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          )        '\,                              UNITE 3 STATES                            d
        .[
g              NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
      * ,b            j                                REGION 1 M1 PARK AVENUE                                  l
        %'+, . . . . . /,&                KING OF PMUS$lA. PENNSYLVANIA iMoS                        l l
March 22, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:        Phillip F. McKee, Chief, Operating Reactor Programs Branch, Division of Reactor Programs, IE FROM:                Stewart D. Ebneter, Chief, Engineering Programs Branch, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs, RI
 
==SUBJECT:==
APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G., SAFE SHUTDOWN TEAM INSPECTIONS Enclosed you will find logic and work sheets associated with Appendix R, Section III.G, Safe Shutdown Team Inspections.        These logic and work sheets were developed by Region I to digest the complex requirements of III.G and to provide for an orderly record of inspection findings respectively.          Some of these sheets were used for the recent SALEM-1 inspection and were found to be valuable to both the team and Region I management. These sheets are sent to you for your review and comment, and for distribution to our counterparts and team members, in the other Regional offices.
A list ef the logic and work sheets is provided in Enclosure 1 to\this letter.
A brief description of these logic and work sheets is presented in Enclosure 2.
It is our hope that this information may be of help to the inspection team in the other Regions: We welcome any comments.
Questions should be directed to Sada Pullani, FTS 488-1290.
UW            M Stewart D. Ebneter, Chief Engineering Programs Branch
 
==Enclosures:==
as stated cc w/ enclosures T. Murley T. Martin C. Anderson S. Pullani l
                                ~
1 l
8808150347 FOIA 080705 PDR                pop JONESBB-92 c                                                                                              (Y/P
 
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Enclosure 1 APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G, SAFE SHUTOOWN INSPECTION LOGIC AND WORK SHEETS Logic Sheets
: 1. Inspection and Enforcement Processes
: 2. Logic for Compliance with III.G
: 3. Effect of Approved and Pending Exemption Requests Work Sheets
: 4. Compliance with III.G 1
: 5. Compliance with III.G.2                                                            i
: 6. Compliance with III.G.3 and III.L                                                  l 1
: 7. Safety Significance of Inspection Findings                                        ;
: 8. Management Involvement in Complying with the Rule
                                                                                                )
: 9. Resolution of Inspection Findings                                                  l
: 10. Summary of Inspection ' Findings 1
j l
 
o  .
Enclosure 2
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION OF LOGIC AND WORK SHEETS l
The Logic Sheets attempt to digest the complex requirements of III.G, where as    l the Work Sheets provide for a systematic identification of specific deficiencies and an orderly record of these inspection findings, l
Item I shows the ovarall logic for the inspection and subsequent enforcemen'      I actions. Note that the safety significance and management involvement for all inspection findings are shown as part of the inspection process and should        l preferably be completed before the team leaves the site. This is to assure that significant safety issues are promptly identified, conveyed to the licensee and dealt with. Item 2 breaks down the complex requirements of III.G to its different protective options and their finer elements. Item 3 shows the effects of approved and pending exemption requests on compliance.
Note the Region I inspection criterion that an approved exemption request          i results in compliance and a pending exemption request results in an "Unresolved    1 Item", provided of course, the' remaining finer elements of the appropriate protective options are satisfied.
4, 5, ar.d 6 discussed below.
This criterion is also reflected in items    1 l
Items 4, 5, and 6 address compliance with subsections III.G.1, 2 and 3 of the rule. Items 7 and 8 provides input to the enforcement actions as noted in item 1. Item 9 keeps track of licensee commitments as opposed to acceptable solutions to the inspection findings.      Item 10 is primarily for the use of the team leader to summarize the inspection findings for management briefing. A completed Work Sheet (Item 5) is also enclosed as an illustration.
l
 
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                                                                                          ._.=.u._ _ . _ .            _    __  _  _ . _ _ _ _                  ,
E FFE CT OF APPROVED EXEMPTsos!                                        EFrtcT of PEMDir1G G X EMPTID A) g.G                                                                                    EG Re  WCH '                                                                          Regive Ped 3 I FA                    $$5                                                    l FA                    SSS  ,
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                                ~
s FULLfW9                                                                                                                        (J-fg pyp 3}
 
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9 PLhMT                                                                                                                COM PLD A N CE lulTW EG1                                                                                                                                                                                    .
L 81dg.) ' LEl. )) (LOC 64 ion)
RE DUNDheli TR A sN G OF SAFE SMUTDOMN SYSTEMS (SSS,)ie fs % i                                                                                            5 Gs. L R E G UIRE MEs>1s                                                                                                                CONCL tfS IOrl Crossoal. Inssnt slA -* Train hii) Tucan Bla) Train C(IB) Trasn Dinv)                                                          &                                }' 7,,j"                    '
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  * **'LQG                y y g FULL COMPLIANCG o-e solo' res .G.1 SSSs                                                                                                                                                                    t con,pl.                                                                            si,,. s 1            1),    g      UNRe sol ve,o COLD sNU1'DoMM(EG,lh $                                                                        NDM -COM PLibMCE G QUfPHEUT 1 Train pee o da m pe,                                                                              '*'*'^''**')
                                                                                                                                                                  ~                                          I e, s olis s'e s                                                          Gr .1
                                                                                                                                                                                                    *(compiel sheel s.2)                                                                          REASDAl
(.c!ACLE APPLICADLE MCTE CABLES                                                                                                                                                        **
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                                                                                                                                        ,, ,, e                                                    f              Esapeir maini4,"onsste
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                .            ..                  EA PLAIRI PPDTE CTsorJ PROVIDCD rM Tilt FIRE ARE A                                                                                        y om, 3gg APPROVED CxErfP TIG Al (3ER k) () () ( )
M EX F:AIDIMG kosTfo NPR        kW          L Dale)                                                                (Secison) (Payc
__i___1.                                                                                                              .
S K G TCil DF FIRE A REA                                                                                                          Et VL A AsA TORY AIO TES                                                                                                                                  LGGEND
      *!                                                                                                                                  (1)                                                                                                                                                      nan    Complo'ancepyrus'ad. ER M      Pasliat Corepin'ance (Eqlein)
C'3    Alon- compin'ance
()    Esplenalory Alois O    Reason 41 co ncluss'av)(cir<!*
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SSSs  s afe S!wiJoan Syslemt ER    Exempkon Reye#
SER    S-fcl Edals.aIu'an Rapod-l
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^
Con lo'nued on      S})GE*T                                                                                                  EMSPECTOR tAdd if necessar37)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        _
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                                                                                          "            ~                                                                                        !
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f --l                                                                                            ! l
                                                                                                                                                                                                              .w
 
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                            . SAFETY SIGNIFICAsiCE OF IM SPECTION WINDINGS PLhMT LGldg.)' (El.)* (Localion)
(}    IMS PE CTION FlMDINQ AN A LY SIS suNM A AY exFL A MA T/ou                                  p
          .t. $ A FE SHOTDoldM CAPAGlLITY (SSC)                                                                                                  I Yt.5 A/c                                                YLS Na (ass (4rning a..[ ire in FA)
                .11 A chien8, rneintnin H.t slidja>>l(Hs)ff                            l t . '2.      >
                                              >>    Cold      so      (Cs)?            l
: 2. MITl G A TIM G FA C TOR S ( P1Fs)
Comta<slohs
                .2.s Probabi+dTa Rre. Lou ?                                                    N FA (Tp)                                      {
Low Fire Lo n elo ^) ?                          l 12                                                          ?
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p o, t.Ls. ad, psi,< *s            e          !
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rj sna        ,,        ua.
gxple,n
(
2 4 SS C ifih~ ire uses no Loss of cpik Pewer (LOOP) ?                            %u prob ____              LOOP.'
Es plain                                        l
            .15          FP in L. FA previ                sal &Heet4                        L eHer                                          i    i er                          At C?                                              (Dah)        (sechen) (P.7) ggg 2G                re vi.etJ Clhe Y bli}          e  /efacfors f}i (,,deso,)
                                                                    ?
                                                                    ?                    .
l 7                    .
l                                                        1
: s. S A PE TY SIGNIFICAMCB
( Conso dce all MFs in Sec. 2 sine. . Alole Ynal I SII. ' @ ans wers are. .+ { Qanswees -. MFs)
* 3 I $l nJ{s'canhSa                        Concern ?
Ex Pt. A MATCAY NO TES                                                      ] l_tgryp
    ,        (l)                                                                          l    SSC Sef SilsrHeu,e CapetM,.
I    SSSs          **      **      sus i                                                                                i        MFs Mob shn Fackrs) a,d LOO P Lou by              sde Poun.
ConUnued on Sheeb                              1MSPECTCg              l        FA        fire A ,e a.
1                                                                                  ;
FP        fin Preh els ei, s.PULLhm                                                                                                                          '
 
                . M AMA GE MEU T X M VO L.VE M E A.I T'      1H COMPLYING MIT                THE RULR                                        l PL AAIT FIRE AREA (FA)                                                                                $ HE E T .}
cstelo.) # (Es.) * (toe, hen)
()    1N SPEC TIos) psga sKs q .,,.                                                                                                            ,
AMA LYSI S    SUM M AR Y                          l        E APL AN A TIO N
: 1. MANAdEHGHT R E sPONSIVE NE 55 W "b      -.
g1 onsive. lo all NRc lt.Hers                                                                                      e 1.L RespC including Gen. L<Haus ) ?                        l                                                                p 1.2 Good.faibi aNejk ce                    l              l                                                                  *l 1 3 'Def            edut.kr unch.cv>>rfunds) f I . 9 .ics        wenV lit and snin.          ?
: 2. ANALYSE S PERFORMED                                          !
2.L Pn - App. R PMA pr Iks. FA ?
21      PosI  App Ryg fg .lQ Q?
23 rfe s 2 A nok. dr ?                                    I                                                                    I
: 3. MoDIFI C A TIo Als                                            ;
31 he - Appe R commH. conplek ?                          l
              .3 .1                                                                                                                    '
Posb - App. A commit. complek 1                  l 31 Modifot . Ise. onel comnittmanh ?
A. Fire fro}cchon Program (rpe)                                  l AI Proc.edtrves acleynl[t                                  ,
A .1    &asfmed uell mainbimrl?
43 Skaff #6 aole                    ed
* 49 Traini              etc4.      ak ?                    !                                                      .
          .                                                                I
: 5. 07HEA. A77Al GUTEs (.Descu6e)                                                                                            j 51                                                        i                                                              t 52                                                        I i
t 5.1                                                      i                                                              s l                                                              !
G M AMAGE ME^JT IUVOLVCMEUT                                    \
: f. co n'si d tv. a.ll einv oNrofades.
                                                                            ;                                                            L Aloh /Adett @ answen a,c + .' 4                                                                                        ll bu                                                                  p
                    .\~oi answers n - f.eku in .uen                                                                                  _
b.I    A de galc
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EX PL AMATORY NOTSG IN SPEC T0 A
(' I Coni.inued en Pcs S.PULLhWe                                                                                                                      __
 
l ll y                                                                                                _
o        ;                                                                                                                                _
f m-n
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n                                            g t                                            b                                                f f                                                I 3                                              d                                              (
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R                                                t r lmc                                    S ba />                                      N S                                                                                l                                          I G                                                                                    p eh N                                                                                  c e    l I                                s                                          .          l m
D                                        ~                                    - fa        *f a                                                          t h
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I T
t s
e                                  ._ s ms
                              .                  y                                  .
n t C                                  e s      e                                        ol e E                                ER                                        .
li-c P                    .
k4                                          -      s      s
~,      S                    .
n 1 9                                      *.
k N                                I:
* de          r I            , .
                                          ** 4                                      .
f s n a
e        \
F                            -                                              .
je gK O                            .
                                                                                          ~us y
                                                                                    .              c
_.                                                            e    {*
N                  .
en s c<
O                  .        .
I n
T                  .                                                              e s ic e
                  )                                                                              f U        U          _
L        D                                                                      l c      u O        I T                                                                        fd
                                                                                  - b1          n S        A                                                                              i E        C s            _
R        O                                                                      (
L                      N.                                      - C
(                        O I                              .
                                                                                  .      R                  -
                )                        T                                                N
                    .                    C                              -
L                      A                                      _
O 5                  .                                            T (E      4              p                                    .-.
                '        t              E                                                E j        n i
T S
L G        D              E                              -    -
B D        !
n              G                              -                A L        a        .                                    -                T G
G      r        .                                      .
P
(                        U                                                E S                              .
C N        .
                                    .                                                      C O        -      E-                                              A I
T        - S    E C                                                                S                                              I G              N                                              N                                              H P        .
E                                                O
                                                                                          /                                              A s        -      C                                    -          I                                              L U              I 2  3        4                  L                t                            L I        -L                L.    .  -      -
A                      2  3      4            U 2    2  2        2 P
                          .              .                                                .              3    3  3      3            .
1              2                                  -
3                                              S
                                                                                                                              .!s lill        lll        c
 
    -            '                              i q
S                                        e T            K          .
_                              e E            R                                        s m, /.s E            A                                        n M            1 W                                        e      )
          $                                                      co E                                      L          0 R                                                0 n        HV C
1                                          f 8"'                                  .
I S
R      _                      .-
N        n                                          (
o                            _
0t i
n    _                        _
            .      C K *L _                                _-
E C
N S            A G
l C
I b
1            F D            I M                                        R N            G F
I I                                      E S                                      D N                                                    A O            Y                                      E I          T                                      L T            E C            r                                      M A
E            h                                      E P            S                                      T S
I
  .      A 1
F                    -
O
                                                                    )
Y                                                        y r
R                                                        a A                                                        s s
N                  _                                    e c
M                                                        c 1
U                                                        r S                                                        f i
_                                                  A J
A
(
b e
1 e
                        ^                                    h        ~
0                                a S        ~
1                                              ~
T                                        n      ~
                                                                        ~
P                                        o I
                                                                        ~
S                                      tr C      _
                                                                        ~
S                                        e i      '
E        _                              t      ~
D i
n      ~
l            I n          I o      ~A T                                                  C L
n                                                              L A                                                              U P
L
._        P            w                                              ~.
S
                                                    ,1 l
1 ! i  :      1
 
PLAN 7                      XU                                                                                                                                      COM PLIAN C E &JI TH                                    III . G. '2
* FIRE AREA                              AB                                                                                          GA' Cha vgsn,9 Ilavry Arcat                                                                                                                                                                                                  gygg,          12    ,
(UL DG. ) ' (EL. )*(LOCATION)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ,
RECUNDAuf TR AIMS OF SAFL SNUTDotJM 31STEus(s$5 sin' FA mi                                                                                                                                        a            P R01E CT E O N OPTIDM S OF lll G.2-                                                                                                          COMCLUSION
                                                        -e                                                                                                                                            N '' ~ouissDC PRI. c 0 A1 T ----+&                                                                                                          s.,
ccess out Trauns AIA TRAIM Alth TRAIN 15WIRAnNC& TMIMD(11)                                                                                                                                    a                  s a s sa c n on- susca ycb Pas. cour. 4 2                                                                                                  & FULL CoHPLIANCE SSSs                                                                cyc g                                                            l_ - __                                                y    e                  L                  c.                    &    1 c.                      _f                                    g @ unREsoLvCD
__ 4                                                                        .
NCAl- COMPLIAsnct    W_
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ' ^      "
E Qt11P M E A11                                                    Puyf>II                                                              Puyp 12 Puwg 13                                    j                              f                a                      h    1                                                      ,
i o    d              ,
4        5                                                          REA50M
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ^
CADLE S                                                                      "!' ' "                                                      "
E            *
* E'                          I    -Y      'o          U    'ba    <A            O            o    U  ' -t
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ~
* pD                                                            p                y?                                  -
O <
1)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          .i
* A    O K                            )
                                                                                                                                                                                                                '')      Ci 't                    M                                                                Cc                              ggggggy                  I,,5 f eUn c{ do ,
i                                            I PRO TE C TIOh! I'ROWDED IM TIIC FontE AREA                                                                                                                                                    .
4            4                                                                                                        so nnve rs r c> > t ri d a rca -
og                                                                                                                                            (1) () (          l(      )g      i8 l M3                  J E 32) (            3            4)                                                        #
4 M bPPROVLD E KC HPTIOFI (SER M ER                                                                                                                                        .5 g3 94
                                                                                                                                                                    .L le m -1      1
                                                                                                                                                                                                )n i > un > ( i( 3 e u u i( n                  .            I
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                >( nu>
PYhDnfDIU soths anR{E R se                                                                                                              (Darc) cisam    cAsc)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ...._a__~....--...-..__
skE rcin or FInc ^REA                                                                                                                                                                                  EAPLAMATORY 9eOTES                                                                                                                LEGEMQ l
g                                                                                                                                                  o Deleel.a., Ggisc=0
* LMe$                                  ,, ) pa,j,eg o,;cgjg conc ,e jc y,,((                                                                                                          Enir Compliance lAppumdER
                                                                                                                                                            ,1, . ,, , >, a t nact o
l                                                                                                                                                -y j\ulo sa.ppress.nn ligtneatf                            (1) Sep*'cl'a.,:                Be la.m Pa.usjon f 2                                                          ,
can Parinal coplias(tspid e------;--:                                                                                                                                        i,,e ,1,o,,, ,1,.. .,. .e .. a                                  c ,,, e a ,, ,:n a ..L,a is ~ a n y                                                                                                      a **4i" e l ~ro>w e sln                                                                                                                              (see s te. .5 also) .                                                                                                                                                                                      l) EAplsnnin l
                      ,,. , ,, f^,e ,                                                .Y 2 H Molm' (3) In slafl< L ardo st~ppv. nd'                                                                                                                    Q g ,,,,,        g, g      Mole-G,,efusi R                                                                                                                              , , , , y,                ,,  4,,,,,,,, z ,ff, , g3 43                                                                                              ,ss.    ,e,u,.,,y o        e~; s n                                                                                                                        ... c. u.,
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9, c n. , ,, .. ..., 1,,i,, ,, a n , .,, s                                                                                                          g,,, ,,                ,oa _
                                                                                        .' ' "                                                                                                                            <.<s lis~ l la-        [*,,,<,"'''''*'
EstemyNon ReyesF
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SAFE          SHU T Do k)N            INS PE C TID A)          GUIDE LIAIES, L. PJanb                                  Insp.s                                  1n:/3. meles u .1 n sp c clic.n kle inc4.c4y Gw-21        i: : :::,%                      @o o a=        buurrnevl>(E.6,J,ob,I                                Comrru)n o I.:                    ( B7?          '
                                                                                                                                                        .s      r) y 23        Ivpeel;co Go,k . sh eds ( Bla.n k Fm m .)
v9          L v:veclro n            th! .:          >
                                                                                      ,  Co wjaled =L hicrk - A c;l.:
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3:          PH A R , F. Alt                                        37        Condial- { Troy                            ed        ()
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33        GAe w h: FA l:,.m '.. . .;                            3e                        c.;
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: 5. : Ica <.,                              . Hosidct. -
                                                                                                  ~
AM 5 7 few Edwif              A oi  *.        >> 3 '' *
* A' G Ph! l Prernoji~/: Hend 7 r cie i ey
                                                                                                  ~
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53      E    n  lyknl  ecGad Ma <rs;. q'la      f4cnd rn
                                                                                                                          ~
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                                            <eo Aw,cA ~ 4                                                                                                t L . ews r.a P, e.s e ,n, .ab.4) pro,su :en                  -
s.,    p;n af 5,,k y                                    10. J s 4 (Troini'* l B *" p *y                                                                                                                      AN
:    s., a f'''.~ ~ ~Pk 55 Plad Tew(Escar d): Mor>dy
                                                                                                        .P. 1._    ,                                    ,    ,          .
: l. , Cfh% Ilem.:
b.I      l ivni/erdio 1 on:0)              ror            r$n m          er a  -    >Ah e          fd*l?,l('''/'                    Y
                                                                                                                                            '                            ~~
                                  '2      fro              k1        1o                                  >rll15fijR              bio & f'HN
                                                          ,7 r u ie r,,,-lo..                  1r { - o,,          ~ ,.
i-                                      ~,
 
              .                                                                                                                          - A lla eh m9 vl_L.
                  .                                                                                                                                    3 REPORT FORb1 AT AND RESPON SIBILITY PLANT 1                                                                                                  e. A e M A A T                                            8 1                                                .                                          st G S POMSlDILI T Y f"I* u[-
n S ECTION NUMGER 4 TITLE                                Keg,r cI*ry , ,
l RcnAcus R.yo.sr.., l.1, Groijp            als n u~        Rec 6M              :
  .                                                                                                                                n          .
I 1.0 Pe re ns Conh clecl                                            Nb          Att                A ll.                                Su AHA. 5 .
I 3-0      Paupo:e                                                  NA            RL            Pullaan              V'    l i
3.O Gack rou nc(.                                                  NA            RI            fu //. e <is        v'              I 1              t
  -                                                                                                                                  i                        (
    ,4O Coir e:por.rt c ec e                                                NA            B AlL                                                                4 i
                                                                                                                                  ,                            i c .t            PeJL a n,            v'
: 5. O Posi.-F. tic Scje Shulclown Gpcl} M A                                                                                                            l GO I. n *j)e cb ion                                              Mh          R !.            Pw%,                '
b$eYncclQls3mj
: 9. O Inepeel,w q                fed - Frre.                        .__                            _                                                  ,
j cep s.Lsun capddf.                                  _
l        9 :( Pi ! . I . , n      1    i'e,em F. ,a Av :                            __
t                                ,
I                                            i f                                                                                  !
7.!. x                            (,~.,*  A,,,
                                                                    -.)      F2.G. ' CI I fo,h .                        .    /                f i                                            !
i                                                                                                                                          *
    ;              7. t . y                          (r,vc    4,..  ;                  o v.(4 l
7 /.z                            ( F, rc A,c._                        ed* Hl                        ,            i y!                              l                  i l              71-o                            (fir. A n _ .j                      :
cwea j                                                                .
1                                                                  I 7.l 11                        ( f;, Ar.s _ y                        g$s                            .
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l I                7 /. 2 ;'.                    ( jQ,c. A rec    _j        Y        OTHE4 72                        .~huf. cI c,w f r eecluvu 2 (s.2f 3                  ASB
                          $enfe                                                                                                                                  .
l 72: F,oee A .. k/< , n.y I                ,
I i                                                                    .
                    , . 2. :. P, c c e d.. .e        UdLTAvey                      -        ,                                                                  ,
l                                                                                                                                                              l 73 A ssoci s.le d C, rca,'/s (c4ec.)b G.:i                                    sut(r).!                                                                i g, , ,, , a                        r.t i 1.4 U 1                                                                                              1 7 f , fire P,o le e l,s , fe a ture:                          E s.1 is cues                                                                          t l
75                                                                                            .
l La hi                    '
                                                                            ' E. .T ,      -h s B                                            s      '      *
: 2. 0o 2msgenug04 GthVlio,gsyg.o
: a.                                                                        <~ pcnea    Rcp
: 10. O Q a s./4              A  s: <e  re w  e.c.                    E. 6,L/,c    All            P u n, St. o      use              A Techn, go os fv Iv1p .                              Q 1.                              /
: 12. 0 Un resa e d. 14em.s                                              MA          RL          P uhm,.            /
L3 0        co a c/ u ss ev                                              NA        R t.          Pan .n i          /
ao Exs t l wl e m ea                                                    uA        c 1.          Putt m,            <                                    j
                                                                                                                                        .n nu.ap
      ~
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        .  .                                                                                          4 //oclu m u./ 2. ,
                                            ~
l~0R MA T        r 0R    FEEDER        REPOR T 70    Insp ecl%n of ?or b he t Sa.fc.Sh.l~'~t.ai.r.      -
                                                                            .            Cc.pa kUp 1        -
y 7.] Pr olc-lior . . , Variota Fire 11,ce s L&csc,a den A:io..esn,g.g.fa                                , ,,.p c -!, m i
                                                                      , Ch  e  ~
                                                                                <a%i @y
                                                                                      , ,  ,,,e&
ILv    c A,  <f...
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ff70 (Terry) u e r e,/                      M68__
 
          . etcase pan n i .
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50-        8                  I SITE                                                              insp. no.                  i N Atf6                                                TI TL E                  I    CR4h MI xA T/o r (
        .t.      LICENSEE l
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;                    S.V PULL A NI                            FIRE PRC TCC Tlo d  CAIGtNCER          R EGIb H J.
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A r er tH* y 1          ~
Inspe* tion Recults (Inspection Findings)                                                                                .I i
                                            -                                      :            USNRC inspection of a licensed activity normally results in                                                              !
vid a l'e s                                                                  I
                                                                                    - - -      1) the identification of ap i:=(:) cf a:-acompliance, 2) the
                                                                                  ,            identification of a Deviation, 3) a finding that the matter is acceptable, or 4) determination that the matter is unresolved.
In the latter case additional information is needed in order to properly classify the matter as one of the other three cases.
R EG.*J !. A13R T 13h514
                                                                                  ;        C S Tt.t ' DF Rl' -
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                                                                                                  .in tj)c elre n Cnlr ro'c        ?  ,_      3,g gn yg g                      n      Evih tory (,D) 4 /c .                              2_                                >          W ,m e. L,cen:ee
                                                                                                                                  'p.            FllJ DIN G ( F)                              cow.oitn.esd) 5 f .                  ,                                      kr C 2 T ~/01. E -f-A' A.TUF1          !.IC CI.'S E 2 S          ( "'Y ' '')                                        (- ^ d \'i D ;a v 4L) h m                                                                                          .
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A/OYC :                                                                                                  1 i
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* l III. Detailed Discussion A. De finieions A knowledge and understanding of the teminology is required before a mean-ingful description of the NRC Enforcement Program can be set forth.      We e
following definitions are, for the most paet, taken from IE Manual Chapter 0800 and the Code of Federal Regulations.                                            l
: 1. Regulatory Requirements Regulatory requirements are directions (or prohibitions) imposed on a licensee or other person which are legally binding -- those which are enforceable in the courts. Regulatory Requirements of concern to the NRC normally are those contained in the Ato=ic Energy Act, NRC Rules and Regulations, Orders, and Licenses and permits issued pursuant to            I the Act.
: 2. Licensee Cotr.it=ent Wrough various written or recorded means applicants and licensees soca-times promise that certain equipment, procedures, guides, codes or standards, controls or actions will be installed or implemented. Such a promise is a licensee co=mitment. They are not a regulatory require-ment and are not enforceable and cannot be used as the basis for ar(
t:IcicaNon                                                                    l item-o f-noncompitanca. They can, however, be used as the basis for a          l deviation and the licensee can be asked (but not required) to respond.          ;
i Licensee commitments can be transforned into a regulatory requirement i
by incorporation into a license (or permit) as license (or permit)              I 1
1 condition, or by changing the technical specifications. At such time            j they become legally snforceable and can be used as the basis gow af        -  !
Did aliou 4teu-of-noncompbmc e ,
i 9-3                                              l
 
                                                                  ./ '
l
                                                                                                      )
4 l
: 3. Acceptable Items An acceptable item is a matter or situation not involving an itea of-ta c( a:l2 u
            . noncompliance,    fatture to meet a license consniement, deviation, or an unresolved item. It is also an item which meets inspection criteria.
Weddi: 0
: 4. -14es-o f-Noncompli anc e A vicLxhou
            .An_iten of-noncompliance is a situation whc. rein a licensee fails to com-Vi ' o Items-oh  s nl . s:e liance,-have been ply with a regulatory requirement.                  '            '
:a                    L w a'          pi '.
categorized into three severity levels:      vio16    W ,4 ,- in f rac tio ns -and-deficiencies.- 'Ihese-categories are described in a letter to all                  -
licensees, dated December 31, 1974 c-                                                  1
: 5. Deviation A deviation is a situation wherein a licensee 1) fails to meet comit-ments to the Comission, 2) fails to meet provisions of applicable Regulatory Guides, or 3) f ails to comply with codes, standards or gener-ally accepted practices in the industry which have safety .or            security
                                                                                      . . . i ,) , e l
significance, and such situation does not constitute ari item of noncompliance.
: 6. Unresolved items An unresolved item is a matter about w !ch more information is required e.M slica in order to determine whether it is an acceptable itec, ari Leem-ofwon-compliance, or a fei-lura-.to meer = licensee-comunitment-(deviation).
: 7. Notice of Violation A Notice of violation is a written notice to a licensee required by 10 CTR 2.201, of apparent items-of-noneoeplieMviolations,__ infractions.              l
              .or de ficiano44+) . The Notice of Violation may itself be the enforcement          l sanction or it may be issued in conjunction with a civil penalty action or an order.
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PLAN >                                                                                                                      COM P L ikhl C E blTH                                  (([. G . 2_
FIR E AREA                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            SHEET
* f*2
_ .BtDG.
(            ) , (EL. ),(LOCATfDN)
RE DuMDAss T TR AIM S OF SAFL SilUID0tJN ST3 7EM S (S 35e)in FA uf                                                                                            P R'01E CT I O N OPTION S OF lll G.2                                                  C ONC L USION
                                                                                                                                                  *d ''                                                            '
                                    -v                                                                                                                        outstoc PRt. COUT Cross old Trains NA inssn A(1) TRAtNB((                                                                        TRAIN C(g TRAIUD llN) EN                        z nasnoe sson.1ncarcD PR s . Co ns T. --> $                                            FULL CoHPLIANCE S S Ss a.
t      r 4 b.
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E      2 y                          l$          5      2    8 i            %g lY; 3      mom. COMP LIActCt                                            .
h                                                      ( "0' A''* ")
E QUIPME M T                                                                                                                                                                }                          q,        h C        k ". 'D                S        E 4    *
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        $  d    R A              E REhson
                                                                                                                                                                                              -b                                  N      -
CADLE S                                                                                                                                              4 o o e 3 <                          c d 'o o                e        3  3
                                                                                                                                                              '') d % O < "                                " < " 2                0        <
l
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                $    g,4ptg;y PRO TE C TION PROVIDED th! THt FIR E AREA                                                                                                  .
                                                                                                                                                                }                                                              b OR M hPPROVED ExE 61PTson (SER
                                                                                                                                            ),                    n'                              i                                          1
                                                                                                                                                                          )( )( )( )( ><                          )( >< >(. >< )( >
                                                                                                                                                                >(                                          >(
                                                                                                                      ~
                                                                      -                                                                                    r E23 ER PLAIDIAIDIM krits JUR&E Rp (D                                                                      e c ATC) rson)    cAsc)
      ' SKETCH OF FIRE AREA                                                                                                                                  EXPL AMATORY NOTE S                                                                    LEGEND (1)                                                                                    m CornpliancelApprettelER can Parhat comploarn(Esplek C3 Non- compliance t>    Expla nalorg Nole.
a                            o, Condwien Q R{c.non  ,ct.
fic.A aol.)
FA      Fire Ar SSSs Safe. siw%n Sysicm ER      Exernpl ion ReyesF
_                                                                                                                                                                                                                            sea sage 9 eoas. R.,,,+.
e c. P,ime                                Confein=d AB    A ux.                  le(g -
                                                                                                                          - = _                                                                                                                        c R. Conhd Roovi l
  ;    Conlinued. on Sh eet                                                                                                                                                                          IM SPE s. TOR                                    Csn Cable Spread. Room E'H4 ER Pending with NRK 0 "''* 'E0 ._ ..-- .                                                                                                                _ _ _ .
 
XN                                                        COM P L E AN C t                        .TH      III . G . 2 P L A A17                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ,, y g g ,        1 A6            BA' Chargung kny A rea FIRE AREA
                                            ,( DL DG. ) ' (EL. )'(t_OCATiON) c o^/ C L U SID A) uf          P R'o1 E CT s 0 N OF:10 M S OF lll Gn.2 -
REDUMDAuf TR AIM S O! SAFF. SilllTDOUM SYSTEM s(S S$a) e% FA                                                        'b 4 OU1s sDC Pits. COU T                            .l                                    s.,
                                                  -e Ceoss otrl Irau. r,s AIA inson A(1) TRAINBl& TRhlN L(B)TRAIM D (W)EU zusave non-sncayev                                pas, cour. + 2 & ,;,,g_cogyg,xycc S S S3                                    CVC S          - - -                - --                              i                              3
                                                                                                                                                                      ,''      ,            kI [ h                    $ b U A' RESOLVED W
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                                                                                                                                            *                $    s
                                                                                                                                                                      $                  .                                          NOM- COMP LlhetCE
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        * * ^ '* 0 "b Puyp In          Puu:p 12 Punp 13                                      }                h      f                    s. h              h      1 E QUIPME M T k $            $      $5        5    d              h  O            d            REA50M                                  _-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ''' "#'N
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ^
Ne
                                                      '"I'
* E            "''$~                '' b'              \ I            .$ ~o            e -bo e u d              o          's< 3 g,pg,y 3,,, j a ff, 4 Q _
CADLE S                                                                      p*/' I                                                                            * <        loM 2          O        _q p"f"            p*~l'''                        , _ _ _ __\ h_ m et                      $  4      <        ~i                                          c Su nn yc Rt r o n n est avra -
PRO TE C TIOM PROVID E D thI THe FIRE ARE A                                                                        "
( 1) ,( ) ( 1( J g<in                  t) (3)      ()()()(              111                'I gg i
                                                                                                                                          ^                        I                              .
i+
r )(2.)( )( )( )( )( )( 8( )( )( 14 )( >
                                                                                                                          /
M      APPROVED E XC HP7sOM M E R PE,MDlyDin win 4RI{ E R (D A7c) E c crsort) cAsc) 1lem (SER 4      . .tI- s 3-8 4 EAP(.hMATORY MOTE S                                                                  LEGEMD SKETCH OF FIRE ^REA                                                                                                                                                                  g, g-(b DelecInon              h* cal)
* L ocel.ns ) pgvjjg w;cjjj; co C ,e jc                                                                                  CornploencelAppreedEl l                                                                            . i. . m ., ,,a      ~a                                                                                                  I2 m Pad,a caeplums%ple j                                                                      -y Anjo sajrpressrove ( l f lol}                i        ( )  Separalutn            :  Beluun        Pu>sp>            ,II _,
l                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          #Y V  ' * ~ ' ' ~                                                        t o cafions sI, awn o'd* r e at l-                            ( An g g ,, peng;,. y ,jh npp}                                                    o explan a.'ly mie l
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:        e \ e- ,1 r l m                                                  occ ,, s. 3              1, c > .
n, Q,,ejgg, ,I see a,ug                        - %                                                                          (3) f n3 c[lt A. a w {o. S & ff)r. ndb'                                                    Q g Y",,'o,,  'l*      I'''
* k " *
* y                      Mo V                                                      cr re a con cl. ?e r G a rs e r sc. l.cils
* B3FA                                          Fire Ar s.. .--:-;                                                                                                                                                                                                                U O          PUMP '21 H 2
                                                                            ~~- CNa s                                                @) C26h 3 [, oinf ]'#")
                                                                                                                                                                                              ""L """fp(d $$$3 Selr e. 6hlaan VLsfcw l                                                    yg fi '!< j'" ' '' ' '
se:t
* ro rt I ~~
                                                          -~
c .t lis" I In -                                                                  EK      Exernpl e'on Reyed
                                            - . ,        }''
n                                                                                                                                                                            sea sq.9soa.R,ps o          ec""' _'2 v ec p,;rno coni in d i s
                                          '                                                                                                                                                                                      A8 A(4x. Idg< -                  ~
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ~
                                                                                                                                                          - . _ _ _ _ _ _                      _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - --            C R. Conho(. Rood)
ERII*"I
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C P                                  -                              , 61 e
 
    '                                                  s                                    .
i l
10 4
March 23, 1984 0
TO ALL LICENSEES SUBJECT TO APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR PART 50:
Enclosed are four documents on the subject of the fire protection program at your facility mandated by 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. En-closure 1 contains NRC staff interpretations of certain Appendix R provisions.
In some cases the interpretations differ from those contained in previous staff guidance. Enclosure 2 contains questions developed as a result of the industry- .
sponsored Fire Protection Sen:inar held recently in Washington, DC. and NRC staff responses to those questions. Enclosure 3 contains additional questinns and answers which came to the staff's attention subsequent to the seminar. En-closure 4 is a complete list of previous staff guidance cr the fire protect.fon        j program. Where guidance has been modified by the interpretations in Enc,losure 1, it is so noted.
These documents are being provided informally at this time, and may be added to or otherwise modified during the remainder of the NRC Regional Workshops on        I At the conclusion of the workshops, the revised guidance will fire protecjion.
be transmitted fomally to all affected licensees. When this process is ccm-plete, the NRC will no longer accept arguments that either the Comission's rules or staff guidance on those rules has not been correctly understood.
6@
                                                                \'.h'''
 
1 i
l 1
l AGEt:0A FOR APPENDIX R WORKSHOP Region 9:00 - 9:05              Welcome Opening Remarks b          / .sVollmer/ Taylor 9:05 - 9:25 Scope of Appendix R Inspections                    ISE Oes MJ%
9:25 - 9:50                                                                                                ,
9:50 - 10:00              Break
                                                                                  #" *"'                          l 10:00 - 11:00              Information flotice 84-09 l
Fire Barrier Testing and Configuration            CMES r
Licensees Re-assessment for Conformance            DL                        )
to Appendix R f
Procedures for Alternative Shutdown                AS8                        ,
capability                                                                    !
Responses to Industry Questions and Additional Answers on the Spec'ific Area                            f CMES                      j 11:00 - 12:00 I            Fire Protection and Seismic Events                  CMEB                    !
II          Structural Steel                                    CMEB III          Fire Barrier Qualifications                          CMEB IV          Suppression 12:00 - 12:45 Lunch Break ASB 12:45 - 3:00  V            Safe and Alternate Shutdown                          ASB                    1 VI            Procedures                                            I&E                    l VII          Audits                                                ASB                    l VIII          Safe Shutdown and Fire Damage                                                l DL IX          Long Term Conformance                                CHEB X            Fire Area Boundaries                                  DL XI          Guidance Documents                                    DL XII          Exemption Criteria                                    CMEB l
XIII        Intervening Combustibles CHEB XIV          Radiant Energy Shields                                                        ;
CMEB XV          Emergency Lighting                                                          l 3:00 - 3:10    Break                                                                                    1 All 3:10 - 4:00    General huestions and Answer Session Vollmer/ Taylor 4:00 - 4:15    Wrap Up
 
5 v3 ATTENDANCE LIST MAY 4, 1984 Name                      Organization Arias , J.            Florida Power & Light Company Asfour, K. J.        Bechtel Power Corporation Asnoche, F.          Caroliria Power & Light Company Baker, W. H.          Tennessee Valley Authority Barnett, T. E.        Mississippi Power & Light Comp Barrow, J.            Florida Power & Light Company Bates, D. B.          Carolina Power & Light Company Bayer, R. K.          Virginia Electric Power Compan Bearden, B.          Missi.ssippi Power & Light Camp Bianco, V. A.        Tennessee Valley Authority Bilyeu, R. C.        Virginia Electric Power Compan Black, K. M.          Mississippi Power & Light Comp Blomberg, P. F.      Fluor Eng1neers, Inc. (FPC)
Bordner, R. E.        EPM, Inc. (NUFPG)
Brain, S. G.          Florida Power & Light Company Bray, J. M.          Georgia Power Company Bridges, S.          Tennessee Valley Authority Buck, C. L.          Alabama Power Company Burford, J. N.        Florida Power & Light Company Burgold, S. R.        Virginia Electric Power Compan Burns, W. E.          Georgia Power Company Butcher, R. C.        USNRC Butler, S. D.        NRC/RII Buxton, G. E.        Middle South Services, Inc.
Campbell, R. C.      Bechtel Power Corporation Carroll, H. E.        Virginia Electric Power Compan Carroll, K. C.        Virginia Electric Power Compan Castles, H. D.        Middle South Services, Inc.
Chase, J. W.          Carolina Power & Light Company Christopher, W. T. TVA, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plan Clark, T. V.          M&M Protection Consultants r.onlon, T. E.        NRC/RII Crisler, M. J.        Florida Power & Light Company Crienjak, R. V.      USNRC Cutter, A. B.        Carolina Power & Light Company Dager, H. J.          Florida Power & Light Company' Davis, M. J.          USNRC Deacy, R. M.          Impell Corporation Deckert, W. M.        Phoenix Contractors D'eckmann, H.        CEI (Pery)
O( nnelly, H. I.      South Carolina Electric and Ga Coubleday, E. C.      NES Downs, R. E.          Georgia Power Company Dungan, K. W.      ,PLC Dymek, J. L.      C Florida Power & Light Company Eaves, D. W.          American Nuclear Insurers Ellis, D. B.          Tennessee Valley Authority, (N El rod, S. A.        NRC/RII
 
m  w              ~
                                                                  /
dage2ofAttendanceListforMeetingof 05/04/84 Name                                  Organization Y
Elton, T. L.                  Georgia Power Company Engelhardt, J.                TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
* Feierabend, C. D.            USNRC Ferguson,' R. L'.'            NRC/DE Fioravante, N.                USNRC Firestone, A. B.              Carolina Power & Light Company Fisher, C. L.                Florida Power & Light Company Franklin, J. C.              Florida Power & Light Company Garner, L. W.                Nuclear Regulatory Comission Garrett, F. D.                Tennessee Valley Authority Goewa, L. T.                  Georgia Power Company Gosla, I.                    Bechtel Power Corporation Grace, J. N.                  Nuclear Regulatory Comission Guill, P.                    Duke Power Company Hafer, D.                    Gilbert Associates Inc.
Haltom, S. O.                Georgia Power Company Hardy, S.                    Carolina Power & Light Co.
Harkleroad, J. R.            Tennessee Valley Authority Hart, S.                      Georgia Power Company Hawkins, W. F.                Watts Bar Nuclear Plant                    i Virginia Electric & Power Co.
Hegner, J.
Hehl, C. W.                  Nuclear Regulatory Comission Hellums, M.                  Tennessee Valley Authority Helsel, J. C.                Bechtel Hendricks, J. R.              Duke Power Company Holland, W. E.                OSNTEC Holmoerg, V.                  Mississippi Power & Light Comp Holmes-Ray, P.                Nuclear Regulatory Comission I
Horrell, M. P.                EBASCO Services Inc.
Hutchins, S. P.              Mississippi Power & Light Comp Hyland, E.                    Duke Power Company                          l Jackson, R. W.                Bechtel Jenison, K. M.                Nuclear Regulatory Comission Jones, D. H.                  Alabama Power Company Kane, J. P.            .      EPM                                        !
Kemer, R. W.                  Florida Power and Light Compan            l Kilroy, R. J.                Bechtel King, T. W.                    Duke Power Company        .
Kinsaul, R. L.                Southern Company Services Koom, A. R.                  South Carolina Electric & Gas Kubicki, D.                  USNRC                                      l Kune, S. W.                  Bechtel                    .
LeBlanc, C.                    Phoenix Ledford, T. A.                Duke Power Company                        l Logan, S. B.                  Tennessee Valley Authority Love, D. L.                  Ark. Power and Light Company Luehman, J. G.                Nuclear Regulatory Comission Madden, P.                    Nuclear Regulatory Comission Maddry, J. M.                Southern Comoany Services Mali, K.                      Tennessee Valley Authority Manner, D. S.            ,?  PLC, Inc.
Mantz, D.                    Florida Power & Light Co.
Ha rdi s , D.                United Energy Services Maxwell, G. F.                Nuclear Regulatory Comission
 
3 of Attendance List for Meeting of 05/04/84      .
1 Name                                  Organization              g l    McAfee, D. E.                  Georgia Power Company McAnuity, P.                  Duke Power / Catawba
* McKee, P.                      Nuclear Regulatory Comission McKeown, E.                    Tennessee Valley Authority McLeod, J. N.                  Southern Company Services McNeill, T.                    Carolina Power & Light Co.
McQueen,J.                    Carolina Power & Light Co.
Meras, J.                      Rockbestos Miles, R. C.                  Tennessee Valley Authority, Wa Miller, R. F.                  SCSI Mosby, D.                      Impell Corp.
Moxley, R. K.                  Georgia Power Compar.y Myer!, D. O.                  Nuclear Regulatory Comission Nejfelt, G. M.                Nuclear Regulatory Comission Nickle, J. L.                  Management Analysis Co.
Oates, R.                      Carolina Power & Light Co.
O'Laughlin, R. J.              PLC, Inc.
Olshinski, J. A.              Nuclear Regulatory Comission Orga, R.                      Virginia Electric & Power Co.
Parr, K. P.                    Tennessee Valley Authority Patterson, C.                  hRC/ Browns Ferry Peebles, T. A.                Nuclear Regulatory Comission Pickett, E.                    Georgia Power Company                  l Pierson, B.                    Nuclear Regulatory Comission            ;
Pitts, T. L.                  Tennessee Valley Authority            '
Pointer, K.                    Georgia Power Company Ponder, J. J.                  Georgia Power Company          ,      1 Porter, D.                    Florida Power                          l Porterfield, R. E.            Carolina Power & Light Co.            l Powell, R. J.                  SCSI Powell, S.'C                    Florida Power                          l Prevatte, R.                  Nuclear Regulatory Comission Publ, B.                      Bechtel Power Corporation Quick, D.                      MAC Reckford, S.                    Florida Power & Light Co.
Reed, J. M.                    Southern Company Services Revels, R. W.                  Duke Power Company Rhinehart, M. D.                Georgia Power Company Rhoads, D. A.                  Gilbert / Commonwealth Rippe, J.                      TSI Ristan, D. J.                  Wisconsin Public Services Roper, E. Y.                    Carolina Power & Light Co.
* Ruggiero, J.                    EBASCO Services Ruland, B.                      NRC/Farley                            l Schmiedel, R. P.                Florida Power Corporation Shead, R.                      Rockbestos Sheehy, E.                      Tennessee Valley Authority Shelton, E. J.                  Bechtel Power Corporation Shields, W.                    USNRC Shukla, G. S.                  Bechtel Power Corporation Sinopoli, C.                J Virginia Electric Power Compan Skolds, J.
Impell Slovic, R. C.                  Bechtel Power Corporation Snell, W. D.                  Georgia Power Company
 
        -4 age 4 of Attendance 1.ist for Meeting of 05/04/84 vf
    .        Name                                Organitation                                                                                          ,
i Sprankle, R. A.                Georgia Power Company                                                                                          U#
!        Stetka, T. F.                  USNRC                                                                                        .
Stock, F.                      United Energy Services
                                                                                                                                      *                    /y Stouffer, L. R.                Bechtel Power Corporation                                                                                        /y(
Sudduth, C. H.                  Tennessee Valley Authority Taylor, P.                      Nuclear Energy Services Thompson, R. E.                Tennessee Valley Authority Traczyk, G. J.                  Florica Power & Light Company Vance, J. C.                    SCSI Walker, D. A.                  Tennessee Valley Authority Wallace, D. L.                  Tennessee Valley Authority Wambach, T. V.                  USNRC/0NRR/DC Warnick, L.                    Virginia Electric Power Compan Waters, D.                      CPU Waters, D. L.                  Duke Power Company Weaver, E. M.                  Duke' Power Company Webb, G. M.                    South Carolina Electric and Ga Whitney, L. E.                  USNRC/DQASIP/0RPB Wilks, G.                      M&M Protection Consultation Williams, K. A.                Florida Power Corporation Wilson, J.                      USNRC Wilson, J. W.                  SCSI Wilson, K. R.                  Florida Power Corporation Wimbrow, R. T.                  Tennessee Valley Authority Wright, R. J.                  Mississippi Power & Light Comp
                                                                                        '                                              f r
                                                                . . , - _ , .,- . .      , . , . _ . ,_ _                  ..,r-_  ,    __ . _ , , _ ,    _
 
[                                            ,
                                                                                      'pcJoWA        '          -l
                              -              Interpretations of Appendix R l
l Section III.L.2.d of Appendix R
: 1. Process Monitoring Instrumentation to 10 CFR Part 50 states that "the process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of' the proce1Lvariables necessarv to                        (
l terform and con \ trol" the reactivity control function, the reactor coolant In I&E Information makeup functio    and the reactor heat removal function.
Notice 84-09 (Attachment 1, p.6), the Staff provides a listing of instru-4 mentation acceptable to and preferred by the Staff to demonstrate compli-Q                              While this guidance provides an acceptable method q      fancewith*,hisprovision.
for compliance with the regulation, it does not exclude other alternative /aow W methods of compliance. Accordingly, a licensee may propose to the Staff gg
[v    n While such a /dfid''#
        ,) G,P  k alternative instrumentation to comp?y with the regulatiol
)        ,
f tbmittal is not an exemption request, it must be justified based on a The licensee may also propose alternatives _to
  /                  echnical evaluation.
O' $
        .J g/
b M'yyactualcompliancewiththeregulation(e.g.,instrumentationw E
            '      not provide a direct reading of the process variable) by filing an exemp-f              tpnrequestwithadequatejustification.
2.
Reoair of Cold Shutdown Equioment Section III.L.5 of Appendix R states that when in the alternative or dedicated shutdown mode, "equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions shall not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equip-ment and systems shall be limited so that the systems can be made operab This is not to be and cold shutdown can be ' achieved within 72 hours."
confused with the requirements in Section III.G.l.b of Appendix R.
Section III.G.l.b contains the requirements for normal _ shutdown modes utilizing the control room or emergency control station (s)
 
ttifand ik                            ik lif
                                                                                                                      .                                                                                                      l l
capabilities. The fire areas falling under the requirements of III.G.I.b are those for which an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability is not being provided.                      For these fire areas, Section III.G.l.b requires r              ~
only thegpabilityj repair the systems necessary to achieve and main-tain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) within 72 hours, not the capability to repair and achieve cold .s_hutdown within 7? hours as required for the alternative or dedi-cated shutdown modes by Section III.L (noted above).
With regard to areas involving normal shutdown, however, Section I of Appendix R states that reairs must be made using only onsite cap-                                            ,
abilities,                fter repa      are made cold shutdown can be achieved on a                            .
reasonable schedule using any available power source.                                                          fpuV.
Fire' Damage Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 utilizes the term                              32 g M g 3.
In promulgating Appendix R, the Commission has ee of'                                                                                                --
0 provided methods acceptable for assuring that necessary structures, f
systems and components are f ree of fire damage (see ea, Section III.G.2a,
      &        b and c), that is the structure, system or component under consideration is capable of performing its intended function before, during and after the postulated fire, as needed.                  Licensees seeking exemptions from these provisions of the regulation must show that the alternative proposed will also provide reaso'nable assurance that necessary structures, systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions before, during and after the postulated fire, as needed.
: 4.            Fire Area Boundaries The term "fire area" as used in Appendix R                                                i means an area sufficiently bounded to withstand the hazards associated i
 
c
        )                                              ,
with the area and, as necessary, to protect important equipment within In order to meet the regulation, the area from a fire outside the area.
fire area boundaries need not be completely sealed floor-to-ceiling,
  ~
wall-to-wall bdundaries.      Where fire area boundaries were not approved                                                h under the Appendix A process, or where such boundaries are not wall-to-                                                  a wall, floor-to-ceiling boundaries with all penetrations sealed to the l
fire ratino required of the boundaries, licensees must perform an evalua-tion to assess the adequacy of fire area boundaries in their plants to determine if the boundaries are sufficient.        This analysis must be per-formed by at least a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Although not required, licensees may submit their evaluations                  ,
for Staff review and concurrence.      In any event, these analyses must be retained by the licensees for subsequent NRC audits.
: 5. Automatic Detection and Suppression      Sections III.G.2.b and III.G.2.c of Appendix R state that "In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area..."
Other provisions of Appendix R also use the phrase "fire detectors and                                                  ;
an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area..." (see e a ,
Section III.G.2.e).
In order to comply with these provisions, suppression and detection sufficient to protect against the hazards of the area must be installed.
In this regard, suppression less than full area coverage may be adequate to comply with the regulation. Where full area suppression and dea c-tion is not insta11ec, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy and necessity of partial suppression and detection in an
 
r  .    .      .  .
t
          )
* 1 area. The evaluation must be performed by a fire protection engineer Although not required, licensees and, if required, a systems engineer.
may submit their evaluations to the Staff for review and concurrence.
Inanyevent,dheevaluationsmustberetainedforsubsequentNRC audits. While full suppression in an area is not required by the regulation (unless necessary due to the hazard associated with the area), where 3 licensee is providing no supp ession or detection, an                      !
exemption must be requested.
: 6. Alternative or_0edicated Shutdown Section III.G.3 of Appendix R provides for "alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the      .
l While general guidance issued                l area, room, or zone under consideration".                                                l by the Staff to date has reflected a preference for alternative shutdown to be independent of the fire area under consideration, this is not intended to imply tnat alternative shutdown in the same fire area but                    1 independent of the room or the zone is unacceptable or not also in com-                  1 pliance with the regulation.
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l QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE NUCLEAR UTILITY FIRE PROTECTION SEMINAR I. Fire Protection and Seismic Events QUESTION A. For which situations other than the reactor coolant pump lube oil system are seism'ic events assumed to be initiators of a fire?                                                                      I 1
i
 
===RESPONSE===
{
The guidelines for the seismic design of fire protection systems which cover other general situations is delineated in BTP CMEB C.1.C(3) and (4):
    "(3) As a minimum, the fire suppression system should be capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown following the safe shutdown l
earthquake (SSE).      In areas of high seismic activity, the staff will consider on a case-by-case basis,the need to design the fire detection and suppression systems to be functional following the SSE.
(4)    The fire protection systems should retain their original design capability for (a) natural phenomena of less severity and greater frequency than the most severe natural phenomena (approximately once in 10 years) suen as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, ice storms, or small-intensity earthquakes
 
  <    >                                                                                        m 1
l that are characteristic of the geographic region, and (b) potential man-made site-related events such as oil barge collisions or aircraft crashes that have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific J
plant site. The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall picnt fire protection program."                                J l
We have considered California as being a high seismic activity area.
l For those plants reviewed under Appendix A, our position is (A.4):
                    "Postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not be        ,
considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomens".
Our guidelines on the seismic design of fire protection systems installed in safety related areas are delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.29 "Seismic Design          1 Classification", paragraph C.2. The failure of any system should not affect            l l
a system from performing its safety function.
Our guidelines on the seismic design of hydrogen lines is delineated in BTP CHEB C.S.d(5):
(5) Hydrogen lines in safety-related areas should be either designed to seismic Class I requirements, or sleeved such that the outer pipe is directly vented to the outside, or should be equipped with excess
 
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l                                                                                      I i
flow valves so that in case of a line break, the hydrogen concentration in the affected areas will not exceed 2%.
All PWR's have a hydrogen line going to the Volume Control Tank (Make-up Tank) that needs to be protected.
To identify plant specific situations in which seismic events could initiate a fire in a specific plant area, the fire protection engineer and systems engineer performing the fire hazards analysis should be concerned with l
in-situ combustible materials which can be released in a manner such that      l An          l they could contact in-situ ignition sources by a seismic event.          ,
example of this would bi the rupture of the RCP lube oil line directly above
                                                                                      \
the hot reactor coolant piping. The fire protection engineer should also be concerned with seismic induced ignition sources, electrical or mechanical, which could contact nearby in-situ combustible materials.
 
l - >
e        QUESTION B.
Is a random fire to be postulated concurrent with a seismic event?                            1 I
 
===RESPONSE===
Our position, as stated in Section C.1.6 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, is "Worst case fire need not be postulated to be simultaneous with nonfire-related failures
                                                                                                              /
in safety systems, plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena."
Where plant systems are designed to prevent the release of combustible materials caused by a seismic event, such as a dike around a fuel oil tank transformer, or seismic supports for hydrogen lines, then no fire                '
need to be arbitrarily assumed to take place in the fire hazards analysis.              .
Because it'is impossible to completely preclude the occurrence of a seismically induced fire, Section C.6.c(4) of CHEB 9.5-1 states:
                  "Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual firefighting in areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake. The piping system serving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be    provided The            withvalves piping and supports to ensure system pressure integrity.
for the portion of hose standpipe system affected by this functional requirement should, as a minimum, satisfy ANSI B31.1, ' Power Piping.'
The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valves in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a normal seismic Category I water system such as the essential service water system. The cross connection should be (a) capable of providing flod to at least two hose stations (approximately 75 gpm per hose station), and (b) designed to the same standards as the seismic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the seismic Category I water system."
The post-seismic procedures should include a damage survey, and a deter nation of whether any fires were initiated as a result of the seismic event.
 
l l
l
'                          OUESTION I
C.
If the reactor coolant pump lube oil system and associated appertanances are seismically designed, does the lube oil collection system also require seismic design? Is an exemption required?
u
 
===RESPONSE===
Where the RCP lube oil system is capable of withstanding the safe shutdown l
earthquake (SSE), the analysis should assume that only random oil leaks from the joints could occur during the lifetime of the plant. The oil collection system, therefore, should be designed to safely channel the quantity of oil    ,
1 from one pump to a vented and closed container.
Under this set of circumstances,  l the oil collection system would not have to be seismically designed to channel leakage to the container.
1 An exemption would be required for a non-seismically designed oil collection          l system. The basis for this exemption would be that random leaks are not assumed to occur simultaneously with the seismic event, since the lube oil However, the Rule, as system is designed to withstand the seismic event.
written, does not make this allowance.
 
* '                                          J                                                  ha QUESTION D.
It would appear that a literal reading of Section III.0 regarding the oil collection system for the reactor coolant pump could be met by a combination of seismically designed splash shields and a sump with sufficient capacity to contain the entire lube oil system inventory.
If the reactor coolant pump is seismically designed and the nearby piping hot surfaces are protected by seismically designed splash shields such that any spilled lube oil would contact only cold surfaces, does the design concept conform to the requirements of the rule?
 
===RESPONSE===
If the reactor coolant pump, including the oil system, is seismically designed and the nearby hot surfaces of piping are protected by seismically designed splash shields such that any spilled lube oil would contact only cold surfaces, and it could be demonstrated by engineering analysis that a sump and splash shields would be capable of preventing a fire during normal and design besis accident conditions, the safety objective of Section III.0 would be achieved. Such a design concept would have to be evaluated under the exemption process. The justification for the exemption should provide reason-able assurance that oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage The sump should be points would be safely collected and drained to the sump.
The shown capable of safely containing all of the anticipated oil leakage.
analysis should verify that there are no electric sources of ignition.
 
                                                                                                              /
II. StructuM1 Steel QUESTION A.
Does the NRC's definition of structural steel supporting fire barriers completely accomodate approaches described in NFPA guidance documents and standards?
1 l
l
 
===RESPONSE===
l The NRC does not define the structural steel supporting fire barriers.
This steel is identified by the licensee. Our position regarding the need to protect the structural steel, which forss a part of or supports fire barriers, is consistent witn sound fire protection engineering principles as delineated in both NFPA codes and standards, and The Fire Protection Handbook.                    ,
i I
 
3              l l
l i
                                                                                                                                \
l QUESTION                                                                                                            i l
1 l
B.
Is it necessary to protect structural steel in existing fire barriers where those barriers were approved in an Appendix A SER?
                              \.
f
 
===RESPONSE===
f If unprotected structural steel in existing fire barriers has been evaluated and specifically accepted the configuration in a published safety evaluation report (SER), it is not necessary to protect the steel or request an exemp Exposed steel, such as cable tray supports, need to be protected if their failure because of a fire would result in the loss of the integrity of the                          .
fire barrier.                                                                                                    ,
e 8
                            ,    , - - - - , , - - - - . .,--,-.,--,,,,,,,----,,,...,,-.-,,n      . , ,- - ,--v  -  ~ ,,---
 
O P
* k l                                                                                                                                      l l
l l
s
                                                                                                                                      )
1 QUESTION                                                                                                                        .
C.      Does structural steel whose sole purpose is to carry dynamic loads l
from a seismic event require protection in accordance with Section                                                      l III.G.2a of Appendix R?
 
===RESPONSE===
f If the failure of any structural steel due to a fire could result in the loss of the fire barrier, it must be protected.                                                                              .
O e
l 1
i
 
l ,  ,                                                                                            'o III. Fire Barrier Q'ualifications OVESTION A. RecedtlytheStaffhasapplieda325'Fcoldsidetemperature criterion to its evaluation of the acceptability of one-hour and three-hour fire barrier cable tray wraps. This criterion is not in Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5.1, Appendix A as an acceeptance criterion for fire barrier cable tray wraps and is not contained in Appendix R.      It appears to represent post-Appendix R guidance. What is the origin of this criterion and why is it applicable to electrical cables where insulation degradation does ,
not begin until jacket temperatures reach 450*F to 650*F?
l
 
===RESPONSE===
Fire barriers relied upon to protect shutdown related systems to meet the requirements of III.G.2 need to have a fire rating of either cne or three l
hours. 550.48 references BTP'APCSB 9.5-1, where the fire protection definitions are found.      Fire' fating is defined:                                          l "Fire Rating - the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure; it defines the period of resistance to a standard fire exposure before the first critical point in behavior is observed (see NFPA 251)."
 
it I
The acceptance criteria contained in Chapter 7 of NFaA 251, "Standard of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials," pertains to non-be These criteria stipulate that transmission of heat through the fire barriers.
barrier "shall not have been such as to raise the temperature on its une The ambient air surface more thar, 250*F above its initial temperature."
temperature at the beginning of c fire test must be between 50'F an!
The It is generally recognized that 75'F represents an acceptable norm.
resulting 325'F cold side temperature criterion is used for cable tray wraps because they perform the fire barrier function to preserve the cables free of fire damage.
It is clear that cable that begins to degrade at 450*F is free of fire damage at 325'F.                                                                                                                            '
1 l
l 1
_    _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _        _ _ __. _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ - .          _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ = - _ _ _ _ _ . _ -          -
 
    . ,                                                                                m l
QUESTION l
B.
Due to obstructions and supports, it is often impossible to achieve      I exact duplication of the, specific tested configuration of the one-hour fire barriers which are to be placed around either conduits or cable For each specific instance where exact replication of a        N' trays.
previously tested configuration is not and cannot be achieved, is an exemption necessary in order to avoid a citation for a violation?        l
 
===RESPONSE===
No.
Where exact replice. tion of a tested configuration cannot be achieved, l
the field installation should meet the following criteria:                '
l 1.
The continuity of the fire barrier material is maintained.
l
: 2. The thickness of the barrier is maintained.
i 3.
The nature of the support assembly is unchanged from the tested configuration.
 
o    '
                                                                .                                                (3 2                                                                                                  l
                        ,                                                                                                                        t
: 4. The application or "end use" of the fire barrier is unchanged from the tested configuration. For example, the use of a cable tray barrier to protect a cable tray which differs in configuration from those that were f
testedwodidbeacceptable. However, the use of structural steel fire proofing to protect a cable tray assembly would not be acceptable.
l
: 5. The configuration has been reviewed by a qualified fire protection engineer and found to provide an equivalent level of protection.
e 4
l l
                  --          - . _ . -    ,,-_,.-..,,__,,,_._-,,_-,~_,._,,..,__._,,-,#
                                                                                                  -.m. -. . _ , - _ , _ , . . _ ~ , , - . - - ,
 
                                                                                    /7 QUESTION C.
Where labeled and rated fire doors have been modified to incorporate security hardware or for flooding protection, is an exemption from Appendix R required?
x
 
===RESPONSE===
Minor design changes to a fire door assembly which do not change the fire rating of the fire barrier in which they are installed does not need an exemption. An example of a minor change would be the installation of "contacts" for electronic supervision of the door.
The installation of a plastic vision panel would constitute a modification    '
I which necessitates an exemption request.
1 I
l
 
1
    . n l
1 i
QUESTION                                                                                                                                      !  )
IV. Automatic Suppression                                                                                                                  I l
i A.
Staff guidance provided in Generic t.etter 83-33 concerning automatic suppression coverage of fire areas              "throughout interprets the \
phrase "in the fire area" in Section III.G as meaning What delivered water density or occupancy standard the fire area."                                                                    i                        ?
as specified in NFPA-STD-13 must be achieved to meet this i
 
===RESPONSE===
Thedesignershoulddetermine}
Individual plant areas are diverse in nature.
Those areas which the particular water density or occupancy classification.b                                      tibles,
* contain a limited quantity of in-situ and anticipated                    idered as transient com and which feature contents such as tanks and piping,For                                  may      those be cons                l "Ordinary Hazard (Group 1)", as defined by NFPA Standard                                            pancy No. 1 areas containing large amounts of cables or flammable liquids, a The decision as to which classification of "Extra Hazard" may be warranted.                                                          t ction classification should be applied should be made by a qualified!
engineer.
h ld be
(
Once the occupancy classification is determined,                Any density along the water de based on the Density Curves in table 2.2.1(B) of NFPA 13.
lineated in the curves would be in conformance with our guidelines as de                                                                              l Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
                                                                                  ,n. . - . , - - - - - . - - - . , - , . - - . - . - - - - - - - - .
 
a ,
* 6 QUESTION B.
Section 4.1.2 of NFPA-STD-13 allows for "partial insta,11ations" or partial coverage.
The standard states that "(t)he authority having With the NRC as jurisdiction shall be consulted in each case."
authority in this instance, must consulation occur only through the exemption process?                                                                                                  v
 
===RESPONSE===
I No. The staff is always available to consult with utility representatives and provide guidance as to the ac:eptability of a particular fire protection configuration in individual plant areas.                                                                              .
                                                                                                                                \
 
  . .                                                                                                      J QUESTION C.
How does a suppression system designer know whether the term "throughout the area" means that sprinkler heads must be above or below cable trays when, in his judgment, the hazard of concern is a floor based fire?
 
===RESPONSE===
Section C.6.c(3) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 states:
l Fixed water extinguishing systems should conform to requirements of
        "(3) appropriate standards such as NFPA-13, "Standard for the Installation f
of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA-15, "Standard for Water Spray Fixed                                          :
Systems."                                                                                                  !
This question pertains to those sprinkler systems covered by NFPA-13.
l Chapter 4 of NFPA-13 provides guidance as to the location of sprinkler hea                                            I In general, to achieve complete area-wide                      l in relation to common obstructions.
coverage, sprinklers should be located at the ceifing, with additional sprin provided below significant obstructions such as wide HVAC ducts an To the extent that an existing or proposed or solid bottom stacked cable trays.
sprinkler systes design deviates from this concept, the design would h justified by a fire hazards analysis.
 
t t)
QUESTION        .
D. Must suppression systems approved and installed under BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A be extended or altered to meet the total area requirements of Section III.G (as interpreted by the Staff) or does this "requirement" only appl  to new installations?
 
===RESPONSE===
Suppression systems installed in connection with Appendix A may or may not have to be extended as a result of III.G. The licensee must analyze each area where suppression is required by III.G, and where only partial suppression has been provided, determine if the coverage is adequate for the fire hazard in the area. The licensee may consult with the staff during this review. In any event, the Appendix R analysis showing
      'that the suppression provided is adequate must be retained and available for NRC audit.
i l
l l
 
\
    *  *  /
V. Safe and Alternative Shutdown QUESTION A. As part of the Appendix A review process, some plants had committed to an alternative shutdown system in the form of a remote shutdown panel or remote shutdown system. Footnote 2 to Appendix R describes alternative shutdown capability as being associated with "Rerouting, relocating, or modifying of existing systems." To the extent that an existing remote shutdown system previously reviewed and approved under Appendix A to BTP 9.5.1 does not require modifications, rerouting, or relocating of existing systems, are the requirements of Section III.L of Appendix R backfit?
RESPONSE                                                                            .
Yes. E.xisting remote shutdown capabilities previously reviewed and approved under Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 do not categorically comply with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R.      Licensees were requested to re-analyze their plants to determine compliance with Section III.G and, thus,
  .            Section III.L of Appendix R.                    ,
l
 
o ,
e6 QUESTION R. Some licensees defined safe shutdown capability for purposer of analysis to Section III.G criteria as being composed of both the normal safe shutdown capability and the pre-existing redundant or remote safe shutdown capability which was previously installed as part of the Appendix A process.      This definition often took the form of two "safe shutdown trains" comprising (1) one of the two normal safe shutdown trains, and (2) a second safe shutdown train capability which was being provided by the pre-existing remote shutdown capability. This definitional process, which was under-taken by a number of licensees, makes a significant difference in the implementation of Appendix R.      Under such a definition, does Section III.L criteria apply when the Commission did not call out Section III.L as a backfit?
Resp 0NSE The definitional process mentioned' considers an alternative shutdown 1
capability provided under the Appendix A review as a redundant shutdown              j capability under the Appendix R review.        This definitional process is incorrect. For the purpose of analysis to Section III.G.2 criteria, the        l safe shutdown capability is defined as one of the two normal safe shut-            l down trains.      If the criteria of Section III.G.2 is not met, an alternative shutdown capability is required.      The altenative shutdown capability may utilize existing remote shutdown capabilities and must meet the criteria of Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R.
 
QUESTION C.          Why do the Staff interpretive memoranda regarding the criteria for satisfaction of Section III.L form the auditable basis for deter-mining codpliance to Appendix R v: hen the Commission failed to backfit this section to all plants?
 
===RESPONSE===
Although 10 CFR 50.48(b) does not specifically include Section III.L.
with Sections III.G. , J. , and O. of Appendix R as a requirement 1
applicable to all power reactors licensed pr.ior to January 1, 1979, the Appendix, read as a whole, and the Court of Appeals decision on the Appendix, Connecticut Light and Power, et al. v. NRC, 673 F2d. 525 (D.C. Cir. ,
1932), does mean that Section III.L. applies to the alternative safe shutdown                                                                                    j option under Section III.G.
l l
l l
          - _ _ _ ,            -_ --  _- _  _ _ _ _ ~ __  - _ _ _ . . _ _                . _ . _ .___ ,,r . - _ . . . _ . , -_ _
 
s  a
? . .                                                                                                                    ,
stes                        a VI. Procedures l
QUESTION A. With regard to the term "post-fire procedures" the Commission states that it is impossible to predict the course and extent of a fire.
Given this, how does one write post-fire shutdown and repair pro-cedures that are both symptomatic and usable to an operator?
l
 
===RESPONSE===
Safe shutdown capabilities including alternative shutdown capabilities are all designed for some maximum level of fire-damage (system unavail-abilities, spurious actuations).                              Since the extent of the fire can not be predicted, it seems prudent to have the post-fire shutdown procedures guide the operator from full system availability to the minimum shutdown capability. As for repair procedure, similar conditions exist. A repair procedure can be written based on the maximum level of damage that is expected. This procedure would then provide shutdown capability without accurately predicting likely fire damage.                                                                                                    ,
                                      - - , - - - - , , + ~ - - - , - - - ,    -,,--,-nr,-r,        - , - ~ -- - - +w-nv    --n---,-e-,,-  -,  w
 
e
~ '
on s QUESTION
: 8. Does the NRC have any requirements regarding whether post-fire operating procedures should be based upon fire areas, systems, or by symptom-based?
 
===RESPONSE===
The NRC does not have requirements, nor do we propose any requirements regarding whether post-fire operating procedures should be based upon fire areas, systems or be symptom-based.                                            We suggest that the pos'..-fire shutdown capabilities designs be reviewed with the plant operat'Jn staff and procedures written with their input.                                                                                                              .
      --    - - - - . . . , , _ _ , -      ..,....---+-...mm-,---  ., , _- - . ..-.--  ,.,-,.----.,---__.,ew,-- - - - - . .-,-. - - - - - - ,-- . ...- - , , -
 
            ~~~
  . a m,
QUESTION C.      Is it acceptable to develop post-fire operating procedures only                                                                                                              l for thnse areas where alternative shutdown is required? (For                                                                                                                ;
other areas standard, emergency operating procedures would be utilized in the presence of potential fire damage to a single I
train.)                        .
                                                ~
l RESPONSE                                                                                                                                                                            l Yes. The only requirement for post-fire operating procedures is for                                                                                                              l those areas where alternative shutdown is required.                                                                                                            For other 6 teas of the plant, shutdown would be achieved utilizing one of the two normal trains of shutdown system.                          Shutdown in degraded modes (one train unavail-able) s,hould be covered by present operator training and abnormal and emergency operating procedures.                                            If the degra.ied modes of eparation are not presently covered, we would suggest that the optration staff of the plant determine whether additional training or procedures are needed.                                                                                                                )
l l
l l
 
  . .                                                                          e<, d> l QUESTION D. Do any NRC Staff guidance documents exist relative to the extent, form, nature, etc. of Appendix R post-fire operating procedures?
 
===RESPONSE===
No. Other than the criteria of Section III L, no specific post-fire shutdown procedure guidance has been developed.
f                #          h l?          /          /
                                =      ju                A o f 6 4 u d s a'ud
                                                  ./An w & n a A a u s s oo w ,J d s # s; & p + m ' s "
pnp +M.
M      //  wwi A 4. N'"
                  --,,c                y-asas
 
e a t
VII. Aug!ts' QUESTION A. Since the Commission states that fire damage cannot be defined and fire                                                                        i spread cannot be predicted, how does the Commission determine which Appendix R violations have "important safety implications?"
 
===RESPONSE===
III.G.2 provides alternative to ensure that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage.          Fire spread within one area cannot be predicted, but damage is limited to one fire area.
Determination of the Appendix R violations that have "important safety impli-cations" are based on the equipment, components, and systems that are located in the same fire area shat are needed for saft shutdown or can adversely affect safe shutdown, and are not protected by the features of III.G.2, III.G.3 or an approved alternative.
I 8O
                          -- - . - - -    --,,n., -. ...--,---, - --w-,_ - ,-,-      -w,, , , , ~ g-.- - . - - , - n-_,-- - - - . - - ,,,a-,_-n.--,,-  e-,-
 
                                                                                                                              - ~~ --
QUESTION B. How does the Commission ensure that violations of the rule are uniformly treated between regions?
 
===RESPONSE===
Each Region evaluates violations in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR 2, Appendix C.          The Policy provides guidance for the determination of The Office of Inspection appropriate enforcement sanctions for violations.
and Enforcement provides guidance for and monitors Regional implementation of the Policy to ensure a uniform application.                            In addition, the policy requires that all escalated enforcement actions be approved by the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.                                                                                                    .
I
          ,        --      -.  - _ . - . -    - - - - . - - . . . . . - _ . _ , ,      , _ _ , . . . . . , - , , ,,.,----.,_.n--    - - - - , , - -
 
                                                                                            ._._,    --1 l
1 QUESTION Will NTOLs be subject to an Appendix R audit now being performed on              l C.
plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 19797 Or, will the                ;
current review and analysis being performed by the Stai'f be satisfactory?
Resp 0NSE Plants licensed after January 1,1979 are subject to inspections of their fire protection programs.
10 CFR 50.48 requires each such plant to have a fire protection plan.                l Their operating license contains a specific license condition to imple-          ,
ment their approved fire protection program. The fire protection inspections will be against the particular license conditions.
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  .  .                                                          .                                                'i QUESTION D.        Does the NRC plan to issue a new or revised version of Temporary Instruction 2515/62 for future Appendix R audits?
 
===RESPONSE===
TI-2515/62 will be revised as necessary to reflect headquarters guidance on inspection requirements and guidance.
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                                                  ..__.___ -____.~ ____. _ _ __, __. _,.,. _____.        _. ...__
 
      .        ,                                          j                                                                                      20 O                                                                                                                                          l i
l QUESTION F. Temporary Instruction 2515/52 provided a list of documentation                                                                l that the NRC needs to review as part of the audit process.                                    In past audits, the NRC has requested additional information other than that contained on the list. Will a new list of documenta-tion be developed?
l
 
===RESPONSE===
The documentation listing provided in TI-2515/62 does not restrict                                                                  i the inspection team from enhancing inspection efficiency by request-ing a licensee to provide additional relevant documentation.                                A new listing of documentation for TI-2515/62 is not being developed.
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                                                          ,      , ~,e.,--, - . ,ye.- -.g,,  . - - , , .e_,  ,,.-.,,., ,,.-. ,,,,. ---,,
 
                                                                                                        ~ ~-
QUESTION        ,
F.    (1) To what extent will Appendix R issues be raised at future Regional I&E Fire Protection audits after a successful Appendix R audit?
(2) For example, if an area has already been reviewed and no non-compliance found, will it be subject to later review and reintsr-pretation by the Staff?
        .        RESPONSE (1) The Appendix R inspections are conducted on a sample basis.                                            These inspections do not certify that all possible items of non-compliance with Appendix R have been identfied.                        The inspection results do pro-vide a basis for a determination of the adeq.;w,' of a licensee's Appendix
                .R reanalysis, modif? cation and preparation.                                          When noncompliance with Appendix R requirements are identified, a notice of violation will be issued to ensure adequate corrective action.
(2)  See Response (1) above.                      In those cases in which the licensee believes that the staff has invoked a reinterpretation of adequacy in areas which had previously been reviewed, NRC's procedures' for informal appeal would be applicable.                                                          S#4 dr o- m j
                                                                                                                -        s l
 
QUESTION G. At the end of the audit, will the NRC provide a list of items that had,been reviewed and found in conformance with Appendix R? To date, only areas of nonconformance have been specifically identi-fied in exit interviews.
 
===RESPONSE===
Subsequent to an Appendix R inspection, the NRC will not provide a list of items reviewed and found to be in conformance with Appendix R.
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l VIII.              Safe Shutdown and Fire Damage QUESTION-                                                                                                          ,
A.          What circuit failure modes must be considered in identifying circuits associated by spurious actuation?
RESPONSE                                                                                                          i Sections III.G.2 and III.L.7 of Appendix R define the circuit failure modes as hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground. If the con-corn is spurious actuation of equipment, actual circuit failure modes could be bypassed by assuming all possible failure states for the equip-                                        '
ment (valves could fail eitner open or closed).
                            & J s k u ... e;u,n                                                    R->+ L                                I I
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QUESTION B. If one mode of fire damage involves a "hot short" how long does that condition exist as a result of fire damage prior to termi-nating in a ground or open circuit and stopping the spurious I
actuation?
i RESPONSE                                                                                                                                      l l
We would postulate that a "hot short" condition exists until action has been taken to isolate the given circuit from the fire area, or other actions as appropriate have been taken to' negate the effects of the spurious actuation. We do not postulate that the fire would eventually                                                              .
clear the "hot short."
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                                                                    - ,. --.-- , , -_-..,- - . -- , - - .,, . - -.,ng  , . - .,,.--,,-w-.,.,,---  -,.,,
 
i QUESTION                                                                                                                !
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C. Since hot shutdown cannot be maintained indefinitely, hot shutdown equipment needs to be protected for only a limited period of time.
How long must a plant remain in that condition in order to meet                                                    i 1
the requirement for achieving hot shutdown with a single train of                                                  l l
equipment?
1 1
 
===RESPONSE===
Section III.G.1 requires that the one train of systems needed to achieve and maintain hot shutdown be free of fire damage.                                  Thus, the systems needed are to be completely protected from the fire regardless of time.                                                {
If the intent of the question concerns how long these systems must operate,                                            !
these systems must be capable of operating until the systems needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown are available.                                                                      l 1
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                      . _ . _ _ - - , - - - _ - - ~ _ , _ _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ - , , _ _ . - ._ . . _ _ , , - _ - - - - - - - , _ .
* O O    ,
QUESTION D. Certain equipment is necessary only in the ccoldown phase when the plant is neither in hot nor cold shutdown condition as defined by technical specifications.          Is this equipment considered hot or cold shutdown in nature?
 
===RESPONSE===
As stated in Section III.G.1, one train of systems needed to achieve
.          and maintain hot shutdown conditions must be free of fire damage.
Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown can be repaired within 72 hours.        Thus, if this certain equipment necessary only in the cooldown phase, is used to achieve cold shutdown, it can be repaired within 72 hours.      If the certain equipment is maintaining hot shutdown while repairs are being made, one train must be free of                        l fire damage.                                                                                i
>                                                                                                        l l
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QUESTION 1
E. Most PWRs do not require pressurizer heaters to maintain stable conditions. In fact, the Commission does not consider heaters to be important to safety and they are not required to meet Class IE requirements.      Are tiiey required for hot shutdown under
.          Appendix R? If yes, then how does a plant meet the separation                                              i requirements of Section III.G.2.d. e. or f without major structural i
alterations to the pressurizer?                                                                            !
 
===RESPONSE===
One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions must be free of fire damage.                          PWR licensees have demon-strated the capability to achieve and maintain stable hot shutdown conditions without the use of pressurizer heaters by utilizing the charging pump and c water solid pressurizer for reactor coolant pressure control.
                                                                                                    ~r__7-    ._-,- -
 
                                                                          --              .. -              ~ ~
  . .                                                                                                                20 QUESTION F. Appendix R, Section III.L.4 states in part, "If such esuipment and                                    !
systems will not be capable of being powered by both on-site and off-site electrical power systems because of fire damage, an inde-                                    j l
pendent on-site power system shall be provided," Again, in                                            i l
Appendix R, Section III.L.5, the statement is made "If such equip-ment and systems used prior to 72 hours after the fire will not be                                    l 1
capable of being powtred by both on-site and off-site electrical power systems because of fire damage, an independent on-site power system shall be provided." An interpretation is needed of the                                        j
                                                                                          ~
meaning and the applicability of these two quotes relative to alternative shutdown capabilities.
 
===RESPONSE===
These statements are meant to indicate that the alternative shutdown capability thould be powered from an onsite power system independent (both electrically and physically) from the area under consideration.
Further, if the normal emergency onsite power supplies (diesel gene-rators) are not available because of fire damage, then a separate and i
;                  independent onsite power system shall be provided.                            As an example.
l some plants are utilizing a dedicated onsite diesel generator or gas turbine to power instrumentation and control panels 'shich are a part of the alternative shutdown capability, i                                                                                                                          ,
5
 
                                    "~
QUESTION 1
G. For BWRs, I&E Information Notice 84-09 suggests that licensees need to have torus level indication post-fire. If an analysis shows that a level does not change significantly during any operational
        ~
modes or worse case conditions, is level indication still required?
Is an analysis in file adequate or is an exemption request required?
4 RESPONSE                                                                                  ,
1 It continues to be our position that torus (suppression pool) level                      l l
indication is the preferred post-fire monitoring instrumentation in                      l 4              order to confirm that hot shutdown is being properly established. We                      )
l recognize that existing analyses indicate that suppression pool level is not significantly changed during emergency shutdown conditions.
However, we believe the operator should be able to confirm that spurious                  I operations or other unanticipated occurrences have not affected the torus function. An analysis of torus level change by itself is not considered an acceptable' basis.
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                                                                                        .                                    nu IX.                              Lona Term Conformance QUESTION A. Will future changes (no matter how minor) to approved configurations berdquiredtobereviewedbytheStaffinanexemptionrequest?
At what point may the process of 10 CFR 50.59 be invoked?
 
===RESPONSE===
When a modification is made to the plant, the evaluation made in conforrance with 10 CFR 50.59 to determine whether an unreviewed safety question is involved must include on assessment of the modification's imnact on the fire hazards analysis for the area.                              This part of the evaluation must be performed by the person responsible for the fire safety program for the plant.                                The
            .. assessment must include the effect on combustible loading and distribution and the consideration of whether circuits or components, including associated circuits, for a train of equipment needed for safe shutdown are being affected or a new element introduced in the area.                              If this evaluation concludes that there is no significant impact, this conclusion and its basis must be documented as part of the 50.59 evaluation and be available for future inspection and reference.                            If the evaluation finds that there is an impact      l that could result in the area either not being in conformar.ce with Appandix R,                            l or some other aspect of the approved fire protection program, or being outside the basis for an exemption that was granted for the area involved, the licensae must either make modifications to achieve conformance or justify and request l
exemption from the NRC.                                                                                    1
 
. s s                                  .                                  /
QUESTION B. If an exemption is warranted and at the same time the provisions of the rule indicate that the appropriate schedular deadlines have passed, should a schedular exemption be filed at the same time as the technical exemption request?
E. If as part of the exemption request the utility is proposing to make              ,
modifications to achieve a reasonable level of conformance with Appendix R, and if the associated "clock" has run out for that type of modification, should the technical exemption request and the det.ription of the modification be filed with a schedular exemption?
 
===RESPONSE===
If a technical exemption is warranted and no modifications are required, there obviously is no schedular consideratio        If, however, modification must be        !
implemented to meet the basis for the technical exemption, then a schedule              l l
should be proposed and justified.      In the inte.-im, the plant would be in violation of the regulations. The justificatio,n for the schedule must include the reason for the timing (i.e., a new modification or a just identified non-compliance), a demonstration of best effort for timely implementation, and a determination of what, if any, interim compensatory measures are appropriate until modifications are completed.
 
t QUESTION C. When filing a schedular exemption under $50.12, it is not always clear from what spcific paragraphs of $50.48 an exemption should be sought.
Is it acceptable to request a blanket exemption from the schedular provisions of 10 CFR 550.48 without a specification by paragraph?
G. If an exemption request is submitted to meet newly pww-                          ... nterpre-tations of Appendix R, when does the licensee need to be in compliance?
Is the schedule presented in Appendix R still the guideline or must a new schedule be developed under a diffe''9nt criteria?
 
===RESPONSE===
We prefer that a request for schedular exemption be accurate with regard '.o the specific subsection of 50.48(c).                          The request must be specific enough so that the staff can determine what is being delayed and until when.
The justification for a delayed schedule makes necessary the specific identity of what is missing from where and what that could mean in a fire situation.
The categories of implementation schedules in 50.48(c) should be used as guidance in any proposed schedular exemption request.
                    - _ _ - _ _ - . - _ - _ - . _._ _..__.-_..__..__ _-__ _._.__.___._-._.~
 
  ,            ,  j                                                                                                                                                99 QUESTION D.      What guidance can the NRC Staff give the industry regarding when a deviation from the literal interpretation of Appendix R is sufficiently trivial as to not require a specific exemption?
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===RESPONSE===
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                  .            The answer to this question it similar to IX.A.                                      The significance of a deviation                          '
must be judged as part of a fire hazards analysis.                                      The conclusion of this                                  I analysis is always subject to review by the NRC inspector similar to any 50.59 evaluation.
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    ..- . - , -      . .- . - - - . - -    , , . ~ - ~ , , - , - , - ., ,, ,.,,,. -.,...,---, ,- ,-... . ,.. ,_.,,        -n .+,,, .._-.,,------ . , . ~ , , . . ,  .,,.,.r..
 
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                                                                              ,        G
      ,dESTION    .
l 1
F. What is the process for altering configuration not yet implemented for plants with Appendix R SERs?
RESPONSE          !
l If licensees propose changes to their NRC approved modifications, they                                  l l
must submit their new proposal and revised schedule for implementation for NRC approval.
l l
l If the revised schedule is in accord with 50.48(c), a schedular exemption                                j is not required. If not, a schedular exemption is required.                  This exemp-must be justified as to (1) the reason for the change, (2) the basis for the revised schedule, and (3) the interim measures that will be provided
    .to assure post fire shutdown capability until the final modifications are implemented.
 
Ca/sc CoeH9 0W        Nr A2prz          /-
X. Fire Area Boundaries _                                                  _. .
QUESTION A. If a fire area boundary was described as a rated barrier in the l
1977kfire hazards analysis, no open item; existed in this area in the Appendix A SER, and the barriers have not been 11tered, then need those barriers be reviewed by licensees or the Staff under Appendix R?                                                      l l
RESPONSE                                                                            !
I In BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Fire Barrier is defined as:
I i
      "Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, floors, ad the supports), including beams, joists, columns, penetration seals or closures, fire doors, and fits dampers that Jre rated by approving laboratories in hours of resistance to fire and are used to prevent the spread of fire."
If a fire boundary was described as a rated barrier in the 1977 fire hazards      )
analysis, was evaluated and documen't.ed in a published SER, then those fire area boundaries need not be reviewtd as part of the re-analysis for compliance 1
with Section III.G of Appendix R.                                                !
The term "fire area" as used in Appendix R means an area sufficiently bounded    l
                                                                                          )
l to withstand the hazards associated with the fire area and, as necessary, to    i protect important equipment within t o fire area from a fire outside the        l; 1
i
 
. .                                                                                                                                              %g area. In order to ' meet the regulation, fire area boundaries need not be completely sealed floor-to-ceiling, wall-to-wall boundaries.                                          Where fire area boundar'ies were not approved under the Appendix A process, or where such boundaries are not wall-to-wall, floor-to-ceiling boundaries with all penetrations skaled to the fire rating required of the boundry, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy of fire area boundaries in their plants to determine if the boundaries are sufficient. This                                                                                .
analysis must be performed by at least a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer.                  Although not required, licensees may submit their evalt'ations for Staff review and concurrence.                                        In any event, these analyses must be retained by the licensees for subsequent NRC audits.
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                        - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - , --,n  - . , .,,,-,-,,,-.,-,e--m  -, ,,-, , . - - ,        ,      , . - -                    -
                                                                                                                                                    ,,e
 
49'46 1
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QUESTION B. Mus't exterior walls to buildings and their penetrations be qualified as rated barriers?
 
===RESPONSE===
1 Exterior walls and their penetrations need not be qualified as rated barriers                          '
unless (1) they are required to separate a shutdown-related division (s) inside                        ,
l the plant from its redundant (alternate) counterpart outside the plant in the immediate vicinity of the exterior wall, (2) they separate safety related areas from non-safety related areas that present a significant fire threat                              !
l to the safety related areas, or (3) they are cesignated as a fire barrier in
                                        ~
the FSAR or FHA.                                                                                        f l
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                                                                            , , , , .,y_ . , _.__.,_, _  _ , . , , ,
 
l  . .
l QUESTION      .
i l
!      C. How should a utility define the boundaries of fire areas comprising l            exterior yards?
i l
 
===RESPONSE===
An exterior yard area without fire barriers should be considered as one fire area (note answer to question X.A).
The protection for redundant / alternate shutdown systems within a yard area would be determined on the bases of the largest credible fire that is likely to occur and the resulting damage.                          The boundaries of such damage would have to be justified with a fire hazards analysis.                        The analysis should consider the degree of spatial separat' ion between divisions; the presence of in-situ and transient combustibles, including vehicular traffic; grading; available fire protection; sources of ignition; and the vulnerability and criticality                          -
of the shutdown related systems.
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QUESTION    .
D. What is the. smallest opening allowed in a fire area barrier for which an exemption request is not needed?
 
===RESPONSE===
Unsealed openings in the configuration for which approval was obtained by an approved laboratory or the NRC~ staff would be acceptable.
Our position on openings is given in Section 5.a(3) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1:                                            )
    "(3) Openings througn fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that required of the barrier itself.
Openings inside conduit larger than 4 inches in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier penetration.      Openings inside conduit 4 inches or less in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier unless the conduit extends at least 5 feet on each side of the fire barrier and is sealed either at both ends or at the fire barrier with non-4
                            , - - ,v    .- w--  .----- . r . . .n ,- - - . , - . - -- , - - , - e. es- w <,.-  -y.
 
,                  combustible material to prevent the passage of smoke end hot gases.
Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentials should be qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions."
The unsealed opening (s) allowed in a fire area boundary or a barrier which separates redundant shutdown divisions should not permit flame, radiant energy, smoke and hot gases to pass through the barrier and cause damage to
  ~
redundant shutdown divisions on thi other side.        The licensee should assess the adequacy of existing protection and should determine the minimum size based on a fire hazards analysis and conservative fire protection engineering judgment. If the significance of ope-'ngs in fire barriers is marginal, a formal exemption request could be submitted or the staff consulted.                    The basis for the lack of significance should be available for review by HRC Inspectors.                                                                                                  l l
Our acceptance ol' unprotected openings in fire barriers would depend upon the quantity and nature of combustible materials on either side of the                                        I barrier; the location of the opening (s) in relation to the ceiling (for openings in walls); the location, vulnerability and importance of shutdown systems on either side of the barrier; and compensating fire protection.
 
l QUESTION E. Appendix R, Section III.G.3 states "alternative or. dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area room or zone under consideration...." What l
is the implied utilization of a room or zone concept under Section III.G of Appendix R7 The use of the phraseology "area, room or zone under consideration" is used again at the end of the Section III.G.3.                                              Does the requirement for detection and fixed suppression indicate that the                                                                l
                                                                                                                                                )
requirement can be limited to a fire zone rather than throughout a fire area? Under what conditions and with what caveats can the fire                                                              )
zone concept be utilized in demonstrating conformance to Appendix R?
 
===RESPONSE===
Section III.G was written after NRC's multi-discipline review teams had visited all operating power plants.                                                  From these audits, the NRC recognized that it is not practical and may be impossible to subdivide some portions of an operating plant into fire areas.                                            In addition, the HRC recognized that in some                l cases where fire areas are designated, it may not be possible to provide alternate shutdown capability independent of the fire area and, therefore, would have to be evaluated on the basis of fire zones within the fire area.
The NRC also recognized that because some licensees had not yet performed a safe shutdown analysis, these analyses may identify new unique configurations.
To cover the large variation of possible configurations, the requirements of Section III.G were presented in three parts:
l
 
  .      .                                                                                                                  O/
* Section III.G.1 requires a performance goal be met regardless of the configuration.
* Section III.G.2 requires certain separation, suppression and detection requirements where fire areas can be and are designated which are acceptable without analysis.
* Section III.G.3 requires alternative dedicated shutdown capability for
                                                                              ~
configurations that do not safisfy the requirements of III.G.2 or where fire suppressants released as a result of fire fighting, rupture of the system or inadvertent operation of the system may damage redundant equipment.
Section III.G recognizes that the need for alternate or dedicated shutdown capability may have to be considered on the basis of a fire area, a room or a fire zone.                  It is clear that when fire areas are designated, the alternative or dedicated capability must be independent of the fire area where it is
,                possible to do so (See Supplementary Information for the final rule Section III.G). When fire areas are not designated or where it is not possible to have the alternative or dedicated capability independent of the fire area,                                .
careful consideration must be given to the selection and location of the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to assure that the performance requirement set forth in Section III.G.1 is set.
 
l Where alternate or dedicated shutdown is provided for a room or zone, the capability aust be physically and electrically independent of that room or zone. This independence east be carefully evaluated to assure that the performance requirementt of Section III.G.1 are met. The vulnerability of the equipment and personnel required at the location of the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to the environments produced at that location as a result of the fire or fire suppressant's must be evaluated.                      These environments may be due to the hot layer, smoke, drifting suppressants,                            l common ventilation systems, comon drain systems or flooding. In addition, l
other interactions between the locations may be possible in unique configurations.
l If alternate shutdown is provided on the basis of rooms or zones, the                              i 1
provision of fire detection and fixed suppression is cnly required in the room                    l or zone under consideration.                                                                  .
The main caveat with the use of the room / zone concept is that the alternate or dedicated shutdown capability must be demonstrated to be independent of the fire area under consideration where possible.                  It this cannot be done, it must be demonstrated to be "independent" of the room or fire zone under consideration and this "independence" must be given careful consideration.
In all cases the performance requirements of Section III.G.1 must be satisfied.
There is no "implied utilization" of a room or zone concept other than that stated above.      Compliance with Section III.G.2 cannot be based on rooms or zones as explained in Generic Letter 83-33.
 
e
  .  .                                          /
                                                                                                )
QUESTION                -
1 F.      In Generic Letter 83-33 at p. 2, the NRC Staff referred to the guidance l
in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 to establish the rating of the barrier. What      1 level of documentation must be provided to verify that the area meets the requirements of Appendix R?
 
===RESPONSE===
As explained in our response to Question II.B, if the fire rating of a fire barrier was specifically evaluated for the existing fire loading during the Appendix A review and the evaluation was docinented in a published SER, the barrier does not have to be re-evaluated for Appendix R          l l
compliance.
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l The documentation that verifies the acceptance of an existing barrier is the SER.
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M XI. Guidance Docum'ents l
QUESTION    ,
(
l A. PleaselidtallNRRguidancedocumentsandpositionpapersissuedsince Appendix R was promulgated.
 
===RESPONSE===
Fire Protection Guidance Issued Since January 1, 1975:
IE Information Notices                                  ,
No. 83-41:    Actuation of fire suppression systems causing inoperability of safety related equipment.
No. 83-69:    Improperly installed fire dampers at nuclear power plants.
No. 83-83:    Use of portable radio transmitters inside nuclear power plants.
l
              *No. 84-09:    Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)
Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, Rev. 1      Fire Protection System, dated 5/1/76 I
 
zg  ,
i 9.5-1, Rev. 2 Fire Protection Program, dated 03/78                                                                            1 i                                                                                                                              l 1
9.5-1, Rev. 3 Fire Protection Program, July 1981.
                                          \
Regulations 10 CFR Part 50:      Proposed fire protection program for nuclear power plants operating prior to January 1,1979, dated May 29, 1980.
                                                                                                                                                    )
Federal Register Vol. 45, No.105, 36082.                                                                '
10 CFR Part 50:      Fire protection program for operating nuclear power plants, dated November 19, 1980.        .
Federal Register Vo. 45, No. 225, 76602.
10 CFR Part 50:      Fire prot.ection rule corrections, dated September 8, 1981.
Federal Register Vo. 46, No.173, 447.14.
Generic letters:
Note:  The following documents were obtained from the Palisades file -
Docket No. 50-255.            Similar documents should be in the file for other operating facilities.                  The dates may vary slightly.
: 1. Ltr dated 9/28/76 - Enclosing App. A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and supple-mentary guidance on information needed for fire protection program evaluation.
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        ~:.: 1 I
                              .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    l
: 2. Ltr dated 12/1/76 - Enclosing sample Technical Specifications and
        )                                                                                                                                                                                    !
and errata sheet.                                                                                                                                                          !
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  +                                                                                                                                                                                          l
: 3. Ltr dated!8/19/77 - Enclosing ' Huclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance."
: 4. Ltr dated 6/8/78 - Re: Manpower requirements for operating reactors.
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: 5. Ltr dated 9/7/79 - Re: Minimum fire brigade shift size.
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: 6. Ltr dated 9/14/79 - Enclosing staff positions - safe shutdown                                                                                                              !
capability.
1
: 7. Ltr dated 10/31/80 - Enclosing new 10 CFR 50.48 regarding fire protection schedules for operating nuclest power plants.                                                                                                                    l l
l
            *8. Ltr dated 11/24/80 - Enclosing a copy of revised 10 CFR 50.48 and new App. R to 10 CFR 50, and a summary of open items from the SER for the BTP APCSB 9.5-1 review.
            *9. Ltr dated 2/20/81 - Generic Letter 81-12 identifying information                                                                                                            i needed for NRC review of modifications for alternative shutdown capability, l
I
 
l                                                  *
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                                                                                      . . jl l
                            .                                                  s                                                            l l
        *10. Ltr dated 4/7/82    .orovided clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 and guidance on information needed for NRC review of exemption requests.
                            \
: 11. Ltr dated 10/6/82 - Generic Letter 82-21; provided criteria for annual, biennial, and triennial audits required by Technical Specifications.
        *12. Ltr dated 10/19/83 - Generic Letter 83-33; NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
1 Staff Generic Positions
: 1. Letter, Denton to Bernsen, dated 4/20/82 - Control room fires.
        *2. SECY 83-269, dated July 5, 1983 - Attachments B and C.
: 3. Memo, Eisenhut to 01shinski, dated 12/20/83 - Physical independence of electrical systems.
: 4. Meno, Eisenhut to Jordan, dated 10/24/83 - Bullet resistant fire doors.
        "Staff positions regarding the need for certain exemptions delineated in this guidance document have been revised per the "Interpretations of Appendix R" (Enclosure 1 of this document).
 
l l                                                                  . ..
QUESTION
                                                          .                                                                                                                                                                                i B.          If a utility determines that a deviation from a guidance document exists, does an exemption request need to be filed?                                                                                                      If so, what is the legal
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ]
basis for this requirement?
l
 
===RESPONSE===
l
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            \
No.                                                                                                                                                                                                                  1 1
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                                                                                                                                            ;77 QUESTION l
C. How does the Staff initiate interpretations of Appendix R in a manner                                                                )
whi'ch ensures their technical adequacy and consistency with the rule's                                                              I objectives {e g. , presentation to ACRS, issue for comment as in draf t                                                              j regulatory guides, etc.)?
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===RESPONSE===
Staff interpretations are initiated when our experience shows that generic issues are identified that require clarification.                                            These interpretations are reviewed for accuracy and consistency by the cognizant Division Directors. Usually, they are not' issued for comment.                                                    However, Generic Letter 83-33 was commented on by the NUFPG since it was initiated, in part, at their request.
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a
* 60 QUESTION D. Will licensees be automatically sent a copy of new Staff position papers as they are developed?
 
===RESPONSE===
The Staff positions on generic subjects are considered for issuance in Generic Letters from ONRR and Information Notices Jr Bulletins from OI&E.
Staff positions issued for specific questions on specific plants are not given generic promulgation.
4
                                                  ~
                                                                                                                                                \
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Wp /
XII. Exemption Criteria QUESTION A. How does a licensee demonstrate that alernative measures are equivalent to the measures of Section III.G.2 in order to obtain an exemption lacking a formal definition of the term "free of fire damage"?
 
===RESPONSE===
One train of components protected by one of the options provided in III.G.2 defines free of fire damage to mean the component is protected by one of the options specified.            The alternative con',idered for an option must provide equivalent safety for the plant.                                                  They need not necessarily be equivalent separation or barriers.                            In fact, the three alternatives listed.in III.G.2 are not equivalent for the same fire hazard.                                                          The alternative measured must be shown to meet III.G.I.
A formal definition of the term "free of fire damage" is not necessary to demonstrate equ.ivalent plant safety.                                  The alternative configuration should show that there is reasonable assurance that the component is not exposed to environments that will cause damage.                                                  If the component need not be repaired or replaced after the fire it has not been damaged.
y__ - - - - - - - - -    m -
                                      ,  ,,--,.r-._, -._,__ _ , ,v.,_, . , _ _ _ , , . _ . _ , . _ , , , _ . , _ , , ,          ,    ,_,.--%.,  _ - _ _ , _ _ _ , _ , . , _ , , - - , . . , . . ,
 
t QUESTION        .
B. Circuit modifications are an ongoing process.                        How recent must a coordination study be in order to be valid in protecting circuits associated by common power source?
 
===RESPONSE===
We would expect that as circuit modifications are made, the design package would address the electrical protection required and the effects of this protection on the coordination of the protection for the power distribution system. This type of consideration s'hould be included in the evaluation required by 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests and Experiments. 'The design package                                                      '
1 and modification evaluation could not be complete without consideration of the coordination study.              Therefore, we would expect that the coordination O
studies would be current with the last circuit modification made.
G
                                - ~ - - . - -              ,,,.,....,,e, --- , ,,__,,y-c---,r---,,_,n,  -
vm-,---v..,-wn-, . - - - -- --
 
XIII. Intervenino Combustibles QUESTION A. Within Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b, the phrase "twenty feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards" is utilized. What is the definition of "no intervening combustible"?          Is the regulation focused predominantly on the absence of fixed-combustibles?
 
===RESPONSE===
There is no specific definition of "no intervening combustible." The regulation is focused on the absence of in-situ combustibles.                                              .
In BTP CHEB 9.5-1, noncombustible material is defined as:
  "Noncombustible Material
: a. A material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors when subjected to fire or heat.
: b. Material having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined in a.,  above, with a surfacing not over 1/8-inch thick that has a flame spread rating not higher than 50 when measured using ASTM E-84 Test "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials."
 
  '  '                                                                                                                                        /            Gy 1
i In Generic Letter 83-33, we state:
l "Staff Position:                      Section III.G.2.b requires the "separation ... with .lo intervening combustibles ..." To meet this requirement, plastic jackets and insulation of grouped electrical cables, including those which are coated, should be considered as intervening combustibles."
For fire protection, "no intervening combustibles" means that there is no significant quantities of in-situ materials which will ignite and burn located between redundant shutdown systems.                                                    The amount of such combustibles that has significance is a judgmental decision.                                                              As with other issues, if the licensees fire protection engineer is concerned that the quantity of combustibles between shutdown divisions may not be considered insignificant by an independent reviewer, an exemption could be requested, or the staff consulted.
Transient materials are not considered as an intervening combustible; however, they must be considered as part of the overall fire hazard within an area.
        --    ,.,  - - . - . , - - - - . . - - -      ,.  -,,--e  - - ,-- - . , - . - - - - , - , - w-    . , , -    ---.-,---,--n--m-n---  -v----  --- - - - -
 
                                                      ,                          ,                                                        h6 1
    @ESTION                        ,
B. Are unexposed combustibles, such as oil in sumps, closed cans, or sealed drums, or electrical cable in conduits, considered as "intervening                                                                  l combustibles"?
l 1
RESPONSE                                                                                                                                  j l
Oil in closed cans or electrical cables in conduits are not' considered as intervening combustibles.
                                                                                                                                              .\
                                                                                                                                                \
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1
* J h(s i
XIV. Radiant' Energy Shields QUESTION Recently, the NRC Staff indicated that non-combustibla radiant energy shields should be tested against the ASTM-STD-E-119 based, apparently, on the requirements of BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Rev. 3, a document issued after Appendix R was promulgatep.
This new requirement would not appear to oc required by Appendix R or BTP APCS 8 9.5-1 Appendix A.                                        Could the Staff clarify the requirements in this area?
ANSWER During the Appendix A reviews, we observed that inside some containments, there were large concentrations of cables converging at these electrical penetration areas.                            In some cases, where the penetrations were grouped by division, shields were placed between the divisions so that radiant energy from a fire involving the cables of one division would not degrade or ignite cables of the other divisions.                                                            These shields also directed the convective energy from the fire away from the surviving division. These shields were usually constructed of 1/2 inch sarinite board in a metal frame. Appendix R, Section III.G.f refers to these shields as "a noncombustible radiant energy shield." The guidelines in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.a(1)b. indicate that these shields should have a fire rating of 1/2 hour.                                                            In our opinion any l
material with a 1/2 hour fire rating should be capabic of performing the required function.
 
                                                                                                        ~.w a The guidelinas of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 relating to a fire-rated radient energy shield are being considered in our current reviews of NTOL plants.                    However, to the extent that an applicant can justify that a proposed radiant energy shield can achiave an equivalent level of safety, we have been accepting shields that have not been tested against the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-119.                                    '
In our Appendix R reviews, we have accepted non-fire-rated radiant energy shields that have been demonstrated by fire hazards analysis to provide an acceptable level of protection against the anticipated hazard of a localized fire within the containment.
l
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XV. Emergency Lightino l
QUESTION What is the requisite intensity level for emergency lighting for egress routes and areas where shutdown functions must be performed? What are the bases for determining these levels of lighting?.
ANSWER                                                                                              l The level of illumination provided by emergency lighting in access routes                          I to and in areas where shutdown functions must be performed is a level that is sufficient to enable an operator to reach that area and perform the shutdown                    '
functions. At the remote shutdown panels the illumination levels should be sufficient for control panel operators.
The bases for determining these levels of lighting are the guidelines contained in Section 9.5.3 of the Standard Review Plan, which are based on industry standards (i.e., Illuminating Engineering Society Handbook).
Where a licensee has provided emergency lighting per Section III.J of Appendix'R, we would expect that the licensee verify by field testing that this lighting is adequate to perform tb> ' ''nded tasks.
 
    .                                a.
e
              ~
QUESTIONS RAISED BY OTHER UTILITIES
: 1. Redundant Trains / Alternate Shutdown                                                                                                      :
QUESTION l
Confusion exists as to what wi11 be classified as an alternate shutdown system and thus what systems might be required to be protected by suppres-sion and detection under Section III.G.3.b.                                                      For example, while we are relying upon the turbine-building condensate system for a reactor building fire and thc RHR system for a turbine building fire, would one system be considered the alternative to the other?                                                      If so, would suppression and detection be required for either or both systems under III.G.3.b? An explanation of alternative shutdown needs to be advanced for all licensees.
 
===RESPONSE===
If the system is being used to provide its design function, it generally                                                                          !
l is considered redundant.                                          If the system is being used in lieu of the                                      l preferred system because the redundant components of the preferred system does not meet the separation criteria of Section III.G.2, the system is considered an alternative shutdown capability.                                                        Thus, for the example above, it appears that the condensate system is providing alternative shutdown capability in lieu of separating redundant components of the RHR system.            Fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system                                                                          ,
I would be required in the are . where separation of redundant components                                                                          I of the RHR system is not provided.                                          However, in the event of a turbine e
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - -                        _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ - _ ,      _ , _ - _ , - . _ . . _ _ . _  _._.,._....y-___            . __-~_ .__.____- .._.,_-..~.-_._,, ,-
 
                                                                                                                  .j 4
2-1 l
building fire, the RHR system would be used for safe shutdown and is                                      I
                        ,                                                                                          1 i
not considered an alternative capability.                      However, one train of the W      RHR system must be separated from the turbine building.                                                    !
l l
l l
_. _  _ . . _  .  . .  . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - . - _ .        _ _ , - -- _  - - . - - - - --- ---J
: 2. Intervenino Combustibles QUESTION Twenty feet of separation with' absolutely no intervening combustibles is a rare case in most n,uclear plants.                                    What 's a most acceptable method of addressing intervening combustibles? How are various utilities addressing this subject, and what would be sufficient justification to support an exemption request?
 
===RESPONSE===
(See Response XIII).
If more than negligible quantities of combustible materials (such as isolated cable runs) exist between redundant shutdown divisions, an exemption request should be filed.      ["Negligible quantity" is an admittedly judgmental criterion, and this judgment should be made by a qualified fire protection engineer and documented for later NRC audit.] Justifications for such exemptions have been based on the following factors:
: 1. A relatively large horizontal spatial separation between redundant divisions; all cables qualified to IEEE-383.
: 2. The presence of an automatic fire suppression system over the intervening combustible (such as a cable tray fire suppression system);
                  +
m,    , - _            ,    . _ - . . , . . - . _ _ , . - , - . _ _ . . _      , , _ , , . , , _ _ , . _ , _ _ , _ _ _ - _ . , _ - , , , , _ - _ . - . , . - . . . _ _ _ . _ . , . - _
: 3. The presence of fire stops to inhibit fire propagation in intervening cable trays;
: 4. The likely fire propagation direction of burning intervening combustibles in relation to the locition of vulnerable shutdown divisions;
: 5. The availability of compensating active and passive fire protection.
Any future changes in the cable configuration due to modifications could be handled under 50.59.                                                                                                          j l
l h
e
_ . , _ , - ,  ._..,_9.._,,,,,,,,__,,.,____,,      , _ , , _ , , , . . _ _ , _ _ , , _ , , ,,
 
i
  . .                                                                                                      l I
                                                -s-                                                        !
: 3. NRR Reviews and OI&E Inspections QUESTION i
Where assumptions are made and clearly stated within the analysis sub-                                ,
mitted to NRR for review, will such assumptions be subject to a second review by OI&E during the inspection process?
I l
Where assumptions are made in conjunction with the analysis, should exemp-tion requests be filed just to provide protection for the licensee?
If NRR accepts a licensee's selection of equipment and shutdown paths as being sufficient to meet the Appendix R shutdown criteria, will OI&E review and have the right to challenge the approved shutocwn patns and approved equipment selection? Or will they only check the shutdown paths and equipment in question to see that they meet the Appendix R requirements, i.e., separation?
 
===RESPONSE===
To the extent that a licensee's submittal to NRR is comprehensive and sufficiently detailed, the basis for the OI&E Appendix R inspection will
              +
e
                                                            ,,--- ,--- --- -- , v. - - - - -- . . - . - - .
 
6-be the assumptions, shutdown paths and equipment selections approved by NRR. 'If the inspection results in new information that casts doubt upon the approved configuration, the Regional inspectors have the responsibility to resolve such doubts.
0 4
h e
        .. . - - - - . - - - - - , , ,          , _ , , . . . _    , . - . . , , , , , _ , , , _ -    ,,,-_,__,_.._n,....,,,,            ,, e,.--.,,_...n,,_n n -
 
s                                    -7
: 4. Floor-to-Floor Separation QUESTION Where redundant circuits are separated by floor elevation but are within                                                                          1 the same fire area due to open hatchways, stairs, etc., what is the NRC's position with regard to separation criteria? If train A is located twenty feet from an open hatchway on the lower, elevation and train B is located ten feet from the same opening on the next elevation, would this be considered                                                                        !
adequate separation?
 
===RESPONSE===
l If a wall or floor / ceiling assembly contains major unprotected openings such as hatchways and stairways, then plant locations on either side of such a barrier must be considered as part of a single fire area.                                                  Refer to the staff position on Fire Areas in Generic Letter 83-33.
As to the example provided, if train A was separated by a cumulative horizontal distar.ce of .?O feet from train B, with no intervening combustible materials or fire hazards, and both elevations were provided with fire detection and suppressian, the area would be in compliance with Section III.G.2.b.
4 v__  . _ _ _ _ _ ..-. _ . , - _ . - . .          -_ . _ , _ . . _ . , ~ . . , _ . . . . , _          _ , , . . , , _ . - . _ . . .
 
8-
: 5. Twenty-Foot Sepe. ration Criteria QUESTION Assuming that a licensee is, utilizing the 20-foot separation for circuit protection, could an exemption request be granted for a portion of the circuit that did not maintain the 20-foot minimum separation if that portion was protected by one-hour barrier unt)120-foot was achieved? This barrier would not be firewall-to-firewall, and the circuit protection would not be claimed under the one-hour barrier rule.
 
===RESPONSE===
With the erection of a partial qualified one-hour fire rated barrier, if 20 feet of horizontal separation existed between redundant circuits, without intervening combustibles or fire hazards, and if the fire area was
,                      protected by automatic fire detection and suppression, compliance with Section III.G.2.b would be achieved.
These types of configuration have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
1 1
i e
 
; , .                                    /                                                                            l
:                                                                                                                      i l
l
                                                      . g.                                                            l
: 6. Exemption Request QUESTION (a) What is the threshold f.or exemption requests?    (b)        Is it necessary to file a request for each and every possible deviation from Appendix R?
Typical examples are:
(A) Where standard hardware has been removed from a fire door and replaced with security hardware, is it necessary to file an exemp-tion request?
(B) Where penetration designs have been reviewed and approved by NRC but have not been classified by an approval laboratory, will it be necessary to submit an exemption request?
l (C)    Is an exemption request necessary for perimeter walls of safety-related buildings that have either nonrating penetrations or of a                                        i nonrated design, i.e., r.rtal walls?
(D) How do we submit future modification exemption requests, etc.?
l Would NRC prefer them individually, or developed and submitted                                          I in packages for review and approval?
l l
                  +
e
                                      -n    . - , - -    -, - . . - - -.        . , . . , -    . . - - - , . - . , , -
 
. o                      ,
I 10 1
(E) When an exemption request is filed, what criteria are used to determine the level of detail needed to support the request?
(F) With regard to exemption reque,ts for future modifications, will they be submitted under' 50.12 or 50.487
 
===RESPONSE===
(a) The licensee must develop its criteria for an exemption request threshold.
I l
(b) No.
(A) See response III.C.
I (B) No.
(C) See response X.B.
(D) Futureexemptjonsshouldbesubmittedindividually,iftheyare independent of each other.
(E) See Enclosure 2 of NRC's letter to all licensees dated April-May 1982.
(F)      10 CFR 50.12.
e
                                                                                          /
 
Enclosure 4          .
i        ,    ,
                          . Chemical Engineering Branch / Fire Protection Section Staff Guidance for Compliance With Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R , Section III. G. 1. a 1
POSITION:        One train of systems necessary for hot shutdown shall be free of fire damage.
GUIDANCE:          (Systems necessary for hot' shutdown)
Sections 4 and 6 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979 sections 4 and 6 of-Generic Letter 81-12, Feb. 20,1981 Section V of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 GUIDANCE:          (Free of fire damage)
Section C'1.b of CHEB 9.5-1, July,1981 Section 1.2.1 of Attachment A and Section b of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983 Section III of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984*
Section III.G.1.b POSITION:          Systems necessary for cold shutdown can be repaired within 72 hours.
                                        -        _                _  _        _ . _ . _            _                - - . - _ .      _ ~ ,      . , _ . - . _ . ,
 
o- .
GUIDANCE:          (Systems necessary for cold shutdown)
Sections 5 and 7 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979
                                  \
Sections 5 and 7 of Generic Letter 81-12, Feb. 20,1981.
Section a of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983*
GUIDANCE:          (Allowable repairs)
Position Statement on Allowable Repairs memo, Mattson to Vollmer, July 2,1982 Section b of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 Section XI of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 GUIDANCE: (General)
Sections C.1.b. and C.5.a. of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July, 1981.
Sections V, IX, X, XI of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984.
Section III. G. 2 POSITION:          Establishes the basis for the use of fire areas for assessing compliance with III.G.2.
 
e e              e
* e GUIDANCE:                                      .
                                                                "Definitions" Section and Section III.C of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, May 1, 1976
                                                                  \
                                                                "Definitions" Section and Sections 8.2 and 8.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.120, June, 1976 Section 1 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979 Section 1 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Sections B.3 and 8.4 of BTP CME 8 9.5-1, July,1981 Enclosure 3 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May, 1982*
Section 2 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983*
Section 1 of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984*                            -
POSITION:
Establishes the basis for including associated circuit in assessing system separation.                                                        -
GUIDANCE:
Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May, 1982 Section 1.2.2 of Attachment A and Section e of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983
                                                                                      , - . _    . _ . _ _ _ _ ,      ,,    ._  ,_ -    ,m ,
 
o'
                                                                                                                              .                                                I 4-                                                                .
Section III. G. 2. a POSITION:      Redundant shutdown divisions shall be separated by a 3-hour fire barrier.                    Structural steel in such barriers shall be protected.
                                \
GUIDANCE:      (Separated by a 3-hour barrier)                                                                '
Section C.4.a of Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.120, November 1977                              ,
Section 0.1.a of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 Section C.4.a. of Revision 1 of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, March,1978 Sections C.S.a and C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July, 1981 Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982.
Section 1.2.3 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983
                            *                                                          ~
Section 2 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983 GUIDANCE:      (Integrity of fire walls / structural steel)
Section C.4.(l0) of Regulatory Guide 1.120, June,1976
                                                                      ~
Section C.4.a of Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.120, Nov. ,1977 Section D.1.j o'f Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 i
                                                              .e. .        w- ,-n,,    .-,,--,--.-------------nn----,            - , . - - - ,  ,.n--- -- - , - -- . - - --
: e.                                                    - .._.
5-Section C.4.a(10) of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Revision 1, March,1978 Section C.S.a of BTP CHEB 9.5-1, July,1981 S
                                  \ ection 3 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983                                          .
Enclosure to memo, Eisenhut to Jordan, re: "Bullet Resistant Fire Doors," October 24, 1983 Section II of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 Section III. G. 2. b POSITION:    Redundant divisions shall be separcted by more than 20 feet free of intervening combustibles. Automatic fire suppression and fire detection shall be provided throughout the fire area.
GUIDANCE:    (20 feet free of combustibles)
Section C.S.b.2 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981                                                                                                                          !
Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982 Section 1.2.4 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 3, 1983 Sections 5 and 6 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983 Section VI of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 l
4 i
e
                                            --------.-------e.-._,--..--          , ---- - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - * -        -'re'*          *e--'M''*'  * * ' ' " + - - - - - * - '
 
e
* ga ;                                                        **                                  .
GUIDANCE:      (Sprinklers and fire detection)                                                                                                        - -
Sections C.S.a, c, d, e of Regulatory Guide 1.120, June 1976 S
                                    \ ections C.5.a. c, d, e of Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide
                                    .1.120, November 1977                                                        '
Sections E.1, 3, 4, S'of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1,
  .                                  February 24, 1977 Sections C.5.a. c, d, e of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, March 1978 Sections B.4, C.S.b, C.6.a. c, d, e of CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Section 1.2.4 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983*                                                                                  l Section 1 of Response to Region II, memo Vollmer to Eisenhut,                                                                                1 July 27, 1983 Section 1 of Generic Letter 83-33., October 19, 1983*
Section VII of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984*
Section III.G.2.c POSITION:    Redundant divisions shall be separated by a 1-hour fire barrier.
Automatic fire detection and suppression shall be provided                                                                                            i throughout the fire area.
l
                                      -----,------,,-,,,,----------,-,,----w------mv-        ,                    - - - -+-- . -,n - --, ~-  - - -+-----, , -, -    --e ,-.--
 
. . 9          -
                                            ,          7      -
GUIDANCri (1-hour fire barrier between redundant divisions)-        ,
Section C.4.a of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 1.120, November 1977 Sections C.S.a and C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May, 1982 Section 1.2.5 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 Section II of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 GUIDANCE:    (Detection and suppression)
[See guidance for same issue in III.G.2.b)
Section III.G.2.d POSITION:    Establishes fire protection inside non-inerted containment.
GUIDANCE:
Section C.6.a of Reg. Guide 1.120
* Section C.6.a of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 1.120, November 1977                                  ,
Section F.1 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.51, February 24, 1977 Section C.6.a of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, March 1978 Section C.7.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Section 1.2.6 of Attachmen,t A to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983 e
 
                          -      ',                                    ~B~                                        .
SectionIII.b.3.a POSITION:
Establishes basis for locations where an alternate shutdown capability should be provided. (Where III.G.2 is not
      .                      sati sfied)
                                    .i GUIDANCE:                                          -
                  '                  Section 1 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979*
Section 1 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981*
Sections C.l.d, C.S.a. and C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Enclosure 2 to clarification letter of Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982*
Section III.G.3.b POSITION:
Establishes further bases for providi':g an alternate shutdown capability (where red.undant divisions could be damaged by fire suppression). Requires fire detection and fixed suppres-sion in a location where alternate shutdown is provided.
GUIDANCE:    (fire detection and suppression)
[See guidance for III.G.2.b]
Section F.6 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 Section C.6.f of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 1.120, November 1977
 
                                              .. C ,. ,      -
                                            .                              . g. '                                                                          -
Section D.6 of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, March 1978 t
* Section C.7.f of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Section 1.2.7 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269 July 5,1983
                                                  \.
Section 4 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983 Appendix R. Section III.J POSITION:          Requires 8-tour, battery powered emergency lighting units in all areas needed for safe shutdown and in access and egress routes thereto.
GUIDANCE:
Section C.4.e of Reg. Guide 1.120, June 1976 Section C.4.e of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 1.120, Nov.1977 Section 0.5 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 Section C.4.e of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 Section C.S.g of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Section 1.3 to Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 Enclosure to memo, Vollmer to Eisenhut, re: Emergency Lighting Requirements, December 21, 1983.
 
. o                      ..    .
Appendix R Section III.0 POSITION:    Establishes design parameters for an RCP oil collection system                              I I
i GUIDANCE:              -
Section C.7.a of BTP CHEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Memo, Vollmer to Eisenhut, re: "Oil Collection System Reactor Coolant Pumps, St. Lucie 2," April 1,1983                              l Section 1.6 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983 Section XII, IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 i
Accendix R, Section III.L.1 l
POSITION:    Establishes general design requirements for the alternate                                  !
shutdown capability l
GUIDANCE:                                                                                                )
Sections 2 and 8 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown                            i l
Capability, June 19, 1979                                                    l Sections 2 and 8 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Section C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Attachment 1 to Enclosure 2 of letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May, 1982 1
i Section 1.4.2 of Attachment A and Sections a and e of                        l Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5,'1983                                    I Sections IV, V, IX of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984*
l
 
Section L.2 POSITION:    Establishes the performance goals for the alternate shutdown system.
GUIDANCE:
Section 3 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19 1979 Section 3 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Section d,of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983*
_S_ection L.3 POSITION:    Establishes independence of the alternate shutdown capability, requirements pertaining to loss of offsite power, and imple-mentation procedures.
GUIDANCE:
Section 1 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown-Capability, June 19, 1979 Section 1 of Generic Letter 81-13, February 20, 1981 At'tachment 1 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982 Section X of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1983 Section L.4 POSITION:    Establishes requirements for hot standby / hot shutdown.
9-                        . , , - - - -          , - , - - . , , , - - . - - -  -
                                                                                                    , , . , - - - - - -  , , - - ,y  ,, ---  y -- - -
 
  ,  ,  /                                                                        -
GUIDANCE:
Sections 4 and 6 of' Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979 Sections 4 and 6 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Attachment 1 to Enc 1'osure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982 Section L.S POSITION:      Establishes requirements for cold shutdown.
GUIDANCE:
Sections 5 and 7 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979
* 1 Sections 5 and 7 of Generic Letter 81-12, Feb. 20,1981                      '
Attachment 1 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Lettjr 81-12, April-May,1982 l
Position statement on allowable repairs for safe shutdown; memo, Mattson to Vollmer, July 2,1982
                                      ~
Section 1.4.1 of Attachment A 'and Section b of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 Section XI of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984                            l Section L.6 POSITION:      Establishes that shutdown systems need not be designed to meet Seismic Category 1 criteria.
a
            ._m  .    -
_, -  , - - ,        - _ .    .-    ,__c-.  . _ ,  ..,.
 
c.'y        o                              .
13-                                                    ,
GUIDANCE:
No further guidance issued Section L.7 5
POSITION:                        Establishes requirements for associated circuits.
GUIDANCE:
* Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Attachment 2 to inclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982 Section 1.2.2 of Attachment A and Section c_ of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983 T
* Staff positions regarding the need for certain exemptions delineated in this guidance document have been revised per the "Interpretations of Appendix R" (Enclosure 1).
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L k      \.                                      UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t* ASH WGTON, C. C. 20S55                      J27    1
              \p,,el.l.
,                  ,.                              ..      March 28,1984
                                                ~ . -                                                          .
MEMORANDUM FOR:    Faust Rosa, Chief Instrumentation & Control System Branch Division of Systems Integration FROM:              Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation s       
 
==SUBJECT:==
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION:                  ROBERT L. FERGUSON t.
In accordance with the provisions of NRC Manual Chapter 4125, Differing Professional Opinions, and NRR Offico Letter No.11. Revision 1. Supplementary Guidance for Processing Resolutions of Differing Professional Opinions. I am                    l designating you as the Responsible Manager for conducting an independent                        i assessment of the issues raised in this Differing Professional Opinion.                          l l
The enclosed package contains Mr. Ferguson's written statement and supervisory and management views on this issue. I am also enclosing a memorandum from Mr. Gregory A. Harrison to Mr. Case which also addresses the issues raised in                    l the DPO. You may call upon other management resources for assistance, as
(              appropriate.
I Please plan to complete your independent assessment and provide it to me by                      '
C.O.B. April 27                I would like to be briefed periodically on the status of your effortJ,1984.'                        '
_                                              )
                                        ''    M      l N Nf              I}                  /                    *~
Harold R.. Denton, Director s
Office of Nuclear, Reactor Regulation
 
==Enclosure:==
 
As stated                                                                                        '
l cc:    R. Vollmer W. Johnston Y. Benaroya                                                                              l R. FErguson                    ,
D. Eisenhut T. Novak A. Schwencer.
G. Harrison s
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CASH WG TON, C, C. 20666
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FROM: H. DENTON                              ORIO. DUE DATE:            04/27/84  TICKET NO:  849093    I DOC DATE:  03/28/84  l TO:        FAUST ROSA                                                            NRR RCVD DATE:  03/28/84
                  ~
                                                  ** YELLOW **                                                  l FOR SIGNATURE OF            DENTON DESC:                                                                                CC:
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION                                                  CASE /DENTON FUNCHES REFERRED TO: DOSI              DATES 03/28/84 CONTACT:    ROSA OM hjg PLEASE REVIEW THE DUE DATE IMMEDIATELY:
l IF THE DUE DATE DOES NOT ALLOW ADEQUATE                            REQUESTS FOR REVISION OF YELLOW TIME TO RESPOND TO THIS TICKET, YCU MAY                            TICKET DUE DATES MAY BE hADE, WITH REQUEST A REVISED DUE DATE. THE REQUEST                            JUSTIFICATION, THRU THE WEEKLY WITS      ,
MUOT INCLUDE A VALID JUSTIFICATION AND                              UPDATE UP TO ONE WEEK AFTER ASSIGN-      1 BE MADE THROUGH YOUR CORRESPONDENCE CO-                            MENT BY NRR MAIL ROOM. THE NEW DUE ORDINATOR TO THE NRR MAIL ROOM (KAREN                              DATE, IF APPROVED BY NRR MAILROOM, BOWMAN OR HAZEL SMITH)                                              WILL BE USED TO TRACK DIVISION COR-RESPONDENCE COMPLETION SCHEDULES.        j PLEASE DO NOT HAND CARRY  ____-
CONCURRENCE PACKAGES TO DIRECTORS OFFICE
                                                        =
                                                                                                                  \
WITHOUT FIRST GOING THRU THE NRR MAIL ROOM.
___________________________________________                                          l 1
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UNITED STATES                                            ffm      -
k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                        l d                                              cAssinarow,e c. noses
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                                                                                                                          ~
APR 1 3 1984 MEMOPsANDUM FOR:    Jerse L. Funches, Director olanning and Program Analysis Staff FROM:                Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director                                                            !
Division of Licensing                                                                    i l
 
==SUBJECT:==
BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR DP0                                                                l
 
==References:==
: 1. Memorandum Fuches to Eisenhut,
                                          ' "Differin Professional Opinion" l
l April 9, 984
: 2. Memorandum Denton to Cotter and                                                        l Rosenthal "Ferguson DP0", April 10,1984 In your reference (1) memorandum, you suggested that a Board Notification be considered regarding a DP0 on a Haddam Neck SER.                                NRR Office Letter          '
No.19 Rovision 2 requires that DP0s be handled using the procedures in
(              NRC Manual Chapter 4125.
Furthermore, NRC Manual Chapter 4125 states that Office Directors should                                      I inform the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel of any differing professional opinion that relates to issues before them. The April 10, 1984 memorandum (2) from Denton to Cotter and Rosenthal satisfied the NRC Manual Chapter 4125 requirements. Therefore, no board notification is required at this time.
A board notification would be required if 'you used external sources in your investigation and may be required when                            our investi tion is completed.
                                                                                                    . s    ut,biector          !
Division of Licensing                    l 1
;                                                                                                                                1 1
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WASHINGTON. D. C. 20$55 kE*...< W/                                May 3, 1984 MEMOR.                  Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, DL Roger J. M6ttson, Director, DSI Hugh Thompson, Director, DHFS Themis P. Soeis, Director, DST FROM:                    Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
 
==SUBJECT:==
DP0 AND INTERPRETATIONS OF APPENDIX R Mr. Denton wishes to meet with us and the NRR fire protection engineers on the enclosed DP0, at 10:00 a.m., May 8. This DP0 is opposed to the adoption of "Interpretations of Appendix R" provided in Enclosure 2, which were negotiated between the NRC and industry for the purpose of expediting :ompliance with A:,endix R. Enclosure 3 is Generic Letter 85-33 which is also mentione.' in the DPO.
j      u      Y
(                                                      Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
 
==Enclosures:==
1
: 1.      DP0
: 2.      Interpretations of App. R
: 3.      Generic Ltr 83-33                                                    {
I cc; w/ enclosures                                                            I H. Denton                                                          1 E. Case                                                            I W. Shields                                                        I cc: w/o enclosures                                                          l W. Johnston                                                        l V. Benaroya                                                        l R. Ferguson                                                        l R. Eberly D. Kubicki                                                        l J. Stang T. Wambach                                                        l l
              \
0
            "'~
N                      -
 
        /                                                            UNITED STATES
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g                          NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                          . WASHINGTo N, D. C. 20555 jdj,j e..,*
s MAY 2                    1984
                                                                                                            . ,, . c. . ,.
MEMORANDUM FOR:                    Robert L. Ferguson, Section Leader                                                              ~~
Fire Protection Section                                                                  .
Chemical Engineering Branch, DE                                                      -
                                                      ~
l
                                                                                                    ~
Randy Eberly, Fire Protection Engineer (CMEB)                                                                    - -          !
FROM:
                          -                        Dennis Kubicki, Fire Protection Engineer (CMEB) ..                                                                      -
Chuck Ramsey, Fire Protection Engineer (RO: III)                                              .        .
1
-                                                    John Stang, Fire Protection Engineer (CMEB)                                                .                                  ;
Joe Ulie, Fire Protection Engineer (RO: III)
 
==SUBJECT:==
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION                                        "INTERPRETATIONS OF APPENDIX R"                                      .
j EXECUTIVE
 
==SUMMARY==
 
Since 1982, the NRR fire protection staff has performed their review of Appendix R exemption requests to a consistent basis. This basis has                                                                                                )
been formally issued in Generic Letter 83-33. New interpretations of                                                                                          ' '
the basic Appendix R requirements have been developed. These new interpretations are contrary to existing guidance and will permit neither a timely nor consistent resolution of Appendix R deviations.
(            Specific recommendations for resolution of the issues are proposed.
i Backoround                                                                    i During our reviews of a significant number of Appendix R exemption requests, it became apparent that many utilities ha,d not assessed compliance with the Rule on the basis of valid fire areas as defined in our Branch Technical Position. In addition, some utilities did not provide complete fire detegtion and automatic fire suppression systems on the basis of recognized industry practice (as defined by the National Fire Protection Association) and sound fire protection engineering principles. As a result, Generic Letter 83-33 was issued to further clarify our position and to avoid future conflict.                                                        To the extent that utilities significantly deviated from these positions, resolution was attained through the exemption process under the time constraints imposed by 10 CFR 50.48. Since April 1982, when the staff began reviewing significant                                                                                      l numbers of exemption requests, a consistent basis has been established for the level of safety that must be achieved in order to deviat.e from the Rule.
Contrary to this established guidance and against specific recommendations by the staff, new gugidance, in the form of intepretations of Appendix R, was developed in support of the Regional Appendix R workshops.
e    e
                                                - 9 e
e          a e , t . usW er                      gg
: l.        ,
l
                                                  .                                  .                                                            l l            Robert Ferguson                                                                                              .
l                                    .
(            1. Prevailind Itaff View                              .
The recently drafted "Interpretations of Appendix R" states that -
licensees, that have not assessed compliance wit'i Section III.G .                                            -      -
of Appendix R on the basis of fire areas or with the provision o' fire detection and suppression systems throughout a fire area as                                              -
delineated in Generic Letter 83-33, must perform an "evaluation .t0                                                - -
assess the adequacy" of fire area boundary construction, and detection and suppression system coverage. ~This evaluation does not have to be                                                  .
submitted on the docket for NRR review as is currently done under the ~                                                      ,
exemption process and no guidance is furnished as to the nature 'of the.                                        ,
evaluation.                                                                                              ,
If, during the audit, the inspection team takes issue with the adequacy.. . .
of fire area boundaries or the extent of fire suppression and detection,-
the licensees would present the evaluation as justification for the                                                -
l existing configuration and attempts at resolution would be undertaken.                                                        l If the issue (s) could not be resolved, it (they) would be deferred as an "unresolved item" for subsequent NRR action.
: 2. Oricinators Opinion                                      - ,
                                                                                                                                                    )
Appendix R was promulgated as a means of expediting resolution of post-                        .
Browns Ferry SER fire protection open items and to provide a basis for                                                        l consistent resolution of them. The lack of a requirement in the new                                                            l
(                "Interpretations" for timely, advance documentation of the licensee's analyses of deviations from the staff positions of Generic Letter 83-33 undermines the basis for original.ly promulgating Appendix R because,                                                          )
by requiring no prior review and deferring resolution of issues to the audit, a significant time delay will result.                      In addition, due to the varying composition of the audit teams, the resolution of technical issues may vary to a significant degree. For example, under s'imilar conditions at different plants, one audit team may accept a partial fire suppression system while another team may insist upon complete
                    ' area-wide protection.
  -                  Additional Appendix R audits are scheduled to occur well into the future.
It is also anticipated that unresolved audit issues would require NRC action, which would necessitate further delays. These delays would not be expected under the staff's previous approach because all significant technical issues would be resolved by NRR in advance of the audit.
To the extent that plant modifications would be necessary to satisfy staff concerns, these modifications would be further delayed because agreement as to'the nature of the modifications would not be reached until some time af ter the audit. Whereas, under our previous approach, agreement is reached at an earlier stage and the schedule for completing the modifications commences well in advance of the audits, normally at the time the SER is issued.
9 O
e
                                          -- . - . .- - -- - . - - - .            . . . -        . - , . -. .- - ..~ .
 
        .            .                                      .                                                                            j
[        ..
f                            Robert Ferguson Under the'n$ interpretations, r)o specific guidance is provided to the utilities regarding the nature of the evaluations that they are expected to perform. Based on the staff's previous experience, we feel that licensees are likely to conduct evaluations which vary significantly                                                                      -          -
as to the degree of comprehensiveness, completeness, and the application ~
of sound fire protectjon engineering principles. Consequently, the staff is likely to find that all relevant considerations have not been taken                                                                            - -
into' account and that an equivalent level of safety has not been provided.
For example, a utility may conclude as some have attempted that a
* particular fire protection configuration, such as a partial heig)yt fire                                                                                      .
barrier between redundant shutdown divisions, is adequate based on an .                                                                        .
assumption that no "credible" fire will occur. However, there is no ,
generally recognized method to predict the. location, magnitude and
,                                  resulting damage of a fire in any location, consequently design. basis                                                                      . .    .
protection is mandated by the rule.
Licenseca, confronted with the ina'dequacy of their evaluation at the time of the audit, may request additional time to conduct a more thorough evaluation or refer the matter to NRR for approval, similar to the exemption process. This will only                                                        result in further delays toward eventual Appendix R compliance.-
In addition to the time considerations involved, areas that are not in compliance with the Rule may be construed by some utilities as
(                              being acceptable although the same conclusion will not be held by the.
    \                              staff.              Therefore, under this approach, there is no way to ensure a consistent level of fire safety.
Under the new interpretations, licensees that have already committed to fire protection modifications in conjunction with previously requested and approved exemptions may now elect to delete their commitments from these modifications and propose a new approach which may provide a lesser degree of safety and which would not be ultimately acceptable to the
                                  , staff.                                                                                                  ,
o
* Under the new interpretations, greater reliance is placed upon the
      -                            Appendix R audit. However, an audit, by its very nature, is a limited scope effort. Only a sampling of areas and systems is reviewed. Since it is a limited effort, the staff would not have reasonable assurance that all potentially significant safety problems were discovered.
If, under the new interpretations, an audit team discovered a number of safety problems within some areas of the sample, there is no mechanism to resolve the , larger question of the adequacy of the protection in the un audited areas. As a result, more areas of the plant may be in non-compliance with potentially serious consequences if a fire should occur.
                                                              *b O
y  -
                                      ----,..,,,.-e.-            ..--,-.r.,. ,v.,-.  ,,,,-,.,,,,w..-,-,-n-,,,~.,.-,.n.,--e,-,,.,en                      ernn-.n.,,.nen.,.                n,..
 
f          .'*                            ,
e Robert Ferguson ,                                                                                                                        ,
* Because of t'he new interpretations it will now bel the staf f's position '
that all that a utility needs t'o do to justify fire area buundaries and the extent of fire detection and suppression is an "evaluation". It is therefore likely th~a t an individual utility will have some form of                                                                          . -
evaluation available for the audit team. If serious safety problems are discovered during an audit, the inspection team will not be in a pos4-tion to efficiently resolve or cite the utility for the conditic..b'ecause they have literally done what the new interpretations require.                                                            Also, there is nothing specifically written or implied in the interpretations that                                                                      - ..
                            . utilities will be sanctioned or cited for inadequate evaluations. With                                                                                .
l the reduced likelikhood of enforcement action, utilities will'be lesc                                                        ~        '
inclined to take the Rule seriously and the staff itself will be increasingly frustrated in their efforts to achieve resolution of                                                                                              i unresolved issues.                                                                                                    ,          . . .
                      '        The'new interpretation regarding the nature of fire area boundaries,                                                                            -
which states that boundary wallc and floor / ceiling assemblies need not be continuous, conflicts with previous staff criteria as defined                                                                                          f in the Branch Technical Positions. Therefore, the technical basis for our review has been changed.                              This change has been effected as a result of utility initiatives, via management directive, without -                                                                                  -
following usual appropriate NRC procedures or consideri.ng relevant staff input.
* At a meeting between the staff and the Nuclear Utilities Fire Protection
(                          Group in March 1983, it was agreed that the Group would propose criteria for the NRC acceptance of partial coverage suppression and detection systems. To this date, the Group has been unable to provide any criteria due to the number of variables that must be considered in each case.
It is therefore doubtful that the individual utilities will be able to assess Appendix R compliance of such systems based en an evaluation, as permitted by the recent interpretations.
: 3.        Originators Assessment of Consequences
  ,                            The adoption of the new "Interpretations of Appendix R" undermines                                                                                      .
the Rule by causing significant delays associated with the identification and resolution of fire protection related safety problems. It may also result in a lack of consistency in the resolution of safety deviations.                                                                                      l The interpretations also change the technical basis of the Rule and                                                                                          <
our review efforts by redefining the nature of fire area boundaries.
: 4.        Related Efforts None
: 5.        Recommendations
: 1. Do not issue the "Interpretations of Appendix R" as presently written, but as amended in by Enclosure 1.
: 2.  -Re-affirm that the staff positions as delineated in Generic Letter 83-33 are the basis for resolving technical issues associated with compliance with Appendix R.                                                                                              .
1          -,          ., -  ,,-.-.__,,w-  m.,_--_ _  , , _ ,  ,_....%        . - - .  % , , , . . .-~,,,.~,,w,__.,..,...,.,                        -
m--    ,,
 
s.
      , ./        ,
1 1
                    . Robert Ferguson                                                                                                                                                                                  I l
                                    . Mandats that, to the exte'nt utilities deviat4 from the positions
: 3.                                                                                                                                                                                          l of Generic Letter 83-33, they should justify such deviations via a detailed fire hazard analysis which must be submitted to the staff for review under the exemption process.                                                                                                      -                -
Ii                  ..
                                                                          % ). M -                                                                            l '}
                          .@bk.
Randy ' fee'FTy                                    Dennis Kubicki r
ohn Stang                                          -
l Fire Pfotection Engineer                          Fire Protection Engineer                                                        Fire Protection Engineer                                    .    ,
Chemical. Engineering Br.                          . Chemical. Engineering Br.                                                      Chemical Enginibring,Br.
ld
                                    ~'
: f. h                                                                                          .                . - . -
                      ,, ,_ ,_                1
                                                              , fir Chuck Ramse -
Fire Protsction Engineer Fire Protection Engineer
                                                                                                                                                      ;e~cJoe Ulie                                          -
l i
Region III                                                                      Region III
 
==Enclosure:==
As stated cc:      V. Benaroya W. Johnston H. Denton                                                                                                                                                                                  J
(                          E. Case                                                                                                                                                                                  ,
V. Stello                        .
T. Wambach                                                                                                                                                                                ,
W. Shields                                                        :                                                                                                                      1 L. Whitney                                                                                                                                                                                1 J. Craig N. Fioravante D. Parr                          -
J. Wermiel 1
S. Trubatch                                                                                                                                                                              i
                              'T. Chan                                                                                                                                                                                l D. Notley ,
                                                  . e
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                                                                            -,...-.,--.._y,,.      . ---,,_.- , .. ,._ , .. .---- -..-..-- ,----,-- ,-                      ...,.m...    . _ - - . - - - , , - - - - , -
 
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                                                                                                                      . .          l l
                                                                                                                      . . .        l I
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                                                                                            ..                                      j
* 1 AMENDED INTERPRETATIONS OF APPENDIX R                -                    ..e                i e
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                                                                                .                                                  1 a                                                  !
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                                                        --      - - -n    -
 
[              1. Fire Area Boundaries                                                                                                                                    .
                    . Section III.' Gof Appendix R sets forth the requirements for fire l
protection for safe shutdown capability on the basis of fire areas.
A fire area is ' defined in NUREG 75/087 and 03N as that portion of'                                                                                          -                  -
a building or plant that is separated from Mer areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors and ceilings with any openings or                                                                                              ~
penetrations protecte'd with seals or closures having a fire resisi.ance                                                                                                  - -
ratihg equal to that required of the barrier).
                                                                                                                                                                                ~
Based on the guidance in Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1, the boundary                                                                                                                    .
fire barrier should have a 3-hour fire resistance rating or it s%ould .                                                                                            .
                    . be shown by analysis that its fire rating exceeds with conservative                                                                                ,
margin, the fire loading in the fire areas on either side of the boundary fire barrier. The boundary fire barrier need not be rated at 3-hour                                                                                            . .            .
unless the fire boundary warrants such a rating.
Where fire area boundaries were'no't approved during the Appendix.A review, or where such boundaries are not continuous barriers with all penetrations sealed to prevent fire propagation, licensees must                                                                                        .
evaluate and justify the adequacy of the boundary construction. All unsealed openings must be identified and justified. Particular attention                                                                                                            -
should be given to stairways'and hatchways. This analysis must be                                                                                                                      -
performed by a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Licensees must submit their evaluations of these deviations
(                  for Staff review and must have these evaluations available for subsequent NRC audits.
: 2.      Automatic Uetection and Suppression Coverage Sections'5II.G.2.bandIII.G.2.cofAppendixRstatethat"Inaddition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area. . ." Other provisions of Appendix R also use the phrase "fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire '
area..." (see n , Section III.G.2.e).
  ,                    To comply with these requirements, suppression and detection sufficient
_                  to protect against the hazards of the area must be installed.                                                                        ' Full coverage fire detection and suppression systems fully comply with the regulation. Detection and suppression systems with less than full area coverage may be adequate to comply with the regulation. Where full area suppression and detection is not installed, licensees must perform an evaluation tg assess the adequacy and necessity of partial suppression and detection in an area. The evaluation must be performed by a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Licensees must s bmit the'Ir evaluations to the Staff for review. The evaluations must be available for subsequent NRC audits.
Where a licensee is providing no suppression or no detection, an exemption must be requested.
O e
            --    --              - - . , , - - , - -  e----, ev.,-,m. ,,m. ,,-._.,.-e.---w---e-- - - , -.r-,mm--r,,.,-,-wm,,,-ma+,.vvmnw    -e,ww-u-~.-w-            - - - - - - , ,, -. maw,,w,,-
 
s .
: 3. Fire Damage                              .
                                                                                                                                                                      ~
I'nSection III.G I      of Appendix R, the Commission hah specified means for ensuring that structures, systems and components important to safe are free of fire, damage (see e.g. , Section III.G.2.a, b and c), that is the structure, system or component under consideration is capable of.                                                                      -
performing its intended function before, during and after the postulated' fire,    Licensees seeking exemptions from these requirements of the                                                                --                              '
regulation must show that the alternative proposed will also provide                                                                        - -
reasonable assurance that necessary structures, systems and components are undamaged by the fire suppression agent and are therefore capable of -                                                        ' '
performing their intended functions before, during and after the,*                                                                                          .
postulated fire.                                                                                                              ..      .
: 4. Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown
                                                                                                                                                        ~
Section III.G.3 of Appendix R provides for "alternative or dedicated                                                                                                l shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables,                                                                        -
systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration".
While the supplementary information issued with the Rule has reflected                                                                                              1 a preference for alternative shutdown to be independent of the fire area                                                                                            I under consideration, this is not always possible. In such cases alternative shutdown in the same fire area but independent of the room or the zone                                                                                    -
under consideration is acceptable if it can be demonstrated by detailed                                                                                      '
fire hazard analysis that a single fire will not disable both trains of redundant equipment and the alternate shutdown capability.                                                                                                  .
t i
e O
e            g e  e e
                                                                                                                                                  ,      ,-n      -
                                                                                                                                                                                  ,-}}

Latest revision as of 10:39, 12 January 2021

Forwards Logic & Work Sheets Re App R,Section Iii.G, Safe Shutdown Team Insps
ML20207D419
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/22/1984
From: Ebneter S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Mckee P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML20151H089 List:
References
FOIA-88-92 NUDOCS 8808150347
Download: ML20207D419 (144)
v • d • e


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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

     * ,b            j                                 REGION 1 M1 PARK AVENUE                                   l
        %'+, . . . . . /,&                KING OF PMUS$lA. PENNSYLVANIA iMoS                        l l

March 22, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Phillip F. McKee, Chief, Operating Reactor Programs Branch, Division of Reactor Programs, IE FROM: Stewart D. Ebneter, Chief, Engineering Programs Branch, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs, RI

SUBJECT:

APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G., SAFE SHUTDOWN TEAM INSPECTIONS Enclosed you will find logic and work sheets associated with Appendix R, Section III.G, Safe Shutdown Team Inspections. These logic and work sheets were developed by Region I to digest the complex requirements of III.G and to provide for an orderly record of inspection findings respectively. Some of these sheets were used for the recent SALEM-1 inspection and were found to be valuable to both the team and Region I management. These sheets are sent to you for your review and comment, and for distribution to our counterparts and team members, in the other Regional offices. A list ef the logic and work sheets is provided in Enclosure 1 to\this letter. A brief description of these logic and work sheets is presented in Enclosure 2. It is our hope that this information may be of help to the inspection team in the other Regions: We welcome any comments. Questions should be directed to Sada Pullani, FTS 488-1290. UW M Stewart D. Ebneter, Chief Engineering Programs Branch

Enclosures:

as stated cc w/ enclosures T. Murley T. Martin C. Anderson S. Pullani l 

                                ~

1 l 8808150347 FOIA 080705 PDR pop JONESBB-92 c (Y/P

,p .. Enclosure 1 APPENDIX R, SECTION III.G, SAFE SHUTOOWN INSPECTION LOGIC AND WORK SHEETS Logic Sheets

1. Inspection and Enforcement Processes
2. Logic for Compliance with III.G
3. Effect of Approved and Pending Exemption Requests Work Sheets
4. Compliance with III.G 1
5. Compliance with III.G.2 i
6. Compliance with III.G.3 and III.L l 1
7. Safety Significance of Inspection Findings  ;
8. Management Involvement in Complying with the Rule
                                                                                               )
9. Resolution of Inspection Findings l
10. Summary of Inspection ' Findings 1

j l

o . Enclosure 2

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION OF LOGIC AND WORK SHEETS l The Logic Sheets attempt to digest the complex requirements of III.G, where as l the Work Sheets provide for a systematic identification of specific deficiencies and an orderly record of these inspection findings, l Item I shows the ovarall logic for the inspection and subsequent enforcemen' I actions. Note that the safety significance and management involvement for all inspection findings are shown as part of the inspection process and should l preferably be completed before the team leaves the site. This is to assure that significant safety issues are promptly identified, conveyed to the licensee and dealt with. Item 2 breaks down the complex requirements of III.G to its different protective options and their finer elements. Item 3 shows the effects of approved and pending exemption requests on compliance. Note the Region I inspection criterion that an approved exemption request i results in compliance and a pending exemption request results in an "Unresolved 1 Item", provided of course, the' remaining finer elements of the appropriate protective options are satisfied. 4, 5, ar.d 6 discussed below. This criterion is also reflected in items 1 l Items 4, 5, and 6 address compliance with subsections III.G.1, 2 and 3 of the rule. Items 7 and 8 provides input to the enforcement actions as noted in item 1. Item 9 keeps track of licensee commitments as opposed to acceptable solutions to the inspection findings. Item 10 is primarily for the use of the team leader to summarize the inspection findings for management briefing. A completed Work Sheet (Item 5) is also enclosed as an illustration. l 

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A r er tH* y 1 ~ Inspe* tion Recults (Inspection Findings) .I i 

                                           -                                      :            USNRC inspection of a licensed activity normally results in                                                               !

vid a l'e s I 

                                                                                    - - -      1) the identification of ap i:=(:) cf a:-acompliance, 2) the
                                                                                  ,             identification of a Deviation, 3) a finding that the matter is acceptable, or 4) determination that the matter is unresolved.

In the latter case additional information is needed in order to properly classify the matter as one of the other three cases. R EG.*J !. A13R T 13h514 

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  • l III. Detailed Discussion A. De finieions A knowledge and understanding of the teminology is required before a mean-ingful description of the NRC Enforcement Program can be set forth. We e

following definitions are, for the most paet, taken from IE Manual Chapter 0800 and the Code of Federal Regulations. l

1. Regulatory Requirements Regulatory requirements are directions (or prohibitions) imposed on a licensee or other person which are legally binding -- those which are enforceable in the courts. Regulatory Requirements of concern to the NRC normally are those contained in the Ato=ic Energy Act, NRC Rules and Regulations, Orders, and Licenses and permits issued pursuant to I the Act.
2. Licensee Cotr.it=ent Wrough various written or recorded means applicants and licensees soca-times promise that certain equipment, procedures, guides, codes or standards, controls or actions will be installed or implemented. Such a promise is a licensee co=mitment. They are not a regulatory require-ment and are not enforceable and cannot be used as the basis for ar(

t:IcicaNon l item-o f-noncompitanca. They can, however, be used as the basis for a l deviation and the licensee can be asked (but not required) to respond.  ; i Licensee commitments can be transforned into a regulatory requirement i by incorporation into a license (or permit) as license (or permit) I 1 1 condition, or by changing the technical specifications. At such time j they become legally snforceable and can be used as the basis gow af -  ! Did aliou 4teu-of-noncompbmc e , i 9-3 l 

                                                                 ./ '

l 

                                                                                                      )

4 l

3. Acceptable Items An acceptable item is a matter or situation not involving an itea of-ta c( a:l2 u
            . noncompliance,    fatture to meet a license consniement, deviation, or an unresolved item. It is also an item which meets inspection criteria.

Weddi: 0

4. -14es-o f-Noncompli anc e A vicLxhou
            .An_iten of-noncompliance is a situation whc. rein a licensee fails to com-Vi ' o Items-oh   s nl . s:e liance,-have been ply with a regulatory requirement.                   '            '
a L w a' pi '.

categorized into three severity levels: vio16 W ,4 ,- in f rac tio ns -and-deficiencies.- 'Ihese-categories are described in a letter to all - licensees, dated December 31, 1974 c- 1

5. Deviation A deviation is a situation wherein a licensee 1) fails to meet comit-ments to the Comission, 2) fails to meet provisions of applicable Regulatory Guides, or 3) f ails to comply with codes, standards or gener-ally accepted practices in the industry which have safety .or security
                                                                                     . . . i ,) , e l

significance, and such situation does not constitute ari item of noncompliance.

6. Unresolved items An unresolved item is a matter about w !ch more information is required e.M slica in order to determine whether it is an acceptable itec, ari Leem-ofwon-compliance, or a fei-lura-.to meer = licensee-comunitment-(deviation).
7. Notice of Violation A Notice of violation is a written notice to a licensee required by 10 CTR 2.201, of apparent items-of-noneoeplieMviolations,__ infractions. l
              .or de ficiano44+) . The Notice of Violation may itself be the enforcement           l sanction or it may be issued in conjunction with a civil penalty action or an order.

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i l 10 4 March 23, 1984 0 TO ALL LICENSEES SUBJECT TO APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR PART 50: Enclosed are four documents on the subject of the fire protection program at your facility mandated by 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. En-closure 1 contains NRC staff interpretations of certain Appendix R provisions. In some cases the interpretations differ from those contained in previous staff guidance. Enclosure 2 contains questions developed as a result of the industry- . sponsored Fire Protection Sen:inar held recently in Washington, DC. and NRC staff responses to those questions. Enclosure 3 contains additional questinns and answers which came to the staff's attention subsequent to the seminar. En-closure 4 is a complete list of previous staff guidance cr the fire protect.fon j program. Where guidance has been modified by the interpretations in Enc,losure 1, it is so noted. These documents are being provided informally at this time, and may be added to or otherwise modified during the remainder of the NRC Regional Workshops on I At the conclusion of the workshops, the revised guidance will fire protecjion. be transmitted fomally to all affected licensees. When this process is ccm-plete, the NRC will no longer accept arguments that either the Comission's rules or staff guidance on those rules has not been correctly understood. 6@ 

                                                               \'.h

1 i l 1 l AGEt:0A FOR APPENDIX R WORKSHOP Region 9:00 - 9:05 Welcome Opening Remarks b / .sVollmer/ Taylor 9:05 - 9:25 Scope of Appendix R Inspections ISE Oes MJ% 9:25 - 9:50 , 9:50 - 10:00 Break 

                                                                                 #" *"'                           l 10:00 - 11:00               Information flotice 84-09 l

Fire Barrier Testing and Configuration CMES r Licensees Re-assessment for Conformance DL ) to Appendix R f Procedures for Alternative Shutdown AS8 , capability  ! Responses to Industry Questions and Additional Answers on the Spec'ific Area f CMES j 11:00 - 12:00 I Fire Protection and Seismic Events CMEB  ! II Structural Steel CMEB III Fire Barrier Qualifications CMEB IV Suppression 12:00 - 12:45 Lunch Break ASB 12:45 - 3:00 V Safe and Alternate Shutdown ASB 1 VI Procedures I&E l VII Audits ASB l VIII Safe Shutdown and Fire Damage l DL IX Long Term Conformance CHEB X Fire Area Boundaries DL XI Guidance Documents DL XII Exemption Criteria CMEB l XIII Intervening Combustibles CHEB XIV Radiant Energy Shields  ; CMEB XV Emergency Lighting l 3:00 - 3:10 Break 1 All 3:10 - 4:00 General huestions and Answer Session Vollmer/ Taylor 4:00 - 4:15 Wrap Up

5 v3 ATTENDANCE LIST MAY 4, 1984 Name Organization Arias , J. Florida Power & Light Company Asfour, K. J. Bechtel Power Corporation Asnoche, F. Caroliria Power & Light Company Baker, W. H. Tennessee Valley Authority Barnett, T. E. Mississippi Power & Light Comp Barrow, J. Florida Power & Light Company Bates, D. B. Carolina Power & Light Company Bayer, R. K. Virginia Electric Power Compan Bearden, B. Missi.ssippi Power & Light Camp Bianco, V. A. Tennessee Valley Authority Bilyeu, R. C. Virginia Electric Power Compan Black, K. M. Mississippi Power & Light Comp Blomberg, P. F. Fluor Eng1neers, Inc. (FPC) Bordner, R. E. EPM, Inc. (NUFPG) Brain, S. G. Florida Power & Light Company Bray, J. M. Georgia Power Company Bridges, S. Tennessee Valley Authority Buck, C. L. Alabama Power Company Burford, J. N. Florida Power & Light Company Burgold, S. R. Virginia Electric Power Compan Burns, W. E. Georgia Power Company Butcher, R. C. USNRC Butler, S. D. NRC/RII Buxton, G. E. Middle South Services, Inc. Campbell, R. C. Bechtel Power Corporation Carroll, H. E. Virginia Electric Power Compan Carroll, K. C. Virginia Electric Power Compan Castles, H. D. Middle South Services, Inc. Chase, J. W. Carolina Power & Light Company Christopher, W. T. TVA, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plan Clark, T. V. M&M Protection Consultants r.onlon, T. E. NRC/RII Crisler, M. J. Florida Power & Light Company Crienjak, R. V. USNRC Cutter, A. B. Carolina Power & Light Company Dager, H. J. Florida Power & Light Company' Davis, M. J. USNRC Deacy, R. M. Impell Corporation Deckert, W. M. Phoenix Contractors D'eckmann, H. CEI (Pery) O( nnelly, H. I. South Carolina Electric and Ga Coubleday, E. C. NES Downs, R. E. Georgia Power Company Dungan, K. W. ,PLC Dymek, J. L. C Florida Power & Light Company Eaves, D. W. American Nuclear Insurers Ellis, D. B. Tennessee Valley Authority, (N El rod, S. A. NRC/RII

m w ~ 

                                                                  /

dage2ofAttendanceListforMeetingof 05/04/84 Name Organization Y Elton, T. L. Georgia Power Company Engelhardt, J. TVA, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

  • Feierabend, C. D. USNRC Ferguson,' R. L'.' NRC/DE Fioravante, N. USNRC Firestone, A. B. Carolina Power & Light Company Fisher, C. L. Florida Power & Light Company Franklin, J. C. Florida Power & Light Company Garner, L. W. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Garrett, F. D. Tennessee Valley Authority Goewa, L. T. Georgia Power Company Gosla, I. Bechtel Power Corporation Grace, J. N. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Guill, P. Duke Power Company Hafer, D. Gilbert Associates Inc.

Haltom, S. O. Georgia Power Company Hardy, S. Carolina Power & Light Co. Harkleroad, J. R. Tennessee Valley Authority Hart, S. Georgia Power Company Hawkins, W. F. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant i Virginia Electric & Power Co. Hegner, J. Hehl, C. W. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Hellums, M. Tennessee Valley Authority Helsel, J. C. Bechtel Hendricks, J. R. Duke Power Company Holland, W. E. OSNTEC Holmoerg, V. Mississippi Power & Light Comp Holmes-Ray, P. Nuclear Regulatory Comission I Horrell, M. P. EBASCO Services Inc. Hutchins, S. P. Mississippi Power & Light Comp Hyland, E. Duke Power Company l Jackson, R. W. Bechtel Jenison, K. M. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Jones, D. H. Alabama Power Company Kane, J. P. . EPM  ! Kemer, R. W. Florida Power and Light Compan l Kilroy, R. J. Bechtel King, T. W. Duke Power Company . Kinsaul, R. L. Southern Company Services Koom, A. R. South Carolina Electric & Gas Kubicki, D. USNRC l Kune, S. W. Bechtel . LeBlanc, C. Phoenix Ledford, T. A. Duke Power Company l Logan, S. B. Tennessee Valley Authority Love, D. L. Ark. Power and Light Company Luehman, J. G. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Madden, P. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Maddry, J. M. Southern Comoany Services Mali, K. Tennessee Valley Authority Manner, D. S. ,? PLC, Inc. Mantz, D. Florida Power & Light Co. Ha rdi s , D. United Energy Services Maxwell, G. F. Nuclear Regulatory Comission

3 of Attendance List for Meeting of 05/04/84 . 1 Name Organization g l McAfee, D. E. Georgia Power Company McAnuity, P. Duke Power / Catawba

  • McKee, P. Nuclear Regulatory Comission McKeown, E. Tennessee Valley Authority McLeod, J. N. Southern Company Services McNeill, T. Carolina Power & Light Co.

McQueen,J. Carolina Power & Light Co. Meras, J. Rockbestos Miles, R. C. Tennessee Valley Authority, Wa Miller, R. F. SCSI Mosby, D. Impell Corp. Moxley, R. K. Georgia Power Compar.y Myer!, D. O. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Nejfelt, G. M. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Nickle, J. L. Management Analysis Co. Oates, R. Carolina Power & Light Co. O'Laughlin, R. J. PLC, Inc. Olshinski, J. A. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Orga, R. Virginia Electric & Power Co. Parr, K. P. Tennessee Valley Authority Patterson, C. hRC/ Browns Ferry Peebles, T. A. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Pickett, E. Georgia Power Company l Pierson, B. Nuclear Regulatory Comission  ; Pitts, T. L. Tennessee Valley Authority ' Pointer, K. Georgia Power Company Ponder, J. J. Georgia Power Company , 1 Porter, D. Florida Power l Porterfield, R. E. Carolina Power & Light Co. l Powell, R. J. SCSI Powell, S.'C Florida Power l Prevatte, R. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Publ, B. Bechtel Power Corporation Quick, D. MAC Reckford, S. Florida Power & Light Co. Reed, J. M. Southern Company Services Revels, R. W. Duke Power Company Rhinehart, M. D. Georgia Power Company Rhoads, D. A. Gilbert / Commonwealth Rippe, J. TSI Ristan, D. J. Wisconsin Public Services Roper, E. Y. Carolina Power & Light Co.

  • Ruggiero, J. EBASCO Services Ruland, B. NRC/Farley l Schmiedel, R. P. Florida Power Corporation Shead, R. Rockbestos Sheehy, E. Tennessee Valley Authority Shelton, E. J. Bechtel Power Corporation Shields, W. USNRC Shukla, G. S. Bechtel Power Corporation Sinopoli, C. J Virginia Electric Power Compan Skolds, J.

Impell Slovic, R. C. Bechtel Power Corporation Snell, W. D. Georgia Power Company 

       -4 age 4 of Attendance 1.ist for Meeting of 05/04/84 vf
   .        Name                                 Organitation                                                                                           ,

i Sprankle, R. A. Georgia Power Company U# ! Stetka, T. F. USNRC . Stock, F. United Energy Services 

                                                                                                                                     *                    /y Stouffer, L. R.                 Bechtel Power Corporation                                                                                         /y(

Sudduth, C. H. Tennessee Valley Authority Taylor, P. Nuclear Energy Services Thompson, R. E. Tennessee Valley Authority Traczyk, G. J. Florica Power & Light Company Vance, J. C. SCSI Walker, D. A. Tennessee Valley Authority Wallace, D. L. Tennessee Valley Authority Wambach, T. V. USNRC/0NRR/DC Warnick, L. Virginia Electric Power Compan Waters, D. CPU Waters, D. L. Duke Power Company Weaver, E. M. Duke' Power Company Webb, G. M. South Carolina Electric and Ga Whitney, L. E. USNRC/DQASIP/0RPB Wilks, G. M&M Protection Consultation Williams, K. A. Florida Power Corporation Wilson, J. USNRC Wilson, J. W. SCSI Wilson, K. R. Florida Power Corporation Wimbrow, R. T. Tennessee Valley Authority Wright, R. J. Mississippi Power & Light Comp 

                                                                                       '                                               f r
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                             -               Interpretations of Appendix R l

l Section III.L.2.d of Appendix R

1. Process Monitoring Instrumentation to 10 CFR Part 50 states that "the process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of' the proce1Lvariables necessarv to (

l terform and con \ trol" the reactivity control function, the reactor coolant In I&E Information makeup functio and the reactor heat removal function. Notice 84-09 (Attachment 1, p.6), the Staff provides a listing of instru-4 mentation acceptable to and preferred by the Staff to demonstrate compli-Q While this guidance provides an acceptable method q fancewith*,hisprovision. for compliance with the regulation, it does not exclude other alternative /aow W methods of compliance. Accordingly, a licensee may propose to the Staff gg [v n While such a /dfid# 

        ,) G,P  k alternative instrumentation to comp?y with the regulatiol

) , f tbmittal is not an exemption request, it must be justified based on a The licensee may also propose alternatives _to 

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b M'yyactualcompliancewiththeregulation(e.g.,instrumentationw E 

            '      not provide a direct reading of the process variable) by filing an exemp-f              tpnrequestwithadequatejustification.

2. Reoair of Cold Shutdown Equioment Section III.L.5 of Appendix R states that when in the alternative or dedicated shutdown mode, "equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions shall not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equip-ment and systems shall be limited so that the systems can be made operab This is not to be and cold shutdown can be ' achieved within 72 hours." confused with the requirements in Section III.G.l.b of Appendix R. Section III.G.l.b contains the requirements for normal _ shutdown modes utilizing the control room or emergency control station (s)

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                                                                                                                     .                                                                                                      l l

capabilities. The fire areas falling under the requirements of III.G.I.b are those for which an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability is not being provided. For these fire areas, Section III.G.l.b requires r ~ only thegpabilityj repair the systems necessary to achieve and main-tain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station (s) within 72 hours, not the capability to repair and achieve cold .s_hutdown within 7? hours as required for the alternative or dedi-cated shutdown modes by Section III.L (noted above). With regard to areas involving normal shutdown, however, Section I of Appendix R states that reairs must be made using only onsite cap- , abilities, fter repa are made cold shutdown can be achieved on a . reasonable schedule using any available power source. fpuV. Fire' Damage Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 utilizes the term 32 g M g 3. In promulgating Appendix R, the Commission has ee of' -- 0 provided methods acceptable for assuring that necessary structures, f systems and components are f ree of fire damage (see ea, Section III.G.2a, 

     &         b and c), that is the structure, system or component under consideration is capable of performing its intended function before, during and after the postulated fire, as needed.                  Licensees seeking exemptions from these provisions of the regulation must show that the alternative proposed will also provide reaso'nable assurance that necessary structures, systems and components are capable of performing their intended functions before, during and after the postulated fire, as needed.
4. Fire Area Boundaries The term "fire area" as used in Appendix R i means an area sufficiently bounded to withstand the hazards associated i

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        )                                               ,

with the area and, as necessary, to protect important equipment within In order to meet the regulation, the area from a fire outside the area. fire area boundaries need not be completely sealed floor-to-ceiling, 

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wall-to-wall bdundaries. Where fire area boundaries were not approved h under the Appendix A process, or where such boundaries are not wall-to- a wall, floor-to-ceiling boundaries with all penetrations sealed to the l fire ratino required of the boundaries, licensees must perform an evalua-tion to assess the adequacy of fire area boundaries in their plants to determine if the boundaries are sufficient. This analysis must be per-formed by at least a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Although not required, licensees may submit their evaluations , for Staff review and concurrence. In any event, these analyses must be retained by the licensees for subsequent NRC audits.

5. Automatic Detection and Suppression Sections III.G.2.b and III.G.2.c of Appendix R state that "In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area..."

Other provisions of Appendix R also use the phrase "fire detectors and  ; an automatic fire suppression system in the fire area..." (see e a , Section III.G.2.e). In order to comply with these provisions, suppression and detection sufficient to protect against the hazards of the area must be installed. In this regard, suppression less than full area coverage may be adequate to comply with the regulation. Where full area suppression and dea c-tion is not insta11ec, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy and necessity of partial suppression and detection in an

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  • 1 area. The evaluation must be performed by a fire protection engineer Although not required, licensees and, if required, a systems engineer.

may submit their evaluations to the Staff for review and concurrence. Inanyevent,dheevaluationsmustberetainedforsubsequentNRC audits. While full suppression in an area is not required by the regulation (unless necessary due to the hazard associated with the area), where 3 licensee is providing no supp ession or detection, an  ! exemption must be requested.

6. Alternative or_0edicated Shutdown Section III.G.3 of Appendix R provides for "alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the .

l While general guidance issued l area, room, or zone under consideration". l by the Staff to date has reflected a preference for alternative shutdown to be independent of the fire area under consideration, this is not intended to imply tnat alternative shutdown in the same fire area but 1 independent of the room or the zone is unacceptable or not also in com- 1 pliance with the regulation. in.v1 I b R?N / pjeaJ j /t k

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l QUESTIONS RAISED DURING THE NUCLEAR UTILITY FIRE PROTECTION SEMINAR I. Fire Protection and Seismic Events QUESTION A. For which situations other than the reactor coolant pump lube oil system are seism'ic events assumed to be initiators of a fire? I 1 i

RESPONSE

{ The guidelines for the seismic design of fire protection systems which cover other general situations is delineated in BTP CMEB C.1.C(3) and (4): 

    "(3) As a minimum, the fire suppression system should be capable of delivering water to manual hose stations located within hose reach of areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown following the safe shutdown l

earthquake (SSE). In areas of high seismic activity, the staff will consider on a case-by-case basis,the need to design the fire detection and suppression systems to be functional following the SSE. (4) The fire protection systems should retain their original design capability for (a) natural phenomena of less severity and greater frequency than the most severe natural phenomena (approximately once in 10 years) suen as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, ice storms, or small-intensity earthquakes 

 <    >                                                                                        m 1

l that are characteristic of the geographic region, and (b) potential man-made site-related events such as oil barge collisions or aircraft crashes that have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific J plant site. The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall picnt fire protection program." J l We have considered California as being a high seismic activity area. l For those plants reviewed under Appendix A, our position is (A.4): 

                    "Postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not be         ,

considered concurrent with other plant accidents or the most severe natural phenomens". Our guidelines on the seismic design of fire protection systems installed in safety related areas are delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.29 "Seismic Design 1 Classification", paragraph C.2. The failure of any system should not affect l l a system from performing its safety function. Our guidelines on the seismic design of hydrogen lines is delineated in BTP CHEB C.S.d(5): (5) Hydrogen lines in safety-related areas should be either designed to seismic Class I requirements, or sleeved such that the outer pipe is directly vented to the outside, or should be equipped with excess 

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l I i flow valves so that in case of a line break, the hydrogen concentration in the affected areas will not exceed 2%. All PWR's have a hydrogen line going to the Volume Control Tank (Make-up Tank) that needs to be protected. To identify plant specific situations in which seismic events could initiate a fire in a specific plant area, the fire protection engineer and systems engineer performing the fire hazards analysis should be concerned with l in-situ combustible materials which can be released in a manner such that l An l they could contact in-situ ignition sources by a seismic event. , example of this would bi the rupture of the RCP lube oil line directly above 

                                                                                      \

the hot reactor coolant piping. The fire protection engineer should also be concerned with seismic induced ignition sources, electrical or mechanical, which could contact nearby in-situ combustible materials.

l - > e QUESTION B. Is a random fire to be postulated concurrent with a seismic event? 1 I

RESPONSE

Our position, as stated in Section C.1.6 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, is "Worst case fire need not be postulated to be simultaneous with nonfire-related failures 

                                                                                                              /

in safety systems, plant accidents, or the most severe natural phenomena." Where plant systems are designed to prevent the release of combustible materials caused by a seismic event, such as a dike around a fuel oil tank transformer, or seismic supports for hydrogen lines, then no fire ' need to be arbitrarily assumed to take place in the fire hazards analysis. . Because it'is impossible to completely preclude the occurrence of a seismically induced fire, Section C.6.c(4) of CHEB 9.5-1 states: 

                 "Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose connections for manual firefighting in areas containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake. The piping system serving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should be    provided The            withvalves piping and supports to ensure system pressure integrity.

for the portion of hose standpipe system affected by this functional requirement should, as a minimum, satisfy ANSI B31.1, ' Power Piping.' The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valves in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a normal seismic Category I water system such as the essential service water system. The cross connection should be (a) capable of providing flod to at least two hose stations (approximately 75 gpm per hose station), and (b) designed to the same standards as the seismic Category I water system; it should not degrade the performance of the seismic Category I water system." The post-seismic procedures should include a damage survey, and a deter nation of whether any fires were initiated as a result of the seismic event.

l l l ' OUESTION I C. If the reactor coolant pump lube oil system and associated appertanances are seismically designed, does the lube oil collection system also require seismic design? Is an exemption required? u

RESPONSE

Where the RCP lube oil system is capable of withstanding the safe shutdown l earthquake (SSE), the analysis should assume that only random oil leaks from the joints could occur during the lifetime of the plant. The oil collection system, therefore, should be designed to safely channel the quantity of oil , 1 from one pump to a vented and closed container. Under this set of circumstances, l the oil collection system would not have to be seismically designed to channel leakage to the container. 1 An exemption would be required for a non-seismically designed oil collection l system. The basis for this exemption would be that random leaks are not assumed to occur simultaneously with the seismic event, since the lube oil However, the Rule, as system is designed to withstand the seismic event. written, does not make this allowance.

  • ' J ha QUESTION D.

It would appear that a literal reading of Section III.0 regarding the oil collection system for the reactor coolant pump could be met by a combination of seismically designed splash shields and a sump with sufficient capacity to contain the entire lube oil system inventory. If the reactor coolant pump is seismically designed and the nearby piping hot surfaces are protected by seismically designed splash shields such that any spilled lube oil would contact only cold surfaces, does the design concept conform to the requirements of the rule?

RESPONSE

If the reactor coolant pump, including the oil system, is seismically designed and the nearby hot surfaces of piping are protected by seismically designed splash shields such that any spilled lube oil would contact only cold surfaces, and it could be demonstrated by engineering analysis that a sump and splash shields would be capable of preventing a fire during normal and design besis accident conditions, the safety objective of Section III.0 would be achieved. Such a design concept would have to be evaluated under the exemption process. The justification for the exemption should provide reason-able assurance that oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage The sump should be points would be safely collected and drained to the sump. The shown capable of safely containing all of the anticipated oil leakage. analysis should verify that there are no electric sources of ignition. 

                                                                                                             /

II. StructuM1 Steel QUESTION A. Does the NRC's definition of structural steel supporting fire barriers completely accomodate approaches described in NFPA guidance documents and standards? 1 l l

RESPONSE

l The NRC does not define the structural steel supporting fire barriers. This steel is identified by the licensee. Our position regarding the need to protect the structural steel, which forss a part of or supports fire barriers, is consistent witn sound fire protection engineering principles as delineated in both NFPA codes and standards, and The Fire Protection Handbook. , i I

3 l l l i 

                                                                                                                               \

l QUESTION i l 1 l B. Is it necessary to protect structural steel in existing fire barriers where those barriers were approved in an Appendix A SER? 

                             \.

f

RESPONSE

f If unprotected structural steel in existing fire barriers has been evaluated and specifically accepted the configuration in a published safety evaluation report (SER), it is not necessary to protect the steel or request an exemp Exposed steel, such as cable tray supports, need to be protected if their failure because of a fire would result in the loss of the integrity of the . fire barrier. , e 8 

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1 QUESTION . C. Does structural steel whose sole purpose is to carry dynamic loads l from a seismic event require protection in accordance with Section l III.G.2a of Appendix R?

RESPONSE

f If the failure of any structural steel due to a fire could result in the loss of the fire barrier, it must be protected. . O e l 1 i

l , , 'o III. Fire Barrier Q'ualifications OVESTION A. RecedtlytheStaffhasapplieda325'Fcoldsidetemperature criterion to its evaluation of the acceptability of one-hour and three-hour fire barrier cable tray wraps. This criterion is not in Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5.1, Appendix A as an acceeptance criterion for fire barrier cable tray wraps and is not contained in Appendix R. It appears to represent post-Appendix R guidance. What is the origin of this criterion and why is it applicable to electrical cables where insulation degradation does , not begin until jacket temperatures reach 450*F to 650*F? l

RESPONSE

Fire barriers relied upon to protect shutdown related systems to meet the requirements of III.G.2 need to have a fire rating of either cne or three l hours. 550.48 references BTP'APCSB 9.5-1, where the fire protection definitions are found. Fire' fating is defined: l "Fire Rating - the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure; it defines the period of resistance to a standard fire exposure before the first critical point in behavior is observed (see NFPA 251)."

it I The acceptance criteria contained in Chapter 7 of NFaA 251, "Standard of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials," pertains to non-be These criteria stipulate that transmission of heat through the fire barriers. barrier "shall not have been such as to raise the temperature on its une The ambient air surface more thar, 250*F above its initial temperature." temperature at the beginning of c fire test must be between 50'F an! The It is generally recognized that 75'F represents an acceptable norm. resulting 325'F cold side temperature criterion is used for cable tray wraps because they perform the fire barrier function to preserve the cables free of fire damage. It is clear that cable that begins to degrade at 450*F is free of fire damage at 325'F. ' 1 l l 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ = - _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - 

   . ,                                                                                m l

QUESTION l B. Due to obstructions and supports, it is often impossible to achieve I exact duplication of the, specific tested configuration of the one-hour fire barriers which are to be placed around either conduits or cable For each specific instance where exact replication of a N' trays. previously tested configuration is not and cannot be achieved, is an exemption necessary in order to avoid a citation for a violation? l

RESPONSE

No. Where exact replice. tion of a tested configuration cannot be achieved, l the field installation should meet the following criteria: ' l 1. The continuity of the fire barrier material is maintained. l

2. The thickness of the barrier is maintained.

i 3. The nature of the support assembly is unchanged from the tested configuration.

o ' 

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                       ,                                                                                                                        t
4. The application or "end use" of the fire barrier is unchanged from the tested configuration. For example, the use of a cable tray barrier to protect a cable tray which differs in configuration from those that were f

testedwodidbeacceptable. However, the use of structural steel fire proofing to protect a cable tray assembly would not be acceptable. l

5. The configuration has been reviewed by a qualified fire protection engineer and found to provide an equivalent level of protection.

e 4 l l 

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                                                                                    /7 QUESTION C.

Where labeled and rated fire doors have been modified to incorporate security hardware or for flooding protection, is an exemption from Appendix R required? x

RESPONSE

Minor design changes to a fire door assembly which do not change the fire rating of the fire barrier in which they are installed does not need an exemption. An example of a minor change would be the installation of "contacts" for electronic supervision of the door. The installation of a plastic vision panel would constitute a modification ' I which necessitates an exemption request. 1 I l

1 

   . n l

1 i QUESTION  ! ) IV. Automatic Suppression I l i A. Staff guidance provided in Generic t.etter 83-33 concerning automatic suppression coverage of fire areas "throughout interprets the \ phrase "in the fire area" in Section III.G as meaning What delivered water density or occupancy standard the fire area." i  ? as specified in NFPA-STD-13 must be achieved to meet this i

RESPONSE

Thedesignershoulddetermine} Individual plant areas are diverse in nature. Those areas which the particular water density or occupancy classification.b tibles,

  • contain a limited quantity of in-situ and anticipated idered as transient com and which feature contents such as tanks and piping,For may those be cons l "Ordinary Hazard (Group 1)", as defined by NFPA Standard pancy No. 1 areas containing large amounts of cables or flammable liquids, a The decision as to which classification of "Extra Hazard" may be warranted. t ction classification should be applied should be made by a qualified!

engineer. h ld be ( Once the occupancy classification is determined, Any density along the water de based on the Density Curves in table 2.2.1(B) of NFPA 13. lineated in the curves would be in conformance with our guidelines as de l Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. 

                                                                                 ,n. . - . , - - - - - . - - - . , - , . - - . - . - - - - - - - - .

a ,

  • 6 QUESTION B.

Section 4.1.2 of NFPA-STD-13 allows for "partial insta,11ations" or partial coverage. The standard states that "(t)he authority having With the NRC as jurisdiction shall be consulted in each case." authority in this instance, must consulation occur only through the exemption process? v

RESPONSE

I No. The staff is always available to consult with utility representatives and provide guidance as to the ac:eptability of a particular fire protection configuration in individual plant areas. . 

                                                                                                                               \

 . .                                                                                                      J QUESTION C.

How does a suppression system designer know whether the term "throughout the area" means that sprinkler heads must be above or below cable trays when, in his judgment, the hazard of concern is a floor based fire?

RESPONSE

Section C.6.c(3) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 states: l Fixed water extinguishing systems should conform to requirements of 

       "(3) appropriate standards such as NFPA-13, "Standard for the Installation f

of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA-15, "Standard for Water Spray Fixed  : Systems."  ! This question pertains to those sprinkler systems covered by NFPA-13. l Chapter 4 of NFPA-13 provides guidance as to the location of sprinkler hea I In general, to achieve complete area-wide l in relation to common obstructions. coverage, sprinklers should be located at the ceifing, with additional sprin provided below significant obstructions such as wide HVAC ducts an To the extent that an existing or proposed or solid bottom stacked cable trays. sprinkler systes design deviates from this concept, the design would h justified by a fire hazards analysis.

t t) QUESTION . D. Must suppression systems approved and installed under BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A be extended or altered to meet the total area requirements of Section III.G (as interpreted by the Staff) or does this "requirement" only appl to new installations?

RESPONSE

Suppression systems installed in connection with Appendix A may or may not have to be extended as a result of III.G. The licensee must analyze each area where suppression is required by III.G, and where only partial suppression has been provided, determine if the coverage is adequate for the fire hazard in the area. The licensee may consult with the staff during this review. In any event, the Appendix R analysis showing 

     'that the suppression provided is adequate must be retained and available for NRC audit.

i l l l

\ 

   *   *   /

V. Safe and Alternative Shutdown QUESTION A. As part of the Appendix A review process, some plants had committed to an alternative shutdown system in the form of a remote shutdown panel or remote shutdown system. Footnote 2 to Appendix R describes alternative shutdown capability as being associated with "Rerouting, relocating, or modifying of existing systems." To the extent that an existing remote shutdown system previously reviewed and approved under Appendix A to BTP 9.5.1 does not require modifications, rerouting, or relocating of existing systems, are the requirements of Section III.L of Appendix R backfit? RESPONSE . Yes. E.xisting remote shutdown capabilities previously reviewed and approved under Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 do not categorically comply with Section III.G.3 of Appendix R. Licensees were requested to re-analyze their plants to determine compliance with Section III.G and, thus, 

 .            Section III.L of Appendix R.                     ,

l

o , e6 QUESTION R. Some licensees defined safe shutdown capability for purposer of analysis to Section III.G criteria as being composed of both the normal safe shutdown capability and the pre-existing redundant or remote safe shutdown capability which was previously installed as part of the Appendix A process. This definition often took the form of two "safe shutdown trains" comprising (1) one of the two normal safe shutdown trains, and (2) a second safe shutdown train capability which was being provided by the pre-existing remote shutdown capability. This definitional process, which was under-taken by a number of licensees, makes a significant difference in the implementation of Appendix R. Under such a definition, does Section III.L criteria apply when the Commission did not call out Section III.L as a backfit? Resp 0NSE The definitional process mentioned' considers an alternative shutdown 1 capability provided under the Appendix A review as a redundant shutdown j capability under the Appendix R review. This definitional process is incorrect. For the purpose of analysis to Section III.G.2 criteria, the l safe shutdown capability is defined as one of the two normal safe shut- l down trains. If the criteria of Section III.G.2 is not met, an alternative shutdown capability is required. The altenative shutdown capability may utilize existing remote shutdown capabilities and must meet the criteria of Sections III.G.3 and III.L of Appendix R.

QUESTION C. Why do the Staff interpretive memoranda regarding the criteria for satisfaction of Section III.L form the auditable basis for deter-mining codpliance to Appendix R v: hen the Commission failed to backfit this section to all plants?

RESPONSE

Although 10 CFR 50.48(b) does not specifically include Section III.L. with Sections III.G. , J. , and O. of Appendix R as a requirement 1 applicable to all power reactors licensed pr.ior to January 1, 1979, the Appendix, read as a whole, and the Court of Appeals decision on the Appendix, Connecticut Light and Power, et al. v. NRC, 673 F2d. 525 (D.C. Cir. , 1932), does mean that Section III.L. applies to the alternative safe shutdown j option under Section III.G. l l l l 

         - _ _ _ ,             -_ --   _- _   _ _ _ _ ~ __   - _ _ _ . . _ _                 . _ . _ .___ ,,r . - _ . . . _ . , -_ _

s a ? . . , stes a VI. Procedures l QUESTION A. With regard to the term "post-fire procedures" the Commission states that it is impossible to predict the course and extent of a fire. Given this, how does one write post-fire shutdown and repair pro-cedures that are both symptomatic and usable to an operator? l

RESPONSE

Safe shutdown capabilities including alternative shutdown capabilities are all designed for some maximum level of fire-damage (system unavail-abilities, spurious actuations). Since the extent of the fire can not be predicted, it seems prudent to have the post-fire shutdown procedures guide the operator from full system availability to the minimum shutdown capability. As for repair procedure, similar conditions exist. A repair procedure can be written based on the maximum level of damage that is expected. This procedure would then provide shutdown capability without accurately predicting likely fire damage. , 

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e ~ ' on s QUESTION

8. Does the NRC have any requirements regarding whether post-fire operating procedures should be based upon fire areas, systems, or by symptom-based?

RESPONSE

The NRC does not have requirements, nor do we propose any requirements regarding whether post-fire operating procedures should be based upon fire areas, systems or be symptom-based. We suggest that the pos'..-fire shutdown capabilities designs be reviewed with the plant operat'Jn staff and procedures written with their input. . 

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QUESTION C. Is it acceptable to develop post-fire operating procedures only l for thnse areas where alternative shutdown is required? (For  ; other areas standard, emergency operating procedures would be utilized in the presence of potential fire damage to a single I train.) . 

                                                ~

l RESPONSE l Yes. The only requirement for post-fire operating procedures is for l those areas where alternative shutdown is required. For other 6 teas of the plant, shutdown would be achieved utilizing one of the two normal trains of shutdown system. Shutdown in degraded modes (one train unavail-able) s,hould be covered by present operator training and abnormal and emergency operating procedures. If the degra.ied modes of eparation are not presently covered, we would suggest that the optration staff of the plant determine whether additional training or procedures are needed. ) l l l l 

 . .                                                                           e<, d> l QUESTION D. Do any NRC Staff guidance documents exist relative to the extent, form, nature, etc. of Appendix R post-fire operating procedures?

RESPONSE

No. Other than the criteria of Section III L, no specific post-fire shutdown procedure guidance has been developed. f # h l? / / 

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e a t VII. Aug!ts' QUESTION A. Since the Commission states that fire damage cannot be defined and fire i spread cannot be predicted, how does the Commission determine which Appendix R violations have "important safety implications?"

RESPONSE

III.G.2 provides alternative to ensure that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage. Fire spread within one area cannot be predicted, but damage is limited to one fire area. Determination of the Appendix R violations that have "important safety impli-cations" are based on the equipment, components, and systems that are located in the same fire area shat are needed for saft shutdown or can adversely affect safe shutdown, and are not protected by the features of III.G.2, III.G.3 or an approved alternative. I 8O 

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                                                                                                                             - ~~ --

QUESTION B. How does the Commission ensure that violations of the rule are uniformly treated between regions?

RESPONSE

Each Region evaluates violations in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR 2, Appendix C. The Policy provides guidance for the determination of The Office of Inspection appropriate enforcement sanctions for violations. and Enforcement provides guidance for and monitors Regional implementation of the Policy to ensure a uniform application. In addition, the policy requires that all escalated enforcement actions be approved by the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. . I 

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                                                                                           ._._,    --1 l

1 QUESTION Will NTOLs be subject to an Appendix R audit now being performed on l C. plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 19797 Or, will the  ; current review and analysis being performed by the Stai'f be satisfactory? Resp 0NSE Plants licensed after January 1,1979 are subject to inspections of their fire protection programs. 10 CFR 50.48 requires each such plant to have a fire protection plan. l Their operating license contains a specific license condition to imple- , ment their approved fire protection program. The fire protection inspections will be against the particular license conditions. O e 1 l i i O 

  .   .                                                           .                                                'i QUESTION D.         Does the NRC plan to issue a new or revised version of Temporary Instruction 2515/62 for future Appendix R audits?

RESPONSE

TI-2515/62 will be revised as necessary to reflect headquarters guidance on inspection requirements and guidance. f fzf(AEo) 46W b /?7axl lo /Nd St AMWfeks<. \ I i 1 I .I l 

                                                  ..__.___ -____.~ ____. _ _ __, __. _,.,. _____.         _. ...__

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l QUESTION F. Temporary Instruction 2515/52 provided a list of documentation l that the NRC needs to review as part of the audit process. In past audits, the NRC has requested additional information other than that contained on the list. Will a new list of documenta-tion be developed? l

RESPONSE

The documentation listing provided in TI-2515/62 does not restrict i the inspection team from enhancing inspection efficiency by request-ing a licensee to provide additional relevant documentation. A new listing of documentation for TI-2515/62 is not being developed. l i- 

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QUESTION , F. (1) To what extent will Appendix R issues be raised at future Regional I&E Fire Protection audits after a successful Appendix R audit? (2) For example, if an area has already been reviewed and no non-compliance found, will it be subject to later review and reintsr-pretation by the Staff? 

       .        RESPONSE (1) The Appendix R inspections are conducted on a sample basis.                                            These inspections do not certify that all possible items of non-compliance with Appendix R have been identfied.                        The inspection results do pro-vide a basis for a determination of the adeq.;w,' of a licensee's Appendix
               .R reanalysis, modif? cation and preparation.                                           When noncompliance with Appendix R requirements are identified, a notice of violation will be issued to ensure adequate corrective action.

(2) See Response (1) above. In those cases in which the licensee believes that the staff has invoked a reinterpretation of adequacy in areas which had previously been reviewed, NRC's procedures' for informal appeal would be applicable. S#4 dr o- m j 

                                                                                                               -         s l

QUESTION G. At the end of the audit, will the NRC provide a list of items that had,been reviewed and found in conformance with Appendix R? To date, only areas of nonconformance have been specifically identi-fied in exit interviews.

RESPONSE

Subsequent to an Appendix R inspection, the NRC will not provide a list of items reviewed and found to be in conformance with Appendix R. CQ-b g/ lll TG i dNs3 ,- L g 

     .4 5
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l VIII. Safe Shutdown and Fire Damage QUESTION- , A. What circuit failure modes must be considered in identifying circuits associated by spurious actuation? RESPONSE i Sections III.G.2 and III.L.7 of Appendix R define the circuit failure modes as hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to ground. If the con-corn is spurious actuation of equipment, actual circuit failure modes could be bypassed by assuming all possible failure states for the equip- ' ment (valves could fail eitner open or closed). 

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QUESTION B. If one mode of fire damage involves a "hot short" how long does that condition exist as a result of fire damage prior to termi-nating in a ground or open circuit and stopping the spurious I actuation? i RESPONSE l l We would postulate that a "hot short" condition exists until action has been taken to isolate the given circuit from the fire area, or other actions as appropriate have been taken to' negate the effects of the spurious actuation. We do not postulate that the fire would eventually . clear the "hot short." l 1 i l 

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i QUESTION  ! l l C. Since hot shutdown cannot be maintained indefinitely, hot shutdown equipment needs to be protected for only a limited period of time. How long must a plant remain in that condition in order to meet i 1 the requirement for achieving hot shutdown with a single train of l l equipment? 1 1

RESPONSE

Section III.G.1 requires that the one train of systems needed to achieve and maintain hot shutdown be free of fire damage. Thus, the systems needed are to be completely protected from the fire regardless of time. { If the intent of the question concerns how long these systems must operate,  ! these systems must be capable of operating until the systems needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown are available. l 1 l I 1 

                     . _ . _ _ - - , - - - _ - - ~ _ , _ _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ - , , _ _ . - ._ . . _ _ , , - _ - - - - - - - , _ .
  • O O ,

QUESTION D. Certain equipment is necessary only in the ccoldown phase when the plant is neither in hot nor cold shutdown condition as defined by technical specifications. Is this equipment considered hot or cold shutdown in nature?

RESPONSE

As stated in Section III.G.1, one train of systems needed to achieve . and maintain hot shutdown conditions must be free of fire damage. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown can be repaired within 72 hours. Thus, if this certain equipment necessary only in the cooldown phase, is used to achieve cold shutdown, it can be repaired within 72 hours. If the certain equipment is maintaining hot shutdown while repairs are being made, one train must be free of l fire damage. i > l l l

o o l QUESTION 1 E. Most PWRs do not require pressurizer heaters to maintain stable conditions. In fact, the Commission does not consider heaters to be important to safety and they are not required to meet Class IE requirements. Are tiiey required for hot shutdown under 

.          Appendix R? If yes, then how does a plant meet the separation                                               i requirements of Section III.G.2.d. e. or f without major structural i

alterations to the pressurizer?  !

RESPONSE

One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions must be free of fire damage. PWR licensees have demon-strated the capability to achieve and maintain stable hot shutdown conditions without the use of pressurizer heaters by utilizing the charging pump and c water solid pressurizer for reactor coolant pressure control. 

                                                                                                    ~r__7-     ._-,- -

                                                                          --               .. -              ~ ~
  . .                                                                                                                 20 QUESTION F. Appendix R, Section III.L.4 states in part, "If such esuipment and                                    !

systems will not be capable of being powered by both on-site and off-site electrical power systems because of fire damage, an inde- j l pendent on-site power system shall be provided," Again, in i l Appendix R, Section III.L.5, the statement is made "If such equip-ment and systems used prior to 72 hours after the fire will not be l 1 capable of being powtred by both on-site and off-site electrical power systems because of fire damage, an independent on-site power system shall be provided." An interpretation is needed of the j 

                                                                                         ~

meaning and the applicability of these two quotes relative to alternative shutdown capabilities.

RESPONSE

These statements are meant to indicate that the alternative shutdown capability thould be powered from an onsite power system independent (both electrically and physically) from the area under consideration. Further, if the normal emergency onsite power supplies (diesel gene-rators) are not available because of fire damage, then a separate and i

independent onsite power system shall be provided. As an example.

l some plants are utilizing a dedicated onsite diesel generator or gas turbine to power instrumentation and control panels 'shich are a part of the alternative shutdown capability, i , 5 

                                   "~

QUESTION 1 G. For BWRs, I&E Information Notice 84-09 suggests that licensees need to have torus level indication post-fire. If an analysis shows that a level does not change significantly during any operational 

       ~

modes or worse case conditions, is level indication still required? Is an analysis in file adequate or is an exemption request required? 4 RESPONSE , 1 It continues to be our position that torus (suppression pool) level l l indication is the preferred post-fire monitoring instrumentation in l 4 order to confirm that hot shutdown is being properly established. We ) l recognize that existing analyses indicate that suppression pool level is not significantly changed during emergency shutdown conditions. However, we believe the operator should be able to confirm that spurious I operations or other unanticipated occurrences have not affected the torus function. An analysis of torus level change by itself is not considered an acceptable' basis. 1 l 1 l i i s l 

                                                                                       .                                     nu IX.                              Lona Term Conformance QUESTION A. Will future changes (no matter how minor) to approved configurations berdquiredtobereviewedbytheStaffinanexemptionrequest?

At what point may the process of 10 CFR 50.59 be invoked?

RESPONSE

When a modification is made to the plant, the evaluation made in conforrance with 10 CFR 50.59 to determine whether an unreviewed safety question is involved must include on assessment of the modification's imnact on the fire hazards analysis for the area. This part of the evaluation must be performed by the person responsible for the fire safety program for the plant. The 

            .. assessment must include the effect on combustible loading and distribution and the consideration of whether circuits or components, including associated circuits, for a train of equipment needed for safe shutdown are being affected or a new element introduced in the area.                               If this evaluation concludes that there is no significant impact, this conclusion and its basis must be documented as part of the 50.59 evaluation and be available for future inspection and reference.                             If the evaluation finds that there is an impact       l that could result in the area either not being in conformar.ce with Appandix R,                             l or some other aspect of the approved fire protection program, or being outside the basis for an exemption that was granted for the area involved, the licensae must either make modifications to achieve conformance or justify and request l

exemption from the NRC. 1

. s s . / QUESTION B. If an exemption is warranted and at the same time the provisions of the rule indicate that the appropriate schedular deadlines have passed, should a schedular exemption be filed at the same time as the technical exemption request? E. If as part of the exemption request the utility is proposing to make , modifications to achieve a reasonable level of conformance with Appendix R, and if the associated "clock" has run out for that type of modification, should the technical exemption request and the det.ription of the modification be filed with a schedular exemption?

RESPONSE

If a technical exemption is warranted and no modifications are required, there obviously is no schedular consideratio If, however, modification must be  ! implemented to meet the basis for the technical exemption, then a schedule l l should be proposed and justified. In the inte.-im, the plant would be in violation of the regulations. The justificatio,n for the schedule must include the reason for the timing (i.e., a new modification or a just identified non-compliance), a demonstration of best effort for timely implementation, and a determination of what, if any, interim compensatory measures are appropriate until modifications are completed.

t QUESTION C. When filing a schedular exemption under $50.12, it is not always clear from what spcific paragraphs of $50.48 an exemption should be sought. Is it acceptable to request a blanket exemption from the schedular provisions of 10 CFR 550.48 without a specification by paragraph? G. If an exemption request is submitted to meet newly pww- ... nterpre-tations of Appendix R, when does the licensee need to be in compliance? Is the schedule presented in Appendix R still the guideline or must a new schedule be developed under a diffe9nt criteria?

RESPONSE

We prefer that a request for schedular exemption be accurate with regard '.o the specific subsection of 50.48(c). The request must be specific enough so that the staff can determine what is being delayed and until when. The justification for a delayed schedule makes necessary the specific identity of what is missing from where and what that could mean in a fire situation. The categories of implementation schedules in 50.48(c) should be used as guidance in any proposed schedular exemption request. 

                    - _ _ - _ _ - . - _ - _ - . _._ _..__.-_..__..__ _-__ _._.__.___._-._.~

 ,             ,   j                                                                                                                                                99 QUESTION D.       What guidance can the NRC Staff give the industry regarding when a deviation from the literal interpretation of Appendix R is sufficiently trivial as to not require a specific exemption?

l l

RESPONSE

l I 

                 .             The answer to this question it similar to IX.A.                                       The significance of a deviation                           '

must be judged as part of a fire hazards analysis. The conclusion of this I analysis is always subject to review by the NRC inspector similar to any 50.59 evaluation. C 

   ..- . - , -       . .- . - - - . - -    , , . ~ - ~ , , - , - , - ., ,, ,.,,,. -.,...,---, ,- ,-... . ,.. ,_.,,         -n .+,,, .._-.,,------ . , . ~ , , . . ,  .,,.,.r..

g 

                                                                              ,         G
      ,dESTION    .

l 1 F. What is the process for altering configuration not yet implemented for plants with Appendix R SERs? RESPONSE  ! l If licensees propose changes to their NRC approved modifications, they l l must submit their new proposal and revised schedule for implementation for NRC approval. l l l If the revised schedule is in accord with 50.48(c), a schedular exemption j is not required. If not, a schedular exemption is required. This exemp-must be justified as to (1) the reason for the change, (2) the basis for the revised schedule, and (3) the interim measures that will be provided 

   .to assure post fire shutdown capability until the final modifications are implemented.

Ca/sc CoeH9 0W Nr A2prz /- X. Fire Area Boundaries _ _. . QUESTION A. If a fire area boundary was described as a rated barrier in the l 1977kfire hazards analysis, no open item; existed in this area in the Appendix A SER, and the barriers have not been 11tered, then need those barriers be reviewed by licensees or the Staff under Appendix R? l l RESPONSE  ! I In BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Fire Barrier is defined as: I i 

      "Fire Barrier - those components of construction (walls, floors, ad the supports), including beams, joists, columns, penetration seals or closures, fire doors, and fits dampers that Jre rated by approving laboratories in hours of resistance to fire and are used to prevent the spread of fire."

If a fire boundary was described as a rated barrier in the 1977 fire hazards ) analysis, was evaluated and documen't.ed in a published SER, then those fire area boundaries need not be reviewtd as part of the re-analysis for compliance 1 with Section III.G of Appendix R.  ! The term "fire area" as used in Appendix R means an area sufficiently bounded l 

                                                                                          )

l to withstand the hazards associated with the fire area and, as necessary, to i protect important equipment within t o fire area from a fire outside the l; 1 i

. . %g area. In order to ' meet the regulation, fire area boundaries need not be completely sealed floor-to-ceiling, wall-to-wall boundaries. Where fire area boundar'ies were not approved under the Appendix A process, or where such boundaries are not wall-to-wall, floor-to-ceiling boundaries with all penetrations skaled to the fire rating required of the boundry, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy of fire area boundaries in their plants to determine if the boundaries are sufficient. This . analysis must be performed by at least a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Although not required, licensees may submit their evalt'ations for Staff review and concurrence. In any event, these analyses must be retained by the licensees for subsequent NRC audits. l l 

                       - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - , --,n  - . , .,,,-,-,,,-.,-,e--m   -, ,,-, , . - - ,        ,       , . - -                    -
                                                                                                                                                   ,,e

49'46 1 I 1 QUESTION B. Mus't exterior walls to buildings and their penetrations be qualified as rated barriers?

RESPONSE

1 Exterior walls and their penetrations need not be qualified as rated barriers ' unless (1) they are required to separate a shutdown-related division (s) inside , l the plant from its redundant (alternate) counterpart outside the plant in the immediate vicinity of the exterior wall, (2) they separate safety related areas from non-safety related areas that present a significant fire threat  ! l to the safety related areas, or (3) they are cesignated as a fire barrier in 

                                       ~

the FSAR or FHA. f l l l I l 

                                                                            , , , , .,y_ . , _.__.,_, _  _ , . , , ,

l . . l QUESTION . i l ! C. How should a utility define the boundaries of fire areas comprising l exterior yards? i l

RESPONSE

An exterior yard area without fire barriers should be considered as one fire area (note answer to question X.A). The protection for redundant / alternate shutdown systems within a yard area would be determined on the bases of the largest credible fire that is likely to occur and the resulting damage. The boundaries of such damage would have to be justified with a fire hazards analysis. The analysis should consider the degree of spatial separat' ion between divisions; the presence of in-situ and transient combustibles, including vehicular traffic; grading; available fire protection; sources of ignition; and the vulnerability and criticality - of the shutdown related systems. l I 1 1

QUESTION . D. What is the. smallest opening allowed in a fire area barrier for which an exemption request is not needed?

RESPONSE

Unsealed openings in the configuration for which approval was obtained by an approved laboratory or the NRC~ staff would be acceptable. Our position on openings is given in Section 5.a(3) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1: ) 

    "(3) Openings througn fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that required of the barrier itself.

Openings inside conduit larger than 4 inches in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier penetration. Openings inside conduit 4 inches or less in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier unless the conduit extends at least 5 feet on each side of the fire barrier and is sealed either at both ends or at the fire barrier with non-4 

                           , - - ,v    .- w--   .----- . r . . .n ,- - - . , - . - -- , - - , - e. es- w <,.-   -y.

, combustible material to prevent the passage of smoke end hot gases. Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentials should be qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions." The unsealed opening (s) allowed in a fire area boundary or a barrier which separates redundant shutdown divisions should not permit flame, radiant energy, smoke and hot gases to pass through the barrier and cause damage to 

 ~

redundant shutdown divisions on thi other side. The licensee should assess the adequacy of existing protection and should determine the minimum size based on a fire hazards analysis and conservative fire protection engineering judgment. If the significance of ope-'ngs in fire barriers is marginal, a formal exemption request could be submitted or the staff consulted. The basis for the lack of significance should be available for review by HRC Inspectors. l l Our acceptance ol' unprotected openings in fire barriers would depend upon the quantity and nature of combustible materials on either side of the I barrier; the location of the opening (s) in relation to the ceiling (for openings in walls); the location, vulnerability and importance of shutdown systems on either side of the barrier; and compensating fire protection.

l QUESTION E. Appendix R, Section III.G.3 states "alternative or. dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area room or zone under consideration...." What l is the implied utilization of a room or zone concept under Section III.G of Appendix R7 The use of the phraseology "area, room or zone under consideration" is used again at the end of the Section III.G.3. Does the requirement for detection and fixed suppression indicate that the l 

                                                                                                                                               )

requirement can be limited to a fire zone rather than throughout a fire area? Under what conditions and with what caveats can the fire ) zone concept be utilized in demonstrating conformance to Appendix R?

RESPONSE

Section III.G was written after NRC's multi-discipline review teams had visited all operating power plants. From these audits, the NRC recognized that it is not practical and may be impossible to subdivide some portions of an operating plant into fire areas. In addition, the HRC recognized that in some l cases where fire areas are designated, it may not be possible to provide alternate shutdown capability independent of the fire area and, therefore, would have to be evaluated on the basis of fire zones within the fire area. The NRC also recognized that because some licensees had not yet performed a safe shutdown analysis, these analyses may identify new unique configurations. To cover the large variation of possible configurations, the requirements of Section III.G were presented in three parts: l 

 .       .                                                                                                                  O/
  • Section III.G.1 requires a performance goal be met regardless of the configuration.
  • Section III.G.2 requires certain separation, suppression and detection requirements where fire areas can be and are designated which are acceptable without analysis.
  • Section III.G.3 requires alternative dedicated shutdown capability for
                                                                              ~

configurations that do not safisfy the requirements of III.G.2 or where fire suppressants released as a result of fire fighting, rupture of the system or inadvertent operation of the system may damage redundant equipment. Section III.G recognizes that the need for alternate or dedicated shutdown capability may have to be considered on the basis of a fire area, a room or a fire zone. It is clear that when fire areas are designated, the alternative or dedicated capability must be independent of the fire area where it is , possible to do so (See Supplementary Information for the final rule Section III.G). When fire areas are not designated or where it is not possible to have the alternative or dedicated capability independent of the fire area, . careful consideration must be given to the selection and location of the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to assure that the performance requirement set forth in Section III.G.1 is set.

l Where alternate or dedicated shutdown is provided for a room or zone, the capability aust be physically and electrically independent of that room or zone. This independence east be carefully evaluated to assure that the performance requirementt of Section III.G.1 are met. The vulnerability of the equipment and personnel required at the location of the alternative or dedicated shutdown capability to the environments produced at that location as a result of the fire or fire suppressant's must be evaluated. These environments may be due to the hot layer, smoke, drifting suppressants, l common ventilation systems, comon drain systems or flooding. In addition, l other interactions between the locations may be possible in unique configurations. l If alternate shutdown is provided on the basis of rooms or zones, the i 1 provision of fire detection and fixed suppression is cnly required in the room l or zone under consideration. . The main caveat with the use of the room / zone concept is that the alternate or dedicated shutdown capability must be demonstrated to be independent of the fire area under consideration where possible. It this cannot be done, it must be demonstrated to be "independent" of the room or fire zone under consideration and this "independence" must be given careful consideration. In all cases the performance requirements of Section III.G.1 must be satisfied. There is no "implied utilization" of a room or zone concept other than that stated above. Compliance with Section III.G.2 cannot be based on rooms or zones as explained in Generic Letter 83-33.

e 

 .   .                                           /
                                                                                               )

QUESTION - 1 F. In Generic Letter 83-33 at p. 2, the NRC Staff referred to the guidance l in Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 to establish the rating of the barrier. What 1 level of documentation must be provided to verify that the area meets the requirements of Appendix R?

RESPONSE

As explained in our response to Question II.B, if the fire rating of a fire barrier was specifically evaluated for the existing fire loading during the Appendix A review and the evaluation was docinented in a published SER, the barrier does not have to be re-evaluated for Appendix R l l compliance. l 1 l The documentation that verifies the acceptance of an existing barrier is the SER. 1 I 1

M XI. Guidance Docum'ents l QUESTION , ( l A. PleaselidtallNRRguidancedocumentsandpositionpapersissuedsince Appendix R was promulgated.

RESPONSE

Fire Protection Guidance Issued Since January 1, 1975: IE Information Notices , No. 83-41: Actuation of fire suppression systems causing inoperability of safety related equipment. No. 83-69: Improperly installed fire dampers at nuclear power plants. No. 83-83: Use of portable radio transmitters inside nuclear power plants. l 

              *No. 84-09:    Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (10 CFR 50, Appendix R)

Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, Rev. 1 Fire Protection System, dated 5/1/76 I

zg , i 9.5-1, Rev. 2 Fire Protection Program, dated 03/78 1 i l 1 9.5-1, Rev. 3 Fire Protection Program, July 1981. 

                                         \

Regulations 10 CFR Part 50: Proposed fire protection program for nuclear power plants operating prior to January 1,1979, dated May 29, 1980. 

                                                                                                                                                   )

Federal Register Vol. 45, No.105, 36082. ' 10 CFR Part 50: Fire protection program for operating nuclear power plants, dated November 19, 1980. . Federal Register Vo. 45, No. 225, 76602. 10 CFR Part 50: Fire prot.ection rule corrections, dated September 8, 1981. Federal Register Vo. 46, No.173, 447.14. Generic letters: Note: The following documents were obtained from the Palisades file - Docket No. 50-255. Similar documents should be in the file for other operating facilities. The dates may vary slightly.

1. Ltr dated 9/28/76 - Enclosing App. A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and supple-mentary guidance on information needed for fire protection program evaluation.
                                                                                                                                                                                       ~:.: 1 I
                              .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    l
2. Ltr dated 12/1/76 - Enclosing sample Technical Specifications and
       )                                                                                                                                                                                     !

and errata sheet.  ! l 

 +                                                                                                                                                                                           l
3. Ltr dated!8/19/77 - Enclosing ' Huclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance."
4. Ltr dated 6/8/78 - Re: Manpower requirements for operating reactors.

l 1

5. Ltr dated 9/7/79 - Re: Minimum fire brigade shift size.

1 1 l

6. Ltr dated 9/14/79 - Enclosing staff positions - safe shutdown  !

capability. 1

7. Ltr dated 10/31/80 - Enclosing new 10 CFR 50.48 regarding fire protection schedules for operating nuclest power plants. l l

l 

           *8. Ltr dated 11/24/80 - Enclosing a copy of revised 10 CFR 50.48 and new App. R to 10 CFR 50, and a summary of open items from the SER for the BTP APCSB 9.5-1 review.
           *9. Ltr dated 2/20/81 - Generic Letter 81-12 identifying information                                                                                                            i needed for NRC review of modifications for alternative shutdown capability, l

I

l * (1 : l i \ 

                                                                                      . . jl l
                           .                                                   s                                                             l l
       *10. Ltr dated 4/7/82     .orovided clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 and guidance on information needed for NRC review of exemption requests.
                           \
11. Ltr dated 10/6/82 - Generic Letter 82-21; provided criteria for annual, biennial, and triennial audits required by Technical Specifications.
       *12. Ltr dated 10/19/83 - Generic Letter 83-33; NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.

1 Staff Generic Positions

1. Letter, Denton to Bernsen, dated 4/20/82 - Control room fires.
       *2. SECY 83-269, dated July 5, 1983 - Attachments B and C.
3. Memo, Eisenhut to 01shinski, dated 12/20/83 - Physical independence of electrical systems.
4. Meno, Eisenhut to Jordan, dated 10/24/83 - Bullet resistant fire doors.
       "Staff positions regarding the need for certain exemptions delineated in this guidance document have been revised per the "Interpretations of Appendix R" (Enclosure 1 of this document).

l l . .. QUESTION 

                                                          .                                                                                                                                                                                i B.          If a utility determines that a deviation from a guidance document exists, does an exemption request need to be filed?                                                                                                      If so, what is the legal
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ]

basis for this requirement? l

RESPONSE

l 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           \

No. 1 1 1 l l l l l l l I 

                                                                                                                                            ;77 QUESTION l

C. How does the Staff initiate interpretations of Appendix R in a manner ) whi'ch ensures their technical adequacy and consistency with the rule's I objectives {e g. , presentation to ACRS, issue for comment as in draf t j regulatory guides, etc.)? l l l

RESPONSE

Staff interpretations are initiated when our experience shows that generic issues are identified that require clarification. These interpretations are reviewed for accuracy and consistency by the cognizant Division Directors. Usually, they are not' issued for comment. However, Generic Letter 83-33 was commented on by the NUFPG since it was initiated, in part, at their request. I 1 l 

   ~

1 1

a

  • 60 QUESTION D. Will licensees be automatically sent a copy of new Staff position papers as they are developed?

RESPONSE

The Staff positions on generic subjects are considered for issuance in Generic Letters from ONRR and Information Notices Jr Bulletins from OI&E. Staff positions issued for specific questions on specific plants are not given generic promulgation. 4 

                                                  ~
                                                                                                                                                \

l l

Wp / XII. Exemption Criteria QUESTION A. How does a licensee demonstrate that alernative measures are equivalent to the measures of Section III.G.2 in order to obtain an exemption lacking a formal definition of the term "free of fire damage"?

RESPONSE

One train of components protected by one of the options provided in III.G.2 defines free of fire damage to mean the component is protected by one of the options specified. The alternative con',idered for an option must provide equivalent safety for the plant. They need not necessarily be equivalent separation or barriers. In fact, the three alternatives listed.in III.G.2 are not equivalent for the same fire hazard. The alternative measured must be shown to meet III.G.I. A formal definition of the term "free of fire damage" is not necessary to demonstrate equ.ivalent plant safety. The alternative configuration should show that there is reasonable assurance that the component is not exposed to environments that will cause damage. If the component need not be repaired or replaced after the fire it has not been damaged. y__ - - - - - - - - - m - 

                                     ,   ,,--,.r-._, -._,__ _ , ,v.,_, . , _ _ _ , , . _ . _ , . _ , , , _ . , _ , , ,          ,     ,_,.--%.,   _ - _ _ , _ _ _ , _ , . , _ , , - - , . . , . . ,

t QUESTION . B. Circuit modifications are an ongoing process. How recent must a coordination study be in order to be valid in protecting circuits associated by common power source?

RESPONSE

We would expect that as circuit modifications are made, the design package would address the electrical protection required and the effects of this protection on the coordination of the protection for the power distribution system. This type of consideration s'hould be included in the evaluation required by 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests and Experiments. 'The design package ' 1 and modification evaluation could not be complete without consideration of the coordination study. Therefore, we would expect that the coordination O studies would be current with the last circuit modification made. G 

                                - ~ - - . - -               ,,,.,....,,e, --- , ,,__,,y-c---,r---,,_,n,   -

vm-,---v..,-wn-, . - - - -- --

XIII. Intervenino Combustibles QUESTION A. Within Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b, the phrase "twenty feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards" is utilized. What is the definition of "no intervening combustible"? Is the regulation focused predominantly on the absence of fixed-combustibles?

RESPONSE

There is no specific definition of "no intervening combustible." The regulation is focused on the absence of in-situ combustibles. . In BTP CHEB 9.5-1, noncombustible material is defined as: 

  "Noncombustible Material
a. A material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors when subjected to fire or heat.
b. Material having a structural base of noncombustible material, as defined in a., above, with a surfacing not over 1/8-inch thick that has a flame spread rating not higher than 50 when measured using ASTM E-84 Test "Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials."
 '   '                                                                                                                                         /             Gy 1

i In Generic Letter 83-33, we state: l "Staff Position: Section III.G.2.b requires the "separation ... with .lo intervening combustibles ..." To meet this requirement, plastic jackets and insulation of grouped electrical cables, including those which are coated, should be considered as intervening combustibles." For fire protection, "no intervening combustibles" means that there is no significant quantities of in-situ materials which will ignite and burn located between redundant shutdown systems. The amount of such combustibles that has significance is a judgmental decision. As with other issues, if the licensees fire protection engineer is concerned that the quantity of combustibles between shutdown divisions may not be considered insignificant by an independent reviewer, an exemption could be requested, or the staff consulted. Transient materials are not considered as an intervening combustible; however, they must be considered as part of the overall fire hazard within an area. 

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                                                     ,                           ,                                                         h6 1
   @ESTION                         ,

B. Are unexposed combustibles, such as oil in sumps, closed cans, or sealed drums, or electrical cable in conduits, considered as "intervening l combustibles"? l 1 RESPONSE j l Oil in closed cans or electrical cables in conduits are not' considered as intervening combustibles. 

                                                                                                                                              .\
                                                                                                                                               \

l l 1

  • J h(s i

XIV. Radiant' Energy Shields QUESTION Recently, the NRC Staff indicated that non-combustibla radiant energy shields should be tested against the ASTM-STD-E-119 based, apparently, on the requirements of BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Rev. 3, a document issued after Appendix R was promulgatep. This new requirement would not appear to oc required by Appendix R or BTP APCS 8 9.5-1 Appendix A. Could the Staff clarify the requirements in this area? ANSWER During the Appendix A reviews, we observed that inside some containments, there were large concentrations of cables converging at these electrical penetration areas. In some cases, where the penetrations were grouped by division, shields were placed between the divisions so that radiant energy from a fire involving the cables of one division would not degrade or ignite cables of the other divisions. These shields also directed the convective energy from the fire away from the surviving division. These shields were usually constructed of 1/2 inch sarinite board in a metal frame. Appendix R, Section III.G.f refers to these shields as "a noncombustible radiant energy shield." The guidelines in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.a(1)b. indicate that these shields should have a fire rating of 1/2 hour. In our opinion any l material with a 1/2 hour fire rating should be capabic of performing the required function. 

                                                                                                        ~.w a The guidelinas of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 relating to a fire-rated radient energy shield are being considered in our current reviews of NTOL plants.                    However, to the extent that an applicant can justify that a proposed radiant energy shield can achiave an equivalent level of safety, we have been accepting shields that have not been tested against the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-119.                                    '

In our Appendix R reviews, we have accepted non-fire-rated radiant energy shields that have been demonstrated by fire hazards analysis to provide an acceptable level of protection against the anticipated hazard of a localized fire within the containment. l ) .

XV. Emergency Lightino l QUESTION What is the requisite intensity level for emergency lighting for egress routes and areas where shutdown functions must be performed? What are the bases for determining these levels of lighting?. ANSWER l The level of illumination provided by emergency lighting in access routes I to and in areas where shutdown functions must be performed is a level that is sufficient to enable an operator to reach that area and perform the shutdown ' functions. At the remote shutdown panels the illumination levels should be sufficient for control panel operators. The bases for determining these levels of lighting are the guidelines contained in Section 9.5.3 of the Standard Review Plan, which are based on industry standards (i.e., Illuminating Engineering Society Handbook). Where a licensee has provided emergency lighting per Section III.J of Appendix'R, we would expect that the licensee verify by field testing that this lighting is adequate to perform tb> ' nded tasks. 

   .                                 a.

e 

              ~

QUESTIONS RAISED BY OTHER UTILITIES

1. Redundant Trains / Alternate Shutdown  :

QUESTION l Confusion exists as to what wi11 be classified as an alternate shutdown system and thus what systems might be required to be protected by suppres-sion and detection under Section III.G.3.b. For example, while we are relying upon the turbine-building condensate system for a reactor building fire and thc RHR system for a turbine building fire, would one system be considered the alternative to the other? If so, would suppression and detection be required for either or both systems under III.G.3.b? An explanation of alternative shutdown needs to be advanced for all licensees.

RESPONSE

If the system is being used to provide its design function, it generally  ! l is considered redundant. If the system is being used in lieu of the l preferred system because the redundant components of the preferred system does not meet the separation criteria of Section III.G.2, the system is considered an alternative shutdown capability. Thus, for the example above, it appears that the condensate system is providing alternative shutdown capability in lieu of separating redundant components of the RHR system. Fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system , I would be required in the are . where separation of redundant components I of the RHR system is not provided. However, in the event of a turbine e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ - _ , _ , _ - _ , - . _ . . _ _ . _ _._.,._....y-___ . __-~_ .__.____- .._.,_-..~.-_._,, ,- 

                                                                                                                 .j 4

2-1 l building fire, the RHR system would be used for safe shutdown and is I 

                       ,                                                                                           1 i

not considered an alternative capability. However, one train of the W RHR system must be separated from the turbine building.  ! l l l l _. _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - . - _ . _ _ , - -- _ - - . - - - - --- ---J

2. Intervenino Combustibles QUESTION Twenty feet of separation with' absolutely no intervening combustibles is a rare case in most n,uclear plants. What 's a most acceptable method of addressing intervening combustibles? How are various utilities addressing this subject, and what would be sufficient justification to support an exemption request?

RESPONSE

(See Response XIII). If more than negligible quantities of combustible materials (such as isolated cable runs) exist between redundant shutdown divisions, an exemption request should be filed. ["Negligible quantity" is an admittedly judgmental criterion, and this judgment should be made by a qualified fire protection engineer and documented for later NRC audit.] Justifications for such exemptions have been based on the following factors:

1. A relatively large horizontal spatial separation between redundant divisions; all cables qualified to IEEE-383.
2. The presence of an automatic fire suppression system over the intervening combustible (such as a cable tray fire suppression system);
                  +

m, , - _ , . _ - . . , . . - . _ _ , . - , - . _ _ . . _ , , _ , , . , , _ _ , . _ , _ _ , _ _ _ - _ . , _ - , , , , _ - _ . - . , . - . . . _ _ _ . _ . , . - _

3. The presence of fire stops to inhibit fire propagation in intervening cable trays;
4. The likely fire propagation direction of burning intervening combustibles in relation to the locition of vulnerable shutdown divisions;
5. The availability of compensating active and passive fire protection.

Any future changes in the cable configuration due to modifications could be handled under 50.59. j l l h e _ . , _ , - , ._..,_9.._,,,,,,,,__,,.,____,, , _ , , _ , , , . . _ _ , _ _ , , _ , , ,,

i 

 . .                                                                                                       l I
                                               -s-                                                         !
3. NRR Reviews and OI&E Inspections QUESTION i

Where assumptions are made and clearly stated within the analysis sub- , mitted to NRR for review, will such assumptions be subject to a second review by OI&E during the inspection process? I l Where assumptions are made in conjunction with the analysis, should exemp-tion requests be filed just to provide protection for the licensee? If NRR accepts a licensee's selection of equipment and shutdown paths as being sufficient to meet the Appendix R shutdown criteria, will OI&E review and have the right to challenge the approved shutocwn patns and approved equipment selection? Or will they only check the shutdown paths and equipment in question to see that they meet the Appendix R requirements, i.e., separation?

RESPONSE

To the extent that a licensee's submittal to NRR is comprehensive and sufficiently detailed, the basis for the OI&E Appendix R inspection will 

             +

e 

                                                           ,,--- ,--- --- -- , v. - - - - -- . . - . - - .

6-be the assumptions, shutdown paths and equipment selections approved by NRR. 'If the inspection results in new information that casts doubt upon the approved configuration, the Regional inspectors have the responsibility to resolve such doubts. 0 4 h e 

       .. . - - - - . - - - - - , , ,          , _ , , . . . _    , . - . . , , , , , _ , , , _ -    ,,,-_,__,_.._n,....,,,,            ,, e,.--.,,_...n,,_n n -

s -7

4. Floor-to-Floor Separation QUESTION Where redundant circuits are separated by floor elevation but are within 1 the same fire area due to open hatchways, stairs, etc., what is the NRC's position with regard to separation criteria? If train A is located twenty feet from an open hatchway on the lower, elevation and train B is located ten feet from the same opening on the next elevation, would this be considered  !

adequate separation?

RESPONSE

l If a wall or floor / ceiling assembly contains major unprotected openings such as hatchways and stairways, then plant locations on either side of such a barrier must be considered as part of a single fire area. Refer to the staff position on Fire Areas in Generic Letter 83-33. As to the example provided, if train A was separated by a cumulative horizontal distar.ce of .?O feet from train B, with no intervening combustible materials or fire hazards, and both elevations were provided with fire detection and suppressian, the area would be in compliance with Section III.G.2.b. 4 v__ . _ _ _ _ _ ..-. _ . , - _ . - . . -_ . _ , _ . . _ . , ~ . . , _ . . . . , _ _ , , . . , , _ . - . _ . . .

8-

5. Twenty-Foot Sepe. ration Criteria QUESTION Assuming that a licensee is, utilizing the 20-foot separation for circuit protection, could an exemption request be granted for a portion of the circuit that did not maintain the 20-foot minimum separation if that portion was protected by one-hour barrier unt)120-foot was achieved? This barrier would not be firewall-to-firewall, and the circuit protection would not be claimed under the one-hour barrier rule.

RESPONSE

With the erection of a partial qualified one-hour fire rated barrier, if 20 feet of horizontal separation existed between redundant circuits, without intervening combustibles or fire hazards, and if the fire area was , protected by automatic fire detection and suppression, compliance with Section III.G.2.b would be achieved. These types of configuration have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 1 1 i e

, . / l
i l

l 

                                                      . g.                                                             l
6. Exemption Request QUESTION (a) What is the threshold f.or exemption requests? (b) Is it necessary to file a request for each and every possible deviation from Appendix R?

Typical examples are: (A) Where standard hardware has been removed from a fire door and replaced with security hardware, is it necessary to file an exemp-tion request? (B) Where penetration designs have been reviewed and approved by NRC but have not been classified by an approval laboratory, will it be necessary to submit an exemption request? l (C) Is an exemption request necessary for perimeter walls of safety-related buildings that have either nonrating penetrations or of a i nonrated design, i.e., r.rtal walls? (D) How do we submit future modification exemption requests, etc.? l Would NRC prefer them individually, or developed and submitted I in packages for review and approval? l l 

                 +

e 

                                      -n    . - , - -    -, - . . - - -.        . , . . , -    . . - - - , . - . , , -

. o , I 10 1 (E) When an exemption request is filed, what criteria are used to determine the level of detail needed to support the request? (F) With regard to exemption reque,ts for future modifications, will they be submitted under' 50.12 or 50.487

RESPONSE

(a) The licensee must develop its criteria for an exemption request threshold. I l (b) No. (A) See response III.C. I (B) No. (C) See response X.B. (D) Futureexemptjonsshouldbesubmittedindividually,iftheyare independent of each other. (E) See Enclosure 2 of NRC's letter to all licensees dated April-May 1982. (F) 10 CFR 50.12. e 

                                                                                          /

Enclosure 4 . i , , 

                          . Chemical Engineering Branch / Fire Protection Section Staff Guidance for Compliance With Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R , Section III. G. 1. a 1

POSITION: One train of systems necessary for hot shutdown shall be free of fire damage. GUIDANCE: (Systems necessary for hot' shutdown) Sections 4 and 6 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979 sections 4 and 6 of-Generic Letter 81-12, Feb. 20,1981 Section V of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 GUIDANCE: (Free of fire damage) Section C'1.b of CHEB 9.5-1, July,1981 Section 1.2.1 of Attachment A and Section b of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983 Section III of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984* Section III.G.1.b POSITION: Systems necessary for cold shutdown can be repaired within 72 hours. 

                                       -        _                _   _        _ . _ . _            _                 - - . - _ .       _ ~ ,      . , _ . - . _ . ,

o- . GUIDANCE: (Systems necessary for cold shutdown) Sections 5 and 7 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979 

                                 \

Sections 5 and 7 of Generic Letter 81-12, Feb. 20,1981. Section a of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983* GUIDANCE: (Allowable repairs) Position Statement on Allowable Repairs memo, Mattson to Vollmer, July 2,1982 Section b of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 Section XI of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 GUIDANCE: (General) Sections C.1.b. and C.5.a. of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July, 1981. Sections V, IX, X, XI of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984. Section III. G. 2 POSITION: Establishes the basis for the use of fire areas for assessing compliance with III.G.2.

e e e

  • e GUIDANCE: .
                                                                "Definitions" Section and Section III.C of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, May 1, 1976
                                                                 \
                                                                "Definitions" Section and Sections 8.2 and 8.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.120, June, 1976 Section 1 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979 Section 1 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Sections B.3 and 8.4 of BTP CME 8 9.5-1, July,1981 Enclosure 3 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May, 1982*

Section 2 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983* Section 1 of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984* - POSITION: Establishes the basis for including associated circuit in assessing system separation. - GUIDANCE: Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May, 1982 Section 1.2.2 of Attachment A and Section e of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 

                                                                                      , - . _    . _ . _ _ _ _ ,       ,,     ._   ,_ -     ,m ,

o' 

                                                                                                                             .                                                 I 4-                                                                .

Section III. G. 2. a POSITION: Redundant shutdown divisions shall be separated by a 3-hour fire barrier. Structural steel in such barriers shall be protected. 

                               \

GUIDANCE: (Separated by a 3-hour barrier) ' Section C.4.a of Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.120, November 1977 , Section 0.1.a of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 Section C.4.a. of Revision 1 of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, March,1978 Sections C.S.a and C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July, 1981 Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982. Section 1.2.3 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 

                           *                                                          ~

Section 2 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983 GUIDANCE: (Integrity of fire walls / structural steel) Section C.4.(l0) of Regulatory Guide 1.120, June,1976 

                                                                      ~

Section C.4.a of Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.120, Nov. ,1977 Section D.1.j o'f Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 i 

                                                              .e. .         w- ,-n,,    .-,,--,--.-------------nn----,             - , . - - - ,   ,.n--- -- - , - -- . - - --
e. - .._.

5-Section C.4.a(10) of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Revision 1, March,1978 Section C.S.a of BTP CHEB 9.5-1, July,1981 S 

                                  \ ection 3 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983                                           .

Enclosure to memo, Eisenhut to Jordan, re: "Bullet Resistant Fire Doors," October 24, 1983 Section II of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 Section III. G. 2. b POSITION: Redundant divisions shall be separcted by more than 20 feet free of intervening combustibles. Automatic fire suppression and fire detection shall be provided throughout the fire area. GUIDANCE: (20 feet free of combustibles) Section C.S.b.2 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981  ! Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982 Section 1.2.4 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 3, 1983 Sections 5 and 6 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983 Section VI of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 l 4 i e 

                                            --------.-------e.-._,--..--           , ---- - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - * -        -'re'*          *e--'M*'   * * ' ' " + - - - - - * - '

e

  • ga ; ** .

GUIDANCE: (Sprinklers and fire detection) - - Sections C.S.a, c, d, e of Regulatory Guide 1.120, June 1976 S 

                                    \ ections C.5.a. c, d, e of Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide
                                    .1.120, November 1977                                                         '

Sections E.1, 3, 4, S'of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, 

 .                                   February 24, 1977 Sections C.5.a. c, d, e of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, March 1978 Sections B.4, C.S.b, C.6.a. c, d, e of CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Section 1.2.4 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983*                                                                                   l Section 1 of Response to Region II, memo Vollmer to Eisenhut,                                                                                1 July 27, 1983 Section 1 of Generic Letter 83-33., October 19, 1983*

Section VII of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984* Section III.G.2.c POSITION: Redundant divisions shall be separated by a 1-hour fire barrier. Automatic fire detection and suppression shall be provided i throughout the fire area. l 

                                      -----,------,,-,,,,----------,-,,----w------mv-         ,                     - - - -+-- . -,n - --, ~-   - - -+-----, , -, -     --e ,-.--

. . 9 - 

                                           ,          7       -

GUIDANCri (1-hour fire barrier between redundant divisions)- , Section C.4.a of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 1.120, November 1977 Sections C.S.a and C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Attachment 2 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May, 1982 Section 1.2.5 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 Section II of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 GUIDANCE: (Detection and suppression) [See guidance for same issue in III.G.2.b) Section III.G.2.d POSITION: Establishes fire protection inside non-inerted containment. GUIDANCE: Section C.6.a of Reg. Guide 1.120

  • Section C.6.a of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 1.120, November 1977 ,

Section F.1 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.51, February 24, 1977 Section C.6.a of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, March 1978 Section C.7.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Section 1.2.6 of Attachmen,t A to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983 e 

                         -      ',                                    ~B~                                         .

SectionIII.b.3.a POSITION: Establishes basis for locations where an alternate shutdown capability should be provided. (Where III.G.2 is not 

      .                       sati sfied)
                                   .i GUIDANCE:                                           -
                 '                   Section 1 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979*

Section 1 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981* Sections C.l.d, C.S.a. and C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Enclosure 2 to clarification letter of Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982* Section III.G.3.b POSITION: Establishes further bases for providi':g an alternate shutdown capability (where red.undant divisions could be damaged by fire suppression). Requires fire detection and fixed suppres-sion in a location where alternate shutdown is provided. GUIDANCE: (fire detection and suppression) [See guidance for III.G.2.b] Section F.6 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 Section C.6.f of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 1.120, November 1977 

                                              .. C ,. ,      -
                                            .                              . g. '                                                                           -

Section D.6 of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, March 1978 t

  • Section C.7.f of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Section 1.2.7 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269 July 5,1983
                                                 \.

Section 4 of Generic Letter 83-33, October 19, 1983 Appendix R. Section III.J POSITION: Requires 8-tour, battery powered emergency lighting units in all areas needed for safe shutdown and in access and egress routes thereto. GUIDANCE: Section C.4.e of Reg. Guide 1.120, June 1976 Section C.4.e of Revision 1 to Reg. Guide 1.120, Nov.1977 Section 0.5 of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 Section C.4.e of BTP APCSB 9.5-1, February 24, 1977 Section C.S.g of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Section 1.3 to Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 Enclosure to memo, Vollmer to Eisenhut, re: Emergency Lighting Requirements, December 21, 1983.

. o .. . Appendix R Section III.0 POSITION: Establishes design parameters for an RCP oil collection system I I i GUIDANCE: - Section C.7.a of BTP CHEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Memo, Vollmer to Eisenhut, re: "Oil Collection System Reactor Coolant Pumps, St. Lucie 2," April 1,1983 l Section 1.6 of Attachment A to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983 Section XII, IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 i Accendix R, Section III.L.1 l POSITION: Establishes general design requirements for the alternate  ! shutdown capability l GUIDANCE: ) Sections 2 and 8 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown i l Capability, June 19, 1979 l Sections 2 and 8 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Section C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, July 1981 Attachment 1 to Enclosure 2 of letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May, 1982 1 i Section 1.4.2 of Attachment A and Sections a and e of l Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5,'1983 I Sections IV, V, IX of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984* l

Section L.2 POSITION: Establishes the performance goals for the alternate shutdown system. GUIDANCE: Section 3 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19 1979 Section 3 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Section d,of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983* _S_ection L.3 POSITION: Establishes independence of the alternate shutdown capability, requirements pertaining to loss of offsite power, and imple-mentation procedures. GUIDANCE: Section 1 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown-Capability, June 19, 1979 Section 1 of Generic Letter 81-13, February 20, 1981 At'tachment 1 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982 Section X of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1983 Section L.4 POSITION: Establishes requirements for hot standby / hot shutdown. 9- . , , - - - - , - , - - . , , , - - . - - - - 

                                                                                                   , , . , - - - - - -   , , - - ,y   ,, ---   y -- - -

 ,   ,   /                                                                        -

GUIDANCE: Sections 4 and 6 of' Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979 Sections 4 and 6 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Attachment 1 to Enc 1'osure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982 Section L.S POSITION: Establishes requirements for cold shutdown. GUIDANCE: Sections 5 and 7 of Staff Position - Safe Shutdown Capability, June 19, 1979

  • 1 Sections 5 and 7 of Generic Letter 81-12, Feb. 20,1981 '

Attachment 1 to Enclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Lettjr 81-12, April-May,1982 l Position statement on allowable repairs for safe shutdown; memo, Mattson to Vollmer, July 2,1982 

                                      ~

Section 1.4.1 of Attachment A 'and Section b of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5, 1983 Section XI of IE Notice 84-09, February 13, 1984 l Section L.6 POSITION: Establishes that shutdown systems need not be designed to meet Seismic Category 1 criteria. a 

           ._m   .     -

_, - , - - , - _ . .- ,__c-. . _ , ..,.

c.'y o . 13- , GUIDANCE: No further guidance issued Section L.7 5 POSITION: Establishes requirements for associated circuits. GUIDANCE:

  • Enclosure 2 of Generic Letter 81-12, February 20, 1981 Attachment 2 to inclosure 2 to letter of clarification for Generic Letter 81-12, April-May,1982 Section 1.2.2 of Attachment A and Section c_ of Attachment C to SECY 83-269, July 5,1983 T
  • Staff positions regarding the need for certain exemptions delineated in this guidance document have been revised per the "Interpretations of Appendix R" (Enclosure 1).

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L k \. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t* ASH WGTON, C. C. 20S55 J27 1 

             \p,,el.l.
,                   ,.                              ..       March 28,1984
                                                ~ . -                                                          .

MEMORANDUM FOR: Faust Rosa, Chief Instrumentation & Control System Branch Division of Systems Integration FROM: Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation s

SUBJECT:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION: ROBERT L. FERGUSON t. In accordance with the provisions of NRC Manual Chapter 4125, Differing Professional Opinions, and NRR Offico Letter No.11. Revision 1. Supplementary Guidance for Processing Resolutions of Differing Professional Opinions. I am l designating you as the Responsible Manager for conducting an independent i assessment of the issues raised in this Differing Professional Opinion. l l The enclosed package contains Mr. Ferguson's written statement and supervisory and management views on this issue. I am also enclosing a memorandum from Mr. Gregory A. Harrison to Mr. Case which also addresses the issues raised in l the DPO. You may call upon other management resources for assistance, as ( appropriate. I Please plan to complete your independent assessment and provide it to me by ' C.O.B. April 27 I would like to be briefed periodically on the status of your effortJ,1984.' ' _ ) 

                                             M       l N Nf              I}                  /                    *~

Harold R.. Denton, Director s Office of Nuclear, Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

As stated ' l cc: R. Vollmer W. Johnston Y. Benaroya l R. FErguson , D. Eisenhut T. Novak A. Schwencer. G. Harrison s W, , m . (YX/ZL

8[9# %y'g 

                     '                                  UNITED STATES                               .

. ,A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

  .      5-           .

CASH WG TON, C, C. 20666 

         %.f*se,e@* .__   .
       ,                                  , ,., 4         .                                                    .

FROM: H. DENTON ORIO. DUE DATE: 04/27/84 TICKET NO: 849093 I DOC DATE: 03/28/84 l TO: FAUST ROSA NRR RCVD DATE: 03/28/84 

                  ~
                                                  ** YELLOW **                                                   l FOR SIGNATURE OF            DENTON DESC:                                                                                CC:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION CASE /DENTON FUNCHES REFERRED TO: DOSI DATES 03/28/84 CONTACT: ROSA OM hjg PLEASE REVIEW THE DUE DATE IMMEDIATELY: l IF THE DUE DATE DOES NOT ALLOW ADEQUATE REQUESTS FOR REVISION OF YELLOW TIME TO RESPOND TO THIS TICKET, YCU MAY TICKET DUE DATES MAY BE hADE, WITH REQUEST A REVISED DUE DATE. THE REQUEST JUSTIFICATION, THRU THE WEEKLY WITS , MUOT INCLUDE A VALID JUSTIFICATION AND UPDATE UP TO ONE WEEK AFTER ASSIGN- 1 BE MADE THROUGH YOUR CORRESPONDENCE CO- MENT BY NRR MAIL ROOM. THE NEW DUE ORDINATOR TO THE NRR MAIL ROOM (KAREN DATE, IF APPROVED BY NRR MAILROOM, BOWMAN OR HAZEL SMITH) WILL BE USED TO TRACK DIVISION COR-RESPONDENCE COMPLETION SCHEDULES. j PLEASE DO NOT HAND CARRY ____- CONCURRENCE PACKAGES TO DIRECTORS OFFICE 

                                                        =
                                                                                                                 \

WITHOUT FIRST GOING THRU THE NRR MAIL ROOM. ___________________________________________ l 1 [

  • 1770b '

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                                                                                                                              .l
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UNITED STATES ffm - k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l d cAssinarow,e c. noses 

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                                                                                                                          ~

APR 1 3 1984 MEMOPsANDUM FOR: Jerse L. Funches, Director olanning and Program Analysis Staff FROM: Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director  ! Division of Licensing i l

SUBJECT:

BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR DP0 l

References:

1. Memorandum Fuches to Eisenhut,
                                          ' "Differin Professional Opinion" l

l April 9, 984

2. Memorandum Denton to Cotter and l Rosenthal "Ferguson DP0", April 10,1984 In your reference (1) memorandum, you suggested that a Board Notification be considered regarding a DP0 on a Haddam Neck SER. NRR Office Letter '

No.19 Rovision 2 requires that DP0s be handled using the procedures in ( NRC Manual Chapter 4125. Furthermore, NRC Manual Chapter 4125 states that Office Directors should I inform the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel of any differing professional opinion that relates to issues before them. The April 10, 1984 memorandum (2) from Denton to Cotter and Rosenthal satisfied the NRC Manual Chapter 4125 requirements. Therefore, no board notification is required at this time. A board notification would be required if 'you used external sources in your investigation and may be required when our investi tion is completed. 

                                                                                                    . s    ut,biector          !

Division of Licensing l 1

1 1

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        ,p p ita uq'o                                                                  fs k
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    !        7  ' , , ,g              NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g          jj y                      ,

WASHINGTON. D. C. 20$55 kE*...< W/ May 3, 1984 MEMOR. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, DL Roger J. M6ttson, Director, DSI Hugh Thompson, Director, DHFS Themis P. Soeis, Director, DST FROM: Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering

SUBJECT:

DP0 AND INTERPRETATIONS OF APPENDIX R Mr. Denton wishes to meet with us and the NRR fire protection engineers on the enclosed DP0, at 10:00 a.m., May 8. This DP0 is opposed to the adoption of "Interpretations of Appendix R" provided in Enclosure 2, which were negotiated between the NRC and industry for the purpose of expediting :ompliance with A:,endix R. Enclosure 3 is Generic Letter 85-33 which is also mentione.' in the DPO. j u Y ( Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering

Enclosures:

1

1. DP0
2. Interpretations of App. R
3. Generic Ltr 83-33 {

I cc; w/ enclosures I H. Denton 1 E. Case I W. Shields I cc: w/o enclosures l W. Johnston l V. Benaroya l R. Ferguson l R. Eberly D. Kubicki l J. Stang T. Wambach l l 

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0 

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N - 

       /                                                            UNITED STATES

[ q*y . ' ,g'k r/ , g NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

                                                          . WASHINGTo N, D. C. 20555 jdj,j e..,*

s MAY 2 1984 

                                                                                                           . ,, . c. . ,.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert L. Ferguson, Section Leader ~~ Fire Protection Section . Chemical Engineering Branch, DE - 

                                                      ~

l 

                                                                                                   ~

Randy Eberly, Fire Protection Engineer (CMEB) - -  ! FROM: 

                          -                         Dennis Kubicki, Fire Protection Engineer (CMEB) ..                                                                      -

Chuck Ramsey, Fire Protection Engineer (RO: III) . . 1 - John Stang, Fire Protection Engineer (CMEB) .  ; Joe Ulie, Fire Protection Engineer (RO: III)

SUBJECT:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION "INTERPRETATIONS OF APPENDIX R" . j EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Since 1982, the NRR fire protection staff has performed their review of Appendix R exemption requests to a consistent basis. This basis has ) been formally issued in Generic Letter 83-33. New interpretations of ' ' the basic Appendix R requirements have been developed. These new interpretations are contrary to existing guidance and will permit neither a timely nor consistent resolution of Appendix R deviations. ( Specific recommendations for resolution of the issues are proposed. i Backoround i During our reviews of a significant number of Appendix R exemption requests, it became apparent that many utilities ha,d not assessed compliance with the Rule on the basis of valid fire areas as defined in our Branch Technical Position. In addition, some utilities did not provide complete fire detegtion and automatic fire suppression systems on the basis of recognized industry practice (as defined by the National Fire Protection Association) and sound fire protection engineering principles. As a result, Generic Letter 83-33 was issued to further clarify our position and to avoid future conflict. To the extent that utilities significantly deviated from these positions, resolution was attained through the exemption process under the time constraints imposed by 10 CFR 50.48. Since April 1982, when the staff began reviewing significant l numbers of exemption requests, a consistent basis has been established for the level of safety that must be achieved in order to deviat.e from the Rule. Contrary to this established guidance and against specific recommendations by the staff, new gugidance, in the form of intepretations of Appendix R, was developed in support of the Regional Appendix R workshops. e e 

                                                - 9 e

e a e , t . usW er gg

l. ,

l 

                                                 .                                   .                                                             l l             Robert Ferguson                                                                                               .

l . ( 1. Prevailind Itaff View . The recently drafted "Interpretations of Appendix R" states that - licensees, that have not assessed compliance wit'i Section III.G . - - of Appendix R on the basis of fire areas or with the provision o' fire detection and suppression systems throughout a fire area as - delineated in Generic Letter 83-33, must perform an "evaluation .t0 - - assess the adequacy" of fire area boundary construction, and detection and suppression system coverage. ~This evaluation does not have to be . submitted on the docket for NRR review as is currently done under the ~ , exemption process and no guidance is furnished as to the nature 'of the. , evaluation. , If, during the audit, the inspection team takes issue with the adequacy.. . . of fire area boundaries or the extent of fire suppression and detection,- the licensees would present the evaluation as justification for the - l existing configuration and attempts at resolution would be undertaken. l If the issue (s) could not be resolved, it (they) would be deferred as an "unresolved item" for subsequent NRR action.

2. Oricinators Opinion - ,
                                                                                                                                                   )

Appendix R was promulgated as a means of expediting resolution of post- . Browns Ferry SER fire protection open items and to provide a basis for l consistent resolution of them. The lack of a requirement in the new l ( "Interpretations" for timely, advance documentation of the licensee's analyses of deviations from the staff positions of Generic Letter 83-33 undermines the basis for original.ly promulgating Appendix R because, ) by requiring no prior review and deferring resolution of issues to the audit, a significant time delay will result. In addition, due to the varying composition of the audit teams, the resolution of technical issues may vary to a significant degree. For example, under s'imilar conditions at different plants, one audit team may accept a partial fire suppression system while another team may insist upon complete 

                   ' area-wide protection.
  -                  Additional Appendix R audits are scheduled to occur well into the future.

It is also anticipated that unresolved audit issues would require NRC action, which would necessitate further delays. These delays would not be expected under the staff's previous approach because all significant technical issues would be resolved by NRR in advance of the audit. To the extent that plant modifications would be necessary to satisfy staff concerns, these modifications would be further delayed because agreement as to'the nature of the modifications would not be reached until some time af ter the audit. Whereas, under our previous approach, agreement is reached at an earlier stage and the schedule for completing the modifications commences well in advance of the audits, normally at the time the SER is issued. 9 O e 

                                          -- . - . .- - -- - . - - - .            . . . -        . - , . -. .- - ..~ .

        .            .                                       .                                                                             j

[ .. f Robert Ferguson Under the'n$ interpretations, r)o specific guidance is provided to the utilities regarding the nature of the evaluations that they are expected to perform. Based on the staff's previous experience, we feel that licensees are likely to conduct evaluations which vary significantly - - as to the degree of comprehensiveness, completeness, and the application ~ of sound fire protectjon engineering principles. Consequently, the staff is likely to find that all relevant considerations have not been taken - - into' account and that an equivalent level of safety has not been provided. For example, a utility may conclude as some have attempted that a

  • particular fire protection configuration, such as a partial heig)yt fire .

barrier between redundant shutdown divisions, is adequate based on an . . assumption that no "credible" fire will occur. However, there is no , generally recognized method to predict the. location, magnitude and , resulting damage of a fire in any location, consequently design. basis . . . protection is mandated by the rule. Licenseca, confronted with the ina'dequacy of their evaluation at the time of the audit, may request additional time to conduct a more thorough evaluation or refer the matter to NRR for approval, similar to the exemption process. This will only result in further delays toward eventual Appendix R compliance.- In addition to the time considerations involved, areas that are not in compliance with the Rule may be construed by some utilities as ( being acceptable although the same conclusion will not be held by the. 

    \                              staff.              Therefore, under this approach, there is no way to ensure a consistent level of fire safety.

Under the new interpretations, licensees that have already committed to fire protection modifications in conjunction with previously requested and approved exemptions may now elect to delete their commitments from these modifications and propose a new approach which may provide a lesser degree of safety and which would not be ultimately acceptable to the 

                                  , staff.                                                                                                   ,

o

  • Under the new interpretations, greater reliance is placed upon the
      -                             Appendix R audit. However, an audit, by its very nature, is a limited scope effort. Only a sampling of areas and systems is reviewed. Since it is a limited effort, the staff would not have reasonable assurance that all potentially significant safety problems were discovered.

If, under the new interpretations, an audit team discovered a number of safety problems within some areas of the sample, there is no mechanism to resolve the , larger question of the adequacy of the protection in the un audited areas. As a result, more areas of the plant may be in non-compliance with potentially serious consequences if a fire should occur. 

                                                             *b O

y - 

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f .'* , e Robert Ferguson , ,

  • Because of t'he new interpretations it will now bel the staf f's position '

that all that a utility needs t'o do to justify fire area buundaries and the extent of fire detection and suppression is an "evaluation". It is therefore likely th~a t an individual utility will have some form of . - evaluation available for the audit team. If serious safety problems are discovered during an audit, the inspection team will not be in a pos4-tion to efficiently resolve or cite the utility for the conditic..b'ecause they have literally done what the new interpretations require. Also, there is nothing specifically written or implied in the interpretations that - .. 

                           . utilities will be sanctioned or cited for inadequate evaluations. With                                                                                 .

l the reduced likelikhood of enforcement action, utilities will'be lesc ~ ' inclined to take the Rule seriously and the staff itself will be increasingly frustrated in their efforts to achieve resolution of i unresolved issues. , . . . 

                     '        The'new interpretation regarding the nature of fire area boundaries,                                                                            -

which states that boundary wallc and floor / ceiling assemblies need not be continuous, conflicts with previous staff criteria as defined f in the Branch Technical Positions. Therefore, the technical basis for our review has been changed. This change has been effected as a result of utility initiatives, via management directive, without - - following usual appropriate NRC procedures or consideri.ng relevant staff input.

  • At a meeting between the staff and the Nuclear Utilities Fire Protection

( Group in March 1983, it was agreed that the Group would propose criteria for the NRC acceptance of partial coverage suppression and detection systems. To this date, the Group has been unable to provide any criteria due to the number of variables that must be considered in each case. It is therefore doubtful that the individual utilities will be able to assess Appendix R compliance of such systems based en an evaluation, as permitted by the recent interpretations.

3. Originators Assessment of Consequences
  ,                             The adoption of the new "Interpretations of Appendix R" undermines                                                                                       .

the Rule by causing significant delays associated with the identification and resolution of fire protection related safety problems. It may also result in a lack of consistency in the resolution of safety deviations. l The interpretations also change the technical basis of the Rule and < our review efforts by redefining the nature of fire area boundaries.

4. Related Efforts None
5. Recommendations
1. Do not issue the "Interpretations of Appendix R" as presently written, but as amended in by Enclosure 1.
2. -Re-affirm that the staff positions as delineated in Generic Letter 83-33 are the basis for resolving technical issues associated with compliance with Appendix R. .

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                   . Robert Ferguson                                                                                                                                                                                  I l
                                    . Mandats that, to the exte'nt utilities deviat4 from the positions
3. l of Generic Letter 83-33, they should justify such deviations via a detailed fire hazard analysis which must be submitted to the staff for review under the exemption process. - -

Ii .. 

                                                                          % ). M -                                                                             l '}
                         .@bk.

Randy ' fee'FTy Dennis Kubicki r ohn Stang - l Fire Pfotection Engineer Fire Protection Engineer Fire Protection Engineer . , Chemical. Engineering Br. . Chemical. Engineering Br. Chemical Enginibring,Br. ld 

                                    ~'
f. h . . - . -
                     ,, ,_ ,_                1
                                                              , fir Chuck Ramse -

Fire Protsction Engineer Fire Protection Engineer 

                                                                                                                                                     ;e~cJoe Ulie                                           -

l i Region III Region III

Enclosure:

As stated cc: V. Benaroya W. Johnston H. Denton J ( E. Case , V. Stello . T. Wambach , W. Shields  : 1 L. Whitney 1 J. Craig N. Fioravante D. Parr - J. Wermiel 1 S. Trubatch i 

                              'T. Chan                                                                                                                                                                                 l D. Notley ,
                                                 . e
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b e e 1 e . ) I 1 l Enclosure 1 . g . s l 

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                                                                                                                     . . .         l I

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                                                                                           ..                                      j
  • 1 AMENDED INTERPRETATIONS OF APPENDIX R - ..e i e

1 l l 4 1 m . . . l I 1 l l k l l t 1 1 1 

                                                                                .                                                   1 a                                                  !

O I e e O e O e 

                                                       --       - - -n    -

[ 1. Fire Area Boundaries . 

                   . Section III.' Gof Appendix R sets forth the requirements for fire l

protection for safe shutdown capability on the basis of fire areas. A fire area is ' defined in NUREG 75/087 and 03N as that portion of' - - a building or plant that is separated from Mer areas by boundary fire barriers (walls, floors and ceilings with any openings or ~ penetrations protecte'd with seals or closures having a fire resisi.ance - - ratihg equal to that required of the barrier). 

                                                                                                                                                                               ~

Based on the guidance in Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1, the boundary . fire barrier should have a 3-hour fire resistance rating or it s%ould . . 

                    . be shown by analysis that its fire rating exceeds with conservative                                                                                ,

margin, the fire loading in the fire areas on either side of the boundary fire barrier. The boundary fire barrier need not be rated at 3-hour . . . unless the fire boundary warrants such a rating. Where fire area boundaries were'no't approved during the Appendix.A review, or where such boundaries are not continuous barriers with all penetrations sealed to prevent fire propagation, licensees must . evaluate and justify the adequacy of the boundary construction. All unsealed openings must be identified and justified. Particular attention - should be given to stairways'and hatchways. This analysis must be - performed by a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Licensees must submit their evaluations of these deviations ( for Staff review and must have these evaluations available for subsequent NRC audits.

2. Automatic Uetection and Suppression Coverage Sections'5II.G.2.bandIII.G.2.cofAppendixRstatethat"Inaddition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area. . ." Other provisions of Appendix R also use the phrase "fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the fire '

area..." (see n , Section III.G.2.e). 

 ,                     To comply with these requirements, suppression and detection sufficient

_ to protect against the hazards of the area must be installed. ' Full coverage fire detection and suppression systems fully comply with the regulation. Detection and suppression systems with less than full area coverage may be adequate to comply with the regulation. Where full area suppression and detection is not installed, licensees must perform an evaluation tg assess the adequacy and necessity of partial suppression and detection in an area. The evaluation must be performed by a fire protection engineer and, if required, a systems engineer. Licensees must s bmit the'Ir evaluations to the Staff for review. The evaluations must be available for subsequent NRC audits. Where a licensee is providing no suppression or no detection, an exemption must be requested. O e 

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3. Fire Damage .
                                                                                                                                                                      ~

I'nSection III.G I of Appendix R, the Commission hah specified means for ensuring that structures, systems and components important to safe are free of fire, damage (see e.g. , Section III.G.2.a, b and c), that is the structure, system or component under consideration is capable of. - performing its intended function before, during and after the postulated' fire, Licensees seeking exemptions from these requirements of the -- ' regulation must show that the alternative proposed will also provide - - reasonable assurance that necessary structures, systems and components are undamaged by the fire suppression agent and are therefore capable of - ' ' performing their intended functions before, during and after the,* . postulated fire. .. .

4. Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown
                                                                                                                                                        ~

Section III.G.3 of Appendix R provides for "alternative or dedicated l shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, - systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration". While the supplementary information issued with the Rule has reflected 1 a preference for alternative shutdown to be independent of the fire area I under consideration, this is not always possible. In such cases alternative shutdown in the same fire area but independent of the room or the zone - under consideration is acceptable if it can be demonstrated by detailed ' fire hazard analysis that a single fire will not disable both trains of redundant equipment and the alternate shutdown capability. . t i e O e g e e e 

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