ML19150A317

SMR DC RAI - Request for Additional Information No. 522 Erai No. 9681 (14)

ML19150A317
Person / Time
Site:	NuScale
Issue date:	05/30/2019
From:	NRC
To:	NRC/NRO/DLSE/LB1
References
Download: ML19150A317 (56)

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NuScaleDCRaisPEm Resource From: Cranston, Gregory Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2019 9:25 AM To: Request for Additional Information Cc: Lee, Samuel; Chowdhury, Prosanta; NuScaleDCRaisPEm Resource; Santos, Cayetano

Subject:

Request for Additional Information No. 522 eRAI No. 9681 (14)

Attachments: RAI 9681 Attachments only Rev2.pdf; Request for Additional Information No. 522 (eRAI No. 9681).pdf This supersedes the recall of 5/21/19.

Attached please find NRC staffs request for additional information (RAI) concerning review of the NuScale Design Certification Application and an attachment regarding Chapter 1.

Please submit your technically correct and complete response by July 15, 2019, to the RAI to the NRC Document Control Desk.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Thank you.

1

Hearing Identifier: NuScale_SMR_DC_RAI_Public Email Number: 572 Mail Envelope Properties (SN6PR09MB28968DE9E3B409222E286AE590180)

Subject:

Request for Additional Information No. 522 eRAI No. 9681 (14)

Sent Date: 5/30/2019 9:24:58 AM Received Date: 5/30/2019 9:25:08 AM From: Cranston, Gregory Created By: Gregory.Cranston@nrc.gov Recipients:

"Lee, Samuel" <Samuel.Lee@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Chowdhury, Prosanta" <Prosanta.Chowdhury@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "NuScaleDCRaisPEm Resource" <NuScaleDCRaisPEm.Resource@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Santos, Cayetano" <Cayetano.Santos@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Request for Additional Information" <RAI@nuscalepower.com>

Tracking Status: None Post Office: SN6PR09MB2896.namprd09.prod.outlook.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 442 5/30/2019 9:25:08 AM RAI 9681 Attachments only Rev2.pdf 556594 Request for Additional Information No. 522 (eRAI No. 9681).pdf 107525 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:

Recipients Received:

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.0 Introduction This document presents the Tier 1 information developed for the NuScale, LLC Power Plant.

The Tier 1 information is the information that is to be certified through rulemaking and includes the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria required by 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1).

Tier 1 includes the following information:

• definitions

• general provisions

• design descriptions

• Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

• site parameters

• interface requirements The information presented in Tier 1 is consistent with the information presented in Tier 2.

A graded approach is employed relative to the level of design information presented in Tier 1, i.e., the amount of design information presented is proportional to the safety significance of the structures, systems, and components being addressed.

NuScale Tier 1 Definitions 1.1 Definitions The definitions below apply to terms that may be used in the design descriptions and associated Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC).

Acceptance Criteria refers to the performance, physical condition, or analysis result for structures, systems, and components (SSC), or program that demonstrates that the design commitment is met.

Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or engineering or technical evaluation. Engineering or technical evaluations could include, but are not limited to, comparisons with operating experience or design of similar SSC.

Approved design means the design as described in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), including any changes to the final safety analysis report (FSAR) since submission to the NRC of the last update of the FSAR.

As-built means the physical properties of an SSC following the completion of its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site. In cases where it is technically justifiable, determination of physical properties of the as-built SSC may be based on measurements, inspections, or tests that occur prior to installation, provided that subsequent fabrication, handling, installation, and testing do not alter the properties.

ASME Code meansSection III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, as incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a with specific conditions or in accordance with relief granted or alternatives authorized by the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55aendorsed in 10 CFR 50.55a, unless a different section of the ASME Code is specifically referenced.

ASME Code Data Report means a document that certifies that a component or system is constructed in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code. This data is recorded on a form approved by the ASME.

Common or Shared ITAAC means ITAAC that are associated with common or shared SSC and activities that support multiple NPMs. This includes (1) SSC that are common or shared by multiple NPMs, and for which the interface and functional performance requirements between the common or shared SSC and each NPM are identical, or (2) analyses or other generic design and qualification activities that are identical for each NPM (e.g., environmental qualification of equipment). For a multi-module plant, satisfactory completion of a common or shared ITAAC for the lead NPM shall constitute satisfactory completion of the common or shared ITAAC for associated NPMs.

Component, as used for reference to ASME Code components, means a vessel, concrete containment, pump, pressure relief valve, line valve, storage tank, piping system, or core support structure that is designed, constructed, and stamped in accordance with the rules of the ASME Code. ASME Code Section III classifies a metal containment as a vessel.

Design Commitment means that portion of the design description that is verified by ITAAC.

Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified. Design descriptions Tier 1 1.1-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Definitions consist of a system description, system description tables, system description figures, and design commitments. System description tables and system description figures are only used when appropriate. The system description is not verified by ITAAC; only the design commitments are verified by ITAAC. System description tables and system description figures are only verified by ITAAC if they are referenced in the ITAAC table.

Inspect or Inspection means visual observations, physical examinations, or reviews of records based on visual observation or physical examination that compare (a) the SSC condition to one or more design commitments or (b) the program implementation elements to one or more program commitments, as applicable. Examples include walkdowns, configuration checks, measurements of dimensions, or nondestructive examinations. The terms, inspect and inspection, also apply to the review of Emergency Planning ITAAC requirements to determine whether ITAAC are met.

Tier 1 1.1-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Definitions ITAAC are those Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria identified in the combined license that if met by the licensee are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility has been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the license, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and the Commission's rules and regulations.

Module-Specific ITAAC means ITAAC that are associated with SSC that are specific to and support operation of a single, individual NuScale Power Module. Module-specific ITAAC shall be satisfactorily completed for each NuScale Power Module.

NuScale Power Module (NPM) is a collection of systems, sub-systems, and components that together constitute a modularized, movable, nuclear steam supply system. The NPM is composed of a reactor core, a pressurizer, and two steam generators integrated within a reactor pressure vessel and housed in a compact steel containment vessel.

Reconciliation or Reconciled means the identification, assessment, and disposition of differences between a design feature as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) an approved design feature and an as-built plant design feature. For ASME Code piping systems, it is the reconciliation of differences between the design feature as described in the UFSAR approved design and the as-built piping system. For structural features, it is the reconciliation of differences between the design as described in the UFSAR approved design and the as-built structural feature.

Report, as used in the ITAAC table Acceptance Criteria column, means a document that verifies that the acceptance criteria of the subject ITAAC have been met and references the supporting documentation. The report may be a simple form that consolidates all of the necessary information related to the closure package for supporting successful completion of the ITAAC.

Common or Shared ITAAC means ITAAC that are associated with common or shared SSC and activities that support multiple NPMs. This includes (1) SSC that are common or shared by multiple NPMs, and for which the interface and functional performance requirements between the common or shared SSC and each NPM are identical, or (2) analyses or other generic design and qualification activities that are identical for each NPM (e.g., environmental qualification of equipment). For a multi-module plant, satisfactory completion of a common or shared ITAAC for the lead NPM shall constitute satisfactory completion of the common or shared ITAAC for associated NPMs.

Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) Ground Motion is the site-specific vibratory ground motion for which safety-related SSC are designed to remain functional. The SSE for a site is a smoothed spectra developed to envelop the ground motion response spectra. The SSE is characterized at the free ground surface. A combined license (COL) applicant may use the SSE for design of site-specific SSC.

System Description (Tier 1) includes

• a concise description of the system's or structure's safety-related functions, nonsafety-related functions that support safety-related functions, and certain nonsafety risk-significant functions.

• a listing of components required to perform those functions.

• identification of the system safety classification.

Tier 1 1.1-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Definitions

• the system components general locations.

The system description may include system description tables and figures.

Tier 1 1.1-4 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 Definitions Test means actuation or operation, or establishment of specified conditions, to evaluate the performance or integrity of as-built SSC, unless explicitly stated otherwise, to determine whether ITAAC are met.

Tier 1 means the portion of the design-related information contained in the generic Design Control Document that is approved and certified by the design certification rule (Tier 1). The design descriptions, interface requirements, and site parameters are derived from Tier 2 information. Tier 1 includes:

• definitions and general provisions

• design descriptions

• ITAAC

• significant site parameters

• significant interface requirements Type Test means a test on one or more sample components of the same type and manufacturer to qualify other components of the same type and manufacturer. A type test is not necessarily a test of an as-built SSC.

Top-Level Design Features means the principal performance characteristics and physical attributes that are important to performing the safety-related and certain nonsafety-related functions of the plant.

Type Test means a test on one or more sample components of the same type and manufacturer to qualify other components of the same type and manufacturer. A type test is not necessarily a test of an as-built SSC.

Module-Specific ITAAC means ITAAC that are associated with SSC that are specific to and support operation of a single, individual NuScale Power Module. Module-specific ITAAC shall be satisfactorily completed for each NuScale Power Module.

Tier 1 1.1-5 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 General Provisions 1.2 General Provisions 1.2.1 Design Descriptions Design descriptions pertain only to the structures, systems, and components (SSC) of the standard design and not to their operation and maintenance after fuel load. In the event of an inconsistency between the design descriptions and the Tier 2 information, the design descriptions in Tier 1 shall govern.

Design descriptions consist of system descriptions, system description tables, system description figures, and design commitments. System description tables and system description figures are only used when appropriate. The system description provides a concise description of the top-level design features and performance characteristics of the SSC system functions, safety classification, and general location. The system description only describes those portions of the system or structure that are important to the top-level design features and performance characteristics of the system or structure. Design commitments are provided in numbered paragraphs that are used to develop the Design Commitment column in the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) table. These commitments address top-level design features and performance characteristics such as:

• seismic classification

• American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code classification

• Class 1E SSC

• equipment to be qualified for harsh environments

• instrumentation and controls equipment to be qualified for other than harsh environments The absence of discussion or depiction of SSC in the design description shall not be construed as prohibiting a licensee from using such SSC, unless it would prevent SSC from performing a top-level design feature or performance characteristic, or impairing the performance of those functions, as discussed or depicted in the design description.

When the term operate, operates, or operation is used with respect to equipment discussed in the acceptance criteria, it refers to the actuation or control of the equipment.

1.2.2 Interpretation of System Description Tables Cells with no values in system description tables contain an N/A to denote that the cell is not applicable.

1.2.3 Interpretation of System Description Figures Figures are provided for some systems or structures with the amount of information depicted based on their safety significance. These figures may represent a functional diagram, general structural representation, or other general illustration. Unless specified, these figures are not indicative of the scale, location, dimensions, shape, or spatial relationships of as-built SSC. In particular, the as-built attributes of SSC may vary from the Tier 1 1.2-1 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 General Provisions attributes depicted on these figures, provided that the top-level design features discussed in the design description pertaining to the figure are not adversely affected. Valve position indications shown on system description figures do not represent a specific operational state.

The figure legends in Tier 2 Section 1.7 are used to interpret Tier 1 system description figures.

1.2.4 Implementation of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design commitments and, inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria are provided in ITAAC tables with the following format:

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Each commitment in the Design Commitment column of the ITAAC tables has one or more associated requirements for inspections, tests or analyses specified in the Inspections, Tests, Analyses column. Each inspection, test or analysis has an associated acceptance criterion in the third column of the ITAAC tables that demonstrate that the Design Commitment in the first column has been met.

Inspections, tests, or analyses may be performed by the licensee or by its authorized vendors, contractors, or consultants.

Inspections, tests, or analyses may be

• performed by more than a single individual or group.

• implemented through discrete activities separated by time.

• performed at any time prior to fuel load, including before issuance of the combined license for those ITAAC that do not require as-built equipment.

• performed at a location other than the construction site.

Additionally, inspections, tests, or analyses may be performed as part of other activities such as construction inspections and preoperational testing. Therefore, inspections, tests, or analyses need not be performed as a separate or discrete activity.

If an acceptance criteria does not specify the temperature, pressure, or other conditions under which an inspection or test must be performed, then the inspection or test conditions are not constrained.

Many of the Acceptance Criteria state that a report or analysis exists and concludes that When these words are used, it indicates that the ITAAC for that Design Commitment will be met when it is confirmed that appropriate documentation exists and the documentation shows that the Design Commitment is met.

For the acceptance criteria, appropriate documentation may be a single document or a collection of documents that show that the stated acceptance criteria are met. Examples of appropriate documentation include:

• design reports Tier 1 1.2-2 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 General Provisions

• test reports

• inspection reports

• analysis reports

• evaluation reports Tier 1 1.2-3 Revision 2

NuScale Tier 1 General Provisions

• design and manufacturing procedures

• certified data sheets

• commercial grade dedication procedures and records

• quality assurance records

• calculation notes

• equipment qualification data packages Conversion or extrapolation of test results from the test conditions to the design conditions may be necessary to satisfy an ITAAC. Suitable justification should be provided for , and applicability of, any necessary conversions or extrapolations of test results necessary to satisfy an ITAAC.

1.2.5 Acronyms and Abbreviations The acronyms and abbreviations contained in Tier 2 Table 1.1-1 are applicable to Tier 1.

Tier 1 1.2-4 Revision 2

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The NuScale Power Module The ASME Code Section III Design Reports (NCA-3550)

NuScale ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 An inspection will be performed of the exist and conclude that the NuScale Power Module ASME Table Power piping systems listed in Table NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1, 1 Code Class 1, 2 and 3 as- built piping systems listed in 2.1-4 Module 2.1-1 comply with ASME 2 and 3 as-built piping system Design Table 2.1-1 meet the requirements of ASME Code Section ITAAC Code Section III Reports required by ASME Code Section III.

III.

requirements.

The NuScale Power Module NuScale An inspection will be performed of the ASME Code Section III Data Reports for the NuScale Power ASME Code Class 1, 2, and Table Power NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1, Module ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components listed in 2 3 components conform to the 2.1-4 Module 2, and 3 as-built component Data Reports Table 2.1-2 and interconnecting piping exist and conclude rules of construction of ASME ITAAC required by ASME Code Section III. that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

Code Section III.

The NuScale Power Module NuScale An inspection will be performed of the ASME Code Section III Data Reports for the NuScale Power ASME Code Class CS Table Power NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class Module ASME Code Class CS components listed in Table 3 components conform to the 2.1-4 Module CS as-built component Data Reports 2.1-2 exist and conclude that the requirements of ASME rules of construction of ASME ITAAC required by ASME Code Section III. Code Section III are met.

Code Section III.

Safety-related SSC are Protective features are installed in accordance with the as-protected against the NuScale An inspection and analysis will be performed built Pipe Break Hazard Analysis Report and safety-related dynamic and environmental Table Power of the as-built high- and moderate-energy SSC are protected against or qualified to withstand the 4 effects associated with 2.1-4 Module piping systems and protective features for the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high-ITAAC safety-related SSC. postulated failures in high- and moderate-energy piping and moderate-energy piping systems.

systems.

The NuScale Power Module NuScale The as-built LBB analysis for the ASME Code Class 2 ASME Code Class 2 piping An analysis will be performed of the ASME Table Power piping systems listed in Table 2.1-1 and interconnected 5 systems and interconnected Code Class 2 as-built piping systems and 2.1-4 Module equipment nozzles is bounded by the as-designed LBB equipment nozzles are interconnected equipment nozzles.

ITAAC analysis.

evaluated for LBB.

NuScale The RPV beltline material A vendor test will be performed of the Charpy An ASME Code Certified Material Test Report exists and Table Power 6 has a Charpy upper-shelf V-Notch specimen of the RPV beltline concludes that the initial RPV beltline material Charpy 2.1-4 Module energy of 75 ft-lb minimum. material. upper-shelf energy is 75 ft-lb minimum.

ITAAC The CNV serves as an NuScale The leakage rate for local leak rate tests (Type B and Type essentially leak- tight barrier A leakage test will be performed of the Table Power C) for pressure containing or leakage-limiting boundaries 7 against the uncontrolled pressure containing or leakage- limiting 2.1-4 Module and CIVs meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, release of radioactivity to the boundaries, and CIVs.

ITAAC Appendix J.

environment.

1

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title NuScale Containment isolation valve Each CIV listed in Table 2.1-3 travels from the full open to Table Power A test will be performed of the automatic 8 closure times limit potential full closed position in less than or equal to the time listed in 2.1-4 Module CIVs.

releases of radioactivity. Table 2.1-3 after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

ITAAC The length of piping shall be NuScale The length of piping between each containment penetration minimized between the An inspection will be performed of the as-built Table Power and its associated outboard CIV is less than or equal to the 9 containment penetration and piping between containment penetrations and 2.1-4 Module length identified in the associated outboard associated outboard CIVs.

ITAAC Table 2.1-1.

CIVs.

i. An electrical rating report exists that defines and

i. An analysis will be performed of the identifies the required design electrical rating to power the CNTS as-designed containment electrical design loads of each CNTS containment electrical NuScale The CNTS containment penetration assemblies.

penetration assembly listed in Table 2.1-3.

Table Power electrical penetration 10 2.1-4 Module assemblies are sized to ii. The electrical rating of each CNTS containment ITAAC power their design loads. ii. An inspection will be performed of CNTS electrical penetration assembly listed in Table 2.1-3 is as-built containment electrical penetration greater than or equal to the required design electrical rating assembly.

as specified in the electrical rating report.

Physical separation exists

i. Physical separation between redundant divisions of between the redundant MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying divisions of the MPS Class circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by 1E instrumentation and barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot control current-carrying be maintained), or by a combination of separation distance circuits, and between Class NuScale and barriers.

1E instrumentation and An inspection will be performed of the MPS Table Power 11 control current-carrying Class 1E as-built instrumentation and control 2.1-4 Module ii. Physical separation between MPS Class 1E circuits and non-Class 1E current-carrying circuits.

ITAAC instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and instrumentation and current-non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying carrying circuits. The scope circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by of this commitment includes barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot the cables from the NPM be maintained), or by a combination of separation distance disconnect box to the and barriers.

instrument.

The RPV is provided with surveillance capsule holders to hold a capsule containing Four surveillance capsule holders are installed in the RPV NuScale RPV material surveillance beltline region at approximately 90 degree intervals Table Power An inspection will be performed of the as-built 12 specimens at locations where locations where the capsules will be exposed to a neutron 2.1-4 Module RPV surveillance capsule holders.

the capsules will be exposed flux consistent with the objectives of the RPV surveillance ITAAC to a neutron flux consistent program.

with the objectives of the RPV surveillance program.

2

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The remotely-operated CNTS NuScale containment isolation valves A test will be performed of the CNTS safety- Each remotely-operated CNTS containment isolation valve Table Power change position under related valves under preoperational listed in Table 2.1-2 strokes fully open and fully closed by 13 2.1-4 Module design-basis temperature, temperature, differential pressure, and flow remote operation under preoperational temperature, ITAAC differential pressure, and flow conditions. differential pressure, and flow conditions.

conditions.

The ECCS safety-related NuScale valves listed in Table 2.1-2 A test will be performed of the ECCS safety- Each ECCS safety-related valve listed in Table 2.1-2 Table Power change position under related valves listed in Table 2.1-2 under strokes fully open and fully closed by remote operation 14 2.1-4 Module design-basis temperature, preoperational temperature, differential under preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and ITAAC differential pressure, and flow pressure, and flow conditions. flow conditions.

conditions.

The DHRS safety-related NuScale valves listed in Table 2.1-2 A test will be performed of the DHRS safety- Each DHRS safety-related valve listed in Table 2.1-2 Table Power change position under related valves listed in Table 2.1-2 under strokes fully open and fully closed by remote operation 15 2.1-4 Module design-basis temperature, preoperational temperature, differential under preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and ITAAC differential pressure, and flow pressure, and flow conditions. flow conditions.

conditions.

NuScale Table Power 16 Not used. Not used. Not used.

2.1-4 Module ITAAC NuScale Table Power 17 Not used. Not used. Not used.

2.1-4 Module ITAAC The CNTS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves listed in Table 2.1-2 fail to (or A test will be performed of the CNTS safety-NuScale Each CNTS safety-related hydraulic-operated valve listed in maintain) their safety-related related hydraulic-operated valves listed in Table Power Table 2.1-2 fails to (or maintains) its safety-related position 18 position on loss of electrical Table 2.1-2 under preoperational 2.1-4 Module on loss of motive power under preoperational temperature, power under design-basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow ITAAC differential pressure, and flow conditions.

temperature, differential conditions.

pressure, and flow conditions.

3

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The ECCS safety-related RRVs and RVVs listed in Table 2.1-2 fail to (or Each ECCS safety-related RRV and RVV listed in Table NuScale maintain) their safety-related A test will be performed of the ECCS safety-2.1-2 fails to (or maintains) its safety-related position open Table Power position on loss of electrical related RRVs and RVVs listed in Table 2.1-2 19 on loss of electrical power to its corresponding trip valve 2.1-4 Module power to their corresponding under preoperational temperature, differential under preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and ITAAC trip valves under design- pressure, and flow conditions.

flow conditions.

basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

The DHRS safety-related hydraulic- operated valves listed in Table 2.1-2 fail to (or A test will be performed of the DHRS safety-NuScale Each DHRS safety-related hydraulic- operated valve listed maintain) their safety- related related hydraulic-operated valves listed in Table Power in Table 2.1-2 fails to (or maintains) its safety-related 20 position on loss of electrical Table 2.1-2 under preoperational 2.1-4 Module position open on loss of motive power under preoperational power under design-basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow ITAAC temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

temperature, differential conditions.

pressure, and flow conditions.

The CNTS safety-related NuScale check valves listed in Table A test will be performed of the CNTS safety- Each CNTS safety-related check valve listed in Table 2.1-2 Table Power 2.1-2 change position under related check valves listed in Table 2.1-2 strokes fully open and closed (under forward and reverse 21 2.1-4 Module design-basis temperature, under preoperational temperature, differential flow conditions, respectively) under preoperational ITAAC differential pressure, and flow pressure, and flow conditions. temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

conditions.

4

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Each CNTS containment electrical For each CNTS containment electrical penetration assembly penetration assembly is rated listed in Table 2.1-3, either (i) a circuit interrupting device either (i) to withstand fault coordination analysis exists and concludes that the current and overload currents for the carrying capability for the CNTS containment electrical time required to clear the penetration assembly is greater than the analyzed fault and fault from its power source, or overload currents for the time required to clear the fault from (ii) to withstand the maximum its power source, or (ii) an analysis of the CNTS fault and overload current for containment electrical penetration maximum fault and its circuits without a circuit overload current exists and concludes the fault and overload interrupting device.i. A CNTS current is less than the current carrying capability of the NuScale containment electrical i. An analysis will be performed of the CNTS CNTS containment electrical penetration.

Table Power 22 penetration assembly is rated as-built containment electrical penetration i. A circuit interrupting device coordination analysis exists 2.1-4 Module to withstand fault currents for assembly. and concludes that the current carrying capability for each ITAAC the time required to clear the CNTS containment electrical penetration assembly listed in fault from its power source. Table 2.1-3 is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

OR OR ii. A CNTS containment electrical penetration ii. An analysis of the CNTS containment penetration assembly is rated to maximum fault current exists and concludes the fault current withstand the maximum fault is less than the current carrying capability of the CNTS current for its circuits without containment electrical penetration a circuit interrupting device.

The CNV serves as an NuScale essentially leaktight barrier Table Power A preservice design pressure leakage test of No water leakage is observed at CNV bolted flange 23 against the uncontrolled 2.1-4 Module the CNV will be performed. connections.

release of radioactivity to the ITAAC environment.

NuScale 24(RAI Table Power The NMP lifting fixture A rated load test will be performed of the The NMP lifting fixture supports a load of at least 150 to 155 9571, 2.1-4 Module supports its rated load NMP lifting fixture percent of the manufactures rated capacity.

added this ITAAC The NMP lifting fixture is NuScale constructed to provide 25(RAI Table Power assurance that a single An inspection will be performed of the as-built 9571, The NMP lifting fixture is single-failure-proof 2.1-4 Module failure does not result in NMP lifting fixture.

added this ITAAC uncontrolled movement of the lifted load 5

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Chemical The chemical and volume and An inspection will be performed of the The ASME Code Section III Design Report (NCA-3550) control system ASME Code Table Volume chemical and volume control system ASME exists and concludes that the chemical and volume control 1 Class 3 piping system 2.2-3 Control Code Class 3 as-built piping system Design system ASME Code Class 3 as-built piping system meets complies with the ASME System Report required by ASME Code Section III. the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

Code Section III.

ITAAC Chemical The chemical and volume ASME Code Section III Data Reports for the chemical and and An inspection will be performed of the control system ASME Code volume control system ASME Code Class 3 components Table Volume chemical and volume control system ASME 2 Class 3 components conform listed in Table 2.2-2 and interconnecting piping exist and 2.2-3 Control Code Class 3 as-built component Data to the rules of construction of conclude that the requirements of ASME Code Section III System Reports required by ASME Code Section III.

ASME Code Section III are met.

ITAAC The chemical and volume control system ASME Code Chemical A test will be performed of the chemical and Class 3 air-operated Each chemical and volume control system ASME Code and volume control system ASME Code Class 3 demineralized water system Class 3 air-operated demineralized water system supply Table Volume air-operated demineralized water system 3 supply isolation valves isolation valve listed in Table 2.2-2 strokes fully open and 2.2-3 Control supply isolation valves under preoperational change position under fully closed by remote operation under preoperational System temperature, differential pressure, and flow design-basis temperature, temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

ITAAC conditions.

differential pressure, and flow conditions.

Chemical and Table Volume 4 Not used. Not used. Not used.

2.2-3 Control System ITAAC The chemical and volume control system ASME Code Class 3 air-operated Chemical demineralized water system A test will be performed of the chemical and Each chemical and volume control system ASME Code and supply isolation valves volume control system ASME Code Class 3 Class 3 air-operated demineralized water system supply Table Volume perform their function to fail air-operated demineralized water system isolation valve listed in Table 2.2-2 performs its function to 5

2.2-3 Control to (or maintain) their position supply isolation valves under preoperational fail to (or maintain) its position performs fails closed on loss System on loss of motive power temperature, differential pressure and flow of motive power under preoperational temperature, ITAAC under design-basis conditions. differential pressure, and flow conditions.

temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

6

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Containm ent The CES level The CES level instrumentation detects a level increase in Table A test will be performed of the CES level Evacuatio 1 instrumentation supports the CES sample tank, which correlates to a detection of an 2.3-1 instrumentation.

n System RCS leakage detection. unidentified RCS leakage rate of one gpm within one hour.

ITAAC Containm The CES pressure instrumentation detects a pressure ent The CES pressure Table A test will be performed of the CES pressure increase in the CES inlet pressure instrumentation (PIT-Evacuatio 2 instrumentation supports 2.3-1 instrumentation. 1001/PIT1019), which correlates to a detection of an n System RCS leakage detection.

unidentified RCS leakage rate of one gpm within one hour.

ITAAC 7

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title

i. An analysis will be performed of the

i. The output documentation of the MPS Functional output documentation of the System Specification Phase satisfies the requirements of the Functional Specification Phase.

System Functional Specification Phase.

ii. An analysis will be performed of the ii. The output documentation of the MPS Design Phase output documentation of the System satisfies the requirements of the System Design Phase.

Design Phase.

The MPS design and iii. The output documentation of the MPS Prototype iii. An analysis will be performed of the software are implemented Development Phase satisfies the requirements of the output documentation of the System using a quality process System Prototype Development Phase.

Prototype Development Phase.

composed of the following iv. The output documentation of the MPS Equipment iv. An analysis will be performed of the system design lifecycle Requirements Specification Phase satisfies the output documentation of the Equipment phases, with each phase requirements of the Equipment Requirements Requirements Specification Phase.

having outputs which satisfy Specification Phase.

v. An analysis will be performed of the the requirements of that v. The output documentation of the MPS Hardware output documentation of the Hardware phase. Planning Phase satisfies the requirements of the Planning Phase.

Hardware Planning Phase.

vi. An analysis will be performed of the

• System Functional vi. The output documentation of the MPS Hardware Module output documentation of the Hardware Specification Phase Requirements Phase satisfies the requirements of the Protection Requirements Phase.

• System Design Phase Hardware Requirements Phase.

System vii. An analysis will be performed of the

• System Prototype vii. The output documentation of the MPS Hardware Design and output documentation of the Hardware Development Phase Phase satisfies the requirements of the Hardware Table Safety Design Phase.

1

• Equipment Requirements Design Phase.

2.5-7 Display viii. An analysis will be performed of the Specification Phase viii. The output documentation of the MPS Software and output documentation of the Software

• Hardware Planning Phase Planning Phase satisfies the requirements of the Indication Planning Phase.

• Hardware Requirements Software Planning Phase.

System ix. An analysis will be performed of the Phase ix. The output documentation of the MPS Software ITAAC output documentation of the Software

• Hardware Design Phase Requirements Phase satisfies the requirements of the Requirements Phase.

• Software Planning Phase Software Requirements Phase.

x. An analysis will be performed of the

• Software Requirements x. The output documentation of the MPS Software Design output documentation of the Software Phase Phase satisfies the requirements of the Software Design Phase.

• Software Design Phase Design Phase.

xi. An analysis will be performed of the

• Software Implementation xi. The output documentation of the MPS Software output documentation of the Software Phase Implementation Phase satisfies the requirements of the Implementation Phase.

• Software Configuration Software Implementation Phase.

xii. An analysis will be performed of the Phase xii. The output documentation of the MPS Software output documentation of the Software

• System Testing Phase Configuration Phase satisfies the requirements of the Configuration Phase.

• System Installation Phase Software Configuration Phase.

xiii. An analysis will be performed of the xiii. The output documentation of the MPS Testing Phase output documentation of the System satisfies the requirements of the System Testing Phase.

Testing Phase.

xiv. The output documentation of the MPS Installation xiv. An analysis will be performed of the Phase satisfies the requirements of the System output documentation of the System Installation Phase.

Installation Phase.

8

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Module Protection System and Protective measures are A test will be performed on the access control Protective measures restrict modification to the MPS Table Safety provided to restrict 2 features associated with MPS tunable tunable parameters without proper configuration and 2.5-7 Display modifications to the MPS parameters. authorization.

and tunable parameters.

Indication System ITAAC

i. Physical separation between each redundant separation groups and divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current- carrying circuits is Physical separation exists (1) provided by a minimum separation distance, or by barriers between each the redundant (where the minimum separation distances cannot be separation groups of the maintained), or by a combination of separation distance and Module MPS Class 1E barriers.

Protection instrumentation and control System current-carrying circuits, ii. Physical separation between each division of the MPS and and(2) between each Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying An inspection will be performed of the MPS Table Safety divisions of the MPS Class circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by 3 Class 1E as-built instrumentation and control 2.5-7 Display 1E instrumentation and barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot current- carrying circuits.

and control current-carrying be maintained), or by a combination of separation distance Indication circuits, and (3) between and barriers.

System Class 1E instrumentation and ITAAC control current-carrying iii. Physical separation between MPS Class 1E circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and instrumentation and control non- Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying current-carrying circuits. circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot be maintained), or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

9

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Electrical isolation exists (1) between each the redundant separation groups of the

i. Class 1E electrical isolation devices are installed Module MPS Class 1E between each redundant separation groups and divisions of Protection instrumentation and control the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits.

System circuits, and (2) between and each divisions of the MPS An inspection will be performed of the MPS ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices are installed Table Safety Class 1E instrumentation and 4 Class 1E as-built instrumentation and control between each division of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation 2.5-7 Display control circuits, and (3) circuits. and control circuits.

and between Class 1E Indication instrumentation and control ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices are installed System circuits and non-Class 1E between MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits ITAAC instrumentation and control and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits.

circuits to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

Module Protection i. The Class 1E circuit does not degrade below defined Electrical isolation exists System i. A type test, analysis, or a combination of acceptable operating levels when the non-Class 1E side of between the EDSS-MS and type test and analysis will be performed of the isolation device is subjected to the maximum credible subsystem non-Class 1E Table Safety the Class 1E isolation devices. voltage, current transients, shorts, grounds, or open circuits.

5 circuits and connected MPS 2.5-7 Display Class 1E circuits to prevent and ii. An inspection will be performed of the ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices are installed the propagation of credible Indication MPS Class 1E as-built circuits. between the EDSS-MS Subsystem non-Class 1E circuits electrical faults.

System and connected MPS Class 1E circuits.

ITAAC Module Protection Communications System i. Communications independence between each redundant independence exists (1) and separation groups and divisions of the Class 1E MPS is between each redundant Table Safety A test will be performed of the Class 1E provided.

6 separation groups of the 2.5-7 Display MPS.

Class 1E MPS and (2) and ii. Communications independence between each division of between each divisions of the Indication the Class 1E MPS is provided.

Class 1E MPS.

System ITAAC 10

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Module Protection System and Communications Table Safety independence exists between A test will be performed of the Class 1E Communications independence between the Class 1E MPS 7

2.5-7 Display the Class 1E MPS and non- MPS. and non-Class 1E digital systems is provided.

and Class 1E digital systems.

Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System and Table Safety The MPS automatically A reactor trip signal is automatically initiated for each 8 A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display initiates a reactor trip signal. reactor trip function listed in Table 2.5-1.

and Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System and The MPS automatically Table Safety An ESF actuation signal is automatically initiated for each 9 initiates an ESF actuation A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display ESF function listed in Table 2.5-2.

signal.

and Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System and Table Safety The MPS automatically The RTBs open upon an injection of a single simulated MPS 10 A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display actuates a reactor trip. reactor trip signal.

and Indication System ITAAC 11

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Module Protection System and The MPS automatically The ESF equipment automatically actuates to perform its Table Safety 11 actuates the engineered A test will be performed of the MPS. safety-related function listed in Table 2.5-2 upon an injection 2.5-7 Display safety feature equipment. of a single simulated MPS signal.

and Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System and Table Safety The MPS manually actuates The RTBs open when a reactor trip is manually initiated 12 A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display a reactor trip. from the main control room.

and Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System and The MPS actuates the ESF equipment to perform its safety-Table Safety The MPS manually actuates 13 A test will be performed of the MPS. related function listed in Table 2.5-3 when manually 2.5-7 Display the ESF equipment.

initiated.

and Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System The reactor trip logic fails to a and safe state such that loss of Table Safety electrical power to a MPS Loss of electrical power in a separation group results in a 14 A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display separation group results in a trip state for that separation group.

and trip state for that separation Indication group.

System ITAAC 12

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Module Protection The ESFs logic fails to a safe System state such that loss of and electrical power to a MPS Loss of electrical power in a separation group results in the Table Safety 15 separation group results in a A test will be performed of the MPS. safe state listed in Table 2.1-3. an actuation state for that 2.5-7 Display safe state listed in Table 2.1- separation group.

and

3. predefined safe state for Indication that separation group.

System ITAAC

i. Upon initiation of a real or simulated MPS reactor trip Module An MPS signal once initiated signal listed in Table 2.5-1, the RTBs open, and the RTBs Protection (automatically or manually), do not automatically close when the MPS reactor trip signal System results in an intended clears.

and sequence of protective Table Safety A test will be performed of the MPS reactor 16 actions that continue until ii. Upon initiation of a real or simulated MPS engineered 2.5-7 Display trip and engineered safety features signals.

completion, and requires safety feature actuation signal listed in Table 2.5-2, the ESF and deliberate operator action in equipment actuates to perform its safety-related function Indication order to return the safety and continues to maintain its safety- related position and System systems to normal. perform its safety-related function when the MPS ITAAC engineered safety feature actuation signal clears.

Module The MPS response times Protection from sensor output through System equipment actuation for the and The MPS reactor trip functions listed in Table 2.5-1 and reactor trip functions and Table Safety ESFs functions listed in Table 2.5-2 have response times 17 ESF functions are less than A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display that are less than or equal to the design basis safety or equal to the value required and analysis response time assumptions.

to satisfy the design basis Indication safety analysis response time System assumptions.

ITAAC 13

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The MPS interlocks listed in Table 2.5-4 automatically Module establish an operating Protection bypass for the specified System reactor trip or ESF actuations The MPS interlocks listed in Table 2.5-4 automatically and when the interlock condition establish an operating bypass for the specified reactor trip Table Safety 18 is met, and the operating A test will be performed of the MPS. of or ESF actuations when the interlock condition is met.

2.5-7 Display bypass is automatically The operating bypass is automatically removed when the and removed when the interlock interlock condition is no longer satisfied.

Indication condition is no longer System satisfied. function as ITAAC required when associated conditions are met.

The MPS permissives listed in Table 2.5-4 allow the Module manual bypass of the Protection specified reactor trip or ESF System actuations when the The MPS permissives listed in Table 2.5-4 allows the and permissive condition is met, manual bypass of the specified reactor trip or ESF Table Safety 19 and the operating bypass is A test will be performed of the MPS. actuations when the permissive condition is met. The 2.5-7 Display automatically removed when operating bypass is automatically removed when the and the permissive condition is no permissive condition is no longer satisfied.

Indication longer satisfied. function as System required when associated ITAAC conditions are met.

The O-1 Override listed in Table 2.5-4 is The MPS Module overrides established when Protection the manual override switch is System The MPS overrides listed in Table 2.5-4 are The O-1 active and the RT-1 interlock and Override listed in Table 2.5-4 is established when the is established. The Override Table Safety manual override switch is active and the RT-1 interlock is 20 switch must be manually A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display established. The Override switch must be manually taken taken out of Override when and out of Override when the Override, O-1 Override, is no the O-1 Override is no longer Indication longer needed.

needed. function as required System when associated conditions ITAAC are met.

14

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Module Protection System The MPS is capable of The MPS performs its safety-related functions if any of its and performing its safety-related protection channels is out of service. With a safety function Table Safety functions when oneif any of 21 A testTests will be performed of the MPS. module out of service switch activated, the safety function is 2.5-7 Display its protection channels is placed in trip or bypass based on the position of the safety and placed in maintenance function module trip/bypass switch.

Indication bypass out of service.

System ITAAC Module Protection System and Table Safety MPS operational bypasses Each operational MPS manual or automatic bypass is 22 A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display are indicated in the MCR. indicated in the MCR.

and Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System and Table Safety MPS maintenance bypasses 23 A test will be performed of the MPS. Each maintenance bypass is indicated in the MCR.

2.5-7 Display are indicated in the MCR.

and Indication System ITAAC Module A report exists and concludes that:

Protection

• Self-testing features verify that faults requiring detection System are detected.

and The MPS self-test features

• Self-testing features verify that upon detection, the Table Safety detect faults in the system system responds according to the type of fault.

24 A test will be performed of the MPS.

2.5-7 Display and provide an alarm in the

• Self-testing features verify that faults are detected and and main control room. responded within a sufficient timeframe to ensure safety Indication function is not lost.

System

• The presence and type of fault is indicated by the MPS ITAAC alarms and displays.

15

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Module Protection System and The PAM Type B and Type C An inspection will be performed for the ability The PAM Type B and Type C displays listed in Table 2.5-5 Table Safety 25 displays are indicated on the to retrieve the as-built PAM Type B and Type are retrieved and displayed on the SDIS displays in the 2.5-7 Display SDIS displays in the MCR. C displays on the SDIS displays in the MCR. MCR.

and Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System and The controls located on the Table Safety operator workstations in the A test will be performed of the controls on the The IHAs controls provided on the operator workstations in 26 2.5-7 Display MCR operate to perform operator workstations in the MCR. the MCR perform the functions listed in Table 2.5-6.

and IHAs.

Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System The RTBs are installed and and An inspection will be performed of the as-built The RTBs have the proper connections for the shunt and arranged in order to Table Safety RTBs, including the connections for the shunt undervoltage trip mechanisms and auxiliary contacts, and 27 successfully accomplish the 2.5-7 Display and undervoltage trip mechanism and are arranged as shown in Figure 2.5-2 to successfully reactor trip function. under and auxiliary contacts. accomplish the reactor trip function.

design conditions.

Indication System ITAAC Module Protection System Two of the four separation and groups and one of the two Separation groups A & C and Division I of RTS and ESFAS Table Safety An inspection will be performed of the as-built 28 divisions of RTS and ESFAS utilize a different programmable technology from separation 2.5-7 Display MPS.

will utilize a different groups B & D and Division II of RTS and ESFAS.

and programmable technology.

Indication System ITAAC 16

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Module Protection System The MCR isolation switches and that isolate the manual MCR An inspection will be performed of the Table Safety switches from MPS in case of The MCR isolation switches are located in the remote 29 location of the as-built MCR isolation 2.5-7 Display a fire in the MCR are located shutdown station.

switches.

and in the remote shutdown Indication station.

System ITAAC

i. The Class 1E circuit does not degrade below defined Electrical isolation exists i. A type test, analysis, or acombination of acceptable operating levels when the non- Class 1E side of between the NMS Class 1E type test and analysis will be performed of the isolation device is subjected to the maximum credible Neutron Table circuits and connected non- the Class 1E isolation devices. voltage, current transients, shorts, grounds, or open circuits.

Monitoring 1 2.6-1 Class 1E circuits to prevent ITAAC the propagation of credible ii. An inspection will be performed of the ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices are installed electrical faults. NMS Class 1E as-built circuits. between NMS Class 1E circuits and connected non- Class 1E circuits.

i. Physical separation between redundant divisions of NMS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying Physical separation exists circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by between the redundant barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot divisions of the NMS Class be maintained), or by a combination of separation distance 1E instrumentation and and barriers.

Neutron control current-carrying An inspection will be performed of the NMS Table Monitoring 2 circuits, and between Class Class 1E as-built instrumentation and control 2.6-1 ii. Physical separation between NMS Class 1E ITAAC 1E instrumentation and current-carrying circuits.

instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and control current-carrying non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by instrumentation and control barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot current-carrying circuits.

be maintained), or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

Electrical isolation exists between the redundant divisions of the NMS Class i. Class 1E electrical isolation devices are installed 1E instrumentation and between redundant divisions of NMS Class 1E Neutron control circuits, and between An inspection will be performed of the NMS instrumentation and control circuits.

Table Monitoring 3 Class 1E instrumentation and Class 1E as-built instrumentation and control 2.6-1 ITAAC control circuits and non-Class circuits. ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices are installed 1E instrumentation and between NMS Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits control circuits to prevent the and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits.

propagation of credible electrical faults.

17

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Radiation The CES automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated CES high radiation Monitoring responds to a high radiation Table A test will be performed of the CES high signal listed in Table 2.7-1, the CES automatically

- Module- 1 signal from CES-RT- 1011 to 2.7-2 radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Specific mitigate a release of identified in the table.

ITAAC radioactivity.

The CVCS automatically Radiation responds to a high radiation Upon initiation of a real or simulated CVCS high radiation Monitoring Table signals from CVC-RT- 3016, A test will be performed of the CVCS high signal listed in Table 2.7-1, the CVCS automatically

- Module- 2 2.7-2 6A-AB-RT- 0142, and 6B-AB- radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified component to the position Specific RT- 0141 to mitigate a identified in the table.

ITAAC release of radioactivity.

Radiation The CVCS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated CVCS high radiation Monitoring responds to a high radiation Table A test will be performed of the CVCS high signal listed in Table 2.7-1, the CVCS automatically

- Module- 3 signal from 6A-AB-RT- 0142 2.7-2 radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified component to the position Specific to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

ITAAC radioactivity.

Radiation The CVCS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated CVCS high radiation Monitoring responds to a high radiation Table A test will be performed of the CVCS high signal listed in Table 2.7-1, the CVCS automatically

- Module- 4 signal from 6B-AB-RT- 0141 2.7-2 radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified component to the position Specific to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

ITAAC radioactivity.

18

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The module-specific Seismic Category I equipment listed in Table 2.8-1, including its associated supports and anchorages, withstands design basis seismic loads without loss of its function(s) during and after an SSE. The scope of equipment for this design commitment is module- specific, safety-related equipment, and module-specific, nonsafety-

i. A seismic qualification record form exists and concludes related equipment that has i. A type test, analysis, or acombination of that the module-specific Seismic Category I equipment one of the following design type test and analysis will be performed of listed in Table 2.8-1, including its associated supports and features: the module-specific Seismic Category I anchorages, will withstand the design basis seismic loads Equipmen equipment, including its associated supports and perform its function(s) during and after an SSE.

Table t

• Nonsafety-related and anchorages.

1 2.8-2 Qualificati mechanical and electrical ii. The module-specific Seismic Category I equipment on ITAAC equipment located within ii. An inspection will be performed of the listed in Table 2.8-1, including its associated supports and the boundaries of the module-specific Seismic Category I as-built anchorages, is installed in its design location in a Seismic NuScale Power Module equipment, including its associated supports Category I structure in a configuration bounded by the that has an augmented and anchorages.

equipments seismic qualification record form.

Seismic Category I design requirement.

• Nonsafety-related mechanical and electrical equipment that performs a credited function in Chapter 15 analyses (secondary main steam isolation valves (MSIV), feedwater regulating valves (FWRV) and secondary feedwater check valves.)

19

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The module-specific electrical equipment located in a harsh environment, including associated connection assemblies, withstand the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal i. An EQ record form exists and concludes that the operations, AOOs, DBAs, module- specific electrical equipment listed in Table 2.8-1,

i. A type test or a combination of type test and post- accident conditions including associated connection assemblies, perform their and analysis will be performed of the module-and performs its function for function under the environmental conditions specified in the Equipmen specific electrical equipment, including the period of time required to EQ record form for the period of time required to complete Table t associated connection assemblies.

2 complete the function. The the function.

2.8-2 Qualificati scope of equipment for this on ITAAC ii. An inspection will be performed of the design commitment is ii. The module-specific electrical equipment listed in Table module-specific as-built electrical equipment, module-specific, Class 1E 2.8-1, including associated connection assemblies, are including associated connection assemblies.

equipment located within a installed in their design location in a configuration bounded harsh environment, and by the EQ record form.

module-specific, nonsafety-related equipment with an augmented equipment qualification design requirement located within the boundaries of the NuScale Power Module.

20

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The non-metallic parts, materials, and lubricants used in module-specific mechanical equipment perform their function up to the end of their qualified life in the design basis harsh environmental conditions (both internal service conditions and external environmental conditions) experienced during normal A qualification record form exists and concludes that the operations, AOOs, DBAs, non-metallic parts, materials, and lubricants used in module-Equipmen A type test or a combination of type test and and post- accident specific mechanical equipment listed in Table 2.8-1 perform Table t analysis will be performed of the non-metallic 3 conditions. The scope of their function up to the end of their qualified life under the 2.8-2 Qualificati parts, materials, and lubricants used in equipment for this design design basis harsh environmental conditions (both internal on ITAAC module-specific mechanical equipment.

commitment is module- service conditions and external environmental conditions) specific, safety-related specified in the qualification record form.

mechanical equipment, and module-specific, nonsafety-related mechanical equipment that performs a credited function in Chapter 15 analyses (secondary main steam isolation valves (MSIV), feedwater regulating valves (FWRV) and secondary feedwater check valves.)

i. A type test or a combination of type test

i. An EQ record form exists and concludes that the Class The Class 1E computer- and analysis will be performed of the Class 1E computer-based instrumentation and control systems based instrumentation and 1E computer-based instrumentation and listed in Table 2.8-1 perform their function under the Equipmen control systems located in a control systems located in a mild environmental conditions specified in the EQ record form.

Table t mild environment withstand environment.

4 2.8-2 Qualificati design basis mild ii. The Class 1E computer-based instrumentation and on ITAAC environmental conditions ii. An inspection will be performed of the control systems listed in Table 2.8-1 are installed in their without loss of safety-related Class 1E as-built computer- based design location in a configuration bounded by the EQ record functions. instrumentation and control systems located form.

in a mild environment.

21

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The Class 1E digital equipment performs its An EQ record form exists and concludes that the Class 1E safety-related function when Equipmen digital equipment listed in Table 2.8-1 withstands the design subjected to the design basis A type test, analysis, or a combination of type Table t basis electromagnetic interference, radio frequency 5 electromagnetic interference, test and analysis will be performed of the 2.8-2 Qualificati interference, and electrical surges that would exist before, radio frequency interference, Class 1E digital equipment.

on ITAAC during, and following a DBA without loss of safety-related and electrical surges that function.

would exist before, during, and following a DBA.

The safety-related valves listed in Table 2.8-1 are functionally designed and A Qualification Report exists and concludes that the safety-qualified to perform their Equipmen related valves listed in Table 2.8-1 are capable of safety-related function under A type test or a combination of type test and Table t performing their safety-related function under the full range 6 the full range of fluid flow, analysis will be performed of the safety-2.8-2 Qualificati of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, differential pressure, related valves listed in Table 2.8-1.

on ITAAC temperature conditions, and fluid conditions up to and electrical conditions, including DBA conditions.

temperature conditions, and fluid conditions up to and including DBA conditions.

i. An American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Section III Data Report exists and concludes that the relief

i. A vendor test will be performed of each valves listed in Table 2.8-1 meet the valves required set Equipmen The safety-related relief safety-related relief valves. pressure, capacity, and overpressure design requirements.

Table t 7 valves provide overpressure 2.8-2 Qualificati protection. ii. An inspection will be performed of each ii. Each relief valve listed in Table 2.8-1 is provided with on ITAAC safety-related as-built relief valves. an American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Certification Mark that identifies the set pressure, capacity, and overpressure.

The safety-related DHRS Equipmen A type test or a combination of type test and passive condensers listed in A report exists and concludes that the safety-related DHRS Table t analysis will be performed of the safety-8 Table 2.8-1 have the capacity passive condensers listed in Table 2.8-1 have a heat 2.8-2 Qualificati related DHRS passive condensers listed in to transfer their design heat removal capacity sufficient to transfer their design heat load.

on ITAAC Table 2.8-1.

load.

22

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The CNTS containment electrical penetration

i. An EQ record form exists and concludes that the CNTS assemblies located in a harsh i. A type test or a combination of type test electrical penetration assemblies listed in Table 2.8-1, environment, including and analysis will be performed of the CNTS including associated connection assemblies, performs their associated connection containment electrical penetration function under the environmental conditions specified in the Equipmen assemblies, withstand the assemblies equipment including associated EQ record form for the period of time required to complete Table t design basis harsh connection assemblies.

9 the function.

2.8-2 Qualificati environmental conditions on ITAAC experienced during normal ii. An inspection will be performed of the ii. The CNTS electrical penetration assemblies listed in operations, AOOs, DBAs, containment CNTS electrical penetration Table 2.8-1, including associated connection assemblies, and postaccident conditions assembles, including associated connection are installed in their design location in a configuration and performs its function for assemblies.

bounded by the EQ record form.

the period of time required to complete the function.

Control The air exfiltration out of the The air exfiltration measured by tracer gas testing meets the Room CRE meets the assumptions Table air exfiltration assumed in the CRHS breathing and Habitabilit 1 used to size the CRHS A test will be performed of the CRE.

3.1-2 pressurization analysis. is less than the CRE air infiltration y System inventory and the supply flow rate assumed in the dose analysis.

ITAAC rate.

Control The CRHS valves change Room position under design basis A test will be performed of the CRHS valves Each CRHS valve listed in Table 3.1-1 strokes fully open Table Habitabilit 2 temperature, differential under preoperational temperature, differential and fully closed by remote operation under preoperational 3.1-2 y System pressure, and flow pressure, and flow conditions. temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

ITAAC conditions.

The CRHS solenoid-operated Control valves perform their function A test will be performed of the CRHS Each CRHS solenoid-operated valve listed in Table 3.1-1 Room to fail open on loss of motive Table solenoid-operated valves under performs its function to fail open on loss of motive power Habitabilit 3 power under design basis 3.1-2 preoperational temperature, differential under preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and y System temperature, differential pressure and flow conditions. flow conditions.

ITAAC pressure, and flow conditions.

Control The CRE heat sink passively Room maintains the temperature of A report exists and concludes that the CRE heat sink Table An analysis will be performed of the as-built Habitabilit 4 the CRE within an acceptable passively maintains the temperature of the CRE within an 3.1-2 CRE heat sinks.

y System range for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> acceptable range for the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a DBA.

ITAAC following a DBA.

Control Room The CRHS maintains a The CRHS maintains a positive pressure of greater than or Table Habitabilit 5 positive pressure in the MCR A test will be performed of the CRHS. equal to 1/8 inches water gauge in the CRE relative to 3.1-2 y System relative to adjacent areas. adjacent areas, while operating in DBA alignment.

ITAAC 23

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Normal The CRVS air-operated CRE Control isolation dampers perform Room their function to fail to the A test will be performed of the air-operated Each CRVS air-operated CRE isolation damper listed in Table Heating closed position on loss of CRE isolation dampers under preoperational Table 3.2-1 performs its function to fail to the closed position 1

3.2-2 Ventilation motive power under design temperature, differential pressure and flow on loss of motive power under preoperational temperature, and Air basis temperature, differential conditions. differential pressure, and flow conditions.

Conditioni pressure, and flow ng ITAAC conditions.

Normal Control Room The CRVS maintains a The CRVS maintains a positive pressure of greater than or Table Heating positive pressure in the CRB A test will be performed of the CRVS while equal to 1/8 inches water gauge in the CRB relative to the 2

3.2-2 Ventilation relative to the outside operating in the normal operating alignment. outside environment, while operating in the normal and Air environment. operating alignment.

Conditioni ng ITAAC Normal Control The CRVS maintains the Room hydrogen concentration The airflow capability of the CRVS maintains the hydrogen Table Heating levels in the CRB battery A test will be performed of the CRVS while 3 concentration levels in the CRB battery rooms containing 3.2-2 Ventilation rooms containing batteries operating in the normal operating alignment.

batteries below one percent by volume.

and Air below one percent by Conditioni volume.

ng ITAAC Reactor Building Heating The RBVS maintains a Ventilation The RBVS maintains a negative pressure in the RXB Table negative pressure in the RXB A test will be performed of the RBVS while and Air 1 relative to the outside environment, while operating in the 3.3-1 relative to the outside operating in the normal operating alignment.

Conditioni normal operating alignment.

environment.

ng System ITAAC Reactor Building Heating The RBVS maintains a Ventilation The RBVS maintains a negative pressure in the RWB Table negative pressure in the A test will be performed of the RBVS while and Air 2 relative to the outside environment, while operating in the 3.3-1 RWB relative to the outside operating in the normal operating alignment.

Conditioni normal operating alignment.

environment.

ng System ITAAC 24

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Reactor Building The RBVS maintains the Heating hydrogen concentration Ventilation The airflow capability of the RBVS maintains the hydrogen Table levels in the RXB battery A test will be performed of the RBVS while and Air 3 concentration levels in the RXB battery rooms containing 3.3-1 rooms containing batteries operating in the normal operating alignment.

Conditioni batteries below one percent by volume.

below one percent by ng volume.

System ITAAC The single-failure-proof FHM main and auxiliary hoists are constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a Fuel single hoist mechanism A report exists and concludes that the FHM main and Handling Table component does not result in An inspection will be performed of the as-built auxiliary hoists are single-failure-proof in accordance with Equipmen 1 3.4-1 the uncontrolled movement of FHM main and auxiliary hoists. the approved design.

t System the lifted load.The FHM main The FHM main and auxiliary hoists are single-failure-proof.

ITAAC and auxiliary hoists are single-failure-proof in accordance with the approved design.

Fuel The FHM main hoist is Handling capable of lifting and The FHM main hoist lifts, supports, holds with the brakes, Table A rated load test will be performed of the Equipmen 2 supporting its rated load, and transports a load of at least 125 percent of the 3.4-1 FHM main hoist.

t System holding the rated load, and manufacturers rated capacity.

ITAAC transporting the rated load.

Fuel The FHM auxiliary hoist is Handling capable of lifting and The FHM auxiliary hoist lifts, supports, holds with the Table A rated load test will be performed of the Equipmen 3 supporting its rated load, brakes, and transports a load of at least 125 percent of the 3.4-1 FHM auxiliary hoist.

t System holding the rated load, and manufacturers rated capacity.

ITAAC transporting the rated load.

Fuel Single-failure-proofThe FHM Handling welds are inspectedcomply The results of the non-destructive examination of the FHM Table An inspection will be performed of the as-built Equipmen 4 with the American Society of welds comply with American Society of Mechanical 3.4-1 FHM welds.

t System Mechanical Engineers NOG- Engineers NOG-1 Code.

ITAAC 1 Code.

The FHM travel is limited to Fuel maintain a water inventory for The FHM maintains at least 10 feet of water above the top Handling Table personnel shielding with the A test will be performed of the FHM gripper of the fuel assembly when lifted to its maximum height with Equipmen 5 3.4-1 pool level at the lower limit of mast limit switches. the pool level at the lower limit of the normal operating low t System the normal operating low water level.

ITAAC water level.

25

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The new fuel jib crane hook Fuel movement is limited to Handling Table prevent carrying a fuel A test will be performed of new fuel jib crane The new fuel jib crane interlocks prevent the crane from Equipmen 6 3.4-1 assembly over the fuel interlocks. carrying a fuel assembly over the spent fuel racks.

t System storage racks in the spent ITAAC fuel pool.

The fuel storage system Fuel An inspection will be performed of the fuel ASME Code Section III Data Reports for the fuel storage ASME Code Class NF Table Storage storage system ASME Code Class NF as- system ASME Code Class NF fuel storage racks exist and 1 components conform to the 3.5-1 System built component Data Reports required by conclude that the requirements of ASME Code Section III rules of construction of ASME ITAAC ASME Code Section III. are met.

Code Section III.

The fuel storage racks maintain an effective neutron multiplication factor (k-effective) within the following limits at a 95 percent probability, 95 percent confidence level when loaded with fuel of the maximum reactivity to assure The as-built fuel storage racks, including any neutron Fuel subcriticality during plant life, An inspection will be performed of the as-built absorbers, and their configuration within the SFP conform to Table Storage 2 including normal operations fuel storage racks, their configuration in the the design values for materials and dimensions and their 3.5-1 System and postulated accident SFP, and the associated documentation. tolerances, as shown to be acceptable in the approved fuel ITAAC conditions: storage criticality analysis described in the UFSAR.

• If credit for soluble boron is taken, k-effective must not exceed 0.95 if flooded with borated water, and k-effective must not exceed 1.0 if flooded with unborated water.

Ultimate The ultimate heat sink ASME An inspection will be performed of the The ASME Code Section III Design Report (NCA-3550)

Heat Sink Code Class 3 piping system Table ultimate heat sink ASME Code Class 3 as- exists and concludes that the ultimate heat sink ASME Piping 1 listed in Table 3.6-1 complies 3.6-2 built piping system Design Report required by Code Class 3 as-built piping system meets the requirements System with ASME Code Section III ASME Code Section III. of ASME Code Section III.

ITAAC requirements.

Ultimate The UHS Code Class 3 An inspection will be performed of the UHS The ASME Code Section III Data Report for the UHS ASME Heat Sink 2 (Added Table components conform to the ASME Code Class 3 as-built component Code Class 3 components listed in Table 3.6-1 and Piping in 4/4/19 3.6-2 rules of construction of ASME Data Report required by ASME Code Section interconnecting piping exists and concludes that the System letter)

Code Section III. III. requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

ITAAC 26

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The spent fuel pool, refueling pool, reactor pool, and dry Ultimate dock piping and connections There are no gates, openings, drains, or piping within the Heat Sink An inspection will be performed of the as-built Table are located to prevent the SFP, RFP, reactor pool, and dry dock that are below 80 ft Piping 2 SFP, RFP, reactor pool and dry dock piping 3.6-2 drain down of the SFP and building elevation (55 ft pool level) as measured from the System and connections.

reactor pool water level bottom of the SFP and reactor pool.

ITAAC below the minimum safety water level.

Fire Two separate firewater Each firewater storage tank provides a usable water volume Table Protection storage tanks provide a An inspection will be performed of the as-built 1 dedicated for firefighting that is greater than or equal to 3.7-1 System dedicated volume of water for firewater storage tanks.

300,000 gallons.

ITAAC firefighting.

The FPS has a sufficient number of fire pumps to provide the design flow i. A report exists and concludes that the fire pumps can requirements to satisfy the i. An test and analysis will be performed of provide the flow demand for the largest sprinkler or deluge Fire flow demand for the largest the as-built fire pumps. system plus an additional 500 gpm for fire hoses assuming Table Protection 2 sprinkler or deluge system failure of the largest fire pump or loss of off-site power.

3.7-1 System plus an additional 500 gpm ii. A test will be performed of the fire ITAAC for fire hoses assuming pumps. ii. Each fire pump delivers the design flow to the FPS, failure of the largest fire while operating in the fire-fighting alignment.

pump or loss of off-site power.

27

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Safe-shutdown can be achieved assuming that all equipment in any one fire A safe-shutdown analysis report exists and concludes that:

area (except for the MCR and under the bioshield) is

• Safe-shutdown can be achieved assuming that all rendered inoperable by fire equipment in any one fire area (except for the MCR and damage and that reentry into under the bioshield) is rendered inoperable by fire and the fire area for repairs and that reentry into the fire area for repairs and operator operator actions is not Fire actions is not possible possible. An alternative A safe-shutdown analysis of the as- built Table Protection

• Smoke, hot gases, or fire suppressant cannot migrate 3 shutdown capability that is plant will be performed, including a post-fire 3.7-1 System from the affected fire area into other fire areas to the physically and electrically safe-shutdown circuit analysis.

ITAAC extent that they could adversely affect safe-shutdown independent of the MCR capabilities, including operator actions.

exists. Additionally, smoke,

• An independent alternative shutdown capability that is hot gases, or fire suppressant MPS equipment rooms within the reactor building that cannot migrate from the are used as the alternative shutdown capability are affected fire area into other physically and electrically independent of the MCR.

fire areas to the extent that exists.

they could adversely affect safe-shutdown capabilities, including operator actions.

A FHA report exists and concludes that:

A plant FHA considers Fire potential fire hazards and Table Protection

• Combustible loads and ignition sources are accounted 4 ensures the fire protection A FHA of the as-built plant will be performed.

3.7-1 System for, and features in each fire area are ITAAC

• Fire protection features are suitable for the hazards they suitable for the hazards.

are intended to protect against.

The PLS provides normal i. A test will be performed of the MCR i. The PLS provides at least 100 foot-candles illumination Plant illumination of the operator operator workstations and auxiliary panel at the MCR operator workstations and at least 50 foot-Table Lighting workstations and auxiliary illumination. candles at the auxiliary panels.

1 3.8-1 System panels in the MCR and ITAAC operator workstations in the ii. A test will be performed of the RSS ii. The PLS provides at least 100 foot- candles illumination RSS. operator workstations illumination. at the RSS operator workstations.

i. The PLS provides at least 10 foot- candles of The PLS provides emergency i. A test will be performed of the MCR illumination at the MCR operator workstations and auxiliary Plant illumination of the operator operator workstations and auxiliary panel panels when it is the only MCR lighting system in operation.

Table Lighting workstations and auxiliary illumination.

2 3.8-1 System panels in the MCR and ii. The PLS provides at least 10 foot- candles at the RSS ITAAC operator workstations in the ii. A test will be performed of the RSS operator workstations when it is the only RSS lighting RSS. operator workstations illumination.

system in operation.

28

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Eight-hour battery-pack emergency lighting fixtures Plant Eight-hour battery-pack emergency lighting fixtures provide illumination for post-Table Lighting A test will be performed of the eight- hour illuminate their required target areas to provide at least one 3 FSSD activities performed by 3.8-1 System battery-pack emergency lighting fixtures. foot-candle illumination in the areas outside the MCR or operators outside the MCR ITAAC RSS where post-FSSD activities are performed.

and RSS where post-FSSD activities are performed.

Radiation The CRVS automatically Monitoring responds to a high-radiation Upon initiation of a real or simulated CRVS high-radiation

- NuScale Table signal from 00-CRV-RT- A test will be performed of the CRVS high- signals listed in Table 3.9-1, the CRVS automatically Power 1 3.9-2 0503, 00-CRV-RT-0504, and radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules 00-CRV-RT-0505 to mitigate identified in the table.

1-12 a release of radioactivity.

ITAAC Radiation The CRVS and the CRHS Monitoring automatically respond to a Upon initiation of a real or simulated CRVS high-radiation

- NuScale Table high-radiation signal from 00- A test will be performed of the CRVS high- signals listed in Table 3.9-1, the CRVS and the CRHS Power 2 3.9-2 CRV-RT-0510 and 00-CRV- radiation signals. automatically align/actuate the identified components to the Modules RT-0511 to mitigate a release positions identified in the table.

1-12 of radioactivity.

ITAAC Radiation The RBVS automatically Monitoring responds to a high-radiation Upon initiation of a real or simulated RBVS high-radiation

- NuScale Table signal from 00-RBV-RE- A test will be performed of the RBVS high- signals listed in Table 3.9-1, the RBVS automatically Power 3 3.9-2 0510, 00-RBV-RE-0511, and radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules 00-RBV-RE-0512 to mitigate identified in the table.

1-12 a release of radioactivity.

ITAAC Radiation The GRWS automatically Monitoring responds to a high-radiation Upon initiation of a real or simulated GRWS high-radiation

- NuScale signals from 00-GRW- RIT-Table A test will be performed of the GRWS high- signals listed in Table 3.9-1, the GRWS automatically Power 4 0046, 00-GRW- RIT-0060, 3.9-2 radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules and 00-GRW- RIT-0071 to identified in the table.

1-12 mitigate a release of ITAAC radioactivity.

Radiation Monitoring The GRWS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated GRWS high-radiation

- NuScale responds to a high-radiation Table A test will be performed of the GRWS high- signals listed in Table 3.9-1, the GRWS automatically Power 5 signal from 00-GRW- RIT-3.9-2 radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules 0060 to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

1-12 radioactivity.

ITAAC 29

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Radiation Monitoring The GRWS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated GRWS high-radiation

- NuScale responds to a high-radiation Table A test will be performed of the GRWS high- signals listed in Table 3.9-1, the GRWS automatically Power 6 signal from 00-GRW- RIT-3.9-2 radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules 0071 to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

1-12 radioactivity.

ITAAC Radiation The LRWS automatically Monitoring responds to a high-radiation Upon initiation of a real or simulated LRWS high-radiation

- NuScale Table signal from 00-LRW-RIT- A test will be performed of the LRWS high- signals listed in Table 3.9-1, the LRWS automatically Power 7 3.9-2 0569 and 00-LRW-RIT-0571 radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

1-12 radioactivity.

ITAAC Radiation The ABS automatically Monitoring responds to a high-radiation Upon initiation of a real or simulated ABS high-radiation

- NuScale Table signals from 00-AB-RT- 0153 A test will be performed of the ABS high- signal listed in Table 3.9-1, the ABS automatically Power 8 3.9-2 and 00-AB-RT- 0166 to radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules mitigate a release of identified in the table.

1-12 radioactivity.

ITAAC Radiation Monitoring The ABS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated ABS high-radiation

- NuScale responds to a high-radiation Table A test will be performed of the ABS high- signal listed in Table 3.9-1, the ABS automatically Power 9 signal from 00-AB-RT- 0166 3.9-2 radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

1-12 radioactivity.

ITAAC Radiation Monitoring The PSCS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated PSCS high-radiation

- NuScale responds to a high-radiation Table A test will be performed of the PSCS high- signal listed in Table 3.9-1, the PSCS automatically Power 10 signal from 00-PSC-RE-3.9-2 radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Modules 1003 to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

1-12 radioactivity.

ITAAC 30

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The single-failure-proof RBC main hoist is constructed to provide assurance that a Reactor failure of a single hoist The RBC main hoist is single-failure-proof.A report exists Table Building mechanism does not result in An inspection will be performed of the as-built 1 and concludes that the RBC main hoist is single-failure-3.10-1 Crane the uncontrolled movement of RBC main hoist..

proof in accordance with the approved design.

ITAAC the lifted load. The RBC main hoist is single-failure-proof in accordance with the approved design.

The single-failure-proof RBC auxiliary hoists are constructed to provide assurance that a failure of a Reactor single hoist mechanism does The RBC auxiliary hoists are single- failure-proof.A report Table Building An inspection will be performed of the as-built 2 not result in the uncontrolled exists and concludes that the RBC auxiliary hoists are 3.10-1 Crane RBC auxiliary hoists.

movement of the lifted single-failure-proof in accordance with the approved design.

ITAAC load.The RBC auxiliary hoists are single-failure-proof in accordance with the approved design.

The single-failure-proof RBC wet hoist is constructed to provide assurance that a Reactor failure of a single hoist The RBC wet hoist is single-failure- proof.A report exists Table Building mechanism does not result in An inspection will be performed of the as-built 3 and concludes that the RBC wet hoist is single-failure-proof 3.10-1 Crane the uncontrolled movement of RBC wet hoist.

in accordance with the approved design.

ITAAC the lifted load.The RBC wet hoist is single-failure-proof in accordance with the approved design.

The RBC main hoist is Reactor capable of lifting and The RBC main hoist lifts, supports, holds with the brakes, Table Building A rated load test will be performed of the 4 supporting its rated load, and transports a load of at least 125 to 130 percent of the 3.10-1 Crane RBC main hoist.

holding the rated load, and manufacturers rated capacity.

ITAAC transporting the rated load.

The RBC auxiliary hoists are Reactor capable of lifting and The RBC auxiliary hoists lift, support, hold with the brakes, Table Building A rated load test will be performed of the 5 supporting their rated load, and transport a load of at least 125 to 130 percent of the 3.10-1 Crane RBC auxiliary hoists.

holding the rated load, and manufacturers rated capacity.

ITAAC transporting the rated load.

31

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The RBC wet hoist is capable Reactor of lifting and supporting its The RBC wet hoist lifts, supports, holds with the brakes, and Table Building A rated load test will be performed of the 6 rated load, holding the rated transports a load of at least 125 to 130 percent of the 3.10-1 Crane RBC wet hoist.

load, and transporting the manufacturers rated capacity.

ITAAC rated load.

Load path RBC welds are inspected.All RBC weld joints Reactor The results of the non-destructive examination of the RBC whose failure could result in An inspection will be performed of the as-built Table Building weld joints whose failure could result in the drop of a critical 7 the drop of a critical load RBC weld joints whose failure could result in 3.10-1 Crane loadwelds comply with American Society of Mechanical comply with the American the drop of a critical load.

ITAAC Engineers NOG-1 Code.

Society of Mechanical Engineers NOG-1 Code.

Reactor The results of the non-destructive examination of the RBC Table Building Load path RBC wet hoist An inspection will be performed of the as-built 8 wet hoist welds comply with American Society of 3.10-1 Crane welds are inspected. RBC wet hoist.

Mechanical Engineers NOG-1 Code.

ITAAC

i. The MLA single load path elements

i. A rated load test will be performed of the support a load of at least 300 to 305 percent of Reactor 9 (RAI MLA single load path elements. the manufacturer's rated capacity.

Table Building 9571, The MLA is capable of 3.10-1 Crane added supporting its rated load.

ii. A rated load test will be performed of the ii. The MLA dual load path elements ITAAC this)

MLA dual load path elements. support a load of at least 150 to 155 percent of the manufacturer's rated capacity.

The single-failure-proof MLA is constructed to provide Reactor 10 (RAI assurance that it will not fail The MLA is single-failure-proof.A report exists and Table Building 9571, in a manner that results in the An inspection will be performed of the as-built concludes that the MLA is single-failure-proof in accordance 3.10-1 Crane added uncontrolled movement of the MLA.

with the approved design.

ITAAC this) lifted load.The MLA is single-failure-proof in accordance with the approved design.

The following RXB fire and smoke barriers exist in accordance with the fire hazards analysis, and have been Fire and smoke barriers qualified for the fire rating specified in the fire hazards provide confinement so that analysis:

Reactor the impact from internal fires, Table An inspection will be performed of the RXB Building 1 smoke, hot gases,or fire 3.11-2 as-built fire and smoke barriers.

• fire-rated doors ITAAC suppressants is contained

• fire-rated penetration seals within the RXB fire area of

• fire-rated dampers origin.

• fire-rated walls, floors, and ceilings

• smoke barriers 32

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The following RXB internal flooding barriers exist in accordance with the internal flooding analysis report and Internal flooding barriers have been qualified as specified in the internal flooding provide confinement so that analysis report:

Reactor Table the impact from internal An inspection will be performed of the RXB Building 2 3.11-2 flooding is contained within as-built internal flooding barriers.

• flood resistant doors ITAAC the RXB flooding area of

• curbs and sills origin.

• walls

• water tight penetration seals

• National Electrical Manufacturer's Association enclosures The Seismic Category I RXB Reactor is protected against external Table An inspection will be performed of the RXB The RXB floor elevation at ground entrances is higher than Building 3 flooding in order to prevent 3.11-2 as-built floor elevation at ground entrances. the maximum external flood elevation.

ITAAC flooding of safety- related SSC within the structure.

The RXB includes radiation Reactor The thickness of RXB radiation shielding barriers is greater Table shielding barriers for normal An inspection will be performed of the as-built Building 4 than or equal to the required thickness specified in Table 3.11-2 operation and post-accident RXB radiation shielding barriers.

ITAAC 3.11-1.

radiation shielding.

The RXB includes radiation attenuating doors for normal operation and for post- The RXB radiation attenuating doors are installed in their Reactor accident radiation shielding. design location and have a radiation attenuation capability Table An inspection will be performed of the as-built Building 5 These doors have a radiation that meets or exceeds that of the wall within which they are 3.11-2 RXB radiation attenuating doors.

ITAAC attenuation capability that installed. in accordance with the approved door schedule meets or exceeds that of the design.

wall within which they are installed.

i. A design report exists and concludes that the deviations

i. An inspection and analysis will be between the drawings used for construction and the as-built The RXB is Seismic Category Reactor performed of the as-built RXB. RXB have been reconciled, and the RXB maintains its Table I and maintains its structural Building 6 structural integrity under the design basis loads.

3.11-2 integrity under the design ITAAC ii. An inspection will be performed of the as-basis loads.

built RXB. ii. The dimensions of the RXB critical sections conform to the approved design.

33

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title A report exists and concludes that the Non-Seismic Category I SSC located where there is a potential for adverse interaction with the RXB or a Seismic Category I SSC exists in the RXB will not impair the ability of Seismic Non-Seismic Category I SSC Category I SSC to perform their safety functions during or located where there is a following an SSE as demonstrated by one or more of the potential for adverse following criteria:

An inspection and analysis will be performed interaction with a the RXB or Reactor of the as-built non-Seismic Category I SSC Table a Seismic Category I SSC

• Seismic Category I SSC are isolated from non-Seismic Building 7 located where there is a potential for adverse 3.11-2 exists in the RXB will not Category I SSC, so that interaction does not occur.

ITAAC interaction with the RXB or a Seismic impair the ability of Seismic

• Seismic Category I SSC are analyzed to confirm that Category I SSC in the RXB. in the RXB.

Category I SSC to perform the ability to perform their safety functions is not their safety functions during impaired as a result of impact from non- Seismic or following a SSE. Category I SSC.

• A non-Seismic Category I restraint system designed to Seismic Category I requirements is used to assure that no interaction occurs between Seismic Category I SSC and non-Seismic Category I SSC.

Safety-related SSC are Protective features are installed in accordance with the as-protected against the An inspection and analysis will be performed built Pipe Break Hazard Analysis Report and safety-related Reactor dynamic and environmental of the as-built high- and moderate-energy Table SSC are protected against or qualified to withstand the Building 8 effects associated with piping systems and protective features for the 3.11-2 dynamic and environmental effects associated with ITAAC postulated failures in high- safety- related SSC located in the RXB postulated failures in high- and moderate-energy piping and moderate-energy piping outside the Reactor Pool Bay.

systems.

systems.

Radioactiv The RWB includes radiation The thickness of RWB radiation shielding barriers is greater Table e Waste shielding barriers for normal An inspection will be performed of the as-built 1 than or equal to the required thickness specified in Table 3.12-2 Building operation and post-accident RWB radiation shielding barriers.

3.12-1.

ITAAC radiation shielding.

The RWB includes radiation attenuating doors for normal operation and for post- The RWB radiation attenuating doors are installed in their Radioactiv accident radiation shielding. design location and have a radiation attenuation capability Table e Waste An inspection will be performed of the as-built 2 These doors have a radiation that meets or exceeds that of the wall within which they are 3.12-2 Building RWB radiation attenuating doors.

attenuation capability that installed. in accordance with the approved door schedule ITAAC meets or exceeds that of the design.

wall within which they are installed.

A design report exists and concludes that the deviations Radioactiv The RWB is an RW-IIa between the drawings used for construction and the as-built Table e Waste structure and maintains its An inspection and analysis will be performed 3 RW-IIa RWB have been reconciled and that the as-built 3.12-2 Building structural integrity under the of the as-built RW-IIa RWB.

RW-IIa RWB maintains its structural integrity under the ITAAC design basis loads.

design basis loads.

34

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The following CRB fire and smoke barriers exist in accordance with the fire hazards analysis, and have been Fire and smoke barriers qualified for the fire rating specified in the fire hazards provide confinement so that analysis:

Control the impact from internal fires, Table An inspection will be performed of the CRB Building 1 smoke, hot gases, or fire 3.13-1 as-built fire and smoke barriers.

• fire-rated doors ITAAC suppressants is contained

• fire-rated penetration seals within the CRB fire area of

• fire-rated dampers origin.

• fire-rated walls, floors, and ceilings

• smoke barriers The following CRB internal flooding barriers exist in accordance with the internal flooding analysis report and Internal flooding barriers have been qualified as specified in the internal flooding provide confinement so that analysis report:

Control Table the impact from internal An inspection will be performed of the CRB Building 2 3.13-1 flooding is contained within as-built internal flooding barriers.

• flood resistant doors ITAAC the CRB flooding area of

• walls origin.

• water tight penetration seals

• National Electrical Manufacturer's Association (NEMA) enclosures The Seismic Category I CRB Control is protected against external Table An inspection will be performed of the CRB The CRB floor elevation at ground entrances is higher than Building 3 flooding in order to prevent 3.13-1 as-built floor elevation at ground entrances. the maximum external flood elevation.

ITAAC flooding of safety- related SSC within the structure.

The CRB at Elevation 120-0 i. A design report exists and concludes that the deviations (except for the elevator shaft, between the drawings used for construction and the as-built the stairwells, and the fire i. An inspection and analysis will be CRB have been reconciled, and the CRB at Elevation 120-Control protection vestibule which are performed of the as-built CRB. 0 and below (except for the elevator shaft, the stairwells, Table Building 4 Seismic Category II) and and the fire protection vestibule) maintains its structural 3.13-1 ITAAC below is Seismic Category I ii. An inspection will be performed of the as- integrity under the design basis loads.

and maintains its structural built CRB at Elevation 120- 0 and below.

integrity under the design ii. The dimensions of the CRB critical sections conform to basis loads. the approved design.

35

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Table Control 5 Non-Seismic Category I SSC An inspection and analysis will be performed A report exists and concludes that the Non-Seismic 3.13-1 Building located where a potential for of the as-built non-Seismic Category I SSC in Category I SSC located where a potential for adverse ITAAC adverse interaction with a the CRB. interaction with a Seismic Category I SSC exists in the CRB Seismic Category I SSC will not impair the ability of Seismic Category I SSC to exists in the CRB will not perform their safety functions during or following a safe-impair the ability of Seismic shutdown earthquake as demonstrated by one or more of Category I SSC to perform the following criteria:

their safety functions during

• The collapse of the non-seismic Category I structure to or following a safe shutdown strike a seismic Category I SSC.

earthquake.

• The collapse of the non-Category I structure will not impair the integrity of Seismic Category I SSCs, nor result in incapacitating injury to control room occupants,

• The non-Category I structure will be analyzed and designed to prevent its failure under SSE conditions.

The common Seismic Category I equipment listed in Table 3.14-1, including its associated supports and anchorages, withstands design basis seismic loads without loss of its function(s) during and after a safe shutdown earthquake. The

i. A sSeismic qQualification Report record form exists and scope of equipment for this

i. A type test, analysis, or a combination of concludes that the common Seismic Category I equipment design commitment is type test and analysis will be performed of listed in Table 3.14-1, including its associated supports and Equipmen common, safety- related the common Seismic Category I equipment, anchorages, will withstand the design basis seismic loads t equipment, and common, including its associated supports and and perform its function during and after a safe shutdown Qualificati nonsafety-related equipment Table anchorages. earthquake.

on - 1 that provides one of the 3.14-2 Shared following nonsafety-related ii. An inspection will be performed of the ii. The common Seismic Category I equipment listed in Equipmen functions:

common Seismic Category I as- built Table 3.14-1, including its associated supports and t ITAAC equipment, including its associated supports anchorages, is installed in its design location in a Seismic

• Provides physical support and anchorages. Category I structure in a configuration bounded by the of irradiated fuel (fuel equipments seismic qualification record form.

handling machine, spent fuel storage racks, reactor building crane, and module lifting adaptor)

• Provides a path for makeup water to the UHS

• Provides containment of UHS water

• Monitors UHS water level 36

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title The common electrical equipment located in a harsh environment, including its connection assemblies, withstands the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal operations,

i. An equipment qualification record form exists and anticipated operational

i. A type test or a combination of type test concludes that the common electrical equipment listed in Equipmen occurrences, DBA, and post-and analysis will be performed of the Table 3.14-1, including its connection assemblies, performs t accident conditions and common electrical equipment, including its its function under the environmental conditions specified in Qualificati performs its function for the Table connection assemblies. the equipment qualification record form for the period of on - 2 period of time required to 3.14-2 time required to complete the function.

Shared complete the function. The ii. An inspection will be performed of the Equipmen scope of equipment for this common as-built electrical equipment, ii. The common electrical equipment listed in Table 3.14-1, t ITAAC design commitment is including its connection assemblies. including its connection assemblies, is installed in its design nonsafety-related equipment location in a configuration bounded by the EQ record form.

that provides monitoring of the UHS water level and the non-safety related electrical equipment on the fuel handling machine and reactor building crane used to physically support irradiated fuel.

Table Equipmen 3 The RW-IIa components and i. An inspection and reconciliation analysis i. A report exists and concludes that the as-built RW-IIa 3.14-2 t (Respons piping used for processing will be performed of the as-built RW-IIa components and piping used for processing gaseous Qualificati e to RAI gaseous radioactive waste components and piping listed in Table 3.14- radioactive waste listed in Table 3.14-1 meet the RW-IIa on - 9608 listed in Table 3.14-1 are 1. used for processing gaseous radioactive design criteria.

Shared added this constructed to the standards waste.

Equipmen ITAAC) of RW-IIa.

t ITAAC The as-built main control Human The as-built configuration of main control room HSI is room HSI is consistent with Table Factors An inspection will be performed of the as-built consistent with the as-designed configuration of main 1 the final design specifications 3.15-1 Engineeri configuration of MCR HSI. control room HSI as modified by the Integrated System validated by the integrated ng ITAAC Validation Report.

system validation test.

Physical Vital equipment will be Table Security All vital equipment locations will be 1 located only within a vital Vital equipment is located only within a vital area.

3.16-1 System inspected.

area.

ITAAC 37

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Physical Access to vital equipment Vital equipment is located within a protected area such that Table Security All vital equipment physical barriers will be 2 requires passage through at access to the vital equipment requires passage through at 3.16-1 System inspected.

least two physical barriers. least two physical barriers.

ITAAC Physical The external walls, doors, Type test, analysis, or a combination of type Table Security ceiling, and floors in the MCR test and analysis of the external walls, doors, A report exists and concludes that the walls, doors, ceilings, 3

3.16-1 System and CAS will be bullet- ceiling, and floors in the MCR and CAS, will and floors in the MCR and CAS are bullet-resistant.

ITAAC resistant. be performed.

An access control system will be installed and designed for Physical The access control system is installed and provides use by individuals who are Table Security authorized access to vital areas within the nuclear island 4 authorized access to vital The access control system will be tested.

3.16-1 System and structures only to those individuals with authorization areas within the nuclear ITAAC for unescorted access.

island and structures without escort.

Unoccupied vital areas within Physical the nuclear island and Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests Unoccupied vital areas within the nuclear island and Table Security structures will be designed and inspections of unoccupied vital areas' 5 structures are locked and alarmed and intrusion is detected 3.16-1 System with locking devices and intrusion detection equipment and locking and annunciated in the CAS.

ITAAC intrusion detection devices devices will be performed.

that annunciate in the CAS.

The CAS will be located Physical inside the protected area and The CAS is located inside the protected area, and the Table Security will be designed so that the 6 The CAS will be inspected. interior of the alarm station is not visible from the perimeter 3.16-1 System interior is not visible from the of the protected area.

ITAAC perimeter of the protected area.

Security alarm devices in the Security alarm devices in the RXB and CRB, within the RXB and CRB, including nuclear island and structures including transmission lines to Physical transmission lines to annunciators, are tamper-indicating and self-checking; an Table Security annunciators, will be tamper- All security alarm devices and transmission 7 automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm 3.16-1 System indicating and self- checking, lines in the RXB and CRB will be tested.

system or a component thereof occurs or when the system ITAAC and alarm annunciation is on standby power; the alarm annunciation indicates the indicates the type of alarm type of alarm and location.

and its location.

38

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Intrusion detection and assessment systems in the Physical RXB and CRB within the The intrusion detection systems in the RXB and CRB, within Table Security nuclear island and structures Intrusion detection and assessment systems 8 the nuclear island and structures provide a visual display 3.16-1 System will be designed to provide in the RXB and CRB will be tested.

and audible annunciation of all alarms in the CAS.

ITAAC visual display and audible annunciation of alarms in the CAS.

Intrusion detection systems' recording equipment will record security alarm Intrusion detection systems' recording equipment is capable Physical annunciations within the The intrusion detection systems' recording of recording each security alarm annunciation within the Table Security nuclear island and structures 9 equipment in the RXB and CRB will be nuclear island and structures, including each alarm, false 3.16-1 System including each alarm, false tested. alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication and the type of ITAAC alarm, alarm check, and alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.

tamper indication, and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.

Emergency exits through the vital area boundaries within the nuclear island and Physical structures will be alarmed Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests Emergency exits through the vital area boundaries within Table Security with intrusion detection and inspections of emergency exits through the nuclear island and structures are alarmed with intrusion 10 3.16-1 System devices and within the vital area boundaries within the nuclear detection devices and secured by locking devices that allow ITAAC nuclear island and structures island and structures will be performed. prompt egress during an emergency.

are secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.

Physical The CAS will have a landline Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests Table Security telephone service with the The CAS is equipped with landline telephone service with 11 and inspections of the CAS's landline 3.16-1 System control room and local law the control room and local law enforcement authorities.

telephone service will be performed.

ITAAC enforcement authorities.

The CAS is capable of continuous communication with on-Physical The CAS will be capable of Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests duty watchmen, armed security officers, armed responders, Table Security continuous communication 12 and inspections of the CAS's continuous or other security personnel who have responsibilities within 3.16-1 System with on-duty security force communication capabilities will be performed. the physical protection program and during contingency ITAAC personnel.

response events.

39

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Nonportable communications Physical equipment in the CAS will Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests All nonportable communication devices in the CAS remain Table Security remain operable from an and inspections of the nonportable 13 operable from an independent power source in the event of 3.16-1 System independent power source in communications equipment will be the loss of normal power.

ITAAC the event of the loss of performed.

normal power.

Radiation Monitoring The CFDS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated CFDS high-radiation ITAAC for responds to a high-radiation Table A test will be performed of the CFDS high- signal listed in Table 3.17-1, the CFDS automatically NuScale 1 signal from 6A-CFD-RT-3.17-2 radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Power 1007 to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

Modules radioactivity.

1-6 Radiation The BPDS automatically Monitoring responds to a high-radiation Upon initiation of a real or simulated BPDS high-radiation ITAAC for signals from 6A-BPD-RIT-Table A test will be performed of the BPDS high- signal listed in Table 3.17-1 the BPDS automatically NuScale 2 0552, 6A-BPD-RIT- 0529, 3.17-2 radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Power and 6A-BPD-RIT- 0705 to identified in the table.

Modules mitigate a release of 1-6 radioactivity.

Radiation Monitoring The BPDS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated BPDS high-radiation ITAAC for responds to a high-radiation Table A test will be performed of the BPDS high- signal listed in Table 3.17-1, the BPDS automatically NuScale 3 signal from 6A-BPD-RIT-3.17-2 radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Power 0529 to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

Modules radioactivity.

1-6 Radiation Monitoring The BPDS automatically Upon initiation of a real or simulated BPDS high-radiation ITAAC for responds to a high-radiation Table A test will be performed of the BPDS high- signal listed in Table 3.17-1, the BPDS automatically NuScale 4 signal from 6A-BPD-RIT-3.17-2 radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Power 0705 to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

Modules radioactivity.

1-6 Radiation Monitoring The CFDS automatically ITAAC Upon initiation of a real or simulated CFDS high-radiation responds to a high-radiation Table For A test will be performed of the CFDS high- signal listed in Table 3.18-1, the CFDS automatically 1 signal from 6B-CFD-RT-3.18-2 NuScale radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions 1007 to mitigate a release of Power identified in the table.

radioactivity.

Modules 7-12 40

Table Table No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. Title Radiation Monitoring The BPDS automatically ITAAC responds to a high-radiation Upon initiation of a real or simulated BPDS high-radiation Table For signals from 6B-BPD-RIT- A test will be performed of the BPDS high- signal listed in Table 3.18-1, the BPDS automatically 2

3.18-2 NuScale 0551 and 6B-BPD-RIT- 0530 radiation signals. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions Power to mitigate a release of identified in the table.

Modules radioactivity.

7-12 Radiation Monitoring The BPDS automatically ITAAC Upon initiation of a real or simulated BPDS high-radiation responds to a high-radiation Table For A test will be performed of the BPDS high- signal listed in Table 3.18-1, the BPDS automatically 3 signal from 6B-BPD-RIT-3.18-2 NuScale radiation signal. aligns/actuates the identified components to the positions 0530 to mitigate a release of Power identified in the table.

radioactivity.

Modules 7-12 41

Request for Additional Information No. 522 (eRAI No. 9681)

Issue Date: 05/21/2019 Application

Title:

NuScale Standard Design Certification 048 Operating Company: NuScale Power, LLC Docket No.52-048 Review Section: 14.03 - Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Application Section: 14.03 QUESTIONS 14.03-3 14.03.01-1 Please see the attachment to this Request for Additional Information.

Title 10, Section 52.47(b)(1) of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) requires that a design certification application contain the proposed inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the inspections, tests, and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, a facility that incorporates the design certification has been constructed and will operate in accordance with the design certification, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), and the NRC's rules and regulations. For the ITAAC to be "sufficient," (1) the inspections, tests, and analyses (ITA) must clearly identify those activities necessary to demonstrate that the acceptance criteria (AC) are met; (2) the AC must state clear design or performance objectives demonstrating that the Tier 1 design commitments (DCs) are satisfied; (3) the ITA and AC must be consistent with each other and the Tier 1 DC; (4) the ITAAC must be capable of being performed and satisfied prior to fuel load; and (5) the ITAAC, as a whole, must provide reasonable assurance that, if the ITAAC are satisfied, the facility has been constructed and will be operated in accordance with the design certification, the AEA, and the NRC's rules and regulations.

The staff has reviewed all DCD Rev 2, Tier 1 ITAAC tables and Chapter 1 of Tier 1 against these objectives, and in light of NRC guidance, Commission policy, and lessons learned from plants that are currently under construction that are in the process of implementing ITAAC. Based on this review, the staff has compiled the attached list of proposed ITAAC wording changes. The applicant is requested to make these changes in the Tier 1 ITAAC tables and in Chapter 1 of Tier 1, or otherwise show that the ITAAC comply with 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1). Additionally, the applicant is requested to address the following items, or otherwise show that the ITAAC comply with 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1):

1. ITAAC 29 in Table 2.5-7 verifies that the MCR isolation switches are located in the remote shutdown station but it does not verify the functionality of the switches. Please explain how ITAAC 29 verifies that the MCR isolation switches actually isolate the manual MCR switches from the MPS in case of fire. If ITAAC 29 does not verify the functionality of the MCR isolation switches, please explain what changes to the existing ITAAC in Tier 1 would be necessary to verify the functionality of the MCR isolation switches through ITAAC. If the applicant believes that ITAAC are not necessary to verify the functionality of the MCR isolation switches, please explain this and please explain why an ITAAC is, nonetheless, necessary to verify the location of the MCR isolation switches.

2. The design commitments listed in the design descriptions of DCA Part 2, Tier 1 are not consistent with the design commitments in the corresponding ITAAC tables. Although not identified in the attachment, the design

commitments in the design descriptions of DCA Part 2, Tier 1 should be revised to be consistent with the design commitment in the ITAAC tables.

Additional explanations for the basis of the staff's proposed revisions in the attachment are provided below:

1. Tier 1, Section 1.1: Propose adding a definition of "approved design" to clarify what this term refers to. Without a definition, it is not clear who the approver is or when the design is considered approved (at certification or when the ITAAC is closed?). To provide clarity and flexibility, the staff proposes to define the "approved design" in terms of the updated final safety analysis report.

2. Tier 1, Section 1.2.4: Propose adding explanatory material consistent with past design certifications as applied to the NuScale design.

3. ITAAC 12 in Table 2.1-4: To resolve the use of the ambiguous word, "approximately" in the AC.

4. ITAAC 22 in Table 2.1-4: To clarify the applicability of the ITAAC to the assemblies and to add consideration of overload currents.

5. ITAAC 1 and 2 in Table 2.3-1: To make the scope of the ITA and AC consistent with the DC.

6. ITAAC 3, 4, and 6 in Table 2.5-7: To clarify the applicability of physical separation, electrical isolation, and communications independence in the DC and ITAAC.

7. ITAAC 15 in Table 2.5-7: To clarify the DC and make the DC consistent with the AC.

8. ITAAC 21 in Table 2.5-7: To clarify the DC and resolve an inconsistency between the DC and AC.

9. ITAAC 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.7-2: The DCs for ITAAC 2 to 4 relate to a single Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) high radiation signal, but the AC for each ITAAC cover all 3 CVCS radiation signals. The proposed changes consolidate ITAAC 2 to 4 so that the scope of the DC matches the scope of the AC.

10. ITAAC 1 in Table 3.4-1: To resolve an inconsistency between the DC and AC.

11. ITAAC 4 in Table 3.4-1: The DC is actually an ITA. The staff's proposed revisions correct this.

12. ITAAC 2 in Table 3.5-1: To remove an unnecessary conditional statement in the DC and to clarify what the "approved" analysis is.

13. ITAAC 3 in Table 3.7-1: To clarify in the AC the alternative shutdown capability referred to in the DC.

14. ITAAC 4, 5, and 6 in Table 3.9-2: See explanation for ITAAC 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.7-2.

15. ITAAC 8 and 9 in Table 3.9-2: See explanation for ITAAC 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.7-2.

16. ITAAC 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3.10-1: To resolve inconsistencies between the DC and AC.

17. ITAAC 7 in Table 3.10-1: The DC is actually an ITA. The staff's proposed revisions correct this and make it consistent with the AC.

18. ITAAC 8 in Table 3.10-1: This ITAAC could be deleted if the proposed revisions to ITAAC 7 in Table 3.10-1 are incorporated as shown in the attachment since the scope of the revised ITAAC 7 would encompass the scope of ITAAC 8.

19. ITAAC 10 in Table 3.10-1: To resolve inconsistencies between the DC and AC.

20. ITAAC 5 in Table 3.11-2: To remove unnecessary and ambiguous qualifying language in the AC.

21. ITAAC 2 in Table 3.12-2: To remove unnecessary and ambiguous qualifying language in the AC.

22. ITAAC 7 and 8 in Table 3.16-1: To make the scope of the ITAAC consistent among the DC, ITA, and AC.

23. ITAAC 9 in Table 3.16-1: To clarify the scope of the ITA.

24. ITAAC 10 in Table 3.16-1: To make the scope of the ITA and AC consistent with the DC.

25. ITAAC 2, 3, and 4 in Table 3.17-2: See explanation for ITAAC 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.7-2.

26. ITAAC 2 and 3 in Table 3.18-2: See explanation for ITAAC 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.7-2.