ML071420444
| ML071420444 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/2007 |
| From: | NRC/NRR/ADRA/DRA/AFPB |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML071420444 (1) | |
Text
General Comments
- 1.
The definitions provided in various procedures are not consistent. Use definitions from NFPA 805 where available.
FPIP-0104
- 1.
3.4 - Revise definition to clarify.
- 2.
4.1.1 - Add CWDs, block diagrams, raceway layout drawings for completeness.
- 3.
9.1.1 - Delete note. Performance goals are requirements, not guidance.
- 4.
9.1.2 - Item #5 and #9, manual valves should be included for completeness.
Future modifications may change position of valves in the SSD flow paths.
FPIP-0105
- 1.
3.2 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?
- 2.
9.2.16 - Are indication and alarm circuits needed to be evaluated? These may give erroneous information to plant operators.
- 3.
9.3.1 - Why are criteria different from plant to plant? Is high impedance fault considered?
- 4.
9.8 - Why BNP only? Are other plants need verification?
FPIP-0122
- 1.
3.11 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?
- 2.
4.3.1 - Add electrical diagrams (CWDs, block diagrams, etc.)
- 3.
9.1 - Should thermoset/thermoplastic inter-cable failures be considered based on CAROLFIRE?
- 4.
9.1.1 - The 4th bullet contradict the definition in 3.7 where inter-cable short of two or more separate cables is postulated.
- 5.
9.2.1 - What about hot shorts? How many is postulated?
- 6.
9.3.6.4 - Add loss of instrumentation
- 7.
9.3.6.5 - Monitoring functions not discussed in failure scenarios.