ML18036A740

LER 92-005-00:on 920505,unit 2 Instrument Mechanics Performed Functional Test on Wrong Refueling Zone Radiation Monitor.Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail During Work Activities.Radiation Monitor Placed in svc.W/920603 Ltr

ML18036A740
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	06/03/1992
From:	Jay Wallace, Zeringue O TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-92-005-02, LER-92-5-2, NUDOCS 9206100133
Download: ML18036A740 (16)

Text

ACCELERATED DI TRIBUTION DEMONS TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9206100133 DOC.DATE: 92/06/03 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIE.:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WA'LLACE,J.E. Tennessee Valley Authority, ZERINGUE,O.J. Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R

SUBJECT:

LER 92-005-00:on 920505,unit 2 instrument mechanics performed functional test on wrong refuelinq zone radiation monitor. Caused by lack of attention to detail during work D activities. Radiation monitor placed in svs.W920603 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE'E22T COPIES RECEIVED'LTR L TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

ENCL i SIZE NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL SANDERS,M. 1 1 HEBDON,F 1 1 ROSS,T. ,1 1 D INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPBll 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB SD NRR DSg/SPLBSD1 LREG RGN2 FILE 02 01 1'.

1 1

1 1

1 1

NRR/DST/SICBSH3 NRR/DST/SRXB SE RES/DSIR/EIB 1

1 1

1 1

1 EXTERNAL EGGG BRYCE I J H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

D D

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P l-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAiWIE FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T blEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32

41 Tennessee Vatley Authority, Post Office Box 2000. Decatur.'Alabama 35609 O. J, 'Ike'eringue Vice President. Browns Ferry Operations JUN 03 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C'. 20555

Dear Sir:

TVA BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-260 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LER-50-260/92005 The enclosed report provides details concerning unplanned engineered safety feature actuations resulting from actuation of the wrong trip test switch during the performance of a surveillance instruction.

The report is submitted in'ccordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Sincerely,

( ~Pulp(Af

0. J. Zeringue Enclosure cc: see page 2 9206100133 920603 PDR S

ADOCK 05000260 PDR

~+2.2.

(( I

~

I'

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JUN 0 3 1992 cc (Enclosure):

INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circ'le 75 Parkway.

Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Paul Krippner American Nuclear Insurers Town Center, Suite 300S 29 South Main Street West Hartford, Connecticut 06107 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, P.O. Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Thierry M. Ross U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

0 II NRC Fbrm 366 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION Approved OHB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAHE (1) IDOCKET NUMBER (2) I w

TITLF. (4) Engineered -safety feature actuation resulting from the wrong test switch being turned during a rv'1 V V

) JSEgUENTIAL J )REVISION[ J ) J FACILITY NAHES . )DOCKET NUHBER(S)

TH DA Y A N H D Y Y 1 I I I I l l I I I 1

06 0 392 1 1 OPERATING I ITHIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE RE()UIREHENTS OF 10 CFR g:

NODE I .I ~

f wn ll N I20.402(b) i20.405(c) )50.73(a)(2)(iv) I I73.71(b)

POWER (20.405(a)(l)(i) I50.36(c)(.1) I l50.73(a)(2)(v) 1 I73 71(c).

LEVEL I )20.405(a)(1)(ii) )50.36(c)(2) )50.73(a)(2)(vii) [OTHER (Speci,fy in

]20.405(a)( l)(iii) J (50.73(a)(2)(i) )50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Abstract below and in (20.405(a)( l)(iv) .'] )50.73(a)(2)(ii) )50.73(a)(2),(viii)(B) Text, NRC Form 366A) 4 v 1 I

Y T H I

N NT HA F T

,IREPORTABLEI P

I,IAI D R H

l,l i AREA CODE P

J IREPORTABLEI P T P D 14 EXPECTED I N H D Y Y I SUBHISSION I I I m 0 N 0 DAT 1 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i .e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) ( 16)

On May 5, 1992, with Units 1 and 3 defueled and .Unit 2 at 100 percent power, the Unit 2 Instrument Mechanics (IMs) performed a functional test on .the wrong refueling zone radiation monitor thereby causing the actuation .of BFN's engineered safety features .(ESF). This challenge to the ESFs is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

The root cause for .this event is lack of .attention to detail during work activities.

The immediate corrective actions were: an assistant shift operations supervisor instructed the IMs to discontinue the surveillance instruction and place the radiation monitor in service. Alarms were reset, and ESF actions were returned to standby. Additionally,, TEA counselled the individuals involved and will review this event with maintenance personnel.

NRC Form 366(6-89)

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION Approved OHB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAHE (1) IDOCKET NUHBER (2)

I I I I SEQUENTIAL I IREVISIONI I I I I Browns Ferry Unit 2 I Y I I I I TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I: PLANT CONDITIONS Unit 2 was at approximately 100 percent power (Power Operations). Units 1 and 3 were defueled.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. ~Ev nt':

On May 5, 1992, at 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />, the Unit 2 control room unit operator (UO)

(utility, licensed) noticed engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations when the Unit 2 refueling zone ventilation isolated. This isolation resulted from Instrument Mechanics (IM) (utility, nonlicensed) performing a functional test on the wrong radiation monitor.

The surveillance instruction (SI) required four ventilation monitors to be functionally tested. The logic for these monitors is that one upscale or two downscale trips will initiate ESF actuations. The functional tests for the first three monitors were performed without incident. The event

.occurred during the performance of the functional test of the fourth monitor (2-RM-90-141). As required,,the IM inserted a shorting plug on the correct radiation monitor (2-RM-90-141), located in the Auxiliary Instrument Room, to ensure that an anticipated trip signal would not initiate ESF equipment. The IM then returned to the control room and with the other IM'erforming the test, went to the rear of the panel to connect one lead of a voltmeter. After properly placing the lead, they returned to the front of the panel to connect the second lead. However, both IMs went directly to the wrong radiation monitor (2-RM-90-140) and connected the lead to this monitor, and placed the "operate/zero/trip" test switch to trip.

This resu1'ted in a Group 6 primary containment isolation system (PCIS) actuation [JM]. This resulted in isolation of the reactor and refuel zone ventilation [VA] on Units 1, 2, and 3; actuation of the standby gas treatment systems (SGTS) [BH]; and initiation of the control room emergency ventilation, system (CREV) [VI].

NRC Form 366(6-89)

Cl

~ ~ I ' I ~ s ~ c I ~ ~ I I I ~

o ~ I XI ) ~

1 'I ~ a I I I I o I I I I I ~ ~ ~

) ~

- ~ . ~ '

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~

~ I ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~ 0

~ ~ ~ ~

) ' ~ ~

~ ~ ~I ~ ~ II I~~ ~ ~ ~ II lgl t I ~

I ' ~ ~ .'I II ' ~ )

~ ~ ~

g f ) ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~

I ~

~ ~

~ ~

)

~ ~ ~

) ) ~ ~ I I ~

I '

I ) II ~ I s ~ s ~ ) . o'- ~

) ~ ~ I ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ I

NRC Form 366A U.S. UCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSION Approved ONB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT" (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) IDOCKET NUNBER (2)

I ,iSEQUENTIAL J JREVISIONi )

Browns Ferry Unit 2 I I I I I 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

F t A t The ASOS'nstructed the IMs to discontinue the test and to return 2-RM-90-140 to service. The ASOS reset the alarms, and ESF actuations were returned to standby.

G.

The trip signal on 2-RM-90-140 resul'ted in a partial Group 6 PCIS actuation. The PCIS actuation included the reactor building, and refueling zone ventilation system isolation; A, B, and C SGTS starting; and A and B CREV systems starting.

III. CAUSE OF THE EVICT The immediate cause for the ESF actuation was the introduction of a trip signal to the logic circuitry of 2-RM-90-140.

B- R~t~Isae-The root cause of this event was lack of attention to detail during work activities.

IV. RLHETX ANALTSIS Since all equipment performed as designed during the event, the inadvertent actuation of several ESF components did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

V CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A. tv t on The ASOS noticed the alarm panel for the radiation monitor was illuminated and instructed the IMs to discontinue the SI and to return the radiation monitor to normal. Alarms were reset and ESF initiations were returned to standby.

NRC Form 366(6-89)

C' NRC Form 366A (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) t Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) IOOCKET NUMBER (2) N I ]SEQUENTIAL .i iREVISIONi Browns Ferry Uni t 2 I

~ Y A I I I I TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) ( 17),

B. tv At t v Individuals involved were counselled on the importance of paying close attention to detail following work procedures and self-checking each step. In addition, this event will be discussed with maintenance personnel. TVA will emphasize employee responsibility for self-checking and maintaining a questioning attitude.

VI. ADDITIONAL XNFORMATION None.

B.

None. However, TVA has experienced previous events as a result of lack of attention to detail. As a result, TVA continues to emphasize to its employees their responsibilities.

VII.

Th'is 'event will be discussed with maintenance personnel. TVA will emphasize employee responsibility for self-checking and maintaining a-questioning attitude. This will be completed by July 6, 1992..

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the

'ext as [XZ].

NRC Form 366(6-B9)

ll L

J