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{{#Wiki_filter:Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013-1 No.: NRC 13-1 Examiners:
Applicant:
SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions:
IC-21 Turnover:
Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOSR 3.7.4.1 , MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ISOLATION 1 MS018A1B/C/D VALVE TRAVEL AND INDICATION 18 MONTH SURVEILLANCE (due date in 3 days). The SM directs the SG PORVs to/R.e stroked with the MCB MIA stations and returned to " Auto" upon completion. i' I Event Malf. No. Event Event I No. Type* Description IMF CV32B 1 B CV pump auto start failure TRGSET 1 1A CV pump trip on SI ZL01 SI01 PA(3) = = 1 IMF CV01A (1 0) IMF RX17 3.5 Rod control summing amp failure TRGSET 2 FW break when SI actuates "ZL01IA066(2)
== 0" IMF FW19B (2 0) 3.5 30 1 TRGSET 3 N-BOP , US 1 BwOSR 3.7.4.1 , 1 MS018A1B/CID Surv. with ZA01 PKMS042A > TS-US 1 MS018B valve failure. 0.90 IMF PB2411 (30) ON IMF PB2412 (3 0) ON lOR ZL01 MS018B2 (3 0) ON lOR ZL01MS018B1 (3 0) ON lOR ZA01ZIMS010 (3 0) 90 2 IMF TC14D 0 R-ATC , US #4 Governor valve servo failure closed 3 IMF RX06K 0 1 5 I-BOP , US 1 C SG NR level transmitter 1 L T -539 f ails l ow TS-US 4 I MF CV 1 0 0 30 I-ATC , U S 1 CV 1 2 1 cont r olle r fa i lu r e 5 IMF FW 16 1 50030 I-BO P , U S 1 PT-508 FW Htr D sch Pr ess fa i ls hig h 6 IM F TH 03B 450 M-A LL 1 B SG TR (4 50 gpm) 7 P rel o ad C-A T C 1 A CV p um p tri ps/1 B C V p um p f a i ls t o au to s t a rt 1, 8 Pr e l oa d M-ALL 1 B S G f e e d li n e brea k i n s ide con t ainment (3.5 MLB M/h r f a u l t e d and ru p t u r e d) *(N)o r mal , .. (R)ea ctlv l ty (I)nst ru ment , (C)om p on e nt, (M)ajor T r an s ie n t SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOSR 3.7.4.1, MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ISOLATION 1 MS018A/B/C/D VALVE TRAVEL AND INDICATION 18 MONTH SURVEILLANCE (due at end of shift). After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP performs 1 BwOSR 3.7.4.1. The 1 B SG PORV valve will fail the test due to a broken hydraulic line when the valve is stroked open. The Unit Supervisor will enter Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition A and Tech Spec 3.6.3, Condition C. 1MS019B will remain closed to comply with TS 3.6.3, condition C. 1 MS018B will remain unavailable for the remainder of tbe scenario.
The crew should inform the SM following the 1MS018B failure. After the 1 MS0188 failure has been addressed, the #4 turbine governor valve. servo Will fail, causing the #4 governor valve to close. Turbine load will lower approximately 70 Mw. The ATC will borate the RCS as necessary and/or move rods in to stabilize RCS temperature.
After the #4 governor valve failure is addressed, 1 C SG NRlevel transmitter 1 L T -539 will fail low. 1 FW530, Feedwater Regulating Valve, will open fully and 1 C;SG will rise. The BOP will take manual control of 1 C SG level and stabilize 1 C SG level. 1 BwOAINST""2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment E, will be implernented.
will restore 1C SG level control to automatic after 1 C SG level is restored to normal and an operable 1C SG NR level controlling channel is selected.
Technical specifications 3.3.1, and Eand 3.3.2, conditions A and 0 are applicable.
After the 1 L T -539 failure has been addressed).
1 C\(121 Charging pump flow control valve controller 1 FK-121 will fail to 0% demand. The and pressurizer level will drop. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by takingmanu91 control of the 1 FK-121. After the 1 FK-121 failure has been addressed, feedwater line pressure detector 1 PT-508 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both main feedwater pumps speed will lower, reducing feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels to begin lowering.
The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control oftbernain feedwater pumps. 1 BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEfr.:iAttachment J, will be implemented.
1 PT-508 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario .. After the 1 PT.:508 faUure11as been addressed, a 450 gpm SGTR initiates on the 1 B SG. The crew will determine that the leakage is beyond the capacity of a single charging pump and initiate a reactor trip and safety transient of the reactor trip and safety injection result in a feedline break inside containfflentOn the ruptured SG. The crew will implement 1 BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
When safety injection is actuated, the 1A CV pump will trip. The 1 B CV pump must be manually started to establish high head ECCS flow. After determining 1 B SG secondary pressure boundary is not intact the crew will transition to 1 BwEP-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.
The crew will complete isolation of 1 B SG and transition to 1 BwEP-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, based on secondary radiation trends on the 1 B SG. In addition, the crew will recognize 1 B SG pressure does not drop to zero and lowering pressurizer level/pressure will indicate a SGTR (alternate indications).
After determining ruptured SG pressure is less than 320 psig the crew will transition 1 BwCA-3.1 , SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT --SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED. Completion criteria is completion of step () *1 BwCA-3.1.
Critical Tasks 1. Manually start the 1 B CV pump prior to completion step 6 of 1 BwEP-O. (ERG Critical Task number -E-O--I) (KIA number -013000A4.01 importance
-4.5/4.8) 2. Isolate 1 B Steam Generator prior to completing step 4 of 1 BwEP-2. (ERG Critical Task number -E-2--A) (KIA number -000040AA 1.10 importance
-4.1/4.1) NOTE: No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the2013.Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam. A similar major event (SGTR) is included on the 13-2 Audit Exam scenario, this event is different because this event is a SGTR that is also faulted while the 13-2 Audit EXam scenario contains a SGTR with a loss of RCS pressure control. .3 Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013-1 No.: NRC 13-2 Examiners: Applicant:
SRO ( RO . " BOP Initial Conditions
: IC-31 Turnover:
Unit 1 is at 90% power, steady state , equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. 1 B Heater Drain Pump is OOS for motor replacement for the past 3 days. Expected back in service in 7 days. 1CVS149C was returned to service last shift following maintenance to replace its fuse block. Following completion of turnover , the shift manager requests the BOP swap 75 gpm letdown orifices from 1CVS149B to 1CVS149C per BwOP CV-9 for an upcoming clearance order on 1CVS149B to replace its fuse block while the RO monitors reactor power. I Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description lOR lDI1HD01PB PTl 1B HD pump OOS IMF MS01A 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01B 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01C 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01D 100 MSIV fail to close IMF CS01B 1 B CS pp failure MRF RP37 OUT K643 CS Trn A actuation relay failure TRGSET 1 PlR PORV 455A failure "YP:MFW35A==1" TRG 1 "IMF TH11A (0 90) 5" TRGSET 2 1 RYSOOOA block valve breaker trips CI llO 1 RYSOOOA(2)==0" MRF ED05SC (2 5) OPEN 1 None N-BOP, US Swap 75 gpm letdown orifices 2 IMF RX1SH 650 I-ATC, US loop 4 Thot RTD fails high IMF RX1Sl 650 TS , US 3 IMF RX03C 4.S I-BOP , US 1 FT-522 fails high (Stm Flow) 4 IMF FW35A C-BOP , US 1A Heater Drain Pump trip requiring turbine runback R-RO, US 5 Preload C-ATC, 1 RY 455A partially opens TS-US 1 RYSOOOA block valve breaker trips 6 MS07C 4 0 M-All Uncontrolled d epressurization of all SGs 7 Preload C-BOP , US Fai lure of both trains of CS to automatically actuate IS DMF MS01D C-All 1A &1 D MSIVs close *(N)orma l, .. (R)eactlv lty (I)nstrument, (C)ornponent , (M)a Jor TransIent SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 90% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOl. Online risk is green. 1 B Heater Drain Pump is OOS for motor replacement for the past 3 days. Expected back in service in 7 days. 1CV8149C was returned to service last shift following maintenance to replace its fuse block. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP swap 75 gpm letdown orifices from 1CV8149B to 1CV8149C per BwOP CV-9 for an upcoming clearance order on 1CV8149B to replace its fuse block while the RO monitors reactor power. After completing shift turnover and relief, the crew will swap 75 gpm letdown orifices.
The BOP will manually lower letdown pressure, remove 1CV8149B from operation and place 1CV8149C on-line. The BOP will then restore letdown line pressure and restore letdown to automatic operatlQn After completing the letdown orifice swap, loop 4 Thot fails high, resulting in demanded rod inward motion. The crew should take actions to stabilize the plant per 1 BwOA INST-2 attachment A. Technical Specifications 3.3.1 applies. After the RTD failure has been addressed, a failure of 1 FT-522 steam flow channel will occur. The crew will enter 1 BwOA INST-2 and perform appropriate actions. The crew should swap to an operable steam flow channel. No Technical Specification applies. After completion of 1 BwOA INST -2 actions, 1A Heater Drain Pump will trip. 1 BwOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRIP-Attachment C will be entered. The BOP will initiate a turbine load reduction to 780 MW at 20 MW/minute.
The RO will the R<;S as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature.
As the crew is reducing load to addreS$the1AHppump, PZR PORV 1 RY455A will open to the intermediate position, resulting in a. slow drop. The A TC will isolate the PZR PORV by closing 1 RY8000A, PORV block valve. Once1RY8000A is closed, its breaker will trip open, removing power from 1 RY8000A. 1 RY 455A will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.
Tech Spec 3.4.11, conditions Band C apply. If pressure drops below 2209 psig, Tech Spec 3.4.1 will apply. After the plant is of 1 RY455A addressed, a large fault will occur on the 1C MS line. When containment 20 psig, Phase B actuates but the CS pumps do not start. The crew should manually realign train A CS valves which will start the 1 A CS pump. Operators should transition to 1 BwEP-2 MSIVs have failed to close and that an uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs is in progress.
The crew should transition to 1 BwCA-2.1 where they will throttle AF flow to the SGs. Entry into 18wJ;ff .. H.1 will be required when the crew throttles AF flow to 45 gpm per SG, however, a note in 1 BwFR-H.
tf;le procedure not to be performed.
The crew will continue in 1 BwCA-2.1 until 81 termination whenthe 1A & 10 M81Vs will close and the crew will transition to 1 BwEP-2. The crew will then isolate AF to the 1 B & 1 C SGs. Entry into 1 BwFR-P.1 may be required as directed by the status trees. Completion criteria is completion of 1 BwEP-2.
Critical Tasks 1. Manually actuate one train of containment spray prior to transition out of 1 BwEP-O. (ERG Critical Task number -E-O--E) (KIA number -013000A4.01 importance
-4.5/4.8) 2. Manually control AF flowrate to 45 gpm for each SG before orange path in integrity occurs. (ERG Critical Task number -ECA-2.1--A) (KIA number -OWE12EA1.3 importance
-3.4/3.9) NOTE: No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam. 3 Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013-1 No.: NRC 13-3 Examiners: Applicant:
SRO '-ATC BOP Initial Conditions
: IC-21 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power , steady state , equilibrium xenon , BOL. Online risk is green. 1A CW pump is OOS for impeller work. Expected back in service in one week. 1 PR11 J filter change planned early in shift. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description Preload lOR ZDI1CW01PA PTL 1A CW PP OOS IRF ED051C OPEN 1CW001A OOS IRF ED075C OPEN IMF ED06A Breaker 1562 ABT failure IMF FW44 1B AF Pp Trip IMF FW48A 1A AF Pp fails to auto start IMF RX17 3.5 Rod control summing amp failure 1 None N-BOP 1 PR 11 J filter change TS-US 2 lOR ZDI1W001 PA TRIP C-BOP, 1 A Containment Chilled Water Pump trip C US TS-US 3 IMF RX05 150030 I-BOP , Steam line pressure detector 1 PT -507 fails high US 4 IMF CV23A 80 180 C-ATC 1A letdown HX tube leak (or BOP), US 5 IMF CV16 100 10 I-ATC, VCT level channel 1 L T -112 failure. US 6 None R-ATC , Emergency load drop of 200 MW US 7 IMF RD02H08 R-ATC , Single Dropped Rod (H-8) US 8 IMF RD02D04 M-AII Multiple Dropped Rods (H-8 and D-4) 9 IMF TH03D 450 M-ALL 1D SGTR 10 Preload C-BOP 1 A AF Pp auto start failure , 1 B AF Pp trip *(N)orma l , .. (R)eactlVity (I)nstrument , (C)om ponent, (M)aJor Trans i ent SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. RCS boron concentration is 645 ppm. Online risk is green. 1A CW pump is OOS for impeller work. Expected back in service in one week. 1 PR 11 J filter change planned early in shift. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. After completing shift turnover and relief, a Radiation Protection Technician will contact the main control room and request the crew shutdown 1 PR 11 J sample pump to support daily filter replacement.
The Unit Supervisor will enter Tech Spec 3.4.15, condition B. Approximately two minutes later, the RP Technician will request restart of the 1 PR 11 J skid. 1 PR 11 J will be restarted.
LCO 3.4.15 may be exited after filter change completion and monitor is operating normally for 90 minutes. :;';t After changing the 1 PR11 J filter, the 1 A Containment Chilled Water pump will trip, in 1 A Containment Chiller tripping.
The crew will start the standby Chilled Water anq.9 , hiller per BwOP VP-1 after receiving a report that the 1 A Chilled Water pump motor appears damag'ed. Containment pressure and temperature will slowly rise as a result of the loss of Containment Cooling ,._ The US should reference LCO 3.6.4 and 3.6.5 and place priority to start the standby Chiller. After the Containment Chilled Water malfunction has steam line pressure detector 1 PT-507 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both pumps speed will rise, raising feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the main feedwater INST-2 , OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment J, will" be implemented. 1 PT-507 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario. " " '-.-'.-. ->. After the steam line pressure detector
*.
* the 1A letdown heat exchanger will develop a tube leak. Letdown flow and leyelvyillJower and CC surge tank level and radiation will rise. The crew will implement 1 BwOA COOLING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, and locate and isolate the leakage. The crew will aligr:t;!!he1 B letdown heat exchanger in accordance with BwOP CV-22, OPERATION OF LETDOWN AND EXCHANGERS.
After the letdown heat exchanger failUre is addressed, VCT level transmitter 1LT-112 will fail high, causing letdown to divert).t9the HLJr. The RO will take manual control and close the letdown divert valve. Tech Spec 3.3.9 does ndfapf,>,Jy in Mode 1. The instrument failure will prevent RMCS for operating in automatic mode. 1 L"I-112.NVitl remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.
After the has been addressed, rod H-8 will drop into the core causing Tave to drop and reactor;Rower to ipitiaf fY drop. The crew will implement 1 BwOA ROD-3, DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD. made sufficient reactivity manipulation , either by adjusting Tave to within 3&deg;F of Tref, or ioad reduction to reduce power to within the range allowable for the dropped rod recovery, a seOPQg.tod (0-4) will drop into the core. After the plant is stabilized and the crew has completed a reactivity change to match Tave to Tref, a second rod will drop into the core. The crew should identify that two rods have dropped into the core and trip t he reactor. The crew w i ll take im mediate actions per 1 BwEP-O , REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECT I ON and tra nsition t o 1 BwEP ES-0.1 , REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE. After th e transitions to 1 BwEP ES-O.1, the thermal hydraulic shock from the reactor trip results in a SGTR. When the main generator trips, an ABT failure of breaker 1562 results in the 1 B RCP being de-energized. The crew will manually actuate safety injection and return to 1 BwEP-O. The 1 B AF pump will start and then trip. The 1A AF pump fails to auto-start.
The crew will manually start the 1A AF pump. The scenario is complete when the crew has terminated high head injection and established normal charging flow in 1 BwEP-3. Critical Tasks 1. Manually trip the reactor upon discovery of multiple dropped control rods prior to completion of step 4 in 1 BwOA ROD-3 (if crew re-enters the procedure at step 1) upon second dropped rod, or upon verification that the DR PI indication for the second dropped rod is valid (per INPO SER 15-90 & SER 19-89) (KIA number -APE003A2.01 importance
-3.7/3.9) 2. Identify the 10 SG as the ruptured SG and isolate prior to a transition to 1 BWC::;A-3.1 is required. (ERG Critical Task number -E-3--A) (KIA number -EPE038EA 1.32 importance 3. Depressurize RCS to restore RCS inventory prior to 10 SG PORV or safetyyalye:
" water release. (ERG Critical Task number -E-3--C) (KIA number EPE038EA 1.09, importance Y 3.2/3.3) 4. Establish the minimum required AFW flowrate to the SGs of E-O series. (ERG Critical Task number -E-O-F) (KIA number -061000A2.05 importance
-3;::](3.4) NOTE: No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in other sections of the 2013 NRC exam. repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or 0;.: ("::';< ( ............... '.' ...... A .similar event redu 9 t ..
. i .*.* O ..*... n ................ ) .. 'i i .. ***.n .*.*.*. , ... fo IUqfjD on the 13-3 Audit Exam scenario, however ,\\1hIS event IS different because this event IS a change (200 MW vs. 100 MW) In a shorter time '(, . span (15 minutes vs. 30 minutes) with a dropped control rod during the ramp whereas the 13-1 Audit Exam has no such complication.
'6 F event (1 PT-508 failure) is included on the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario, however this event is different'gecavse it is initiated by a different instrument (1 PT-507 failure) and affects the feedwater control system and SG'!evels in the opposite direction.
A similar major event (SGTR) is on the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario, however this event is different because it involves a direct SGTR with different critical tasks allowing the stoppage of break flow whereas the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario is a ruptured and faulted SG not allow for stoppage of break flow and requires implementation of a different mitigating strategY.0* .3 Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013 -1 No.: NRC 13-4 Examiners: Applicant SRO r-ATC BOP Initial Conditions
: IC-21 Turnover:
Unit 1 is at 100% power , steady state , equilibrium xenon , BOL. Online risk is green. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.
I Event Malf. No. Event Event I No. Type* Description Preload IMF RP14A SI actuation failure (Train A) IMF RP14B SI actuation failure (Train B) TRGSET 1 ZDISIA 1 = = 1 TRG 1 DMF RP14A TRGSET 2 ZDISIA 1 = = 1 TRG 2 DMF RP14B TRGSET 3 ZDISIA2 = = 1 TRG 3 DMF RP14A TRGSET 4 ZDISIA2 = = 1 TRG 4 DMF RP14B IMF RH04B 1 SI8811 B fails to auto open IMF RH01A 1A RH Pp trip IMF RH12B 1 B RH Pp auto start failure IMF FW01 1A FW Pp fail to start/trip 1 None N-BOP , Perform 1 BwOS FW-W1 US 2 IMF RX01J 0 300 I-BOP , US 1 PT-544 , 1 D SG steam pressure channel fails low TS-US 3 IMF RX13A 100 10 I-ATC, US PZR level channel 1 L T-459 fails high (Tech Spec) TS-US 4 lOR ZAI1TK130 9560 I-ATC , US 1 TK-130 controller faillure 5 IMF FW02A C-BOP , 1 B FW Pump trip requiring turbine runback US R-ATC 6 IMF TH18B 1 B RCP shaft break 7 IM F TH 06B (030) 540000 M-ALL Large break RCS LOCA (1 B RCS cold leg) 8 Preload Failure of SI to automatically actuate 9 Preload C-ATC , 1 SI8811 B fails to auto open BOP (N)ormal , .. (R)eactlvlty (I)nstrument , (C)omponent , (M)aJor Transie n t SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.
After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will perform 1 BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.
After completing 1 BwOS FW"W1, 10 SG steam pressure channel, 1 PT-544, fails low. The crew should take actions to stabilize the plant per 1 BwOA INST-2. Technical Specifications 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 apply. After the 10 SG steam pressure failure has been addressed, PZR level will fail high. 1 CV121, charging header flow control valve, will lower charging flow and pressurizer level will lower. The A TC will take manual control of PZR level and stabilize PZR level. 1 BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment C, will be implemented.
The ATC will restore PZR level control to automatic after PZR level is restored to normal and an operable PZR level control channel is selected.
Technical Specifications 3.3.1, conditions A and K apply. . . After the 1LT-459 failure is addressed, 1TK-130 output, Letdtlwn Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Controller, will fail causing high letdown temperature.
""fheB\NAR should be referenced and the RO should take manual control to restore letdown normaL. The crew may elect to isolate letdown due to high temperature.
If isolated, letdown may be restored .. BwOP CV-17, or excess letdown may be placed in service. After the 1TK130 Controller has been Feedwater Pump will trip. 1 BwOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRIP-Attachment A will be entered. The BOP will initiate a turbine load reduction to 700 MW at 250 MW/minute.
The ATC will borate the RCS as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature.
After the crew stabilizes theptant from the FW pump trip, the 1 B RCP shaft will fail. RCS flow in the 1 B loop will drop until an automatic reactor trip occurs due to low RCS loop flow. The 1 B RCP will dislodge components into shortly (30 sec) by a large break LOCA in RCS loop 1 B due to the dislodged RCP components.Pressurizer pressure will fall to the auto SI setpoint, but auto SI actuation will fail requiring a
SI 1A RH pump will trip when starting.
The crew must manually start 1 B RH pump to ECCS flow. The crew will take actions per 1 BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
The crew will transition to 1 BwEP-1 after determining that the ReS is not intact. When the leyel reaches the low-2 setpoint the crew will transition to 1 BwEP ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG Upon transition to 1BwEP ES-1.3, 1S18811B will not automatically open due to failure of relay K648. The crew will align the 1 B RH pump for cold leg recirculation per attachment A of 1 BwEP ES-1.3 to ensure long term core cooling. Completion criteria is performance of 1 BwEP ES-1.3, step 3.
Critical Tasks 1. Manually actuate Safety Injection prior to transition to 1 BwEP-2 or past step 7.a of 1 BwEP ES-0.1. (ERG Critical Task number -E-O--D) (KiA number -000040AA 1.01 importance
-4.6/4.6) 2. Manually start 1 B RH pump prior to completion of step 6 of 1 BwEP. (ERG Critical Task number -H) (KiA number-000011EA1.13 importance
-4.1/4.2) 3. Transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish ECCS recirculation flow that at least meets the assumptions of the plant specific LOCA analysis. (ERG Critical Task number -ES-1.3--A) (KiA number -006000A4.05 importance
-3.9/3.8) NOTE: No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam. 3 Simulation Facili t y Braidwood Scenario Ope r a ti ng Test No.: 2013-1 No.:
NRC 13-sp Applicant:
SRO ",:<;\ ATC BOP In i tial Conditions
: I C-18 Turnover:
Unit 1 is ope r ating at 7S% power, steady state , equilibrium xenon. 1B CW PP is OOS for i ntake bay inspection.
Following completion of turnover, the crew is to pe gp rm 1 BwOS EH-M1 , UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURV E ILLANCE using the p r eferred of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton. The Equipment Operato r has and is standing by at t he Unit 1 E H skid. TSO has requested Unit 1 load to full power at maximum allowable rate due to g r id demand following the surveillance. Event Malf. No. Even t Event No. Type Description Preload lOR ZD I 1CW01PB PTL 1B CW PP OOS MRF ED093B OPEN 1CW001B OOS IMF FW44 1 B AF pump fa i ls t o start IMF RP1SD 1 B SI pump fails to automa t ically start MRF RP84 OPEN trgset 1 " ZLOS2BRKA(2)
== 1" IMF CV01 B (1 0) 1 B CV pump trips when Rx trips trg 1 " IMF FW 1 9C 3.S 010" Feed l i ne break i ns i de conta i nment when Rx t r i ps 1 None N-BOP , Perfo r m 1 BwOS EH-M1. US 2 None R-A T C , Raise power at 0.4 Mw/M i n US 3 IMF NI08H (SOO 10) I-ATC , PR NI N-44 fails high US TS-US 4 lOR ZDIOVC01 CA TRIP C-BOP , MCR Supp l y Fan OA T ri p US TS , US S I MF CV01A C-A T C , 1A CV pump t r ip US TS , U S 6 I MF R X04 E 0 12 0 I-BO P , F e ed Fl o w c ha nnel 1 FTS3 0 A fails low U S 7 IM F ED07A C-ATC , Loss of bus 141 BOP TS-US 8 IMF RP09A M Inadvertent FWI (ALL) Feed l in e break inside containmen t 9 Preload 1 B CV pump trip when Rx trips Preload Loss of heat sink (1 B AF pp) *(N)orma l , (R)eactivity (I)nstrument , (C)omponent , (M)ajor Transient SCENARIO OVERVIEW r Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOS EH-M1, UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE using the preferred method of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton. The Equipment Operator has been briefed and i s standing by at the Unit 1 EH skid. After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will perform 1 BwOS EH-M1 , UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE.
After completing the surveillance, Power Team will request Unit raise turbine load to full power at maximum allowable rate due to grid demand. The crew will commence a power ascension at 0/1: mw/min. After a measurable change in power, a failure of power range N-44 lower detector wilidSty d P The crew should take actions per 1 BwOA INST-1 including defeating the channel functions
.. -rechl'lica r Specifications 3.3.1 applies. After the Power Range failure is addressed, the MCR Supply Fan OA will trip. Ti'Je crew will send an equipment operator to investigate the cause. Upon receiving the thatlocal indications are a motor overload, the crew will start the OB VC train as directed by MCR SUP FAN OA TRIP DP HIGH LOW and BwOP VC-1. Technical Specification 3.7.10 condition A applies. After the MCR Supply Fan OA failure is addressed, The crew will implement 1 BwOA PRI-1S , LOSS OF NORMAL CHARGING.
The crew 1 B CV pump to restore normal charging.
Technical Specifications 3.S.2 condition A and TRM d, conditie>n A apply. After the charging pump failure is addressed;
'Pee ow channel 1 FT-S30A will fail low , resulting in indications of lowering feed flow and openi , Qg ... 2f 1 1 C S/G Feed Reg Valve to attempt to match feed flow with steam flow. The BOP will take manual control of 1 FWS30 to restore 1 C SG level. The US will enter 1 BwOA INST-2 ,
WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL-Attachment G. After addressing the failed feed flow channel , a ground fault will occur on bus 141. 1 BwOA ELEC-3 will be entered and the operators vyiU&sect;J flrt redundant equipment on bus 142 and investigate the status of bus 141. Tech Spec 3.8.9 applies. .--Following ELEC-3 actions, an inadvertent F WI occurs. When the crew manually trips the reactor , a feed line break on the 1 C SG inside containment will occur. SI will actuate. The crew will enter 1 BwEP ... l}to the plant. The 1 B SI pump fails to auto start and must be manually started due to a failure o f i ts retaY. The 1 B AF pump will n o t start (engi ne will seize) resulting in a tra nsition to 1 H.1 at step 15 of , lBwEf'-O.
The 1 B C V pump trips when the reactor trips. Bleed and feed will be required due to the status of thS t GV pumps. Complet i on criteria is estab lis hin g startup feedwater pump flow to the no n-f ault e d SGs. Critical Tasks 1. Manually start the 1 B SI pump before transition out of 1 BwEP-O (ERG Critical Task number -E-O-J) (KIA number 006000A4.01 4.1/3.9) 2. In i t ia te RCS ble ed and feed before attempting to establi s h m ai n f e edwater flow or con de n s a te flow to any SG (ERG Critical Task number -FR-H.1--F) (KIA number OOOEOSEA 1.1 importanc e 4.1/4.0)
NOTE: No normal, reactivity, lie, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam.}}

Revision as of 07:40, 17 July 2018

2013 Braidwood Station Initial Operator Licensing Examination Scenario Forms ES-D1
ML13142A551
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Site: Braidwood  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/15/2013
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Download: ML13142A551 (15)


Text

Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013-1 No.: NRC 13-1 Examiners:

Applicant:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions:

IC-21 Turnover:

Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOSR 3.7.4.1 , MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ISOLATION 1 MS018A1B/C/D VALVE TRAVEL AND INDICATION 18 MONTH SURVEILLANCE (due date in 3 days). The SM directs the SG PORVs to/R.e stroked with the MCB MIA stations and returned to " Auto" upon completion. i' I Event Malf. No. Event Event I No. Type* Description IMF CV32B 1 B CV pump auto start failure TRGSET 1 1A CV pump trip on SI ZL01 SI01 PA(3) = = 1 IMF CV01A (1 0) IMF RX17 3.5 Rod control summing amp failure TRGSET 2 FW break when SI actuates "ZL01IA066(2)

== 0" IMF FW19B (2 0) 3.5 30 1 TRGSET 3 N-BOP , US 1 BwOSR 3.7.4.1 , 1 MS018A1B/CID Surv. with ZA01 PKMS042A > TS-US 1 MS018B valve failure. 0.90 IMF PB2411 (30) ON IMF PB2412 (3 0) ON lOR ZL01 MS018B2 (3 0) ON lOR ZL01MS018B1 (3 0) ON lOR ZA01ZIMS010 (3 0) 90 2 IMF TC14D 0 R-ATC , US #4 Governor valve servo failure closed 3 IMF RX06K 0 1 5 I-BOP , US 1 C SG NR level transmitter 1 L T -539 f ails l ow TS-US 4 I MF CV 1 0 0 30 I-ATC , U S 1 CV 1 2 1 cont r olle r fa i lu r e 5 IMF FW 16 1 50030 I-BO P , U S 1 PT-508 FW Htr D sch Pr ess fa i ls hig h 6 IM F TH 03B 450 M-A LL 1 B SG TR (4 50 gpm) 7 P rel o ad C-A T C 1 A CV p um p tri ps/1 B C V p um p f a i ls t o au to s t a rt 1, 8 Pr e l oa d M-ALL 1 B S G f e e d li n e brea k i n s ide con t ainment (3.5 MLB M/h r f a u l t e d and ru p t u r e d) *(N)o r mal , .. (R)ea ctlv l ty (I)nst ru ment , (C)om p on e nt, (M)ajor T r an s ie n t SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOSR 3.7.4.1, MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ISOLATION 1 MS018A/B/C/D VALVE TRAVEL AND INDICATION 18 MONTH SURVEILLANCE (due at end of shift). After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP performs 1 BwOSR 3.7.4.1. The 1 B SG PORV valve will fail the test due to a broken hydraulic line when the valve is stroked open. The Unit Supervisor will enter Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition A and Tech Spec 3.6.3, Condition C. 1MS019B will remain closed to comply with TS 3.6.3, condition C. 1 MS018B will remain unavailable for the remainder of tbe scenario.

The crew should inform the SM following the 1MS018B failure. After the 1 MS0188 failure has been addressed, the #4 turbine governor valve. servo Will fail, causing the #4 governor valve to close. Turbine load will lower approximately 70 Mw. The ATC will borate the RCS as necessary and/or move rods in to stabilize RCS temperature.

After the #4 governor valve failure is addressed, 1 C SG NRlevel transmitter 1 L T -539 will fail low. 1 FW530, Feedwater Regulating Valve, will open fully and 1 C;SG will rise. The BOP will take manual control of 1 C SG level and stabilize 1 C SG level. 1 BwOAINST""2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment E, will be implernented.

will restore 1C SG level control to automatic after 1 C SG level is restored to normal and an operable 1C SG NR level controlling channel is selected.

Technical specifications 3.3.1, and Eand 3.3.2, conditions A and 0 are applicable.

After the 1 L T -539 failure has been addressed).

1 C\(121 Charging pump flow control valve controller 1 FK-121 will fail to 0% demand. The and pressurizer level will drop. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by takingmanu91 control of the 1 FK-121. After the 1 FK-121 failure has been addressed, feedwater line pressure detector 1 PT-508 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both main feedwater pumps speed will lower, reducing feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels to begin lowering.

The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control oftbernain feedwater pumps. 1 BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEfr.:iAttachment J, will be implemented.

1 PT-508 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario .. After the 1 PT.:508 faUure11as been addressed, a 450 gpm SGTR initiates on the 1 B SG. The crew will determine that the leakage is beyond the capacity of a single charging pump and initiate a reactor trip and safety transient of the reactor trip and safety injection result in a feedline break inside containfflentOn the ruptured SG. The crew will implement 1 BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

When safety injection is actuated, the 1A CV pump will trip. The 1 B CV pump must be manually started to establish high head ECCS flow. After determining 1 B SG secondary pressure boundary is not intact the crew will transition to 1 BwEP-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION.

The crew will complete isolation of 1 B SG and transition to 1 BwEP-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, based on secondary radiation trends on the 1 B SG. In addition, the crew will recognize 1 B SG pressure does not drop to zero and lowering pressurizer level/pressure will indicate a SGTR (alternate indications).

After determining ruptured SG pressure is less than 320 psig the crew will transition 1 BwCA-3.1 , SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT --SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED. Completion criteria is completion of step () *1 BwCA-3.1.

Critical Tasks 1. Manually start the 1 B CV pump prior to completion step 6 of 1 BwEP-O. (ERG Critical Task number -E-O--I) (KIA number -013000A4.01 importance

-4.5/4.8) 2. Isolate 1 B Steam Generator prior to completing step 4 of 1 BwEP-2. (ERG Critical Task number -E-2--A) (KIA number -000040AA 1.10 importance

-4.1/4.1) NOTE: No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the2013.Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam. A similar major event (SGTR) is included on the 13-2 Audit Exam scenario, this event is different because this event is a SGTR that is also faulted while the 13-2 Audit EXam scenario contains a SGTR with a loss of RCS pressure control. .3 Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013-1 No.: NRC 13-2 Examiners: Applicant:

SRO ( RO . " BOP Initial Conditions

IC-31 Turnover:

Unit 1 is at 90% power, steady state , equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. 1 B Heater Drain Pump is OOS for motor replacement for the past 3 days. Expected back in service in 7 days. 1CVS149C was returned to service last shift following maintenance to replace its fuse block. Following completion of turnover , the shift manager requests the BOP swap 75 gpm letdown orifices from 1CVS149B to 1CVS149C per BwOP CV-9 for an upcoming clearance order on 1CVS149B to replace its fuse block while the RO monitors reactor power. I Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description lOR lDI1HD01PB PTl 1B HD pump OOS IMF MS01A 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01B 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01C 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01D 100 MSIV fail to close IMF CS01B 1 B CS pp failure MRF RP37 OUT K643 CS Trn A actuation relay failure TRGSET 1 PlR PORV 455A failure "YP:MFW35A==1" TRG 1 "IMF TH11A (0 90) 5" TRGSET 2 1 RYSOOOA block valve breaker trips CI llO 1 RYSOOOA(2)==0" MRF ED05SC (2 5) OPEN 1 None N-BOP, US Swap 75 gpm letdown orifices 2 IMF RX1SH 650 I-ATC, US loop 4 Thot RTD fails high IMF RX1Sl 650 TS , US 3 IMF RX03C 4.S I-BOP , US 1 FT-522 fails high (Stm Flow) 4 IMF FW35A C-BOP , US 1A Heater Drain Pump trip requiring turbine runback R-RO, US 5 Preload C-ATC, 1 RY 455A partially opens TS-US 1 RYSOOOA block valve breaker trips 6 MS07C 4 0 M-All Uncontrolled d epressurization of all SGs 7 Preload C-BOP , US Fai lure of both trains of CS to automatically actuate IS DMF MS01D C-All 1A &1 D MSIVs close *(N)orma l, .. (R)eactlv lty (I)nstrument, (C)ornponent , (M)a Jor TransIent SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 90% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOl. Online risk is green. 1 B Heater Drain Pump is OOS for motor replacement for the past 3 days. Expected back in service in 7 days. 1CV8149C was returned to service last shift following maintenance to replace its fuse block. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP swap 75 gpm letdown orifices from 1CV8149B to 1CV8149C per BwOP CV-9 for an upcoming clearance order on 1CV8149B to replace its fuse block while the RO monitors reactor power. After completing shift turnover and relief, the crew will swap 75 gpm letdown orifices.

The BOP will manually lower letdown pressure, remove 1CV8149B from operation and place 1CV8149C on-line. The BOP will then restore letdown line pressure and restore letdown to automatic operatlQn After completing the letdown orifice swap, loop 4 Thot fails high, resulting in demanded rod inward motion. The crew should take actions to stabilize the plant per 1 BwOA INST-2 attachment A. Technical Specifications 3.3.1 applies. After the RTD failure has been addressed, a failure of 1 FT-522 steam flow channel will occur. The crew will enter 1 BwOA INST-2 and perform appropriate actions. The crew should swap to an operable steam flow channel. No Technical Specification applies. After completion of 1 BwOA INST -2 actions, 1A Heater Drain Pump will trip. 1 BwOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRIP-Attachment C will be entered. The BOP will initiate a turbine load reduction to 780 MW at 20 MW/minute.

The RO will the R<;S as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature.

As the crew is reducing load to addreS$the1AHppump, PZR PORV 1 RY455A will open to the intermediate position, resulting in a. slow drop. The A TC will isolate the PZR PORV by closing 1 RY8000A, PORV block valve. Once1RY8000A is closed, its breaker will trip open, removing power from 1 RY8000A. 1 RY 455A will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.

Tech Spec 3.4.11, conditions Band C apply. If pressure drops below 2209 psig, Tech Spec 3.4.1 will apply. After the plant is of 1 RY455A addressed, a large fault will occur on the 1C MS line. When containment 20 psig, Phase B actuates but the CS pumps do not start. The crew should manually realign train A CS valves which will start the 1 A CS pump. Operators should transition to 1 BwEP-2 MSIVs have failed to close and that an uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs is in progress.

The crew should transition to 1 BwCA-2.1 where they will throttle AF flow to the SGs. Entry into 18wJ;ff .. H.1 will be required when the crew throttles AF flow to 45 gpm per SG, however, a note in 1 BwFR-H.

tf;le procedure not to be performed.

The crew will continue in 1 BwCA-2.1 until 81 termination whenthe 1A & 10 M81Vs will close and the crew will transition to 1 BwEP-2. The crew will then isolate AF to the 1 B & 1 C SGs. Entry into 1 BwFR-P.1 may be required as directed by the status trees. Completion criteria is completion of 1 BwEP-2.

Critical Tasks 1. Manually actuate one train of containment spray prior to transition out of 1 BwEP-O. (ERG Critical Task number -E-O--E) (KIA number -013000A4.01 importance

-4.5/4.8) 2. Manually control AF flowrate to 45 gpm for each SG before orange path in integrity occurs. (ERG Critical Task number -ECA-2.1--A) (KIA number -OWE12EA1.3 importance

-3.4/3.9) NOTE: No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam. 3 Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013-1 No.: NRC 13-3 Examiners: Applicant:

SRO '-ATC BOP Initial Conditions

IC-21 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power , steady state , equilibrium xenon , BOL. Online risk is green. 1A CW pump is OOS for impeller work. Expected back in service in one week. 1 PR11 J filter change planned early in shift. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description Preload lOR ZDI1CW01PA PTL 1A CW PP OOS IRF ED051C OPEN 1CW001A OOS IRF ED075C OPEN IMF ED06A Breaker 1562 ABT failure IMF FW44 1B AF Pp Trip IMF FW48A 1A AF Pp fails to auto start IMF RX17 3.5 Rod control summing amp failure 1 None N-BOP 1 PR 11 J filter change TS-US 2 lOR ZDI1W001 PA TRIP C-BOP, 1 A Containment Chilled Water Pump trip C US TS-US 3 IMF RX05 150030 I-BOP , Steam line pressure detector 1 PT -507 fails high US 4 IMF CV23A 80 180 C-ATC 1A letdown HX tube leak (or BOP), US 5 IMF CV16 100 10 I-ATC, VCT level channel 1 L T -112 failure. US 6 None R-ATC , Emergency load drop of 200 MW US 7 IMF RD02H08 R-ATC , Single Dropped Rod (H-8) US 8 IMF RD02D04 M-AII Multiple Dropped Rods (H-8 and D-4) 9 IMF TH03D 450 M-ALL 1D SGTR 10 Preload C-BOP 1 A AF Pp auto start failure , 1 B AF Pp trip *(N)orma l , .. (R)eactlVity (I)nstrument , (C)om ponent, (M)aJor Trans i ent SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. RCS boron concentration is 645 ppm. Online risk is green. 1A CW pump is OOS for impeller work. Expected back in service in one week. 1 PR 11 J filter change planned early in shift. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. After completing shift turnover and relief, a Radiation Protection Technician will contact the main control room and request the crew shutdown 1 PR 11 J sample pump to support daily filter replacement.

The Unit Supervisor will enter Tech Spec 3.4.15, condition B. Approximately two minutes later, the RP Technician will request restart of the 1 PR 11 J skid. 1 PR 11 J will be restarted.

LCO 3.4.15 may be exited after filter change completion and monitor is operating normally for 90 minutes. :;';t After changing the 1 PR11 J filter, the 1 A Containment Chilled Water pump will trip, in 1 A Containment Chiller tripping.

The crew will start the standby Chilled Water anq.9 , hiller per BwOP VP-1 after receiving a report that the 1 A Chilled Water pump motor appears damag'ed. Containment pressure and temperature will slowly rise as a result of the loss of Containment Cooling ,._ The US should reference LCO 3.6.4 and 3.6.5 and place priority to start the standby Chiller. After the Containment Chilled Water malfunction has steam line pressure detector 1 PT-507 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both pumps speed will rise, raising feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the main feedwater INST-2 , OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment J, will" be implemented. 1 PT-507 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario. " " '-.-'.-. ->. After the steam line pressure detector

  • .
  • the 1A letdown heat exchanger will develop a tube leak. Letdown flow and leyelvyillJower and CC surge tank level and radiation will rise. The crew will implement 1 BwOA COOLING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, and locate and isolate the leakage. The crew will aligr:t;!!he1 B letdown heat exchanger in accordance with BwOP CV-22, OPERATION OF LETDOWN AND EXCHANGERS.

After the letdown heat exchanger failUre is addressed, VCT level transmitter 1LT-112 will fail high, causing letdown to divert).t9the HLJr. The RO will take manual control and close the letdown divert valve. Tech Spec 3.3.9 does ndfapf,>,Jy in Mode 1. The instrument failure will prevent RMCS for operating in automatic mode. 1 L"I-112.NVitl remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.

After the has been addressed, rod H-8 will drop into the core causing Tave to drop and reactor;Rower to ipitiaf fY drop. The crew will implement 1 BwOA ROD-3, DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD. made sufficient reactivity manipulation , either by adjusting Tave to within 3°F of Tref, or ioad reduction to reduce power to within the range allowable for the dropped rod recovery, a seOPQg.tod (0-4) will drop into the core. After the plant is stabilized and the crew has completed a reactivity change to match Tave to Tref, a second rod will drop into the core. The crew should identify that two rods have dropped into the core and trip t he reactor. The crew w i ll take im mediate actions per 1 BwEP-O , REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECT I ON and tra nsition t o 1 BwEP ES-0.1 , REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE. After th e transitions to 1 BwEP ES-O.1, the thermal hydraulic shock from the reactor trip results in a SGTR. When the main generator trips, an ABT failure of breaker 1562 results in the 1 B RCP being de-energized. The crew will manually actuate safety injection and return to 1 BwEP-O. The 1 B AF pump will start and then trip. The 1A AF pump fails to auto-start.

The crew will manually start the 1A AF pump. The scenario is complete when the crew has terminated high head injection and established normal charging flow in 1 BwEP-3. Critical Tasks 1. Manually trip the reactor upon discovery of multiple dropped control rods prior to completion of step 4 in 1 BwOA ROD-3 (if crew re-enters the procedure at step 1) upon second dropped rod, or upon verification that the DR PI indication for the second dropped rod is valid (per INPO SER 15-90 & SER 19-89) (KIA number -APE003A2.01 importance

-3.7/3.9) 2. Identify the 10 SG as the ruptured SG and isolate prior to a transition to 1 BWC::;A-3.1 is required. (ERG Critical Task number -E-3--A) (KIA number -EPE038EA 1.32 importance 3. Depressurize RCS to restore RCS inventory prior to 10 SG PORV or safetyyalye:

" water release. (ERG Critical Task number -E-3--C) (KIA number EPE038EA 1.09, importance Y 3.2/3.3) 4. Establish the minimum required AFW flowrate to the SGs of E-O series. (ERG Critical Task number -E-O-F) (KIA number -061000A2.05 importance

-3;::](3.4) NOTE: No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in other sections of the 2013 NRC exam. repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or 0;.: ("::';< ( ............... '.' ...... A .similar event redu 9 t ..

. i .*.* O ..*... n ................ ) .. 'i i .. ***.n .*.*.*. , ... fo IUqfjD on the 13-3 Audit Exam scenario, however ,\\1hIS event IS different because this event IS a change (200 MW vs. 100 MW) In a shorter time '(, . span (15 minutes vs. 30 minutes) with a dropped control rod during the ramp whereas the 13-1 Audit Exam has no such complication.

'6 F event (1 PT-508 failure) is included on the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario, however this event is different'gecavse it is initiated by a different instrument (1 PT-507 failure) and affects the feedwater control system and SG'!evels in the opposite direction.

A similar major event (SGTR) is on the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario, however this event is different because it involves a direct SGTR with different critical tasks allowing the stoppage of break flow whereas the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario is a ruptured and faulted SG not allow for stoppage of break flow and requires implementation of a different mitigating strategY.0* .3 Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013 -1 No.: NRC 13-4 Examiners: Applicant SRO r-ATC BOP Initial Conditions

IC-21 Turnover:

Unit 1 is at 100% power , steady state , equilibrium xenon , BOL. Online risk is green. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.

I Event Malf. No. Event Event I No. Type* Description Preload IMF RP14A SI actuation failure (Train A) IMF RP14B SI actuation failure (Train B) TRGSET 1 ZDISIA 1 = = 1 TRG 1 DMF RP14A TRGSET 2 ZDISIA 1 = = 1 TRG 2 DMF RP14B TRGSET 3 ZDISIA2 = = 1 TRG 3 DMF RP14A TRGSET 4 ZDISIA2 = = 1 TRG 4 DMF RP14B IMF RH04B 1 SI8811 B fails to auto open IMF RH01A 1A RH Pp trip IMF RH12B 1 B RH Pp auto start failure IMF FW01 1A FW Pp fail to start/trip 1 None N-BOP , Perform 1 BwOS FW-W1 US 2 IMF RX01J 0 300 I-BOP , US 1 PT-544 , 1 D SG steam pressure channel fails low TS-US 3 IMF RX13A 100 10 I-ATC, US PZR level channel 1 L T-459 fails high (Tech Spec) TS-US 4 lOR ZAI1TK130 9560 I-ATC , US 1 TK-130 controller faillure 5 IMF FW02A C-BOP , 1 B FW Pump trip requiring turbine runback US R-ATC 6 IMF TH18B 1 B RCP shaft break 7 IM F TH 06B (030) 540000 M-ALL Large break RCS LOCA (1 B RCS cold leg) 8 Preload Failure of SI to automatically actuate 9 Preload C-ATC , 1 SI8811 B fails to auto open BOP (N)ormal , .. (R)eactlvlty (I)nstrument , (C)omponent , (M)aJor Transie n t SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.

After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will perform 1 BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.

After completing 1 BwOS FW"W1, 10 SG steam pressure channel, 1 PT-544, fails low. The crew should take actions to stabilize the plant per 1 BwOA INST-2. Technical Specifications 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 apply. After the 10 SG steam pressure failure has been addressed, PZR level will fail high. 1 CV121, charging header flow control valve, will lower charging flow and pressurizer level will lower. The A TC will take manual control of PZR level and stabilize PZR level. 1 BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment C, will be implemented.

The ATC will restore PZR level control to automatic after PZR level is restored to normal and an operable PZR level control channel is selected.

Technical Specifications 3.3.1, conditions A and K apply. . . After the 1LT-459 failure is addressed, 1TK-130 output, Letdtlwn Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Controller, will fail causing high letdown temperature.

""fheB\NAR should be referenced and the RO should take manual control to restore letdown normaL. The crew may elect to isolate letdown due to high temperature.

If isolated, letdown may be restored .. BwOP CV-17, or excess letdown may be placed in service. After the 1TK130 Controller has been Feedwater Pump will trip. 1 BwOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRIP-Attachment A will be entered. The BOP will initiate a turbine load reduction to 700 MW at 250 MW/minute.

The ATC will borate the RCS as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature.

After the crew stabilizes theptant from the FW pump trip, the 1 B RCP shaft will fail. RCS flow in the 1 B loop will drop until an automatic reactor trip occurs due to low RCS loop flow. The 1 B RCP will dislodge components into shortly (30 sec) by a large break LOCA in RCS loop 1 B due to the dislodged RCP components.Pressurizer pressure will fall to the auto SI setpoint, but auto SI actuation will fail requiring a

SI 1A RH pump will trip when starting.

The crew must manually start 1 B RH pump to ECCS flow. The crew will take actions per 1 BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

The crew will transition to 1 BwEP-1 after determining that the ReS is not intact. When the leyel reaches the low-2 setpoint the crew will transition to 1 BwEP ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG Upon transition to 1BwEP ES-1.3, 1S18811B will not automatically open due to failure of relay K648. The crew will align the 1 B RH pump for cold leg recirculation per attachment A of 1 BwEP ES-1.3 to ensure long term core cooling. Completion criteria is performance of 1 BwEP ES-1.3, step 3.

Critical Tasks 1. Manually actuate Safety Injection prior to transition to 1 BwEP-2 or past step 7.a of 1 BwEP ES-0.1. (ERG Critical Task number -E-O--D) (KiA number -000040AA 1.01 importance

-4.6/4.6) 2. Manually start 1 B RH pump prior to completion of step 6 of 1 BwEP. (ERG Critical Task number -H) (KiA number-000011EA1.13 importance

-4.1/4.2) 3. Transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish ECCS recirculation flow that at least meets the assumptions of the plant specific LOCA analysis. (ERG Critical Task number -ES-1.3--A) (KiA number -006000A4.05 importance

-3.9/3.8) NOTE: No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam. 3 Simulation Facili t y Braidwood Scenario Ope r a ti ng Test No.: 2013-1 No.:

NRC 13-sp Applicant:

SRO ",:<;\ ATC BOP In i tial Conditions

I C-18 Turnover:

Unit 1 is ope r ating at 7S% power, steady state , equilibrium xenon. 1B CW PP is OOS for i ntake bay inspection.

Following completion of turnover, the crew is to pe gp rm 1 BwOS EH-M1 , UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURV E ILLANCE using the p r eferred of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton. The Equipment Operato r has and is standing by at t he Unit 1 E H skid. TSO has requested Unit 1 load to full power at maximum allowable rate due to g r id demand following the surveillance. Event Malf. No. Even t Event No. Type Description Preload lOR ZD I 1CW01PB PTL 1B CW PP OOS MRF ED093B OPEN 1CW001B OOS IMF FW44 1 B AF pump fa i ls t o start IMF RP1SD 1 B SI pump fails to automa t ically start MRF RP84 OPEN trgset 1 " ZLOS2BRKA(2)

== 1" IMF CV01 B (1 0) 1 B CV pump trips when Rx trips trg 1 " IMF FW 1 9C 3.S 010" Feed l i ne break i ns i de conta i nment when Rx t r i ps 1 None N-BOP , Perfo r m 1 BwOS EH-M1. US 2 None R-A T C , Raise power at 0.4 Mw/M i n US 3 IMF NI08H (SOO 10) I-ATC , PR NI N-44 fails high US TS-US 4 lOR ZDIOVC01 CA TRIP C-BOP , MCR Supp l y Fan OA T ri p US TS , US S I MF CV01A C-A T C , 1A CV pump t r ip US TS , U S 6 I MF R X04 E 0 12 0 I-BO P , F e ed Fl o w c ha nnel 1 FTS3 0 A fails low U S 7 IM F ED07A C-ATC , Loss of bus 141 BOP TS-US 8 IMF RP09A M Inadvertent FWI (ALL) Feed l in e break inside containmen t 9 Preload 1 B CV pump trip when Rx trips Preload Loss of heat sink (1 B AF pp) *(N)orma l , (R)eactivity (I)nstrument , (C)omponent , (M)ajor Transient SCENARIO OVERVIEW r Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1 BwOS EH-M1, UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE using the preferred method of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton. The Equipment Operator has been briefed and i s standing by at the Unit 1 EH skid. After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will perform 1 BwOS EH-M1 , UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE.

After completing the surveillance, Power Team will request Unit raise turbine load to full power at maximum allowable rate due to grid demand. The crew will commence a power ascension at 0/1: mw/min. After a measurable change in power, a failure of power range N-44 lower detector wilidSty d P The crew should take actions per 1 BwOA INST-1 including defeating the channel functions

.. -rechl'lica r Specifications 3.3.1 applies. After the Power Range failure is addressed, the MCR Supply Fan OA will trip. Ti'Je crew will send an equipment operator to investigate the cause. Upon receiving the thatlocal indications are a motor overload, the crew will start the OB VC train as directed by MCR SUP FAN OA TRIP DP HIGH LOW and BwOP VC-1. Technical Specification 3.7.10 condition A applies. After the MCR Supply Fan OA failure is addressed, The crew will implement 1 BwOA PRI-1S , LOSS OF NORMAL CHARGING.

The crew 1 B CV pump to restore normal charging.

Technical Specifications 3.S.2 condition A and TRM d, conditie>n A apply. After the charging pump failure is addressed;

'Pee ow channel 1 FT-S30A will fail low , resulting in indications of lowering feed flow and openi , Qg ... 2f 1 1 C S/G Feed Reg Valve to attempt to match feed flow with steam flow. The BOP will take manual control of 1 FWS30 to restore 1 C SG level. The US will enter 1 BwOA INST-2 ,

WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL-Attachment G. After addressing the failed feed flow channel , a ground fault will occur on bus 141. 1 BwOA ELEC-3 will be entered and the operators vyiU§J flrt redundant equipment on bus 142 and investigate the status of bus 141. Tech Spec 3.8.9 applies. .--Following ELEC-3 actions, an inadvertent F WI occurs. When the crew manually trips the reactor , a feed line break on the 1 C SG inside containment will occur. SI will actuate. The crew will enter 1 BwEP ... l}to the plant. The 1 B SI pump fails to auto start and must be manually started due to a failure o f i ts retaY. The 1 B AF pump will n o t start (engi ne will seize) resulting in a tra nsition to 1 H.1 atstep 15 of , lBwEf'-O.

The 1 B C V pump trips when the reactor trips. Bleed and feed will be required due to the status of thS t GV pumps. Complet i on criteria is estab lis hin g startup feedwater pump flow to the no n-f ault e d SGs. Critical Tasks 1. Manually start the 1 B SI pump before transition out of 1 BwEP-O (ERG Critical Task number -E-O-J) (KIA number 006000A4.01 4.1/3.9) 2. In i t ia te RCS ble ed and feed before attempting to establi s h m ai n f e edwater flow or con de n s a te flow to any SG (ERG Critical Task number -FR-H.1--F) (KIA number OOOEOSEA 1.1 importanc e 4.1/4.0)

NOTE: No normal, reactivity, lie, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam.