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| | issue date = 10/05/1994 | | | issue date = 10/05/1994 |
| | title = LER 93-014-02:on 930722,determine 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Would Not Protect Motors.Detailed Study Showed Motors Would Have Performed Intended Safety functions.W/941005 Ltr | | | title = LER 93-014-02:on 930722,determine 4 Kv Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage Protection Dropout Setpoint Would Not Protect Motors.Detailed Study Showed Motors Would Have Performed Intended Safety functions.W/941005 Ltr |
| | author name = HAGAN J J, PASTVA M J | | | author name = Hagan J, Pastva M |
| | author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY | | | author affiliation = PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. OF NEW JERSEY |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:e Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 | | {{#Wiki_filter:e OPS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station October 5, 1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 |
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| ==Dear Sir:== | | ==Dear Sir:== |
| SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 October 5, 1994 SUPPLEMENTAL LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-014-02 This submittal is made to reclassify an occurrence as a Voluntary Report for informational purposes. | | |
| This occurrence had been previously identified as reportable pursuant to Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR 50.73. MJPJ:pc Distribution -4 i i I . '.. J..-: ........ v vu-(; v l11e power is in your hands. 9410200158 941005 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s Sincerely yours, 95-2189 REV 7-92 FORM 366 .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COME'LY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE. PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31S0-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) II PAGE (3) Salem Generating Station -Unit 1 05000 272 1 OF 04 TITLE (4) Voluntary Reporting of 4 Kilo-Volt Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage (UV) I Protection DroJout Setvoint. | | SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-014-02 This submittal is made to reclassify an occurrence as a Voluntary Report for informational purposes. This occurrence had been previously identified as reportable pursuant to Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73. |
| EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER f6 REPORT NUMBER f7) OTHER FACILITl!':S INVOLVED (8) SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY' YEAR 05000 311 Salem Unit 2 FACILITY NAME DOCKET. NUMBER ----05000 07 22 93 93 014 02 .10 05 94 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more (11) *MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73:71(b) I I 80 I 20.405(a)(1) | | Sincerely yours, MJPJ:pc Distribution |
| : 0)
| | ...,nnr.---~ |
| * 50.36(c)(1) | | . .~. . v-4 ivu-(; |
| : 50. 73 (a)(2)(v) 73.71 (c) 20.405 (a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2)
| | i I . '.. J..-: |
| .** 50.73(a)(2)(vii) x OTHER I -20A05(a)(1)(iii)
| | v l11e power is in your hands. |
| : 50. 73 (a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) (A) (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)
| | 9410200158 941005 PDR ADOCK 05000272 95-2189 REV 7-92 s |
| (1) (iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | | |
| : 50. 73 (a)(2)(viii)(B) below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 20.405 (a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
| | N~C FORM 366 .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COME'LY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE. PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31S0-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. |
| Voluntarv J LICENSEE:CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12). NAME .. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) M. J. Pastva, Jr. -LER Coordinator (609) 339-5165 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TO NPRDS *' ' SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES NO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) x DATE (15) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) On 7/22/93, it was determined that the 91. 6% dropout set point for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4* kilovolt (KV) vital buses would not fully protect the 230 and 460 volt (V) motors should the 4KV bus voltage degrade to less than 93.2%, but greater than 91. 6%. At that time it was concluded the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and guidance provided in "Safety Evaluation And Statement Of Staff Positions Relative To The Emergency Power Systems For Operating Reactors" NRC letter, dated 6/2/77, were not fully met. Continued operation of both Sa_lem Uni ts was based upon self-imposed administrative controls on 4KV bus p.lignment until implementation of design changes to change the dropout setpoint. | | FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 272 II PAGE (3) |
| A subsequent detailed study shows the motors would have performed their intended safety functions with the 91. 6% setpoint. | | Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 1 OF 04 TITLE (4) Voluntary Reporting of 4 Kilo-Volt Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage (UV) |
| As such, this report is made voluntarily for informational purposes. | | Protection DroJout Setvoint. |
| -NRG FORM 366 (5-92)
| | EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER f6 REPORT NUMBER f7) OTHER FACILITl!':S INVOLVED (8) |
| BLOCK NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ' 14 15 REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH13LOCK NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS TITLE UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 DOCKET NUMBER VARIES 'PAGE NUMBER ''* UP T076 TITLE 6TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EVENT DATE 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER LER NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK REPORT DATE UP TO 18 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL -DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 1 OPERATING MODE . -3 POWER LEVEL 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE LICENSEE CONTACT CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES .. 1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE . | | I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY' YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Salem Unit 2 05000 311 FACILITY NAME DOCKET. NUMBER |
| VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
| | -- -- 05000 07 22 93 93 014 02 .10 05 94 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more (11) |
| Westinghouse
| | *MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73:71(b) |
| -Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 93-014-02 PAGE 2 of 4 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx} REPORT IDENTIFICATION:
| | I L:~E~~~O) I 80 I 20.405(a)(1) 0) |
| Voluntary Reporting Of 4 Kilo-Volt Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage (UV) Protection Dropout Setpoint Date of Discovery:
| | * 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73 (a)(2)(v) 73.71 (c) 20.405 (a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) x OTHER 20A05(a)(1)(iii) 50. 73 (a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) (A) (Specify in Abstract I below and in Text, NRC 20.405(a) (1) (iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73 (a)(2)(viii)(B) Form 366A) 20.405 (a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) Voluntarv J LICENSEE:CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12). |
| 7/22/93 Report Date: 10/5/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 93-320. INITIAL"CONDITIONS:
| | NAME .. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) |
| Unit 1: Mode 1 Reactor Power 80% -Unit Load 815 MWe Unit 2: Mode 1 Reactor Power 100% Unit Load 1140 MWe DISCUSSION:
| | M. J. Pastva, Jr. - LER Coordinator (609) 339-5165 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) |
| On July 22, 1993, an initial determination was made that the 91.6% dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4 kilovolt (KVJ vital buses* {VJ}, would not fully protect the 230 and 460 volt (V) motors should the 4KV bus voltage degrade to less than 93.2%, but greater than 91.6%. At that time it was concluded the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report {UFSAR) and guidance provided in "Safety Evaluation And Statement Of Staff Positions Relative To The Emergency Power Systems For Operating Reactors" NRC letter, dated June 2, 1977, were not fully met. This was identified during a self-initiated adequacy review to ensure the intent of the 1977 NRC letter was being met. Continued operation of both sa.lem Units was based upon ensuring that the 4KV bus voltage would be maintained at or above 93.2% by imposition of additional administrative controls on 4KV bus alignment until implementation of design changes to change the dropout setpoint.
| | REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TONPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) x NO SUBMISSION DATE (15) |
| The NRC was notified of this determination pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b) | | ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) |
| {l) (ii) (B). In addition, on August 20, 1993, this issue was reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a) | | On 7/22/93, it was determined that the 91. 6% dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4* kilovolt (KV) vital buses would not fully protect the 230 and 460 volt (V) motors should the 4KV bus voltage degrade to less than 93.2%, but greater than 91. 6%. At that time it was concluded the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and guidance provided in "Safety Evaluation And Statement Of Staff Positions Relative To The Emergency Power Systems For Operating Reactors" NRC letter, dated 6/2/77, were not fully met. Continued operation of both Sa_lem Uni ts was based upon self-imposed administrative controls on 4KV bus p.lignment until implementation of design changes to change the dropout setpoint. A subsequent detailed study shows the motors would have performed their intended safety functions with the 91. 6% setpoint. As such, this report is made voluntarily for informational purposes. |
| (2) (ii) (B) and 10CFR50.73(a) | | NRG FORM 366 (5-92) |
| (2) (v) (D) A subsequent detailed study shows the motors would have performed their intended safety functions with the 91.6% setpoint. | | |
| Therefore, a reportable occurrence with the setpoint, as described, does not 1 | | REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH13LOCK BLOCK NUMBER OF TITLE NUMBER DIGITS/CHARACTERS 1 UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 2 DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 3 VARIES 'PAGE NUMBER ''* . |
| ..\ VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 93-014-02 PAGE 3 of 4 DISCUSSION: (cont'd) exist pursuant to 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73.
| | 4 UP T076 TITLE 6TOTAL 5 EVENT DATE 2 PER BLOCK 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 6 LER NUMBER 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 7 REPORT DATE 2 PER BLOCK UP TO 18 FACILITY NAME 8 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 TOTAL - DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 9 1 OPERATING MODE 10 3 POWER LEVEL 1 |
| | 11 REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES UP TO 50 FOR NAME 12 LICENSEE CONTACT 14 FOR TELEPHONE CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 13 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE |
| | ' 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES 1 |
| | 14 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES 6 TOTAL 15 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 2 PER BLOCK |
| | |
| | VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION 1 Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 93-014-02 2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION: |
| | Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx} |
| | REPORT IDENTIFICATION: |
| | Voluntary Reporting Of 4 Kilo-Volt Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage (UV) Protection Dropout Setpoint Date of Discovery: 7/22/93 Report Date: 10/5/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 93-320. |
| | INITIAL"CONDITIONS: |
| | Unit 1: Mode 1 Reactor Power 80% - Unit Load 815 MWe Unit 2: Mode 1 Reactor Power 100% Unit Load 1140 MWe DISCUSSION: |
| | On July 22, 1993, an initial determination was made that the 91.6% |
| | dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4 kilovolt (KVJ vital buses* {VJ}, would not fully protect the 230 and 460 volt (V) motors should the 4KV bus voltage degrade to less than 93.2%, but greater than 91.6%. At that time it was concluded the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report |
| | {UFSAR) and guidance provided in "Safety Evaluation And Statement Of Staff Positions Relative To The Emergency Power Systems For Operating Reactors" NRC letter, dated June 2, 1977, were not fully met. This was identified during a self-initiated adequacy review to ensure the intent of the 1977 NRC letter was being met. Continued operation of both sa.lem Units was based upon ensuring that the 4KV bus voltage would be maintained at or above 93.2% by imposition of additional administrative controls on 4KV bus alignment until implementation of design changes to change the dropout setpoint. The NRC was notified of this determination pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b) {l) (ii) (B). In addition, on August 20, 1993, this issue was reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (ii) (B) and 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (v) (D) |
| | A subsequent detailed study shows the motors would have performed their intended safety functions with the 91.6% setpoint. Therefore, a reportable occurrence with the setpoint, as described, does not |
| | |
| | ..\ |
| | VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 93-014-02 3 of 4 DISCUSSION: (cont'd) exist pursuant to 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73. |
| ANALYSIS: | | ANALYSIS: |
| In July 1993, a self-initiated adequacy review concluded the 91.6% . dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4 KV vital buses, would not fully protect 230 and 460V motors. Continued operation of both Salem Units was based upon the following self-imposed administrative controls regarding 4KV bus alignment: | | In July 1993, a self-initiated adequacy review concluded the 91.6% . |
| : 1. Hourly logging of 4KV vital bus voltages, maintained between 4.3KV and 4.5KV. 2. Maintaining only two vital buses energized from their operating transformer, if both the corresponding group buses are on their respective Auxiliary Power Transformer (APT) . 3a. Maintaining three vital buses energized from the operating transformer, if one of the corresponding group buses is transferred to the operating Station Power Transformer (SPT) or 3b. Maintaining three vital buses energized from the operating transformer, if the load which can be transferred from the APTs is reduced by 5 mega volt amps. However, revision 01 to calculation ES-15.00S(Q), "Salem Units 1 and 2 Degraded Grid Study", shows worst case recovery vital bus voltage is 93.2% of 4KV following transfer of the APTs to the SPTs. A subsequent detailed study shows that the 230 and 460V motors will perform their safety functions with the 91.6% setpoint. | | dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4 KV vital buses, would not fully protect 230 and 460V motors. Continued operation of both Salem Units was based upon the following self-imposed administrative controls regarding 4KV bus alignment: |
| As such, the self-imposed administrative controls serve to add greater enhancement to the performance of these motors, from a reliability standpoint. | | : 1. Hourly logging of 4KV vital bus voltages, maintained between 4.3KV and 4.5KV. |
| The initial determination that the 91.6% dropout setpoint did not meet the intent of the UFSAR and the BTP resulted from overly restrictive conservatism in reviewing/assessing the ES-15.00S(Q), revision 01 calculations, without benefit of the results of the subsequent detailed study. Dropout setpoint selection at 91.6%*was based on the lowest voltage the 4.16KV motors could be allowed to operate (i.e. 90%) due to voltage drops in the motors' cables and relay inaccuracy considerations. | | : 2. Maintaining only two vital buses energized from their operating transformer, if both the corresponding group buses are on their respective Auxiliary Power Transformer (APT) . |
| --------------
| | 3a. Maintaining three vital buses energized from the operating transformer, if one of the corresponding group buses is transferred to the operating Station Power Transformer (SPT) or 3b. Maintaining three vital buses energized from the operating transformer, if the load which can be transferred from the APTs is reduced by 5 mega volt amps. |
| ----VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit l DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 93-014-02 PAGE 4 of 4 SIGNIFICANCE:
| | However, revision 01 to calculation ES-15.00S(Q), "Salem Units 1 and 2 Degraded Grid Study", shows worst case recovery vital bus voltage is 93.2% of 4KV following transfer of the APTs to the SPTs. |
| | A subsequent detailed study shows that the 230 and 460V motors will perform their safety functions with the 91.6% setpoint. As such, the self-imposed administrative controls serve to add greater enhancement to the performance of these motors, from a reliability standpoint. |
| | The initial determination that the 91.6% dropout setpoint did not meet the intent of the UFSAR and the BTP resulted from overly restrictive conservatism in reviewing/assessing the ES-15.00S(Q), revision 01 calculations, without benefit of the results of the subsequent detailed study. Dropout setpoint selection at 91.6%*was based on the lowest voltage the 4.16KV motors could be allowed to operate (i.e. |
| | 90%) due to voltage drops in the motors' cables and relay inaccuracy considerations. |
| | |
| | I~-- - |
| | VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit l 5000272 93-014-02 4 of 4 SIGNIFICANCE: |
| This report is made for informational purposes, since the dropout setpoint provides adequate protection for the worst case design basis event. As such, this issue is not reportable pursuant the requirements of 10CFR50.73. | | This report is made for informational purposes, since the dropout setpoint provides adequate protection for the worst case design basis event. As such, this issue is not reportable pursuant the requirements of 10CFR50.73. |
| ACTIONS TAKEN/PLANNED: | | ACTIONS TAKEN/PLANNED: |
| Related design changes, including changing the dropout setpoint, were implemented on Unit 1 during its last refueling outage and are scheduled for Unit 2 during its next refueling outage. The self-imposed administrative controls will be maintained for Unit 2 until implementation of the aforementioned design changes. License Change Requests have been submitted to revise Technical Specifications regarding the second level undervoltage relay setpoint. | | Related design changes, including changing the dropout setpoint, were implemented on Unit 1 during its last refueling outage and are scheduled for Unit 2 during its next refueling outage. |
| The importance of adequately considering lower voltage levels whenever evaluating 4KV setpoints for changes has been discussed with the Electrical Engineering Group. Appropriate changes to the UFSAR will be implemented. | | The self-imposed administrative controls will be maintained for Unit 2 until implementation of the aforementioned design changes. |
| | License Change Requests have been submitted to revise Technical Specifications regarding the second level undervoltage relay setpoint. |
| | The importance of adequately considering lower voltage levels whenever evaluating 4KV setpoints for changes has been discussed with the Electrical Engineering Group. |
| | Appropriate changes to the UFSAR will be implemented. |
| Appropriate documents will be revised to incorporate the results of the subsequent study involving the 91.6% dropout setpoint. | | Appropriate documents will be revised to incorporate the results of the subsequent study involving the 91.6% dropout setpoint. |
| MJPJ:pc SORC Mtg. 94-077 ager -tions}} | | ager - |
| | tions MJPJ:pc SORC Mtg. 94-077}} |
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LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr
ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998
LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr
ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998
LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr
ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr
ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr
ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr
ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998
LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr
ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr
ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged
ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr
ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr
ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr
ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr
ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected
ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998
Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences
ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr
ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr
ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998
Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs
ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr
1999-08-26
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr
ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr
ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr
ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr
ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr
ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr
ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr
ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr
ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr
ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr
ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998
LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr
ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr
ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998
LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr
ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998
LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998
LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr
ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr
ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998
LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr
ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998
LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr
ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr
ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998
LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr
ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr
ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr
ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr
ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998
LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr
ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged
ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998
LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr
ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998
LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr
ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998
LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr
ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr
ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998
LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr
ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected
ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998
Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences
ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr
ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr
ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998
Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs
ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr
ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr
1999-08-26
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data
ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr
ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr
ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr
ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913
ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr
ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999
Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF).
ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr
ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr
ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr
ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr
ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr
ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr
ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999
Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF).
ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr
ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr
ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999
NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept
ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr
ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr
ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr
ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999
Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716
ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr
ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr
ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr
ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr
ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr
ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr
ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999
Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1
ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999
Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1
ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr
ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr
ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr
ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999
Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11.
ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr
ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr
ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr
ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr
ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr
ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified
ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999
LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr
ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl
ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr
ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr
ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999
a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise
ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables
ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999
LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr
ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999
LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr
ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
e OPS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station October 5, 1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-014-02 This submittal is made to reclassify an occurrence as a Voluntary Report for informational purposes. This occurrence had been previously identified as reportable pursuant to Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73.
Sincerely yours, MJPJ:pc Distribution
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v l11e power is in your hands.
9410200158 941005 PDR ADOCK 05000272 95-2189 REV 7-92 s
N~C FORM 366 .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COME'LY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE. PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31S0-0104), OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 272 II PAGE (3)
Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 1 OF 04 TITLE (4) Voluntary Reporting of 4 Kilo-Volt Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage (UV)
Protection DroJout Setvoint.
EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER f6 REPORT NUMBER f7) OTHER FACILITl!':S INVOLVED (8)
I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY' YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Salem Unit 2 05000 311 FACILITY NAME DOCKET. NUMBER
-- -- 05000 07 22 93 93 014 02 .10 05 94 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more (11)
- MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73:71(b)
I L:~E~~~O) I 80 I 20.405(a)(1) 0)
- 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73 (a)(2)(v) 73.71 (c) 20.405 (a)(1 )(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) x OTHER 20A05(a)(1)(iii) 50. 73 (a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) (A) (Specify in Abstract I below and in Text, NRC 20.405(a) (1) (iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73 (a)(2)(viii)(B) Form 366A) 20.405 (a)(1 )(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) Voluntarv J LICENSEE:CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12).
NAME .. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
M. J. Pastva, Jr. - LER Coordinator (609) 339-5165 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TONPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) x NO SUBMISSION DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On 7/22/93, it was determined that the 91. 6% dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4* kilovolt (KV) vital buses would not fully protect the 230 and 460 volt (V) motors should the 4KV bus voltage degrade to less than 93.2%, but greater than 91. 6%. At that time it was concluded the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and guidance provided in "Safety Evaluation And Statement Of Staff Positions Relative To The Emergency Power Systems For Operating Reactors" NRC letter, dated 6/2/77, were not fully met. Continued operation of both Sa_lem Uni ts was based upon self-imposed administrative controls on 4KV bus p.lignment until implementation of design changes to change the dropout setpoint. A subsequent detailed study shows the motors would have performed their intended safety functions with the 91. 6% setpoint. As such, this report is made voluntarily for informational purposes.
NRG FORM 366 (5-92)
REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH13LOCK BLOCK NUMBER OF TITLE NUMBER DIGITS/CHARACTERS 1 UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL 2 DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 3 VARIES 'PAGE NUMBER * .
4 UP T076 TITLE 6TOTAL 5 EVENT DATE 2 PER BLOCK 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 6 LER NUMBER 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 6 TOTAL 7 REPORT DATE 2 PER BLOCK UP TO 18 FACILITY NAME 8 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 TOTAL - DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 9 1 OPERATING MODE 10 3 POWER LEVEL 1
11 REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES UP TO 50 FOR NAME 12 LICENSEE CONTACT 14 FOR TELEPHONE CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 13 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE
' 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES 1
14 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES 6 TOTAL 15 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 2 PER BLOCK
VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION 1 Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 93-014-02 2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}
REPORT IDENTIFICATION:
Voluntary Reporting Of 4 Kilo-Volt Vital Bus Second Level Undervoltage (UV) Protection Dropout Setpoint Date of Discovery: 7/22/93 Report Date: 10/5/94 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.93-320.
INITIAL"CONDITIONS:
Unit 1: Mode 1 Reactor Power 80% - Unit Load 815 MWe Unit 2: Mode 1 Reactor Power 100% Unit Load 1140 MWe DISCUSSION:
On July 22, 1993, an initial determination was made that the 91.6%
dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4 kilovolt (KVJ vital buses* {VJ}, would not fully protect the 230 and 460 volt (V) motors should the 4KV bus voltage degrade to less than 93.2%, but greater than 91.6%. At that time it was concluded the intent of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
{UFSAR) and guidance provided in "Safety Evaluation And Statement Of Staff Positions Relative To The Emergency Power Systems For Operating Reactors" NRC letter, dated June 2, 1977, were not fully met. This was identified during a self-initiated adequacy review to ensure the intent of the 1977 NRC letter was being met. Continued operation of both sa.lem Units was based upon ensuring that the 4KV bus voltage would be maintained at or above 93.2% by imposition of additional administrative controls on 4KV bus alignment until implementation of design changes to change the dropout setpoint. The NRC was notified of this determination pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b) {l) (ii) (B). In addition, on August 20, 1993, this issue was reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (ii) (B) and 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (v) (D)
A subsequent detailed study shows the motors would have performed their intended safety functions with the 91.6% setpoint. Therefore, a reportable occurrence with the setpoint, as described, does not
..\
VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1 5000272 93-014-02 3 of 4 DISCUSSION: (cont'd) exist pursuant to 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73.
ANALYSIS:
In July 1993, a self-initiated adequacy review concluded the 91.6% .
dropout setpoint for second level undervoltage protection of both Salem Units' 4 KV vital buses, would not fully protect 230 and 460V motors. Continued operation of both Salem Units was based upon the following self-imposed administrative controls regarding 4KV bus alignment:
- 1. Hourly logging of 4KV vital bus voltages, maintained between 4.3KV and 4.5KV.
- 2. Maintaining only two vital buses energized from their operating transformer, if both the corresponding group buses are on their respective Auxiliary Power Transformer (APT) .
3a. Maintaining three vital buses energized from the operating transformer, if one of the corresponding group buses is transferred to the operating Station Power Transformer (SPT) or 3b. Maintaining three vital buses energized from the operating transformer, if the load which can be transferred from the APTs is reduced by 5 mega volt amps.
However, revision 01 to calculation ES-15.00S(Q), "Salem Units 1 and 2 Degraded Grid Study", shows worst case recovery vital bus voltage is 93.2% of 4KV following transfer of the APTs to the SPTs.
A subsequent detailed study shows that the 230 and 460V motors will perform their safety functions with the 91.6% setpoint. As such, the self-imposed administrative controls serve to add greater enhancement to the performance of these motors, from a reliability standpoint.
The initial determination that the 91.6% dropout setpoint did not meet the intent of the UFSAR and the BTP resulted from overly restrictive conservatism in reviewing/assessing the ES-15.00S(Q), revision 01 calculations, without benefit of the results of the subsequent detailed study. Dropout setpoint selection at 91.6%*was based on the lowest voltage the 4.16KV motors could be allowed to operate (i.e.
90%) due to voltage drops in the motors' cables and relay inaccuracy considerations.
I~-- -
VOLUNTARY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit l 5000272 93-014-02 4 of 4 SIGNIFICANCE:
This report is made for informational purposes, since the dropout setpoint provides adequate protection for the worst case design basis event. As such, this issue is not reportable pursuant the requirements of 10CFR50.73.
ACTIONS TAKEN/PLANNED:
Related design changes, including changing the dropout setpoint, were implemented on Unit 1 during its last refueling outage and are scheduled for Unit 2 during its next refueling outage.
The self-imposed administrative controls will be maintained for Unit 2 until implementation of the aforementioned design changes.
License Change Requests have been submitted to revise Technical Specifications regarding the second level undervoltage relay setpoint.
The importance of adequately considering lower voltage levels whenever evaluating 4KV setpoints for changes has been discussed with the Electrical Engineering Group.
Appropriate changes to the UFSAR will be implemented.
Appropriate documents will be revised to incorporate the results of the subsequent study involving the 91.6% dropout setpoint.
ager -
tions MJPJ:pc SORC Mtg.94-077
