IR 05000298/2013007

IR 05000298-13-007, August 12-30, 2013, Cooper, Triennial Fire Inspection

ML13273A480
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	09/30/2013
From:	Geoffrey Miller Division of Reactor Safety IV
To:	Limpias O Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
Miller G
References
IR-13-007
Download: ML13273A480 (29)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 30, 2013

SUBJECT:

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE INSPECTION REPORT 05000298/2013007

Dear Mr. Limpias:

On August 30, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Cooper Nuclear Station. On August 30, 2013, the team discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The team documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

The NRC team documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Cooper Nuclear Station. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Cooper Nuclear Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket: 05000298 License: DPR-46 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000298/2013007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information Electronic distribution by RIV:

Acting Regional Administrator (Steven.Reynolds@nrc.gov)

Acting Deputy Regional Administrator (Thomas.Bergman@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

DRP Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Tom.Blount@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Jeffrey.Josey@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Christopher.Henderson@nrc.gov)

Acting Branch Chief, DRP/C (Jessie.Quichocho@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer (Bob.Hagar@nrc.gov)

CNS Administrative Assistant (Amy.Elam@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)

Project Manager (Lynnea.Wilkins@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov)

ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (Daniel.Rich@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, RES/DRA/FRB (MarkHenry.Salley@nrc.gov)

R:\_Reactors\DRS\CNS 2013007-RP-EDU-130830.pdf ADAMS: No Yes SUNSI Review Complete Reviewer Initials: EU Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Non-publicly Available Sensitive EB2/RI EB2/SRI EB2/SRI EB2/RI RPBC/C EB2/C E. Uribe J. Mateychick G. Pick S. Makor B. Hagar G. Miller

/RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

9/17/13 9/23/13 9/18/13 9/17/13 9/30/13 9/30/13

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket: 50-298 License: DPR-46 Report Nos.: 05000298/2013007 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Location: 72676 648A Avenue Brownville, NE 68321 Dates: August 12-30, 2013 Team Leader: E. Uribe, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 Inspectors: J. Mateychick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 G. Pick, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 S. Makor, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 Approved By: Geoffrey B. Miller, Branch Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety-1- Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000298/2013007; 08/12/2013 - 08/30/2013; Cooper Nuclear Station; Triennial Fire

Protection Team Inspection.

The report covered a two-week triennial fire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors from Region IV. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation (NCV), was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the significance determination process (SDP) does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after the NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C.(4), Fire Protection, for the failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the team identified that the licensee failed to implement adequate corrective actions for a condition adverse to fire protection related to circuits that could disable the automatic starting of the electric driven fire pump due to fire damage. The licensee entered this finding into its corrective action program under Condition Report 2013-05866 The failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to fire protection was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events (fire)and affects the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

The team performed a walkdown of both, electric and diesel, fire pump circuits from the control room to the fire pump house. The control room has fire pump switches and status lights in the sprinkler control and fire alarm panel. The control room is continuously manned and fire extinguishers are available for manual fire suppression.

The fire pump circuits in the cable spreading room are routed in separate conduits in parallel with no fixed ignition sources near the conduits. Transient combustibles in the cable spreading room are limited and strictly controlled. Transient combustibles are only a potential threat where the conduits vertically go through the floor. The fire pump circuits in the seal water pump area and hallway (control building elevation 903) are not routed near any fixed ignition sources. Combustible materials are stored near the conduits in the multipurpose facility, but there are no significant ignition sources or work areas nearby. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, the finding was assigned a low degradation rating, because the wiring was routed in conduits through areas with limited combustibles and no ignition sources; consequently this finding is of very low safety significance (Green)per Attachment 1, Task 1.3.1, Question 1. The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since it was not indicative of present performance in that the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago. (Section 1R05.03.b)

Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R05 Fire Protection

This report presents results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordance with the NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial),at the Cooper Nuclear Station. The licensee committed to adopt a risk informed fire protection program in accordance with National Fire Protection Association 805 (NFPA-805), but has not yet completed the program transition. The inspection team evaluated the implementation of the approved fire protection program in selected risk-significant areas with an emphasis on the procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems that ensure the post-fire capability to safely shutdown the plant.

The inspection team used the fire hazards analysis section of the Cooper Nuclear Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events as well as Cooper Nuclear Stations current fire PRA to select the following five risk-significant fire areas (inspection samples) for review:

• Fire Area I-1E HPCI Pump Room, Reactor Building-859 9Elevation

• Fire Area III-3B 4160V/480V SWGR Room 1G, Reactor Building-932 6 Elevation

• Fire Area VI-8F, 8G DIV 2 DC Battery and Switchgear Rooms, Control Building-903 6 Elevation

• Fire Area VII-10 Auxiliary Relay Room, Control Building-903 6 Elevation

• Fire Area IX-14A, 14C Diesel Generator 1A Room and Diesel Oil Day Tank Room, Diesel Generator Building-903 6 Elevation The inspection team evaluated the licensees fire protection program using the applicable requirements, which included plant Technical Specifications, Operating License Condition 2.C(4), the NRC safety evaluations, 10 CFR 50.48, and Branch Technical Position 9.5-1. The team also reviewed related documents that included the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), Sections VII-18, X-9, X-18, XIII-10; the fire hazards analysis; and the Post-Fire Safe and Alternative Shutdown Analysis Report.

Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment. Five inspection samples were completed.

.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the piping and instrumentation diagrams, safe shutdown equipment list, safe shutdown design basis documents, and the post-fire safe shutdown analysis to verify that the licensee properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for fires in the selected fire areas. The team observed walkdowns of the procedures used for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown in the event of a fire to verify that the procedures properly implemented the safe shutdown analysis provisions.

For each of the selected fire areas, the team reviewed the separation of redundant safe shutdown cables, equipment, and components located within the same fire area. The team also reviewed the licensees method for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48; Branch Technical Position 9.5-1, Appendix A; and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. Specifically, the team evaluated whether at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path remained free of fire damage in the event of a fire.

In addition, the team verified that the licensee met applicable license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.02 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe the material condition and configuration of the installed fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) and verify that the electrical raceway fire barriers were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area. The team compared the installed configurations to the approved construction details, supporting fire tests, and applicable license commitments.

The team reviewed installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material possessed an appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.03 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the design, maintenance, testing, and operation of the fire detection and suppression systems in the selected fire areas. The team verified the automatic detection systems and the manual and automatic suppression systems were installed, tested, and maintained in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association code of record or approved deviations and that each suppression system was appropriate for the hazards in the selected fire areas.

The team performed a walkdown of accessible portions of the detection and suppression systems in the selected fire areas. The team also performed a walkdown of major system support equipment in other areas (e.g., fire pumps and Halon supply systems) to assess the material condition of these systems and components.

The team reviewed the electric and diesel fire pumps flow and pressure tests to verify that the pumps met their design requirements. The team also reviewed the fire water yard loop flow and pressure tests to verify that the system capability met the design requirements.

The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, and drill critique records. The team also reviewed pre-fire plans and smoke removal plans for the selected fire areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact post-fire safe shutdown capability. In addition, the team inspected fire brigade equipment to determine operational readiness for firefighting.

The team observed an unannounced fire drill and subsequent drill critique on September 29, 2013, using the guidance contained in Inspection Procedure 71111.05AQ, Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly. The team observed fire brigade members fight a simulated fire in the Control Building, Elevation 903, Seal Water Pump Corridor. The team verified that the licensee identified problems, openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and identified appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated included:

• proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus

• proper use and layout of fire hoses

• employment of appropriate firefighting techniques

• sufficient firefighting equipment was brought to the scene

• effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control

• search for victims and propagation of the fire into other areas

• smoke removal operations

• utilization of pre-planned strategies

• adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario

• completion of drill objectives

b. Findings

Introduction.

The team identified a Green non-cited violation of License Condition 2.C(4), Fire Protection, for the failure to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement adequate corrective actions for a condition adverse to fire protection related to circuits that could disable the automatic starting of the electric driven fire pump due to fire damage.

Description.

The firewater system has two fire pumps and a jockey pump taking suction from the fire water storage tanks. The diesel driven fire pump (FP-P-D) and the electric driven fire pump (FP-P-E) are required by the approved fire protection program and are subject to the Technical Requirement Manual requirements for operability and surveillance testing. The jockey pump normally maintains system pressure when there is no demand for fire water. The jockey pump cannot maintain system pressure if an automatic suppression system actuates or a fire hose is used. On low system pressure, each fire pump is started by a pressure switch in its discharge piping.

Information Notice 2009-29, Potential Failure of Fire Water Supply Pumps to Automatic Start Due to a Fire, dated November 24, 2009, communicated that the NRC inspections identified cable installations where fire damage to fire pump control circuits routed to the control room could prevent fire pumps from automatically starting.

The diesel and electric driven fire pumps have controls and status indication in the control room. The licensee evaluated the information in Information Notice 2009-29 for applicability to their fire pumps in Condition Report 2009-10104. The evaluation confirmed that damage to the circuits external to the fire pump house would not prevent the diesel driven fire pump from starting; however, the evaluation did not address the electric driven fire pump. The team determined the electric driven fire pump control circuits are susceptible to fire damage that could prevent the pump from automatically starting. The team determined that the susceptibility of the fire pump control circuits was a condition adverse to fire protection. The team concluded the licensee had failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to fire protection that could prevent the automatic start of the electric driven fire pump.

Analysis.

The failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to fire protection was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Events (fire) and affects the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

The team performed walkdowns of both fire pump circuits from the control room to the fire pump house. The control room has fire pump switches and status lights in the sprinkler control and fire alarm panel. The control room is continuously manned and fire extinguishers are available for manual fire suppression. The fire pump circuits in the cable spreading room are routed in separate conduits in parallel with no fixed ignition sources near the conduits. Transient combustibles in the cable spreading room are limited and strictly controlled. The fire pump circuits in the seal water pump area and hallway (control building elevation 903) are not routed near any fixed ignition sources.

Combustible materials are stored near the conduits in the multipurpose facility, but there are no significant ignition sources or work areas nearby. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, the inspectors assigned a low degradation rating to the finding, because the wiring was routed in conduits through areas with limited combustibles and no ignition sources; consequently this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) per Attachment 1, Task 1.3.1, Question 1. The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since it was not indicative of present performance in that the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago.

Enforcement.

License Conditions 2.C(4), Fire Protection, requires the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program.

The Fire Protection Program is described in Updated Safety Analysis Report and listed the NRC Safety Evaluation Reports. Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.2, Commitment to Fire Protection Regulatory Compliance, includes commitment to the NRC Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A. The NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated May 23, 1979, specified administrative controls including the quality assurance provisions for fire protection satisfied the objectives of Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1. Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 10.9, Quality Assurance Program, states The design, procurement, installation, testing, and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety-related areas are required to be covered by a Quality Assurance program. CNS quality assurance program implementing procedures and processes establish Quality Assurance requirements applicable to the fire protection program. Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A, Section C.8, Corrective Action, states Measures should be established to assure that conditions adverse to fire protection, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and non-conformances are promptly identified, reported and corrected.

Contrary to the above, since December 2, 2009, the measures established by the licensee failed to assure that conditions adverse to fire protection, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, uncontrolled combustible material and non-conformances are promptly identified, reported and corrected.

Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate and correct deficiencies related to the electric fire pump circuits that could prevent the automatic starting of the pump due to fire damage to cables. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program (Condition Report 2013-05866), this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000298/2013007-01, Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for a Condition Adverse to Fire Protection.

.04 Protection From Damage From Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The team performed plant walkdowns and document reviews to verify that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown, which are located in the same fire area, would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team verified:

• A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not directly, through production of smoke, heat, or hot gases, cause activation of suppression systems that could potentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains

• A fire in one of the selected fire areas or the inadvertent actuation or rupture of a fire suppression system would not directly cause damage to all redundant trains (e.g., sprinkler-caused flooding of other than the locally affected train)

• Adequate drainage is provided in areas protected by water suppression systems

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.05 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

Review of Methodology The team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the control room for fires that require evacuation of the control room, with or without offsite power available.

The team conducted plant walkdowns to verify that the plant configuration was consistent with the description contained in the safe shutdown and fire hazards analyses. The team focused on ensuring the adequacy of systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor decay heat removal, process monitoring instrumentation, and support systems functions.

The team also verified that the systems and components credited for hot shutdown would remain free from fire damage. Finally, the team verified that the transfer of control from the control room to the alternative shutdown location would not be affected by fire-induced circuit faults (e.g., by the provision of separate fuses and power supplies for alternative shutdown control circuits).

Review of Operational Implementation The team verified that licensed and non-licensed operators received training on alternative shutdown procedures. The team also verified that sufficient personnel to perform a safe shutdown were trained and available onsite at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigade members.

The team performed a walkdown of the post-fire safe shutdown procedure with licensed operators to determine the adequacy of the procedure. The team verified that the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits. Time critical actions that were verified included restoring electrical power, establishing control at the remote shutdown and local shutdown panels, establishing reactor coolant makeup, and establishing decay heat removal.

The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfer capability and instrumentation and control functions to verify that the tests were adequate to demonstrate the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.06 Circuit Analysis

a. Inspection Scope

This segment of inspection is suspended for plants in transition to a risk-informed fire protection program in accordance with NFPA 805. Therefore, the team did not evaluate this area.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.07 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the contents of designated emergency storage lockers and reviewed the alternative shutdown procedure to verify that portable radio communications and fixed emergency communications systems were available, operable, and adequate for the performance of designated activities. The team verified the capability of the communication systems to support the operators in the conduct and coordination of their required actions. The team also verified that the design and location of communications equipment such as repeaters and transmitters would not cause a loss of communications during a fire. The team discussed system design, testing, and maintenance with the system engineer.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.08 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the portion of the emergency lighting system required for alternative shutdown to verify that it was adequate to support the performance of manual actions required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions and to illuminate access and egress routes to the areas where manual actions would be required. The team evaluated the locations and positioning of the emergency lights during a walkdown of the alternative shutdown procedure.

The team verified that the licensee installed emergency lights with an 8-hour capacity, maintained the emergency light batteries in accordance with manufacturer recommendations, and tested and performed maintenance in accordance with plant procedures and industry practices.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The team verified that the licensee identified repairs needed to reach and maintain cold shutdown and had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and materials to accomplish these repairs. Using these procedures, the team evaluated whether these components could be repaired in time to bring the plant to cold shutdown within the time frames specified in their design and licensing bases. The team verified that the repair equipment, components, tools, and materials needed for the repairs were available and accessible on site.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.10 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The team verified that compensatory measures were implemented for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment; passive fire barriers; or pumps, valves, or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions). The team also verified that the short-term compensatory measures compensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective action could be taken and that the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to service in a reasonable period of time.

The team reviewed operator manual actions credited for achieving hot shutdown for fires that do not require an alternative shutdown. The team verified that operators could reasonably be expected to perform the actions within the applicable shutdown time requirements. The team reviewed the operator manual actions using the guidance contained in NUREG-1852, Demonstrating the Feasibility and Reliability of Operator Manual Actions in Response to Fire, dated October 2007.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.11 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed changes to the approved fire protection program. The team verified that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.12 B.5.b Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees implementation of guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the potential loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire as required by Section B.5.b of the Interim Compensatory Measures Order, EA-02-026, dated February 25, 2002, and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2).

The team verified that the licensee maintained and implemented adequate procedures, maintained and tested equipment necessary to properly implement the strategies, and ensured station personnel were knowledgeable and capable of implementing the procedures. The team performed a visual inspection of portable equipment used to implement the strategy to ensure the availability and material readiness of the equipment, including the adequacy of portable pump trailer hitch attachments, and verify the availability of on-site vehicles capable of towing the portable pump. The team assessed the off-site ability to obtain fuel for the portable pump and foam used for firefighting efforts. The strategy and procedure selected for this inspection sample included:

• Steam Relief Valve Remote Operation One B.5.b mitigating strategy sample was completed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

[OA]

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The team selected a sample of condition reports associated with the licensee's fire protection program to verify that the licensee had an appropriate threshold for identifying deficiencies. The team reviewed the corrective actions proposed and implemented to verify that they were effective in correcting identified deficiencies. The team evaluated the quality of recent engineering evaluations through a review of condition reports, calculations, and other documents during the inspection.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

The team presented the inspection results to Oscar Limpias, Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff at an exit meeting on August 30, 2013. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The team asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

M. Bergmmeier, Operations Group Supervisor

R. Dyer, EPM Support Engineer

J. Dykstra, Electrical Components Engineer

S. Holmes, Control Room Supervisor

J. Flaherty, Licensing

W. Green, Engineering Programs Supervisor

C. Long, Fire Protection System Engineer

C. Murphy, Control Room Supervisor

K. Newcomb, Fire Chief

T. Parker, EP&C Manager

J. Reimers, System Engineering Supervisor

M. Saadallah, EPM Support Engineer

J. Schroeder, Operations Manager

Z. Shepherd, Reactor Operator

T. Shudak, Fire Protection Program Engineer

B. Swoboda, Mechanical Design Engineer

D. Vandercamp, Licensing Manager

NRC Personnel

J. Josey, Senior Resident Inspector

C. Henderson, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action for a Condition

05000298/2013007-01 NCV Adverse to Fire Protection

-1- Attachment