ML14022A055

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1, Revision 0, Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 - Supplemental Information.

ML14022A055
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	01/14/2014
From:	Westinghouse
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14022A052	List: ML14022A054 ML14022A055
References
102-06818-DCM/MAM/PJH WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1, Rev. 0
Download: ML14022A055 (112)

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Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled MWestinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 January 2014Revision 0Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Submittal Report forPalo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 -Supplemental Information Westinghouse Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1Revision 0Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde NuclearGenerating Station Unit 1 -Supplemental Information Rolando Perez *Risk Applications

& Methods IIWalter Djordjevic Seismic Walkdown Peer Review Team LeaderJanuary 2014Reviewer:

Derek Seaman*Risk Applications

& Methods IIReviewer:

Chris WandellSenior Consulting

Engineer, Arizona Public ServiceApproved:

Dan Sadlon *Manager, Risk Applications

& Methods II*Electronically approved records are authenticated in the electronic document management system.Westinghouse Electric Company LLC1000 Westinghouse DriveCranberry

Township, PA 16066, USA© 2014 Westinghouse Electric Company LLCAll Rights Reserved Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled REVISION LOGRev Date Revision Description Rev. 0 1/2014 Supplement 1 includes the main body of WCAP- 17679-N P, Rev. 0(Reference 48, "Executive Summary" through "References")

and new orrevised content in the appendices that address the conduct and results of thefollow-on walkdown activities performed during and following refueling outage 1RI 7. Revision bars are used in the main body to easily identify theupdates.

With the exception of Appendices A and B, revision bars areutilized in the appendices to identify the updates relative to thecorresponding appendices of WCAP- 17679-NP, Rev. 0. Note thatAppendices A and B consist of the completed checklists resulting from thefollow-on walkdowns and one original SWC (IJRMNB04) that requirededitorial correction.

Editorial and formatting corrections relative to WCAP-17679-NP, Rev. 0 are not identified with individual revision bars in thisdocument.

Supplement I corrects an error contained in the second paragraph of Section6.4 regarding potentially adverse seismic conditions entered into the plant'sCAP.WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Executive SummaryFollowing the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) established the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) in response toCommission direction.

The NTTF made several recommendations, some of which are related toimproving the protection of nuclear power plants against natural phenomena.

With recommendation 2.3(Rec 2.3), the NTTF recommended the NRC require licensees to perform seismic and flooding walkdowns to identify and address vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of hazard protection features.

On March 12,2012, the NRC issued a letter, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f),

that requests information from all powerreactor licensees related to NTTF recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3. For the seismic aspect of Rec 2.3,licensees are required to perform Seismic Walkdowns to verify the current plant configuration with thecurrent seismic licensing basis, verify the adequacy of current strategies and maintenance plans, andidentify and address degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed conditions.

This report contains theArizona Public Service Company (APS) response for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit I to the request for information related to the seismic aspects of NTTF Rec 2.3, as addressed inenclosure 3 of the NRC letter.The original version of this WCAP report summarizes the results from the at-power Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys performed from July 30 through August 6, 2012. Supplement I incorporates theresults from the additional walkdowns performed during and after refueling outage IR17, from April 6through April 7, 2013, and on April 30, 2013.To establish a consistent methodology for performance of the Seismic Walkdowns, the Electric PowerResearch Institute (EPRI), in conjunction with the industry, developed guidance in EPRI Technical ReportTR-1025286.

This guidance was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The Seismic Walkdowns conducted at PVNGS Unit I conform to the requirements of the EPRI Technical Report. Consistent withthe guidance, the following topics are addressed in this PVNGS Unit I Seismic Walkdown report:1. Seismic Licensing Basis for Seismic Category I Structures,

Systems, and Components (SSCs)2. Personnel Qualifications

3. Process used for selection of SSCs4. Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys5. Licensing Basis Evaluations

6. Peer Review7. IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution ReportThe required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed for accessible equipment inPVNGS Unit I during the period from July 30 through August 6, 2012, while the plant was operating inMode 1. Inaccessible equipment (containment building and energized high-voltage equipment) areidentified in the PVNGS Unit I Seismic Walkdown Report and walkdowns were conducted during theUnit I refueling outage, IR17, from April 6 through April 7, 2013, and afterward on April 30, 2013. Alsoduring 1R17, supplemental inspections of electrical cabinets were performed in accordance with the NRCresponse to industry frequently asked question 4.20. In addition, Area Walk-Bys were completed, asrequired, during these follow-on activities.

Documentation of these additional inspections and the relatedevaluations is provided in this supplemental report.The following information identifies the requests in the 50.54(f) letter (in italics) followed by a summaryof the APS response:

a. Information on the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS-1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled iiThe PVNGS current Seismic Licensing Basis (seismic codes, standards, and methods) isdocumented in report Section I and was used to inform the Seismic Walkdown licensing basisevaluations.

b. Information related to the implementation qf the walkdown process.The approach used to implement the Seismic Walkdown process at PVNGS conforms to theguidance of EPRI Technical Report TR-1025286.

Report Sections 3 through 5 providedetailed descriptions of how the walkdown process was implemented at PVNGS.c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including any seismic anomalies,

outliers, or other,findings) identified by the IPEEE and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reducethem (including their completion dates).No plant-specific seismic vulnerabilities were identified at PVNGS Unit I by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program.

The results of the IPEEE program aredescribed in report Section 7.d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified

degraded, nonconforming, orunanalyzed conditions.

Include a detailed description of the actions taken or planned toaddress these conditions using the guidance in Regulatory Issues Summary 2005-20,

Revision, 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical

Guidance, "Operabilit, Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety,"

including entering the condition in the corrective action program.The summary of the key findings of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys is providedin report Section 4. The licensing basis evaluations of potentially adverse seismic conditions and their resolutions are described in detail in Section 5 and Appendix D of this report. A totalof 38 licensing basis evaluations have been satisfactorily closed and seven open evaluations have been entered into the PVNGS Corrective Action Program (CAP) for resolution.

Itemsentered into the CAP are annotated in Appendix D. None of these identified conditions prevent the equipment from performing the intended safety functions during or after a designbasis seismic event. Results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys are documented on EPRI TR-1025286 checklists in report Appendices A and B, respectively.

e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features.

There are no planned or newly installed protection or mitigation features that resulted from theimplementation of the Seismic Walkdown guidance at PVNGS. However, two of thepotentially adverse seismic conditions that were identified during the Seismic Walkdowns resulted in action being taken to restore seismic design margins.

Bookcases installed near thecontrol boards in the Unit I Control Room were removed and maintenance was performed inUnit I on a solenoid valve support plate related to the controls for an atmospheric steam dumpvalve. Neither of these conditions would have prevented safety-related equipment fromperforming its intended safety function during or after a design basis seismic event; thechanges were implemented to restore seismic design margins.f Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.The peer review process performed at PVNGS confirmed and informed the selection of SSCsprocess, provided real-time feedback to the Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) duringperformance of the walkdowns, and confirmed that the licensing basis evaluations carefully WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled iiicompared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licensing basisdocumentation.

Details of the peer reviewer activities are described in report Section 6.In summary, PVNGS Unit I equipment that was inspected and evaluated for the Seismic Walkdownprocess, including initial and supplemental inspections and related licensing basis evaluations, wasdetermined to be capable of performing intended safety functions during and after a design basis seismicevent and the site monitoring and maintenance procedures were determined to be adequate.

Follow-on activities to complete the remaining aspects of this process were completed as described in thissupplemental report. Therefore, the required NTTF 2.3 walkdown activities have been successfully completed for PVNGS Unit 1 in accordance with the EPRI Guidance document and the intent of Enclosure 3 to the NRC 50.54(f) letter has been satisfied.

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled ivACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We wish to acknowledge the following contributors to the effort.Mike Powell -Arizona Public Service (Director Fukushima Response)

Chris Wandell -Arizona Public ServiceJustin Wood -Arizona Public ServiceWinston Borrero -Arizona Public ServiceRandall "Gene" Eimar- Arizona Public ServiceJonathon Lucero -Arizona Public ServiceNick Reidenbach

-Arizona Public ServiceDerek Morris -Arizona Public ServiceMark Meyer -Arizona Public ServiceNathan Hardwick-Arizona Public ServiceJose "Angel" Delgadillo

-Arizona Public ServiceMichael Cribbins

-Westinghouse Electric CompanyRolando Perez -Westinghouse Electric CompanyDerek Seaman -Westinghouse Electric CompanyGary Douglas -Westinghouse Electric CompanyJoe Somsel -Westinghouse Electric CompanyPaul Karavoussianis

-Stevenson

& Associates Walter Djordjevic

-Stevenson

& Associates Hunter Young -Stevenson

& Associates Timothy Nealon -Stevenson

& Associates Andrew Masiunas

-Stevenson

& Associates Cory Figliolini

-Stevenson

& Associates WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS-I January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled VLIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Acronym Definition AFAS Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation SignalAF Auxiliary Feedwater AFW Auxiliary Feedwater SystemAHU Air Handling UnitAPS Arizona Public ServiceASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AUX Auxiliary BuildingAWC Area Walk-By Checklist CAP Corrective Action ProgramCE Combustion Engineering CF Containment FunctionCH Chemical and Volume ControlCLB Current Licensing BasisCP Containment PurgeCST Condensate Storage TankCT Condensate Transfer and StorageCTMT Containment CTRL Control BuildingCVCS Chemical and Volume Control SystemDBM Design Basis ManualDCM Design Criteria ManualDF Diesel Fuel Oil and TransferDG Diesel Generator DHR Decay Heat RemovalEAHU Essential Air Handling UnitEC HVAC Essential Chilled WaterEPRI Electric Power Research Institute EQCF Equipment Qualification Control FormEQID Equipment Identification EW Essential Cooling WaterFAQ Frequently Asked Question(s)

FCR Field Change RequestGA Service GasGR Gaseous RadwasteHA HVAC Auxiliary BuildingHC HVAC Containment BuildingHD HVAC Diesel Generator BuildingHJ HVAC Control BuildingHPSI High Pressure Safety Injection HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled viAcronym Definition IA Instrument and Service AirIC Reactor Coolant Inventory ControlIPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External EventsIEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISRS In-Structure Response SpectraMCC Motor Control CenterMO Motor-Operated MOV Motor-Operated ValveMSSS Main Steam Support Structure NCR Non-Conformance ReportsNQR Non-Quality RelatedNRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply SystemNTTF Near-Term Task ForceOBE Operating Basis Earthquake P&ID Piping and Instrumentation DiagramPB Class 1E 4.16 kv PowerPC Reactor Coolant Pressure ControlPE Class I E Standby Generation PG Class I E 480v Power Switchgear PGD Project General Design CriteriaPH Class I E 480v Power Motor Control CenterPK Class IE 125 VDCPN Class 1 E Instrument PowerPRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PVAR Palo Verde Action Request (Corrective Action Program)PVNGS Palo Verde Nuclear Generating StationRAS Re-circulation Actuation SignalRAW Risk Achievement WorthRC Reactivity Control or Reactor CoolantRCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure BoundaryRCS Reactor Coolant SystemRD Radioactive Waste DrainRLE Review Level Earthquake RM Main Control BoardROB Rule of the BoxRWT Refueling Water TankS&A Stevenson

& Associates SA Engineered Safety Features Actuation SystemSB Reactor Protection SC-I Seismic Category IWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled viiAcronymSDCSDOCSFPSGSISOVSPSPRASQUGSSCsSSESSELSWCSWESWELSWGSWMSSWTUFSARUHSZAZGziDefinition Shutdown CoolingVendor/Supplier DocumentSpent Fuel PoolMain SteamSafety Injection Solenoid-Operated ValveEssential Spray PondsSeismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Seismic Qualification Utility GroupStructures,

Systems, and Components Safe Shutdown Earthquake Safe Shutdown Equipment ListSeismic Walkdown Checklist Seismic Walkdown EngineerSeismic Walkdown Equipment ListSeismic Walkdown Guidance (EPRI TR-1025286)

Site Work Management SystemSeismic Walkdown TeamUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportUltimate Heat SinkAuxiliary BuildingDiesel Generator BuildingControl BuildingWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled viiiTABLE OF CONTENTSI. SEISM IC LICENSING BASIS ..........................................................................................................

1-11.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRA ...........................................................................

-I1.2 SEISM IC QUALIFICATION OF SC-1 EQUIPMENT

............................................................

1-12. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

....................................................................................................

2-12.1 EQUIPM ENT SELECTION PERSONNEL

........................................................................

2-I2.2 SEISM IC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS

...................................................................................

2-12.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEW ERS ..........................................................................................

2-32.4 IPEEE REVIEW ERS ................................................................................................................

2-32.5 PEER REVIEW TEAM ............................................................................................................

2-33. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEM S, AND COM PONENTS ............................................

3-13.1 SELECTION PROCESS SUM MARY .....................................................................................

3-13.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS

........................

3-43 .2 .1 B ase L ist I ....................................................................................................................

3 -93 .2 .2 S W E L 1 ........................................................................................................................

3 -93.3 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RELATED ITEM S .....................................................................

3-103 .3 .1 B ase L ist 2 ..................................................................................................................

3 -123.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down

.....................................................................................................

3-123 .3 .3 S W E L 2 ......................................................................................................................

3 -123.4 INACCESSIBLE ITEM S ........................................................................................................

3-134. SEISM IC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS

...................................................................

4-14.1 BACKGROUND

.......................................................................................................................

4-14.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISM IC WALKDOW NS ....................................................................

4-24.3 WALKDOW N RESULTS .........................................................................................................

4-35. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

.........................................................................................

5-16 .P E E R R E V IE W ..................................................................................................................................

6-

16.1 INTRODUCTION

.....................................................................................................................

6-16.2 PEER REVIEW -SELECTION OF SSCs ...............................................................................

6-26 .2 .1 P u rp o se .........................................................................................................................

6 -26.2.2 Peer Review Activity

-Selection of SSCs ...................................................................

6-26.2.3 Peer Review Findings

-Selection of SSCs ..................................................................

6-36.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments

-Selection of SSCs ........................................

6-56.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review -Selection of SSCs .........................................................

6-56.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BYC H E C K L IS T S ...........................................................................................................................

6-56.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS

...............................................................

6-86.5 REVIEW SUBM ITTAL REPORT ..........................................................................................

6-107. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES

..............................................................................................................

7-18. RE F E R E N C E S ....................................................................................................................................

8-1WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS-I January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled ixAPPENDIX A -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCs) .................................................

A-IAPPENDIX B -AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (AWCs) .............................................................

B-1APPENDIX C -PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS

..............................................................................

C-IAPPENDIX D -LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS SUMMARY ...............................................

D-IA PPEN D IX E -Q U A LIFIC AT IO N S ......................................................................................................

E-IAPPENDIX F -PVNGS UN IT I SW EL REPORT ................................................................................

F-IAPPENDIX G -SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLES ........................................................................

G-IWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled xLIST OF TABLESTable 3-I:Table 3-2:Table 3-3:Table 3-4:Table 3-5:Table 3-6:Table 3-7:Table 3-8:Table 6-1:Table 6-2:Table G- I:Table G-2:Table G-3:Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "System Type" .................................

3-6Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute

........

3-7Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Equipment Type Number" .............

3-8Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Environment (Temperature)"

.........

3-9PVNGS-1 Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdowns

................................

3-13PVNGS- I FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections

.......................................................................

3-14PVNGS-1 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage 1R17 .........................................................

3-15PVNGS-l Item Completed During the April 30, 2013, Inspection

........................................................

3-16SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit I .........................

6-6Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit I ......................................................

6-8P V N G S -l B ase L ist I ............................................................................................................................

G -1P V N G S -I S W E L I ................................................................................................................................

G -2PVNGS-1 Base List 2 (SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2) ...............................................................

G-14WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 1- I1. SEISMIC LICENSING BASISThis report is applicable to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1.The licensing basis for Seismic Category I (SC-I) equipment at PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 is defined in theUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR, Reference

32) Section 3.7 and is supported by summaryseismic design criteria defined in Design Criteria Manual -Project General Design Criteria (DCM-PGD, Reference

42) Section 1.3.2. Site design ground motion response spectra for the Safe ShutdownEarthquake (SSE) are provided in UFSAR Figures 3.7-1 and 3.7-2, as well as UFSAR Sections 3.9.2.2,3.9.3 and 3.10, and adhere to Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design ofNuclear Power Plants (Reference 43). Damping values for SC-I equipment are listed in UFSAR Table3.7-1 and conform to Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear PowerPlants (Reference 44).As defined in UFSAR Section 2.5, the SSE is based on the postulated occurrence of a magnitude 8.0earthquake located 72 miles from the site. Through use of attenuation curves, extrapolation of responsespectra, and analysis of intensity data, 0.2g is considered a conservative representation of the severity ofhorizontal and vertical vibratory ground motion for the SSE. For additional conservatism, the seismicanalysis of all Category I structures was performed utilizing a 0.25g SSE. Figures 3.7-1 through 3.7-4 ofthe UFSAR show the horizontal and vertical design response spectra corresponding to the SSE andOperating Basis Earthquake (OBE), respectively.

1.1 IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRAA time-history analysis was used to develop in-structure response spectra (ISRS) for buildings housingSC-I equipment.

Modeling techniques such as the selection of the minimum number of mass points,number of dynamic degrees of freedom per mass point, and torsional

effects, are described in BechtelTopical Report BC-TOP-4-A (Reference 51). The seismic input was defined in terms of the free-field acceleration time history and the soil-structure interaction parameters.

The structural damping valuesused were per Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference 44). Soil damping characteristics were modified toaccount for strain levels. Design basis ISRS are plotted in DBM-C5 (Reference

53) Appendix A.1.2 SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF SC-1 EQUIPMENT SC-I equipment is classified according to Regulatory Guide 1.29, Seismic Design Classification (Reference 45), and is discussed in UFSAR Section 3.2 (Reference

32) and in DCM-PGD Section 1.4.3(Reference 42), which states:Category I structures,

systems, and components are those that are important to safety anddesigned to remain functional in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). Thesestructures,

systems, and components are those necessary to assure:* The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB).* The capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition.

• The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could resultin potential offsite exposures.

Per UFSAR Section 3.10.2, SC-1 electrical equipment within the Bechtel scope of supply was qualified per Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std 344-75 (Reference 46). This standard iscomprehensive and similar to current requirements for nuclear safety-related components.

Per UFSARWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 1-2Section 3.10.5, SC-1 electrical equipment within the Combustion Engineering scope of supply wasqualified per IEEE Std 344-71 (Reference

41) plus the additional requirements listed. With the additional requirements, the qualification criteria and methods are similar to those of IEEE Std 344-75 (Reference 46). For qualification by testing, per application of the preceding

criteria, much of the electrical equipment was subject to shake table testing.

The required test levels were typically based on the in-structure response spectra discussed above.Per Section 3.9.2.2 of the UFSAR., analytical methods without testing were employed to qualify SeismicCategory I mechanical equipment such as piping, ductwork, tanks and vessels, heat exchangers, filters,and pumps. Qualification for mechanical components with mechanisms that must change position inorder to perform the safety-related function was performed by test or a combination of test and analysis asper the IEEE Std 344-1975 requirements and UFSAR Sections 3.9.2, 3.9.3 and 3.10. These components include American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and non-ASME items such as valves withactuators and their appurtenances as well as check valves, relief valves, fans, chillers, air handling units,and various skid-supplied devices.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-12. PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS 2.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PERSONNEL The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) development was performed by Westinghouse personnel, Messrs. Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman. Resumes are provided in Appendix E. PVNGSOperations (Gene Eimar, Shift Manager and Angel Delgadillo, Senior Auxiliary Operator) providedverification of safety function selections.

PVNGS Engineering (Chris Wandell, Winston Borrero)provided technical input to screening and selection of equipment.

PVNGS System Engineering input wasprovided by performing a review of System Health Reports.Rolando Perez -Mr. Perez is the Technical Leader for the Palo Verde Unit 1 SWEL development activityin the Risk Applications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and MajorProjects Division.

Rolando has over 15 years of experience in Westinghouse and over 35 years ofexperience in the nuclear safety area. Rolando has worked for Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering (CE) as a Training

Engineer, Transient

Analyst, and Setpoint Analyst.

Rolando hasconducted lectures on reactor core physics, health physics, fluid systems, protection

systems, and plantoperational concepts.

In 2009 Rolando expanded his expertise to include CE-designed plants that employdigital-based reactor trip and monitoring systems ("CE digital plants").

Derek Seaman -Mr. Seaman is a member of the Palo Verde Unit I SWEL development team in the RiskApplications and Methods Group of Westinghouse's Engineering, Equipment and Major ProjectsDivision.

Derek has over 6 years of experience in Westinghouse in the nuclear engineering area. Derekhas rotated through various plant outage positions including reload engineering analyses and projectmanagement of fuel reload campaigns.

Derek has evaluated power increase proposals from a safetyanalysis perspective and has designed and implemented quality assurance systems in the nuclearengineering area.Chris J. Wandell, P.E. -Mr. Wandell is a Senior Consulting Civil Engineer in the Palo Verde NuclearDesign Engineering Department.

Chris is a Professional Civil Engineer with over 30 years of experience in the design, analysis, and modification of Seismic Category I pipe supports, electrical raceway supports,

heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) supports, instrument

supports, and steel and concretestructures.

His experience also includes Class I E Seismic Equipment Qualification.

Mr. Wandell is PaloVerde's structural and seismic subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

Winston G. Borrero -Mr. Borrero is a Senior Consulting Mechanical Engineer in the Palo Verde NuclearDesign Engineering Department.

Winston has over 30 years of experience in the design and construction of Nuclear Plants having worked for Bechtel, Stone & Webster and Sargent & Lundy Engineers at variousnuclear sites. Areas of expertise include stress analysis, fracture mechanics and fatigue analysis, seismicand environmental qualification of equipment, and bolted joint analysis.

Mr. Borrero is Palo Verde'sbolted joint and fatigue stress analysis subject matter expert. He has attended EPRI's NTTF 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Training Course and is a certified Seismic Walkdown Engineer.

2.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEERS The Seismic Walkdown team (SWT) consisted of Seismic Walkdown engineers (SWEs) from Stevenson and Associates (S&A). S&A is recognized as a leading seismic consultant to the nuclear industry and as aregular contributor to the advancement of earthquake engineering knowledge through funded researchWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS-I January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-2projects.

The professional staff has expertise and capabilities in earthquake engineering, structural

dynamics, and structural design. S&A has performed seismic evaluations of US nuclear power plants,using either Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) or Seismic Margin Assessments, to addressUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Individual Plant Evaluation for External Events (IPEEE) forover 35 US and European plants. S&A conducted seismic PRA analyses for all of the US Army depotsthat are demilitarizing their stores of nerve gas ordnance.

The SWT for PVNGS Unit 1, consisting of Hunter Young and Timothy Nealon of S&A, conducted initialwalkdowns from July 30, 2012, through August 2, 2012. For supplemental walkdowns occurring April 6,2013, through April 7, 2013, during refueling outage IR17 and April 30, 2013, the SWT consisted ofHunter Young and Cory Figliolini of S&A (Resum6s are provided in Appendix E). Chris Wandell andWinston Borrero led the support from PVNGS for walkdowns as well as the interface with plantoperators.

Other PVNGS professional staff provided support and guidance and these persons areacknowledged within this report. The Stevenson

& Associates Seismic Walkdown Engineers wereaccompanied by at least one of the following PVNGS qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers:

ChrisWandell, Nicholas Reidenbach, Winston Borrero, Justin Wood, Derek Morris, and Mark Meyer. ThePVNGS engineers (along with the Auxiliary Operator team member) provided walkdown oversight relative to expected conduct in the plant (Nuclear, Radiological and Industrial Safety),

compliance withNRC-Approved EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (TR-1025286),

PVNGS procedural compliance (inclusive of CAP), and insight into Licensing Basis issues.Hunter Young, P.E. -Mr. Young is a Senior Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in thedynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He hasmanaged and led Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use inprobabilistic risk assessments.

Mr. Young has performed the seismic analyses of braced steel frames,concrete foundations, masonry walls, large storage tanks, and electrical and mechanical equipment anchorage.

In addition, Mr. Young has executed the walkdown and analysis of tank structures and theirassociated leak path piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic eventsusing manual and finite element methods.

Mr. Young has a Master of Engineering in Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Bachelors of Science in CivilEngineering from the University of Notre Dame. He is a licensed P.E. (civil) in California and hascompleted the 5-day Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Walkdown training course.Timothy Nealon -Mr. Nealon is an Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office with specialization in thedynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He hasparticipated in Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use inprobabilistic risk assessments.

In addition, Mr. Nealon has conducted walkdowns and analysis of tankstructures and their associated leakpath piping to assess loss of inventory in the event of beyond-design-basis seismic events using various methods.

Furthermore, he has been trained and has conducted NTTF2.3 Fukushima response Seismic Walkdowns at multiple nuclear stations.

Mr. Nealon has a Master ofScience in Structural Engineering and a Bachelor of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the University at Buffalo.

Mr. Nealon has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course.Cory Figliolini

-Mr. Figliolini is a Staff Engineer in the S&A Phoenix office. He has planned andperformed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use inprobabilistic risk assessments.

Mr. Figliolini has conducted seismic analyses of electrical and mechanical equipment anchorage, storage tanks, and civil structures including containment.

Mr. Figliolini has a JointMaster of Science, Structural Engineering

& Mechanics from the Universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh and a Bachelors of Science in Civil Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute.

He is registered asan E.I.T. in Massachusetts.

Mr. Figliolini has completed the 5-day SQUG Walkdown training course.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 2-32.3 LICENSING BASIS REVIEWERS The Licensing Basis Reviewers for PVNGS Unit 1 consisted of Hunter Young, Timothy Nealon, and CoryFigliolini from the SWT. Their qualifications are provided under Section 2.2. Chris Wandell andWinston Borrero participated in the development of the licensing basis evaluations and provided technical bases for Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments for potentially adverse seismic conditions which were entered into the Corrective Action Program.2.4 IPEEE REVIEWERS The IPEEE Reviewers consisted of a combination of the Equipment Selection Personnel and the SWT.Rolando Perez and Derek Seaman of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (qualifications listed inAppendix E) identified equipment subject to IPEEE enhancements for incorporation in SWEL 1. HunterYoung and Timothy Nealon of S&A (qualifications listed in Section 2.2) performed the identification ofactions taken to eliminate or reduce the IPEEE vulnerabilities previously identified.

Jonathan Lucero,Engineer Sr. PRA from PVNGS, contributed to the IPEEE review.Jonathan L. Lucero -Mr. Lucero is a Senior Engineer in the Palo Verde Probabilistic Risk Assessment Department.

Jonathan has over 10 years of engineering experience in foundation design, structural

dynamics, and uncertainty analysis.

His experience also includes multidisciplinary applications, generalized information theory and fuzzy logic. Mr. Lucero is Palo Verde's seismic PRA subject matterexpert. He has attended EPRI's Education of Risk Professionals Program and Seismic PRA trainingcourse.2.5 PEER REVIEW TEAMThe peer reviewers for PVNGS Unit I are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas ofWestinghouse.

Mr. Djordjevic is also designated the peer review Team Leader. Neither was involved inthe Seismic Walkdown inspection process as to maintain their independence from the project.

Mr.Djordjevic is an advanced-degree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience and has been trained as a Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training),

EPRI IPEEE Add-on, andSeismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE). Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with 15years of nuclear engineering experience and 10 years of aerospace engineering experience.

Resum6s areprovided in Appendix E. Mr. Djordjevic led the seismic peer review activities and Mr. Douglas led theSWEL selection peer review. All peer review activities were performed by both engineers.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-13. SELECTION OF STRUCTURES,

SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.1 SELECTION PROCESS SUMMARYThis section describes the process used by Westinghouse to select the structures,

systems, andcomponents (SSCs) that were included in the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (PVNGS-1)

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL). The process described in Section 3 (Selection of SSCs) ofEPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3.: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), was used as guidance todevelop the PVNGS-I SWEL. The following steps from the integrated project schedule outline thisprocess of SWEL selection:

Project Kickoff MeetingObtain customer inputsRetrieve original Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE -full-scope Seismic Margin Assessment) documentation

-basis for Safe Shutdown Equipment List(SSEL) Base List 1Review current Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) databaseRetrieve containment function equipment Retrieve modifications since the IPEEERetrieve recently modified/upgraded equipment information Retrieve seismic vulnerabilities from Corrective Action Program (CAP)Retrieve System Health ReportsRetrieve spent fuel pool (SFP) SC-I equipment (piping and instrumentation

drawings, Design Basis Manuals, and Training Manual) -basis for SSEL Baselist 2Assemble preliminary Safe Shutdown Equipment List (i.e., Base List 1)Perform Screen #1, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out)Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out)Perform Screen #3, Safety Function SupportAssemble preliminary SSEL (Base List 2)Perform Screen #1, Seismic Category I (non-Seismic Category I SSCs screen out)Perform Screen #2, Regular Inspections (Structures, Piping, Penetrations screen out)Site visit to confirm preliminary SSELFinalize SSELSelect SWEL IPerform Screen #4System varietyEquipment type varietyEnvironment varietyRisk importance considerations Equipment access considerations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects)IPEEE Seismic Vulnerability findingsSample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Select SWEL 2 (spent fuel pool related items)Perform Screen #3System varietyEquipment type varietyEnvironment varietyWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-2Equipment access considerations Major new or replacement equipment Recently modified/upgraded (zone of influence effects)Sample considerations including unit-to-unit variation Perform Screen #4 rapid drain-down assessment Confirm SWEL with Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)Obtain PVNGS- I Operations approval of SWELSWEL Peer ReviewPer the guidance provided in Section 2 of Reference 1, PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staffmembers participated in the selection of the SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided input andassistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel collecting the data associated with the equipment considered.

The exchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the PVNGSstaff members included:

• Review of the IPEEE and PRA list of components was performed by the Westinghouse andPVNGS team to correct discrepancies in classification, errors in equipment identification (EQID),omissions, risk categorization, etc." Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

• A presentation held on July 17, 2012, to discuss Westinghouse's methodology for SWELselection.

• Verification of equipment information through PVNGS's Site Work Management System(SWMS) (Reference 2)." Provide risk importance data derived from the PVNGS Internal Events Probabilistic RiskAssessment (PRA) model (Reference 33)." Assist in identifying and categorizing the different operating environment types existing at theplant." Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plant that have thepotential to be relevant to the SWEL.* Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment with operational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

" Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) Database for review of CAP and modifications against seismic equipment.

• Provide System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals (DBMs) for review by the Equipment Selection Personnel.

" SWEL Peer Review and approval of the SSCs selected for the Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys(see Appendix F).WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- I January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-3Meetings were conducted from June 26, 2012, through June 29, 2012, to perform a Pre-Job Brief of theproject and to conduct working sessions with PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff memberswith the goal of achieving confirmation of at least 80% of the SWEL and to identify items for follow-up.

The agenda followed during the meetings included:

• Pre-Job Brief of the SWEL selection project" Discuss high-level approach to SWEL Development

" Review of preliminary Base List I for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #4 Sample Selection attributes o Select the SWEL I itemso Identify items for follow-up

• Review of preliminary Base List 2 for accuracy and completeness o Populate the Screen #3 Sample selection attributes o Select the SWEL 2 itemso Identify items for follow-up

• Identify any unit-to-unit considerations

• Summarize results* Summary post-job briefingA second meeting was held on July 17, 2012, to provide a presentation summarizing theWestinghouse/PVNGS team's selection methodology and conduct a second working session withPVNGS staff members to further refine the SWEL.The following personnel participated in these working sessions:

AttendeeChris WandellWinston BorreroJustin WoodJose (Angel) Delgadillo Randall (Gene) EimarRolando PerezDerek SeamanCompanyAPSAPSAPSAPSAPSWestinghouse Westinghouse PositionSenior Consulting Engineer (Civil)Senior Consulting Engineer (Mechanical)

Engineer (Modifications)

Auxiliary OperatorOperations Shift ManagerSWEL Development Lead (participated remotely via WebExl)SWEL Developer Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference 1, SSCs were selected in the following two groups:" SWEL 1 -A sample of items that safely shutdown the reactor and maintain containment integrity.

• SWEL 2 -A sample of spent fuel pool (SFP) related items, including items that could result in arapid drain-down of the SFP.The SWELs from these two groups were combined into a single SWEL for use during the SeismicWalkdowns and Area Walk-Bys.

The following sections discuss how the PVNGS-I SWEL selection process has met the objectives of theguidance of Reference 1, particularly as it relates to incorporating the appropriate variety of classes ofWebEx is a trademark or registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-4equipment, environments, primary and secondary

systems, new and replacement equipment, and otherelements discussed in Section 3 of Reference 1.3.2 SAMPLE OF REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE FIVE SAFETY FUNCTIONS The five safety functions include the four safe shutdown functions (reactor reactivity

control, reactorcoolant pressure

control, reactor coolant inventory

control, and decay heat removal, which includes theultimate heat sink), plus the containment functions.

The IPEEE (Reference

3) Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) was used as the starting point forcompiling a list (Base List 1) of the SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 1 selection process.

A listconsisting of 979 SSCs was assembled based on the following tables documented in Appendix 3.A ofReference 3:" Table 3A-I -Reactor Protection System SSEL (36 items)" Table 3A-2 -Support Systems SSEL (403 items)* Table 3A-3 -Required Instrumentation SSEL (72 items)* Table 3A-4 -Primary Auxiliary Feedwater SSEL (70 items)* Table 3A-5 -Secondary Auxiliary Feedwater SSEL (59 items)* Table 3A-6 -Atmospheric Dump Valves SSEL (72 items)* Table 3A-7 -Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray SSEL (42 items)* Table 3A-8 -Shutdown Cooling System SSEL (84 items)* Table 3A-9 -High Pressure Safety Injection SSEL (89 items)" Table 3A-10 -High Pressure Recirculation SSEL (52 items)A review of the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database (Reference

34) was thenperformed to expand the equipment list. Seismic Category I (SC-1) equipment that was considered in theSPRA, but not included in the IPEEE tables, was identified and added to the equipment list, resulting in atotal equipment count of 1236 items.Since the IPEEE applies to the three PVNGS Units, general EQIDs were used in the SSEL tables (i.e., theEQIDs presented therein do not show the Unit number, which is normally indicated by the first character of the EQID). In contrast, in the SPRA database, much of the equipment was identified by using the UnitI designation.

Therefore, all EQIDs in the list were converted to the Unit I designation.

Per the guidance provided in Section 3 of Reference 1, the process for selecting a sample of the SSCsassociated with the safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity must include thefollowing four screens:* Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:The purpose of Screen #1 is to restrict the scope of SSCs in the SWEL to those that are classified as SC-I. This is intended to comply with the request in the NRC 50.54(0 letter (Reference 50),under the "Requested Actions"

section, to "verify current plant configuration with the currentlicense basis."Out of 1236 SSCs initially considered, 1119 were retained by Screen #1 and subsequently passedto Screen #2.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-5" Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems:The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter out the SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirmthat their configuration continues to be consistent with the established plant licensing basis. Thetypes of SSCs that are excluded consist of SC-I Structures, Containment Penetrations, and SC-IPiping Systems.Manual valves, check valves, flow orifices, fire dampers, and relief valves were also excluded inaccordance with the guidance, since they are either considered in-line components or equipment that is regularly inspected.

Out of 1119 items coining in from Screen #1, 775 were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed to Screen #3.* Screen #3 -Support for the 5 Safety Functions:

The purpose of Screen #3 is to filter out the SSCs that do not support at least one of the following safety functions:

o Reactor reactivity controlo Reactor coolant pressure controlo Reactor coolant inventory controlo Decay heat removal, including the ultimate heat sinko Containment functionThe safety functions supported by each SSC exiting Screen #2 were determined in consultation with PVNGS staff members (Shift Manager/Auxiliary Operator) during the first set of meetings.

Out of 775 items coming in from Screen #2, 412 were retained by Screen #3 and subsequently passed to Screen #4. The list of equipment from Screen #3, entering Screen #4, is defined asBase List 1.* Screen #4 -Sample Considerations:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to narrow the Base List I candidate items to those of mostsignificance.

The PVNGS-1 SWEL 1 contains 1242 representative items from each of thefollowing sample selection attributes:

o A variety of types of systems:The PVNGS-1 Base List I equipment was categorized based on the third and fourthcharacters of their EQIDs, which identifies the plant system. There were 31 systemcategories contained in Base List 1. Table 3-1 shows how these system categories wererepresented in SWEL 1.2 The original SWEL I consisted of 125 items. One item was removed (IMCHEEO1) because it was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. See discussion in Section 3.4.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-6Table 3-1: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "System Type"Number of Items Number of Itemsin Base List I Selected for SWEL 1AF Auxiliary Feedwater 14 8CH Chemical and Volume Control 29 10 *CP Containment Purge 4 1CT Condensate Transfer and Storage 3 1DF Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer 1 0DG Diesel Generator 14 3EC HVAC Essential Chilled Water 8 4EW Essential Cooling Water 8 3GA Service Gas 1 0GR Gaseous Radwaste 2 1HA HVAC Auxiliary Building 4 1HC HVAC Containment Building 12 6HD HVAC Diesel Generator Building 4 2HJ HVAC Control Building 21 11IA Instrument and Service Air 1 0PB Class 1E 4.16 kv Power 3 1PE Class I E Standby Generation 2 1PG Class I E 480v Power Switchgear 6 3PH Class I E 480v Power Motor Control Center 8 4PK Class IE 125 VDC 20 9PN Class IE Instrument Power 12 6RC Reactor Coolant 16 9RD Radioactive Waste Drain 2 1RM Main Control Board 30 8SA Engineered Safety Features Actuation System I ISB Reactor Protection 14 1SG Main Steam 40 7SI Safety Injection 101 19SP Essential Spray Ponds 4 2ZA Auxiliary Building 6 0ZJ Control Building I I I* Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I System Type.Note that the DF (Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer),

GA (Service Gas), IA (Instrument andService Air), and ZA (Auxiliary Building) systems are not represented because theequipment types covered by each system are already well represented.

o Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications):

Major new and replacement equipment were identified through a review of either:1) Section 8 (System Design History) or 2)Section II (Change History),

of a selection ofthe major system DBMs (References 4 through 30). Recent modifications were assessedthrough consultation with PVNGS Operations and Design Engineering staff members.Additionally, System Health Reports were reviewed to ensure that recent modifications were captured and examined for potential impact. The participating PVNGS Operations staff members were asked to provide any information they felt the System Health Reportsmay not have touched upon. This was to address any recent modifications where 1)weight and/or the location of the center of gravity of the replacement are significantly WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-7different, or 2) design of the mounting and anchorage of the replacement is significantly different than the original, or 3) items within the zone of influence had to be reinstalled.

Based on this sampling consideration, 38 Base List I items were identified as havingmajor new or replacement modifications.

Of these, the 15 items shown in Table 3-2 wererepresented in SWEL 1.Table 3-2: Equipment Selected for SWEL Based on the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" Attribute Item Walkdown Description Major New or Replacement Equipment Equipment Modifications 115 I EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 Addition of relays. See Reference 6, p. 101Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 310 IJSIBUVO616 RC loop 2A isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed themotor operated actuators.

See Reference 30, p. 250.Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 312 IJSIBUVO626 RC loop 2B isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed themotor operated actuators.

See Reference 30, p. 250.Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. See11 IJAFBUVO034 SG-EOIA isolation valve Reference 4, p. 104.12 IJAFBUV0035 SG-E01 B isolation valve Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. SeeReference 4, p. 104.14 IJAFCUV0036 SG-E01A isolation valve Replaced actuator and yoke assembly on valves. SeeReference 4, p: 104.Relocated the motor operated valve from outside theRC loop I long-term recirc/SDC bioshield wall to the inside near the hot leg nozzle tovalve eliminate flow induced vibration in the line. SeeReference 30, p. 248.303 IMS1BPOI LPSI pump "B' LPSI pump shaft and mechanical seal retrofit.

SeeReference 30, p. 246.Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 313 IJSIBUVO636 RC loop IA isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed themotor operated actuators.

See Reference 30, p. 250.Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 314 IJSIBUVO646 RC loop I B isolation valve valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed themotor operated actuators.

See Reference 30, p. 250.50 I MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake filter Modified hangers.

See Reference 6, p. 104.222 IJSGBUVOI30 SG-EO1A isolation valve Lock nut screw replaced.

See Reference 29, p. 154223 IJSGBUVO035 SG-EOIB isolation valve Lock nut screw replaced.

See Reference 29, p. 154Added pressure relieving spring check valves. See319 IJSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SDC isolation valveRernc30p.28 Reference 30, p. 248.Modified the HPSI throttle valves and miniflow isolating 321 IJSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc iso (closes on valves from rising/rotating stem valves and changed theRAS) motor operated actuators.

See Reference 30, p. 250.o A variety of types of equipment:

The Base List 1 items were each assigned to one of the 22 classes of equipment listed inAppendix B of Reference

1. Table 3-3 shows how these classes were represented inSWEL 1. Two classes, compressors and motor generators, were not represented becausethere are no SC-I equipment in these categories.

Additionally, the transformers that areSC-I were considered part of the larger equipment typically represented as switchgear ormotor control centers (MCCs). Thus, this classification is not individually represented inSWEL 1.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-8Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Equipment Type Number"Equipment Type Number of Items Number of ItemsNumer Description nuBe of I Selected forNumber in Base List 1 SESWEL I0 Miscellaneous 13 61 Motor Control Centers 13 62 Low-Voltage Switchgear 12 43 Medium-Voltage Switchgear 214 Transformers 0 05 Horizontal Pumps 11 56 Vertical Pumps 8 47 Fluid-Operated Valves 23 108 Motor-Operated Valves, Solenoid-Operated Valves 115 319 Fans 8 410 Air Handlers 10 411 Chillers 112 Air Compressors 0 013 Motor Generators 0 014 Distribution Panels 41 515 Batteries on Racks 4 216 Battery Chargers and Inverters 12 517 Engine Generators 2 118 Instruments on Racks 74 1619 Temperature Sensors 3 220 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 39 921 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 20 8 ** Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I Equipment Type Number.o A variety of environments:

Since the site is located in a dry environment, typical of a desert climate, it was decidedto identify the equipment operating environments based on its location either "inside"(i.e., inside an equipment room) or "outside" (i.e., outdoors) and based on the normalmaximum design temperature of the corresponding equipment environment.

Thesedesign temperatures were determined from a review of Appendix A of the Equipment Qualification Program Manual (Reference

31) and Section 9.4 of the Updated FinalSafety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Reference 32). Based on this review, seven categories of equipment operating environments were identified.

Table 3-4 shows how theseequipment operating environments were represented in SWEL 1.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-9Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List I Data and Selected SWEL Items Based on "Environment (Temperature)"

Temperature Number of Items Number of Items(OF) in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 180 142 (All inside) 47 (All inside)104 150 (All inside) 42 (All inside)113 8 (2 inside and 6 outside) 3 (All outside)120 62 (All inside) 17 * (All inside)122 4 (All outside) 2 (All outside)124 18 (All inside) 5 (All inside)140 28 (All inside) 8 (All inside)* Refer to Section 3.4 for explanation of change to SWEL I Environment list.o Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program:Based on a review of the IPEEE report (Reference 3), there were no Unit I seismicvulnerabilities identified.

However, the IPEEE report states that a limited number ofactions were taken to improve plant seismic capacity; no specific actions other than aUnit 3 example were provided, e.g., the anchorage on the bookcases located behind thecontrol cabinets in Unit 3 was improved to reduce the possibility that the cabinets wouldbe impacted during a seismic event.The following additional considerations were factored into the SWEL 1 selection process:o Numerical measures of risk importance:

The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) derived from the Internal Events PRA model(Reference

33) was compiled for the Base List 1 items to determine potentially risk-significant SSCs. Items with a RAW value greater than 2 were considered of "high" riskimportance.

There were 70 items of high risk importance in Base List 1; 26 wereselected for SWEL 1.o Protected train restrictions during the walkdown week:The protected train schedules

[PVNGS "Work Week Schedule"]

during the PVNGS-1walkdown dates (from July 30, 2012, through August 3, 2012) were reviewed so thatinaccessible items could be identified and deferred from SWEL 1. Of the 124 itemsselected for SWEL 1, 2 items were expected to be inaccessible due to protected trainrestrictions (see Appendix G, Table G-2, Items, 33 and 102). Their walkdowns weredeferred to PVNGS refueling outage 1RI 7, performed in spring 2013.3.2.1 Base List 1The list of equipment retained by Screen #3 (and subsequently entering Screen #4) is defined as Base ListI and is summarized in Appendix G, Table G-1.3.2.2 SWEL 1The list of equipment retained by Screen #4 is defined as SWEL I and is summarized in Appendix G,Table G-2.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-103.3 SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RELATED ITEMSThe starting point for compiling a list of the SFP-related SSCs to be considered in the SWEL 2 selection process was a review of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System DBM (Reference

35) and itsassociated drawings (References 36 through 40). This review identified fifteen SC-1 components.

Eleven additional components were later identified (during the first set of meetings) based on a systemreview.Per the guidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1, the process for selecting a sample of the SSCsassociated with the SFP includes the following four screens:" Screen #1 -Seismic Category I:The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #1 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #1 of SWEL 1. The purpose of Screen #1 is to limit the items to those that havea seismic licensing basis.All SSCs initially considered for SWEL 2 (26 items) were passed from Screen #1 to Screen #2." Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems:The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #2 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #2 of SWEL 1. Screen #2 considers only those items associated with the SFPthat are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process.

The purpose of Screen #2 is to filter outthe SSCs that regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to beconsistent with the established plant licensing basis.Of the 26 items retained by Screen #1, 6 were retained by Screen #2 and subsequently passed onto Screen #3." Screen #3 -Sample Considerations:

The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List2.The process for selecting SFP-related SSCs using Screen #3 is similar to the process described earlier for Screen #4 of SWEL 1. The purpose of Screen #3 is to narrow the Base List 2candidate items to those of most significance, considering the following sample selection attributes:

o A variety of types of systemso Major new and replacement equipment (including recent modifications) o A variety of types of equipment o A variety of environments Since there were only six items associated with the SFP., all items contained in Base List 2 wereselected for input to SWEL 2.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-11Screen #4 -Rapid Drain-Down:

The purpose of Screen #4 is to identify items that could allow the SFP to drain rapidly.

Per theguidance established in Section 3 of Reference 1, the SSCs considered are not limited to SC-Iitems. Any items identified as having the potential for rapidly draining the SFP should beconsidered.

The Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference

1) specifies the following on page 3-8:"Determine whether there are SFP penetrations below about 10 feet above the top of the fuelassemblies.

If there are no such penetrations, then no rapid drain-down items would beadded to SWEL 2."UFSAR (Reference

32) SeCtion 9.1.3.3.1.1.1, pages 9.1-35 and 9.1-36, states the following:

"If a pipe break were to occur in the Seismic Category I/quality portion of the system, poolcooling could be lost. However, the event would be self-limiting as all pipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water levels for spent fuelshielding of l Oft as required by Regulatory Guide 1.13. All pipes extending down into thepool have siphon breaker holes at or above the minimum required water level. Under theseconditions, sufficient time (longer than 30 minutes) is available to isolate the break andrecover the minimum level required for start of the pool cooling system. If the spent fuel poolclean up system is aligned with the refueling pool (drain valves),

administrative procedures are in place to identif, locate and isolate a pipe break within the containment in a timelymanner."The first two sentences of this UFSAR excerpt deal with the possibility of losing SFP waterinventory following a pipe break. The next two sentences deal with how quickly the Fuel PoolCooling and Cleanup System can be restored following a pipe break and are not pertinent to rapiddrain-down.

Based on this documentation, there are no rapid drain-down items for input to SWEL 2.A review of the SFP and its relationship to the adjacent fuel transfer canal and cask load pit wasconducted to ensure that a* rapid drain-down could not occur via a loss of gate seal integrity.

Asystem review showed that the bottom of the fuel transfer canal gate and cask load pit gate invertare 3-1/2 inches below the top of the spent fuel racks. Although a loss of these gate seals wouldresult in flooding of the cask load pit and the fuel transfer canal, it would not result in a waterlevel less than 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

This is due to the relatively smallvolume of the fuel transfer canal and cask load pit. The fuel transfer tube within the fuel transfercanal was also considered since it provides an isolation path to the reactor cavity. The fueltransfer tube seal, canal isolation valve PPCNV1 18, and quick-operating closure deviceMPCEMOIA are SC-I items considered part of the SFP structure assessed by analysis andperiodic inspections and were therefore excluded from SWEL 2. Drainage from the cask load pitto the decontamination pit would be limited because the bottom of the decontamination gateinvert is 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

Although a rapid drain-down threatassociated with the gate seal system was not found, the instrument air supply system to the SFPgate was included in the Area Walk-By.WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-123.3.1 Base List 2The equipment retained by Screen #2 and subsequently entering Screen #3 is defined as Base List 2 and issummarized in Appendix G, Table G-3.3.3.2 Rapid Drain-Down SWEL 2 is augmented by the equipment that could potentially cause the SFP to drain rapidly (theequipment retained by Screen #4). As discussed

earlier, there are no rapid drain-down items for input tothe PVNGS-1 SWEL 2.3.3.3 SWEL 2SWEL 2 is defined as the list of equipment retained by Screen #3 plus the equipment retained by Screen#4. As discussed

earlier, Screen #3 was not utilized because all 6 items contained in Base List 2 wereselected for input into SWEL 2. In addition, there was no equipment associated with rapid drain-down.

Therefore, SWEL 2 is the same as Base List 2 (summarized in Appendix G, Table G-3).WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-133.4 INACCESSIBLE ITEMSThe equipment items that were inaccessible during the scheduled PVNGS-1 at-power walkdown dates(from July 30, 2012, through August 3, 2012) are identified in Table 3-5. The guidance allows for itemsto be deferred to a later date if inspection poses a safety concern.

Items with electrical safety challenges or items within containment were deferred to ensure safety when inspecting.

The items in Table 3-5 weresubsequently walked down during and following PVNGS refueling outage 1 R17.Table 3-5: PVNGS-I Equipment Inaccessible During the Scheduled At-Power Walkdowns SWEL I Walkdown Equipment Item Equipment Description LocationNumber14 1MCHEEO1 Regenerative heat exchanger CTMT15 I JCHEHV0239 Charging line to reactor coolant loop 2A isolation globe valve CTMT20 I JCPBUVO005A Containment power access purge supply isolation butterfly damper CTMT36 IJHCBUVO044 Discharge sampling from RU-I containment isolation valve CTMT37 IJHCBUVO047 Inlet sampling to RU-I containment isolation valve CTMT53 1EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL55 1 EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL56 1 EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL77 IJRCBHVO105 Pressurizer and reactor vessel head vent to reactor drain tank globe valve CTMT78 IJRCBHVO108 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe valve CTMT79 I JRCBHV0109 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe valve CTMT80 1JRCBPT0102B Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS)

CTMT81 IJRCBPTI04 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT84 1JRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT85 IJRCNTE1OI Pressurizer temperature CTMT101 IJSGCLT1 I 13C SG-EOIA WR level (required for AFAS) CTMT102 IJSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long-term recirc/SDC valve CTMT108 1JSIBPSV189 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump CTMT109 IJSIBUVO614 Safety injection tank 2A discharge isolation globe valve CTMT111 1 JSIBUVO624 Safety injection tank 2B discharge isolation globe valve CTMT120 IJSINPT391 HPSI long-term recirc loop I pressure xmtr CTMTItem 1MCHEEO1 was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area. For radiological safety considerations, it was decided to remove this component from SWEL 1. A new item was not selected to replace this itemfor the following reasons:* This item belongs to system type CH. The removal of this item reduced the number of CH itemsin SWEL 1 from II to 10 (see Table 3-1), which is still a good representation of this system type.* This item was not identified as having major new or replacement modifications (see Table 3-2).Therefore, the removal of this item from SWEL 1 had no effect on the representation ofequipment having major new or replacement modifications.

• IMCHEEOI belongs to equipment type 21. The removal of this item from SWEL I reduced thenumber of type 21 items from 9 to 8 (see Table 3-3), which is still a good representations of theequipment type.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-14* IMCHEE01 is assigned a maximum environment temperature of 1200F. The removal of thisitem reduced the number of "1200F items" in SWEL 1 from 18 to 17 (see Table 3-4), which isstill a good representation of the environment temperature type.0 IMCHEEOI is not a risk-significant SSC. Therefore, the removal of this item from SWEL I hadno effect on the representation of high-risk-importance items in SWEL 1.Following the completion of the Unit I at-power walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRCstaff had clarified a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 15 electrical cabinets per FAQ 4.20 were conducted during the follow-on walkdowns.

The list of electrical cabinets that require supplemental inspection is included in Table 3-6.Table 3-6: PVNGS-I FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections SWEL1 Walkdown Description Equipment Item Equipment LocationNumber58 IEPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 CTRL59 IEPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 AUX60 I EPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 AUX61 IEPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 AUX65 1 EPKBM42 DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL68 1EPKCM43 3 DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRL57 IEPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL94 IJSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUXI EPKBD22 (ROB to62 I EPKBM42)

LC 34 control power CTRLI EPKCD23 4 (ROB to66 1EPKCM43) DC distribution panel D23 CTRL124 IJSABCOI B Train ESFAS relay cabinets CTRL64 1EPKBH 12 Battery charger "B" CTRL69 1EPKCN43 Inverter for shutdown cooling isolation valve CTRL69____ IEPKCN43_______

IJSICUV653 C__ICTRL1EPKCM43 was inaccessible during 1RI 7 and was therefore replaced with 1EPKDM44, which was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.S1EPKCD23 was inaccessible during I RI 7 and was therefore replaced with I EPKDD24, which was inspected tosatisfy FAQ 4.20.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-15Table 3-6: PVNGS-1 FAQ 4.20 Supplemental Cabinet Inspections (Continued)

SWELI Walkdown Description Equipment Item Equipment LocationNumber70 I EPKDN44 Inverter for I JSIDUV654 shutdown cooling B return inside CTRLcontainment isolation valve75 1EPNCN 13 5 DC/AC inverter "C" CTRLThe inaccessible equipment walkdowns performed during refueling outage I R 17 are summarized in Table3-7. Since Train C was protected during refueling outage I R17, Train C electrical components weresubstituted with their counterpart from Train D. Table 3-7 indicates equipment substitutions.

Table 3-7: PVNGS-1 Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage IR17SWEL I Walkdown Equipment Item Equipment Description LocationNumber15 1JCHEHV0239 Charging line to reactor coolant loop 2A CTMTisolation globe valve20 IJCPBUVO005A Containment power access purge supply CTMTisolation butterfly damper36 IJHCBUVO044 Discharge sampling from RU-I CTMTcontainment isolation valve37 Inlet sampling to RU-I containment CTMT37 JHCBUV0047 isolation valve53 I EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL55 1EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL56 I EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL77 IJRCBHV0105 Pressurizer and reactor vessel head vent to CTMTreactor drain tank globe valve78 I JRCBHV0108 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe CTMTvalve79 IJRCBHV0109 Pressurizer vent to reactor drain tank globe CTMTvalve80 IJRCBPT0102B Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS)

CTMT57 I EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL58 1EPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 CTRL59 1EPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 AUX60 I EPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 AUX61 1EPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 AUX62 I EPKBD22 LC 34 control power CTRL64 1EPKBH 12 Battery charger "B" CTRL5 I EPNCN13 was inaccessible during I RI 7 and was therefore replaced with 1EPNDNI4, which was inspected tosatisfy FAQ 4.20.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 3-16Table 3-7: PVNGS-I Equipment Inspected During Refueling Outage I R17 (Continued)

SWEL I Walkdown Equipment Item Equipment Description LocationNumber Lcto65 1 EPKBM42 DC power to TCB1 control circuit CTRLIEPKCD23 was inaccessible during I R17 and66 was therefore replaced with 1 EPKDD24, which DC distribution panel D24 CTRLwas inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.1EPKCM43 was inaccessible during 1R 17 and68 was therefore replaced with 1 EPKDM44, DC power to TCB I control circuit CTRLwhich was inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.Inverter for 1JSIDUV654 shutdown70 I EPKDN44 cooling B return inside containment CTRLisolation valveIEPNCNI3 was inaccessible during 1R17 and DC/AC inverter "D"75 was therefore replaced with IEPNDN 14, which CTRLwas inspected to satisfy FAQ 4.20.81 IJRCBPTI04 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT84 IJRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure interlock CTMT85 IJRCNTEIOI Pressurizer temperature CTMT94 IJSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUX101 1JSGCLT1 I 13C SG-EOIA WR level (required for AFAS) CTMT102 IJSIAUV0651 RC loop I long-term recirc/SDC valve CTMT108 1JSIBPSVI89 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump CTMT109 IJSIBUVO614 Safety injection tank 2A discharge CTMTisolation globe valveIII IJSIBUVO624 Safety injection tank 2B discharge isolation CTMT111____ 1JSIBUV0624___globe valve CTMT120 IJSINPT391 HPSI long-term recirc loop 1 pressure xmtr CTMT124 IJSABC0I B train ESFAS relay cabinets CTRLThe equipment that could not be inspected during refueling outage lR17 is identified in Table 3-8. Thewalkdown of this equipment was completed on April 30, 2013.Table 3-8: PVNGS-1 Item Completed During the April 30, 2013, Inspection All required and supplemental inspections are complete.

Inspection results are documented on thecorresponding Seismic Walkdown checklist in Appendix A.WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-14. SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS4.1 BACKGROUND Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were performed in accordance with the requirements of Section4 of EPRI TR- 1025286 (Reference 1). The walkdowns were conducted by the SWT, consisting of thetwo SWEs mentioned in Section 2.2. Members of PVNGS Operations and Engineering provided supportduring all walkdowns.

The SWEs utilized engineering judgment based upon experience and trainingindicated in Section 2.2, supplemented by existing current licensing basis (CLB) plant documentation andanalyses, where applicable, to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions.

For items on the SWEL,these potential seismic conditions-included any adverse anchorage conditions, adverse seismic spatialinteractions, or other adverse seismic conditions.

The results of the walkdown and any pertinent observations were documented for each item on the SWEL using the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) included in Appendix A. In addition to potentially adverse seismic conditions, observations described in the SWCs include those that, after discussion between the SWEs, were determined to beadequate.

Area Walk-Bys were conducted by the SWT in each area of the plant that contained an item on theSWEL. The Area Walk-Bys identified potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCslocated in the vicinity of the SWEL item (up to a maximum radius of 35 ft from the component).

Thearea examinations identified:

1) adverse anchorage conditions,

2) degraded equipment in the area,3) potential seismic spatial interactions,

4) adverse cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting,5) potential flooding/spray or fire hazards, and 6) other adverse housekeeping conditions.

The results ofthe walk-bys and any pertinent observations were documented for each inspected area using Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs), which are included in Appendix B. Observations described on the AWCs includepotentially adverse seismic conditions as well as conditions that were discussed and determined to beadequate at that time.The SWT was assisted by other individuals present on the walkdown, including PVNGS Operations andEngineering personnel.

The SWT for PVNGS Unit I initial walkdowns consisted of Hunter Young andTimothy Nealon of S&A. For supplemental walkdowns during refueling outage IR17, the SWTconsisted of Hunter Young and Cory Figliolini.

Chris Wandell and Winston Borrero led the support fromPVNGS for walkdowns as well as the interface with plant operators.

Additional PVNGS staff facilitated access to equipment and provided additional information regarding plant procedures and functions ofSWEL items. In addition, these individuals assisted in identifying nearby equipment and systems thatcould cause adverse seismic interaction.

Any issue that could not be resolved by consensus of the SWEsduring the walkdowns was identified as a potentially adverse seismic condition on the SWC or AWC (asapplicable).

The conditions identified were evaluated with respect to the CLB. These Licensing BasisEvaluations are listed and described in Appendix D.WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS-1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-24.2 PREPARATION FOR SEISMIC WALKDOWNS In preparation for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, the SWT obtained the SWEL and selected50% of the items (excluding line-mounted equipment) for anchorage configuration verification.

A totalof 76 components were identified as potential anchorage verification candidates and 40 were randomlychosen to fulfill the 50% anchorage configuration verification requirement.

The selection was adjusted toconsider equipment of interest identified by PVNGS, including items that had recent modifications oranchorage changes.

PVNGS design drawings, seismic qualification calculations, and vendor/supplier documents (SDOCs) were reviewed and later taken to the field to verify as-installed configurations wereconsistent with the CLB established by these documents.

The SWT also obtained PVNGS equipment layout drawings to establish a detailed walkdown schedule.

To prepare for observations involving potential interaction with masonry block walls, the SWT reviewedthe equipment layout drawings associated with the SWEL and located masonry walls in proximity.

TheControl Building 74 ft, 100 ft, and 140 ft elevations, in addition to the Auxiliary Building sub-100 ftelevations, were found to have block walls adjacent to SWEL items and Area Walk-By items. The SWTobtained and reviewed calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0120 (Reference

60) for Control Building masonry wallsand 13-CC-ZA-0140 (Reference

61) for Auxiliary Building masonry walls. The calculations indicate thatall in-scope walls were designed and analyzed to not collapse under SSE accelerations, which enabled theSWT to conclude that the SWEL items were free of seismic spatial interaction due to a postulated masonry block wall collapse.

The SWT assessed SWEL and Area Walk-By equipment for seismic spatialinteraction due to differential movement between the equipment and the masonry block walls.In anticipation of potential flooding/spray interaction hazards due to threaded fire piping, the SWTobtained fire suppression diagrams provided within the IPEEE Report (Reference 3). These diagramswere later used in the field for Area Walk-Bys to determine whether threaded fire piping, where present,was normally wet or pre-actuated and dry. Preliminary review of the fire suppression diagrams indicated that areas with threaded fire piping are generally pre-activated sprinkler systems and therefore arenormally dry, thus precluding potential flooding/spray interaction hazards.

However, the SWT wascognizant of exceptions where threaded piping could be normally wet. For these cases, the SWT wouldlook for long spans with flexible

supports, which may lead to excessive threaded joint rotation andpotential spray.Additional current licensing basis documentation obtained and reviewed to support the walkdowns included:

the in-structure floor response spectra for the SSE (DBM-C5, Reference 53), structural dampingcriteria per UFSAR Table 3.7-1 (Reference 32), the PVNGS scaffolding procedure and installation specifications (30DP-9WPll and 13-CN-0380, References 54 and 55), the PVNGS housekeeping procedure (30DP-OWM12, Reference 56), the PVNGS transient material details and analyses (13-A-ZYD-0034 and 13-CC-ZZ-0309, References 57 and 58), the PVNGS lighting details (13-E-ZAL-001 1,Reference 59), and the control room ceiling qualification (Log No. 13-10407-A216-12, Reference 65).The PVNGS IPEEE Report (Reference

3) was also obtained and reviewed.

This document is discussed infurther detail in Section 7.WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-34.3 WALKDOWN RESULTSThe SWT conducted the initial Seismic Walkdowns for Unit I at PVNGS July 30, 2012, through August2, 2012. For components not originally inspected due to having either inaccessible internal anchorages, being located inside containment, or requiring additional interior inspection related to FAQ 4.20.additional walkdowns were conducted during refueling outage 1R17 on April 6, 2013, through April 7,2013, and during follow-on inspections performed on April 30, 2013. Detailed walkdown results areprovided on the SWCs and AWCs in Appendices A and B, respectively.

When walkdown activities identified potentially adverse seismic conditions, licensing basis evaluations were performed and arediscussed in Section 5 and Appendix D. Appendix D provides additional information on the resolution and Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments of each of these conditions.

A summary ofinitial walkdown statistics follows:" A total of 133 components were walked down and 59 Area Walk-Bys were performed.

Six itemslisted on the SWEL (IEPKBD22,

1EPKDD24, 1EPKCD23,

IJRMBB02, IJRMBB04`

and1JRMCB05) were child components contained within parent SWEL components.

These childcomponents are referred

• to as "Rule of the Box" (ROB) items, for which the walkdownobservations are identical to those of the parent item.* Fifteen (15) SWEL components were electrical cabinets whose interiors were not completely examined during the initial walkdowns.

Following the completion of the at-power SeismicWalkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified under FAQ 4.20 aposition on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 15 electrical cabinets occurred on April 6, April 7, and April 30,2013. The list of electrical cabinets requiring supplemental inspection per FAQ 4.20 is includedin Section 3.4. Three (3) SWEL electrical cabinets originally inspected during at-powerwalkdowns were inaccessible during the supplemental inspections due to the plant protected train(refer to Table 3-7, Items 66, 68, and 75). To fulfill the recommendations of FAQ 4.20, sistercomponents for these cabinets on the opposite train were fully inspected-including the cabinetinteriors-and documented on SWCs." One-hundred-one (101) components and forty-nine (49) Area Walk-Bys were resolved in thefield as having no potentially adverse seismic concerns.

Two Area Walk-Bys were confirmed inthe field to have potentially adverse seismic concerns involving seismic housekeeping.

Inaddition, the door to distribution panel IEPNBD26 was found unlatched and confirmed in thefield as a potentially adverse seismic concern.* Forty-five (45) observation's for thirty-one (31) SWEL components and nine (9) Area Walk-Byscould not be readily resolved by the consensus of the SWEs and were considered potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation.

It is important to note that some SWELcomponents or Area Walk-Bys may have multiple potentially adverse conditions that involveanchorage, spatial interaction, or other adverse concerns.

Twenty-four (24) of the 45observations requiring further review involved potential anchorage concerns; 17 involvedpotential seismic spatial interaction concerns; and four involved spray/flooding hazards.

Thirty-eight (38) of the 45 potentially adverse conditions were determined to meet the current seismiclicensing basis. Seven (7) conditions could not be readily resolved per the Licensing BasisEvaluation process and were entered into the CAP. All 45 Licensing Basis Evaluation items arediscussed in Section 5 and Appendix D, which includes additional information on the currentstatus of potentially non-conforming conditions.

Summaries of Seismic Walkdown observations follow:WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-4Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions While inspecting anchorages for SWEL equipment and in-scope Area Walk-By equipment, the SWTnoted 24 cases where as-installed configurations could not be verified by the PVNGS documentation brought in the field (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations).

Discrepancies included:

exceeded boltprojection

lengths, varying equipment pad thicknesses for mechanical components, varying weld patternsfor electrical equipment, and varying anchorage spacing.

Detailed descriptions of these discrepancies arealso indicated in Appendix D. To a limited extent, Field Change Requests (FCRs) and Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) associated with the anchorage documentation that could verify the as-installed configurations were reviewed as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

Three potentially degraded anchorage conditions were observed in the field that required furtherevaluation.

Both the EW "B" Heat Exchanger (IMEWBE01) and the Fuel Pool Cooling HeatExchanger 2 (IMPCBEOI) were noted to have loose anchor bolt nuts which may potentially reduce thebolts' uplift capacities.

The SWT noted the observations as potentially adverse and sought documentation allowing for backed off nuts as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

The SWT also observed hairlinetemperature and shrinkage cracking on the equipment pad for the ESF Switchgear Room "B" Emergency Air Handling Unit (AHU) (IMHJBZ03).

The concern is that the anchorage may have reduced capacity ifthe equipment pad is not properly reinforced.

The SWT noted the observation as potentially adverse andsought documentation indicating proper pad reinforcement as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

The SWT observed no indications of reinforcement yielding and no signs of excessive corrosion for in-scope safety-related equipment.

All cracks observed were noted to be hairline or small cracks (less than0.03 inch) as defined in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 47).Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions The SWT noted seventeen (17) SWEL components or areas where equipment had potential adverseseismic spatial interactions that required further evaluation.

Ten (10) involved potential equipment spatialinteraction with nearby permanent equipment due to potentially insufficient clearances.

For valves1JSGBHVI78 and IJSGBHV185, the SWT observed 1/16 inch clearances between potentially sensitive valve body components and separately structurally mounted components that could potentially interactdue to differential motion during an SSE event. In the Area Walk-By for MSSS Room C-302, the SWTnoted a flexible conduit pinched between 1JSGEUVOI70 (MSIV) and building steel. ValvesI JGRBUVO02 and l JWCAUV0062 (refer to AWC AUX A-A09) in addition to dampers 1MHJBM02 and1MHJBM03 were also observed to have small clearances to permanent equipment.

Electrical components with potentially insufficient clearances to permanent equipment included MCC 1 EPKBM42,auxiliary relay cabinets 1JZABCOI/C02/C03/C04/C05 (refer to AWC AUX A-127), and 1JSABC06

/IJSABC04

/ IJZJBC02A

/ IJESACO1

/ 1JSHCC02 (refer to AWC CTRL Outer Horseshoe).

All ten (10)interaction concerns due to potentially insufficient clearances were documented for further review underLicensing Basis Evaluations.

Two (2) SWEL components or areas involved potential adverse seismic spatial interactions due tooverhead items. IMPCAPOI and other safety-related components in the area (refer to AWC DG G-104)are within the zone of influence of large, flat panel lighting mounted overhead should they fail in aseismic event. Documentation detailing the anchorage of these lights was sought as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

The SWT inspected overhead piping and distribution systems including cable trays and found them well-anchored and ruggedly supported throughout the unit. Large fire extinguishers on small hooks that couldWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-5possibly uplift and fall were found throughout the unit, but no safety-related equipment items were withinfire extinguisher zone of influence.

Overhead lighting was also noted to be rugged in all areas withsensitive equipment, particularly the Control Building.

Where equipment is less sensitive to impact,several instances of lighting fixtures supported by S-hooks with disengaged or missing setscrews wereobserved.

The SWT judged all cases not to be hazardous to safety-related equipment, but the conditions were noted and documented in the CAP.All attached lines and piping to SWEL equipment were inspected and readily concluded to have adequateflexibility in the field. One exception was noted on the EW "B" Heat Exchanger (IMEWBE01) wherethe relief line on top may be subjected to overstress due to differential motion between floors. Thisobservation was noted for further review under Licensing Basis Evaluations.

As noted in Section 4.2, all SWEL components and Area Walk-By equipment within the zone ofinfluence of masonry block walls were evaluated prior to walkdowns not to be impact hazards due tocollapse per existing calculations.

No seismic spatial interaction hazards due to differential movementbetween the equipment and the masonry block walls were observed during the walkdowns.

All scaffolding encountered by the SWT was found to be adequately braced and anchored in addition tohaving sufficient clearances to safety-related equipment in accordance with station procedures.

Several housekeeping issues were discovered within the unit. Two housekeeping issues were confirmed as found in the field by the SWT to be potentially adverse seismic conditions.

A large waste bin locatedapproximately 12" from a safety-related J-box (IEZFI AAKJO1) was observed during the Area Walk-Byof the 100' Elevation of the Fuel Building near the Fuel Building AHUs. The condition was immediately corrected by PVNGS Operations and documented under Palo Verde Action Request (PVAR) 4221593.The SWT also noted laydown equipment stored in proximity to safety-related HVAC duct on the 140'elevation of the Fuel Building (refer to AWC FB 140). The condition was also documented under PVAR4221593.

Housekeeping issues that were found in violation of the housekeeping procedure (Reference

56) were entered into the CAP.Detailed descriptions of all potentially adverse seismic spatial interaction concerns are provided inAppendix D.Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions The SWT observed an unlatched door on distribution panel IEPNBD26, which contained an undervoltage relay and ground relay inside although not on the door. The condition was corrected immediately anddocumented under PVAR 4219492.

The SWT did not note any other degraded conditions, missingequipment fasteners, or irregular mountings on equipment.

Potential Flooding/Spray HazardsThe SWT was cognizant of potential spray and flooding hazards particularly from threaded fire piping.Overhead fire piping was generally found to be welded and ruggedly supported (no rod hung piping) atshort and regular intervals.

Areas that had threaded piping were either confirmed to be pre-activated andtherefore normally dry or have adequate rigid support spacing so as to preclude excessive joint rotation.

One SWEL item and three Area Walk-Bys were observed by the SWT to have potential spray hazardsthat required additional review as part of Licensing Basis Evaluations.

ESF Switchgear Room "B"Emergency AHU (1MHJBZ03, also refer to AWC CTRL J-A05) was observed to be in proximity of aleaking solder joint on the domestic service (DS) water piping north of the AHU. The Area Walk-By forthe "B" Diesel Generator Room (refer to AWC DG G-104) was observed to have DS piping within thezone of influence of heavy heaters and lights overhead should they fall during a seismic event. The AreaWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 4-6Walk-By associated with Reactor Trip Breaker "B" (refer to AWC AUX A-227) was observed to havelarge air handlers on vibration mounts. The concern is that the AHUs could fall off their mounts,allowing their pipe connections to break, flood the area, and open the reactor trip breakers.

Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically induced fire interactions were noted for Unit I by the SWT. This included noobservations of hazardous/flammable material stored in inadequately anchored drums, inadequately anchored

shelves, or unlocked cabinets; and no adverse natural gas or hydrogen lines.Non-NTTF 2.3 Related Observations The SWT (including PVNGS Operator and Engineering SWEs) were also cognizant of issues notnecessarily pertaining to the seismic qualification of safety-related equipment.

The SWT noted conditions such as:" Broken/missing floor grating clips* Missing or partially-engaged set-screws on pendant lighting S-hooks* Support showing wear from seal water tubing to charging pump" NQR junction box with panel nut not installed

• General housekeeping issues such as:o Squeegee stored near AHUo Step ladder near surge tankNon-NTTF 2.3 observations were recorded on the SWCs/AWCs and entered into the PVNGS CAP.Many of these conditions were also corrected on-the-spot by the operations member of the SWT. None ofthese observations (by definition) represented potentially adverse seismic conditions

-fasteners werelocated on non-seismic components; lighting and loose or unsecured items were not within the zone ofinfluence of any soft targets.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 5-15. LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS The 45 potentially adverse seismic conditions requiring further evaluation identified in either theequipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys as discussed in Section 4 were evaluated withrespect to their seismic licensing basis. As indicated in Section 4.3, 24 of the 45 items requiring furtherreview involved potential anchorage concerns; 17 involved potential seismic spatial interaction concerns; and four involved spray/flooding hazards.

These potentially adverse conditions are included in AppendixD, along with their dispositions.

Thirty-eight (38) of the 45 potentially adverse conditions weredetermined to meet their seismic licensing basis. The seven (7) NTTF status "N" potentially adverseseismic conditions that could not readily be shown to meet the current seismic licensing basis wereentered into the site's CAP. For each of the items that fell into this category, the PVAR number isincluded in the disposition text, which is shown in Appendix D. Additional information pertaining to thecurrent resolution and Operability Determinations/Functional Assessments of these items is included inAppendix D.General methodologies adopted by the Licensing Basis Reviewers listed in Section 2.3 for addressing theobservations noted in Section 4 are summarized in the following subsections.

Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Anchorage Conditions For the anchorage observations noted in Section 4 that involved discrepancies between the as-installed configurations and the anchorage documentation (drawings, SDOCs, and calculations) taken into thefield, the Licensing Basis Reviewers collected and reviewed FCRs and NCRs for updates to the fielddocuments that represent the Current Licensing Basis (CLB). Eighteen (18) as-installed anchorage configurations were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. Five (5) as-installed anchorage configurations for SWEL components

IMHFAJOI, IMHFBJ01,

IMPCAE01, IMECBE01, andIMPCBE01 could not be readily shown to reflect CLB documentation, and therefore were entered intothe CAP and indicated as potentially non-conforming conditions by the listing of "No" under Question 5of the SWCs. The two potentially degraded conditions involving backed off nuts for IMEWBE01 and1MPCBE01 were confirmed not to have documentation allowing for gaps. Therefore, these items wereentered into the CAP and indicated as non-conforming conditions by the listing of "No" under Question 2of the SWCs.Evaluations of Potentially Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions Observations involving the possibility of insufficient clearances between safety-related components weregenerally resolved by estimating relative displacement from the in-structure response spectra of Reference

53. Given equipment anchorage and spatial configuration, the Licensing Basis Reviewers determined lower-bound estimates of component frequencies.

These frequency estimates along with the appropriate damping values from UFSAR Table 3.7-1 (Reference

32) were used to obtain spectral accelerations.

Component displacement was then estimated by the following formula (Reference 63):inS,

• 386. 4 nS 2d=SF* o

• 2)Where SF = modal shape factor (1.6 for cantilever)

S, = spectral acceleration (g) from response spectra6) = fundamental frequency (Hz)WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 5-2If the combinations of component displacements under SSE loadings did not exceed the gap noted in thewalkdown, the gap was noted as sufficient to preclude impact.In some instances, licensing basis evaluations of potential spatial interactions were resolved by inspection of installation details and existing analyses.

This disposition method was applied for the auxiliary relaycabinets located 1/8-inch from concrete walls. The Licensing Basis Reviewers located EQCF D95-0038(Reference 65), which documents that the auxiliary relay cabinets were analyzed by finite elementmethodology and determined to be rigid. Therefore, the 1/8-inch as-built gap was noted as sufficient.

All but one of the potential spatial interaction concerns were determined to meet their seismic licensing basis. Storage of material near a SC-I duct in Area FUEL 140 ft. which could potentially impact the ductwas immediately corrected.

The condition was entered into the CAP and indicated as a non-conforming condition by the listing of"No" under Question 7 of the AWC.Evaluations of Other Potentially Adverse Seismic Conditions There were no Licensing Basis Evaluations pertaining to other adverse seismic conditions (loose/missing fasteners, heavy additions to cabinets, unlatched cabinet doors) for Unit 1.Evaluations of Potential FloodinL/Snrav HazardsPotential flooding/spray hazards noted during the walkdown were evaluated by a combination of furtherdocumentation review and reassessment of photographs and walkdown information.

Of particular note,the vibration-mounted AHUs in proximity to the reactor trip breakers on the 120' elevation of theAuxiliary Building were determined to pose no spray or flood hazard to the reactor trip breakers.

PerPVNGS, potential impacts of flooding/spray hazards are mitigated by the enclosed protective cabinets(designed as drip-proof per SDOC NOOI-1303-00057 (Reference 65)), which house the reactor tripbreakers and the distance from the AHUs. All potential flooding/spray hazards were resolved.

Evaluations of Potential Seismically Induced Fire Interactions No potential seismically induced fire interactions were noted for Unit I by the SWT; therefore, there areno Licensing Basis Evaluations.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-16. PEER REVIEW

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This section documents the independent peer review for the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns performed by Stevenson

& Associates (S&A) for Unit I ofPalo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS).

The peer review addresses the following activities:

• Review of the selection of the structures,

systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included inthe Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)* Review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys* Review of the licensing basis evaluations

" Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Program (CAP)* Review of the final and supplement submittal reportsThe peer reviewers for Palo Verde Unit 1 are Messrs. Walter Djordjevic of S&A and Gary L Douglas ofWestinghouse.

Mr. Djordjevic is designated the peer review Team Leader and participated in all peerreview activities as the seismic subject matter expert. Mr. Douglas participated in all peer reviewactivities and led the SWEL selection peer review as the SWEL selection subject matter expert. Neitherpeer reviewer was involved in the Seismic Walkdown inspection process.

Mr. Djordjevic is an advanceddegree structural engineer with over 30 years of nuclear seismic experience.

He has received SeismicCapability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training),

EPRI IPEEE Add-on, Seismic Fragility and SeismicWalkdown Engineer (SWE) training.

Mr. Douglas is a nuclear engineer with 15 years of nuclearengineering experience and 10 years of aerospace engineering experience.

Resumds are provided inAppendix E.The peer review of the SWEL development began on July 25, 2012, and was completed on July 28, 2012.All findings noted on the SWEL Peer Review Checklist were resolved.

The completed SWEL PeerReview Checklist is found in Appendix C. The results of the SWEL development peer review arediscussed in Section 6.2.The peer review of the Seismic Walkdown inspection started on July 25, 2012, with a peer check of theactual walkdowns for Unit 2. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas joined the walkdown team for a portion ofthe day's planned walkdowns to observe the conduct of walkdowns and adherence to the SeismicWalkdown Guidance (SWG) (Reference 1). No additional peer review site visits were made for the Unit1 walkdown as the same procedures were implemented and a similar suite of SWEL equipment wasinspected as selected for PVNGS Unit 2. The required interviews were conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWE inspection team on August 23, 2012, after review of a sample of the Unit 1Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWC) and Area Walk-By Checklists (AWC) to ascertain the quality andprocedural compliance with the SWG. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic andDouglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young on August 19, 2013, to review the SWCs and AWCs completed during the follow-on walkdowns.

The discussion of the results of these sample SWC and AWC reviewsare provided in Section 6.3.The results of the peer review of licensing basis evaluations are provided in Section 6.4. Theseassessments and their outcomes were also discussed with the SWE inspection team on August 23, 2012,and August 19, 2013. The peer reviewers reviewed the 45 licensing basis evaluations and found the finalWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- I January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-2determinations made by the SWEs to be correctly performed, and also concurred with the conclusions forthe 7 items that were not readily determined to meet current licensing basis which were placed in thecorrective action program.6.2 PEER REVIEW -SELECTION OF SSCs6.2.1 PurposeThe purpose of this section is to describe the process used to perform the peer review of the selected SSCsthat were included in the SWEL.6.2.2 Peer Review Activity

-Selection of SSCsThe guidance in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3.: Seismic, dated June 2012 (Reference 1), Section3: Selection of SSCs was used as the basis for this review.This peer review was also based on reviews of the spreadsheets utilized by the SWEL developers togenerate the Base Lists and Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists.Peer review was also based on interviews with the following individuals who were directly responsible for development of the SWEL:o Rolando Perez (Westinghouse) o Derek Seaman (Westinghouse) o Chris Wandell (Palo Verde Engineering) o Winston Borrero (Palo Verde Engineering)

This peer review utilized the Seismic Walkdown Guidance checklist shown in Reference I Appendix F:Checklist for Peer Review of SSC Selection.

For SWEL 1 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process:Verification that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment required toperform the following five safety functions:

o Reactivity Control (RC)o Reactor Coolant Pressure Control (PC)o Reactor Coolant Inventory Control (IC)o Decay Heat Removal (DHR); Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)o Containment Function (CF)Verification that the SSCs selected include an appropriate representation of items having thefollowing sample selection attributes:

o Various types of systemso Major new and replacement equipment o Various types of equipment WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- I January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-3o Various environments o Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE programo Risk insight consideration For SWEL 2 development, the following actions were completed in the peer review process:Verification that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added to SWEL2.Verification that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related items thatwere not included in SWEL 2.6.2.3 Peer Review Findings

-Selection of SSCsThis peer review found that the process for selecting SSCs that were added to the SWEL complied withthe process outlined in Reference 1, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. SWEL I selections totaled 124 itemsand SWEL 2 selections totaled six items.The peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected represented a diverse sample of the equipment requiredto perform the five safety functions.

The bases for items selected to SWEL I were the IPEEE Report,Appendix 3.A (Reference 3), which listed safe shutdown equipment from each redundant train of thesystems supporting the five safety functions, and Seismic Category I items from the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) database.

A breakdown of the safety functions represented by the SWEL Iselections follows:Reactivity control -39 SWEL selections support this functionPressure control -80 SWEL selections support this functionInventory control -53 SWEL selections support this functionDecay heat removal/ultimate heat sink -89 SWEL selections support this functionContainment function

-19 SWEL selections support this functionThe peer reviewers verified that the SSCs selected to SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation ofitems having the required sample selection attributes.

A breakdown of the sample selection attributes represented by the SWEL 1 selections follows:Twenty-seven (27) of 31 Base List systems were represented in the SWEL I list. The peerreviewers recommended that equipment from two unrepresented systems be added to the SWELlist. Components from the remaining unrepresented systems were component types that wereadequately represented by other system selections.

Since all five safety functions are alsoadequately represented by the SWEL, the peer review team concluded that the "various types ofsystems" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

Fifteen (15) of 38 major new or replacement items were represented in the SWEL I list. Thesources for these items were Design Basis Manuals for the systems supporting the five safetyfunctions.

Several of the new or replacement items involved a change to a group of similar items,and at least one item was selected from each group to represent the change. The peer review teamconcluded that the "major new and replacement equipment" sample selection attribute wassatisfactorily represented.

During review of the submittal report, a revision to the SWEL wasneeded to correct an error to this sample consideration attribute in the spreadsheet that was usedto track and implement the SWEL selection process.

This error did not result in a change to theWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-4Base List or SWEL selections; it increased the number of major new or replacement itemsrepresented in the SWEL I list. The peer reviewers verified that the Seismic WalkdownGuidance requirements for this sample consideration attribute were maintained.

Twenty (20) of 22 types of equipment were represented in the SWEL I list. The equipment typesnot represented were "compressors" and "motor-generator sets." The site does not have safety-related equipment in these equipment types. Equipment type "transformer" is a subcomponent toequipment type "switchgear."

The peer review team concluded that the "various types ofequipment" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

All environments were represented in the SWEL I list. The Palo Verde Units are located in a dryenvironment; therefore environment classification was based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment rooms. Since at least one item was selected from each environment classification the peer review team concluded that the "various environments" sample selection attribute was satisfactorily represented.

No items were added to the SWEL I list based on findings of the IPEEE program because noequipment enhancements were required in Unit 1.Twenty-six (26) of 70 risk-significant items were represented in the SWEL list. Risk insightswere applied from the Seismic PRA and Internal Events models to the selection of items to theSWEL. The peer review team concluded that the "risk insights" sample selection attribute wassatisfactorily represented.

The peer reviewers verified that spent fuel pool related items were considered and appropriately added toSWEL 2.Spent fuel pool related items considered were based on a review of design basis manualdescriptions, piping and instrumentation

drawings, isometric

drawings, and a system review usingthe Site Work Management System (SWMS). All items that screened into Base List 2 wereselected to SWEL 2.The peer reviewers verified that appropriate justification was documented for spent fuel pool related itemsthat were not included in SWEL 2.The justification for screening out spent fuel pool related items was reviewed and found to besupported by the Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). Components in-line with SeismicCategory I piping were screened out. No rapid drain-down items were included in SWEL 2. Thisconclusion was supported by a review of the UFSAR (Reference

32) which determined that allpipe penetrations through the pool wall are at or above the minimum required water level of 10 ftabove top of fuel assemblies.

All pipes extending down into the pool have siphon breaker holesthat are at or above the minimum required water level of 10 ft above top of fuel assemblies.

Allitems that screened in to Base List 2 were selected to SWEL 2; therefore the peer review teamconcluded that appropriate justification was documented.

The completed peer review checklist in Appendix C documents the peer review results.The SWEL was revised during the follow-on walkdowns to remove component

1MCHEE01, and toreplace three (3) protected Train C components with corresponding Train D components which werereadily accessible.

This change reduced the number of SWEL I items from 125 to 124. The component was removed because it was located in a locked high-radiation area. It was not necessary to replace1MCHEE01 with a similar equipment type since the sampling selection attributes remained adequately represented by multiple items on the SWEL. The replacement of Train C components with corresponding Train D components is acceptable per the guidance requirements.

The Peer Review Team reviewed theseWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-5SWEL changes and verified that all sampling selection attributes remained adequately represented on theSWEL.6.2.4 Resolution of Peer Review Comments

-Selection of SSCsThe peer review comments documented in the peer review checklist in Appendix C were resolved in atimely manner and improved the Seismic Walkdown process as summarized in the following:

• Additional SWEL selections from systems SA and ZJ were recommended; this enhanced thesystem variety represented on the SWEL.* Adding an Area Walk-By of the SFP to evaluate interactions of equipment with the SFP transfergates and inflatable seal equipment was recommended; this enhanced the walkdown effort.* The enhancements and editorial corrections made to the Unit 2 SWEL report were incorporated into the Unit 1 SWEL report prior to this peer review; this improved report clarity.* Provided clarification that DF system items will be adequately evaluated by the DG systemSWEL Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; this provided for clarity in the report.6.2.5 Conclusion of Peer Review -Selection of SSCsThis peer review concluded that the process for selecting SSCs to be included in the Seismic Walkdownequipment list complied with the process outlined in Reference 1, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. It isfurther concluded that the SWEL sufficiently represents a variety of the required sampling of plantSeismic Category I safe shutdown equipment to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) letter (Reference 50).6.3 PEER REVIEW OF SAMPLE SEISMIC WALKDOWN AND AREA WALK-BYCHECKLISTS A site visit was made on July 25, 2012, by Messrs. Walter Djordjevic and Mr. Gary L. Douglas toperform the peer review of the Seismic Walkdown team's inspection of Unit 2 equipment.

This allowedconstructive feedback to be provided to the walkdown team in the field for subsequent application in theUnit I and Unit 3 walkdowns.

A final review of the SWCs and AWCs was performed on August 22 and23, 2012, after which an interview was conducted by Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas with the SWEinspection team in accordance with the SWG requirements.

The SWE trained walkdown engineers wereMessrs. Hunter A. Young and Timothy S. Nealon. An additional interview was conducted by Messrs.Djordjevic and Douglas with Mr. Hunter A. Young in accordance with the SWG requirements on August19, 2013.Table 6-1 lists the SWC and AWC samples which represent 25% of the SWC and 24% of the AWCpopulations, respectively.

The sample includes equipment from various equipment classes to introduce diversity to the sampling procedure.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-6Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit IEquipment Equipment Walkdown Item Observations Identification (GIP) ClassGap is properly assessed given that MCC is rigid in1EPHBM32 1 Motor Control Center the longitudinal direction, so evaluation isacceptable Inverter for Shutdown1EPKDN44 16 No commentCooling B ReturnPower to PPS "C"1EPNCD27 14 No commentInstrumentation 1JAFBFT0041B 18 AFW Instrument Rack No comment1JAFBUVO035 8 SG-EO1B Isolation No commentValveRegenerative Heat1JCHBUV0924 8 Exchanger Outlet No commentIsolation Globe Valve1JHCBPT0351B 18 Containment Pressure Verified spring nuts on drawing 13-J-ZZS-0143 and -Instrument rack 0147Containment Pressure Verified spring nuts on drawing 13-J-ZZS-0143 and -Instrument rack 0147Performed licensing basis evaluation.

PVAR1JRMNB02 20 RWT Level Panel 4220252 generated to correct sheet 53 ofcalculation 13-CC-ZQ-J01 to reflect installed configuration depicted on sheet 49.1JRMCB05 20 Control Room Board No comment1JSBBC2A 18 I/V Converter 1JSBBC2A 18 Instrument Rack Adjacent masonry wall is seismically designedVerified existing gap of approximately 1/16" isinsufficient to prevent contact between SOy 1SGB-HY185B and tube steel; however, it is also1JSGBHV0185 7 Atmospheric dump determined that SOV functionality will not bevalve HV-185 impaired.

Recommendation is to cut HSS memberor move mounting channel to provide additional clearance.

PVAR 4250333 was entered into the CAPsystem to document the observation and resolution.

SG-EO1B Isolation 1JSGBUN0135 7 No commentValve1JSIBPSV409 7 HPSI Train B Injection No commentto EDT ReliefContainment Spray1JSIBUV0665 8 Pump Recirc to RWT No commentTrain B Globe Valve1JSIBUV676 8 Sump Isolation Valve No comment1MCHBP01 5 Charging Pump 2 No comment1MCTET01 21 CST No commentExcessive bolt projections cannot be reconciled.

1MECBE01 11 Essential Chiller B PVAR 4275110 generated to reconcile theconfiguration discrepancy.

1MEWBP01 5 EW Pump B No commentDG "B" Room Essential 1MHDBJ01 9 No commentExhaust FanWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-7Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit I1MHJBF04 10 Control Room EAHU No comment1MHJBM03 8 MO Damper Clearance to duct (1/4") determined to be adequateVerified anchorage with Sheet 95 of calculation 13-1EPKDM44 1 Motor Control Center CCQOCC-ZQ-E01 1EPNDN14 16 Inverter Verified anchorage with calculation 13-CC-ZQ-EO1 Przr pressure Verified anchorage with Detail 1 on SDOC N001-1JRCBPT0102B 18 (required for 1301-00698 RPS/SIAS)

SDC RCS pressure Verified anchorage with Detail 1 on SDOC NOO1-interlock 1301-00698 SDC RCS pressure Verified anchorage with Detail 1 on SDOC N001-interlock 1301-00698 SG-E01A WR level Verified anchorage with Detail 1 on SDOC NO01-(required for AFAS) 1301-00698 HPSI long-term recirc Verified anchorage with Detail 2 on Drawing 13-J-loop 1 pressure xmtr 01D-0119Clearance to cable tray (1/16") determined to beadequate; evaluation acceptable 1EPGBL36 2 480 V LC36 bus No commentEnvironmental enclosure clearance to building steel(1-1/2")

and cable tray (3/8"), and to the MCC1EPHBM34 1 480 V MCC M34 internally (1/2") determined to be adequate; potential S-hook interaction determined to have noimpact; evaluations acceptable Area Walkdown Description Observations C02, C03, C04 all within close proximity to J wall. C01 is within 1/8" at topto wall.Area: Aux, 100', A-127 Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Per EQCF D95-0038 (Ref. 65), all ZAA and ZABcabinets were analyzed with finite element methodology and determined to be rigid. Therefore, the as-built gap is sufficient.

Area: Aux, 40', A-D15 No commentLight fixtures (3 with open s-hooks) could fall on 1" piping but cannotArea: AUX, 70', A-B21dagepin damage pipingArea: Control,100',

J-109 No commentArea: Control,140',

Inner Horseshoe No comment -suspended ceiling is Category I, no seismic interactions No comment -good housekeeping and heater meets seismicArea: DG, 100', G-104 rqieetrequirements Numerous housekeeping issues along south and west walls. Onepotential impact with Category I duct on west wallArea: MSSS, 140', C-302 Flexible conduit between MSIV and building steel.Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Review of photographs from walkdowns indicated that flexible conduit could withstand MSIV movement due toSSE since valve is well-supported within very close proximity.

Accordingly, differential movement between the MSIV and the buildingsteel will be negligible.

Therefore, there is no adverse seismic concern.Area: SP, 140', Y-124 No commentArea: Yard, 93', CST proximity Light near DMWT judged to not be a hazardArea : CTMT, 100, 1JCHEHV239 No commentProximity WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-8Table 6-1: SWC and AWC Peer Review Samples from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit IArea : CTMT, 120, 1JRCDPT106 Photographs labeled "U1 Outage NTTF 2" are inconsistent with theProximity labeling used elsewhere in the report; corrected in Appendix B.Area : CTMT, 80, 1JSINPT391 No commentProximity Area : CTMT, 140, Pressurizer Cube No comment6.4 REVIEW OF LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS Appendix D provides a list of the potentially adverse seismic conditions identified during the Unit 1Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys and how they were addressed.

If a PVAR was generated, it isreferenced in Appendix D. Messrs. Djordjevic and Douglas conducted an interview with the SWEinspection team on August 23, 2012, to discuss the issues identified to determine if, in the opinion of thepeer reviewers, any of them potentially challenged the current licensing basis of the plant.As noted in Section 5, there were 45 potentially adverse seismic conditions identified in either theequipment Seismic Walkdowns or the Area Walk-Bys requiring evaluation with respect to their seismiclicensing basis. Not all potentially adverse conditions were resolved.

The peer reviewers performed areview of all completed licensing basis evaluations and the walkdown team's decisions for entering thesepotentially adverse seismic conditions into the plant's CAP. Thirty-eight (38) of the licensing basisevaluations determined that the potentially adverse conditions were ultimately found to be in compliance with the current licensing basis. Of the remaining seven (7) potentially adverse seismic conditions thatwere entered into the plant's CAP, six (6) involved follow-up verification of the as-built anchorage configuration with plant documentation and one (1) involved potential interaction between storagematerial and Seismic Category I ducting in the spent fuel pool area. The peer reviews of Sections 4.3 and5, and Appendix D led the peer reviewers to conclude that the licensing basis evaluations carefully compared the actual as-found plant configurations to the current licensing basis documentation in order toassess configuration compliance with the Palo Verde design basis, and the decisions for enteringconditions into the plant's CAP complied with the expectations of the SWG.CAP Status ReviewThe peer reviewers performed a review of the status of items that were entered into the plant's CAP as aresult of the Seismic Walkdowns (see Table 6-2). This supplement submittal report was found toappropriately reflect these updates.Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 1CAP Item CAP StatusPVAR 4221593 Area: FUEL 100' large waste bin located Action completed.

Housekeeping issueapproximately 12" from a safety-related J-box corrected.

(1EZF1AAKJ01)

PVAR 4219492 1EPNBD26 unlatched door Action completed.

Condition corrected.

PVAR 4250333 1JSGBHV0185 gap of approximately 1/16" between Action completed.

Evaluated usingSOV 1SGB-HY185B and tube steel existing calculation 13-MC-SG-0515.

Condition corrected.

PVAR 4214832 Bookcases in the zone of influence of the main Action completed.

Bookcases removedcontrol boards in all three units.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-9Table 6-2: Table of CAP Status from Seismic Walkdown Inspection for Unit 1CAP Item CAP StatusPVAR 4221758 1MEWBE01 slightly loose nut on E saddle anchor Action completed.

Evaluated as nobolt impact on seismic capability and nooperability impact. Condition corrected.

PVAR 4221593 Area: FUEL 140' Seismic Category I duct Action completed.

All improperly along W wall with storage material that could restrained items were corrected.

potentially impact the ductPVAR 4220252 1JRMNB02 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB asreadily verified against CLB documentation evaluated against Sheet 49 of existingcalculation 13-CC-ZQ-J01.

EDC 2013-00470 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-J01 to enhance documentation.

PVAR 4220252 1JRMNB04 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB asreadily verified against CLB documentation evaluated against Sheet 50 of existingcalculation 13-CC-ZQ-JO1.

EDC 2013-00470 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-J01 to enhance documentation.

PVAR 4275110 1MHFAJO1 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB asreadily verified against CLB documentation evaluated within existing NCR CF-01260.

PVAR 4293568 1MHJBZ03 leaking solder joint on the DS piping Joint evaluated as no potential for spraynorth of the AHU .hazard to safety related equipment; Working action plan to correct theleaking joint.PVAR 4275110 1MPCAE01 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB asreadily verified against CLB documentation evaluated in existing calculation 13-CC-ZQ-M001.PVAR 4275110 1MECBE01 anchorage configuration could not be Evaluated using calculation 13-CC-ZJ-readily verified against CLB documentation 0085. No impact on seismic capability and no operability impact. As-foundconfiguration will be documented onEDC 2013-00470.

PVAR 4275110 1MHFBJ01 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition meets CLB asreadily verified against CLB documentation evaluated within existing NCR CF-01260.

PVAR 4275110 1MPCBE01 anchorage configuration could not be As-found condition (no torque on slidingreadily verified against CLB documentation support nuts and 2 middle bolts notinstalled) meets CLB as evaluated inexisting calculation 13-CC-ZQ-MOO1.

PVAR 4220895 1MPCBEO1 E saddle SW bolt nut is loose with gap Action completed.

As-found condition (gap and missing washer) has beencorrected to meet CLB.PVAR 4293568 Area: CTRL J-A05 spray hazard concern from HJB- Joint evaluated as no potential for sprayZ03 hazard to safety related equipment; Working action plan to correct theleaking joint.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 6-106.5 REVIEW SUBMITTAL REPORTThe entire final submittal report has been reviewed by Messrs. W. Djordjevic and G. Douglas and foundto meet the requirements of EPRI TR-1025286

-Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1). Theupdate submittal report has been reviewed by Messrs. W. Djordjevic and G. L. Douglas and found tomeet the requirements of EPRI TR-1025286

-Seismic Walkdown Guidance (Reference 1).WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 7-17. IPEEE VULNERABILITIES A summary of IPEEE vulnerabilities is available in Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events report (Reference 3). Per Reference 3, no seismic vulnerabilities were determined to exist at PVNGS-1 and no significant changes to plant design were required in order todemonstrate the ability to mitigate

.the Review Level Earthquake (RLE). All observations identified fromthe IPEEE walkdowns were resolved prior to issuing of the IPEEE report on June 1, 1995.Table 4-1 of PVNGS CORR 94-001-506 (Reference

62) had documented items to review for the SeismicIPEEE prescreening and walkdown of all three units; and Table 3-4 of Reference 3 summarized theresolution of these original walkdown concerns.

The IPEEE report (Reference

3) concluded that allcomponents have capacities exceeding the 0.3g peak ground acceleration of the RLE. However, actionwas taken to improve the seismic capacity of the bookcases located behind the control cabinets in the Unit3 Control Room. The existing anchorage was determined to be marginal, and additional anchorage wasprovided prior to issuing of the IPEEE report to resolve the concern.

While the condition was also notedfor the same bookcases in Unit I per Reference 62, the IPEEE report did not specify action to provideadditional anchorage for these bookcases.

As noted in Section 4.2, the SWT reviewed the IPEEE report prior to conducting walkdowns.

Similarobservations noted in the IPEEE report regarding the Control Room bookcases were also noted for reviewduring these walkdowns.

The SWT reviewed Detail 35 of 13-A-ZYD-0034 (Reference 57), whichspecifies 23 metal screws fastening the bookcases in all three units to the metal stud wall. The SWT andlicensing basis reviewers determined that, although the as-installed anchorage for the Unit 1 bookcase didnot comply with this detail, the demand forces were adequately low to preclude failure; therefore, noadverse spatial interaction was identified.

As a result of this observation, PVAR 4214832 was generated and PVNGS removed these bookcases from the zone of influence of the main control boards in all threeunits.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-lRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-18. REFERENCES

1. EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 20122. Drawing 13-I-ZZI-0001.R011, "Site Work Management System (SWMS) Equipment Database."

3. CORR 102-03407, "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station -IPEEE."4. Design Basis Manual DBM AF, "Auxiliary Feedwater System,"

Revision 22.5. Design Basis Manual DBM CH, "Chemical and Volume Control System,"

Revision 21.6. Design Basis Manual DBM DF/DG/PE, "Diesel Generator, Class I E Standby Generation, FuelOil Storage and Transfer System,"

Revision 23.7. Design Basis Manual DBM EC, "Essential Chilled Water System,"

Revision 13.8. Design Basis Manual DBM EW, "Essential Cooling Water System,"

Revision 23.9. Design Basis Manual DBM FW, "Feedwater System,"

Revision 13.10. Design Basis Manual DBM HA, "Auxiliary Building HVAC System,"

Revision 17.11. Design Basis Manual DBM HC, "Containment Building HVAC System,"

Revision 9.12. Design Basis Manual DBM HD, "HVAC -Diesel Generator Building,"

Revision 12.13. Design Basis Manual DBM HP, "Containment Hydrogen Control System,"

Revision 13.14. Design Basis Manual DBM MA, "Main Generation System,"

Revision 8.15. Design Basis Manual DBM NA, "13.8 kV AC Non-Class IE Power System,"

Revision 10.16. Design Basis Manual DBM NC, "Nuclear Cooling Water System,"

Revision 19.17. Design Basis Manual DBM NE, "Station Blackout Topical,"

Revision 18.18. Design Basis Manual DBM PB, "Class IE 4.16 kV Power System,"

Revision 13.19. Design Basis Manual DBM PG, "Class IE 480 VAC Power Switchgear System,"

Revision 11.20. Design Basis Manual DBM PH, "Class I E 480V Power -MCC," Revision 11.21. Design Basis Manual DBM PK, "Class 1E 125 VDC Power System,"

Revision 17.22. Design Basis Manual DBM PN, "Class I E Instrument AC Power System,"

Revision 10.23. Design Basis Manual DBM QD, "Emergency Lighting System,"

Revision 10.24. Design Basis Manual DBM RC, "Reactor Coolant System,"

Revision 29.25. Design Basis Manual DBM SA, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation System,"

Revision 16.26. Design Basis Manual DBM SB, "Reactor Protection System,"

Revision 18.27. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-FWCS, "Feedwater Control System,"

Revision 6.28. Design Basis Manual DBM SF-SBCS, "Steam Bypass Control System,"

Revision 6.29. Design Basis Manual DBM SG, "Main Steam," Revision 31.30. Design Basis Manual DBM SI, "Safety Injection System,"

Revision 33.31. Equipment Qualification (EQ) Files EQDF EQ-PM, Equipment Qualification Program Manual,Revision 21.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-232. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report,Revision 17, June 2013.33. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-1 1-019, "Validation of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Conversion for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,"

September 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).34. Interim Version of the Westinghouse Seismic PRA Database (Microsoft Access& database file"APS-SPRA.mdb,"

dated August 22, 2012).35. Design Basis Manual DBM PC "Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System,"

Revision 18.36. Drawing Number 01-M-PCP-0001, "P & I Diagram, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System,"Revision 27.37. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0501, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup SystemIsometric,"

Revision 4.38. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0502, "Fuel Building Isometric Spent Fuel Pool Cooling andCleanup System,"

Revision 2.39. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0503, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup SystemIsometric,"

Revision 0.40. Drawing Number 01-P-PCF-0504, "Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup SystemIsometric,"

Revision 0.41. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-71, "Recommended Practicefor Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

42. Design Criteria Manual DCM-PGD, "Project General Design Criteria,"

Revision 24.43. Regulatory Guide 1.60, "Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"Revision 1, December 1973.44. Regulatory Guide 1.61, "Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,"Revision 0, October 1973.45. Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design Classification,"

Revision 1, August 1973.46. Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers Standard IEEE 344-75, "Recommended Practicefor Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

47. EPRI Report NP-6041-SL, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant SeismicMargin (Revision I)," Revision 1.48. WCAP-17679-NP, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1," Revision 0, November 2012.49. Not used.50. NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of theNear-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident,"

Enclosure 3,"Recommendation 2.3: Seismic."

51. Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-4-A, Rev. 3, "Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,"

November 1974.52. Not used.53. Design Basis Manual DBM-C5, "Seismic Topical,"

Revision 4.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS-1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-354. Procedure 30DP-9WPI 1, "Scaffolding Instructions,"

Revision 24.55. Specification 13-CN-0380, "Installation Specification for Seismic Cat IX and Non-Seismic Scaffolding,"

Revision 20.56. Procedure 30DP-0WM12, "Housekeeping,"

Revision 20.57. Drawing 13-A-ZYD-0034, "Transient Material Restraint Details,"

Revision 20.58. Calculation 13-CC-ZZ-0309, "Transient Material Analysis,"

Revision 5.59. Drawing 13-E-ZAL-00 11, "Lighting Fixture Mounting,"

Revision 31.60. Calculation 13-CC-ZJ-0 120, "Concrete Block Walls," Revision 5.61. Calculation 13-CC-ZA-0140, "Hatches and Penetrations,"

Revision 7.62. Correspondence 94-001-506, "Transmittal of Report Prescreening and Walkdown of PVNGS forSeismic IPEEE."63. "Dynamics of Structures, Theory and Application to Earthquake Engineering,"

Anil K. Chopra,University of California at Berkeley.

64. Not used.65. PVNGS Documents used for Anchorage Configuration Verification and Licensing BasisEvaluations

a. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-EOO1, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation

-Electrical Equipment,"

Revision 5.b. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-JOO1, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation

-ControlEquipment,"

Revision 6.c. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZQ-MOO, "Seismic Qualification Evaluation

-Mechanical Equipment,"

Revision 8.d. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-0001, "Civil-Structural Generator Notes," Revision 24.e. Drawing Number 13-C-OOA-001 1, "Anchor Bolt Schedule and Details,"

Revision 9.f. Drawing Number 13-C-SPS-0376, "Nuclear Service Spray Ponds Sections and DetailsSht 1," Revision 11.g. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0240, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 1," Revision 10.h. Not used.i. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0241, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 2," Revision 9.j. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0242, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 3," Revision 11.k. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0243, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 4," Revision 13.i. Drawing Number 13-C-ZAS-0245, "Auxiliary Building Equipment Foundation DetailsSht 5," Revision 8.m. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0703, "MSSS Concrete Sections and Details,"

Revision 8.n. Drawing Number 13-C-ZCS-0705, "MSSS Floor Inserts and Penetrations,"

Revision20.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-4o. Drawing Number 13-C-ZFS-0187, "Fuel Building Concrete Sections

& Details,"

Revision 11.p. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-01 10, "Diesel Generator Building Diesel Generator Foundation Plan Sections and Details,"

Revision 5.q. Drawing Number 13-C-ZGS-01 16, "Diesel Generator Building Concrete Section andDetails Sht 2," Revision 7.r. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0580, "Control Building Misc Steel Platforms and DetailsSht 1," Revision 6.s. Drawing Number 13-J-OID-0103, "Auxiliary Building Isometric HCA-PT-351A andHCA-PT-352A Sensing Lines," Revision 4.t. Drawing Number 13-J-O1D-0104, "Sensing Lines for HCC-PT-351C and 352-CAuxiliary Building,"

Revision 3.u. Drawing Number 13-J-01 D-01 73, "MSSS Building Iso Sensing Line SGA-PT308, 315;SBG-PT301, 321," Revision 6.v. Drawing Number 13-J-04D-0118, "MSSS ISO AFA-FT-40A and AFB-FT-41A Sensing Lines," Revision 2.w. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0157, "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for12"W x 24"H Plate with Unistrut,"

Revision 6.x. Log Number 13-10407-A216-12, "Wyle Job No. 44815 -Seismic Test of CompactCeiling Light Module and an Incandescent Light Module,"

Revision A.y. SDOC Number E051-00047, "Qualification Report for Class I E Battery Charger,"

Revision 10.z. SDOC Number E054-0070, "Class 1E Inverter IEEE 323 and 324 Qualification Report,"

Revision 7.aa. SDOC Number E105-0001 1, "Outline Line Voltage Regulator 25KVA," Revision 17.bb. SDOC Number EN050B-AOOO15, "General Arrangement 28-Cell Battery Rack Sht. 3,"Revision 5.cc. SDOC Number J601 A-00274, "Nuclear Qualification Test Report for Modulating Atmospheric Dump Valve," Revision 0.dd. SDOC Number M598-01433, "Mounting and Wiring Detail for Q Class HVACInstruments,"

Revision 21.ee. Calculation Number 13-MC-SG-0515, "MSSS Main Steam Bypass And Atmospheric Dump Lines," Revision 14.ff. EPRI Report 1014608, "Seismic Evaluation Guidelines for HVAC Duct and DamperSystems, Revision to 1007896,"

December 2006.gg. Drawing Number 13-E-ZAL-001 1, "Lighting Fixture Mounting Detail Sheet 1,"Revision 32.hh. Drawing Number 13-E-ZFL-0001, "Fuel Handling Building Lighting

&Communications El. 100 ft, & El. 120 ft, Level 1&2," Revision 14.ii. Equipment Qualification Control Form (EQCF) D95-0038, "Restraints for Aux. RelayCabinets."

jj. Calculation Number 13-MC-WC-0502, "Normal Chilled Water Supply System,"Revision 4.WCAP-1 7679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page 8-5kk. Drawing Number 0I-P-WCF-0201, "Aux Bldg Iso Norm Chld Wtr Sys Norm Chlrs ToCont Bldg," Revision 0.II. SDOC Number N00 1-0502-00322, "Bridge Assembly SFHM V-CE- 14439, 3-22-81,"

Revision 4.mm. SDOC Number NOW-0502-00326, "Trolly Hoist Assy SFHM V-CE-14439, 3-22-81,"

Revision 6.nn. Calculation Number 13-CC-ZG-0070, "Diesel Generator Building Equipment Supports,"

Revision 6.oo. Drawing Number 01-E-ZGL-0001, "Diesel Generator Bldg. Lighting

&Communications Plans at El. 100'-0"&

115'-0","

Revision 8.pp. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0143, "Seismic Category I Instrument Mtg. Support for12"w xl8"h Plate with Unistrut,"

Revision 7.qq. Drawing Number 13-J-ZZS-0147, "Seismic I Instrument Mounting Support 5,"Revision 3.rr. Drawing Number 13-C-ZJS-0102, "Control Building Area JID Concrete and SteelPlans for El. 74' and 100'," Revision 10.ss. Field Change Request Number 66708C, "Cont Bldg AR JIA&B PL @ E-100."tt. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-12-015, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic RiskAssessment-Model Development,"

November 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class2).uu. Westinghouse Calculation CN-RAM-12-022, "Palo Verde Seismic Probabilistic RiskAssessment

-Quantification,"

December 2012 (Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2).vv. SDOC Number NOO1-1303-00057, "Std Spec Reac Brkr Swtgr System Com Ltr Log66,72," Revision 3.ww. Drawing Number 13-J-01 D- 119, "Containment Bldg Isometric SIB-PT-391 SensingLine," Revision 3.xx. Nonconformance Report CF-01260, "Anchor Bolt Out of Tolerance."

yy. SDOC Number NOOI-1301-00698, "Wall Rack Assembly V-CE-17414, 23NO82,"Revision 13."WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS-1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page A- IAPPENDIX A -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCs)This appendix provides only the SWCs from the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from July 30 through August 6, 2012, that were revised related to FAQ 4.20, plus the SWCsresulting from the 1R17 refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed from April 6 throughApril 7, 2013, and subsequently on April 30, 2013. The SWCs from the at-power SeismicWalkdowns that are not contained herein can be found in Appendix A of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo VerdeNuclear Generating Station Unit I ").WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-lRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page C- IAPPENDIX C -PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS There was no change to this appendix.

The SWEL Peer Review Checklist can befound in Appendix C of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1").WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-1IAPPENDIX D -LICENSING BASIS EVALUATIONS SUMMARYItem EQIDItem Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF(if issued) 6 Status7Resolution aumpvalve HV-178Pdo0et approximateiy 110 Cleardi'dLt 11/d T D811: -VOlIUCIllUll.

rCI Lr lU1 JUJ33DnlVUVL0Jj between soft air tubing instrument on maximum pipe displacement of.0.085" is considered forlower part of valve and rigid conduit parent pipe of valve HV0178 by similarity.

This is greatermounted separately.

Verify whether gap is than the approximately 1/16" (0.0625 ") gap as found in theacceptable.

field. However, upon reinspection of the component photographs, it is noted that the receptacle receiving theair tubing is cantilevered off the valve body, and therefore has inherent flexibility.

Given the flexibility of the air tubingreceiving receptacle, it is concluded that the as-found gapof 1/16" is acceptable and not an adverse seismic condition.

SSC meets CLB.6 PVAR denotes Palo Verde Action Request which is the entry document for the PVNGS corrective action program.7 NTTF Status denotes conclusions of LBE for the condition.

Y- Condition was found to conform to the Current License Basis. N- Condition is either a Non-Conforming Condition or a Potential Non-Conforming Condition WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-2Item EQIDItem Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF(if issued) 6 Status7Resolution I1MHJBM02 motor-operated Noted an approximately 1/2" clearance n/a *damper between damper enclosure and fire pipingsupport steel. Support duct is braced in N/Sdirection about 12-15' W of damper. Verifywhether clearance is adequate or damperbox is not a soft target.V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Review of Section 3.4.1 of EPRIReport 1014608 (Ref. 65) indicates that braced duct runsmay have an estimated lower-bound frequency of 10 Hz.This falls well out of the flexible range of the PVNGSresponse spectra; accordingly, a 1/2" gap is judged to besufficient; not an adverse seismic condition.

SSC meets CLB.IWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-3Item EQIDItem Description Problem Description PVAR No. NITFIN isrupri 6Status 7Resolution Ilt'pK5M4Z uL power to I L51control circuituoservea ciearance aetween bwcorner and rigidly connected light in the N-Sdirection.

Verify whether clearance isadequate or whether equipment is sensitive to impact.n/aLicensing oasis tvaiuation:

i ne rrequency OT mne MLL in itsweak direction can conservatively be taken as 5 Hz and therigidly connected light at 33 Hz. From the SSE responsespectra using 4% damping in accordance with the UFSAR forwelded structures, the corresponding MCC acceleration at5 Hz for 4% damping on the 100' CTRL elevation is 1.51 g ( =1.35

• sqrt(5%/4%

damping))

whereas the ZPA at 120' forthe light is 0.54g. The estimated maximum relativedisplacement is 0.95 in (= 1.6*1.51g

• 386.4 / (2*pi*5 Hz)A2+ 1.6*0.54g

• 386.4 / (2*pi*33 Hz)A2)),

which is less thanthe gap provided.

Therefore, there is no interaction WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-4Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTrF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status71MEWBE01 EW "B" heat 1) Noted sliRhtlv loose nut on E saddle 4221758 Nexchanger anchor bolt. Verify whether this is anacceptable condition per CLBdocumentation.

2) Also noted a relief line on the top of theHX that may be subjected to overstress dueto differential motion between floors. The10" run on 1" dia. pipe may be subject todifferential motion due to separate rigidsupports mounted to different buildinglevels. Verify whether either there is nofunctionality concern from losing the reliefline or the pipe stress is not excessive dueto differential motion.1) Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Per APS, Unit 1 EW HX doesnot have documentation allowing for gap; therefore nutwas discovered in a degraded condition and PVAR 4221758was generated.

APS reports that PVAR (related work)indicates

-The nine effective bolts on the sliding endsupport maintain the ability to resist tensile loads. Noadverse seismic condition exists.APS reports this is a non-conforming condition.

Operability Determination concluded that the EW HX remainedOperable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that SSC as-found condition (loose nut) has been corrected to meetCLB.2) Licensing Basis Evaluation:

With regards to the reliefvalve piping supports, re-inspection of photos shows athreaded connection at the relief valve. This is judged to bethe weak point and would fail prior to the valve-to-heat-exchanger welded connection.

Therefore, differential support movement between the building floors poses noadverse seismic concern.

SSC meets CLB.APS rmoorts this is not a non-conforming condition.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-5Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status7Area: AUX A- AREA WALK BY Noted a safety-related MOV n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Calculation 13-MC-WCF-0502 A09(iJWCAUVO062) and SOY (HCAUV46) w/approximately 1/4" clearance.

The SOV isrigidly supported off of Containment steel.The flexibility of the MOV relative to theSOV could not be verified in the field.Action shall be taken to determine whethergap is adequate.

(Ref. 65) indicates that the 10" pipe running to1JWCAUVO062 is fixed at Containment Penetration 61.From Drawing 01-P-WCF-0201 (Ref. 65), 1JWCAUV0062 islocated approximately 4 ft from the penetration.

Given thesmall span and large diameter pipe, the displacement of1JWCAUV0062 is judged to be reasonably less than 1/4".Regarding relative displacement to HCAUV46, this SOV isimmediately supported rigidly by steel braced off ofContainment and is accordingly negligible.

Therefore, the1/4" gap is judged to be acceptable; not an adverse seismicWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-6Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution (if issued) Status7Area: FUEL 140' AREA WALK BY 1) Verify whether the Spent Fuel Pool 4221593 N 1) Licensing.Basis Evaluation:

Spent Fuel Handling MachineHandling Machine (1MZFNM03) has 1MZFNM03 SDOCs N001-0502-00322 and N001-0502-support designed to prevent uplift off of 00326 (Ref. 65) indicates that uplift is resisted by memberstracks. on the handling machine that engage grooves on the insideof the rail. Therefore, there is no overturning hazard; SSCmeets CLB.2) Also noted Seismic Category I duct alongW wall with storage material that could 2) Licensing Basis Evaluation:

The NTTF Status is designated potentially impact the duct. Alerted PVNGS "N" for PVAR 4221593 which was issued for storageEngineering and Operations of condition.

material that could potentially impact SC-1 duct along W-PVAR 4221593 generated to reconcile the wall.equipment adjacent to the duct. APS reports that PVAR (related work) indicates

-Allimproperly restrained items were corrected.

No adverseseismic condition exists.APS reports this was a non-conforming condition that wascorrected on the spot, therefore no Operability Determination was necessary.

Area: MSSS C- AREA WALK BY Observed flexible conduit pinched between n/a V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Review of photographs from302 SGE-UV170 (MSIV) and building steel. Flex walkdowns indicates that flexible conduit could withstand conduit runs to junction box SGBJ16. Verify MSIV movement due to SSE since valve is well-supported whether enough flexibility is present in within very close proximity.

Accordingly, differential conduit to accommodate differential movement between the MSIV and the building steel will bemotion. negligible.

Therefore, there is no adverse seismic condition.

SSC meets CLB.IIWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-7Item EQIDItem Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTFF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status7ISDHX A outlet 13-CC-ZQ-JO1 (Ret. 65) calls tor 8" welds at n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Further review ot 13-CC-ZQ-JO1 temperature 4' o.c, which varies from the as-installed Sheet 49 (Ref. 65) shows that the as-installed configuration configuration observed in the field. Verify observed during the walkdown matches the "as-required" as-installed anchorage configuration meets configuration indicated in the CLB documentation.

SSCCLB documentation.

meets CLB. PVAR 4220252 generated by PVNGS to updatethe "as-installed" configuration indicated on Sheet 53 toreflect the field configuration.

APS reports this is not a non-conforming condition, butdoes identify a minor documentation deficiency.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that EDC 2013-00470 will update Calculation 13-CC-ZQ-JO1 to correctIIJ.JnL~rus)Lu Lontainmemn veriy .Lz oonts witn spring nuts Tor piaie n/a T Licensing nasis tvaiuaton:

As-instaniea conringuration pressure connection to Unistrut per CLB verified per Note 1 on DWG 13-J-ZZS-0143 and 13-J-ZZS-documentation.

0147 (Refs. 65) ; SSC meets CLB.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-8Item EQIDItem Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution 6 u7(if Issued) 6 StatusJ.10JLUsIt:- swltcngear room "B" EAHU1.) Notea cracKs in paa near ancnorage onnorth side. Verify whether pad hasreinforcing that develops in the floor slab.2.) Additionally noted a leaking solder jointon the DS piping north of the AHU. Verifywhether spray hazard is plausible for AHU.n/aT 1.) Licensing oasis tvaiuatuon:

bection u or ii---zJ:--uiuz (Ref. 65) confirms that #6 ties @ 12" e.w. are doweled fromthe pad into the base slab; therefore anchorage isadequate; not an adverse seismic condition.

SSC meetsCLB.2.) Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Regarding the leaking solderjoint, combination of support near the joint, relatively lowpressure in the line, and distance of safety-related equipment from the piping leads to judgment that leakingjoint poses no spray hazard to the equipment; PVAR4293568 issued to address leaking joint. SSC meets CLB.IWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 2PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-9Item EQIDItem Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution (if issued) 6Status71EPEBG02 Emergency diesel Dowels per Detail G of 13-C-ZGS-110 (Ref. n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Regarding dowels, inspection otgenerator "B" 65) were not installed and anchor bolts on 13-C-ZGS-0110 (Ref. 65) and walkdown photos reveals thatmain engine exceeded max projection (5- the dowels are 2" in diameter with an air-gap at center.7/8" versus 5-1/4" required).

Verify This reflects the as-found configuration.

Therefore, there iswhether CLB documentation exists allowing no adverse anchorage concern; SSC meets CLB. Regarding for deviation.

projection, inspection of Section 4 on DWG 13-C-ZGS-0110 (Ref. 65) reveals that the as-found projection allows for fullthread engagement into anchor bolt sleeves.

Therefore, there is no adverse anchorage concern as bolt meetsInverter for As-installed configuration did not meet field n/a Y Licensing Bsasts Evaluation:

Per sneet lbw on 1j-LL-ZLQ-U1 shutdown cooling documentation.

Verify whether anchorage and FCR 66708C (Ref. 65), 1/4" channel-to-embed filletisolation valve meets CLB documentation.

welds are documented, which was verified in the field; SSCIJSICUV653 meets CLB.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D- 10Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NT"F Resolution (if issued) 6 Status7IJHCBPTO351B Containment Verify 1/2" bolts with spring nuts for plate n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration pressureconnection to Unistrut per CLBdocumentation.

verified per Note 1 onOWG 13-J-ZZS-0143 (Ref. 65) and 13-J-ZZS-0147 (Ref. 65); SSC meets CLB.ivieasureu 4-i/Q oomi projections oUt naa n/a Y Licensing 1Iasis tvaluation:

F-urther review ot 13-L-LA5-0241 no documentation in field on drawings to Detail 1 (Ref. 65) indicates an anchor bolt T.O.S. of 101'-0"verify this dimension as conforming with with a pad T.O.C. of 100'-8".

Therefore, the maximumCLB documentation.

Action required to projection is 4" from top of pad. 1/4" discrepancy is judgedverify projection as adequate.

acceptable given typical 1/8" tolerance on both theconcrete slab finish and bolt placement in additional to1/8" measurement error; condition meets CLB.WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D- 1IItem EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTTF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status71MHFBJ01 Fuel Building AHU Bolts were noted surpassing the document-4275110 N Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration couldindicated max projection.

Verify whetherthis condition is documented as beingevaluated.

not readily be verified against CLB documentation.

PVAR4275110 generated to reconcile the configuration discrepancy.

APS reports that PVAR (related work) indicates

-Thiscondition was analyzed within NCR CF-01260 (Ref. 65)which concluded the equipment will not be adversely affected by anchor bolts out of elevation tolerance; Noadverse seismic condition exists.APS reports this is a potential non-conforming condition.

An Operability Determination concluded that the SSCremained Operable.

Supplemental Report Update: APS reports that SSC meetsCLB (NCR CF-01260, Ref. 65) therefore this is not a non-conforming condition; no corrective action recuired.

WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-12Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTrF Resolution (if issued)6 Status7Area: AUX A- AREA WALK BY Verify whether vibration mounts on HAN- n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

Per APS, potential impacts of227Z02A/ZO2B have adequate seismic stops soas to preclude anchor failure and possiblewater line rupture.flooding/spray hazards are mitigated by the enclosedprotective cabinets (designed as drip-proof per SDOC N001-1303-00057 (Ref. 65)), which house the reactor tripbreakers and the distance from the AHUs. All potential flooding

/spray hazards were resolved.

The configurations meet CUB.1EPKDM44DC power to TCB1 Anchorage consists of channels inverted n/a V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration iscontrol circuit and welded to MCC base. consistent with Sheet 95 of 13-CC-ZQ-E01 (Ref. 65). SSCInverted channels anchored with 5/8" meets CLB.Concrete Expansion Anchors.

Verify as-installed configuration is consistent withplant documentation.

rressurizer mountea to common rack tnat is weiaea to n/a y Licensing tBasis lvaluation:

As-installed contiguration ispressure steel embeds. Verify as-built weld-to-consistent with Detail 1 on SDOC NOO1-1301-00698 (Ref.transmitter embed pattern.

65). SSC meets CLB.(required forDOC IdACIUIRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure Pressure transmitter is mounted to steel n/a Y Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration isinterlock rack welded to embed plates. Verify as- consistent with Detail 1 on SDOC NOO1-1301-00698 (Ref.built meets anchorage configuration 65). SSC meets CLB.documentation.

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page D-13Item EQID Item Description Problem Description PVAR No. NTrF Resolution (if issued) 6 Status71JSINPT391 HPSI Long-term Typical column-mounted transmitter plate n/a V Licensing Basis Evaluation:

As-installed configuration isrecirc loop 1 bolted to two horizontal P1000 Unistrut consistent with Detail 2 on Drawing 13-J-01D-0119 (Ref.pressure members that are in turn welded at top and 65). SSC meets CLB.transmitter bottom at four locations to column flanges.Verify as-built configurations meets plantdocumentation.

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement 2PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page E- 1APPENDIX E -QUALIFICATIONS This appendix contains only the qualifications of new personnel involved with the1R17 refueling outage Seismic Walkdowns performed from April 6 through April7, 2013, and the subsequent walkdowns performed on April 30, 2013. Thequalifications of personnel involved with the at-power Seismic Walkdowns performed from July 30 through August 6, 2012, can be found in Appendix E ofReference 48 ("Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic WalkdownSubmittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1").WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page E-2CORY T. FIGLIOLINI, E.I.T.EDUCATION 2009 -2010 University of Glasgow,

Glasgow, Scotland, United KingdomUniversity of Edinburgh, Edinburgh,

Scotland, United KingdomJoint Master of Science, Structural Engineering

& Mechanics (M Sc.)2004 -2009 Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Massachusetts Bachelor of Science, Civil and Environmental Engineering (BSCE)REGISTRATION AND AFFILIATIONS Engineer in Training, Massachusetts, Certificate No. 22279PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES Structural analysis and design of steel, concrete, and masonry structures using IBC and UBCDynamic analysis of structures for seismic, vibration, blast, fluid, and wind loadsCompeted 5-day SQUG training course for walkdown and fragility analysis of nuclear facilities and theircomponents Completed 5-day ASME Power Piping Design and Fabrication training courseRisk and hazard analysisConstruction support and inspection PROFESSIONAL HISTORY2010 -Present Stevenson and Associates,

Goodyear, ArizonaEngineerPROJECT EXPERIENCE SUMMARYSeismic Fragility ProjectsMr. Figliolini has planned and performed Seismic Walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures andcomponents for use in probabilistic risk assessments.

On these projects, he has walked down both SafetyRelated and non-Safety Related structures, systems and components in all areas of the power block. Mr.Figliolini has conducted seismic analyses of electrical and mechanical equipment anchorages, storagetanks, and civil structures including containment.

Security ProjectsMr. Figliolini has performed structural modifications to existing structures for hardened alarm stationsand security related equipment supports.

He has performed blast analyses to determine the vulnerability of security structures.

Piping ProjectsMr. Figliolini has worked on Safety Related piping analyses and modifications which include assessment and conversion of piping analysis models, screening and review of piping supports, and modifications topiping supports.

WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement I Revision 0PVNGS- 1 January 2014 3g2m0r-CL0*0-a5 .0ng80(IQ.

Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F- IAPPENDIX F -PVNGS UNIT 1 SWEL REPORTThis appendix is attached to reflect the changes made in Revision 2 and Revision3 of the SWEL transmittal associated with the IRi7 refueling outage SeismicWalkdowns performed from April 6 through April 7, 2013, and afterward on April30, 2013. Please see the "Revision History" on page F-3 for a completeexplanation.

The Revision 0 and Revision 1 SWEL transmittals for the at-powerSeismic Walkdowns performed from July 30 through August 6, 2012, can befound in Appendix F of Reference 48 ("Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1").WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-2*Westinghouse Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Revision 3In Response to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: SeismicPalo Verde Nuclear Station Unit 1C.W~/'~ AJRolando PerezDateEquipment Selection Pe'rs&nnel Leadr-/011Z -/Derek Seaman .-....- ......7/iEquipment Selection Personnel Eim ar, Randall oigitallysigned

byEimar, Randall DateG(Z34606)

DN: cn=Eimar, Randall G(Z34606)

Randall Eimar G(Z34606)

Date: 2013.06.07 12:10:41

-0700'.3Station Operations DatePVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment ListMay24,2013 IWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-3Seismic Walkdown Equipment List; Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Revision HistoryRevision 0 of this document provides the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)developed prior to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) At-PowerSeismic Walkdowns performed between Monday, July 30th, 2012 and Friday, August3rd, 2012. The SWEL contained a total of 131 components (125 SWEL 1 & 6 SWEL 2).Revision 1 of this document updates the "Major New or Replacement Equipment" column of the SWEL 1 table included in Attachment 1 and Table 3-2 of Attachment 3.The information related to "Major New or Replacement Equipment" was revised as aresult of an error found in the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that was used track andimplement the SWEL selection process.

This error did not result in a change to theBase List or SWEL data.Revision 2 of this document revises the SWEL 1 table provided in Attachment 1 todocument changes required for the refueling outage 1R17 walkdown activities performed from April 6 through April 9, 2013. Train C was inaccessible during refueling outage 1R17. Therefore, the following Train C electrical components were substituted with their counterpart from Train D, which were selected from Base List 1:* 1 EPKCD23 was substituted with sister component 1 EPKDD24.* 1 EPKCM43 was substituted with sister component 1 EPKDM44* 1EPNCN13 was substituted with sister component 1EPNDN14.

These components were inspected to fulfill Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 4.20regarding the supplemental inspection of electrical cabinets.

These substitutions did not affect the number of SWEL items and since thereplacements were performed with equipment of the same type, the revised SWEL 1still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance.

That is, component type, along with otherattributes, remain adequately represented on the SWEL.Revision 3 of this document removes SWEL 1 item 14 (1MCHEE01).

This item wasremoved for radiological safety considerations.

It was identified as inaccessible in alocked high-radiation area. A new item was not selected to replace 1MCHEE01 sincethe resulting equipment list still satisfied the Reference 1 guidance.

That is, allattributes remain adequately represented on the SWEL.Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL)A listing of structures,

systems, and components (SSCs) that will be inspected duringthe walkdown, the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL), has been prepared inadvance of the walkdown effort.PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 2 IWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-4Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1The selection of SSCs process described in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, SeismicWalkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012 {Reference 1}, was utilized to developthe SWEL for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1.The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items:o:* SWEL 1 (Attachment

1) is a sample of items to safely shut down the reactor andmaintain containment integrity

• . SWEL 2 (Attachment

2) is a list of spent fuel pool related itemsAPS Operations and Design Engineering Staff Members participated in the selection ofthe SSCs comprising the SWEL and provided inputs and assistance to the Equipment Selection Personnel to find the data associated with the equipment considered.

Theinterchange of information between the Equipment Selection Personnel and the APSStaff Members included:

" Weekly status meetings for review of the SWEL progress.

" Verification of equipment information through APS's SWMS Database system." Discussions with Operations relative to recent upgrades and changes to the plantthat might be relevant to the SWELs.* Discussions with Design Engineering and Operations to select equipment withoperational experience relevant to SWEL selection.

" Provided System Health Reports and Design Basis Manuals for review by theEquipment Selection Personnel.

Details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWEL have beenprovided to APS in the form of a formal presentation, given on July 18, 2012.Additionally, details describing the process for Selection of SSCs to produce the SWELare provided in the "Selection of SSCs" section of the Submittal Report.References

1) EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 3WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-5Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachments

1) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 12) Seismic Walkdown Equipment List 23) SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 4Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownPage F-6Attachment 1 -SWEL 1Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown

1. 1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) IPEEE WalkdownItem Equipment Description Building (SC -1 (Regular ty Equipment System or (I for vu Deferred to CommentsNubrLcnigIsetos)Function Eqimn ytm o Ifr vlerability Numb e qp Licensing Inspections?)

Suppor) Class Type replacement "Inside or en a t? Outage?Basis?) equipment?

O for enhancement?

"Outside")

Operations noted engineering Inst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to the1 1JAFBFT0041A Auxiliary feedwater flow MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Int AF No 140 (I) No No scaff This s be esamied by are(18) MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering 1JAFBFT0041B Auxiliary feedwater flow MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack AFscaffolding was recently added to the(18) MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering 3 1scaffolding was recently added to the1JAFBHV0030 SG-E01A reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MDV (B) AF No 104 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering 4 1JAFBHV0031 SG-EO1B reg valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104 (I) No No scaffolding was recently added to theMSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering S 1MAFBP01 AF pump "B" MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Horz. Pump AF scaffolding was recently added to the(5) No 104 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering 6 IJAFBUV0034 SG-E01A isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (l) No No scaffolding was recently added to theMSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering 7 1JAFBUV0035 SG-E01B isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (l) No No scaffolding was recently added to theMSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering 8 IJAFCUVO036 SG-E01A isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (I) No No scaffolding was recently added to theMSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.9 1JCHBHV0530 RWT outlet to SI train "B" AUX Yes Yes RC IC DHR MOV (8) CH No 104(l) No No10 1MCHBP01 Charging pump 2 AUX Yes Yes RC PC IC Horz. Pump CH No 104(l) No No(5)Train B For Charging Inst Rack11 1JCHBPSLO218 Pump 1MCHEP01 Suction AUX Yes Yes RC IC CH No 104(l) No NoLine Pressure Switch (18)Regenerative Heat12 1JCHBUV0924 Exchanger Outlet To Pass AUX Yes Yes RC IC SOV (8) CH No 104(l) No NoLine Isolation Globe ValveRWT level (required for Inst. Rack13 1JCHCLT0203C YARD Yes Yes DHR CH No 113 (0) No NoRAS) (1.8)Rege4 e a4%eet4 2Q (') me This item was removed frome4-4) SWEL 1.IPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 5 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-7Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 1 -SWEL 1Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown

1. 1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) WalkdownSWEL Waldow Desripion Buiding(SC-1 (Reglar (SaetyIPEEE Item Equipment Description Building (SC -1 (Regular Function Equipment System or (I for blity Deferred to Commentsr C"Inside"r Outage?Numbe q Licensing Inspections?)

Support)

Class Type replacement 0nfor enhancement?

Basis?) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

Charging Line To Reactor15 1JCHEHV0239 Coolant Loop 2A Isolation CTMT Yes Yes RC IC POV (7) CH No 120 (I) No YesGlobe Valve16 1JCHEHV0532 RWT suction iso (fails AUX Yes Yes RC PC POV (7) CH No 104 (I) No Noopen on loss of air)17 11CHEHV0536 RWT suction isolation AUX Yes Yes RC PC MOV (8) CH No 1041() No No18 1MCHEP01 Charging pump 3 AUX Yes Yes RC PC IC Horz. Pump CH No 104) No No(5) H N 10 I Noo19 1MCHET01 RWI" (refueling water Yard Yes Yes RC PC IC Tank (21) CH No 113(0) No Notank) DHRContainment Power20 1JCPBUVO005A Access Purge Supply CTMT Yes Yes CF MOV (8) CP No 120 (I) No YesIsolation Butterfly Damper21 1MCTETO1 CST (condensate storage Yard Yes Yes PC DHR Tank (21) CT No 113(0) No Notank)22 lMDGBF03 DG "B" air intake DG Yes Yes RC PC IC Other (0) DG Yes 140 (I) No Nostructure DHRRC PC IC23 1MDGBXO1A Starting air accumulator DG Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (l) No NoRC PC IC24 1MDGBXO1B Starting air accumulator DG Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (I) No NoRC PC IC25 1MECBEO1 Essential chiller "B" CTRL Yes Yes Chiller (11) EC No B0(l) No NoDHR26 1MECBPO1 Circulating water pump CTRL Yes Yes RC PC IC Horz Pump EC No 80ll) No No"B" DHR (5)RC PC IC27 1MECBT01 EC expansion tank "B" CTRL Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) EC No 80ll) No NoControl room "B" EAHU28 1JECBTV0030 flow reg valve CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV (7) EC No 80(l) No Noflow reg valveHeat29 IMEWBE01 EW "B" heat exchanger AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Exchanger EW No 104(l) No No1 (21)30 1MEWBP01 EW pump "B" AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Horz W No 104(l) No No(S) EW N 10(I Noo31 1MEWBT01 EW "B" surge tank AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR Tank (21) EW No 104 (I) No No(LLRT) RDT/GAS Surge32 1JGRBUVO002 Header Isolation Valve AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) GR No 104(l) No No(Outside Containment)

Although Train "A", the AHU's are ofgreater importance due to cascading 33 1MHAAZ04 EAHU AUX Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HA No 104(l) No No Tech Specs. HAAZ04 was selected as arepresentitive piece of equipment forthe new interpretation of Tech Specs.Inst. Rack34 1JHCBPT03S1B Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF (n8) HC No 104(l) No NoI__________

I___1 ___1 (18) _____ _____PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013Page 6WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-8Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 1 -SWEL 1Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations ScreenScreen

1. 3 Environment SWEL Walkdown

1. 1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) IPEEE WalkdownItem Description Building (SC -1 (Regular Equipment System or (I for vnerability Deferred to CommentsNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Class Type replacement "Inside"or vu Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

O for enhancement?

"Outside")

Inst. Rack35 IJHCBPTO352B Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (I) No No1181Discharge Sampling From36 1JHCBUVO044 RU-1 Containment CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 120 (I) No YesIsolation ValveInlet Sampling To RU-137 1JHCBUVO047 Containment Isolation CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 120 (I) No YesValveInst. Rack38 1JHCDPT0351D Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104(l) No No(18)Inst. Rack39 IJHCDPT0352D Containment pressure AUX Yes Yes CF (18) HC No 104(l) No No40 1MHDBA01 DG "B" room EAHU fan DG Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No NoDG "B" room essential 41 1MHDBJ01 eshaust fan DG Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No NoConautro oo A HUfn42 1MHJBF04 Control room EAHU (fan, CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(1) No No______ ~~filters and HX( _____43DC room "D" essential CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(I) No No1MHJBJO1A eshaust fan44 1MHJBJ01B DC room "B" essential CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(1) No No_____exhaust fan145 1MHJBM02 motor-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR MOV (8) HJ No 80(I) No No46 1MHJBM03 motor-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR MOV (8) HJ No 80(I) No No47 1MHJBM31 Air-operated damper CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(I) No No48 MHJBM Air-operated DC room "B" CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(I) No No48 1MJBMS8 isolation Air-operated computer CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(I) No Noroom DP5 1JHJBTICO124 Control room temp Temp50 indicating controller CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Sensor (19) Hi No 80(l) No No5 1MHJBZ03 ESF switchgear room "B" CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(I) No NoEAHU52 1MHJBZ04 DC room "B" EAHU CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(I) No NoRC PC IC Med. Volt53 1EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus 504 CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF SWGR (3) PB Yes 80(I) No No54 1EPEBG02 Emergency diesel DG Yes Yes RC PC IC Eng. Gen. Nogenerator "B" DHR (17) PE No 140 (I) No55 1EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Low Volt. PG No 80(I) No NoSWGR (2)56 1EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Low Volt. PG No 80(I) No NoSWGR (2)Low Volt.57 1EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PG No 80(I) No NoSWGR (2)55 1EPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 80(I) No No59 1EPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(I) No No60 1EPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(I) No NoIPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 7 IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-9Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdown Attachment 1 -SWEL 1Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown

1. 1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) WalkdownItem Description Building (SC -1 (Regular Function Equipment ype vunerability Deferred to CommentsNumbrLicensing Inspections?)

S t Class Type replacement "Inside"or vu Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for enhancement?

"Outside")

61 1EPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 AUX Yes Yes RC PC DHR MCC (1) PH No 104 (I) No NoDint Panel62 1EPKBD22 LC 34 control power CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(I) No No(14)63 1EPKBF12 DC battery "B" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery PK No 80(I) No No______ ~~Rack (15)No0))o 64 1EPKBH12 Battery charger "B" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery Chg PK No 80(I) No No(16)65 1EPKBM42 DC power to TCB1 control CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80(l) No NocircuitDist Panel66 1EPKDD24 DC distribution panel D24 CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR PK No 80(l) No Yes(14)67 1EPKCF13 DC battery "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC DHR Battery PK No 80(I) No YesRack (15)DC power to TCB1 control68 1EPKDM44 circuit CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80() No YesInverter For Shutdown Inverter69 1EPKCN43 Cooling Isolation Valve CTRL Yes Yes DHR (16) PK No 80(l) No No1JSICUV653 Inverter For IJSIDUV654 Shutdown Cooling B Inverter70 1EPKDN44 Return Inside CTRL Yes Yes CF (16) PK No 80 (I) No NoContainment Isolation Valve71Power to PPS "B" RC PC IC Dist Panel PN No 80(l) No Noinstrumentation DHR (14)PC IC DHR inverter72 1EPNBN12 DC/AC inverter "B" CTRL Yes Yes PN No 80(l) No NoCF (16)73 1EPNBV26 120 V vital ac voltage CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Other (0) PN No 80(l) No Noregulator "B" CF74 1EPNCD27 Power to PPS "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC IC Dist Panel Noinstrumentation DHR (14) PN No 80 (I) No NO75 ~~~PC IC DHR Inverter PN o 80I)N75 1EPNDN14 DC/AC inverter "D" CTRL Yes Yes CF (16) In r PIN No 80(I) No Yes76 1EPNOV28 120 V vital ac voltage CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Other (0) PN No 80(l) No Noregulator "D" CFPressurizer and Reactor77 1JRCBHV0105 Vessel Head Vent ToReactor Drain Tank Globe CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No YesValvePressurizer Vent To78 1JRCBHV0108 Reactor Drain Tank Globe CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No YesValvePressurizer Vent To79 1JRCBHV0109 Reactor Drain Tank Globe CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No YesValvePVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page8 IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-10Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 1 -SWEL 1Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL Walkdown

1. 1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) IPEEE WalkdownItem Equipment Description Building (SC -1 (Regular Function Equipment System or (I for vulnerability Deferred to CommentsNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Class Type replacement "Inside"or Os sutage?Basis?) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

80 1JRCBPT01O2B Przr pressure (required CTMT Yes Yes PC Inst. Rack RC No 120 (I) No Yesfor RPS/SIAS)

(18)81 1JRCBPT104 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120(l) No Yesinterlock C18NInst. Rack82 1JSBBCO2A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR RC No 80(l) No No(18)Inst. Rack83 1JSBCC02A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR RC No 80(1) No No84 1JRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120 Il) No Yesinterlock (18)85 1JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature CTMT Yes Yes PC Temp 9) RC No 120 (I) No YesSensor 119Isolation Containment When choosing containment isolation Isoltio Conainentvalves that esist for both inside and86 1JRDBUVO024 Radwaste Sump Outlet AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) RD No 104(l) No No outs taist otside asIsolaion ate alveoutside containment, outside wasIsolation Gate Valvechsn chosen.Control87 1IRMBB02 RWT level CTRL Yes Yes IC RM No 800) No NoPanel (201) M N 811 NControl88 1JRMBB04 RCS temperature CTRL Yes Yes RC Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No NoControl89 1JRMBB0S Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF Panel RM No 80(1) No NoPanel (20)Control90 1JRMBB06 Auxiliary feedwater flow CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No NoControl91 1JRMCBOS Containment pressure CTRL Yes Yes CF Panel (20) RM No 80(l) No NoSDHX A outlet Control92 1JRMNB02 CTRL Yes Yes DHR RM No 80(I) No Notemperature Panel (20)1Control93 1JRMNB04 Pressurizer temperature CTRL Yes Yes PC Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No NoBreaker94 1JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" AUX Yes Yes RC PC SB No 104(l) No No____________

__________Panel 121 __Operations noted engineering 95 JJSGBHV0178 Atmospheric dump valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124(l) No No scaffolding was recently added to theHV-178 MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering Atmospheric dump valve scaffolding was recently added to the96 1JSGBHV0185 HV-185 MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV 171 SG No 124(l) No No MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering 97 1JSGBPT0306 Instrument air line MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack scaffolding was recently added to thepressure transmitter (18) MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.IPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 9 IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-11Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 1 -SWEL 1Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Screen #3 Environment SWEL I1 Screen #2 (Safety Major new (Temp, °F) Walkdowne Equipment Description Building (SC- 1 (Regular nction Equipment System or (I for IPEEE Deferred to CommentsNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Class Type replacement "Inside"or enn e Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for nhancement?

"Outside")

Operations noted engineering 98 Iscaffolding was recently added to the98 1JSGBPV036B N2 supply solenoid valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR SOV (8) SG No 124 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering scaffolding was recently added to the99 1JSGBUV013D SG-ED1A isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.Operations noted engineering scaffolding was recently added to the100 1JSGBUVD135 SG-EO1B isolation valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124 (I) No No MSSS. This should be examined by areawalkby.SG-EO1A WR level Inst. Rack101 1JSGCLT1113C (reqie fr AFAS) CONT Yes Yes PC DHR Ins. c SG No 120 (I) No No(required for AFAS) (18)This item is being specifically walked102 IJSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long term CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 120 (I) No Yes down due to its significance in plantrecirc/SDC valve history (pipe vibration).

Heat103 1MSIBE01 SDHX "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger SI No 104 (I) No No1 (21)104 1MSIBP01 LPSI pump "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Vert. Pump SI Yes 104(I) No No(6) S e 0Io105 1MSlBP03 Containment Spray Pump AUX Yes Yes CF Vert. Pump The CS pump was selected forB (6) SI No 104 (INo No walkdown per ops/engineering request.HPSI Long Term106 1JSIBPSVO166 Recirculation Train B AUX Yes Yes PC DHR Other (0) SI No 104(l) No NoPressure Relief Valve107 1JSIBPSVO409 HPSI train "B" injection to AUX Yes Yes IC DHR Other (0) SI No 104(l) No NoEDT relief108 1JSIBPSV189 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to CTMT Yes Yes DHR Other (0) SI No 120 (I) No YessumpSafety Injection Tank 2A109 1JSIBUVO614 Discharge Isolation Globe CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (I) No YesValve110 1JSIBUVO616 RC loop 2A isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(l) No NoSafety Injection Tank 2B111 1JSIBUVO624 Discharge Isolation Globe CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (I) No YesValve112 1JSIBUVO626 RC loop 2B isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(l) No No113 1JSIBUV0636 RC loop 1A isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(l) No No114 1JSIBUVO646 RC loop 1B isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(I) No NoContainment Spray Pump115 1JSIBUV0665 Recirculation To Refueling AUX Yes Yes CF MDV (8) SI No 104(l) No NoWater Tank Train B GlobeValveIPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013Page 10WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-12Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 1 -SWEL 1Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen Se 3 Environment SWEL Walkdown

1. 1 Screen #2 Major new (Temp, °F) WalkdownItem Equipment Description Building (SC- 1 (Regular Function Equipment System or (I for vulnerability Deferred to CommentsNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Sunct) Class Type replacement "Inside"or Outage?Basis?) equipment?

0 for"Outside")

116 1-JSIBUV615 RC loop 2A LPSI isolation AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI No 104 (I) No Novalve117 IJSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SDC isolation AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (I) No Novalve118 IJSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc AS AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(I) No No(closes on RAS)119 IJSIBUV676 SUMP isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI No 104(l) No NoHPSI long term recirc loop Inst. Rack Non Class Power however kept in list120 1JSINPT391 1 p res irre loop CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR 18) SI No 120 (I) No Yes because of pressure boundary1 pressure xmtr (18) considerations.

121 1MSPBP01 Spray pond pump "B" SP Yes Yes PC DHR UHS Vert. Pump SP No 122(0) No No(6)122 lMHSBJ01 Spray pond pump house Selected per ops/engineering requestexhaust fan "B" SP Yes Yes PC DHR UHS AHU (6) SP No 122 ()environmental conditions Main Control BoardControl123 1JRMBB01 Section B01 Electrical CTRL Yes Yes PC IC DHR Panel (20) RM No 80(l) No NoSystems P (20)B Train ESFAS Relay Dist. Panel124 1JSABC01 Cabinets CTRL Yes Yes RC (14) SA No 80(I) No No125

• 1JZJBE01 Remote Shutdown Panel CTRL Yes Yes RC PC IC Control ZJ No 80(l) No No_____ __________

_________________DHR Panel (20)No Bl)o* The total number of SWEL 1 items is 124 instead of 125 because items 14 (1MCHEE01) was removed.

The item numbers in the first column of this table were not adjusted to make it easier tocompare the items listed herein to those in previous revisions of this document.

PVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 11WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F- 13Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 2 -SWEL 2Palo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1SWEL Screen 4J2 Associated e Walcldow iption E:uiprrent S-tem Buildng (SeismicWatow Screens wttthulapid CommieiwNumber Equipmem clam. Tpe Licensing In?) Draindown?

N__merBasis?]

1 1MPCAPOI Fuel pod cooling pump 1 PP PC Fuel Building Yes Yes I22 1MPCAEO1 Fuel pod weolvg heat exdcanger 1 HX PC Fuel Building Yes Yes 1473 1MPCSP01 Fuel pod cooling pump 2 PP PC Fuel Building Yes Yes w_4 1MPCOEO1 Fuel pod cooling heat exchanger 2 1-X PC Fuel Building Yes Yes N25 IMI-FAJ01 Fuel Building AHU AHU HF Fuel Building Yes Yes Wi6 1MI-JFBJOI Fuel Building AHU AHU HF Fuel Building Yes Yes N__IPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 12 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-14Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Table 3-1: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "System Type"(Note: The DF (Tank), GA (SOV), IA (SOV) and ZA (Dist. Panels) systems are notrepresented due to the equipment types covered by each system are already wellrepresented.)

StT Number of Items Number of Itemsysemype in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1AF 14 8CH 29 10CP 4 1CT 3 1DF 1 0DG 14 3EC 8 4EW 8 3GA 1 0GR 2 1HA 4 1HC 12 6HD 4 2HJ 21 11IA 1 0PB 3 1Number of Items Number of ItemsSystem Type in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 1PE 2 1PG 6 3PH 8 4PK 20 9PN 12 6RC 16 9RD 2 1RM 30 8SA 11 1SB 14 1SG 40 7SI 101 19SP 4 2ZA 6 0zi 11 1IIPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013Page 13 IWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-15Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Table 3-2: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Major new or replacement equipment" (Of the 412 items comprising Base List 1, 38 items were identified as "Major new or replacement equipment."

The following 15 items were selected for SWEL 1.)Base WalkdownList 1 Equipment Description Item115 1EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S0411 1JAFBUVO034 SG-EO1A isolation valve12 1JAFBUVO035 SG-EO1B isolation valve14 1JAFCUVO036 SG-E01A isolation valve272 1JSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long term recirc/SDC valve303 1MSIBP01 LPSI pump "B"312 1JSIBUVO626 RC loop 2B isolation valve313 1JSIBUVO636 RC loop 1A isolation valve50 1MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake structure 222 1JSGBUVO130 SG-E01A isolation valve223 1JSGBUV0135 SG-E01B isolation valve321 1JSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc iso (closes on RAS)310 1JSIBUVO616 RC loop 2A isolation valve314 1JSIBUV0646 RC loop 1B isolation valve319 1JSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SDC isolation valveIPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 14 [Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-16Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Table 3-3: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Equipment Type"(Note: Equipment type 4 (transformers) are not mentioned as they are part of larger parent equipment (i.e.switchgear, load centers).

Additionally, EQ type 12 (Air Compressors) and 13 (Motor Generators) are not includedas Palo Verde does not have any safety related equipment in this category.)

Equipment Type Description Number of Items Number of ItemsNumber in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 10 Miscellaneous 13 61 Motor Control Centers 13 62 Low Voltage Switchgear 12 43 Medium Voltage Switchgear 2 14 Transformers 0 05 Horizontal Pumps 11 56 Vertical Pumps 8 47 Fluid Operated Valves 23 108 Motor Operated Valves, Solenoid Operated Valves 115 319 Fans 8 410 Air Handlers 10 411 Chillers 2 112 Air Compressors 0 013 Motor Generators 0 014 Distribution Panels 41 515 Batteries on Racks 4 216 Battery Chargers and Inverters 12 517 Engine Generators 2 118 Instruments on Racks 74 1619 Temperature Sensors 3 220 Instrumentation and Control Panels and Racks 39 921 Tanks and Heat Exchangers (GIP Section 7) 20 8IPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 15 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-17Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Table 3-4: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on "Environment (Temperature)"

(Since the PVNGS Units are located in a dry environment, it was decided to classify theenvironments based on the maximum design temperature of the equipment rooms. Temperature values were determined from a review of the EQ DBM and the UFSAR.)Temperature Number of Items Number of Items(°F) in Base List 1 Selected for SWEL 180 142 (All inside) 47 (All inside)104 150 (All inside) 42 (All inside)113 8 (2 Inside and 6 outside) 3 (All outside)120 62 (All inside) 17 (All inside)122 4 (All outside) 2 (All outside)124 18 (All inside) 5 (All inside)140 28 (All inside) 8 (All inside)IPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 16Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-18Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Table 3-5: Sort of the Base List 1 data based on Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and the Availability of the Associated TrainBase Walkdown Is the TrainList e Equipment Description RAWItem Uaalbe45 1MCTET01 CST (condensate storage tank) 30500 No40 1MCHET01 RWT (refueling water tank) 56.89 No138 1EPKBF12 DC battery "B" 9.34 No115 1EPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 9.32 No10 1MAFBPO1 AF pump "B" 6.44 No122 1EPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus 4.92 No129 1EPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 4.92 No121 1EPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus 4.81 No131 1EPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 4.74 No336 1MSPBPO1 Spray pond pump "B" Low Risk No324 1JSIBUV676 SUMP isolation valve Low Risk No123 1EPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus Low Risk No130 1EPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 Low Risk No89 1MHDBA01 DG "B" room EAHU fan Low Risk No90 1MHDBJ01 DG "B" room essential exhaust fan Low Risk No128 1EPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 Low Risk No37 1JCHEHV0532 RWT suction iso (fails open on loss of air) Low Risk No307 1JSIBPSVO409 HPSI train "B" injection to EDT relief Low Risk No67 1MEWBP01 EW pump "B" Low Risk No68 1MEWBT01 EW "B" surge tank Low Risk No25 1JCHBHV0530 RWT outlet to SI train "B" Low Risk No321 1JSIBUV667 HPSI pump "B" recirc iso (closes on RAS) Low Risk No66 IMEWBE01 EW "B" heat exchanger Low Risk No283 1MSIBE01 SDHX "B" Low Risk NoIIPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 17 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownPage F-19Attachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Base Walkdown Is the TrainList 1 n Description RAW Unavailable?

Item Equipment Description 117 1EPEBG02 Emergency diesel generator "B" Low Risk No306 1JSIBPSVO166 HPSI Long Term Recirculation Train B Pressure Relief Valve Low Risk No60 1JECBTV0030 Control room "B" EAHU flow reg valve Low Risk No101 1MHJBF04 Control room EAHU (fan, filters and HX) Low Risk No57 1MECBE01 Essential chiller "B" Low Risk No58 1MECBP01 Circulating water pump "B" Low Risk No309 1JSIBUVO614 Safety Injection Tank 2A Discharge Isolation Globe Valve Low Risk No311 1JSIBUV0624 Safety Injection Tank 2B Discharge Isolation Globe Valve Low Risk No8 1JAFBHV0030 SG-EO1A reg valve Low Risk No9 1JAFBHVO031 SG-EO1B reg valve Low Risk No11 1JAFBUVO034 SG-EO1A isolation valve Low Risk No12 IJAFBUVO035 SG-EO1B isolation valve Low Risk No14 1JAFCUVO036 SG-EO1A isolation valve Low Risk No38 1JCHEHV0536 RWT suction isolation Low Risk No315 1JSIBUVO665 Containment Spray Pump Recirculation To Refueling Water Tank Train B Globe Valve Low Risk No143 1EPKCF13 DC battery "C" Low Risk No27 1MCHBP01 Charging pump 2 Low Risk No146 1EPKCN43 Inverter For Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve 1JSICUV653 Low Risk No151 IEPKDN44 Inverter For 1JSIDUV654 Shutdown Cooling B Return Inside Containment Isolation Valve Low Risk No213 1JSGBHV0178 Atmospheric dump valve HV-178 Low Risk No214 IJSGBHV0185 Atmospheric dump valve HV-185 Low Risk No272 IJSIAUVO651 RC loop 1 long term recirc/SDC valve Low Risk Yes303 1MSIBPO1 LPSI pump "B" Low Risk No305 1MSIBP03 Containment Spray Pump B Low Risk No308 IJSIBPSV189 RC loop 2 LTOP relief to sump Low Risk No310 1JSIBUVO616 RC loop 2A isolation valve Low Risk No312 IJSIBUVO626 RC loop 2B isolation valve Low Risk NoPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 18Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-20Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Base Walkdown RAW Is the TrainList 1 Equipment Description Unavailable?

Item313 1JSIBUV0636 RC loop 1A isolation valve Low Risk No314 1JSIBUV0646 RC loop 1B isolation valve Low Risk No316 1JSIBUV615 RC loop 2A LPSI isolation valve Low Risk No319 1JSIBUV656 RC loop 2 SDC isolation valve Low Risk No6 1JAFBFT0041A Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No7 1JAFBFT0041B Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No29 1JCHBPSL0218 Train B For Charging Pump 1MCHEP01 Suction Line Pressure Switch Not Modeled in the PRA No31 1JCHBUV0924 Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet To Pass Line Isolation Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No32 1JCHCLT0203C RWT level (required for RAS) Not Modeled in the PRA No34 1MCHEEO1 Regenerative heat exchanger Not Modeled in the PRA No35 1JCHEHV0239 Charging Line To Reactor Coolant Loop 2A Isolation Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No39 1MCHEPO1 Charging pump 3 Not Modeled in the PRA No42 1JCPBUVO005A Containment Power Access Purge Supply Isolation Butterfly Damper Not Modeled in the PRA No50 1MDGBF03 DG "B" air intake structure Not Modeled in the PRA No51 1MDGBXO1A Starting air accumulator Not Modeled in the PRA No52 1MDGBXO1B Starting air accumulator Not Modeled in the PRA No59 1MECBT01 EC expansion tank "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No70 1JGRBUVO002 (LLRT) RDT/GAS Surge Header Isolation Valve (Outside Containment)

Not Modeled in the PRA No73 1MHAAZ04 AFW pump room "A" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA Yes79 1JHCBPT0351B Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No80 1JHCBPT0352B Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No81 1JHCBUVO044 Discharge Sampling From RU-1 Containment Isolation Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No82 1JHCBUVO047 Inlet Sampling To RU-i Containment Isolation Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No85 1JHCDPT0351D Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No86 1JHCDPT0352D Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No102 1MHJBJ01A DC room "D" essential exhaust fan Not Modeled in the PRA No103 1MHJBJ01B DC room "B" essential exhaust fan Not Modeled in the PRA NoPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013 Page 19WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1 Revision 0PVNGS-1 January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-21Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Base WldwList Walkdown Description RAW Is the Trainistem Equipment Description?

Item Uaalbe104 1MHJBM02 motor-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No105 1MHJBM03 motor-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No106 lMHJBM31 Air-operated damper Not Modeled in the PRA No107 lMHJBM58 Air-operated DC room "B" isolation Not Modeled in the PRA No108 1MHJBM67 Air-operated computer room DP Not Modeled in the PRA No109 IJHJBTICO124 Control room temp indicating controller Not Modeled in the PRA No110 1MHJBZ03 ESF switchgear room "B" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No111 1MHJBZ04 DC room "B" EAHU Not Modeled in the PRA No137 1EPKBD22 LC 34 control power Not Modeled in the PRA No139 1EPKBH12 Battery charger "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No141 1EPKBM42 DC power to TCB1 control circuit Not Modeled in the PRA No147 1EPKDD24 DC distribution panel D24 Not Modeled in the PRA No150 1EPKDM44 DC power to TCB1 control circuit Not Modeled in the PRA No155 1EPNBD26 Power to PPS "B" instrumentation Not Modeled in the PRA No156 1EPNBN12 DC/AC inverter "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No157 1EPNBV26 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No158 1EPNCD27 Power to PPS "C" instrumentation Not Modeled in the PRA No162 1EPNDN14 DC/AC inverter "D" Not Modeled in the PRA No163 1EPNDV28 120 V vital ac voltage regulator "D" Not Modeled in the PRA No167 1JRCBHV0105 Pressurizer and Reactor Vessel Head Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No168 1JRCBHV0108 Pressurizer Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No169 1JRCBHV0109 Pressurizer Vent To Reactor Drain Tank Globe Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No170 1JRCBPT0102B Przr pressure (required for RPS/SIAS)

Not Modeled in the PRA No171 1JRCBPT104 SDC RCS pressure interlock Not Modeled in the PRA No172 1JSBBC02A I/V converter Not Modeled in the PRA No175 1JSBCC02A I/V converter Not Modeled in the PRA No177 1JRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure interlock Not Modeled in the PRA NoIPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 20 IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page F-22Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, Rev. 3NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic WalkdownAttachment 3 -SWEL Sort TablesPalo Verde Nuclear Station -Unit 1Base Walkdown RAW Is the TrainList e Equipment Description Unavailable?

Item179 1JRCNTE101 Pressurizer temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No181 1JRDBUVO024 Isolation Containment Radwaste Sump Outlet Isolation Gate Valve Not Modeled in the PRA No186 1JRMBB02 RWT level Not Modeled in the PRA No187 1JRMBB04 RCS temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No188 1JRMBB05 Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No189 1JRMBB06 Auxiliary feedwater flow Not Modeled in the PRA No190 1JRMCB05 Containment pressure Not Modeled in the PRA No192 1JRMNB02 SDHX A outlet temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No193 1JRMNB04 Pressurizer temperature Not Modeled in the PRA No195 1JSBBC03 Reactor trip breaker "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No219 1JSGBPT0306 Instrument air line pressure transmitter Not Modeled in the PRA No221 1JSGBPVO306B N2 supply solenoid valve Not Modeled in the PRA No222 1JSGBUV0130 SG-EO1A isolation valve Not Modeled in the PRA No223 1JSGBUVO135 SG-EO1B isolation valve Not Modeled in the PRA No228 1JSGCLT1113C SG-EO1A WR level (required for AFAS) Not Modeled in the PRA No334 1JSINPT391 HPSI long term recirc loop 1 pressure xmtr Not Modeled in the PRA No338 1MHSBJO1 Spray pond pump house exhaust fan "B" Not Modeled in the PRA No355 1JRMBB01 Main Control Board Section BO0 Electrical Systems Not Modeled in the PRA No374 1JSABCO1 B Train ESFAS Relay Cabinets Not Modeled in the PRA No409 1JZJBE01 Remote Shutdown Panel Not Modeled in the PRA NoPVNGS Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List May 24, 2013WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Page 21 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G- 1APPENDIX G -SWEL DEVELOPMENT TABLESThere were no changes to the equipment selected for Base List 1 (Table G-1). One item was removed from SWEL 1(Table G-2) because it was inaccessible in a locked high-radiation area and three Train C electrical components weresubstituted with their counterpart from Train D because they were inaccessible during refueling outage 1R17. Thesechanges are discussed in Section 3.4.There were no changes to Base List 2 and SWEL 2 (Table G-3).Table G-1: PVNGS-1 Base List 1(Refer to Table G- 1 of Reference 48, "Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 SeismicWalkdown Submittal Report for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit I ")WCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

-Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390Upon separation this page is decontrolled Page G-2Table G-2: PVNGS-1 SWEL 1Screen #4 Sample Considerations Screen ScreenSWEL #1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment WalkdownItem Walkdown Majorpion Bnewin Environmentr SaftyIPEEE Deferred toNumber Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., OF vulnerability Outage?Licensing Inspections?)

Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" orBasis?) Support) equipment?

0 for "Outside")

enhancement?

I IJAFBFT0041A Auxiliary MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst. Rack AF No 140(I) No Nofeedwater flow (MS8)FYeo Yes PCIDHRo(N8 2 IJAFBFT0041B Auxiliary Inst. Rack AF No 140 (l) No Nofeedwater flow MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR (18)3OIJAFBHV0030 reg IA MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104(l) No Noregulating valve4 IJAFBHV0031 e ivalve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF No 104(I) No NoHorz.5 IMAFBP01 AF pump "B" MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Pump (5) AF No 104 (1) No No6 IJAFBUVO034 SG-E01A isolation MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (l) No NovalveSG-E01B isolation 7 IJAFBUVO035S IBal MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (I) No No8 IJAFCUVO036 SG-vOIA isolation MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR MOV (8) AF Yes 104 (1) No No________

~~~~valve__________

_______9 IJCHBHV0530 RWT outlet to SI AUX Yes Yes RC IC MOV(8) CR No 104() No No9_ ICB 03 train "B" AUX DHRRC PC Horz.10 IMCHBPOI Charging pump 2 AUX Yes Yes IC Pump (5) CH No 104 (I) No NoTrain B ForCharging Pump Inst. Rack11 IJCHBPSLO218 IMCHEP01 AUX Yes Yes RC IC (18) CH No 104 (l) No NoSuction LinePressure SwitchWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement 1PVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Regenerative HeatExchanger Outlet12 IJCHBUVO924 To Pass Line AUX Yes Yes RC IC SOV (8) CH No 104 (l) No NoIsolation GlobeValveRWT level Inst. Rack13 IJCHCLT0203C revel YARD Yes Yes DHR (18) CH No 113 (0) No No(required for RAS) YAD YsYs DR (18)(This item was Heat4-4 removed from RgeaeratiVO-heat

..Y 4 C NO 444-(oN Yes.SWEL I in this exehangef (44report. SeeSection 3.4.)Charging Line To15 IJCHEHV0239 Reactor Coolant CTMT Yes Yes RC IC POV (7) CH No 120(l) No YesLoop 2A Isolation Globe ValveRWT suction iso16 IJCHEHV0532 (fails open on loss AUX Yes Yes RC PC POV (7) CH No 104 (1) No Noof air)17 IJCHEHV0536 RWT suction AUX Yes Yes RC PC MOV (8) CH No 104 (1) No Noisolation RC PC Horz.18 IMCHEP01 Charging pump 3 AUX Yes Yes IC Pump (5) CH No 104 (I) No No19RWT (refueling Yard Yes Yes Tank (21) CH No 113(0) No Nowater tank) IC DHRContainment power access20 IJCPBUVO005A purge supply CTMT Yes Yes CF MOV (8) CP No 120 (I) No Yesisolation butterfly damperWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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1. 1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment Walkdowntemb Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., FtoNumber Licensing Inspections?)

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21 1MCTET0 CST (condensate Yard Yes Yes PC DHR Tank (21) CT No 113(0) No Nostorage tank)DG "B" air intake DG Yes Yes RC PCD22 1MDGBF03 filter IC DHR Other (0) DG Yes 140 (I) No No23 IMDGBX01A Starting air RC PCaccunulatr DG Yes Yes RCDHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (I) No Noaccumulator IC DHR24 IDB0B Starting air RC PC24 IMDGBXOIB accumulatr DG Yes Yes RCDHR Tank (21) DG No 140 (1) No Noaccumulator IC DHREssential chiller RTL Ys e C DHC25 IMECBE01 "B" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Chiller (11) EC No 80(I) No No26 IMECBPOI Circulating water CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Horz Pump EC No 80(l) No Nopump "B" IC DHR (5)27 IMECBTOI EC expansion tank CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Tank (21) EC No 80(1) No No"B" IC DHRControl room "B" PC IC28 IJECBTV0030 EAHU flow CTRL Yes Yes DHR POV (7) EC No 80(I) No Noregulating valveEW "B" heat PC IC Heat29 IMEWBE01 exchanger AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger EW No 104I() No No(21)30 IMEWBPOI EW pump "B" AUX Yes Yes PC IC Horz Pump EW No 104 (l) No NoDHR (5)31LEB0 W "B" surge PC IC31 IMEWBTOI tank AUX Yes Yes DHR Tank (21) EW No 104 (l) No NoWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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1. 1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment WalkdownItem Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., F IPEEE Deferred toNumber Licensing Inspections?)

Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for "Outside")

enhancement?

(LLRT)RDT/GAS Surge32 IJGRBUV0002 Header Isolation AUX Yes Yes CF SOV (8) GR No 104 (1) No NoValve (OutsideContainment) 33 IMHAAZO4 A EAHpump room AUX Yes Yes PCDHRIC AHU (10) HA No 104 (I) No Yes34 IJHCBPT0351B AUX Yes Yes CF HC No 104 (I) No Nopressure (18)35 IJHCBPT0352B Inst. Rack HC No 104(l) No NoContainm35B resuen AUX Yes Yes CF (18) HCN10 )Noopressure (8Discharge 36 IJHCBUV0044 Sampling From CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 120 (I) No YesRU-I Containment Isolation ValveInlet Sampling To37 IJHCBUV0047 RU-I Containment CTMT Yes Yes CF SOV (8) HC No 120 (l) No YesIsolation Valve38Containment AUInst. Rack HC No 104(I) No NoContainm35D resuen AUX Yes Yes CF (18) HCN10(1Noo pressure (8Containment AUX Yes Yes CF Inst. Rack HC No 104(l)39 IJHCDPT0352D prsueAX Ys YsC 1) H o14()No Nopressure (18)DO "B" room PC IC40 IMHDBA01 EAHU fan DG Yes Yes DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No NoDG "B" room PC IC41 IMHDBJOI essential exhaust DG Yes Yes DHR Fan (9) HD No 140 (I) No Nofan III__II_Control room PC IC42 IMHJBF04 EAHU (fan, filters CTRL Yes Yes DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(I) No Noand HX) DHRWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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1. 1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment IPEEE Deferred toItem Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., OF vulnerability Outage?Number Licensing Inspections?)

Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or enancmet?

Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for "Outside")

enhancement?

DC room "D" PC IC43 IMHJBJOIA essential exhaust CTRL Yes Yes DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(l) No NofanDC room "B" PCtC44 IMHJBJOIB essential exhaust CTRL Yes Yes DHR Fan (9) HJ No 80(l) No Nofanmoto-opeatedPC IC45 IMHJBM02 motor-operated CTRL Yes Yes PH MOV (8) HJ No 80(l) No Nodamper DHRmoto-opeatedPC IC46 IMHJBM03 motor-operated CTRL Yes Yes PC MOV (8) HJ No 80(I) No Nodamper DHRPC 1C47 IMHJBM31 Pneumatic damper CTRL Yes Yes DHR POV (7) HJ No 80(l) No No48 1 MHJBM58 Pneumatic DC PC IC POV (7) Hi No 80(I) No Noroom "B" isolation CTRL Yes Yes DHR49 IMHJBM67 Pnuai TL YsYs PC IC POV (7) Hi No 80(l) No NoPneumatic CTRCYs es DHcomputer room DP DHRControl room temp PC IC Temp50 IJHJBTIC0124 indicating CTRL Yes Yes DHR Sensor(19)

HJ No 80(I) No Nocontroller ESF switchgear CTPCYs e1CH51 IMHJBZ03 "B" EAU CTRL Yes Yes PC AHU (10) HJ No 80(I) No Noroom "B" EAHU HDC room "B" PC IC52 IMHJBZ04 DAHU CTRL Yes Yes DHR AHU (10) HJ No 80(l) No NoRC PC Med. Volt53 IEPBBS04 4.16 kV bus S04 CTRL Yes Yes IC DHR SWGR (3) PB Yes 80(I) No NoCFEmergency diesel RC PC Eng. Gen. PE No 140(l) No Nogenerator "B" IC DHR (17)WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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1. 1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment IPEEE Deferred toItem Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., IF vulnerability Outage?Number Licensing Inspections?)

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RC PC Low Volt.55 IEPGBL32 480 V LC32 bus CTRL Yes Yes R PC PG No 80(1) No NoDHR SWGR (2)RC PC Low Volt. P 'o8 1 oN56 IEPGBL34 480 V LC34 bus CTRýL Yes Yes DHR SWGRPo l PG No 80(1) No No57 IEPGBL36 480 V LC36 bus CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Low Volt. PG No 80(1) No NoDHR SWGR (2)RC PC58 IEPHBM32 480 V MCC M32 CTRL Yes Yes DHR MCC (1) PH No 800() No NoRCPC59 IEPHBM34 480 V MCC M34 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(1) No NoRC PC60 IEPHBM36 480 V MCC M36 AUX Yes Yes DHR MCC (1) PH No 104(l) No No61 IEPHBM38 480 V MCC M38 AUX Yes Yes RCPC MCC (1) PH No 104(l) No NoDHR62 IEPKBD22 CTRL Yes Yes Panel PK No 80(l) No Nopower DHR (14)63 IEPKBFI2 DC battery "B" CTRL Yes Yes RCPC Battery PK No 80(1) No No63 ~~DHR Rack (15) PKN80)64 IEPKBH12 Battery charger CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Battery PK No 80(l) No No"B" DHR Chg (16)DC power to65 IEPKBM42 TCBI control CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (I) PK No 80(1) No NocircuitWCAP- 17679-NP, PVNGS-1Supplement 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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1. 1 Screen #2 N3 Major new Environment VDalkdown Item Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., IF IPEEE Deferred toNumber Licensing Inspections?)

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0 for "Outside")

enhancement?

1EPKDD24DC distribution RC PC Dist Panel66 (substitute for CTRL Yes Yes PK No 80(l) No Yes1EPKCD23) panel D24 DHR (14)67 IEPKCFI3 DC battery "C" CTRL Yes Yes RC PC Battery No NoDHR Rack (15) PK No 80(1)IEPKDM44 DC power to68 (substitute for TCBI control CTRL Yes Yes RC PC MCC (1) PK No 80(1) No YesI EPKCM43) circuitInverter forshutdown cooling Inverter69 1EPKCN43 isolation valve CTRL Yes Yes DHR (16) PK No 80(l) No NoIJSICUV653 Inverter ForIJSIDUV654 70 IEPKDN44 Shutdown Coolin Inverter PK No 80(l) No NoB Return Inside CTRL Yes Yes CF (16)Containment Isolation ValvePower to PPS "B" RC PC Dist Panel71 IEPNBD26 instrumentation IC DHR (14)80()

No No72DC/AC inverter PC IC Inverter PN No 80(l) No NoDC/ACPiBvre"B" CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF (16)120 V vital ac PC IC73 IEPNBV26 voltage regulator CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF Other (0) PN No 80(l) No No"B"Power to PPS "C" RC PC Dist Panel PN No 80(l)74 1EPNCD27 instrumentation CTRL Yes Yes IC DHR (14) No No1EPNDN14 DC/AC inverter PC IC Inverter75 (substitute for "D"CTRL Yes Yes (16) PN No 80() No YesI EPNCN 13) "D" DHR CF (16)120 V vital ac PCIC76 IEPNDV28 voltage regulator CTRL Yes Yes DHR CF Other (0) PN No 80(l) No No"lD" ---WCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-lRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for "Outside")

enhancement?

Pressurizer andReactor Vessel77 IJRCBHV0105 Head Vent To CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (1) No YesReactor DrainTank Globe ValvePressurizer Vent78 IJRCBHV0108 To Reactor Drain CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No YesTank Globe ValvePressurizer Vent79 IJRCBHV0109 To Reactor Drain CTMT Yes Yes PC SOV (8) RC No 120 (I) No YesTank Globe ValvePrzr pressure Inst. Rack80 IJRCBPT0102B (required for CTMT Yes Yes PC t18) RC No 120 (l) No YesRPS/SIAS)

_18)81 IJRCBPTI04 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120 (I) No Yesinterlock (18)Inst. Rack82 IJSBBC02A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR (18) RC No 80(l) No NoInst. Rack83 IJSBCC02A I/V converter CTRL Yes Yes DHR (18) RC No 80 (I) No No84 IJRCDPT106 SDC RCS pressure CTMT Yes Yes DHR Inst. Rack RC No 120 (I) No Yesinterlock (18.)85 IJRCNTEI01 Pressurizer CTMT Yes Yes PC Temp RC No 120 (l) No Yestemperature Sensor (19)Isolation Containment 86 IJRDBUVO024 Radwaste Sump AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) RD No 104 (l) No NoOutlet Isolation Gate ValveControl87 IJRMBB02 RWT level CTRL Yes Yes IC Panel (20) RM No 80 (1) No NoWCAP- 17679-NP, PVNGS- ISupplement IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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Function Class Type replacement (I for "Inside" or vulnerability Outage?Basis?) Support) equipment?

0 for "Outside")

enhancement?

Control88 1JRMBB04 RCS temperature CTRL Yes Yes RC Panel (20) RM No 80 (l) No No89Containment Control RM No 80(l) No NoContaMB05 pr nmuen CIRL Yes Yes CF Panel (20) RINo8()Noo pressure Pnl(0f0Auxiliary CTRL Yes Yes PC DHR Control90 IJRMBB6 feedwater flow Panel (20) RM No 80(l) No No91 IJRMCB05 CTRL Yes Yes CF RM No 80(l) No Nopressure Panel (20)SDHX A outlet GIRL Yes Yes DHR Control (292 IJRMNB02 temperature CoPanel (20) RM No 80() No NoPressurizer Control93 IJRMNB04 temperature GIRL Yes Yes PC Panel (20) RM No 80(1) No NoReacor tip

• Breaker94 IJSBBC03 Reactor trip AUX Yes Yes RC PC' Panel (2) SB No 104 (I) No Nobreaker "B' ael2Atmospheric 95 IJSGBHVO078 dump valve HV- MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124 (l) No No178Atmospheric 96 IJSGBHV0185 dump valve HV- MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG No 124 (1) No No185Instrument air line97 IJSGBPT0306 pressure MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR Inst SG No 104 (l) No Notransmitter (18)98 1JSGBPV0306B N2 supply ve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR SOV (8) SG No 124 (l) No Nosolenoid valveWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- IRevision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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1. 1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment WalkdownItem Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., IF IPEEE Deferred toNumber Licensing Inspections?)

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enhancement?

SG-E01A isolationNoo 99 IJSGBUVOI30 v Alve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124(l) No Novalve100 IJSGBUVO135 valve MSSS Yes Yes PC DHR POV (7) SG Yes 124(l) No NoSG-EOIA WRInst. Rack101 IJSGCLTI 113C level (required for CONT Yes Yes PC DHR (I8) SG No 120 (l) No YesAFAS) _ _8)RC loop I long-102 IJSIAUVO651 term recirc/SDC CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 120 (I) No YesvalveHeat103 IMSIBE01 SDHX "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Exchanger SI No 104 (1) No No(21)104 IMSIBP01 LPSI pump "B" AUX Yes Yes DHR Vert. Pump Yes 104(I) No No(6)105 IMSIBPO3 Containment AUX Yes Yes CF Vert. PumpSpray Pump B (6) SI No 104 (1)HPSI Long-Term Recirculation 106 IJSIBPSVOI66 Train B Pressure AUX Yes Yes PC DHR Other (0) SI No 104 (1) No NoRelief ValveHPSI train "B"107 IJSIBPSVO409 injection to EDT AUX Yes Yes IC DHR Other (0) SI No 104 (l) No Norelief108 IJSIBPSVI89 RC loop 2 LTOP CTMT Yes Yes DHR Other (0) SI No 120(l) No Yesrelief to sumpSafety Injection Tank 2A109 IJSIBUVO614 Discharge CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (1) No YesIsolation GlobeValveWCAP-17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS- 1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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1. 1 Screen #2 #3 Major new Environment WalkdownItem Equipment Description Building (SC -I (Regular (Safety Equipment System or Temp., IF IPEEE Deferred toNumber Licensing Inspections?)

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enhancement?

110 IJSIBUV0616 RC loop 2Ais6lon vA AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) S1 Yes 104 (I) No Noisolation valveSafety Injection Tank 2BIll IJSIBUVO624 Discharge CTMT Yes Yes RC IC MOV (8) SI No 120 (1) No YesIsolation GlobeValve112 IJSIBUVO626 isoloop 2vl AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (I) No No11 IJSIBUV66 isolation valve113 IJSIBUVi636 RC loop vA AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (1) No Noisolation valve114 IJSBUV646 RC loopl1B114 IJSIBUV646 isolation valve AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104 (I) No NoContainment Spray Pump115 IJSBUVO665 Recirculation ToNoo115 IJSIBUV0665 Refueling Water AUX Yes Yes CF MOV (8) S1 No 104(I) No NoTank Train BGlobe Valve116 IJSIBUV615 RCloop2ALPSI AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI No 104(I) No Noisolation valveRC loop 2 SDC AUX Yes Yes DHR MOV (8) SI Yes 104(1) No Noisolation valveHPSI pump "B"118 1JSIBUV667 recirc iso (closes AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) S1 Yes 104 (I) No Noon RAS)119 IJSIBUV676 Sump isolation AUX Yes Yes IC DHR MOV (8) S1 No 104(l) No NovalveHPSI long-term Inst. Rack120 IJSINPT391 recirc loop I CTMT Yes Yes IC DHR (18) SI No 120 (l) No Yespressure xmtrIMSPBPOI Spray pond pump SP Yes Yes PC DHR Vert. Pump SP No 122(0) No No21_ IMSPBP01 "B" SI Yes Yes UHS (6) SI__o 122_(_) NoNoWCAP- 17679-NP, Supplement IPVNGS-1Revision 0January 2014 Enclosure Appendices A and B contain Security-Related Information

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