|
|
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown) |
Line 16: |
Line 16: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:e | | {{#Wiki_filter:OPS~G e |
| * Publ!c Servic.e Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-001-01 DEC 24 1998 LR-N980560 SALEM GENERATING STATION -UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERA TING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Gentlemen: | | * Publ!c Servic.e Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit DEC 24 1998 LR-N980560 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-001-01 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Gentlemen: |
| _This Licensee Event Report entitled "FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations | | _This Licensee Event Report entitled "FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of ' \ |
| ****1OCFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) | | Federal Regulations ****10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) **** |
| **** Attachment | | Sincerely, |
| /rbk c Distribution LER File 3.7 The po\\*er is in rnur hands. Sincerely, A. C. Bakken Ill General Manager Salem Operations | | ~~/~ |
| ' \ 95-2168 REV. 6/94 e
| | A. C. Bakken Ill General Manager Salem Operations Attachment |
| * NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY am NO. 3150-0104 ( 6-1998) EXPIRES 06/30/2001 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) the licensing process and fed back. to industry.
| | /rbk c Distribution LER File 3.7 The po\\*er is in rnur hands. |
| Forward comments reqardinq (See reverse for required of (T:!d digits/characters for each block) | | 95-2168 REV. 6/94 |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366 |
| | ( 6-1998) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT e |
| | U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (LER) |
| | * APPROVED BY am NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 0 |
| | ~~~~=~~=n b:er~eenst~e~O r:::.oms;ep: rt::i!!so::t~e::~:d ::d~:ocr:rp!;:~:~!~: |
| | the licensing process and fed back. to industry. Forward comments reqardinq (See reverse for required n~er of :~:~~:toersyt 70::U;; 10~~e :::;::;c 0:~na~e~~ss 5r_a;0c;1 , r~~l. t~~s-Pa=~~!~:~ |
| | 1 5 (T:!d digits/characters for each block) ~d~~~~~~ Pr1oie:~ i~!!~!~~~* c~:;!~;10°nf ::11a 9="~ 1 :;:a:u:g~~~r::;~;n~=~~~ |
| OKB control nwnber, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. | | OKB control nwnber, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. |
| FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) 1 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TITLE (4) FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I ENTlAL I REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SE:lJMBER I NUMBER Salem Unit 2 05000311 0 2 15 9 7 9 7 -0 0 1 -0 1 12 2 4 9 8 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER I OPERATING I N I THIS REPORT IS SUBMIITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Oleck one or more) 11) MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) | | FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) 1 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TITLE (4) |
| X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) |
| I POWER I o o o I 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | | MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I ENTlAL SE:lJMBER I REVISION I NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 02 15 97 97 - 0 01 - 01 12 24 98 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER I OPERATING MODE (9) |
| S0.73(a)(2)(x)
| | I I N THIS REPORT IS SUBMIITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Oleck one or more) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 11) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) |
| LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
| | I POWER LEVEL (10) |
| OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iil) 50.36(c}(l) 50.73(a)(2)(v}
| | I ooo I 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) |
| 5Dedfv In Abstract below or ----n/'fJt
| | S0.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71 |
| -. m | | ;J~~~.$J;u§IJ}¥Jl*.g~.,!J\W"! 20.2203(a)(2)(ii~ 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER |
| ., , lri NRC Form 366A 111" .
| | ~~11.a'f!}fj,Wif!J:teZJM;*.\:ii~1". |
| 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | | 1 |
| UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Robert B. Knieriem, Licensing Engineer 609-339-1782 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) -"""' "'""''"'" """""""' | | &?.ltfMI.* |
| I -"""" ""'"""" """"'°""" '""'?.0'' | | ----n/'fJt -. m ~':¥'%1<~~ ., :.\t~ , |
| '""'!'¥1' SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 'YES x INO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE (15) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) This supplemental LER reports a TS non-compliance identified during a review of the Salem service Test program (IST) . On February 15, 1997 a review of the Salem IST program determined that the IST surveillance of Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210 was not performed as required. | | .I'.~* 20.2203(a)(2)(iil) 50.36(c}(l) 50.73(a)(2)(v} 5Dedfv In Abstract below or lri NRC Form 366A 111" _fij~fi.Zf~~~..,1~!1~-~}: 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) |
| CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 under the provision that they remain isolated by closure of manual valves CC145 and CC146. Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 that permitted at least one of these two manual isolation valves to remain open during plant operation. | | UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) |
| Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed. | | NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) |
| This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. | | Robert B. Knieriem, Licensing Engineer 609-339-1782 |
| Specifically, the requirements of TS 4.0.5 regarding in-service inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components. | | - """' "'""''"'" """""""' "lli"'~ I - " " " '" " |
| The cause of this event was a lack of programmatic interface between the IST program personnel and Operations department personnel responsible for programs used to control system configuration. | | COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) |
| To prevent recurrence, procedural controls will be implemented to inform IST program personnel of changes to normal valve positions before those changes are implemented so that adjustments to the IST program can be made when warranted to comply with TS 4.0.5. NRC FORM 366 (6-1998) | | """"'°""" ~ |
| * NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOI\
| | '""'?.0'' |
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 -001 -01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17) PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse
| | '""'!'¥1' SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). |
| -Pressurized Water Reactor Safety Injection | | x INO SUBMISSION DATE (15) |
| {BP/-} | | ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) |
| * Containment Spray {BE/-} Component Cooling {KB/-} Main Steam {SB/-} | | This' supplemental LER reports a TS non-compliance identified during a review of the Salem In-service Test program (IST) . On February 15, 1997 a review of the Salem IST program determined that the IST surveillance of Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210 was not performed as required. CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 under the provision that they remain isolated by closure of manual valves CC145 and CC146. Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 that permitted at least one of these two manual isolation valves to remain open during plant operation. Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed. |
| * Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC} CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE PAGE (31 2 OF 4 At the time of the occurrence Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On January 18, 1997 a review as a result of a recent NRC inspection determined that the Inservice Test (IST) surveillance on motor operated valves SJ4 {BP/V} and SJ5, Safety Injection Charging Pumps to Boron Injection Tank {BP/TK}, was not properly performed in the past. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) SGTR-1 requires the operators to close these valves to terminate safety injection during the steam generator tube rupture event. This method implements UFSAR Section 15.4.4 to terminate safety injection. | | This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Specifically, the requirements of TS 4.0.5 regarding in-service inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components. |
| The closure of these valves is an active safety function of the design basis of the plant. Because it is an active safety function, testing of these valves to close is required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 and must be included in the IST program. Subsequent review of the SJ4 and SJS issue determined that there were 12 additional Unit 2 valves that were not being tested in the IST program in the direction contained in the EOPs. These 12 valves are 21CC16 {KB/V}, 22CC16, 2SJ12 {BP/V}, 2SJ13, 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54, 21CS36 {BE/V}, 22CS36, 21MS45 {SB/V} and 23MS45. The corresponding Unit 1 valves are likewise affected. | | The cause of this event was a lack of programmatic interface between the IST program personnel and Operations department personnel responsible for programs used to control system configuration. To prevent recurrence, procedural controls will be implemented to inform IST program personnel of changes to normal valve positions before those changes are implemented so that adjustments to the IST program can be made when warranted to comply with TS 4.0.5. |
| On February 15, 1997 further review determined that the IST surveillance on Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210, was not performed as required. | | NRC FORM 366 (6-1998) |
| CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 as a part of the IST Ten-year Update. This change was made under the provision that CC195 and CC210 remain isolated by closure of manual* valves CC145 and CC146. Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 to allow one of these valves to remain open to permit filling of the Component Cooling Water surge tank from the control room. Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed. | | |
| CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on the SJ4 and SJ5 valves was inadequate communication between the EOP group and the IST reviewers in determining what valves were manipulated in the EOPs and were therefore required to be included in the IST Program. The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on CC195 and CC210 was the lack of a programmatic interface between Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves that could affect the IST program. NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) | | NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) |
| * NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NAME (1) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 -001 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17) PRIOR SIMII,.AR OCCURRENCES PAGE (3) 01 3 OF A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 for the past two years did not identify any reportable occurrences that were caused by an inadequate programmatic interface between the Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves affecting the IST program. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 4 There were no safety consequences associated with the occurrences in this LER. Evaluation of other testing performed on the identified valves provides confidence that .the valves would have operated if needed. This is based on the following.
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | * U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOI\ |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (31 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 - 001 - 01 2 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17) |
| | PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Safety Injection {BP/-} |
| | * Containment Spray {BE/-} |
| | Component Cooling {KB/-} |
| | Main Steam {SB/-} |
| | * Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC} |
| | CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of the occurrence Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5. |
| | DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On January 18, 1997 a review as a result of a recent NRC inspection determined that the Inservice Test (IST) surveillance on motor operated valves SJ4 {BP/V} and SJ5, Safety Injection Charging Pumps to Boron Injection Tank {BP/TK}, was not properly performed in the past. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) SGTR-1 requires the operators to close these valves to terminate safety injection during the steam generator tube rupture event. |
| | This method implements UFSAR Section 15.4.4 to terminate safety injection. The closure of these valves is an active safety function of the design basis of the plant. Because it is an active safety function, testing of these valves to close is required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 and must be included in the IST program. |
| | Subsequent review of the SJ4 and SJS issue determined that there were 12 additional Unit 2 valves that were not being tested in the IST program in the direction contained in the EOPs. These 12 valves are 21CC16 {KB/V}, 22CC16, 2SJ12 {BP/V}, 2SJ13, 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54, 21CS36 {BE/V}, 22CS36, 21MS45 {SB/V} and 23MS45. The corresponding Unit 1 valves are likewise affected. |
| | On February 15, 1997 further review determined that the IST surveillance on Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210, was not performed as required. CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 as a part of the IST Ten-year Update. This change was made under the provision that CC195 and CC210 remain isolated by closure of manual* valves CC145 and CC146. |
| | Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 to allow one of these valves to remain open to permit filling of the Component Cooling Water surge tank from the control room. Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed. |
| | CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on the SJ4 and SJ5 valves was inadequate communication between the EOP group and the IST reviewers in determining what valves were manipulated in the EOPs and were therefore required to be included in the IST Program. |
| | The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on CC195 and CC210 was the lack of a programmatic interface between Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves that could affect the IST program. |
| | NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | * U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION |
| | ~CILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 - 001 01 3 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17) |
| | PRIOR SIMII,.AR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 for the past two years did not identify any reportable occurrences that were caused by an inadequate programmatic interface between the Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves affecting the IST program. |
| | SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no safety consequences associated with the occurrences in this LER. Evaluation of other testing performed on the identified valves provides confidence that .the valves would have operated if needed. This is based on the following. |
| The 21CC16, 22CC16, 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and are stroke timed quarterly in the open direction. | | The 21CC16, 22CC16, 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and are stroke timed quarterly in the open direction. |
| The 21CS36 and 22CS36 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and open stroked during cold shutdown. | | The 21CS36 and 22CS36 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and open stroked during cold shutdown. After the open stroke test, the valve is returned to the closed position. |
| After the open stroke test, the valve is returned to the closed position. | |
| The 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54 valves are in the GL 89-10 Program and are operated when transitioning in and out of cold shutdown. | | The 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54 valves are in the GL 89-10 Program and are operated when transitioning in and out of cold shutdown. |
| The 21MS45 and 23MS45 valves are manual valves and do not have any scheduled stroke tests. These valves are closed which provides assurance that they were capable of being closed in the past. The 2CC195 and 2CC210 valves were radiographed to verify that they were closed. The results were satisfactory and the valves were determined to be operable. | | The 21MS45 and 23MS45 valves are manual valves and do not have any scheduled stroke tests. |
| | These valves are closed which provides assurance that they were capable of being closed in the past. |
| | The 2CC195 and 2CC210 valves were radiographed to verify that they were closed. The results were satisfactory and the valves were determined to be operable. |
| The health and safety of the public was not affected. | | The health and safety of the public was not affected. |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1. The Salem EOPs were reviewed for similar problems and the results are noted above. 2. The Operations Department Emergency/Abnormal Operating Procedure Program procedure, AP. ZZ-0113, will be revised to include IST notification of proposed changes. This will be completed by May 5, 1997. | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS |
| * 3. As a result of the issues in this LER and other recently identified IST issues, a plan has been developed and will be completed to ensure that the Unit 2 IST Program is satisfactory prior to Unit 2 entering Mode 4. 4. The Salem Generating Station IST Manual will be revised to include the addition of the stroke test to the required valve tests for these valves. This will be completed by March 31, 1997. 5. The revised surveillance test for the identified valves will be performed prior to entering the applicable mode when the valve is required to be operable for Units 1 and 2. 6. A review of the normal valve positions in the IST Manual and the normal valve positions listed in the Tagging Request Information System (TRIS) was conducted to identify other discrepancies.
| | : 1. The Salem EOPs were reviewed for similar problems and the results are noted above. |
| Three other valve position discrepancies were identified. | | : 2. The Operations Department Emergency/Abnormal Operating Procedure Program procedure, SC.OP-AP. ZZ-0113, will be revised to include IST notification of proposed changes. This will be completed by May 5, 1997. * |
| Appropriate changes were made to obtain agreement between the IST Manual and TRIS. NRG FORM 366A (6-1998) | | : 3. As a result of the issues in this LER and other recently identified IST issues, a plan has been developed and will be completed to ensure that the Unit 2 IST Program is satisfactory prior to Unit 2 entering Mode 4. |
| * NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER ru-IBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 -001 -01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) PAGE (3) 4 OF 4 7. Procedure SC.RA-IS.ZZ-0007(Q), Exercise Closed Verification Check Valve Radiography, was revised to include quarterly radiography of 1CC195, 2CC195, 1CC210, and 2CC210 to verify that those valves are closed. 8. Salem procedure SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) and Hope Creek procedure HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) were revised to require that IST Program personnel review and approve valve position changes for valves in the IST program. (PIR 970220076, CRCA 05, CRCA 04). NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)}}
| | : 4. The Salem Generating Station IST Manual will be revised to include the addition of the stroke test to the required valve tests for these valves. This will be completed by March 31, 1997. |
| | : 5. The revised surveillance test for the identified valves will be performed prior to entering the applicable mode when the valve is required to be operable for Units 1 and 2. |
| | : 6. A review of the normal valve positions in the IST Manual and the normal valve positions listed in the Tagging Request Information System (TRIS) was conducted to identify other discrepancies. Three other valve position discrepancies were identified. Appropriate changes were made to obtain agreement between the IST Manual and TRIS. |
| | NRG FORM 366A (6-1998) |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A (6-1998) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | * U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION ru-IBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 97 - 001 - 01 4 OF 4 05000272 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) |
| | : 7. Procedure SC.RA-IS.ZZ-0007(Q), Exercise Closed Verification Check Valve Radiography, was revised to include quarterly radiography of 1CC195, 2CC195, 1CC210, and 2CC210 to verify that those valves are closed. |
| | : 8. Salem procedure SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) and Hope Creek procedure HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) were revised to require that IST Program personnel review and approve valve position changes for valves in the IST program. (PIR 970220076, CRCA 05, CRCA 04). |
| | NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)}} |
Similar Documents at Salem |
---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
OPS~G e
- Publ!c Servic.e Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit DEC 24 1998 LR-N980560 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-001-01 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Gentlemen:
_This Licensee Event Report entitled "FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of ' \
Federal Regulations ****10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) ****
Sincerely,
~~/~
A. C. Bakken Ill General Manager Salem Operations Attachment
/rbk c Distribution LER File 3.7 The po\\*er is in rnur hands.
95-2168 REV. 6/94
NRC FORM 366
( 6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT e
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (LER)
- APPROVED BY am NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 0
~~~~=~~=n b:er~eenst~e~O r:::.oms;ep: rt::i!!so::t~e::~:d ::d~:ocr:rp!;:~:~!~:
the licensing process and fed back. to industry. Forward comments reqardinq (See reverse for required n~er of :~:~~:toersyt 70::U;; 10~~e :::;::;c 0:~na~e~~ss 5r_a;0c;1 , r~~l. t~~s-Pa=~~!~:~
1 5 (T:!d digits/characters for each block) ~d~~~~~~ Pr1oie:~ i~!!~!~~~* c~:;!~;10°nf ::11a 9="~ 1 :;:a:u:g~~~r::;~;n~=~~~
OKB control nwnber, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) 1 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TITLE (4)
FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I ENTlAL SE:lJMBER I REVISION I NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 02 15 97 97 - 0 01 - 01 12 24 98 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER I OPERATING MODE (9)
I I N THIS REPORT IS SUBMIITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Oleck one or more) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 11) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
I POWER LEVEL (10)
I ooo I 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
S0.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71
- J~~~.$J;u§IJ}¥Jl*.g~.,!J\W"! 20.2203(a)(2)(ii~ 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER
~~11.a'f!}fj,Wif!J:teZJM;*.\:ii~1".
1
&?.ltfMI.*
n/'fJt -. m ~':¥'%1<~~ ., :.\t~ ,
.I'.~* 20.2203(a)(2)(iil) 50.36(c}(l) 50.73(a)(2)(v} 5Dedfv In Abstract below or lri NRC Form 366A 111" _fij~fi.Zf~~~..,1~!1~-~}: 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Robert B. Knieriem, Licensing Engineer 609-339-1782
- """' "'"""'" """""""' "lli"'~ I - " " " '" "
COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
""""'°""" ~
'""'?.0
'""'!'¥1' SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
x INO SUBMISSION DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
This' supplemental LER reports a TS non-compliance identified during a review of the Salem In-service Test program (IST) . On February 15, 1997 a review of the Salem IST program determined that the IST surveillance of Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210 was not performed as required. CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 under the provision that they remain isolated by closure of manual valves CC145 and CC146. Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 that permitted at least one of these two manual isolation valves to remain open during plant operation. Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed.
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Specifically, the requirements of TS 4.0.5 regarding in-service inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components.
The cause of this event was a lack of programmatic interface between the IST program personnel and Operations department personnel responsible for programs used to control system configuration. To prevent recurrence, procedural controls will be implemented to inform IST program personnel of changes to normal valve positions before those changes are implemented so that adjustments to the IST program can be made when warranted to comply with TS 4.0.5.
NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOI\
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (31 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 - 001 - 01 2 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Safety Injection {BP/-}
Component Cooling {KB/-}
Main Steam {SB/-}
- Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of the occurrence Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On January 18, 1997 a review as a result of a recent NRC inspection determined that the Inservice Test (IST) surveillance on motor operated valves SJ4 {BP/V} and SJ5, Safety Injection Charging Pumps to Boron Injection Tank {BP/TK}, was not properly performed in the past. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) SGTR-1 requires the operators to close these valves to terminate safety injection during the steam generator tube rupture event.
This method implements UFSAR Section 15.4.4 to terminate safety injection. The closure of these valves is an active safety function of the design basis of the plant. Because it is an active safety function, testing of these valves to close is required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 and must be included in the IST program.
Subsequent review of the SJ4 and SJS issue determined that there were 12 additional Unit 2 valves that were not being tested in the IST program in the direction contained in the EOPs. These 12 valves are 21CC16 {KB/V}, 22CC16, 2SJ12 {BP/V}, 2SJ13, 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54, 21CS36 {BE/V}, 22CS36, 21MS45 {SB/V} and 23MS45. The corresponding Unit 1 valves are likewise affected.
On February 15, 1997 further review determined that the IST surveillance on Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210, was not performed as required. CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 as a part of the IST Ten-year Update. This change was made under the provision that CC195 and CC210 remain isolated by closure of manual* valves CC145 and CC146.
Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 to allow one of these valves to remain open to permit filling of the Component Cooling Water surge tank from the control room. Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed.
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on the SJ4 and SJ5 valves was inadequate communication between the EOP group and the IST reviewers in determining what valves were manipulated in the EOPs and were therefore required to be included in the IST Program.
The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on CC195 and CC210 was the lack of a programmatic interface between Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves that could affect the IST program.
NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION
~CILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 - 001 01 3 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17)
PRIOR SIMII,.AR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 for the past two years did not identify any reportable occurrences that were caused by an inadequate programmatic interface between the Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves affecting the IST program.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no safety consequences associated with the occurrences in this LER. Evaluation of other testing performed on the identified valves provides confidence that .the valves would have operated if needed. This is based on the following.
The 21CC16, 22CC16, 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and are stroke timed quarterly in the open direction.
The 21CS36 and 22CS36 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and open stroked during cold shutdown. After the open stroke test, the valve is returned to the closed position.
The 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54 valves are in the GL 89-10 Program and are operated when transitioning in and out of cold shutdown.
The 21MS45 and 23MS45 valves are manual valves and do not have any scheduled stroke tests.
These valves are closed which provides assurance that they were capable of being closed in the past.
The 2CC195 and 2CC210 valves were radiographed to verify that they were closed. The results were satisfactory and the valves were determined to be operable.
The health and safety of the public was not affected.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. The Salem EOPs were reviewed for similar problems and the results are noted above.
- 2. The Operations Department Emergency/Abnormal Operating Procedure Program procedure, SC.OP-AP. ZZ-0113, will be revised to include IST notification of proposed changes. This will be completed by May 5, 1997. *
- 3. As a result of the issues in this LER and other recently identified IST issues, a plan has been developed and will be completed to ensure that the Unit 2 IST Program is satisfactory prior to Unit 2 entering Mode 4.
- 4. The Salem Generating Station IST Manual will be revised to include the addition of the stroke test to the required valve tests for these valves. This will be completed by March 31, 1997.
- 5. The revised surveillance test for the identified valves will be performed prior to entering the applicable mode when the valve is required to be operable for Units 1 and 2.
- 6. A review of the normal valve positions in the IST Manual and the normal valve positions listed in the Tagging Request Information System (TRIS) was conducted to identify other discrepancies. Three other valve position discrepancies were identified. Appropriate changes were made to obtain agreement between the IST Manual and TRIS.
NRG FORM 366A (6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION ru-IBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 97 - 001 - 01 4 OF 4 05000272 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
- 7. Procedure SC.RA-IS.ZZ-0007(Q), Exercise Closed Verification Check Valve Radiography, was revised to include quarterly radiography of 1CC195, 2CC195, 1CC210, and 2CC210 to verify that those valves are closed.
- 8. Salem procedure SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) and Hope Creek procedure HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) were revised to require that IST Program personnel review and approve valve position changes for valves in the IST program. (PIR 970220076, CRCA 05, CRCA 04).
NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)