ML18101B040: Difference between revisions

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* Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit OCT 111995 LR-N95179 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 50-311 UNIT NOS. 1 and 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 95-024-00 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Technical Specification Violations:
                                *
Differential Pressure of the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a)
* Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit OCT 111995 LR-N95179 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO.               50-272 50-311 UNIT NOS.               1 and 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 95-024-00 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Technical Specification Violations: Differential Pressure of the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). Attachment A contains a listing of those commitments made as a result of the investigation into this issue.
(2) (i) (B). Attachment A contains a listing of those commitments made as a result of the investigation into this issue. Attachment A Attachment LER SORC Mtg. 95-115 c Distribution LER File 3.7 -* f * (1 -r ." l_ (_,. \_j u ;, J 9510160155 951011 PDR ADDCK 05000272 S PDR The power is in your hands.
t47/~
: c. c. Warren General Manager Salem Operations 95-2168 REV. 6/94 Dooument Control Desk LR-N95179 PSE&G Commitments 2
: c. c. Warren General Manager Salem Operations Attachment A Attachment LER SORC Mtg. 95-115 c   Distribution LER File 3.7
* OCT 111995 The following commitments have been made by PSE&G as a result of the investigation into LER 272/95-024:
                  -* f * (1 -
l_ (_,. \_j u ;,r  ."
J 9510160155 951011 PDR ADDCK 05000272 S                               PDR The power is in your hands.
95-2168 REV. 6/94
 
Dooument Control Desk           2
* OCT 111995 LR-N95179 PSE&G Commitments The following commitments have been made by PSE&G as a result of the investigation into LER 272/95-024:
Near Term Actions
Near Term Actions
* A surveillance test will be performed using the revised methodology prior to declaring the system operable.
* A surveillance test will be performed using the revised methodology prior to declaring the system operable.
* Direction will be provided to appropriate personnel regarding the impact of manipulating non-safety Fuel Handling Ventilation (FHV) components on the operability of the FHV system.
* Direction will be provided to appropriate personnel regarding the impact of manipulating non-safety Fuel Handling Ventilation (FHV) components on the operability of the FHV system.
* The FHV dp alarm setpoints will be reset to -0.13" wg until such time that the design basis setpoint is validated by Engineering.
* The FHV dp alarm setpoints will be reset to -0.13" wg until such time that the design basis setpoint is validated by Engineering.
Long Term Corrective Actions 1. The design basis and setpoints for the FHV system pressure controller, differential pressure switch (alarm), and radiation monitors will be established.
Long Term Corrective Actions
This activity is expected to be completed by December 11, 1995. 2. . Disposition all open issues identified in Discrepancy Evaluation Forms (DEFs) which affect the operability of the FHV system prior to restart, which is expected during the first and 3econd quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
: 1. The design basis and setpoints for the FHV system pressure controller, differential pressure switch (alarm), and radiation monitors will be established.
This activity is expected to be completed by December 11, 1995.
: 2. . Disposition all open issues identified in Discrepancy Evaluation Forms (DEFs) which affect the operability of the FHV system prior to restart, which is expected during the first and 3econd quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
: 3. Identify inconsistencies between the established design, technicaL specifications and surveillance test procedures prior to restart, which is expected during the first and second quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
: 3. Identify inconsistencies between the established design, technicaL specifications and surveillance test procedures prior to restart, which is expected during the first and second quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
: 4. The impact of the Technical Specification changes and clarifications developed on the design, testing, and maintenance of the FHV system will be formally communicated to appropriate personnel . This training will be provided to appropriate personnel prior to restart, which is expected during the first and second quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively  
: 4. The impact of the Technical Specification changes and clarifications developed on the design, testing, and maintenance of the FHV system will be formally communicated to appropriate personnel . This training will be provided to appropriate personnel prior to restart, which is expected during the first and second quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively ..
.. 5. A condition resolution has been initiated to address the failure to detect the miswired alarm.
: 5. A condition resolution has been initiated to address the failure to detect the miswired alarm.
Document Control Desk LR-N95179 3
 
* 6. Evaluate and identify, where required, the need for controls to prevent unauthorized manipulation of HVAC components (e.g., dampers, vents, controllers, alarms, etc) which can affect TS compliance/operability of a safety related system.
Document Control Desk         3
* OCT 111995 7. Operator response to the FHB dp alarm condition, involvement in approval of the work order which allowed manipulation of the non-safety damper, and adequacy of the alarm response procedure will be further investigated.
* OCT 111995 LR-N95179
: 6. Evaluate and identify, where required, the need for controls to prevent unauthorized manipulation of HVAC components (e.g., dampers, vents, controllers, alarms, etc) which can affect TS compliance/operability of a safety related system.                     *
: 7. Operator response to the FHB dp alarm condition, involvement in approval of the work order which allowed manipulation of the non-safety damper, and adequacy of the alarm response procedure will be further investigated.
: 8. Action has been initiated to evaluate the aggregate impact of the HVAC deficiencies, as discussed in "Prior Similar Occurrences" . A cumulative impact evaluation will be performed to identify any additional corrective actions required other than those considered in the corrective actions listed in the individual LERs.}}
: 8. Action has been initiated to evaluate the aggregate impact of the HVAC deficiencies, as discussed in "Prior Similar Occurrences" . A cumulative impact evaluation will be performed to identify any additional corrective actions required other than those considered in the corrective actions listed in the individual LERs.}}

Revision as of 10:08, 21 October 2019

Forwards LER 95-024-00 Re TS Violations Involving Differential Pressure of Handling Bldg Ventilation Sys. Attachment a Contains Listing of Commitments Made as Result of Investigation Into Issue
ML18101B040
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/11/1995
From: Warren C
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML18101B041 List:
References
LR-N95179, NUDOCS 9510160155
Download: ML18101B040 (3)
v • d • e


Text

OPS~G

  • Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit OCT 111995 LR-N95179 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 50-311 UNIT NOS. 1 and 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 95-024-00 This Licensee Event Report entitled "Technical Specification Violations: Differential Pressure of the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). Attachment A contains a listing of those commitments made as a result of the investigation into this issue.

t47/~

c. c. Warren General Manager Salem Operations Attachment A Attachment LER SORC Mtg.95-115 c Distribution LER File 3.7

-* f * (1 -

l_ (_,. \_j u ;,r ."

J 9510160155 951011 PDR ADDCK 05000272 S PDR The power is in your hands.

95-2168 REV. 6/94

Dooument Control Desk 2

  • OCT 111995 LR-N95179 PSE&G Commitments The following commitments have been made by PSE&G as a result of the investigation into LER 272/95-024:

Near Term Actions

  • A surveillance test will be performed using the revised methodology prior to declaring the system operable.
  • Direction will be provided to appropriate personnel regarding the impact of manipulating non-safety Fuel Handling Ventilation (FHV) components on the operability of the FHV system.
  • The FHV dp alarm setpoints will be reset to -0.13" wg until such time that the design basis setpoint is validated by Engineering.

Long Term Corrective Actions

1. The design basis and setpoints for the FHV system pressure controller, differential pressure switch (alarm), and radiation monitors will be established.

This activity is expected to be completed by December 11, 1995.

2. . Disposition all open issues identified in Discrepancy Evaluation Forms (DEFs) which affect the operability of the FHV system prior to restart, which is expected during the first and 3econd quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
3. Identify inconsistencies between the established design, technicaL specifications and surveillance test procedures prior to restart, which is expected during the first and second quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
4. The impact of the Technical Specification changes and clarifications developed on the design, testing, and maintenance of the FHV system will be formally communicated to appropriate personnel . This training will be provided to appropriate personnel prior to restart, which is expected during the first and second quarter of 1996 for Units 1 and 2, respectively ..
5. A condition resolution has been initiated to address the failure to detect the miswired alarm.

Document Control Desk 3

  • OCT 111995 LR-N95179
6. Evaluate and identify, where required, the need for controls to prevent unauthorized manipulation of HVAC components (e.g., dampers, vents, controllers, alarms, etc) which can affect TS compliance/operability of a safety related system. *
7. Operator response to the FHB dp alarm condition, involvement in approval of the work order which allowed manipulation of the non-safety damper, and adequacy of the alarm response procedure will be further investigated.
8. Action has been initiated to evaluate the aggregate impact of the HVAC deficiencies, as discussed in "Prior Similar Occurrences" . A cumulative impact evaluation will be performed to identify any additional corrective actions required other than those considered in the corrective actions listed in the individual LERs.
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