ML13142A551
| ML13142A551 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/2013 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Exelon Generation Co |
| Zoia, C. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML11354A332 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML13142A551 (15) | |
Text
Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No. : 2013-1 No. :
NRC 13-1 Examiners: Applicant: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-21 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOSR 3.7.4.1 , MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ISOLATION 1MS018A1B/C/D VALVE TRAVEL AND INDICATION 18 MONTH SURVEILLANCE (due date in 3 days). The SM directs the SG PORVs to/R.e stroked with the MCB MIA stations and returned to "Auto" upon completion.
i' ~.
I Event Malf. No. Event Event I No. Type* Description IMF CV32B 1B CV pump auto start failure TRGSET 1 1A CV pump trip on SI ZL01 SI01 PA(3) = = 1 IMF CV01A (1 0)
IMF RX17 3.5 Rod control summing amp failure TRGSET 2 FW break when SI actuates "ZL01IA066(2) == 0" IMF FW19B (2 0) 3.5 30 1 TRGSET 3 N-BOP, US 1BwOSR 3.7.4.1, 1MS018A1B/CID Surv. with ZA01 PKMS042A > TS-US 1MS018B valve failure .
0.90 IMF PB2411 (30) ON IMF PB2412 (3 0) ON lOR ZL01 MS018B2 (3
- 0) ON lOR ZL01MS018B1 (3
- 0) ON lOR ZA01ZIMS010 (3
- 0) 90 2 IMF TC14D 0 R-ATC , US #4 Governor valve servo failure closed 3 IMF RX06K 0 15 I-BOP, US 1C SG NR level transmitter 1LT -539 fails low TS-US 4 IMF CV10 0 30 I-ATC , US 1CV121 controller fa ilure 5 IMF FW16 150030 I-BOP, US 1PT-508 FW Htr Dsch Press fa ils high 6 IMF TH03B 450 M-ALL 1B SGTR (450 gpm) 7 Prel oad C-ATC 1A CV pump trips/1 B CV pump fails to auto start Preload M-ALL 1B SG feedline break inside containment (3.5 1, 8 MLBM/hr faulted and ru ptured)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty (I)nstrument, (C)om ponent, (M)ajor Transient
SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOSR 3.7.4.1, MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ISOLATION 1MS018A/B/C/D VALVE TRAVEL AND INDICATION 18 MONTH SURVEILLANCE (due at end of shift).
After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP performs 1BwOSR 3.7.4.1. The 1B SG PORV valve will fail the test due to a broken hydraulic line when the valve is stroked open. The Unit Supervisor will enter Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition A and Tech Spec 3.6.3, Condition C. 1MS019B will remain closed to comply with TS 3.6.3, condition C. 1MS018B will remain unavailable for the remainder of tbe scenario. The crew should inform the SM following the 1MS018B failure.
After the 1 MS0188 failure has been addressed, the #4 turbine governor valve. servo Will fail, causing the
- 4 governor valve to close. Turbine load will lower approximately 70 Mw. The ATC will borate the RCS as necessary and/or move rods in to stabilize RCS temperature.
After the #4 governor valve failure is addressed, 1C SG NRlevel transmitter 1LT -539 will fail low.
1FW530, Feedwater Regulating Valve, will open fully and 1C;SG I~vel will rise. The BOP will take manual control of 1C SG level and stabilize 1C SG level. 1BwOAINST""2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment E, will be implernented. Tb~.BOP will restore 1C SG level control to automatic after 1C SG level is restored to normal and an operable 1C SG NR level controlling channel is selected. Technical specifications 3.3.1, conditions~ and Eand 3.3.2, conditions A and 0 are applicable.
After the 1 L T -539 failure has been addressed). 1C\(121 Charging pump flow control valve controller 1FK-121 will fail to 0% demand. The 1CV121.t¥~lve ~illfullyclose and pressurizer level will drop. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by takingmanu91 control of the 1FK-121.
After the 1 FK-121 failure has been addressed, feedwater line pressure detector 1PT-508 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both main feedwater pumps speed will lower, reducing feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels to begin lowering. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control oftbernain feedwater pumps. 1BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEfr.:iAttachment J, will be implemented. 1 PT-508 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario ..
After the 1 PT.:508 faUure11as been addressed, a 450 gpm SGTR initiates on the 1B SG. The crew will determine that the leakage is beyond the capacity of a single charging pump and initiate a reactor trip and safety injecti<?~.<Th1}hydraulic transient of the reactor trip and safety injection result in a feedline break inside containfflentOn the ruptured SG. The crew will implement 1BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. When safety injection is actuated, the 1A CV pump will trip. The 1B CV pump must be manually started to establish high head ECCS flow. After determining 1B SG secondary pressure boundary is not intact the crew will transition to 1BwEP-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION. The crew will complete isolation of 1B SG and transition to 1BwEP-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, based on secondary radiation trends on the 1B SG. In addition, the crew will recognize 1B SG pressure does not drop to zero and lowering pressurizer level/pressure will indicate a SGTR (alternate indications). After determining ruptured SG pressure is less than 320 psig the crew will transition 1BwCA-3.1 , SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT -- SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Completion criteria is completion of step () *1 BwCA-3.1.
Critical Tasks
- 1. Manually start the 1B CV pump prior to completion step 6 of 1BwEP-O.
(ERG Critical Task number - E-O--I) (KIA number - 013000A4.01 importance - 4.5/4.8)
- 2. Isolate 1B Steam Generator prior to completing step 4 of 1BwEP-2.
(ERG Critical Task number - E-2--A) (KIA number - 000040AA 1.10 importance - 4.1/4.1)
NOTE:
No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the2013.Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam.
A similar major event (SGTR) is included on the 13-2 Audit Exam scenario, how~ver this event is different because this event is a SGTR that is also faulted while the 13-2 Audit EXam scenario contains a SGTR with a loss of RCS pressure control.
.3
Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013-1 No.:
NRC 13-2 Examiners: Applicant: SRO RO
( . "
BOP Initial Conditions: IC-31 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 90% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. 1B Heater Drain Pump is OOS for motor replacement for the past 3 days. Expected back in service in 7 days. 1CVS149C was returned to service last shift following maintenance to replace its fuse block. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP swap 75 gpm letdown orifices from 1CVS149B to 1CVS149C per BwOP CV-9 for an upcoming clearance order on 1CVS149B to replace its fuse block while the RO monitors reactor power.
I Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description lOR lDI1HD01PB PTl 1B HD pump OOS IMF MS01A 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01B 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01C 100 MSIV fail to close IMF MS01D 100 MSIV fail to close IMF CS01B 1B CS pp failure MRF RP37 OUT K643 CS Trn A actuation relay failure TRGSET 1 PlR PORV 455A failure "YP:MFW35A==1" TRG 1 "IMF TH11A (0
- 90) 5" TRGSET 2 1RYSOOOA block valve breaker trips CIllO 1RYSOOOA(2)==0" MRF ED05SC (2 5)
OPEN 1 None N-BOP, US Swap 75 gpm letdown orifices 2 IMF RX1SH 650 I-ATC, US loop 4 Thot RTD fails high IMF RX1Sl 650 TS , US 3 IMF RX03C 4.S I-BOP, US 1FT-522 fails high (Stm Flow) 4 IMF FW35A C-BOP, US 1A Heater Drain Pump trip requiring turbine runback R-RO, US 5 Preload C-ATC, 1RY 455A partially opens TS-US 1RYSOOOA block valve breaker trips 6 MS07C 4 0 M-All Uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs 7 Preload C-BOP, US Failure of both trains of CS to automatically actuate IS DMF MS01D C-All 1A &1 D MSIVs close
- (N)orma l, (R)eactlvlty (I)nstrument, (C)ornponent, (M)aJor TransIent
SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 90% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOl. Online risk is green. 1B Heater Drain Pump is OOS for motor replacement for the past 3 days. Expected back in service in 7 days. 1CV8149C was returned to service last shift following maintenance to replace its fuse block. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP swap 75 gpm letdown orifices from 1CV8149B to 1CV8149C per BwOP CV-9 for an upcoming clearance order on 1CV8149B to replace its fuse block while the RO monitors reactor power.
After completing shift turnover and relief, the crew will swap 75 gpm letdown orifices. The BOP will manually lower letdown pressure, remove 1CV8149B from operation and place 1CV8149C on-line. The BOP will then restore letdown line pressure and restore letdown to automatic operatlQn After completing the letdown orifice swap, loop 4 Thot fails high, resulting in demanded rod inward motion. The crew should take actions to stabilize the plant per 1BwOA INST-2 attachment A. Technical Specifications 3.3.1 applies.
After the RTD failure has been addressed, a failure of 1FT-522 steam flow channel will occur. The crew will enter 1 BwOA INST-2 and perform appropriate actions. The crew should swap to an operable steam flow channel. No Technical Specification applies.
After completion of 1 BwOA INST-2 actions, 1A Heater Drain Pump will trip. 1BwOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRIP-Attachment C will be entered. The BOP will initiate a turbine load reduction to 780 MW at 20 MW/minute. The RO will borat~ the R<;S as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature.
As the crew is reducing load to addreS$the1AHppump, PZR PORV 1RY455A will open to the intermediate position, resulting in a. slow R~~pl'f#s,sure drop. The A TC will isolate the PZR PORV by closing 1 RY8000A, PORV block valve. Once1RY8000A is closed, its breaker will trip open, removing power from 1RY8000A. 1RY455A will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario. Tech Spec 3.4.11, conditions Band C apply. If pressure drops below 2209 psig, Tech Spec 3.4.1 will apply.
After the plant is st~bilized~nclfaUure of 1 RY455A addressed, a large fault will occur on the 1C MS line.
When containment p~esst1rereaChes 20 psig, Phase B actuates but the CS pumps do not start. The crew should manually realign train A CS valves which will start the 1A CS pump. Operators should transition to 1BwEP-2 and{ec6gnl~etl'l;afthe MSIVs have failed to close and that an uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs is in progress. The crew should transition to 1BwCA-2.1 where they will throttle AF flow to the SGs.
Entry into 18wJ;ff.. H.1 will be required when the crew throttles AF flow to 45 gpm per SG, however, a note in 1 BwFR-H. rdir~cts tf;le procedure not to be performed. The crew will continue in 1BwCA-2.1 until 81 termination whenthe 1A & 10 M81Vs will close and the crew will transition to 1BwEP-2. The crew will then isolate AF to the 1B & 1C SGs. Entry into 1BwFR-P.1 may be required as directed by the status trees.
Completion criteria is completion of 1BwEP-2.
Critical Tasks
- 1. Manually actuate one train of containment spray prior to transition out of 1BwEP-O.
(ERG Critical Task number - E-O--E) (KIA number - 013000A4.01 importance - 4.5/4.8)
(ERG Critical Task number - ECA-2.1--A) (KIA number - OWE12EA1.3 importance - 3.4/3.9)
NOTE:
No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam.
3
Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013-1 No. :
NRC 13-3 Examiners : Applicant:
.~
ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-21 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon , BOL. Online risk is green . 1A CW pump is OOS for impeller work. Expected back in service in one week. 1PR11 J filter change planned early in shift. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description Preload lOR ZDI1CW01PA PTL 1A CW PP OOS IRF ED051C OPEN 1CW001A OOS IRF ED075C OPEN IMF ED06A Breaker 1562 ABT failure IMF FW44 1B AF Pp Trip IMF FW48A 1A AF Pp fails to auto start IMF RX17 3.5 Rod control summing amp failure 1 None N-BOP 1PR 11 J filter change TS-US 2 lOR ZDI1W001 PA TRIP C-BOP, 1A Containment Chilled Water Pump trip US C 3 IMF RX05 150030 TS-US I-BOP, Steam line pressure detector 1PT -507 fails high US 4 IMF CV23A 80 180 C-ATC 1A letdown HX tube leak (or BOP),
US 5 IMF CV16 100 10 I-ATC, VCT level channel 1LT -112 failure .
US 6 None R-ATC , Emergency load drop of 200 MW US 7 IMF RD02H08 R-ATC , Single Dropped Rod (H-8)
US 8 IMF RD02D04 M-AII Multiple Dropped Rods (H-8 and D-4) 9 IMF TH03D 450 M-ALL 1D SGTR 10 Preload C-BOP 1A AF Pp auto start failure, 1B AF Pp trip
- (N)orma l, (R)eactlVity (I)nstrument, (C)om ponent, (M)aJor Transient
SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. RCS boron concentration is 645 ppm.
Online risk is green. 1A CW pump is OOS for impeller work. Expected back in service in one week.
1PR 11 J filter change planned early in shift. Rods are in manual due to rod control summing amplifier malfunction last shift.
After completing shift turnover and relief, a Radiation Protection Technician will contact the main control room and request the crew shutdown 1PR 11 J sample pump to support daily filter replacement. The Unit Supervisor will enter Tech Spec 3.4.15, condition B. Approximately two minutes later, the RP Technician will request restart of the 1PR 11 J skid. 1PR 11 J will be restarted. LCO 3.4.15 may be exited after filter change completion and monitor is operating normally for 90 minutes.
- ';t After changing the 1 PR11 J filter, the 1A Containment Chilled Water pump will trip, re~ulling in 1A Containment Chiller tripping. The crew will start the standby Chilled Water pum.~ anq.9,hiller per BwOP VP-1 after receiving a report that the 1A Chilled Water pump motor appears damag'ed. Containment pressure and temperature will slowly rise as a result of the loss of Containment Cooling,._ The US should reference LCO 3.6.4 and 3.6.5 and place priority to start the standby Chiller.
After the Containment Chilled Water malfunction has be~97§d~!essed, steam line pressure detector 1PT-507 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both main .!eeclw~ter pumps speed will rise, raising feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels t9/?Degiri(ri~lng./ The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the main feedwater p~~ps. 'tl:E}~OA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment J, will"be implemented. 1PT-507 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario. ""
After the steam line pressure detector fail~~~*. ha~ *.ba'~ri* ~ddressed, the 1A letdown heat exchanger will develop a tube leak. Letdown flow and ~CT leyelvyillJower and CC surge tank level and radiation will rise.
The crew will implement 1BwOA PRI-6'~:RMPO['JE'tft COOLING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, and locate and isolate the leakage. The crew will aligr:t;!! he1 B letdown heat exchanger in accordance with BwOP CV-22, OPERATION OF LETDOWN AND REG~~ .,.HEAT EXCHANGERS.
After the letdown heat exchanger failUre is addressed, VCT level transmitter 1LT-112 will fail high, causing letdown to divert).t 9the HLJr. The RO will take manual control and close the letdown divert valve.
Tech Spec 3.3.9 does ndfapf,>,Jy in Mode 1. The instrument failure will prevent RMCS for operating in automatic mode. 1L"I-112.NVitl remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.
After the VC!. tevelcl1an,Q~l has been addressed, rod H-8 will drop into the core causing Tave to drop and reactor;Rower to ipitiaffY drop. The crew will implement 1BwOA ROD-3, DROPPED OR MISALIGNED ROD. Aft~ r/theprew h~s made sufficient reactivity manipulation, either by adjusting Tave to within 3°F of Tref, or comJT"l:ncin~t.a ioad reduction to reduce power to within the range allowable for the dropped rod recovery, a seOPQg. tod (0-4) will drop into the core.
After the plant is stabilized and the crew has completed a reactivity change to match Tave to Tref, a second rod will drop into the core. The crew should identify that two rods have dropped into the core and trip the reactor. The crew will take immediate actions per 1BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION and transition to 1BwEP ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE.
After the transitions to 1BwEP ES-O.1, the thermal hydraulic shock from the reactor trip results in a SGTR. When the main generator trips, an ABT failure of breaker 1562 results in the 1B RCP being de-
energized. The crew will manually actuate safety injection and return to 1BwEP-O. The 1B AF pump will start and then trip. The 1A AF pump fails to auto-start. The crew will manually start the 1A AF pump.
The scenario is complete when the crew has terminated high head injection and established normal charging flow in 1BwEP-3.
Critical Tasks
- 1. Manually trip the reactor upon discovery of multiple dropped control rods prior to completion of step 4 in 1BwOA ROD-3 (if crew re-enters the procedure at step 1) upon second dropped rod, or upon verification that the DR PI indication for the second dropped rod is valid (per INPO SER 15-90 & SER 19-89) (KIA number - APE003A2.01 importance - 3.7/3.9)
- 2. Identify the 10 SG as the ruptured SG and isolate prior to a transition to 1BWC::;A-3.1 is required.
(ERG Critical Task number - E-3--A) (KIA number - EPE038EA 1.32 importance 4.6/4?) ",~
(ERG Critical Task number - E-3--C) (KIA number EPE038EA 1.09, importanceY3.2/3.3)
- 4. Establish the minimum required AFW flowrate to the SGs beforetran~ition.out of E-O series. (ERG Critical Task number - E-O-F) (KIA number - 061000A2.05 importance - 3;::](3.4)
NOTE:
No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam .
0;.:(" ::';<
.'...... A .similar
( .,\\1hIS r~ac~ivity event (emerg~ncy loa~ 9 redu t.i.*O
.*...n
. ... . ). 'ii. .*.*,..foIUqfjD on the 13-3 Audit Exam scenario, however
- .n event IS different because this event IS a larg~r; rna~t1ltude change (200 MW vs . 100 MW) In a shorter time
'(, .span (15 minutes vs. 30 minutes) with a cq.'3lplicationgf~ dropped control rod during the ramp whereas the 13-1 Audit Exam has no such complication . A~~i~ilar '6F event (1 PT-508 failure) is included on the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario, however this event is different'gecavse it is initiated by a different instrument (1 PT-507 failure) and affects the feedwater control system and SG'!evels in the opposite direction. A similar major event (SGTR) is on the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario, however this event is different because it involves a direct SGTR with different critical tasks allowing the stoppage of break flow whereas the 13-1 NRC Exam scenario is a ruptured and faulted SG th~l/does not allow for stoppage of break flow and requires implementation of a different mitigating strategY.0*
.3
Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2013 -1 No.:
NRC 13-4 Examiners: Applicant SRO r- ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-21 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon , BOL. Online risk is green.
Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.
I Event Malf. No. Event Event I No. Type* Description Preload IMF RP14A SI actuation failure (Train A)
IMF RP14B SI actuation failure (Train B)
TRGSET 1 ZDISIA 1 = = 1 TRG 1 DMF RP14A TRGSET 2 ZDISIA 1 = = 1 TRG 2 DMF RP14B TRGSET 3 ZDISIA2 = = 1 TRG 3 DMF RP14A TRGSET 4 ZDISIA2 = = 1 TRG 4 DMF RP14B IMF RH04B 1SI8811 B fails to auto open IMF RH01A 1A RH Pp trip IMF RH12B 1B RH Pp auto start failure IMF FW01 1A FW Pp fail to start/trip 1 None N-BOP, Perform 1BwOS FW-W1 US 2 IMF RX01J 0 300 I-BOP, US 1PT-544, 1D SG steam pressure channel fails low TS-US 3 IMF RX13A 100 10 I-ATC, US PZR level channel 1LT-459 fails high (Tech Spec)
TS-US 4 lOR ZAI1TK130 9560 I-ATC, US 1TK-130 controller faillure 5 IMF FW02A C-BOP, 1B FW Pump trip requiring turbine runback US R-ATC 6 IMF TH18B 1B RCP shaft break 7 IMF TH06B (030) 540000 M-ALL Large break RCS LOCA (1 B RCS cold leg) 8 Preload Failure of SI to automatically actuate 9 Preload C-ATC, 1SI8811 B fails to auto open BOP (N)ormal , (R)eactlvlty (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Transient
SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, BOL. Online risk is green. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.
After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will perform 1BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.
After completing 1BwOS FW"W1, 10 SG steam pressure channel, 1PT-544, fails low. The crew should take actions to stabilize the plant per 1BwOA INST-2. Technical Specifications 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 apply.
After the 10 SG steam pressure failure has been addressed, PZR level channellLT~59 will fail high.
1CV121, charging header flow control valve, will lower charging flow and pressurizer level will lower. The A TC will take manual control of PZR level and stabilize PZR level. 1BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment C, will be implemented. The ATC will restore PZR level control to automatic after PZR level is restored to normal and an operable PZR level control channel is selected. Technical Specifications 3.3.1, conditions A and K apply.
After the 1LT-459 failure is addressed, 1TK-130 output, Letdtlwn Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Controller, will fail causing high letdown temperature. ""fheB\NAR should be referenced and the RO should take manual control to restore letdown temperatu[~~o normaL. The crew may elect to isolate letdown due to high temperature. If isolated, letdown may be restored. p~r BwOP CV-17, or excess letdown may be placed in service.
After the 1TK130 Controller has been addr~sseaj1B Feedwater Pump will trip. 1BwOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRIP-Attachment A will be entered. The BOP will initiate a turbine load reduction to 700 MW at 250 MW/minute. The ATC will borate the RCS as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature.
After the crew stabilizes theptant from the FW pump trip, the 1B RCP shaft will fail. RCS flow in the 1B loop will drop until an automatic reactor trip occurs due to low RCS loop flow. The 1B RCP will dislodge components into theRCS;fOllo"ve~ shortly (30 sec) by a large break LOCA in RCS loop 1B due to the dislodged RCP components.Pressurizer pressure will fall to the auto SI setpoint, but auto SI actuation will fail requiring a man.u~1 SI abt.~ation. 1A RH pump will trip when starting. The crew must manually start 1B RH pump to e~tablishlo.whead ECCS flow. The crew will take actions per 1BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. The crew will transition to 1BwEP-1 after determining that the ReS is not intact.
When the RW~T leyel reaches the low-2 setpoint the crew will transition to 1BwEP ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RE~J~CULATION. Upon transition to 1BwEP ES-1.3, 1S18811B will not automatically open due to failure of relay K648. The crew will align the 1B RH pump for cold leg recirculation per attachment A of 1BwEP ES-1.3 to ensure long term core cooling.
Completion criteria is performance of 1BwEP ES-1.3, step 3.
Critical Tasks
- 1. Manually actuate Safety Injection prior to transition to 1BwEP-2 or past step 7.a of 1BwEP ES-0.1.
(ERG Critical Task number - E-O--D) (KiA number - 000040AA 1.01 importance - 4.6/4.6)
- 2. Manually start 1B RH pump prior to completion of step 6 of 1BwEP. (ERG Critical Task number - E-O--
H) (KiA number- 000011EA1.13 importance - 4.1/4.2)
- 3. Transfer to cold leg recirculation and establish ECCS recirculation flow that at least meets the assumptions of the plant specific LOCA analysis. (ERG Critical Task number - ES-1.3--A) (KiA number
- 006000A4.05 importance - 3.9/3.8)
NOTE:
No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario arere~9ted in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam.
3
Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operati ng Test No.: 2013-1 No.:
~':f:' NRC 13-sp
~ ,I:~'~ Examiners : Applicant: SRO
",:<;\
ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-18 Turnover: Unit 1 is operating at 7S% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon . 1B CW PP is OOS for intake bay inspection. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to pegprm 1BwOS EH-M1 , UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE using the preferred m e't~ed of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton. The Equipment Operator has beE~XJ:!qHefed and is standing by at the Unit 1 EH skid. TSO has requested Unit 1 p~epareto rais~ rl.Jrbine load to full power at maximum allowable rate due to grid demand following the surveillance.
Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type Description Preload lOR ZDI1CW01PB PTL 1B CW PP OOS MRF ED093B OPEN 1CW001B OOS IMF FW44 1B AF pump fa ils to start IMF RP1SD 1B SI pump fails to automatically start MRF RP84 OPEN trgset 1 "ZLOS2BRKA(2) == 1" IMF CV01 B (1 0) 1B CV pump trips when Rx trips trg 1 "IMF FW19C 3.S 010" Feed line break inside conta inment when Rx trips 1 None N-BOP, Perform 1BwOS EH-M1 .
US 2 None R-ATC, Raise power at 0.4 Mw/Min US 3 IMF NI08H (SOO 10) I-ATC, PR NI N-44 fails high US TS-US 4 lOR ZDIOVC01 CA TRIP C-BOP, MCR Supply Fan OA Tri p US TS , US S IMF CV01A C-ATC, 1A CV pump trip US TS , US 6 IMF RX04E 0 120 I-BOP, Feed Flow channel 1FTS30A fails low US 7 IMF ED07A C-ATC, Loss of bus 141 BOP TS-US 8 IMF RP09A M Inadvertent FWI (ALL) Feed line break inside containment 9 Preload 1B CV pump trip when Rx trips Preload Loss of heat sink (1 B AF pp)
- (N)orma l, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient
SCENARIO OVERVIEW r Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon . Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOS EH-M1, UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE using the preferred method of depressing and holding the MCB pushbutton. The Equipment Operator has been briefed and is standing by at the Unit 1 EH skid.
After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will perform 1BwOS EH-M1 , UNIT 1 PUMP OPERABILITY SURVEILLANCE.
After completing the surveillance, Power Team will request Unit raise turbine load to full power at maximum allowable rate due to grid demand. The crew will commence a power ascension at 0/1: mw/min.
After a measurable change in power, a failure of power range N-44 lower detector wilidStydPThe crew should take actions per 1BwOA INST-1 including defeating the channel functions . .-rechl'licar Specifications 3.3.1 applies.
After the Power Range failure is addressed, the MCR Supply Fan OA will trip. Ti'Je crew will send an equipment operator to investigate the cause. Upon receiving the r~port thatlocal indications are a motor overload, the crew will start the OB VC train as directed by BwA~O-33-A8 MCR SUP FAN OA TRIP DP HIGH LOW and BwOP VC-1. Technical Specification 3.7.10 condition A applies.
After the MCR Supply Fan OA failure is addressed, 1A;;C¥tPu~i'~"YJWl~i'P. The crew will implement 1BwOA PRI-1S, LOSS OF NORMAL CHARGING. The crew willstarft~e 1B CV pump to restore normal charging.
Technical Specifications 3.S.2 condition A and TRM d, conditie>n A apply.
After the charging pump failure is addressed;' Pee ow channel 1FT-S30A will fail low, resulting in indications of lowering feed flow and openi,Qg . .2f 1f5)N~~Oi\ 1C S/G Feed Reg Valve to attempt to match feed flow with steam flow. The BOP will diagnose)~l"le !t~i!urEf and take manual control of 1FWS30 to restore 1C SG level. The US will enter 1BwOA INST-2, OPE~!\TlON WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL-Attachment G.
After addressing the failed feed flow channel, a ground fault will occur on bus 141 . 1BwOA ELEC-3 will be entered and the operators vyiU§Jflrt redundant equipment on bus 142 and investigate the status of bus 141.
Tech Spec 3.8.9 applies. .- -
Following completjQ.n?g~.1~w~A ELEC-3 actions, an inadvertent FWI occurs. When the crew manually trips the reactor, a feed line break on the 1C SG inside containment will occur. SI will actuate. The crew will enter 1BwEP. .l}to ~t.?biliz.~ the plant. The 1B SI pump fails to auto start and must be manually started due to a failure of its act~~t.ion retaY. The 1B AF pump will not start (engi ne will seize) resulting in a transition to 1BwFR-H.1 at step 15 of ,l BwEf'-O. The 1B CV pump trips when the reactor trips. Bleed and feed will be required due to the status of thS tGV pumps.
Completion criteria is establishing startup feedwater pump flow to the non-faulted SGs.
Critical Tasks
- 1. Manually start the 1B SI pump before transition out of 1BwEP-O (ERG Critical Task number - E-O-J) (KIA number 006000A4.01 4.1 /3 .9)
- 2. Initiate RCS bleed and feed before attempting to establish mai n feedwater flow or condensate flow to any SG (ERG Critical Task number - FR-H.1 -- F) (KIA number OOOEOSEA 1.1 importance 4.1/4 .0)
NOTE:
No normal, reactivity, lie, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated in the 2013 Audit Exam or other sections of the 2013 NRC exam.