ML071420444: Difference between revisions

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Future modifications may change position of valves in the SSD flow paths.
Future modifications may change position of valves in the SSD flow paths.
FPIP-0105  1. 3.2 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?  2. 9.2.16 - Are indication and alarm circuits needed to be evaluated?  These may give erroneous information to plant operators. 3. 9.3.1 - Why are criteria different from plant to plant? Is high impedance fault considered? 4. 9.8 - Why BNP only?  Are other plants need verification?
FPIP-0105  1. 3.2 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?  2. 9.2.16 - Are indication and alarm circuits needed to be evaluated?  These may give erroneous information to plant operators. 3. 9.3.1 - Why are criteria different from plant to plant? Is high impedance fault considered? 4. 9.8 - Why BNP only?  Are other plants need verification?
FPIP-0122  1. 3.11 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?  
FPIP-0122  1. 3.11 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?
: 2. 4.3.1 - Add electrical diagrams (CWD's, block diagrams, etc.)  
: 2. 4.3.1 - Add electrical diagrams (CWD's, block diagrams, etc.)
: 3. 9.1 - Should thermoset/thermoplastic inter-cable failures be considered based on CAROLFIRE?  
: 3. 9.1 - Should thermoset/thermoplastic inter-cable failures be considered based on CAROLFIRE?
: 4. 9.1.1 - The 4 th bullet contradict the definition in 3.7 where inter-cable short of "two or more" separate cables is postulated.  
: 4. 9.1.1 - The 4 th bullet contradict the definition in 3.7 where inter-cable short of "two or more" separate cables is postulated.
: 5. 9.2.1 - What about hot shorts? How many is postulated?  
: 5. 9.2.1 - What about hot shorts? How many is postulated?
: 6. 9.3.6.4 - Add loss of instrumentation  
: 6. 9.3.6.4 - Add loss of instrumentation
: 7. 9.3.6.5 - Monitoring functions not discussed in failure scenarios.}}
: 7. 9.3.6.5 - Monitoring functions not discussed in failure scenarios.}}

Revision as of 23:52, 12 July 2019

Second Handout for April 19, 2007 Clarification Call Concerning Shearon Harris Transition to NFPA 805
ML071420444
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/2007
From:
NRC/NRR/ADRA/DRA/AFPB
To:
References
Download: ML071420444 (1)


Text

General Comments

1. The definitions provided in various procedures are not consistent. Use definitions from NFPA 805 where available.

FPIP-0104 1. 3.4 - Revise definition to clarify. 2. 4.1.1 - Add CWD's, block diagrams, raceway layout drawings for completeness. 3. 9.1.1 - Delete "note". Performance goals are requirements, not guidance. 4. 9.1.2 - Item #5 and #9, manual valves should be included for completeness.

Future modifications may change position of valves in the SSD flow paths.

FPIP-0105 1. 3.2 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur? 2. 9.2.16 - Are indication and alarm circuits needed to be evaluated? These may give erroneous information to plant operators. 3. 9.3.1 - Why are criteria different from plant to plant? Is high impedance fault considered? 4. 9.8 - Why BNP only? Are other plants need verification?

FPIP-0122 1. 3.11 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?

2. 4.3.1 - Add electrical diagrams (CWD's, block diagrams, etc.)
3. 9.1 - Should thermoset/thermoplastic inter-cable failures be considered based on CAROLFIRE?
4. 9.1.1 - The 4 th bullet contradict the definition in 3.7 where inter-cable short of "two or more" separate cables is postulated.
5. 9.2.1 - What about hot shorts? How many is postulated?
6. 9.3.6.4 - Add loss of instrumentation
7. 9.3.6.5 - Monitoring functions not discussed in failure scenarios.