ML071420444

Second Handout for April 19, 2007 Clarification Call Concerning Shearon Harris Transition to NFPA 805

ML071420444
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	04/19/2007
From:	NRC/NRR/ADRA/DRA/AFPB
To:
References
Download: ML071420444 (1)

Text

General Comments

1. The definitions provided in various procedures are not consistent. Use definitions from NFPA 805 where available.

FPIP-0104

1. 3.4 - Revise definition to clarify.

2. 4.1.1 - Add CWDs, block diagrams, raceway layout drawings for completeness.

3. 9.1.1 - Delete note. Performance goals are requirements, not guidance.

4. 9.1.2 - Item #5 and #9, manual valves should be included for completeness.

Future modifications may change position of valves in the SSD flow paths.

FPIP-0105

1. 3.2 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?

2. 9.2.16 - Are indication and alarm circuits needed to be evaluated? These may give erroneous information to plant operators.

3. 9.3.1 - Why are criteria different from plant to plant? Is high impedance fault considered?

4. 9.8 - Why BNP only? Are other plants need verification?

FPIP-0122

1. 3.11 - Sequential spurious actuations contradict the assumption that cable shorts can happen simultaneously. How can one determine which failure sequence and how far apart the failures occur?

2. 4.3.1 - Add electrical diagrams (CWDs, block diagrams, etc.)

3. 9.1 - Should thermoset/thermoplastic inter-cable failures be considered based on CAROLFIRE?

4. 9.1.1 - The 4th bullet contradict the definition in 3.7 where inter-cable short of two or more separate cables is postulated.

5. 9.2.1 - What about hot shorts? How many is postulated?

6. 9.3.6.4 - Add loss of instrumentation

7. 9.3.6.5 - Monitoring functions not discussed in failure scenarios.