Fireinthesystemisnotcrediblesincethedecayheatunderworstcareconditionsinthecharcoaladsorberamountsto0.715wattsandacorresponding0.4Ftemperaturerise.3~Le~aceeLeakageinthevacuum;part.ofthesystemcanbetoleratedupto110scfm.Underthoseconditionsthevacuumpumpinser-vicecanoperatenormally.Thisispossiblebecauseacontrolvalveinthesystematthevacuumpumpnormallyrecirculatesmostoftheairinthesystem.Withincreasedflowinthesys-.temtherecirculationvalve.closesdown.Leakageatthemixingnozzleoratsomepointdownstreamofthevacuumpumpwillescapefrom.thesystemsincesystempressureattheselocationsisgreaterthanatmospheric'ressure.Themagnitudeofthereleasesheredependuponthesizeoftheleak.Sincethemixingnozzleislocatedintheturbinebuilding,anyleakagewouldbecarriedthroughthenormalventilationsystemtothestack.Aradiationreleasewouldbedetected,alarmedandrecorded.Themagnitudeofanyreleaseatasamepointdown-streamofthevacuumpumpsdependsuponthesizeoftheleak.However,theactivityinthesystemislowbecausethegashasalreadypassedthroughthe"charcoal-adsorbers.Anyreleasewouldgointoabranchoftheturbinebuildingventilationsys-temwhereradiationlevelisalramed.andrecorded.4DosestoPlantPersonnelLeakageoutofthesystemfromtwosources"waspreviouslyiden-tified.Onesourceisfromthemixingnozzlewhichisphysicallylocatedinthesteamjetairejectorroom.Thisroomwillbemodifiedsothatventilationintheroomissegregatedfromthebalanceoftheplant.Thatis,theroomwillbecontrolledsuchthatventilationleakagewillbeintotheroomandnotoutofit.'heonlyaccesstotheroomwillbethroughaseal-typedoorandonlywhentheplantisshut-down.Noaccesswillbepermittedduringoperation.Leakagefromthesystemintotheroomwillbecarriedoutviatheturbinebuildingventilationsystem.NoplantpersonnelexposureisexpectedfromanyleakageatthissourcesTheothersourceofleakageoutofthesystemisdownstreamofthevacuumpumpswheresystempressureis,aboveatmospheric.Atthispointinthesystemtheoff-gashaspassedthroughthechar-coaladsorbers.Leakage,ifitoccurs,willenteranormallyre-strictedaccessareanearthestack.Xtwilldispenseintotheroomandbecarriedoutbyasegmentoftheturbinebuildingven-tilationsystem.ThesignificantXenonandKryptonisotopescontributeapproximately300'i/sec.totheoff-gasstream..Thisisbasedonatotalactivityrateof50,000'i/sec;after30minutedecayandthedesignholdupof20daysforXenonand33hoursforKrypton.79

Basedontheaboveactivities,aventilationflowof2000cfmandaroomvolumeof8000cubicfeet,theMPCvaluesfrom10CFR20TableIforrestrictedareasforKryptonandXenonisotopeswillnotbeexceededforaleakagerateof2.8percentoftheoff-gasstream.Znaddition,forleakageratesupto16percentonlytheMPCforXenon-133isexceeded.5.DecaHeatintheCharcoalDecayheatloadingwascalculatedforthepreadsorberforitwillcontainmostoftheparticulatedaughtersdecayingfromtheparentXenonandKryptongases.Thecalculationassumes,.that.thereactoroperateswithanactivityreleaseof50,000MCi/sec.foraperiodof10years.ForallpracticalpurposesallisotopesareinequilibriumafterthatperiodwiththeexceptionofCS-137.Thecalculatingassumesthattheairflowtothepreadsorberissuddenlyshutoffafterthisten-yearperiod.Itisalsoassumedthatalltheenergyfromdecayisadsorbedbythefirst40poundsofcharcoalinthepreadsorber(10percentofthetotalamountinthisvessel).Withtheseassumptionsandacharcoalinventorybasedona2.5hourdelayintheoff-gaspipe(transittimebasedinvolumeanddesignflowof22scfm),theheataddedamountsto,0.715watts.Assumingalltheheataddeddoesnotexcapetheoriginal40poundsofcharcoalthecorrespondingtemperatureriseis0.4F.This.heatis.essentially-allfromdecayoftheparticulatedaughterswithlessthantwopercentcontributedbythedecayoftheXenonandKryptongasescontainedonthepreadsorber.d.Thesolidwastedatapointslistedasnumbers25and35inTable3.6-2oftheEnvironmentalReportrepresentconcentratedwasteandspentresinrespectively.Themajorisotopesandrelativequantitiesfromthesetwosourcesareessentiallythesameandarelistedbelow:Cesium134Cesium137Manganese54Cobalt6027percent65percent2percent6percente.Thenewequipmenttobeutilizedintheliquidwastesystemwiththeapplicablecodesandstandardsarelistedbelow:COMPONENTCODESSTANDARDSWasteConcentratorConcentratorHeaterConcentratorCondenserConcentratedWastePumpConcentratedWasteTankAllLiquidWastePipingandValvesASMEVIIIDiv.IASMEVIZZDiv.IASMEVIIIDiv.IASMEVIIIDiv.IASMEVIII.API(650)ANSIB31.0TEMA-RASTMA-24080

13.QUESTIONRegardingonsiteradiationprotectiontomaintainpersonne3.exposurestolevelsaslopaspracticable,thefollowingadditionalinfor-mationisrequired:a.Providethequantitiveresultsofplantradiationsurveysfor1850NilToperation.includesurveysofthecontrolroom,officebuilding,radwastebuilding,wastestoragebuilding,machineshoo,andotherworkspaces.Indicatethemaximumvalueforanysignificantareaandindicatetherangeofradiationlevelswheretheymayvaryindependentofreactorpowerlevel,suchasinproximitytodemineralizers,radwastestorageareas,etc.Specificlocalized.radiationareasshouldbedescribed..rb.Provideadiscussionofradiationlevelsassociatedwithfuelhandlingthatis'basedonexperiencewithspentfueltransfertothestoragepool,fuelinspections,andreconstitutionoffuelassemblies,andonexpectationforspentfuelshipmentandany'therplannedfuelhandling.Indicatetheexpectedreductionsifany,intheselevelsresultingfromuseoftheproposedaccessplatform.c.Provideadiscussionoftheventilationsystemsofallbuildingsin.regardtoair'borneactivity3.evels,estimationof'nhalationdosesduringnorma1operation,activityreleasesbywayoftheventilationsystems,andairborneactivitymonitoringequipment,itslocationranges,maintenance,andcalibration.d.Provideadiscussionofthemanagerialandadministrativemeansbywhichdosestopersonne3.arekeptatlevelsthatareas3.owaspracticable.RESPONSEa.PlantradiationsurveyRadiationlevelsinthefollowingareasremainlowatallpower3.evelsandmaybesummarized.asfollows;(1)Controlroom(2)Officebuilding(3)Machineshop(4)StoreRoom(5)Auxiliarycontrolroom(6)Laboffice(7)Countingroomcountsmin300300-3501003.0010010075m~rar0.10.10.10.10.10.10.1

TurbineBuildingTurbinebuildingradiationlevelsingenerallyaccessibleareasarelessthan5mr/hr.Areasabove5.mr/hr,whichareposted,asrequiredarethefollowing:(1)Passagewayeastofwastesurgetank,(5-15mr/hr),(2)TurbineBuildingSampleSink;(10-40mr/hratedgeofsamplesink).(3)SentryPanel;(10-40-mr/hrbehindpanel,betweensamplecoolersandwall;160mr/hrcontactwithlines;13mr/hratfrontofpanel)'(4)Off-gassamplerig,upto200mr/hrduringsamplingofoffgas.)(5)Resintransfervalveat261footelevation,(20mr/hrat,2feetfromva1ve;5'r/hr'trope).RepresentativeTurbineBuildingAreaRadiationMonitorreadingsat1725YNToperationareasfollows:.AreamrhrAdministrativebuildingentrancetoturbinebuildingTurbineoperatingfloor>(generatorend)-Turbineoperatingfloor(feed.pumpend)FeedrumpareaElectricalswitchgearareaCondensatedemineralizervalveareaRegenerationareaMakeupdemineralizerarea0.122.83.30.2'.3401200.3ReactorBuildingReactorbuildingradiationlevelsingenerallyaccessibleareasarelessthan5mr/hrexceptasnoted.,and.posted,asfollows:.(1)Elevation237feet:entirelevelis.considered.aradiationareaduetorod.drivepumps,roddrivemodulearea,roddrivedecontaminationsinks(20~/hratedgeofsinks),rebuiltroddrivestorage,and'ventilationductintheeastpassageway(overheadreading450mr/hrat1inchand15-20mx'/hr4feetoffthefloor).(2)Elevation261feet:lastpassagefromairlocktoprecoattanks,(5-15mr/hr).(3)Elevation261feet:reactorwatersamplesink;(25-70mr/hrstandingatsink;150-200mr/hrinsink;100-150mr/hr3inchesfromturbiditycolumn).82

t(4)Elevation281feet:areabyclean-upsurgetank;(12mr/hrat,3inches).(5)Elevation281feet:fuelpoolfilterprecoattank,(20mx/hrat3inchesfromtank,5mr/hratrope).(6)Elevation298feet:southpassageway,westofliquidpoisontank,and.westpassageway,duetomoistureseparatoranddryerstoragepitdrainvalve(300mr/hrat1inchfromvalveinoverhead.)anddrainline.(7).Elevation'318feet;condensate'linenearcontainmentsprayheatexchangers,(48mr/hrat3inches).(8)Elevation318feet,:.south.passageway.near,linetospentfuelpool,(12mr/hrat3inchesfromdrainvalve).(9)Elevation340feet:entirelevelisconsideredaradia-tionareaduetofuelpool(10-20mr/hratedgeofpool),toolstorageinnortheastcorner(100-200mr/hrat3inchesfromtools;35mr/hratropebarrier),fuelrod.stored.northofreactortopplugs(40mr/hrat3inches),neutronsourcestoredonsouthside(25mp/hrat3inches;5mri/hratrope).RepresentativeReactorBuildingAreaRadiationMonitorreadingsat1725K<Toperationareasfollows:AreaFuelpoolbridge(low-range)Reactoroperatingfloor(equipmenthatcharea)ReactorbuildingequipmentdraintankareaClosedloopcoolingareaCleanupsystemarea(nearpumps)Elevation281feet-nearfuelpoolfiltersControlroddrivemoduleareaSpentfuelpool(eastend)Instrumentationroom(elevation237feet)Cont.sprayheatexchangeaream~r.ar220.42.23155290.4HasteBuilding(1)Controlroom:thewastebuildingcontrolroomradiationlevelremainsbelow5mr/hrunderalloperatingorprocessingconditions.(2)Elevation261feet-entirelevelisconsidered.aHighRadiationAreaduetothefloordrainsample.tanks,whichread.100mr/hrupto5feetaway.Afenceisundercon-structiontolimitaccesstothesetankssothatthewastebuildingmaybereturned.toRadiationAreastatus.83

0(3)Wasteconcentratorroom:Periodicaccessisnecessaryforsampling,(1-2R/hrfieldinareaofsamplepoint).(4)Flatbedfilterroom:periodicaccessisnecessaryforoperationandmaintenance,(200to1000mi/hrfieldde-pendentonprocessconditions).(5)Elevation225feet,.drumfillingandstorage:periodicaccesstobarrelconveyorsystemisnecessaryforoperationaladjustmentandmaintenance.Radiationlevelsaredependentoncontentsofbarrelsinlocale,(spentres'in10-30R/hr;concentrated.waste500-1000./hr).Arearadiationmonitorreadingsaredependentuponprocessconditionsratherthanpowerlevel.Representativewastebuildingarearadiationmonitorreadingsweretakenat1725MNToperation.AreaRadwasteconveyAisleRadwaste-pumproomRadwaste-controlroomRadwaste-storageandshippingm~r4r0.9150.53b.RadiationlevelsfuelhandlingDuringuelhandlingandincoreinstrumentationreplacementoperationradiationlevelshavebeenmeasured.Thesurvey~madeonApril24,1973showedthefollowingresults:(1).Generallevel6inchesabovesurfaceofwaterinfuelpool,reactorcavityandstoragepit,(13mi/hr).(2)Toprailofhandrails,(3-6mr/hr).(3)Bridgeoverfuelpool,(7mr./hrat1inch).(4)Bridgeoverstoragepit,(10mr/hrat1inch).(5)Sippingheadcontrolcenter,(3-5mr/hrat1inch).(6)Underhead,southwestcornerofElevation340feet,(5mr/hr).Severaloperators,techniciansand.supervisorypersonnelindicatedover10percentofMPBBuptakeof60CoduringwholebodycountsfromMay21toMay25,1973.Assumingaone-timeuptakeatthebeginningoftheoutage,lungdosefortheca1endarquarterforatechnicianwith15.6percentMPBBfor60Coand0.8percentMPBBfor58Cowas589mrem.Theequivalentwholebodydoseis196mrem,assuminga3:1ratiobetweenlungdoseandwholebodydose.Thiscalculationassumesthat236nCiwereabsorbedinthelungsat.thestartofth<<<<age.AtypicalCAMreadingof3000counts84

perminute(6x10"Ci/cc)wouldresultinanuptakeof115Ciduringfour40hr.weeks.Theestimateof236Cimaythereforebehigh,butgivesareasonableupperlimittoexpected,uptake.Nodistinctioncanbemadebetweenuptakeduetofuelhandlingactivitiesand.thatassociatedwithLocalPowerRangeMonitorreplacement.Noincreaseinambientradiationlevelswerenotedduringtransferofspentfueltothestoragepit.Thecaskforshipmentofspentfuelwillbebuilttotheapplicablestandards.Nodoseestimatesarecurrentlyavail-able.Theproposedaccessplatformprovidesforconvenientwashdownofthereactorcavityand.storagepitareasafterthewaterlevelhasbeenlowered.Timesavedincleaning,and.lowerairborneactivityresultingfrommoreefficientcleaningwillresultinlowerdosesand.uptakeformaintenancepersonnel.Theresultantdecreasewillbesmallonaman-rembasis.Theprecisefigurescannotbeestimatedfromcurrentlyavailabledata.-.c.'UentilationSystemsBydesign,buildingventilationisprovided.topromoteairmotionfromareasoflowpotentialcontaminationtoareasofhigherpotentialcontamination.Allstationventilationisexhaustedbymeansofthemainstack.Inaddition,thewastebuildingatmosphereispassed.throughhighefficiencyfilterspriortoenteringthemainstreamatthestack.Airborneactivitylevelsinstationbuildingaremonitoredbymeansoflowvolumesampleslocatedinrepresentativeareas.MonthlyaveragereadingsforMarch,Augustand.September1973wereasfollows:MarchAuguacSeptember(1)'urbinebuilding,elevation261feetgear.SteamJetirEjector)(2)Turbinebuilding,elevation300feet(operatingfloor)(3)Reactorbuilding,elevation237feet(nearControl.RodDrive)(4)Wastebuildingelevation247fe'et(5)Largeequipmentdecontaminationroom4.74x10uCi/cc2.81x10-12uCi%c1.98x10-12uCi%c-121.88x10"uCi/cc6.15x10uCi%c1.64x10uCi/cc5.61x10uCi/cc3.41x10uCi/cc2.93x10uCi/cc-ll.123.30x10uCi/cc8.10x10.uCi/cc6.10x10uCi/cc-ll.-118.43x10"uCi/cc5.20x10"uCi/cc4.64x10"3uCi/cc85

workgroupisotopeInhalationdosetoindividualsisverifiedtobelow'byperiodicwholebodycounting.Resultsofwholebodycountingforstatiopersonnelduringoperationwouldbeexpectedtobehighestforoperatorsormechanicsspendingsignificantportionsoftheirtimeinthewastebuilding.Nuclidesdetectedhaveremainedatlowfractionsofthemaximumpermissablebodyburden(MPBB)limit.Thisisreflectedinthefollowingdataforindividuals,withbodyburdensinexcessofonepercent:\percent,MPBBcountingdateoperatormechanicoperatoroperatormechanicoperatormechanicsupervisormechanicoperatormechanicoperatortechnicianoperator,operatorsupervisormechynicmechanicmechanictechnicianmechanicmechanic6OCo60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co~all60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Co60Cox.61.31.51.21.91.71.41.42.82.11.51.11'.3'-.25.02.31.21.02.91.43.'.0'1.12.83/19/733/2o/V33/19/733/21/733/19/733/19/733/19/733/19/733/20/733/21/V33/19/733/19/733/21/733/19/733/19/733/19/733/2o/V33/2o/733/20/73-3/20/733/21/v33/2o/V33/2o/73These'percentagesmaybeconsideredaschroniclevelsforthecalendarquarter.Fortheindividualwiththehighestuptake(4.2percentofMPBBof60Co)thisamountedtoanuptakeof0.046Ciwithresultingdosetothelungsof154mrem/quarter.Iftheeffectivewholebodydoseisconsideredtobeonethirdofthelungdose,thischronicwholebodyexposureamountsto51mrem/quarter.(MPBBfor60Coisconsideredtobe1100Ci)Activityreleasedbywayofthemainstackiscontinuouslymonitoredforparticulateandiodinebyafilterandcharcoalcartridgesamples.Thesamplesarewithdrawnfromthegasstreambyisokineticprobelocatedhighinthestack.Samplesarechangedatleastweekly.Releaselevelsofiodinesand.par-ticulatesfrom"thestack,includingoff-gas,averaged6.6percentofthetechnicalspecificationreleaseratelimitfortheperiodJanuarytoJunelg73.86

Airborneactivityismonitoredbycontinuousairmonitorslocatedin.theReactorBuildingandTurbineBuildingventilationexhaustducts.Thesemonitorsalarminthecontrolroom.AlsoaportableConstantAirMonitorisnormallylocated'nElevation261feetoftheTurbineBuilding.ThethreeConstantAirMonitorscoverarangeof50to500,000countsperminute,orapproximately1011to1$7uCi/cc.Alarmpointsaresetatthe40hoursMPCforIandCo,(9x109uCi/cc).ConstantAirMonitorsarecalibratedsemi-annually.AssociatedcountingequipmentiscalibratedquarterlyMaintenanceofPersonnelRadiationExposureasLowasPracticableRecordsofpersonnelradiationexposuresaremaintained.byfilmbadge,charged.everytwoweeks.Exposureiskeptaslowaspracticalbymeansoftheadministrativepracticesdiscussedbelow.Pocketdosimetersaresupplied.toallpersonnelworkinginradiationareasintheplant.Dosimeterrecordsarekeptoncardsbytheindividual.Dosimeterlogsarekeptbythesuper-visorsofpersonnelroutinelysubjecttotheRegionradiationexposuresintheplant.Inparticular,themaintenanceandoperaionspersonnelkeepsuchalogatalltimes.Logsarealso.keptforinstrumentandradiationprotectiontechniciansduringmaintenanceoutages.First-linesupervisorypersonnelareresponsibleforinitiatingrequestsforAuthorizationtoExceedRadiation'xposureGuidesfortheirpersonnel.Thisauthorizationconsistsofareviewoftheindividual'sexposurerecord.andauthorizationuptoaspecificnumberofmremfortheweekforanyindividualexceeding100mrem/week.Thereviewisaccomplished.byRadiochemistryandRadiationProtectionsupervisorypersonneltakingintoaccountexposurehistoryasrecordedby'ilmbadge,anddosimeterrecordsfortheinterveningperiod,.RadiochemistryandRadiationProtectionsupervisorypersonnelroutinelycomparedosimeterrecordswithfilmbadgeresultstodetectdosimetermalfunctionswhichcouldlead.toinadvertentoverexposure.AsaRadiationWorkPermitisrequiredunderthefollowingconditions:(1)(2)(3)(~)Radiationexposureratesgreaterthan100mrad.perhour.Neutronexposure.Contaminationlevelsgreaterthan10,000antresperminutepersquarefoot.Airborneactivityrequiringuseofrespiratoryequipment.87

(5)Maintenanceofequipment,controlsorinstrumentationinRadiationAreasorHighRadiationAreas.(6)Entryintoanareaofunknowncondition.RadiationWorkPermitsaremadeoutbyseniorRadiationPro-tectiontechnicianswithsupervisorypersonnelonca11forconsu1tation.Necessaryworkprovisionsarespecifiedonthepermitforcontrolofradiationexoosure.Asystemutilizingthermoluminescentdosimeters(TLD's)isbeinginitiated.TheTLDreaderisnowbeingcalibrated.'Personneltrainingandprocedurewritingisinprogress.InitialplanningisunderwaywiththeEngineeringDepartmentforcomputerassistancetofacilitatecalculationofbest"dosetodate",informationutilizingFilmBadge,TLDand.pocketdosimeterdata.88 J

4.QUESTIONYourdescriptionofcompliancewithRegulatoryGuide1.17asgivenonpageIII-44oftheApplicationisnotadequate.PleaseprovidethedetailsofyourIndustrialSecurityPlaninaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.17datedJune1973,asprop-rietaryinformationinconformancewithSection2.790(d)of10CFRPart2.RESPONSEThereplytothisquestionisbeingsubmittedunderseparatecoverasproprietaryinformation.89

.l~~<ar~