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| {{#Wiki_filter:11$S ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835IN 86-57UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555July 11, 1986IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-57: OPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATEDVALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS | | {{#Wiki_filter:11$S ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-57 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY |
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| | COMMISSION |
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| | OFFICE OF INSPECTION |
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| | ===AND ENFORCEMENT=== |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 11, 1986 IE INFORMATION |
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| | NOTICE NO. 86-57: OPERATING |
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| | PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS |
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| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| :All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or aconstruction permit. | | : |
| | All nuclear power reactor facilities |
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| | holding an operating |
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| | license or a construction |
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| | permit. |
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| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| :This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that haveoccurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi-ents will review the events discussed below for applicability to their facili-ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failuresoccurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this noticedo not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or writtenresponse is required. | | : This notice is to advise recipients |
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| | of a series of valve failures that have occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi-ents will review the events discussed |
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| | below for applicability |
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| | to their facili-ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures occurring |
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| | at their facilities. |
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| | However, suggestions |
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| | contained |
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| | in this notice do not constitute |
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| | NRC requirements; |
| | therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description |
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| | of Circumstances: |
| | The NRC has received reports from licensees |
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| | of operating |
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| | nuclear power plants involving |
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| | failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated valves (SOVs) to operate properly. |
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| | These failures have adversely |
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| | affected the intended functions |
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| | of the main steam isolation |
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| | system, pressure relief and fluid control systems. Attachment |
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| | 1 to this information |
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| | notice describes |
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| | the failure events and the corrective |
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| | actions taken.Discussion: |
| | In most of the cases described |
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| | in Attachment |
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| | 1, the cause for triggering |
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| | the event was attributed |
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| | to a malfunctioning |
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| | SOV that served as a pilot valve. This in turn resulted in the malfunction |
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| | of the associated |
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| | main valve. The failures of the SOVs can be traced to the following |
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| | different |
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| | causes: (1) potentially |
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| | high-temperature |
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| | ambient conditions |
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| | are not being continuously |
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| | monitored |
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| | in areas where SOVs are installed |
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| | and operating |
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| | in an energized |
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| | state, (2) hydrocarbon |
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| | contaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shop air systems) are being used periodically |
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| | and are not designed to "oil-free" specifications |
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| | as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants |
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| | causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable |
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| | handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement |
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| | parts program associated |
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| | with the elastomers |
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| | and other short-lived |
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| | subcomponents |
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| | used in SOVs has not been adequately |
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| | maintained, and (5) lubricants |
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| | have been used excessively |
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| | during maintenance. |
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| | ASCO provides installation |
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| | and maintenance |
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| | 8607090425 Attachment |
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| | 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature |
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| | performance |
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| | when compared to EP and is impervious |
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| | to hydrocarbons. |
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| | Its major disadvantage |
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| | is that it is less resistant |
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| | to radiation |
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| | than EP by a factor of ten. ASCO recommends |
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| | Viton for applications |
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| | that are not oil-free and where radiation |
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| | levels do not exceed 20 megarads.On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick |
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| | ===Station maintenance=== |
| | history, which showed the performance |
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| | of Viton to be satisfactory |
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| | in ASCO valves, and the available |
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| | literature |
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| | and industry experience, the licensee replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats and seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad |
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| | limit, the licensee plans to replace these elastomers |
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| | every 3.3 years to meet environmental |
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| | qualifica- tion requirements |
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| | for the MSIV application. |
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| | After replacing |
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| | the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and seal material, the licensee experienced |
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| | several SOV failures resulting |
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| | from open circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick |
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| | Station employs ASCO NP8323A36V |
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| | valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applications |
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| | using the subject dual solenoid valve.)On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor-mance of post-maintenance |
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| | testing of the MSIVs. Investigation |
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| | into the failures indicated |
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| | an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils were replaced and the valves subsequently |
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| | retested satisfactorily. |
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| | On October 15, 1985, an unplanned |
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| | closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating |
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| | at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred when the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated |
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| | SOV was de-energized |
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| | in accordance |
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| | with a periodic test procedure. |
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| | It was not known then that there was an open circuit in the associated |
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| | dc solenoid coil portion of the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of the MSIV resulted. |
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| | The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested satisfactorily. |
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| | Investigation |
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| | into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determined |
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| | that the failures appeared to be separation |
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| | of the very fine coil wire at the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. This connection |
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| | point is a soldered connection |
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| | that is then taped and lacquered. |
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| | Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares from storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated |
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| | the separation |
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| | might be corrosion |
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| | induced by chloride contaminants. |
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| | To date, the licensee and ASCO are unable to determine |
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| | the source of the chloride. |
| | |
| | However, followup investigation |
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| | by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously |
| | |
| | experienced |
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| | similar dc coil open circuit anomalies |
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| | after a surface ship-ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the salt water ambient conditions |
| | |
| | during shipping may have been the source of the chlorine-induced |
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| | failures. |
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| | ASCO recommends |
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| | specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions |
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| | for spare parts and valves at facilities. |
| | |
| | Attachment |
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| | 1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated |
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| | a temporary |
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| | surveillance |
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| | program to monitor opera-bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification |
| | |
| | was performed |
| | |
| | to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual |
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| | coil circuits so that they can be monitored |
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| | directly from cabinets in the control room. This allows continuity |
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| | of the coil circuitry |
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| | to be verified by measuring |
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| | a voltage drop across the resistor. |
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| | According |
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| | to the licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to check the coil circuitry |
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| | for continuity |
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| | on a daily basis.2. Scram Discharge |
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| | Solenoid Valve Failure In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick |
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| | facility experi-enced problems with several scram discharge |
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| | SOVs. The problems were identified |
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| | during periodic surveillance |
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| | testing to determine |
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| | the single rod insertion |
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| | times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion times. Initial troubleshooting |
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| | isolated the problem to the SOVs in the scram discharge |
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| | line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently |
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| | replaced and tested satisfactorily. |
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| | The licensee disassembled |
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| | the failed SOVs, which were manufactured |
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| | by ASCO (Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis. |
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| | When the valves were disas-sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant |
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| | had been applied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms |
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| | internal to the valves during previous routine maintenance.. |
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| | The licensee believes that the excessive |
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| | amount of lubricant |
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| | may have blocked some of the valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby contributing |
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| | to the slow insertion |
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| | times. The technical |
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| | manual for the subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated |
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| | with moderate amounts of Dow Corning's |
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| | Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant |
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| | or an equivalent |
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| | high-grade |
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| | silicone grease.The licensee conducted |
| | |
| | successful |
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| | scram tests on all other rods. A periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as required by the Technical |
| | |
| | Specifications |
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| | provides sufficient |
| | |
| | assurance that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licensee stated that maintenance |
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| | procedures |
| | |
| | and practices |
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| | would be reviewed and modified, as required, to prevent the application |
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| | of excessive |
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| | amounts of lubricant |
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| | during repair or overhaul of components. |
| | |
| | Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant On September |
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| | 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating |
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| | at 100 percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary |
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| | feedwater |
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| | system (AFW)failed to change state when de-energized. |
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| | This failure was detected during the performance |
| | |
| | of a preventive |
| | |
| | maintenance |
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| | procedure |
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| | developed |
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| | to periodically |
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| | cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail-ures previously |
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| | experienced |
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| | on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, two feedwater |
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| | bypass valves failed to open automatically |
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| | and the cause was deter-mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E |
| | |
| | and the licensee has been unable to determine |
| | |
| | the cause of the malfunction. |
| | |
| | The |
| | |
| | Attachment |
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| | 2 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION |
| | |
| | NOTICES Information |
| | |
| | Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-56 Reliability |
| | |
| | Of Main Steam Safety Valves 7/10/86 All PWR facilities |
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| | holding an OL or CP 86-55 86-54 Delayed Access To Safety-Related Areas And Equipment During Plant Emergencies |
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| | Criminal Prosecution |
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| | Of A Former Radiation |
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| | ===Safety Officer Who Willfully Directed An Unqualified=== |
| | Individual |
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| | ===To Perform Radiography=== |
| | Improper Use Of Heat Shrink-able Tubing 7/10/86 6/27/86 6/26/86 86-53 86-52 Conductor |
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| | Insulation |
| | |
| | Degrada- 6/26/86 tion On Foxboro Model E Controllers |
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| | Excessive |
| | |
| | Pneumatic |
| | |
| | Leakage 6/18/86 In The Automatic |
| | |
| | Depressuriza- tion System All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All holders of by-product, source, or special nuclear material All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All BWR facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities |
| | |
| | holding an OL or CP All BWR facilities |
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| | holding an OL or CP 86-51 86-50 86-49 Inadequate |
| | |
| | Testing To Detect Failures Of Safety-Related |
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| | Pneumatic |
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| | Components |
| | |
| | Or Systems Age/Environment |
| | |
| | Induced Electrical |
| | |
| | Cable Failues Inadequate |
|
| |
|
| ==Description of Circumstances==
| | Testing Of Boron Solution Concentration |
| :The NRC has received reports from licensees of operating nuclear power plantsinvolving failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operatedvalves (SOVs) to operate properly. These failures have adversely affected theintended functions of the main steam isolation system, pressure relief andfluid control systems. Attachment 1 to this information notice describes thefailure events and the corrective actions taken.Discussion:In most of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering theevent was attributed to a malfunctioning SOV that served as a pilot valve. Thisin turn resulted in the malfunction of the associated main valve. The failuresof the SOVs can be traced to the following different causes: (1) potentiallyhigh-temperature ambient conditions are not being continuously monitored in areaswhere SOVs are installed and operating in an energized state, (2) hydrocarboncontaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shopair systems) are being used periodically and are not designed to "oil-free"specifications as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminantscausing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionablehandling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement partsprogram associated with the elastomers and other short-lived subcomponents usedin SOVs has not been adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been usedexcessively during maintenance. ASCO provides installation and maintenance8607090425 Attachment 1IN 86-57July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature performance when compared to EPand is impervious to hydrocarbons. Its major disadvantage is that itis less resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten. ASCOrecommends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and whereradiation levels do not exceed 20 megarads.On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick Station maintenancehistory, which showed the performance of Viton to be satisfactory in ASCOvalves, and the available literature and industry experience, the licenseereplaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seatsand seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans toreplace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica-tion requirements for the MSIV application.After replacing the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and sealmaterial, the licensee experienced several SOV failures resulting fromopen circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick Station employs ASCONP8323A36V valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applicationsusing the subject dual solenoid valve.)On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor-mance of post-maintenance testing of the MSIVs. Investigation into thefailures indicated an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils werereplaced and the valves subsequently retested satisfactorily.On October 15, 1985, an unplanned closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2was operating at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred whenthe ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated SOV was de-energizedin accordance with a periodic test procedure. It was not known then thatthere was an open circuit in the associated dc solenoid coil portion ofthe dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure ofthe MSIV resulted. The failed dc coil was replaced and then retestedsatisfactorily.Investigation into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determinedthat the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine coil wire atthe junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. Thisconnection point is a soldered connection that is then taped andlacquered.Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares fromstorage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated the separation might becorrosion induced by chloride contaminants. To date, the licensee andASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. However,followup investigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previouslyexperienced similar dc coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship-ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the saltwater ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of thechlorine-induced failures. ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging,and storage conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities.
| |
|
| |
|
| Attachment 1IN 86-57July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program to monitor opera-bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification wasperformed to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual coilcircuits so that they can be monitored directly from cabinets in thecontrol room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verifiedby measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. According to thelicensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are tocheck the coil circuitry for continuity on a daily basis.2. Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve FailureIn November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick facility experi-enced problems with several scram discharge SOVs. The problems wereidentified during periodic surveillance testing to determine the singlerod insertion times and resulted in several rods with slow insertiontimes. Initial troubleshooting isolated the problem to the SOVs in thescram discharge line for two of the control rods, which were subsequentlyreplaced and tested satisfactorily.The licensee disassembled the failed SOVs, which were manufactured by ASCO(Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis. When the valves were disas-sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant had beenapplied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms internal tothe valves during previous routine maintenance.. The licensee believesthat the excessive amount of lubricant may have blocked some of thevalves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, therebycontributing to the slow insertion times. The technical manual for thesubject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated withmoderate amounts of Dow Corning's Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant or anequivalent high-grade silicone grease.The licensee conducted successful scram tests on all other rods. Aperiodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days asrequired by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurancethat this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licenseestated that maintenance procedures and practices would be reviewed andmodified, as required, to prevent the application of excessive amounts oflubricant during repair or overhaul of components.Haddam Neck Nuclear Power PlantOn September 10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW)failed to change state when de-energized. This failure was detected during theperformance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to periodicallycycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail-ures previously experienced on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, twofeedwater bypass valves failed to open automatically and the cause was deter-mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E and thelicensee has been unable to determine the cause of the malfunction. The
| | In The Standby Liquid Control System 6/18/86 6/16/86 6/13/86 86-48 OL = Operating |
|
| |
|
| Attachment 2IN 86-57July 11, 1986LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to86-56Reliability Of Main SteamSafety Valves7/10/86All PWR facilitiesholding an OL or CP86-5586-54Delayed Access To Safety-Related Areas And EquipmentDuring Plant EmergenciesCriminal Prosecution Of AFormer Radiation SafetyOfficer Who WillfullyDirected An UnqualifiedIndividual To PerformRadiographyImproper Use Of Heat Shrink-able Tubing7/10/866/27/866/26/8686-5386-52Conductor Insulation Degrada- 6/26/86tion On Foxboro Model EControllersExcessive Pneumatic Leakage 6/18/86In The Automatic Depressuriza-tion SystemAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll holders of by-product, source, orspecial nuclearmaterialAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll BWR facilitiesholding an OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll BWR facilitiesholding an OL or CP86-5186-5086-49Inadequate Testing To DetectFailures Of Safety-RelatedPneumatic Components OrSystemsAge/Environment InducedElectrical Cable FailuesInadequate Testing Of BoronSolution Concentration In TheStandby Liquid Control System6/18/866/16/866/13/8686-48OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
| | License CP = Construction |
|
| |
|
| }} | | Permit}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Operating Problems with Solenoid Operated Valves at Nuclear Power PlantsML031220718 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill |
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Issue date: |
07/11/1986 |
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From: |
NRC/IE |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-86-057, NUDOCS 8607090425 |
Download: ML031220718 (4) |
|
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Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2020-02, Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges2020-09-15015 September 2020 Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges ML20225A0322020-09-0303 September 2020 NRC Choice Letter to NAC International with Attached Safety Inspection Report, IR 0721015/2020201, February 24-27, 2020 and July 22, 2020, Inspection of NAC International in Norcross, Georgia Information Notice 2012-09, PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs.2019-11-30030 November 2019 PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs. Information Notice 2011-20, NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011)2019-07-24024 July 2019 NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011) ML19196A2452019-07-15015 July 2019 Public Notice - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Exigent Amendment to Facility Operating License Information Notice 2019-01, Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations2019-03-12012 March 2019 Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations ML16028A3082016-04-27027 April 2016 NRC Information Notice; IN 2016-05: Operating Experience Regarding Complications From a Loss of Instrumentation Air Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2013-20, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-20, Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-11, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2013-11, Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>. |
11$S ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-57 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION
AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 11, 1986 IE INFORMATION
NOTICE NO. 86-57: OPERATING
PROBLEMS WITH SOLENOID OPERATED VALVES AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities
holding an operating
license or a construction
permit.
Purpose
- This notice is to advise recipients
of a series of valve failures that have occurred recently at several nuclear power plants. It is expected that recipi-ents will review the events discussed
below for applicability
to their facili-ties and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar valve failures occurring
at their facilities.
However, suggestions
contained
in this notice do not constitute
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
of Circumstances:
The NRC has received reports from licensees
of operating
nuclear power plants involving
failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated valves (SOVs) to operate properly.
These failures have adversely
affected the intended functions
of the main steam isolation
system, pressure relief and fluid control systems. Attachment
1 to this information
notice describes
the failure events and the corrective
actions taken.Discussion:
In most of the cases described
in Attachment
1, the cause for triggering
the event was attributed
to a malfunctioning
SOV that served as a pilot valve. This in turn resulted in the malfunction
of the associated
main valve. The failures of the SOVs can be traced to the following
different
causes: (1) potentially
high-temperature
ambient conditions
are not being continuously
monitored
in areas where SOVs are installed
and operating
in an energized
state, (2) hydrocarbon
contaminants, probably because backup air systems (e.g., plant service or shop air systems) are being used periodically
and are not designed to "oil-free" specifications
as required for Class IE service, (3) chloride contaminants
causing open circuits in coils of the SOVs, possibly as a result of questionable
handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement
parts program associated
with the elastomers
and other short-lived
subcomponents
used in SOVs has not been adequately
maintained, and (5) lubricants
have been used excessively
during maintenance.
ASCO provides installation
and maintenance
8607090425 Attachment
1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 b. Viton has superior high-temperature
performance
when compared to EP and is impervious
to hydrocarbons.
Its major disadvantage
is that it is less resistant
to radiation
than EP by a factor of ten. ASCO recommends
Viton for applications
that are not oil-free and where radiation
levels do not exceed 20 megarads.On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick
Station maintenance
history, which showed the performance
of Viton to be satisfactory
in ASCO valves, and the available
literature
and industry experience, the licensee replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats and seals. Because Viton has a 20-megarad
limit, the licensee plans to replace these elastomers
every 3.3 years to meet environmental
qualifica- tion requirements
for the MSIV application.
After replacing
the faulty valves with valves having Viton disc and seal material, the licensee experienced
several SOV failures resulting
from open circuits of the dc coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick
Station employs ASCO NP8323A36V
valves that use one ac coil and one dc coil in applications
using the subject dual solenoid valve.)On October 5, 1985, the dc coils of two MSIVs failed during the perfor-mance of post-maintenance
testing of the MSIVs. Investigation
into the failures indicated
an open circuit in the dc coils. The coils were replaced and the valves subsequently
retested satisfactorily.
On October 15, 1985, an unplanned
closure of an MSIV occurred while Unit 2 was operating
at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred when the ac solenoid coil portion of the MSIV associated
SOV was de-energized
in accordance
with a periodic test procedure.
It was not known then that there was an open circuit in the associated
dc solenoid coil portion of the dual SOV. Consequently, when the ac coil was de-energized, closure of the MSIV resulted.
The failed dc coil was replaced and then retested satisfactorily.
Investigation
into the failures of the dc coil by the licensee determined
that the failures appeared to be separation
of the very fine coil wire at the junction point where it connects to the much larger field lead. This connection
point is a soldered connection
that is then taped and lacquered.
Further analysis of the coils (two failed dc coils plus five spares from storage) by the CP&L Research Center indicated
the separation
might be corrosion
induced by chloride contaminants.
To date, the licensee and ASCO are unable to determine
the source of the chloride.
However, followup investigation
by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously
experienced
similar dc coil open circuit anomalies
after a surface ship-ment of SOVs overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the salt water ambient conditions
during shipping may have been the source of the chlorine-induced
failures.
ASCO recommends
specific handling, packaging, and storage conditions
for spare parts and valves at facilities.
Attachment
1 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 The licensee initiated
a temporary
surveillance
program to monitor opera-bility of the solenoid coils on October 16, 1985. A modification
was performed
to install a voltage dropping resistor in the individual
coil circuits so that they can be monitored
directly from cabinets in the control room. This allows continuity
of the coil circuitry
to be verified by measuring
a voltage drop across the resistor.
According
to the licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, plans are to check the coil circuitry
for continuity
on a daily basis.2. Scram Discharge
Solenoid Valve Failure In November 1985, Carolina Power and Light's Brunswick
facility experi-enced problems with several scram discharge
SOVs. The problems were identified
during periodic surveillance
testing to determine
the single rod insertion
times and resulted in several rods with slow insertion times. Initial troubleshooting
isolated the problem to the SOVs in the scram discharge
line for two of the control rods, which were subsequently
replaced and tested satisfactorily.
The licensee disassembled
the failed SOVs, which were manufactured
by ASCO (Model HV-90-405-2A), for failure analysis.
When the valves were disas-sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant
had been applied by the licensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphragms
internal to the valves during previous routine maintenance..
The licensee believes that the excessive
amount of lubricant
may have blocked some of the valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphragms, thereby contributing
to the slow insertion
times. The technical
manual for the subject valves states that body passage gaskets should be lubricated
with moderate amounts of Dow Corning's
Valve Seal Silicone Lubricant
or an equivalent
high-grade
silicone grease.The licensee conducted
successful
scram tests on all other rods. A periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as required by the Technical
Specifications
provides sufficient
assurance that this problem does not exist in other SOVs. In addition, the licensee stated that maintenance
procedures
and practices
would be reviewed and modified, as required, to prevent the application
of excessive
amounts of lubricant
during repair or overhaul of components.
Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant On September
10, 1985, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating
at 100 percent power when one of the six SOVs in the auxiliary
feedwater
system (AFW)failed to change state when de-energized.
This failure was detected during the performance
of a preventive
maintenance
procedure
developed
to periodically
cycle each of the six SOVs to prevent a sticking problem similar to SOV fail-ures previously
experienced
on November 2, 1984. In that earlier event, two feedwater
bypass valves failed to open automatically
and the cause was deter-mined to be sticking SOVs. The faulty SOV was ASCO Model NP8320A-185E
and the licensee has been unable to determine
the cause of the malfunction.
The
Attachment
2 IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-56 Reliability
Of Main Steam Safety Valves 7/10/86 All PWR facilities
holding an OL or CP 86-55 86-54 Delayed Access To Safety-Related Areas And Equipment During Plant Emergencies
Criminal Prosecution
Of A Former Radiation
Safety Officer Who Willfully Directed An Unqualified
Individual
To Perform Radiography
Improper Use Of Heat Shrink-able Tubing 7/10/86 6/27/86 6/26/86 86-53 86-52 Conductor
Insulation
Degrada- 6/26/86 tion On Foxboro Model E Controllers
Excessive
Pneumatic
Leakage 6/18/86 In The Automatic
Depressuriza- tion System All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All holders of by-product, source, or special nuclear material All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All BWR facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All BWR facilities
holding an OL or CP 86-51 86-50 86-49 Inadequate
Testing To Detect Failures Of Safety-Related
Pneumatic
Components
Or Systems Age/Environment
Induced Electrical
Cable Failues Inadequate
Testing Of Boron Solution Concentration
In The Standby Liquid Control System 6/18/86 6/16/86 6/13/86 86-48 OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
|
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list | - Information Notice 1986-01, Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves Causes Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water-Hammer Damage (6 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-02, Failure of Valve Operator Motor During Environmental Qualification Testing (6 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-03, Potential Deficiencies in Enviromental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring (14 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-04, Transient Due to Loss of Power to Intergrated Control System at a Pressurized Water Reactor Designed by Babcock & Wilcox (31 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-05, Main Steam Safety Valve Test Failures and Ring Setting Adjustments (31 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-06, Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment, While Lifting Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 (3 February 1986, Topic: Control of Heavy Loads)
- Information Notice 1986-06, Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment, while Lifting Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-07, Lack of Detailed Instruction & Inadequate Observance of Precautions During Maintenance & Testing of Diesel Generator Woodward Governors (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-08, Licensee Event Report (LER) Format Modification (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-09, Failure of Check & Stop Check Valves Subjected to Low Flow Conditions (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting From Boric Acid Corrosion. (5 January 1995, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Feedwater Line Break (10 November 1988, Topic: Coatings, Anchor Darling)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion. (5 January 1995, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1986-11, Anomalous Behavior of Recirculation Loop Flow in Jet Pump BWR Plants (31 December 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-13, Standby Liquid Control System Squib Valves Failure to Fire (21 February 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-13, Standby Liquid Control Squib Valves Failure to Fire (5 August 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-14, Overspeed Trips of AFW, HPCI & RCIC Turbines (26 August 1991, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1986-14, Overspeed Trips of Afw, HPCI & RCIC Turbines (26 August 1991)
- Information Notice 1986-15, Loss of Offsite Power Caused by Problems in Fiber Optics Systems (10 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-16, Failures to Identify Containment Leakage Due to Inadequate Local Testing of BWR Vacuum Relief System Valves (11 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-17, Update of Failure of Automatic Sprinkler System Valves to Operate (24 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-18, NRC On-Scene Response During a Major Emergency (26 March 1986, Topic: Squib, Backfit)
- Information Notice 1986-19, Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure at Crystal River (21 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-20, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Scaling Factors, 10 CFR Part 61 (28 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-21, Recognition of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Accreditation Program for N Stamp Holders (31 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-22, Underresponse of Radiation Survey Instrument to High Radiation Fields (31 March 1986, Topic: High Radiation Area, Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-23, Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamination with Hot Particles (9 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-23, Excessive Skin Exposures due to Contamination with Hot Particles (9 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-24, Respirator Users Notice: Increased Inspection Frequency for Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Air Cylinders (11 April 1986, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1986-25, Traceability and Material Control of Material and Equipment, Particularly Fasteners (11 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-26, Potential Problems in Generators Manufactured by Electrical Products Incorporated (17 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-27, Access Control at Nuclear Facilities (21 April 1986, Topic: Contraband)
- Information Notice 1986-28, Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices (24 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-29, Effects of Changing Valve Moter-Operator Switch Settings (25 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-30, Design Limitations of Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems (29 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-31, Unauthorized Transfer and Loss of Control of Industrial Nuclear Gauges (14 July 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-32, Request for Collection of Licensee Radioactivity Measurements Attributed to Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident (2 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-33, Information for Licensee Regarding the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident (6 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-34, Improper Assembly, Material Selection, & Test of Valves & Their Actuators (13 May 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-34, Improper Assembly, Material Selection, & Test of Valves & their Actuators (13 May 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-35, Fire in Compressible Material at Dresden Unit 3 (15 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-36, Change in NRC Practice Regarding Issuance of Confirming Letters to Principal Contractors (16 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-37, Degradation of Station Batteries (16 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-38, Deficient Operator Actions Following Dual Function Valve Failures (20 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-39, Failures of RHR Pump Motors and Pump Internals (20 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-40, Degraded Ability to Isolate the Reactor Coolant System from Low-Pressure Coolant Systems in Bwrs (5 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-40, Degraded Ability to Isolate the Reactor Coolant System from Low-Pressure Coolant Systems in BWRs (5 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-41, Evaluation of Questionable Exposure Readings of Licensee Personnel Dosimeters (9 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-42, Improper Maintenance of Radiation Monitoring Systems (9 June 1986, Topic: Temporary Modification, Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-43, Problems with Silver Zeolite Sampling of Airborne Radioiodine (10 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
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