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{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DI TRIBUTION DEMONS TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9206100133 DOC.DATE: 92/06/03 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DI TRIBUTION DEMONS                                     TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM               (RIDS)
NO FACIE.:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WA'LLACE,J.E.
ACCESSION NBR:9206100133               DOC.DATE: 92/06/03     NOTARIZED: NO           DOCKET FACIE.:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station,               Unit 2, Tennessee     05000260 AUTH. NAME             AUTHOR AFFILIATION WA'LLACE,J.E.         Tennessee Valley Authority, ZERINGUE,O.J.         Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R
Tennessee Valley Authority, ZERINGUE,O.J.
Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000260 R  


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 92-005-00:on 920505,unit 2 instrument mechanics performed functional test on wrong refuelinq zone radiation monitor.Caused by lack of attention to detail during work activities.
LER 92-005-00:on 920505,unit 2 instrument mechanics performed functional test on wrong refuelinq zone radiation monitor. Caused by lack of attention to detail during work                           D activities. Radiation monitor placed in svs.W920603                 ltr.
Radiation monitor placed in svs.W920603 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE'E22T COPIES RECEIVED'LTR L ENCL i SIZE TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES D RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME SANDERS,M.
DISTRIBUTION CODE'E22T COPIES RECEIVED'LTR                   L TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
ROSS,T.INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB SD NRR DSg/SPLBSD1 LREG.02 RGN2 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EGGG BRYCE I J H NRC PDR NSIC POORE,W.COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 ,1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'.1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME HEBDON,F ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPBll NRR/DST/SICBSH3 NRR/DST/SRXB SE RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
ENCL i SIZE NOTES RECIPIENT              COPIES            RECIPIENT            COPIES            D ID  CODE/NAME            LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME         LTTR ENCL SANDERS,M.                   1    1    HEBDON,F                  1      1 ROSS,T.                     ,1    1                                                  D INTERNAL: ACNW                           2    2    ACRS                      2      2 AEOD/DOA                     1    1    AEOD/DSP/TPAB            1      1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP                 2    2      NRR/DET/EMEB 7E          1      1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10               1    1      NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10          1      1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB                 1    1      NRR/DREP/PRPBll          2      2 NRR/DST/SELB SD NRR DSg/SPLBSD1 LREG RGN2 FILE 02 01 1'.
D D PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P l-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAiWIE FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T blEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32 41 Tennessee Vatley Authority, Post Office Box 2000.Decatur.'Alabama 35609 O.J,'Ike'eringue Vice President.
1 1
Browns Ferry Operations JUN 03 1992 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C'.20555
1 1
1 1
NRR/DST/SICBSH3 NRR/DST/SRXB SE RES/DSIR/EIB 1
1 1
1 1
1 EXTERNAL    EGGG BRYCE I J H              3    3      L ST LOBBY WARD           1      1 NRC PDR                      1    1    NSIC MURPHY,G.A           1     1 NSIC POORE,W.                1   1     NUDOCS FULL TXT            1     1 D
D D
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P l-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAiWIE FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T blEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR               32   ENCL     32


==Dear Sir:==
41 Tennessee Vatley Authority, Post Office Box 2000. Decatur.'Alabama 35609 O. J, 'Ike'eringue Vice President. Browns Ferry Operations JUN      03    1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:         Document        Control Desk Washington, D.C'.                 20555
TVA-BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)UNIT 1-DOCKET NO.50-260-FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52-LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LER-50-260/92005 The enclosed report provides details concerning unplanned engineered safety feature actuations resulting from actuation of the wrong trip test switch during the performance of a surveillance instruction.
The report is submitted in'ccordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).
Sincerely, (~Pulp(Af 0.J.Zeringue Enclosure cc: see page 2 9206100133 920603 PDR ADOCK 05000260 S PDR~+2.2.((I I~'
U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission JUN 0 3 1992 cc (Enclosure):
INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circ'le 75 Parkway.Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Paul Krippner American Nuclear Insurers Town Center, Suite 300S 29 South Main Street West Hartford, Connecticut 06107 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, P.O.Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000 Regional Administrator U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Thierry M.Ross U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 0 II NRC Fbrm 366 (6-89)FACILITY NAHE (1)w NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)Approved OHB No.3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 IDOCKET NUMBER (2)I TITLF.(4)Engineered-safety feature actuation resulting from the wrong test switch being turned during a rv'1 V V)JSEgUENTIAL J)REVISION[
J)J FACILITY NAHES.)DOCKET NUHBER(S)TH DA Y A N H D Y Y 1 I I I I l 1 l I I I 1 1 06 0 392 OPERATING NODE POWER LEVEL I N I20.402(b) i20.405(c)
(20.405(a)(l)(i)
I50.36(c)(.1)
)20.405(a)(1)(ii)
)50.36(c)(2)
]20.405(a)(l)(iii)J (50.73(a)(2)(i)
(20.405(a)(l)(iv).'])50.73(a)(2)(ii) 4 v 1)50.73(a)(2)(iv)
I l50.73(a)(2)(v)
)50.73(a)(2)(vii)
)50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
)50.73(a)(2),(viii)(B)
I ITHIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE RE()UIREHENTS OF 10 CFR g: I.I~f wn ll I I73.71(b)1 I73 71(c).[OTHER (Speci,fy in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)i AREA CODE J I I Y T H N NT HA F T ,IREPORTABLEI P AI D R'I,I l,l H P IREPORTABLEI EXPECTED I N H D Y Y I I I P T P D 14 I SUBHISSION m 0 N 0 DAT 1 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines)(16)On May 5, 1992, with Units 1 and 3 defueled and.Unit 2 at 100 percent power, the Unit 2 Instrument Mechanics (IMs)performed a functional test on.the wrong refueling zone radiation monitor thereby causing the actuation.of BFN's engineered safety features.(ESF).This challenge to the ESFs is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).
The root cause for.this event is lack of.attention to detail during work activities.
The immediate corrective actions were: an assistant shift operations supervisor instructed the IMs to discontinue the surveillance instruction and place the radiation monitor in service.Alarms were reset, and ESF actions were returned to standby.Additionally,, TEA counselled the individuals involved and will review this event with maintenance personnel.
NRC Form 366(6-89)


NRC Form 366A (6-89)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION Approved OHB No.3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAHE (1)Browns Ferry Unit 2 IDOCKET NUHBER (2)I I I Y I I SEQUENTIAL I IREVISIONI I I I I I I I I TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)(17)I: PLANT CONDITIONS Unit 2 was at approximately 100 percent power (Power Operations).
==Dear      Sir:==
Units 1 and 3 were defueled.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.~Ev nt': On May 5, 1992, at 1800 hours, the Unit 2 control room unit operator (UO)(utility, licensed)noticed engineered safety feature (ESF)actuations when the Unit 2 refueling zone ventilation isolated.This isolation resulted from Instrument Mechanics (IM)(utility, nonlicensed) performing a functional test on the wrong radiation monitor.The surveillance instruction (SI)required four ventilation monitors to be functionally tested.The logic for these monitors is that one upscale or two downscale trips will initiate ESF actuations.
The functional tests for the first three monitors were performed without incident.The event.occurred during the performance of the functional test of the fourth monitor (2-RM-90-141).
As required,,the IM inserted a shorting plug on the correct radiation monitor (2-RM-90-141), located in the Auxiliary Instrument Room, to ensure that an anticipated trip signal would not initiate ESF equipment.
The IM then returned to the control room and with the other IM'erforming the test, went to the rear of the panel to connect one lead of a voltmeter.
After properly placing the lead, they returned to the front of the panel to connect the second lead.However, both IMs went directly to the wrong radiation monitor (2-RM-90-140) and connected the lead to this monitor, and placed the"operate/zero/trip" test switch to trip.This resu1'ted in a Group 6 primary containment isolation system (PCIS)actuation[JM].This resulted in isolation of the reactor and refuel zone ventilation
[VA]on Units 1, 2, and 3;actuation of the standby gas treatment systems (SGTS)[BH];and initiation of the control room emergency ventilation, system (CREV)[VI].NRC Form 366(6-89)
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NRC Form 366A (6-89)U.S.UCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT" (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION Approved ONB No.3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 FACILITY NAME (1)Browns Ferry Unit 2 IDOCKET NUNBER (2)I I ,iSEQUENTIAL J JREVISIONi
TVA  BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1  DOCKET NO. 50-260  FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52  LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LER-50-260/92005 The enclosed            report provides details concerning unplanned engineered safety feature actuations resulting from actuation of the wrong trip test switch during the performance of a surveillance instruction.
)I I I I 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)(17)F t A t The ASOS'nstructed the IMs to discontinue the test and to return 2-RM-90-140 to service.The ASOS reset the alarms, and ESF actuations were returned to standby.G.The trip signal on 2-RM-90-140 resul'ted in a partial Group 6 PCIS actuation.
The    report is submitted in'ccordance with                            10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).
The PCIS actuation included the reactor building, and refueling zone ventilation system isolation; A, B, and C SGTS starting;and A and B CREV systems starting.III.CAUSE OF THE EVICT The immediate cause for the ESF actuation was the introduction of a trip signal to the logic circuitry of 2-RM-90-140.
Sincerely,
B-R~t~Isae-The root cause of this event was lack of attention to detail during work activities.
(      ~Pulp(Af
IV.RLHETX ANALTSIS Since all equipment performed as designed during the event, the inadvertent actuation of several ESF components did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.V CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A.t v t on The ASOS noticed the alarm panel for the radiation monitor was illuminated and instructed the IMs to discontinue the SI and to return the radiation monitor to normal.Alarms were reset and ESF initiations were returned to standby.NRC Form 366(6-89)
: 0. J. Zeringue Enclosure cc: see page              2 9206100133 920603 PDR S
C' NRC Form 366A (6-89)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION t Approved OMB No.3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 FACILITY NAME (1)Browns Ferry Uni t 2 IOOCKET NUMBER (2)N I]SEQUENTIAL.i iREVISIONi I~Y A I I I I TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)(17), B.tv At t v Individuals involved were counselled on the importance of paying close attention to detail following work procedures and self-checking each step.In addition, this event will be discussed with maintenance personnel.
ADOCK 05000260 PDR
TVA will emphasize employee responsibility for self-checking and maintaining a questioning attitude.VI.ADDITIONAL XNFORMATION None.B.None.However, TVA has experienced previous events as a result of lack of attention to detail.As a result, TVA continues to emphasize to its employees their responsibilities.
                                                                                                      ~+2.2.
VII.Th'is'event will be discussed with maintenance personnel.
(( I
TVA will emphasize employee responsibility for self-checking and maintaining a-questioning attitude.This will be completed by July 6, 1992..Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS)codes are identified in the'ext as[XZ].NRC Form 366(6-B9) ll L J}}
 
~
I'
 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JUN 0 3 1992 cc (Enclosure):
INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circ'le  75 Parkway.
Atlanta, Georgia    30339 Paul Krippner American Nuclear Insurers Town Center, Suite 300S 29 South Main Street West  Hartford, Connecticut    06107 NRC  Resident Inspector Browns  Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, P.O. Box 637 Athens, Alabama    35609-2000 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region  II 101  Marietta Street, Suite  2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Thierry  M. Ross U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852
 
0 II NRC  Fbrm 366                                        NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION                                        Approved    OHB  No. 3150-0104 (6-89)                                                                                                                          Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAHE (1)                                                                                                        IDOCKET NUMBER      (2)  I w
TITLF.  (4)    Engineered -safety feature actuation                      resulting from the        wrong  test switch being turned during          a rv'1 V                                                                                                                                      V
                                        )    JSEgUENTIAL      J    )REVISION[              J      )      J  FACILITY NAHES      .        )DOCKET NUHBER(S)
TH    DA                Y A          N                                  H          D Y    Y                1 I        I          I      I    l                      l            I          I      I 1
06        0    392    1                                  1 OPERATING          I    ITHIS  REPORT    IS  SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE RE()UIREHENTS OF 10 CFR                    g:
NODE          I  .I                            ~
f      wn        ll N      I20.402(b)                      i20.405(c)                      )50.73(a)(2)(iv)          I  I73.71(b)
POWER                        (20.405(a)(l)(i)                I50.36(c)(.1)              I    l50.73(a)(2)(v)          1  I73 71(c).
LEVEL I                      )20.405(a)(1)(ii)                )50.36(c)(2)                    )50.73(a)(2)(vii)            [OTHER (Speci,fy in
                                    ]20.405(a)(  l)(iii)        J  (50.73(a)(2)(i)                  )50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)          Abstract below and in (20.405(a)(  l)(iv)      .']  )50.73(a)(2)(ii)                )50.73(a)(2),(viii)(B)        Text,    NRC   Form 366A) 4            v                                  1 I
Y T H I
N NT    HA  F    T
                                                          ,IREPORTABLEI P
I,IAI      D  R H
l,l i AREA CODE P
J IREPORTABLEI P    T    P      D    14                                    EXPECTED    I    N H  D  Y  Y I                                    SUBHISSION    I        I      I m                  0                N  0                                                DAT    1 ABSTRACT      (Limit to        1400 spaces,      i .e., approximately            fifteen single-space typewritten lines)            ( 16)
On May        5, 1992, with Units 1 and 3 defueled and .Unit 2 at 100 percent power, the Unit    2    Instrument Mechanics (IMs) performed a functional test on .the wrong refueling zone radiation monitor thereby causing the actuation .of BFN's engineered safety features .(ESF). This challenge to the ESFs is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR        50.73(a)(2)(iv).
The    root cause for .this event is lack of .attention to detail during work activities.
The immediate              corrective actions were: an assistant shift operations supervisor instructed the IMs to discontinue the surveillance instruction and place the radiation monitor in service. Alarms were reset, and ESF actions were returned to standby. Additionally,, TEA counselled the individuals involved and will review this event with maintenance personnel.
NRC Form  366(6-89)
 
NRC  Form 366A                    U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION                    Approved OHB No. 3150-0104 (6-89)                                                                                        Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAHE (1)                                  IDOCKET NUHBER (2)
I                  I    I I SEQUENTIAL I  IREVISIONI  I  I  I  I Browns Ferry  Unit  2                            I                    Y                                I  I  I  I TEXT  (If more space    is required,  use  additional  NRC Form 366A's) (17)
I:  PLANT CONDITIONS Unit  2 was    at approximately        100  percent power (Power Operations).          Units  1  and 3 were defueled.
II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.    ~Ev  nt':
On May    5, 1992, at 1800 hours, the Unit 2 control room unit operator (UO)
(utility, licensed)          noticed engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations when the Unit 2 refueling zone ventilation isolated.                    This isolation resulted from Instrument Mechanics (IM) (utility, nonlicensed) performing a functional test on the wrong radiation monitor.
The    surveillance instruction (SI) required four ventilation monitors to be functionally tested. The logic for these monitors is that one upscale or two downscale trips will initiate ESF actuations.                    The functional tests for the first three monitors were performed without incident. The event
                      .occurred during the performance of the functional test of the fourth monitor (2-RM-90-141). As required,,the IM inserted a shorting plug on the correct radiation monitor (2-RM-90-141), located in the Auxiliary Instrument Room, to ensure that an anticipated trip signal would not initiate ESF equipment. The IM then returned to the control room and with the other IM'erforming the test, went to the rear of the panel to connect one lead of a voltmeter. After properly placing the lead, they returned to the front of the panel to connect the second lead. However, both IMs went directly to the wrong radiation monitor (2-RM-90-140) and connected the lead to this monitor, and placed the "operate/zero/trip" test switch to    trip.
This resu1'ted in a Group 6 primary containment isolation system (PCIS) actuation [JM]. This resulted in isolation of the reactor and refuel zone ventilation [VA] on Units 1, 2, and 3; actuation of the standby gas treatment systems (SGTS) [BH]; and initiation of the control room emergency      ventilation, system        (CREV)  [VI].
NRC Form  366(6-89)
 
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NRC  Form 366A                    U.S. UCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSION                    Approved ONB No. 3150-0104 (6-89)                                                                                        Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT" (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)                                   IDOCKET NUNBER   (2)
I                         ,iSEQUENTIAL J JREVISIONi   )
Browns Ferry  Unit  2                            I                                                        I   I I I 4
TEXT (If more space   is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)
F             t   A t The   ASOS'nstructed the         IMs to discontinue the test and to return 2-RM-90-140 to service. The               ASOS reset the alarms, and ESF actuations were returned to standby.
G.
The   trip signal     on 2-RM-90-140       resul'ted in a partial Group 6 PCIS actuation. The         PCIS actuation       included the reactor building, and refueling zone   ventilation system isolation;           A, B, and C SGTS   starting;   and A and       B CREV   systems starting.
III. CAUSE OF THE EVICT The immediate cause         for the ESF actuation was the introduction of             a   trip signal to the logic circuitry of 2-RM-90-140.
B-     R~t~Isae-The   root cause of this event         was   lack of attention to detail during work activities.
IV. RLHETX ANALTSIS Since all equipment performed as designed during the event, the inadvertent actuation of several ESF components did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.
V   CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A.                           tv      t   on The ASOS noticed the alarm panel for the radiation monitor was                     illuminated and instructed the IMs to discontinue the SI and to return the                     radiation monitor to normal. Alarms were reset and ESF initiations were                       returned to standby.
NRC Form 366(6-89)
 
C' NRC Form 366A (6-89)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) t       Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)                                   IOOCKET NUMBER (2)           N I                         ]SEQUENTIAL .i iREVISIONi Browns Ferry Uni  t 2                            I
                                                                      ~     Y A                               I I I I TEXT (If more space   is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) ( 17),
B.             tv At             t       v Individuals involved were counselled on the importance of paying close attention to detail following work procedures and self-checking each step. In addition, this event will be discussed with maintenance personnel. TVA will emphasize employee responsibility for self-checking and maintaining a questioning attitude.
VI. ADDITIONAL XNFORMATION None.
B.
None.     However, TVA has experienced           previous events as a result of lack of attention to detail. As a result,               TVA continues to emphasize to its employees their responsibilities.
VII.
Th'is 'event will be discussed with maintenance personnel.                   TVA will emphasize employee responsibility for self-checking and maintaining a-questioning attitude. This will be completed by July 6, 1992..
Energy Industry         Identification       System   (EIIS) codes are identified in the
              'ext   as [XZ].
NRC Form 366(6-B9)
 
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Latest revision as of 16:38, 3 February 2020

LER 92-005-00:on 920505,unit 2 Instrument Mechanics Performed Functional Test on Wrong Refueling Zone Radiation Monitor.Caused by Lack of Attention to Detail During Work Activities.Radiation Monitor Placed in svc.W/920603 Ltr
ML18036A740
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/03/1992
From: Jay Wallace, Zeringue O
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-92-005-02, LER-92-5-2, NUDOCS 9206100133
Download: ML18036A740 (16)
v • d • e


Text

ACCELERATED DI TRIBUTION DEMONS TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9206100133 DOC.DATE: 92/06/03 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIE.:50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WA'LLACE,J.E. Tennessee Valley Authority, ZERINGUE,O.J. Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R

SUBJECT:

LER 92-005-00:on 920505,unit 2 instrument mechanics performed functional test on wrong refuelinq zone radiation monitor. Caused by lack of attention to detail during work D activities. Radiation monitor placed in svs.W920603 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE'E22T COPIES RECEIVED'LTR L TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

ENCL i SIZE NOTES RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL SANDERS,M. 1 1 HEBDON,F 1 1 ROSS,T. ,1 1 D INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPBll 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB SD NRR DSg/SPLBSD1 LREG RGN2 FILE 02 01 1'.

1 1

1 1

1 1

NRR/DST/SICBSH3 NRR/DST/SRXB SE RES/DSIR/EIB 1

1 1

1 1

1 EXTERNAL EGGG BRYCE I J H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

D D

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P l-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAiWIE FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T blEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32

41 Tennessee Vatley Authority, Post Office Box 2000. Decatur.'Alabama 35609 O. J, 'Ike'eringue Vice President. Browns Ferry Operations JUN 03 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C'. 20555

Dear Sir:

TVA BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-260 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-52 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LER-50-260/92005 The enclosed report provides details concerning unplanned engineered safety feature actuations resulting from actuation of the wrong trip test switch during the performance of a surveillance instruction.

The report is submitted in'ccordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Sincerely,

( ~Pulp(Af

0. J. Zeringue Enclosure cc: see page 2 9206100133 920603 PDR S

ADOCK 05000260 PDR

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission JUN 0 3 1992 cc (Enclosure):

INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circ'le 75 Parkway.

Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Paul Krippner American Nuclear Insurers Town Center, Suite 300S 29 South Main Street West Hartford, Connecticut 06107 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, P.O. Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Thierry M. Ross U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

0 II NRC Fbrm 366 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION Approved OHB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAHE (1) IDOCKET NUMBER (2) I w

TITLF. (4) Engineered -safety feature actuation resulting from the wrong test switch being turned during a rv'1 V V

) JSEgUENTIAL J )REVISION[ J ) J FACILITY NAHES . )DOCKET NUHBER(S)

TH DA Y A N H D Y Y 1 I I I I l l I I I 1

06 0 392 1 1 OPERATING I ITHIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE RE()UIREHENTS OF 10 CFR g:

NODE I .I ~

f wn ll N I20.402(b) i20.405(c) )50.73(a)(2)(iv) I I73.71(b)

POWER (20.405(a)(l)(i) I50.36(c)(.1) I l50.73(a)(2)(v) 1 I73 71(c).

LEVEL I )20.405(a)(1)(ii) )50.36(c)(2) )50.73(a)(2)(vii) [OTHER (Speci,fy in

]20.405(a)( l)(iii) J (50.73(a)(2)(i) )50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Abstract below and in (20.405(a)( l)(iv) .'] )50.73(a)(2)(ii) )50.73(a)(2),(viii)(B) Text, NRC Form 366A) 4 v 1 I

Y T H I

N NT HA F T

,IREPORTABLEI P

I,IAI D R H

l,l i AREA CODE P

J IREPORTABLEI P T P D 14 EXPECTED I N H D Y Y I SUBHISSION I I I m 0 N 0 DAT 1 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i .e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) ( 16)

On May 5, 1992, with Units 1 and 3 defueled and .Unit 2 at 100 percent power, the Unit 2 Instrument Mechanics (IMs) performed a functional test on .the wrong refueling zone radiation monitor thereby causing the actuation .of BFN's engineered safety features .(ESF). This challenge to the ESFs is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

The root cause for .this event is lack of .attention to detail during work activities.

The immediate corrective actions were: an assistant shift operations supervisor instructed the IMs to discontinue the surveillance instruction and place the radiation monitor in service. Alarms were reset, and ESF actions were returned to standby. Additionally,, TEA counselled the individuals involved and will review this event with maintenance personnel.

NRC Form 366(6-89)

NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION Approved OHB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAHE (1) IDOCKET NUHBER (2)

I I I I SEQUENTIAL I IREVISIONI I I I I Browns Ferry Unit 2 I Y I I I I TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I: PLANT CONDITIONS Unit 2 was at approximately 100 percent power (Power Operations). Units 1 and 3 were defueled.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. ~Ev nt':

On May 5, 1992, at 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />, the Unit 2 control room unit operator (UO)

(utility, licensed) noticed engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations when the Unit 2 refueling zone ventilation isolated. This isolation resulted from Instrument Mechanics (IM) (utility, nonlicensed) performing a functional test on the wrong radiation monitor.

The surveillance instruction (SI) required four ventilation monitors to be functionally tested. The logic for these monitors is that one upscale or two downscale trips will initiate ESF actuations. The functional tests for the first three monitors were performed without incident. The event

.occurred during the performance of the functional test of the fourth monitor (2-RM-90-141). As required,,the IM inserted a shorting plug on the correct radiation monitor (2-RM-90-141), located in the Auxiliary Instrument Room, to ensure that an anticipated trip signal would not initiate ESF equipment. The IM then returned to the control room and with the other IM'erforming the test, went to the rear of the panel to connect one lead of a voltmeter. After properly placing the lead, they returned to the front of the panel to connect the second lead. However, both IMs went directly to the wrong radiation monitor (2-RM-90-140) and connected the lead to this monitor, and placed the "operate/zero/trip" test switch to trip.

This resu1'ted in a Group 6 primary containment isolation system (PCIS) actuation [JM]. This resulted in isolation of the reactor and refuel zone ventilation [VA] on Units 1, 2, and 3; actuation of the standby gas treatment systems (SGTS) [BH]; and initiation of the control room emergency ventilation, system (CREV) [VI].

NRC Form 366(6-89)

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NRC Form 366A U.S. UCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSION Approved ONB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT" (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) IDOCKET NUNBER (2)

I ,iSEQUENTIAL J JREVISIONi )

Browns Ferry Unit 2 I I I I I 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

F t A t The ASOS'nstructed the IMs to discontinue the test and to return 2-RM-90-140 to service. The ASOS reset the alarms, and ESF actuations were returned to standby.

G.

The trip signal on 2-RM-90-140 resul'ted in a partial Group 6 PCIS actuation. The PCIS actuation included the reactor building, and refueling zone ventilation system isolation; A, B, and C SGTS starting; and A and B CREV systems starting.

III. CAUSE OF THE EVICT The immediate cause for the ESF actuation was the introduction of a trip signal to the logic circuitry of 2-RM-90-140.

B- R~t~Isae-The root cause of this event was lack of attention to detail during work activities.

IV. RLHETX ANALTSIS Since all equipment performed as designed during the event, the inadvertent actuation of several ESF components did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

V CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A. tv t on The ASOS noticed the alarm panel for the radiation monitor was illuminated and instructed the IMs to discontinue the SI and to return the radiation monitor to normal. Alarms were reset and ESF initiations were returned to standby.

NRC Form 366(6-89)

C' NRC Form 366A (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) t Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92 TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) IOOCKET NUMBER (2) N I ]SEQUENTIAL .i iREVISIONi Browns Ferry Uni t 2 I

~ Y A I I I I TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) ( 17),

B. tv At t v Individuals involved were counselled on the importance of paying close attention to detail following work procedures and self-checking each step. In addition, this event will be discussed with maintenance personnel. TVA will emphasize employee responsibility for self-checking and maintaining a questioning attitude.

VI. ADDITIONAL XNFORMATION None.

B.

None. However, TVA has experienced previous events as a result of lack of attention to detail. As a result, TVA continues to emphasize to its employees their responsibilities.

VII.

Th'is 'event will be discussed with maintenance personnel. TVA will emphasize employee responsibility for self-checking and maintaining a-questioning attitude. This will be completed by July 6, 1992..

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the

'ext as [XZ].

NRC Form 366(6-B9)

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