ML18038B386

LER 95-002-00:on 950710,DG 3D Auto Started Due to Personnel Error.Work Was Stopped & DGs Shut Down

ML18038B386
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	08/04/1995
From:	William Jones TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML18038B385	List: ML18038B384 ML18038B386
References
LER-95-002-03, LER-95-2-3, NUDOCS 9508100319
Download: ML18038B386 (10)

Text

NRC FORH 366 .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(sall SSION ROVED BY (NB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE. TO COMPLY HITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS ~

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)' FORNARD COMHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IMFORHATIOH AMD RECORDS MAMAGEHEHT BRANCH (MMBB 7714) ~ U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, (See reverse for required nutter of digits/characters for each block) NASHIHGTOH, DC 20555 0001 REDUCTION PROJECT AMD TO THE PAPERMORK (3140 0104), OFFICE OF HAMAGEHEMT AMD BUDGET UASHIMGTOM DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET INNER (2) PAGE (3)

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 3 05000296 1OFS TITLE (4) DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO START DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR EVENT DATE 5 LER IRNBER 6 REP(NIT DATE 7 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8 SEQUENT I AL REVISION FACILITY NAHE DOCKET HUHBER HOMTH DAY YEAR YEAR. HOMTH DAY YEAR NA HUHBER MUHBER FACILITY MAHE DOCKET MUHBER 07 10 95 95 002 00 08 04 NA OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR: Check. one or more 11 M(X)E (9) N 20.402(b) 20.405(c) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POMER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71 (c)

LEVEL (10) 000 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract and in Text, below 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) MRC Form 366A LICEMSEE C(NITACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAHE TELEPHONE MUHBER (Include Area Code)

William C. Jones, Compliance Licensing Engineer (205)729-7857 DNPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH CXNPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REP(NIT 13 SYS REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE COMPONENT HAMUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TEH TO NPRDS TO MPRDS

< XV<p~ig.'.

SUPPLHKNTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED HOMTH DAY 'EAR YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSIOH DATE). DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On July 10, 1995, at 1446 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.50203e-4 months <br />, diesel generator (DG) 3D auto started, and at approximately 1447 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.505835e-4 months <br />, DGs 3A, 3B, and 3C auto started during the performance of wire lifts conducted to facilitate testing of the Emergency Core Cooling System logic. During the wire lifts, an electri.cian shorted two relay terminals with a pair of pliers. At the time of this event, Unit 3 was defueled and in a long-term outage. Unit 2 was operating at 100 percent power, and Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled. This event was caused by personnel error due to inattention to detail. The electrician performing the wire failed to take proper precautions while working on energized equipment (e.g.,tape ad)acent lift terminals, tape tools). Subsequent to the event the DGs were shutdown and returned to standby readiness. This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) as a condition that resulted in automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

MRC FORM ( )

'P508100319 95080J)

PDR ADOCK 05000296 8 PDR

4l NRC FORII 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI OH APPROVED BY QGI NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) . EXP I RES - 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0'RS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEH ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 'WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION TEXT CONTINUATION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGENENT AHD BUDGET, WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NINIBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUHBER NUMBER Browns Ferry Unit 3 05000296 95 002 00 2 of 5 TEX'I If more s ce is r uired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17)

I ~ PLANT CONDITIONS At the time this event occurred, Unit 3 and Unit 1 were shutdown and defueled. Unit 2 was at 100 percent power.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. Event At 1446 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.50203e-4 months <br /> Central Standard Time (CST) on July 10, 1995/

diesel'enerator (DG) 3D (EK) auto started during the performance of wire lifts conducted to facilitate testing of the Emergency Core Cooling System Logic [JE). The event occurred when an electrician (contractor, non-licensed) was performing a wire lift on a relay [RLY) terminal and the electrician's pliers came in contact with an adjacent terminal. The initial contact caused partial closure of the relay contacts resulting in the auto start of the 3D DG. At 1447 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.505835e-4 months <br /> CST, the pliers again contacted the adjacent terminal causing complete closure of the relay contacts resulting in the auto start of the 3A, 3B, and 3C DGs.

The Assistant Shift Operations Supervisor (ASOS) (utility, licensed) immediately notified personnel in the Auxiliary Instrument Room to stop activities associated with the wire lifts. At 1523 hours0.0176 days <br />0.423 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.795015e-4 months <br /> the DGs were shutdown and returned to standby readiness.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv) as a condition that resulted in an automatic actuation of an ESF.

B. Ino erable Structures Com onents or S stems that Contributed to the Event:

None.

Co Dates and A roximate Times of Ma or Occurrences:

July 10, 1995 at 1446 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.50203e-4 months <br /> CST 3D DG auto started at 1447 hours0.0167 days <br />0.402 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.505835e-4 months <br /> CST 3A, 3B, & 3C DG auto started at 1523 hours0.0176 days <br />0.423 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.795015e-4 months <br /> CST Unit 3 DGs shutdown and returned to standby readiness

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY (His NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS ~ FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTIOH TEXT'ONTINUATION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AHD BUDGETS WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NIH(BER (2) LER NQ(BER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Browns Ferry Unit 3 05000296 95 002 00 3 of 5 TEXT lf more s ce is re uired use additional co ies of NRC Form 366A (17) at 1607 hours0.0186 days <br />0.446 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.114635e-4 months <br /> CST TVA provided a 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii) notification to NRC Operations Center D~ Other S stems or Secondar Functions Affected:

None.

E~ Method of Discover

'Thi's condition was discovered when the Unit Operator (UO)

(utility, licensed] received alarms (ALM) and auto started.

indicators that the 3A, 3B, 3C, and 3D DGs had F~ 0 erator Actions:

When the UO observed the alarms, the ASOS immediately notified personnel in the Auxiliary Instrument'oom to stop activities associated with the wire lift.

G~ Safet S stem Res onses:

The safety systems responded as designed for this type of event.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT A. Immediate Cause:

The immediate cause of the event was the inadvertent contact of pliers between two relay terminals. This short simulated an accident signal resulting in the auto start of the Unit 3 DGs.

B~ Root Cause:

The cause of this event was personnel error due to inattention to detail. During the performance of a wire an electrical panel, the electrician's pliers inadvertently lift on a relay in contacted an adjacent terminal. Although the area inside the electrical panel was cramped, the electrician should have taken additional precautions while working on energized equipment (e.g., tape adjacent terminals, tape tools):

C~ Contributin Factors:

None.

0 NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSIOH APPROVED BY (NQ NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REOUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD CONHENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE INFORHAT I ON AND RECORDS NANAGEHEHT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONHISSION ~

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO,THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION TEXT CONTINUATION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGENENT AND BUDGETS

'WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET N(MBER (2) LER NQIBER (6) PAGE (3)

'YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUHBER NUHBER Browns Ferry Unit 3 05000296 95 002 00 4 of 5 TEXT If more s ace is r uired use additional co ies of 'NRC Form 366A (17)

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT The DGs are designed to auto start when an accident signal is received. In"this event, the auto start of the DGs was a successful completion of the designed function. Operations personnel immediately identified the cause of the ESF actuation and took appropriate corrective actions to restore the DGs to standby readiness.

Therefore, this event did not affect the health and safety of plant

,personnel or the public.

V ~ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A~ Immediate Corrective Actions:

The work was stopped and the DGs were shutdown.

B~ Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:

The electrician was counseled to further emphasize the need to take necessary precautions when working on energized equipment and to develop a questioning attitude prior to performing work.

VI., ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. Failed Com onents:

None.

B. Previous LERs on Similar Events:

There have been several LERs written to document unplanned DG autostarts. Three of these LERs (i.e., 259/89014, 259/91004/

and 296/91003) occurred as a result of personnel error.

In LER 259/89014, the individual allowed a wire to contact another energized, terminal during performance of an SI. The corrective action was to revise the SI to include a precautionary note to insulate adjacent terminals prior to lifting wires.

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NRC FORM 366A U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIOIISSIOH APPROVED BY CKB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATION, COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 MRS'ORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 771C), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOH, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION TEXT CONTINUATION PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NINBER '(2) LER NWER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Browns Ferry'Unit 3 05000296 95 002 00 5 of 5 TEXT If more s ace is re ired use additionaI co ies of HRC Form 366A (17)

In LER 259/91004, the individual placed the wrong keylock switch in the test position. The corrective actions were to install larger identification labels to assist individuals in identifying the correct component.

In LER 296/91003, the individual did not properly install an inhibiting boot during the performance of an SI. The corrective actions were to train .maintenance personnel on the proper installation of boots.

Only LER 296/91003 is similar to this event. However, the previous corrective actions for this LER would not have precluded this event.

VII ~ COMMITMENTS None.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) system and component codes are identified in the text with brackets (e.g., [XX].

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