|
|
(2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) |
Line 3: |
Line 3: |
| | issue date = 06/23/1992 | | | issue date = 06/23/1992 |
| | title = Thermo-Lag Barrier Material Special Review Team Final Report Finding, Current Fire Endurance Tests, and Ampacity Calculation Errors | | | title = Thermo-Lag Barrier Material Special Review Team Final Report Finding, Current Fire Endurance Tests, and Ampacity Calculation Errors |
| | author name = Murley T E | | | author name = Murley T |
| | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
Line 14: |
Line 14: |
| | page count = 5 | | | page count = 5 |
| }} | | }} |
| {{#Wiki_filter:'p -UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555June 23,-1992NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-46: THERMO-LAG'FIRE BARRIER MATERIAL SPECIALREVIEW TEAM .FINAL REPORT FINDINGS, CURRENT-FIRE ENDURANCE TESTS, AND AMPACITY' ' CALCULATION ERRORS | | {{#Wiki_filter:'p - |
| | UNITED STATES |
| | |
| | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| | |
| | OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION |
| | |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 23,-1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-46: THERMO-LAG'FIRE BARRIER MATERIAL SPECIAL |
| | |
| | REVIEW TEAM .FINAL REPORT FINDINGS, CURRENT |
| | |
| | -FIRE ENDURANCE TESTS, AND AMPACITY |
| | |
| | '' CALCULATION ERRORS |
|
| |
|
| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| All holders of operating licenses or construction permi~ sfor'nuclear powerreactors. _ _PurDoseThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is-issuing this informationnotice to inform addressees of (1)-the findings of the NRC's Thermo-LagSpecial Review Team, (2) current Thermo-Lag 330 fire resistance testing beingconducted by Texas Utilities (TU) and Thermal Science; Inc. (TSI),--and (3)errors found in the calculation of cable ampacity derating factors for Thermo-Lag fire resistive barriers. It is expected that recipients ,will review theinformation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions', as-appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in -this information notice are not-NRC requirements; therefore, no specificaction or written response is required.DiscussionFINAL REPORT BY THE SPECIAL REVIEW TEAM FOR THE REVIEW OF THERMO-LAG FIREBARRIER PERFORMANCERThe NRC has been reviewing the qualification of Thermo-Lag-'330-1 fire barriersystems. The NRC previously issued two information notices on these firebarrier systems: (1) Information Notice'91-47, "Failure 6f Thermo-Lag FireBarrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance Test," August 6, 1991, and (2)Information Notice 91-79, "Deficiencies in the Procedures for InstallingThermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials,' December 6, 1991.On February 12, 1992,'the NRC's Special Review Team for the review of Thermo'Lag fire barrier performance met with the'Nuclear Utilities Management and'Resources Council (NUMARC) to discuss the coordination of the industry's -response to Th'ermo-Lag fire endurance, installation, and-ampacity concerns.During the meeting, the staff provided NUMARC'a proposed draft generic letteron the Thermo-Lag fire barrier issue for review and comment. The draft-generic letter was included in-the-meeting minutes which were placed in thePublic Document Room as an enclosure to a February 24, 1992, letter to NUMARCIn a letter of March 3, 1992, NUMARC commented on the proposed draft generic9206150492 PD R 5O g -\n' 3a | | All holders of operating licenses or construction permi~sfor'nuclear power |
| | |
| | reactors. _ _ |
| | PurDose |
| | |
| | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is-issuing this information |
| | |
| | notice to inform addressees of (1)-the findings of the NRC's Thermo-Lag |
| | |
| | Special Review Team, (2)current Thermo-Lag 330 fire resistance testing being |
| | |
| | conducted by Texas Utilities (TU) and Thermal Science; Inc. (TSI),--and (3) |
| | errors found in the calculation of cable ampacity derating factors for Thermo- Lag fire resistive barriers. It is expected that recipients ,will review the |
| | |
| | information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions', as- appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in - |
| | this information notice are not-NRC requirements; therefore, no specific |
| | |
| | action or written response is required. |
| | |
| | Discussion |
| | |
| | FINAL REPORT BY THE SPECIAL REVIEW TEAM FOR THE REVIEW OF THERMO-LAG FIRE |
| | |
| | BARRIER PERFORMANCER |
| | |
| | The NRC has been reviewing the qualification of Thermo-Lag-'330-1 fire barrier |
| | |
| | systems. The NRC previously issued two information notices on these fire |
| | |
| | barrier systems: (1)Information Notice'91-47, "Failure 6f Thermo-Lag Fire |
| | |
| | Barrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance Test," August 6, 1991, and (2) |
| | Information Notice 91-79, "Deficiencies in the Procedures for Installing |
| | |
| | Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials,' December 6, 1991. |
| | |
| | On February 12, 1992,'the NRC's Special Review Team for the review of Thermo' |
| | Lag fire barrier performance met with the'Nuclear Utilities Management and' |
| | Resources Council (NUMARC) to discuss the coordination of the industry's - |
| | response to Th'ermo-Lag fire endurance, installation, and-ampacity concerns. |
| | |
| | During the meeting, the staff provided NUMARC'a proposed draft generic letter |
| | |
| | on the Thermo-Lag fire barrier issue for review and comment. The draft- generic letter was included in-the-meeting minutes which were placed in the |
| | |
| | Public Document Room as an enclosure to a February 24, 1992, letter to NUMARC |
| | |
| | In a letter of March 3, 1992, NUMARC commented on the proposed draft generic |
| | |
| | 9206150492 PD R 5O g -\n' 3a |
| | |
| | IL |
| | |
| | r - , I |
| | |
| | IN 92-46 June 23, 1992 letter and committed to coordinate the industry's efforts associated with the |
| | |
| | issues involving Thermo-Lag. In addition, NUMARC requested that the NRC make |
| | |
| | available any additional. information on the qualification of these barriers. |
| | |
| | In response to this request, the NRC provided NUMARC the "Final Report- Special Review Team for the Review of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Performance," of |
| | |
| | April 21, 1992, (Attachment 1). The final report concluded that some |
| | |
| | licensees have not adequately reviewed and evaluated the fire endurance and |
| | |
| | ampacity test results for applicability to the Thermo-Lag fire barrier systems |
| | |
| | installed-in their facilities. In addition, the final report stated that some |
| | |
| | facilities have used inadequate installation procedures to construct Thermo- Lag fire barriers on electrical raceways and equipment. |
| | |
| | CURRENT THERMO-LAG 330-1 FIRE BARRIER ENVELOPE TESTING |
| | |
| | As a result of the concerns in Information Notices 91-47 and 91-79, TU |
| | |
| | instituted a fire endurance testing program to qualify the Thermo-Lag fire |
| | |
| | barrier protective system specifically for its Comanche Peak Steam Electric |
| | |
| | Station.' This testing was conducted during the weeks of June 15 and 22, 1992. |
| | |
| | The NRC witnessed the preparation of test specimens and the actual testing of |
| | |
| | the TU electric test articles. |
| | |
| | The tests consist of a series of 1-hour fire endurance tests on a variety of |
| | |
| | cable tray and conduit "mock-ups". The "mock-ups" were designed to duplicate |
| | |
| | actual plant configurations. TU installed the fire barriers using stock |
| | |
| | material and actual plant procedures and personnel. |
| | |
| | The first actual tests occurred on June 17,1i992. Three-quarter-inch, and |
| | |
| | one-inch and five-inch conduit configurations were tested. All tests passed |
| | |
| | American Nuclear Insurers criteria, in that electrical cable continuity was - |
| | not lost. However, several temperature readings were above specifications for |
| | |
| | the 3/4-inch and 1-inch conduit tests, and for a junction box that was common |
| | |
| | to all the conduits. Additionally, subsequent investigation of the cabling |
| | |
| | revealed evidence of charring and blistering. NRC standards require that the |
| | |
| | protected components be free of fire damage. |
| | |
| | Preliminary information from the second test of a 12-inch cable tray |
| | |
| | configuration on June 18, -1992, showed satisfactory results. Thermocouple |
| | |
| | temperatures on the protected cables were less than 325 'F. |
| | |
| | The third test was conducted on June 19, 1992. This article was a wide |
| | |
| | (30-inch) ladder back cable tray configuration. At 17 minutes into the test, the Thermo-Lag panel on the bottom of the test article began to sag and the |
| | |
| | stainless steel banding was carrying the load of the panel. At 18 minutes, the joint at the interface between the tray support and the tray showed signs |
| | |
| | of weakening and separation. Internal temperatures within areas of this cable |
| | |
| | tray assembly exceeded 325 'F at 25 minutes. The joint fully separated in |
| | |
| | 41 minutes resulting in cable circuit integrity failure and fire damage to the |
| | |
| | cables. |
| | |
| | . ,.. ., ., |
| | ;~~~ -, , I |
| | |
| | Attachment 1 |
| | _ , IN 92-46 June 23, 1992 c sUNITED STATES |
| | |
| | - |
| | |
| | * t of ¢NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| | |
| | - WASHINGTON. D. C. 2555 April 21, 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: William T. Russell, Assiciate Director |
| | |
| | for Inspection and Technical Assessment |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| | FROM: Thomas E. Murley, Director |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| | SUBJECT: FINAL REPORT - SPECIAL REVIEW TEAM FOR THE REVIEW OF |
| | |
| | THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER PERFORMANCE |
| | |
| | On February 12, 1992, the special review team for the review of Thermo-Lag |
| | |
| | fire barrier performance met with the Nuclear Utilities Management and |
| | |
| | Resources Council (NUMARC) to obtain a commitment for a coordinated industry |
| | |
| | response to our concerns. During the meeting, the team presented the results |
| | |
| | of its review and gave the attendees a proposed generic letter on Thermo-Lag |
| | |
| | fire barriers. |
| | |
| | By a letter of March 3, 1992; NUMARC committed to coordinate the industry's |
| | |
| | efforts and requested additional technical information. The review team's |
| | |
| | final technical report is enclosed for transmittal by your staff to NUMARC and |
| | |
| | the vendor. The report, which has been reviewed by your staff, documents the |
| | |
| | results of the team's review and provides the technical bases for its findings |
| | |
| | and recommendations. The report identifies the full scope of the concerns and |
| | |
| | will facilitate discussions between the staff and NUMARC needed to resolve |
| | |
| | their questions and proceed with the issuance of the proposed generic letter. |
| | |
| | The special review team is available to discuss its final report with you or |
| | |
| | your staff at your convenience. |
| | |
| | Thomas E.ector |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| | |
| | Enclosure: |
| | As stated |
| | |
| | cc w/enclosure: |
| | J. Sniezek |
| | |
| | '"- 92X05120277--920421 PDR REVGP ERONUMRC |
| | |
| | PDR |
| | |
| | I It , |
| | IN 92-46 June 23, 1992 TU has established roving fire watches for Unit 1, in accordance.-with its Fire |
| | |
| | Protection Manual. The roving fire watches cover plant areas where Thermo-Lag |
| | |
| | fire barrier configurations, similar to those'which failed, are used to |
| | |
| | provide a fire endurance barrier'for safe-shutdown equipment. |
| | |
| | TSI is also instituting a fire endurance testing program. This program |
| | |
| | includes testing a new installation technique required for cable trays |
| | |
| | installed with gap widths greater than 0.030 inches. The new seam joining |
| | |
| | technique requires that either (1):stainless steel tie wires be placed through |
| | |
| | the stress skin'at specified intervals or (2) stress skin and a layer of |
| | |
| | Thermo-Lag.trowel grade material be placed over the entire seam length and |
| | |
| | banded in place. Preliminary results of a June 9, 1992, test using the new |
| | |
| | seam joining technique (on seams without wide gaps) on a 36-inch cable tray |
| | |
| | system and a 3/4-inch conduit assembly were considered successful by the |
| | |
| | vendor and testing laboratory. |
| | |
| | The NRC will provide additional information on these fire endurance testing |
| | |
| | programs as it becomes available. |
| | |
| | ===AMPACITY DERATING CALCULATION ERROR=== |
| | In April 1992, the Washington Public Power Supply System, the licensee for |
| | |
| | Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 2,-found a mathematical error in the |
| | |
| | calculation of the ampacity derating factor for the Thermo-Lag fire barrier |
| | |
| | enclosure of cable trays in Industrial Testing Laboratories (ITL) Incorporated |
| | |
| | Test Report ITL-82-5-355C. The error occurred when ITL adjusted the test |
| | |
| | of 40 0C ambient and 90 0C cable. This |
| | |
| | current to baseline temperatures |
| | |
| | adjustment is required when tests are performed at different ambient and cable |
| | |
| | temperatures. ITL used the correct equation for adjusting to temperature |
| | |
| | parameters that differ from the Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA) |
| | publication P-46-426: I' = I X MF (where "I" is at 40 "C ambient and 90 "C |
| | |
| | cable temperature, and "I'"is at other ambient and cable temperature |
| | |
| | conditions). However, in calculating II," ITL multiplied WI'" by "MF" instead |
| | |
| | of dividing. The NRC determined that the ampacity derating factor will change |
| | |
| | from 18 to 33 percent when the mathematical error is corrected. While |
| | |
| | reviewing other ITL test reports, the NRC staff found similar errors in other |
| | |
| | calculations performed by ITL in the adjustment equation for ambient and cable |
| | |
| | temperature conditions. The NRC also noted that the baseline currents |
| | |
| | obtained from the test vary widely (up to 32 percent) from those published in |
| | |
| | the ICEA publication P-54-440. |
| | |
| | WU |
| | |
| | IN 92-46 June 23, 1992 This information notice requires nonspecific action or written response. If |
|
| |
|
| I Lr -, IIN 92-46June 23, 1992 letter and committed to coordinate the industry's efforts associated with theissues involving Thermo-Lag. In addition, NUMARC requested that the NRC makeavailable any additional. information on the qualification of these barriers.In response to this request, the NRC provided NUMARC the "Final Report-Special Review Team for the Review of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Performance," ofApril 21, 1992, (Attachment 1). The final report concluded that somelicensees have not adequately reviewed and evaluated the fire endurance andampacity test results for applicability to the Thermo-Lag fire barrier systemsinstalled-in their facilities. In addition, the final report stated that somefacilities have used inadequate installation procedures to construct Thermo-Lag fire barriers on electrical raceways and equipment.CURRENT THERMO-LAG 330-1 FIRE BARRIER ENVELOPE TESTINGAs a result of the concerns in Information Notices 91-47 and 91-79, TUinstituted a fire endurance testing program to qualify the Thermo-Lag firebarrier protective system specifically for its Comanche Peak Steam ElectricStation.' This testing was conducted during the weeks of June 15 and 22, 1992.The NRC witnessed the preparation of test specimens and the actual testing ofthe TU electric test articles.The tests consist of a series of 1-hour fire endurance tests on a variety ofcable tray and conduit "mock-ups". The "mock-ups" were designed to duplicateactual plant configurations. TU installed the fire barriers using stockmaterial and actual plant procedures and personnel.The first actual tests occurred on June 17,1i992. Three-quarter-inch, andone-inch and five-inch conduit configurations were tested. All tests passedAmerican Nuclear Insurers criteria, in that electrical cable continuity was -not lost. However, several temperature readings were above specifications forthe 3/4-inch and 1-inch conduit tests, and for a junction box that was commonto all the conduits. Additionally, subsequent investigation of the cablingrevealed evidence of charring and blistering. NRC standards require that theprotected components be free of fire damage.Preliminary information from the second test of a 12-inch cable trayconfiguration on June 18, -1992, showed satisfactory results. Thermocoupletemperatures on the protected cables were less than 325 'F.The third test was conducted on June 19, 1992. This article was a wide(30-inch) ladder back cable tray configuration. At 17 minutes into the test,the Thermo-Lag panel on the bottom of the test article began to sag and thestainless steel banding was carrying the load of the panel. At 18 minutes,the joint at the interface between the tray support and the tray showed signsof weakening and separation. Internal temperatures within areas of this cabletray assembly exceeded 325 'F at 25 minutes. The joint fully separated in41 minutes resulting in cable circuit integrity failure and fire damage to thecables..,.. ., .,;~~~ -, , I
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact |
|
| |
|
| Attachment 1_ , IN 92-46June 23, 1992c sUNITED STATES* of -t ¢NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-WASHINGTON. D. C. 2555April 21, 1992MEMORANDUM FOR: William T. Russell, Assiciate Directorfor Inspection and Technical AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationFROM: Thomas E. Murley, DirectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationSUBJECT: FINAL REPORT -SPECIAL REVIEW TEAM FOR THE REVIEW OFTHERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER PERFORMANCEOn February 12, 1992, the special review team for the review of Thermo-Lagfire barrier performance met with the Nuclear Utilities Management andResources Council (NUMARC) to obtain a commitment for a coordinated industryresponse to our concerns. During the meeting, the team presented the resultsof its review and gave the attendees a proposed generic letter on Thermo-Lagfire barriers.By a letter of March 3, 1992; NUMARC committed to coordinate the industry'sefforts and requested additional technical information. The review team'sfinal technical report is enclosed for transmittal by your staff to NUMARC andthe vendor. The report, which has been reviewed by your staff, documents theresults of the team's review and provides the technical bases for its findingsand recommendations. The report identifies the full scope of the concerns andwill facilitate discussions between the staff and NUMARC needed to resolvetheir questions and proceed with the issuance of the proposed generic letter.The special review team is available to discuss its final report with you oryour staff at your convenience.Thomas E.ectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationEnclosure:As statedcc w/enclosure:J. Sniezek'"- 92X05120277--920421PDR REVGP ERONUMRCPDR
| | one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of |
|
| |
|
| IN 92-46June 23, 1992 TU has established roving fire watches for Unit 1, in accordance.-with its FireProtection Manual. The roving fire watches cover plant areas where Thermo-Lagfire barrier configurations, similar to those'which failed, are used toprovide a fire endurance barrier'for safe-shutdown equipment.TSI is also instituting a fire endurance testing program. This programincludes testing a new installation technique required for cable traysinstalled with gap widths greater than 0.030 inches. The new seam joiningtechnique requires that either (1):stainless steel tie wires be placed throughthe stress skin'at specified intervals or (2) stress skin and a layer ofThermo-Lag.trowel grade material be placed over the entire seam length andbanded in place. Preliminary results of a June 9, 1992, test using the newseam joining technique (on seams without wide gaps) on a 36-inch cable traysystem and a 3/4-inch conduit assembly were considered successful by thevendor and testing laboratory.The NRC will provide additional information on these fire endurance testingprograms as it becomes available.AMPACITY DERATING CALCULATION ERRORIn April 1992, the Washington Public Power Supply System, the licensee forWashington Nuclear Project, Unit 2,-found a mathematical error in thecalculation of the ampacity derating factor for the Thermo-Lag fire barrierenclosure of cable trays in Industrial Testing Laboratories (ITL) IncorporatedTest Report ITL-82-5-355C. The error occurred when ITL adjusted the testcurrent to baseline temperatures of 40 0C ambient and 90 0C cable. Thisadjustment is required when tests are performed at different ambient and cabletemperatures. ITL used the correct equation for adjusting to temperatureparameters that differ from the Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA)publication P-46-426: I' = I X MF (where "I" is at 40 "C ambient and 90 "Ccable temperature, and "I'" is at other ambient and cable temperatureconditions). However, in calculating II," ITL multiplied WI'" by "MF" insteadof dividing. The NRC determined that the ampacity derating factor will changefrom 18 to 33 percent when the mathematical error is corrected. Whilereviewing other ITL test reports, the NRC staff found similar errors in othercalculations performed by ITL in the adjustment equation for ambient and cabletemperature conditions. The NRC also noted that the baseline currentsobtained from the test vary widely (up to 32 percent) from those published inthe ICEA publication P-54-440.I It ,
| | Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. |
| WUIN 92-46June 23, 1992 This information notice requires nonspecific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.i.CCar es E. Rossi, Direct oDivision of Operational Events Assessment-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation'.Technical contacts: Ralph Architzel, NRR(301) 504-2804Patrick Madden, NRR(301) 504-2854Attachments: S e PI j loC o1. "Final Report -Special Review Team for the Review of Thermo-Lag FireBarrier Performance," April'21, 19922. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
| |
|
| |
|
| }} | | i.C |
| | |
| | Car es E. Rossi, Direct o |
| | |
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation'. |
| | |
| | Technical contacts: Ralph Architzel, NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 504-2804 Patrick Madden, NRR |
| | |
| | (301) 504-2854 Attachments: S e PIj loCo |
| | |
| | 1. "Final Report - Special Review Team for the Review of Thermo-Lag Fire |
| | |
| | Barrier Performance," April'21, 1992 |
| | 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Thermo-Lag Barrier Material Special Review Team Final Report Finding, Current Fire Endurance Tests, and Ampacity Calculation ErrorsML031200204 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
---|
Issue date: |
06/23/1992 |
---|
From: |
Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-92-046, NUDOCS 9206150492 |
Download: ML031200204 (5) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
---|
Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2020-02, Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges2020-09-15015 September 2020 Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges ML20225A0322020-09-0303 September 2020 NRC Choice Letter to NAC International with Attached Safety Inspection Report, IR 0721015/2020201, February 24-27, 2020 and July 22, 2020, Inspection of NAC International in Norcross, Georgia Information Notice 2012-09, PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs.2019-11-30030 November 2019 PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs. Information Notice 2011-20, NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011)2019-07-24024 July 2019 NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011) ML19196A2452019-07-15015 July 2019 Public Notice - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Exigent Amendment to Facility Operating License Information Notice 2019-01, Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations2019-03-12012 March 2019 Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations ML16028A3082016-04-27027 April 2016 NRC Information Notice; IN 2016-05: Operating Experience Regarding Complications From a Loss of Instrumentation Air Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2013-20, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-20, Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-11, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2013-11, Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
'p -
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 23,-1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-46: THERMO-LAG'FIRE BARRIER MATERIAL SPECIAL
REVIEW TEAM .FINAL REPORT FINDINGS, CURRENT
-FIRE ENDURANCE TESTS, AND AMPACITY
CALCULATION ERRORS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permi~sfor'nuclear power
reactors. _ _
PurDose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is-issuing this information
notice to inform addressees of (1)-the findings of the NRC's Thermo-Lag
Special Review Team, (2)current Thermo-Lag 330 fire resistance testing being
conducted by Texas Utilities (TU) and Thermal Science; Inc. (TSI),--and (3)
errors found in the calculation of cable ampacity derating factors for Thermo- Lag fire resistive barriers. It is expected that recipients ,will review the
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions', as- appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in -
this information notice are not-NRC requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Discussion
FINAL REPORT BY THE SPECIAL REVIEW TEAM FOR THE REVIEW OF THERMO-LAG FIRE
BARRIER PERFORMANCER
The NRC has been reviewing the qualification of Thermo-Lag-'330-1 fire barrier
systems. The NRC previously issued two information notices on these fire
barrier systems: (1)Information Notice'91-47, "Failure 6f Thermo-Lag Fire
Barrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance Test," August 6, 1991, and (2)
Information Notice 91-79, "Deficiencies in the Procedures for Installing
Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials,' December 6, 1991.
On February 12, 1992,'the NRC's Special Review Team for the review of Thermo'
Lag fire barrier performance met with the'Nuclear Utilities Management and'
Resources Council (NUMARC) to discuss the coordination of the industry's -
response to Th'ermo-Lag fire endurance, installation, and-ampacity concerns.
During the meeting, the staff provided NUMARC'a proposed draft generic letter
on the Thermo-Lag fire barrier issue for review and comment. The draft- generic letter was included in-the-meeting minutes which were placed in the
Public Document Room as an enclosure to a February 24, 1992, letter to NUMARC
In a letter of March 3, 1992, NUMARC commented on the proposed draft generic
9206150492 PD R 5O g -\n' 3a
IL
r - , I
IN 92-46 June 23, 1992 letter and committed to coordinate the industry's efforts associated with the
issues involving Thermo-Lag. In addition, NUMARC requested that the NRC make
available any additional. information on the qualification of these barriers.
In response to this request, the NRC provided NUMARC the "Final Report- Special Review Team for the Review of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Performance," of
April 21, 1992, (Attachment 1). The final report concluded that some
licensees have not adequately reviewed and evaluated the fire endurance and
ampacity test results for applicability to the Thermo-Lag fire barrier systems
installed-in their facilities. In addition, the final report stated that some
facilities have used inadequate installation procedures to construct Thermo- Lag fire barriers on electrical raceways and equipment.
CURRENT THERMO-LAG 330-1 FIRE BARRIER ENVELOPE TESTING
As a result of the concerns in Information Notices 91-47 and 91-79, TU
instituted a fire endurance testing program to qualify the Thermo-Lag fire
barrier protective system specifically for its Comanche Peak Steam Electric
Station.' This testing was conducted during the weeks of June 15 and 22, 1992.
The NRC witnessed the preparation of test specimens and the actual testing of
the TU electric test articles.
The tests consist of a series of 1-hour fire endurance tests on a variety of
cable tray and conduit "mock-ups". The "mock-ups" were designed to duplicate
actual plant configurations. TU installed the fire barriers using stock
material and actual plant procedures and personnel.
The first actual tests occurred on June 17,1i992. Three-quarter-inch, and
one-inch and five-inch conduit configurations were tested. All tests passed
American Nuclear Insurers criteria, in that electrical cable continuity was -
not lost. However, several temperature readings were above specifications for
the 3/4-inch and 1-inch conduit tests, and for a junction box that was common
to all the conduits. Additionally, subsequent investigation of the cabling
revealed evidence of charring and blistering. NRC standards require that the
protected components be free of fire damage.
Preliminary information from the second test of a 12-inch cable tray
configuration on June 18, -1992, showed satisfactory results. Thermocouple
temperatures on the protected cables were less than 325 'F.
The third test was conducted on June 19, 1992. This article was a wide
(30-inch) ladder back cable tray configuration. At 17 minutes into the test, the Thermo-Lag panel on the bottom of the test article began to sag and the
stainless steel banding was carrying the load of the panel. At 18 minutes, the joint at the interface between the tray support and the tray showed signs
of weakening and separation. Internal temperatures within areas of this cable
tray assembly exceeded 325 'F at 25 minutes. The joint fully separated in
41 minutes resulting in cable circuit integrity failure and fire damage to the
cables.
. ,.. ., .,
- ~~~ -, , I
Attachment 1
_ , IN 92-46 June 23, 1992 c sUNITED STATES
-
- t of ¢NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- WASHINGTON. D. C. 2555 April 21, 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: William T. Russell, Assiciate Director
for Inspection and Technical Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
FROM: Thomas E. Murley, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT: FINAL REPORT - SPECIAL REVIEW TEAM FOR THE REVIEW OF
THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER PERFORMANCE
On February 12, 1992, the special review team for the review of Thermo-Lag
fire barrier performance met with the Nuclear Utilities Management and
Resources Council (NUMARC) to obtain a commitment for a coordinated industry
response to our concerns. During the meeting, the team presented the results
of its review and gave the attendees a proposed generic letter on Thermo-Lag
fire barriers.
By a letter of March 3, 1992; NUMARC committed to coordinate the industry's
efforts and requested additional technical information. The review team's
final technical report is enclosed for transmittal by your staff to NUMARC and
the vendor. The report, which has been reviewed by your staff, documents the
results of the team's review and provides the technical bases for its findings
and recommendations. The report identifies the full scope of the concerns and
will facilitate discussions between the staff and NUMARC needed to resolve
their questions and proceed with the issuance of the proposed generic letter.
The special review team is available to discuss its final report with you or
your staff at your convenience.
Thomas E.ector
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated
cc w/enclosure:
J. Sniezek
'"- 92X05120277--920421 PDR REVGP ERONUMRC
PDR
I It ,
IN 92-46 June 23, 1992 TU has established roving fire watches for Unit 1, in accordance.-with its Fire
Protection Manual. The roving fire watches cover plant areas where Thermo-Lag
fire barrier configurations, similar to those'which failed, are used to
provide a fire endurance barrier'for safe-shutdown equipment.
TSI is also instituting a fire endurance testing program. This program
includes testing a new installation technique required for cable trays
installed with gap widths greater than 0.030 inches. The new seam joining
technique requires that either (1):stainless steel tie wires be placed through
the stress skin'at specified intervals or (2) stress skin and a layer of
Thermo-Lag.trowel grade material be placed over the entire seam length and
banded in place. Preliminary results of a June 9, 1992, test using the new
seam joining technique (on seams without wide gaps) on a 36-inch cable tray
system and a 3/4-inch conduit assembly were considered successful by the
vendor and testing laboratory.
The NRC will provide additional information on these fire endurance testing
programs as it becomes available.
AMPACITY DERATING CALCULATION ERROR
In April 1992, the Washington Public Power Supply System, the licensee for
Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 2,-found a mathematical error in the
calculation of the ampacity derating factor for the Thermo-Lag fire barrier
enclosure of cable trays in Industrial Testing Laboratories (ITL) Incorporated
Test Report ITL-82-5-355C. The error occurred when ITL adjusted the test
of 40 0C ambient and 90 0C cable. This
current to baseline temperatures
adjustment is required when tests are performed at different ambient and cable
temperatures. ITL used the correct equation for adjusting to temperature
parameters that differ from the Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA)
publication P-46-426: I' = I X MF (where "I" is at 40 "C ambient and 90 "C
cable temperature, and "I'"is at other ambient and cable temperature
conditions). However, in calculating II," ITL multiplied WI'" by "MF" instead
of dividing. The NRC determined that the ampacity derating factor will change
from 18 to 33 percent when the mathematical error is corrected. While
reviewing other ITL test reports, the NRC staff found similar errors in other
calculations performed by ITL in the adjustment equation for ambient and cable
temperature conditions. The NRC also noted that the baseline currents
obtained from the test vary widely (up to 32 percent) from those published in
the ICEA publication P-54-440.
WU
IN 92-46 June 23, 1992 This information notice requires nonspecific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
i.C
Car es E. Rossi, Direct o
Division of Operational Events Assessment- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation'.
Technical contacts: Ralph Architzel, NRR
(301) 504-2804 Patrick Madden, NRR
(301) 504-2854 Attachments: S e PIj loCo
1. "Final Report - Special Review Team for the Review of Thermo-Lag Fire
Barrier Performance," April'21, 1992
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
|
---|
|
list | - Information Notice 1992-01, Cable Damage Caused by Inadequate Cable Installation Procedures and Controls (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-02, Relap5/MOD3 Computer Code Error Associated with the Conservation of Energy Equation (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-02, Relap5/Mod3 Computer Code Error Associated with the Conservation of Energy Equation (3 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-03, Remote Trip Function Failures in General Electric F-Frame Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (6 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-04, Potter and Brumfield Model Mdr Rotary Relay Failures (6 January 1992, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1992-04, Potter and Brumfield Model MDR Rotary Relay Failures (6 January 1992, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in Abs RXMH2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in Abs Rxmh2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-05, Potential Coil Insulations Breakdown in ABS RXMH2 Relays (8 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-06, Reliability of ATWS Mitigation System and Other NRC Required Equipment Not Controlled by Plant Technical Specifications (15 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-06, Reliability of ATWS Mitigation System and Other NRC Required Equipment not Controlled by Plant Technical Specifications (15 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-07, Rapid Flow-induced Erosion/Corrosion of Feedwater Piping (9 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-08, Revised Protective Action Guidance for Nuclear Incidents (23 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-09, Overloading and Subsequent Lock Out of Electrical Buses During Accident Conditions (30 January 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-10, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Iridium-192 Wire Used in Endobronchial Treatments (31 January 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-10, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Iridium-192 Wire used in Endobronchial Treatments (31 January 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-11, Soil and Water Contamination at Fuel Cycle Facilities (5 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-12, Effects of Cable Leakage Currents on Instrument Settings and Indications (10 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-13, Inadequate Control Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plant Sites (18 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-14, Uranium Oxide Fires at Fuel Cycle Facilities (21 February 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-15, Failure of Primary Systems Compression Fitting (24 February 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-16, Loss of Flow from the Residual Heat Removal Pump During Refueling Cavity Draindown (25 February 1992, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level, Temporary Modification, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-17, NRC Inspections of Programs Being Developed at Nuclear Power Plants in Response to Generic Letter 89-10 (26 February 1992, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1992-18, Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire (28 February 1992, Topic: Hot Short, Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1992-19, Misapplication of Potter and Brumfield Mdr Rotary Relays (2 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-19, Misapplication of Potter and Brumfield MDR Rotary Relays (2 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-20, Inadequate Local Leak Rate Testing (3 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-21, Spent Fuel Pool Reactivity Calculations (24 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-23, Results of Validation Testing of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment (27 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-24, Distributor Modification to Certain Commercial-Grade Agastat Electrical Relays (30 March 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-25, Pressure Locking of Motor-Operated Flexible Wedge Gate Valves (2 April 1992, Topic: Stroke time, Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1992-27, Thermally Induced Accelerated Aging and Failure of ITE/Gould A.C. Relays used in Safety-Related Applications (3 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-27, Thermally Induced Accelerated Aging and Failure of Ite/Gould A.C. Relays Used in Safety-Related Applications (3 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-28, Inadequate Fire Suppression System Testing (8 April 1992, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1992-29, Potential Breaker Miscoordination Caused by Instantaneous Trip Circuitry (17 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-30, Falsification of Plant Records (23 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-31, Electrical Connection Problem in Johnson Yokogawa Corporation YS-80 Programmable Indicating Controllers (27 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-32, Problems Identified with Emergency Ventilation Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical Support Centers (29 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-32, Problems Identified with Emergency Ventilation Systems for Near-Site (within 10 Miles) Emergency Operations Facilities and Technical Support Centers (29 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-33, Increased Instrument Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices Are Installed (30 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-33, Increased Instrument Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed (30 April 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-34, New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-35, Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-35, Higher than Predicted Erosion/Corrosion in Unisolable Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping inside Containment at a Boiling Water Reactor (6 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-36, Intersystem LOCA Outside Containment (7 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-37, Implementation of the Deliberate Misconduct Rule (8 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-38, Implementation Date for the Revision to the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (26 May 1992, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1992-39, Unplanned Return to Criticality During Reactor Shutdown (13 May 1992, Topic: Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1992-40, Inadequate Testing of Emergency Bus Undervoltage Logic Circuitry (27 May 1992)
- Information Notice 1992-41, Consideration of Stem Rejection Load In Calculation of Required Valve Thrust (29 May 1992, Topic: Anchor Darling)
... further results |
---|