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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
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Salem Generating Station May 22, 1992 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-036-01; SUPPLEMENT This Supplemental Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.7J. This supplement modifies the root cause and corrective action sections based upon completed Engineering investigations *. Also, the 10CF5.7J reportability identification code on the NRC Form 366 has been corrected.
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On 12/13/91 it was determined that the AFW flow values may have had an
~dverse impact on.the licen~ing basis Steam Line Break (SLB) analyses, placing both Salem Units in an "unanalyzed cohdition". This wris discovered during the assessment of a recently developed Salem-specific model used to generate maximum AFW flows as a function of steam generator pressure. A reanalysis of SLB cases, indicated that the Salem Unit 1 core ~nd containment response would remain within the licensing basis limits thereby justifying continued operation; however, until the AFW flow assumptions used in the SLB analyses were corrected, and the effects of the new flow values on unit operation assessed, Salem Units 1 & 2 were considered to have been in an unanalyzed condition. The new flow values are significantly and nonconservatively different than those-descrihed ih the Salem UFSAR, therefore Salem is considered to have been in a .
condition 6utside of its design hasis. The root cause of the inaccurate AFW flow values (dating back. to 1978) is inadequate design review. The calculations were apparently based on incorrect ~odeling assumptions for AFW system hydraulic conditions. current £tandards require detailed verification for all safety related calculations which should preclude this event from occurring today. A project team was assembled to develop and implement corrective actions to s.ibport future cycles of operation for* both Salem tJni ts. l OCFR :J.1 has been shown to not be applicable.
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER m.JMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 91-036-01 2 of 8 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification system (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Discovery of nonconservative Auxiliary Feedwater System flow rates used in Steam Line Break analyses Discovery Date: 12/13/91 Report Date: 5/22/92 I.
This report was initiated by Incident Report No.91-909.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Unit 1: Mode 1 ReaEtor Power 100% - Unit Load 1150 MWe Unit 2: Defueled - 6 h Refueling in progress DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
To increase the margin between Salem's containment ~afety analyses results and the licensing basis limits for containment temperature and pressure; PSE&G implemented a Containment Margin Program with .
Westinghouse in July 1991. The program involves reevaluation of the containment response during postulated events, with the expectation of identifying more realistic (but conservative) assumptions.
On~ area investigated was the Auxiliary Feedwater system. {BA} flow.
UFSAR section 15.4.8.2 indicates that the AFW flow assumptions used in the Steam Line Break (SLB) analyses (as given in UFSAR Table 10.4-2) are bounding values associated with a completely depressurized faulted steam generator. The SLB cases which produce the most limiting containment response are typically smaller po~tulated breaks (less than l .*4 square feet) , which would have relatively low depressurization rates' for the faulted steam generator. Therefore, it was anticipated that a more realistic model of AFW flow vs. steam generator pressure could justify a reduction in total integrated AFW flow reaching the faulted steam generator.
Reduced flow would result in less inventory contributing to the mass and energy release out of the break, which would result in lower calculated containment te~perature and pressure.
A Salem-specific model was developed and used to generate maximum AFW flows as a function of steam generator pressure. The preliminary results were provided to Westinghou~e (by letter dated November 22, 1991), to determine the sen~itivity of the SLB results.to the AFW flows. Their results indicated that containment response could be
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5 0 0 0 2 7.,!0.2_ _ _ _---"9'--"1'--_,0::...::3~6:<...--0~1_ _ __.,,3:..-.;:0._.f,__,8"--_
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)
,
significantly and adversely affected by the new AFW flow predictions.
Based on .the results of the preliminary sensitivity study, PSE&G took the following immediate actions:
- 1) Met with Westinghouse to review the AFW flow input assumptions for the licensing basis SLB. The.results of the review are summarized under "Analysis of Occurrence."
- 2) The Salem-specific AFW model was completed including independent review. This review revealed a modeling err6r, which when corrected, resulted in approximately 5% lower predicted flows. However, these flows remained higher than the licensing basis analysis values.
- 3) The impact of these higher AFW flows, on safe operation of Salem Unit 1, was evaluated (because Unit 2 was shutdown,*
it was not.an immediate concern). The excess available shutdown margin specifi9 to Salem 1, Cycle 10 was judged sufficient t,o offset the effects of the increased AFW flow. At the request of PSE&G, Westinghouse began reanalyses of the SLB cases to confirm this judgement.
On December 13, 1991 it was determined that the AFW flow values may
- have an adverse impact on th~ licensing basis SLB analyses results.
A one hour notificatiori was made (for both Salem Units), to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.721b) (1). The reanalysis of SLB cases using the Salem 1, Cycle 10 specific shutdown margin, indicated that the reactor core and containment response would remain within the licensing basis limits thereby justifying its continued operation at full power. The evaluation of the impact of increased AFW f lciw upon the Salem 1, Cycle 10 design basis was transmitted by Westinghouse to PSE&G on December 20, 1991 and confirmed the initial judgement outlined in item 3 above.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The r6ot cause of th~ use of an iriaccurate AFW flow value (dating back t6 1978) is inadequate design review. The calculations were apparently based on incorrect modeling ass*1:npt ions. .f.or AFW system hydraulic conditions. Curr~nt standards require detailed -
verification for all safety related calculations which should preclude this event from occurring today.
.
Three (3) basic AFW maximum faulted loop flow
, ~ssumptions have been utilized in Salem's licensing basis:
- 1. 2040 gpm - This value was initially used in the Salem licensing basis SLB analyses. Westinghouse performed the r
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 91-036-01 4 of 8 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)
SLB analyses using multiple single failure assumptions thereby reducing the number of cases by 75%. This value (associated with accident scenarios involving an assumed single failure ~f the AFW runout protection system) was calcul~ted by PSE&G and transmitted to Westinghouse in 1978. In the initial SLB analyses, this AFW maximum flow value was assumed in all SLB cases.
,.
- 2. 1840 ~pm - This value was calculated by PSE&G and transmitted to Westinghouse circa 1978. This value was conservatively associated with accident scenarios not involving an assumed single failure of the AFW runout protection system (as specified in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 15.4.8.2 through FSAR Revision 6)~ However as identified above, Westinghouse ran SLB cases with multiple single failure assumptions and used the 2040 assu~ption.
- 3. 1320 gpm - Circa 1984, Westinghouse performed SLB analyses in suppoFt of Boron Injection Tank (BIT) removal. These analyses required the separation of single*failure assumptions to meet the containment safety limits.
Therefore, for the AFW runout protection failure cases, Westinghouse continued to use the 2040 gpm assumption. For all other single failure assumption cases, Westinghouse took credit for a lower AFW flow assumption (1320 gpm), as per Westinghouse letter PSE-92-052, dated March 5, 1992
("Maximum AFW Flow Assumptions in SLB Licensing Basis Analyses"). The basis of this 1320 gpm value was the sum of the rated AFW flows with a conservatively calculated flow split to the faulted loop. In addition, the use of this 1321 gpm value was not initially conveyed to PSE&G.
Use of the value was revealed during a Containment Margins Project resulting in the issue of LER 272/91-036-00.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The AFW flow rates assumed in the Salem SLB analyses, particularly in those cases for which AFW runout protection remains functional, were
- found to .be significantly lower than predicted using a Salem-specific AFW model. Using low flow rates in the SLB analyses i*
nonconservative in that it underestimates the degree of primary system cooling and return to ~riticality, and also underestimates the mass/energy released inside c.ontalnment.
Westinghouse currently uses a maximum flow of 1320 gpm for the cases without runout protection system failure. Assuming a constant flow of 1320 gpm to the faulted steam generator results in underestimation of total int~grated flow. The Apparent Cause of Occurrence Section
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 91-036-01 5 of 8 ANALYS!S OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) summarizes the results of inve?tigations as to the basis for AFW flow values.
Salem 1. Cycle 10 The effect of the increase in maximum AFW flow has been evaluated for Salem Unit 1 Cycle 10 operation. This increase in maximum AFW flow is non-conservative for the SLB analyses which address core response (DNBR), containment pressure, and containment temperature safety limits. This evaluation took credit for the following increases in minimum shutdown margin which are available for Salem Unit 1, Cycle 10:
- 1) Excess shutdown margin. Salem's }icensing basis analyses assume a shutdown margin of 1600 pcm. Because a minimum shutdown margin of 2570 pcm is available for Salem lr Cycle 10, the additional 970 pcm was* credited in the reanalyses.
- 2) Reduced uncertainty for Rod Worth Calculations. Salem's licensing basis analyses assume 10% uncertainty on rod
W~stinghouse methodology supporting a 7% uncertainty (applicable to all Salem l and 2 cycles of operation), was used, resulting in an additional 200 pcm of shutdown margin for Salem Unit 1, Cycle 10.
With respect to SLB core response, the higher AFW flow increases the amount of RCS {AB} cooldown, which would result in a positive reactivity insertion. The positive reactivity insertion would result in an increased return to pciwer level following the SLB, which has a negative impact on Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB). The SLB reanalyses showed only a slight negative impact on DNB, vs. a large margin between the DNB safety limit and the predicted worst case DNB for the SLB. The impact of the higher AFW flow is easily accommodated by the excess DNB margin for the SLB event.
With respect to containment integrity, Westinghouse reanalyzed the limiting SLB cases for containment temperature and pressure.. The limiting pressure case, a o.9oa sq. ft. split bre~k from 70% power, with an emergency diesel failure, result~d in a peak pressure of 45.8 psig, vs. containment design pressure of 47.0 psig. It was also concluded that the* containment temperature response would not exceed the present Salem EQ temperature envelope.
- No other non~LOCA event. and no LOCA events ar~ adversely impacted by an increase in the maximum AFW flow.
Previous Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operation The results of the Salem 1, Cycle 10 safety analyses may be applied
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUM.BER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 91-036-01 6 of 8 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) to all other Salem cycles whose excess shutdown margin can be demonstra.ted to be greater than or equal to 1170 pcm.
C~cles with Boron Injection ~ank CBtTl Available The Boron Injection Tanks were functionally removed during Salem 1, 7th refueling and Salem 2~ 4th Refueling. The reacti~ity worth of the BIT volume at 20,000 ppm boron is a minimum of 1200 pcm for the conditions associated with the SLB event (End of Cycle, o ppm RCS boron concentration). The BIT benefit alone is greater than the 1170 pci:n used in the Salem 1, Cyc1e*10 evaluation. In addition, the cycles with the BIT available would benefit from an additional 100 pcm (minimum) excess shutdown margin, as we11* as a 100 pcm (minimum) from the reduction in rod worth uncertainty.
It.is therefore concluded that the conclusions from the Salem 1, Cycle 10 evaluation are applicable to Salem 1, Cycles 1 through 7, and Salem 2, cycles 1 through 4.
Cycles Without BIT Available I
Salem l ,* cycles 7, 8, and 9 Because of the Salem 1 control rod pattern, this unit has historically had significant quantities of excess available shutdown margin. Unit 1, Cycle 8 had a minimum shutdown margin of 2550 pcm (20 pcm.less than cycle 10), and a reduced rod worth uncertainty of 198 pcm (2 pcm less than Cycle 10). This results in cycle 8 having a total of 22 pcm less shutdown margin than Cycle 10. This small difference (0.8% of total Cycle 10 shutdown margin) results in a negligible increase in the return to power during a SLB event.* Given the excess margin to the containment limits shown by the cycle 10 analyses (i.e., 45.8 psig vs. 47.psig), as well as the ample margin to the DNBR limit available, it is concluded that the results of the cycl* 10 analyses demonstrate acceptable ~esults for a postulated Salem 1, Cycle 8 SLB. .
Cycle 9 had 2950 pcm *shutdown margin, which exceeds the value for
- Cycle 10 (2570 pcm). The reduced rod wbrth uncertainty available
.- . .
Cycle 9 exceeds the 200 pcm assumed for Cycle 10. Therefore, it is .
. for concluded that the results of the Cycle 10 analyses are applicable to Unit 1, Cycle 9.
Salem 2, Cycles 5 and 6 The contr~l rod pattern at Salem 2 provides less excess shutdown margin than that of Unit 1. Salem 2, Cycle 5 had the lowest excess shutdown margin (80 pcm) and reduced rod worth uncertainty benefit (166 pcm) of all Salem cycles subsequent to BIT removal. The tot~l
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER ?AGE Unit 1 5000272 91-036-01 7 of 8 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) excess shutdown margin for Cycle 5 was 246 pcm, which is considerably less than the 1170 pcm used in the Salem 1, cycle 10 evaluation.
However, the licensing basis shutdown margin calculations for all cycles is reduced by the reactivity worth of most reactive rod (i.e.,
it is assumed to be stuck). For Salem 2, Cycle 5, the postulated
- maximum worth stuck rod had a reactivity of 940 pcm. Based on rod drop time testing per Technical Specifications, successful rod motion testing every 31 days (Technical Specification Surveillances 4.1.3.1.2
( and 4.1.3.2.2) and control rod performance during actual d~mands (reactor trips), there have been no indications of stuck rods at Salem during Cycles 5, and 6. Therefore, taking credit for this results in a total excess shutdown margin of 1186 pcm. This was the minimum excess shutdown margin associated with any of the Salem Unit 2 cycles without the BIT.
- PSE&G is not proposing to remove the stuck rod assumption from the lem licensing basis. However, for the limited purpose of assessing U
fety significance of increased AFW flow on Salem 2, Cycles 5 and 6 d taking credit for all rods operable, this results in sufficient cess shutdown margin to conclude that the results of a postulated P would have been bounded by the Salem 1, Cycle 10 eValuation.
Until the AFW flow assumptions used in the SLB analyses were corrected, and the effects of the new flow values on unit operation assessed, Salem Units 1 & 2 were considered to have been in an -
unanalyzed condition~ The new flow ~alues are significantly higher (nonconservative) than those described in the Salem UFSAR, therefore Salem is considered to have been in a condition outside of its design basis. Therefore, this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR
- 50. 73 (a) (2) (ii).
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The Westinghouse evaluation of Salem 1, Cycle 10 operation, with the new AFW flows, has been reviewed by PSE&G. Based on the Westinghouse input, PSE&G completed a Safety EvaluationJ which included a 10CFR 50.59 evaluation, demonstrating-that Salem Unit 1 cycle 10 operation is acceptable.. Salem Unit 1 procedures h~ve been revised to ensure excess shutdown margin, required by current evaluation, is maintained.
PSF.&G has formed a project team to develop and implement corrective actions to support future cycles of operation for both Salem Units.
As part of normal station practices, the Salt~ Unit 2 fuel load and
~ubsequent mode change~ (in iupport of the 6
- r~fueling outage) was dependent on the issuance* of a Reload Safety Evaluation (RSE) . The RSF. accounted for the pr~ger AFW flow value. Corrective actions implemented during tbe 6 . refueling outage and cre~ited in the RSE for Salem 2, Cycle 7 operation consisted of 1) reduction of the Containment High-High pressure setpoint to 15 psig (from 23.5 psig)
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION
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Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER 1 LER NUMBER PAGE Unit l 5000272 91-036-01 8 of 8 CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd) and 2) administrative controls to ensure that suhtdown margin is maintained 250 pcm above the current Technical Specification value.
The project team is i~glementing the same corrective actions during the present* Unit 1 10 refueling outage for Salem ~git 1, cycle 11 operation as was done for Salem Unit 2 during its 6 r~fueling outage.
The project team is currently eva1uating ~lternatives for permanent implementation ~gring the Salem Unit 2 7t refueling outage and the Salem Unit 1 11 refueling outage.
Westinghouse (at PSE&Gs request), investigated to determine if any generic implications (i.e., 10CF*R21 issues) associated with their use of non-conservative AFW flow assumptions in the Salem licensing basis analyses. Westinghouse found that no generic impl'ications exist because the assumptions used were based either on information obtained from PSE&G or on Salem specifc -AFW system information.
In 1991, PSE&G proactively initiated the development of a Salem specific Accident Analysis Profile (AAP) with Westinghouse. This project, scheduled for completion in 1992, will provide a detailed description of the key accident analyses input assumptions used in our licensing basis. The primary purpose of AAP is to provide on-site engineering staff with additional information with regard to accident analysis assumptions and aid in the evaluation of safety significant issues. In addition, the development of AAP, coupled with the on-going Configuration Baseline Documentation development
- process, will aid in determining if similar discrepancies exist between analysis inputs and actual plant* performance.
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Salem Oper~tions MJP:pc SORC Mtg.92-062 I