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{{#Wiki_filter:ttl'igRPjfpVEZEROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATION~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTERN.Y..14649-0001ROBERTCMECREDYVicePresident@irmaNuclearProductionTEt.EPHONEAREACODE71B5462700January10,1994U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:AllenR.JohnsonProjectDirectorateI-3DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555Subject:ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCInspectionReportNo.50-244/93-21,datedDecember10,1993R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244DearMr.Johnson:DuringanNRCinspectionconductedonOctober4,1993toOctober13,1993,aviolationofNRCrequirementswasidentified.Inaccordancewiththe"GeneralStatementofPolicyandProcedureforNRCEnforcementActions,"10CFRPart2,AppendixC,theviolationislistedbelow:"Planttechnicalspecification4.6.1.e.3.arequiresthatatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,eachemergencydieselgeneratorshallbedemonstratedtobeoperablebysimulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwithasafetyinjectiontestsignalandverifyingde-energizationoftheemergencybusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuses."Contrarytotheabove,onOctober11,1993,itwasdeterminedthattestingtoverifyloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuseswasnotperformedduringthe18monthsurveillancetesting.(1)thereasonfortheviolation,or,ifcontested,thebasisfordisputingtheviolation:RochesterGas&ElectricCorporation(RG&E)acceptstheviolation.Weacknowledgethatplantproceduresdidnotadequatelytestthebusundervoltagelogic,asrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification(TS)4.6.1.e.3.(a).  
{{#Wiki_filter:ttl'igRPjfpVEZEROCHESTER
Lettex:Page2Subject:ViolationResponse93-21-01Date:January10,1994Thereasonfortheviolation,asstatedinLER93-005(DocketNumber50-244,LER93-005,datedNovember10,1993)wasamis-interpretationofTSsurveillancerequirements.TheloadsheddingrequirementofTS4.6.1.e.3.{a)wasinterpretedasthesheddingofnon-essentialloadspoweredfromtheemergencybuses.Thesheddingofnon-essentialloadshadbeentestedbysimulatingasafetyinjection(SI)signalduringperformanceofproceduresRSSP-2.1(SafetyInjectionFunctionalTest)andRSSP-2.1A.(SafetyInjectionFunctionalTestAlignment/Realignment),whichareperformedeachrefuelingoutage.Theneedtoverifyloadsheddingcapabilitiesofsafeguardsloads,withundervoltageandSIpresent,hadnotbeenconsidexed.(2)thecorrectivestepsthathavebeentakenandtheresultsachieved:Theimmediatecorrectiveactionwastoperformthesurveillancetestsnecessarytoverifyloadsheddingcapabilityfromtheemergencybuses.Aprocedurechangenotice(PCN)wasdevelopedforeachassociatedPT-9.1procedure(monthlysurveillancetestproceduresfortestingundervoltageprotectionfor480voltsafeguardsbusses14,16,17,and18).TestingwasstartedonOctober11,1993,andwascompletedonOctober12,1993,withintwenty-fourhoursofdiscovery.DetailsofthistestingandtestmethodologyarediscussedinAttachmentl.(Toperfoimthistesting,individualcomponentsweredeclaredinoperable,oneatatime,foxbriefperiods.Nomorethanonecomponentwasinoperableatagiventime,andthedieselgenerators(DGs)weremaintainedoperableduringtheentiretestingpexiod.)TheguidanceofNRCGenericLetter{GL)87-09,entitled"Sections3.0and4.0oftheStandardTechnicalSpecifications(STS)ontheApplicabilityofLimitingConditionsforOperationandSurveillanceRequirements",wasfollowed.Boththe"A"and"B"DGswereavailabletoperformallintendedfunctionsthroughoutthediscoveryandsurveillancetestingperiod.Thistestingdemonstratedend-to-endoperabilityoftheunder-voltageprotectionsystem.Itverifiedundervoltagesignalstosafeguardscomponents,andundervoltageinconjunctionwithSIsignaltotheComponentCooling'ater(CCW)pumps.Initialtestingofthe"B"CCWpumpundervoltage/SItriplogicwasindeterminate.Atthattime,the"B"CCWpumpwasdeclaredinoperable,untilfurthertestingwasconducted.Thepumpwassubsequentlyverifiedtobefullyoperable,andwasreturnedtoserviceapproximatelytwelvehourslater.ThetestingconductedonOctober11-12,incombinationwiththesurveillancetestsconductedduringthe1993outage,mettherequixementsofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a),andverifiedthatthesafeguardsfunctionswouldhaveperformedasrequired.  
GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION
Letter:Page3Subject:ViolationResponse93-21-01Date:January10,1994RG&EpersonnelsubsequentlyreviewedtherequirementsofTS4.6.1,andcomparedtheserequirementswithsurveillanceproce-dures.Noothernoncomplianceswereidentified.(3)thecorrectivestepsthatwillbetakentoavoidfurtherviolations:0AreviewofSection4oftheGinnaTSwillbeperformedtoensurethatthereareimplementingproceduresforeverysurveillancerequiredbyTS.Thisreviewwillbecompletedpriortocompletionofthenextscheduledrefuelingoutage.ResultsofapreliminaryreviewofSection4havedeterminedthattherearesufficientproceduralcontrolsforimplementingSection4requirements.00Areviewoftheidentifiedimplementingprocedureswillbeperformedtoensurethattheseproceduresdo,infact,implementtheTSrequirements.Thisreviewwillbecompletedpriortocompletionofthenextscheduledrefuelingoutage.Proceduresthatverifyloadsheddingcapabilitywillbeupgradedtoincludesafeguardsloads,forconditionsofundervoltageandSI,priortocompletionofthenextscheduledrefuelingoutage.(4)thedatewhenfullcompliancewillbeachieved:FullcompliancewithTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)wasachievedonOctober12,1993,atthecompletionofsurveillancetesting.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)PWRProjectDirectorateI-3Washington,DC20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector  
~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER
Attachment1PT-9.1SeriesTestDetailsThepurposeofthistestwastoverifyundervoltagesafeguardsloadsheddingcapability.MonthlyTSsurveillancetestingcurrentlyensureseachsafeguardsbreakercanbestrippedfromthebususingthetripcoil.Toverifytheundervoltagestrippingcapability,allthatwasnecessarywastoverifytheintegrityoftheundervoltagelogiccontactsandassociatedcircuitry,tothetripcoils.JumperswereusedtosimulateSIfortheCCWpumpsbecausetheirbreakerstriponundervoltagecoincidentwithSIsignal.TestingSequence:1~Manipulatetestswitchesanddevelopanundervoltageconditionusingtestequipment.2~Verifyauxiliaryoutputrelaysenergizetocausethetripfunction,initiatedbyappropriateoperationoftheintermediatedigitalcontrollogiccircuitry.3~4~5.6.Returntestswitchestonormalandremovetestequipment.Verifycomponentbeingtestedisnot,inservice.Measurethecontinuityofwiringbetweentheundervoltageauxiliaryrelaysandthebreakerswitchgear,usingDCvoltagemeasurementstoground.)tVerifynormallyopenoutputrelaycontactsusingresistancemeasurements.7~8.Locallytriptheassociatedauxiliaryrelayandverifyproperindicatorlampresponseandrelaycontactsindicateclosedbyresistancemeasurement.Resettheauxiliaryrelayandverifyrelaycontactsindicateopenbyresistancemeasurement.9.Repeatsteps1-8forallfourchannels(27/X,27/BX,27D/X,and27D/BX).Onetestanomolywasidentified,asnotedintheviolationresponse.Relay86-16B,associatedwiththe"B"CCWpumpbreaker,failedtomeetthespecifiedresistanceacceptancecriteria.EmergencyMaintenanceprocedureEM-778wasperformedtoverifythecontactdidinfacttripthebreaker.Afterbeingverified,thecontactwasreworkedbysimpleburnishingofexposedcontactsurfaces.~~~v  
N.Y..14649-0001
ROBERTCMECREDYVicePresident
@irmaNuclearProduction
TEt.EPHONEAREACODE71B5462700January10,1994U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
Attn:AllenR.JohnsonProjectDirectorate
I-3DocumentControlDeskWashington,
DC20555Subject:ReplytoaNoticeofViolation
NRCInspection
ReportNo.50-244/93-21,
datedDecember10,1993R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244DearMr.Johnson:DuringanNRCinspection
conducted
onOctober4,1993toOctober13,1993,aviolation
ofNRCrequirements
wasidentified.
Inaccordance
withthe"GeneralStatement
ofPolicyandProcedure
forNRCEnforcement
Actions,"
10CFRPart2,AppendixC,theviolation
islistedbelow:"Planttechnical
specification
4.6.1.e.3.a
requiresthatatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,
eachemergency
dieselgenerator
shallbedemonstrated
tobeoperablebysimulating
alossofoffsitepowerinconjunction
withasafetyinjection
testsignalandverifying
de-energization
oftheemergency
busesandloadsheddingfromtheemergency
buses."Contrarytotheabove,onOctober11,1993,itwasdetermined
thattestingtoverifyloadsheddingfromtheemergency
buseswasnotperformed
duringthe18monthsurveillance
testing.(1)thereasonfortheviolation,
or,ifcontested,
thebasisfordisputing
theviolation:
Rochester
Gas&ElectricCorporation
(RG&E)acceptstheviolation.
Weacknowledge
thatplantprocedures
didnotadequately
testthebusundervoltage
logic,asrequiredbyTechnical
Specification
(TS)4.6.1.e.3.(a).  
Lettex:Page2Subject:Violation
Response93-21-01Date:January10,1994Thereasonfortheviolation,
asstatedinLER93-005(DocketNumber50-244,LER93-005,datedNovember10,1993)wasamis-interpretation
ofTSsurveillance
requirements.
Theloadsheddingrequirement
ofTS4.6.1.e.3.{a)
wasinterpreted
asthesheddingofnon-essential
loadspoweredfromtheemergency
buses.Thesheddingofnon-essential
loadshadbeentestedbysimulating
asafetyinjection
(SI)signalduringperformance
ofprocedures
RSSP-2.1(SafetyInjection
Functional
Test)andRSSP-2.1A.
(SafetyInjection
Functional
TestAlignment
/Realignment),
whichareperformed
eachrefueling
outage.Theneedtoverifyloadsheddingcapabilities
ofsafeguards
loads,withundervoltage
andSIpresent,hadnotbeenconsidexed.
(2)thecorrective
stepsthathavebeentakenandtheresultsachieved:
Theimmediate
corrective
actionwastoperformthesurveillance
testsnecessary
toverifyloadsheddingcapability
fromtheemergency
buses.Aprocedure
changenotice(PCN)wasdeveloped
foreachassociated
PT-9.1procedure
(monthlysurveillance
testprocedures
fortestingundervoltage
protection
for480voltsafeguards
busses14,16,17,and18).TestingwasstartedonOctober11,1993,andwascompleted
onOctober12,1993,withintwenty-four
hoursofdiscovery.
Detailsofthistestingandtestmethodology
arediscussed
inAttachment
l.(Toperfoimthistesting,individual
components
weredeclaredinoperable,
oneatatime,foxbriefperiods.Nomorethanonecomponent
wasinoperable
atagiventime,andthedieselgenerators
(DGs)weremaintained
operableduringtheentiretestingpexiod.)TheguidanceofNRCGenericLetter{GL)87-09,entitled"Sections
3.0and4.0oftheStandardTechnical
Specifications
(STS)ontheApplicability
ofLimitingConditions
forOperation
andSurveillance
Requirements",
wasfollowed.
Boththe"A"and"B"DGswereavailable
toperformallintendedfunctions
throughout
thediscovery
andsurveillance
testingperiod.Thistestingdemonstrated
end-to-end
operability
oftheunder-voltageprotection
system.Itverifiedundervoltage
signalstosafeguards
components,
andundervoltage
inconjunction
withSIsignaltotheComponent
Cooling'ater
(CCW)pumps.Initialtestingofthe"B"CCWpumpundervoltage
/SItriplogicwasindeterminate.
Atthattime,the"B"CCWpumpwasdeclaredinoperable,
untilfurthertestingwasconducted.
Thepumpwassubsequently
verifiedtobefullyoperable,
andwasreturnedtoserviceapproximately
twelvehourslater.Thetestingconducted
onOctober11-12,incombination
withthesurveillance
testsconducted
duringthe1993outage,mettherequixements
ofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a),
andverifiedthatthesafeguards
functions
wouldhaveperformed
asrequired.  
Letter:Page3Subject:Violation
Response93-21-01Date:January10,1994RG&Epersonnel
subsequently
reviewedtherequirements
ofTS4.6.1,andcomparedtheserequirements
withsurveillance
proce-dures.Noothernoncompliances
wereidentified.
(3)thecorrective
stepsthatwillbetakentoavoidfurtherviolations:
0AreviewofSection4oftheGinnaTSwillbeperformed
toensurethatthereareimplementing
procedures
foreverysurveillance
requiredbyTS.Thisreviewwillbecompleted
priortocompletion
ofthenextscheduled
refueling
outage.Resultsofapreliminary
reviewofSection4havedetermined
thattherearesufficient
procedural
controlsforimplementing
Section4requirements.
00Areviewoftheidentified
implementing
procedures
willbeperformed
toensurethattheseprocedures
do,infact,implement
theTSrequirements.
Thisreviewwillbecompleted
priortocompletion
ofthenextscheduled
refueling
outage.Procedures
thatverifyloadsheddingcapability
willbeupgradedtoincludesafeguards
loads,forconditions
ofundervoltage
andSI,priortocompletion
ofthenextscheduled
refueling
outage.(4)thedatewhenfullcompliance
willbeachieved:
Fullcompliance
withTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)
wasachievedonOctober12,1993,atthecompletion
ofsurveillance
testing.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)PWRProjectDirectorate
I-3Washington,
DC20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
RegionI475Allendale
RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector  
Attachment
1PT-9.1SeriesTestDetailsThepurposeofthistestwastoverifyundervoltage
safeguards
loadsheddingcapability.
MonthlyTSsurveillance
testingcurrently
ensureseachsafeguards
breakercanbestrippedfromthebususingthetripcoil.Toverifytheundervoltage
stripping
capability,
allthatwasnecessary
wastoverifytheintegrity
oftheundervoltage
logiccontactsandassociated
circuitry,
tothetripcoils.JumperswereusedtosimulateSIfortheCCWpumpsbecausetheirbreakerstriponundervoltage
coincident
withSIsignal.TestingSequence:
1~Manipulate
testswitchesanddevelopanundervoltage
condition
usingtestequipment.
2~Verifyauxiliary
outputrelaysenergizetocausethetripfunction,
initiated
byappropriate
operation
oftheintermediate
digitalcontrollogiccircuitry.
3~4~5.6.Returntestswitchestonormalandremovetestequipment.
Verifycomponent
beingtestedisnot,inservice.Measurethecontinuity
ofwiringbetweentheundervoltage
auxiliary
relaysandthebreakerswitchgear,
usingDCvoltagemeasurements
toground.)tVerifynormallyopenoutputrelaycontactsusingresistance
measurements.
7~8.Locallytriptheassociated
auxiliary
relayandverifyproperindicator
lampresponseandrelaycontactsindicateclosedbyresistance
measurement.
Resettheauxiliary
relayandverifyrelaycontactsindicateopenbyresistance
measurement.
9.Repeatsteps1-8forallfourchannels(27/X,27/BX,27D/X,and27D/BX).Onetestanomolywasidentified,
asnotedintheviolation
response.
Relay86-16B,associated
withthe"B"CCWpumpbreaker,failedtomeetthespecified
resistance
acceptance
criteria.
Emergency
Maintenance
procedure
EM-778wasperformed
toverifythecontactdidinfacttripthebreaker.Afterbeingverified,
thecontactwasreworkedbysimpleburnishing
ofexposedcontactsurfaces.
~~~v  
~'i0  
~'i0  
ACCELERATEDDISTRIBUTIONDEMONSTRATIONSYSTEMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)CCESSIONNBR:9402010169DOC.DATE'4/01/10NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterGAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONMECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONJOHNSON,A.R.ProjectDirectorateI-3ISUBJECT:Respondstoviolationsnotedininsprept50-244/93-21.Correctiveactions:surveillancetestsnecessarytoverifyloadsheddingcapabilityfromemergencybusesperformed&procedurerevised.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR2ENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofVi&oationResponseNOTES:LicenseExpdatein'ccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).DOCKET05000244D$/05000244RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3PDINTERNAL:AEOD/DEIBAEOD/DSP/TPABDEDRONRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRSS/PEPBNRR/PMAS/ILPB2~BI~REGFILM02RGNTFILEOlEXTERNALEG&G/BRYCEiJH~NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEJOHNSON,AAEOD/DSP/ROABAEOD/TTCNRR/DORS/OEABNRR/DRIL/RPEB-NRR/PMAS/ILPB1NUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS1RES/HFBNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111'11111111111DDRDSNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:DDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEEDIOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR22ENCL22  
ACCELERATED
''t"'l'i"~lliPjt'I/'l'gjll,"i,",iiel'tIt,/f//IP'(/ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONROBERTC.MECREDYVicePtesidentCtnnaNuetearPtoduetion,/net~~~VA~~GToAttIIFI$Tate~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTERN.Y.14649.OO0'ITELEPHONEAREACODE716546'2700January10,1994U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:AllenR.JohnsonProjectDirectorateI-3DocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555Subject:ReplytoaNoticeofViolationNRCInspectionReportNo.50-244/93-21,datedDecember10,1993R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244DearMr.Johnson:DuringanNRCinspectionconductedonOctober4,1993toOctober13,1993,aviolationofNRCrequirementswasidentified.Inacccrdancewiththe"GeneralStatementofPolicyandProcedureforNRCEnforcementActions,"10CFRPart2,AppendixC,theviolationislistedbelow:"Planttechnicalspecification4.6.l.e.3.arequiresthatatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,eachemergencydieselgeneratorshallbedemonstratedtobeoperablebysimulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwithasafetyinjectiontestsignalandverifyingde-energizationoftheemergencybusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuses."Contrarytotheabove,onOctober11,1993,itwasdeterminedthattestingtoverifyloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuseswasnotperformedduringthe18monthsurveillancetesting.(1)thereasonfortheviolation,or,ifcontested,thebasisfordisputingtheviolation:RochesterGas&ElectricCorporation(RG&E)acceptstheviolation.Weacknowledgethatplantproceduresdidnotadequatelytestthebusundervoltagelogic,asrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification(TS)4.6.1.e.3.(a).gw~IToiQ'.9402010169940110PDRADOCK050002449PDR
DISTRIBUTION
DEMONSTRATION
SYSTEMREGULATORY
INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM(RIDS)CCESSIONNBR:9402010169
DOC.DATE'4/01/10
NOTARIZED:
NOFACIL:50-244
RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester
GAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION
MECREDY,R.C.
Rochester
Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT
AFFILIATION
JOHNSON,A.R.
ProjectDirectorate
I-3ISUBJECT:Respondstoviolations
notedininsprept50-244/93-21.
Corrective
actions:surveillance
testsnecessary
toverifyloadsheddingcapability
fromemergency
busesperformed
&procedure
revised.DISTRIBUTION
CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
2ENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp
Rept/Notice
ofVi&oationResponseNOTES:License
Expdatein'ccordance
with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
DOCKET05000244D$/05000244RECIPIENT
IDCODE/NAME
PD1-3PDINTERNAL:
AEOD/DEIB
AEOD/DSP/TPABDEDRONRR/DRCH/HHFB
NRR/DRSS/PEPB
NRR/PMAS/ILPB2
~BI~REGFILM02RGNTFILEOlEXTERNALEG&G/BRYCE
iJH~NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT
IDCODE/NAME
JOHNSON,A
AEOD/DSP/ROAB
AEOD/TTCNRR/DORS/OEAB
NRR/DRIL/RPEB-
NRR/PMAS/ILPB1
NUDOCS-ABSTRACT
OGC/HDS1RES/HFBNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111'11111111111DDRDSNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
DDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE
YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION
LISTSFORDOCUMENTS
YOUDON'TNEEDIOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR22ENCL22  
''t"'l'i"~lliPjt'I
/'l'gjll,"i,",iiel't
It,/f//IP'(/
ROCHESTER
GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION
ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePtesident
CtnnaNuetearPtoduetion
,/net~~~VA~~GToAttIIFI$Tate~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER
N.Y.14649.OO0'I
TELEPHONE
AREACODE716546'2700January10,1994U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
Attn:AllenR.JohnsonProjectDirectorate
I-3DocumentControlDeskWashington,
DC20555Subject:ReplytoaNoticeofViolation
NRCInspection
ReportNo.50-244/93-21,
datedDecember10,1993R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244DearMr.Johnson:DuringanNRCinspection
conducted
onOctober4,1993toOctober13,1993,aviolation
ofNRCrequirements
wasidentified.
Inacccrdance
withthe"GeneralStatement
ofPolicyandProcedure
forNRCEnforcement
Actions,"
10CFRPart2,AppendixC,theviolation
islistedbelow:"Planttechnical
specification
4.6.l.e.3.a
requiresthatatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,
eachemergency
dieselgenerator
shallbedemonstrated
tobeoperablebysimulating
alossofoffsitepowerinconjunction
withasafetyinjection
testsignalandverifying
de-energization
oftheemergency
busesandloadsheddingfromtheemergency
buses."Contrarytotheabove,onOctober11,1993,itwasdetermined
thattestingtoverifyloadsheddingfromtheemergency
buseswasnotperformed
duringthe18monthsurveillance
testing.(1)thereasonfortheviolation,
or,ifcontested,
thebasisfordisputing
theviolation:
Rochester
Gas&ElectricCorporation
(RG&E)acceptstheviolation.
Weacknowledge
thatplantprocedures
didnotadequately
testthebusundervoltage
logic,asrequiredbyTechnical
Specification
(TS)4.6.1.e.3.(a).gw~IToiQ'.9402010169
940110PDRADOCK050002449PDR
0'  
0'  
Letter:Page2Subject:"ViolationResponse93-21-01Date:January10,1994Thereasonfortheviolation,asstatedinLER93-005(DocketNumber50-244,LER93-005,datedNovember10,1993)wasamis-interpretation'ofTSsurveill'ancerequirements.TheloadsheddingrequirementofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)wasinterpretedasthesheddingofnon-essentialloadspoweredfrom,theemergencybuses.Thesheddingofnon-essentialloadshadbeentestedby.simulatingasafetyinjection(SI)signal.duringperformanceofproceduresRSSP-2.1(SafetyInjectionFunctionalTest)andRSSP-2.1A(SafetyInjectionFunctionalTestAlignment/Realignment),whichareperformedeachrefuelingoutage.Theneedtoverifyloadsheddingcapabilitiesofsafeguardsloads,withundervoltageandSIpresent,hadnotbeenconsidered.,l(2)thecorrectivestepsthathavebeentakenandtheresultsachieved:Theimmediatecorrectiveactionwastoperformthesurveillancetestsnecessarytoverifyloadsheddingcapabilityfromtheemergencybuses.Aprocedurechangenotice(PCN)wasdevelopedforeachassociatedPT-9.1procedure(monthlysurveillancetestproceduresfortesting'undervoltageprotectionfor480voltsafeguardsbusses14,16,17,and18).TestingwasstartedonOctober11,1993,andwascompletedonOctober12,1993,withintwenty-fourhoursofdiscovery.DetailsofthistestingandtestmethodologyarediscussedinAttachment1..(Toperformthistesting,indiyidua2.componentsweredeclaredinoperable,oneatatime,forbriefperiods.Nomorethanonecomponentwasinoperableatagiventime,andthedieselgenerators(DGs)weremaintainedoperableduringtheentiretestingperiod.)Theguidanceof.NRCGenericLetter(GL)87-09,entitled"Sections3.0and4.0oftheStandardTechnicalSpecifications(STS)ontheApplicabilityofLimitingConditionsforOperationandSurveillanceRequirements",wasfollowed.,Boththe"A"and"B"DGswereavailabletoperformallintendedfunctionsthroughoutthediscovery.andsurveillancetestingperiod.Thistestingdemonstratedend-to-endoperabilityoftheunder-voltageprotectionsystem.Itverifiedundervoltagesignalstosafeguardscomponents,andundervoltageinconjunctionwithSIsignaltotheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)pumps.Initialtestingofthe"B"CCWpumpundervoltage/SItriplogicwasindeterminate.Atthattime,the"B"CCWpumpwasdeclaredinoperable,untilfurthertestingwasconducted.Thepumpwassubsequentlyverified,tobefullyoperable,andwasreturnedtoserviceapproximatelytwelvehourslater.ThetestingconductedonOctober11-12,incombinationwiththesurveillancetestsconductedduringthe1993outage,mettherequirementsofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a),andverifiedthatthesafeguardsfunctionswouldhaveperformedasrequired.  
Letter:Page2Subject:"Violation
Letter:Page3Subja't:ViolationResponse93-21-01Date:January10,1994RG&EpersonnelsubsequentlyreviewedtherequirementsofTS4.6.1,andcomparedtheserequirementswithsurveillanceproce-dures.Noothernoncomplianceswereidentified.(3')thecorrectivestepsthatwillbetakentoavoidfurtherviolations:000AreviewofSection4oftheGinnaTSwillbeperformedtoensurethatthereareimplementingproceduresforeverysurveillancerequiredbyTS.Thisreviewwillbecompletedpriortocompletionofthenextscheduledrefuelingoutage.ResultsofapreliminaryreviewofSection4havedeterminedthattherearesufficientproceduralcontrolsforimplementingSection4requirements.Areviewoftheidentifiedimplementingprocedureswillbeperformedtoensurethattheseproceduresdo,infact,implementtheTSrequirements.Thisreviewwillbecompletedpriortocompletionofthenextscheduledrefuelingoutage.Proceduresthatverifyloadsheddingcapabilitywillbeupgradedtoincludesafeguardsloads,forconditionsofundervoltageandSI,priortocompletionofthenextscheduledrefuelingoutage.(4)thedatewhenfullcompliancewillbeachieved:FullcompliancewithTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)wasachievedon.October12,1993,atthecompletionofsurveillancetesting.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)PWRProjectDirectorateI-3Washington,DC20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector  
Response93-21-01Date:January10,1994Thereasonfortheviolation,
Attachment1PT-9.1SeriesTestDetailsThepurposeofthistestwastoverifyundervoltagesafeguardsloadsheddingcapability.MonthlyTSsurveillancetest'ingcurrentlyensureseachsafeguardsbreakercanbestrippedfromthebususingthetripcoil.Toverifytheundervoltagestrippingcapability,allthatwasnecessarywastoverifytheintegrityoftheundervoltagelogiccontactsandassociatedcircuitry,tothetripcoils.ZumperswereusedtosimulateSIfortheCCWpumpsbecausetheirbreakerstriponundervoltagecoincidentwithSIsignal.TestingSequence:1~Manipulatetestswitchesanddevelopanundervoltageconditionusingtestequipment.2~Verifyauxiliaryoutputrelaysenergizetocausethetripfunction,initiatedbyappropriateoperationoftheintermediatedigitalcontrollogiccircuitry.3~4~5.Returntestswitchestonormalandremovetestequipment.Verifycomponentbeingtestedisnotinservice.Measurethecontinuityofwiringbetweentheundervoltageauxiliaryrelaysandthebreakerswitchgear,usingDCvoltagemeasurementstoground.6.Verifynormallyopenoutputrelaycontactsusingresistancemeasurements.7~8.Locallytriptheassociatedauxiliaryrelayandverifyproperindicatorlampresponseandrelaycontactsindicateclosedbyresistancemeasurement.Resettheauxiliaryrelayandverifyrelaycontactsindicateopenbyresistancemeasurement.9.Repeatsteps1-8forallfourchannels(27/X,27/BX,27D/X,and27D/BX).Onetestanomolywasidentified,asnotedintheviolationresponse.Relay86-16B,associatedwiththe"B"CCWpumpbreaker,failedtomeetthespecifiedresistanceacceptancecriteria.EmergencyMaintenance'rocedureEM-778wasperformedtoverifythecontactdidinfacttrip.thebreaker.Afterbeingverified,thecontactwasreworkedbysimpleburnishingofexposedcontactsurfaces.  
asstatedinLER93-005(DocketNumber50-244,LER93-005,datedNovember10,1993)wasamis-interpretation'of
TSsurveill'ance
requirements.
Theloadsheddingrequirement
ofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)
wasinterpreted
asthesheddingofnon-essential
loadspoweredfrom,theemergency
buses.Thesheddingofnon-essential
loadshadbeentestedby.simulating
asafetyinjection
(SI)signal.duringperformance
ofprocedures
RSSP-2.1(SafetyInjection
Functional
Test)andRSSP-2.1A
(SafetyInjection
Functional
TestAlignment
/Realignment),
whichareperformed
eachrefueling
outage.Theneedtoverifyloadsheddingcapabilities
ofsafeguards
loads,withundervoltage
andSIpresent,hadnotbeenconsidered.,
l(2)thecorrective
stepsthathavebeentakenandtheresultsachieved:
Theimmediate
corrective
actionwastoperformthesurveillance
testsnecessary
toverifyloadsheddingcapability
fromtheemergency
buses.Aprocedure
changenotice(PCN)wasdeveloped
foreachassociated
PT-9.1procedure
(monthlysurveillance
testprocedures
fortesting'undervoltage
protection
for480voltsafeguards
busses14,16,17,and18).TestingwasstartedonOctober11,1993,andwascompleted
onOctober12,1993,withintwenty-four
hoursofdiscovery.
Detailsofthistestingandtestmethodology
arediscussed
inAttachment
1..(Toperformthistesting,indiyidua2.
components
weredeclaredinoperable,
oneatatime,forbriefperiods.Nomorethanonecomponent
wasinoperable
atagiventime,andthedieselgenerators
(DGs)weremaintained
operableduringtheentiretestingperiod.)Theguidanceof.NRCGenericLetter(GL)87-09,entitled"Sections
3.0and4.0oftheStandardTechnical
Specifications
(STS)ontheApplicability
ofLimitingConditions
forOperation
andSurveillance
Requirements",
wasfollowed.
,Boththe"A"and"B"DGswereavailable
toperformallintendedfunctions
throughout
thediscovery.
andsurveillance
testingperiod.Thistestingdemonstrated
end-to-end
operability
oftheunder-voltageprotection
system.Itverifiedundervoltage
signalstosafeguards
components,
andundervoltage
inconjunction
withSIsignaltotheComponent
CoolingWater(CCW)pumps.Initialtestingofthe"B"CCWpumpundervoltage
/SItriplogicwasindeterminate.
Atthattime,the"B"CCWpumpwasdeclaredinoperable,
untilfurthertestingwasconducted.
Thepumpwassubsequently
verified,to
befullyoperable,
andwasreturnedtoserviceapproximately
twelvehourslater.Thetestingconducted
onOctober11-12,incombination
withthesurveillance
testsconducted
duringthe1993outage,mettherequirements
ofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a),
andverifiedthatthesafeguards
functions
wouldhaveperformed
asrequired.  
Letter:Page3Subja't:Violation
Response93-21-01Date:January10,1994RG&Epersonnel
subsequently
reviewedtherequirements
ofTS4.6.1,andcomparedtheserequirements
withsurveillance
proce-dures.Noothernoncompliances
wereidentified.
(3')thecorrective
stepsthatwillbetakentoavoidfurtherviolations:
000AreviewofSection4oftheGinnaTSwillbeperformed
toensurethatthereareimplementing
procedures
foreverysurveillance
requiredbyTS.Thisreviewwillbecompleted
priortocompletion
ofthenextscheduled
refueling
outage.Resultsofapreliminary
reviewofSection4havedetermined
thattherearesufficient
procedural
controlsforimplementing
Section4requirements.
Areviewoftheidentified
implementing
procedures
willbeperformed
toensurethattheseprocedures
do,infact,implement
theTSrequirements.
Thisreviewwillbecompleted
priortocompletion
ofthenextscheduled
refueling
outage.Procedures
thatverifyloadsheddingcapability
willbeupgradedtoincludesafeguards
loads,forconditions
ofundervoltage
andSI,priortocompletion
ofthenextscheduled
refueling
outage.(4)thedatewhenfullcompliance
willbeachieved:
Fullcompliance
withTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)
wasachievedon.October12,1993,atthecompletion
ofsurveillance
testing.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)PWRProjectDirectorate
I-3Washington,
DC20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
RegionI475Allendale
RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector  
Attachment
1PT-9.1SeriesTestDetailsThepurposeofthistestwastoverifyundervoltage
safeguards
loadsheddingcapability.
MonthlyTSsurveillance
test'ingcurrently
ensureseachsafeguards
breakercanbestrippedfromthebususingthetripcoil.Toverifytheundervoltage
stripping
capability,
allthatwasnecessary
wastoverifytheintegrity
oftheundervoltage
logiccontactsandassociated
circuitry,
tothetripcoils.ZumperswereusedtosimulateSIfortheCCWpumpsbecausetheirbreakerstriponundervoltage
coincident
withSIsignal.TestingSequence:
1~Manipulate
testswitchesanddevelopanundervoltage
condition
usingtestequipment.
2~Verifyauxiliary
outputrelaysenergizetocausethetripfunction,
initiated
byappropriate
operation
oftheintermediate
digitalcontrollogiccircuitry.
3~4~5.Returntestswitchestonormalandremovetestequipment.
Verifycomponent
beingtestedisnotinservice.Measurethecontinuity
ofwiringbetweentheundervoltage
auxiliary
relaysandthebreakerswitchgear,
usingDCvoltagemeasurements
toground.6.Verifynormallyopenoutputrelaycontactsusingresistance
measurements.
7~8.Locallytriptheassociated
auxiliary
relayandverifyproperindicator
lampresponseandrelaycontactsindicateclosedbyresistance
measurement.
Resettheauxiliary
relayandverifyrelaycontactsindicateopenbyresistance
measurement.
9.Repeatsteps1-8forallfourchannels(27/X,27/BX,27D/X,and27D/BX).Onetestanomolywasidentified,
asnotedintheviolation
response.
Relay86-16B,associated
withthe"B"CCWpumpbreaker,failedtomeetthespecified
resistance
acceptance
criteria.
Emergency
Maintenance'rocedure
EM-778wasperformed
toverifythecontactdidinfacttrip.thebreaker.Afterbeingverified,
thecontactwasreworkedbysimpleburnishing
ofexposedcontactsurfaces.  
~l
~l
}}
}}

Revision as of 12:58, 29 June 2018

Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/93-21. Corrective Actions:Surveillance Tests Necessary to Verify Load Shedding Capability from Emergency Buses Performed & Procedure Revised
ML17263A526
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/10/1994
From: MECREDY R C
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: JOHNSON A R
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9402010169
Download: ML17263A526 (12)


See also: IR 05000244/1993021

Text

ttl'igRPjfpVEZEROCHESTER

GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION

~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER

N.Y..14649-0001

ROBERTCMECREDYVicePresident

@irmaNuclearProduction

TEt.EPHONEAREACODE71B5462700January10,1994U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

Attn:AllenR.JohnsonProjectDirectorate

I-3DocumentControlDeskWashington,

DC20555Subject:ReplytoaNoticeofViolation

NRCInspection

ReportNo.50-244/93-21,

datedDecember10,1993R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244DearMr.Johnson:DuringanNRCinspection

conducted

onOctober4,1993toOctober13,1993,aviolation

ofNRCrequirements

wasidentified.

Inaccordance

withthe"GeneralStatement

ofPolicyandProcedure

forNRCEnforcement

Actions,"

10CFRPart2,AppendixC,theviolation

islistedbelow:"Planttechnical

specification

4.6.1.e.3.a

requiresthatatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,

eachemergency

dieselgenerator

shallbedemonstrated

tobeoperablebysimulating

alossofoffsitepowerinconjunction

withasafetyinjection

testsignalandverifying

de-energization

oftheemergency

busesandloadsheddingfromtheemergency

buses."Contrarytotheabove,onOctober11,1993,itwasdetermined

thattestingtoverifyloadsheddingfromtheemergency

buseswasnotperformed

duringthe18monthsurveillance

testing.(1)thereasonfortheviolation,

or,ifcontested,

thebasisfordisputing

theviolation:

Rochester

Gas&ElectricCorporation

(RG&E)acceptstheviolation.

Weacknowledge

thatplantprocedures

didnotadequately

testthebusundervoltage

logic,asrequiredbyTechnical

Specification

(TS)4.6.1.e.3.(a).

Lettex:Page2Subject:Violation

Response93-21-01Date:January10,1994Thereasonfortheviolation,

asstatedinLER93-005(DocketNumber50-244,LER93-005,datedNovember10,1993)wasamis-interpretation

ofTSsurveillance

requirements.

Theloadsheddingrequirement

ofTS4.6.1.e.3.{a)

wasinterpreted

asthesheddingofnon-essential

loadspoweredfromtheemergency

buses.Thesheddingofnon-essential

loadshadbeentestedbysimulating

asafetyinjection

(SI)signalduringperformance

ofprocedures

RSSP-2.1(SafetyInjection

Functional

Test)andRSSP-2.1A.

(SafetyInjection

Functional

TestAlignment

/Realignment),

whichareperformed

eachrefueling

outage.Theneedtoverifyloadsheddingcapabilities

ofsafeguards

loads,withundervoltage

andSIpresent,hadnotbeenconsidexed.

(2)thecorrective

stepsthathavebeentakenandtheresultsachieved:

Theimmediate

corrective

actionwastoperformthesurveillance

testsnecessary

toverifyloadsheddingcapability

fromtheemergency

buses.Aprocedure

changenotice(PCN)wasdeveloped

foreachassociated

PT-9.1procedure

(monthlysurveillance

testprocedures

fortestingundervoltage

protection

for480voltsafeguards

busses14,16,17,and18).TestingwasstartedonOctober11,1993,andwascompleted

onOctober12,1993,withintwenty-four

hoursofdiscovery.

Detailsofthistestingandtestmethodology

arediscussed

inAttachment

l.(Toperfoimthistesting,individual

components

weredeclaredinoperable,

oneatatime,foxbriefperiods.Nomorethanonecomponent

wasinoperable

atagiventime,andthedieselgenerators

(DGs)weremaintained

operableduringtheentiretestingpexiod.)TheguidanceofNRCGenericLetter{GL)87-09,entitled"Sections

3.0and4.0oftheStandardTechnical

Specifications

(STS)ontheApplicability

ofLimitingConditions

forOperation

andSurveillance

Requirements",

wasfollowed.

Boththe"A"and"B"DGswereavailable

toperformallintendedfunctions

throughout

thediscovery

andsurveillance

testingperiod.Thistestingdemonstrated

end-to-end

operability

oftheunder-voltageprotection

system.Itverifiedundervoltage

signalstosafeguards

components,

andundervoltage

inconjunction

withSIsignaltotheComponent

Cooling'ater

(CCW)pumps.Initialtestingofthe"B"CCWpumpundervoltage

/SItriplogicwasindeterminate.

Atthattime,the"B"CCWpumpwasdeclaredinoperable,

untilfurthertestingwasconducted.

Thepumpwassubsequently

verifiedtobefullyoperable,

andwasreturnedtoserviceapproximately

twelvehourslater.Thetestingconducted

onOctober11-12,incombination

withthesurveillance

testsconducted

duringthe1993outage,mettherequixements

ofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a),

andverifiedthatthesafeguards

functions

wouldhaveperformed

asrequired.

Letter:Page3Subject:Violation

Response93-21-01Date:January10,1994RG&Epersonnel

subsequently

reviewedtherequirements

ofTS4.6.1,andcomparedtheserequirements

withsurveillance

proce-dures.Noothernoncompliances

wereidentified.

(3)thecorrective

stepsthatwillbetakentoavoidfurtherviolations:

0AreviewofSection4oftheGinnaTSwillbeperformed

toensurethatthereareimplementing

procedures

foreverysurveillance

requiredbyTS.Thisreviewwillbecompleted

priortocompletion

ofthenextscheduled

refueling

outage.Resultsofapreliminary

reviewofSection4havedetermined

thattherearesufficient

procedural

controlsforimplementing

Section4requirements.

00Areviewoftheidentified

implementing

procedures

willbeperformed

toensurethattheseprocedures

do,infact,implement

theTSrequirements.

Thisreviewwillbecompleted

priortocompletion

ofthenextscheduled

refueling

outage.Procedures

thatverifyloadsheddingcapability

willbeupgradedtoincludesafeguards

loads,forconditions

ofundervoltage

andSI,priortocompletion

ofthenextscheduled

refueling

outage.(4)thedatewhenfullcompliance

willbeachieved:

Fullcompliance

withTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)

wasachievedonOctober12,1993,atthecompletion

ofsurveillance

testing.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)PWRProjectDirectorate

I-3Washington,

DC20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

RegionI475Allendale

RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector

Attachment

1PT-9.1SeriesTestDetailsThepurposeofthistestwastoverifyundervoltage

safeguards

loadsheddingcapability.

MonthlyTSsurveillance

testingcurrently

ensureseachsafeguards

breakercanbestrippedfromthebususingthetripcoil.Toverifytheundervoltage

stripping

capability,

allthatwasnecessary

wastoverifytheintegrity

oftheundervoltage

logiccontactsandassociated

circuitry,

tothetripcoils.JumperswereusedtosimulateSIfortheCCWpumpsbecausetheirbreakerstriponundervoltage

coincident

withSIsignal.TestingSequence:

1~Manipulate

testswitchesanddevelopanundervoltage

condition

usingtestequipment.

2~Verifyauxiliary

outputrelaysenergizetocausethetripfunction,

initiated

byappropriate

operation

oftheintermediate

digitalcontrollogiccircuitry.

3~4~5.6.Returntestswitchestonormalandremovetestequipment.

Verifycomponent

beingtestedisnot,inservice.Measurethecontinuity

ofwiringbetweentheundervoltage

auxiliary

relaysandthebreakerswitchgear,

usingDCvoltagemeasurements

toground.)tVerifynormallyopenoutputrelaycontactsusingresistance

measurements.

7~8.Locallytriptheassociated

auxiliary

relayandverifyproperindicator

lampresponseandrelaycontactsindicateclosedbyresistance

measurement.

Resettheauxiliary

relayandverifyrelaycontactsindicateopenbyresistance

measurement.

9.Repeatsteps1-8forallfourchannels(27/X,27/BX,27D/X,and27D/BX).Onetestanomolywasidentified,

asnotedintheviolation

response.

Relay86-16B,associated

withthe"B"CCWpumpbreaker,failedtomeetthespecified

resistance

acceptance

criteria.

Emergency

Maintenance

procedure

EM-778wasperformed

toverifythecontactdidinfacttripthebreaker.Afterbeingverified,

thecontactwasreworkedbysimpleburnishing

ofexposedcontactsurfaces.

~~~v

~'i0

ACCELERATED

DISTRIBUTION

DEMONSTRATION

SYSTEMREGULATORY

INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

SYSTEM(RIDS)CCESSIONNBR:9402010169

DOC.DATE'4/01/10

NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-244

RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester

GAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION

MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester

Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME

RECIPIENT

AFFILIATION

JOHNSON,A.R.

ProjectDirectorate

I-3ISUBJECT:Respondstoviolations

notedininsprept50-244/93-21.

Corrective

actions:surveillance

testsnecessary

toverifyloadsheddingcapability

fromemergency

busesperformed

&procedure

revised.DISTRIBUTION

CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR

2ENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp

Rept/Notice

ofVi&oationResponseNOTES:License

Expdatein'ccordance

with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

DOCKET05000244D$/05000244RECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

PD1-3PDINTERNAL:

AEOD/DEIB

AEOD/DSP/TPABDEDRONRR/DRCH/HHFB

NRR/DRSS/PEPB

NRR/PMAS/ILPB2

~BI~REGFILM02RGNTFILEOlEXTERNALEG&G/BRYCE

iJH~NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

JOHNSON,A

AEOD/DSP/ROAB

AEOD/TTCNRR/DORS/OEAB

NRR/DRIL/RPEB-

NRR/PMAS/ILPB1

NUDOCS-ABSTRACT

OGC/HDS1RES/HFBNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11111111'11111111111DDRDSNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

DDPLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE

YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION

LISTSFORDOCUMENTS

YOUDON'TNEEDIOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR22ENCL22

t"'l'i"~lliPjt'I

/'l'gjll,"i,",iiel't

It,/f//IP'(/

ROCHESTER

GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION

ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePtesident

CtnnaNuetearPtoduetion

,/net~~~VA~~GToAttIIFI$Tate~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER

N.Y.14649.OO0'I

TELEPHONE

AREACODE716546'2700January10,1994U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

Attn:AllenR.JohnsonProjectDirectorate

I-3DocumentControlDeskWashington,

DC20555Subject:ReplytoaNoticeofViolation

NRCInspection

ReportNo.50-244/93-21,

datedDecember10,1993R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244DearMr.Johnson:DuringanNRCinspection

conducted

onOctober4,1993toOctober13,1993,aviolation

ofNRCrequirements

wasidentified.

Inacccrdance

withthe"GeneralStatement

ofPolicyandProcedure

forNRCEnforcement

Actions,"

10CFRPart2,AppendixC,theviolation

islistedbelow:"Planttechnical

specification

4.6.l.e.3.a

requiresthatatleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,

eachemergency

dieselgenerator

shallbedemonstrated

tobeoperablebysimulating

alossofoffsitepowerinconjunction

withasafetyinjection

testsignalandverifying

de-energization

oftheemergency

busesandloadsheddingfromtheemergency

buses."Contrarytotheabove,onOctober11,1993,itwasdetermined

thattestingtoverifyloadsheddingfromtheemergency

buseswasnotperformed

duringthe18monthsurveillance

testing.(1)thereasonfortheviolation,

or,ifcontested,

thebasisfordisputing

theviolation:

Rochester

Gas&ElectricCorporation

(RG&E)acceptstheviolation.

Weacknowledge

thatplantprocedures

didnotadequately

testthebusundervoltage

logic,asrequiredbyTechnical

Specification

(TS)4.6.1.e.3.(a).gw~IToiQ'.9402010169

940110PDRADOCK050002449PDR

0'

Letter:Page2Subject:"Violation

Response93-21-01Date:January10,1994Thereasonfortheviolation,

asstatedinLER93-005(DocketNumber50-244,LER93-005,datedNovember10,1993)wasamis-interpretation'of

TSsurveill'ance

requirements.

Theloadsheddingrequirement

ofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)

wasinterpreted

asthesheddingofnon-essential

loadspoweredfrom,theemergency

buses.Thesheddingofnon-essential

loadshadbeentestedby.simulating

asafetyinjection

(SI)signal.duringperformance

ofprocedures

RSSP-2.1(SafetyInjection

Functional

Test)andRSSP-2.1A

(SafetyInjection

Functional

TestAlignment

/Realignment),

whichareperformed

eachrefueling

outage.Theneedtoverifyloadsheddingcapabilities

ofsafeguards

loads,withundervoltage

andSIpresent,hadnotbeenconsidered.,

l(2)thecorrective

stepsthathavebeentakenandtheresultsachieved:

Theimmediate

corrective

actionwastoperformthesurveillance

testsnecessary

toverifyloadsheddingcapability

fromtheemergency

buses.Aprocedure

changenotice(PCN)wasdeveloped

foreachassociated

PT-9.1procedure

(monthlysurveillance

testprocedures

fortesting'undervoltage

protection

for480voltsafeguards

busses14,16,17,and18).TestingwasstartedonOctober11,1993,andwascompleted

onOctober12,1993,withintwenty-four

hoursofdiscovery.

Detailsofthistestingandtestmethodology

arediscussed

inAttachment

1..(Toperformthistesting,indiyidua2.

components

weredeclaredinoperable,

oneatatime,forbriefperiods.Nomorethanonecomponent

wasinoperable

atagiventime,andthedieselgenerators

(DGs)weremaintained

operableduringtheentiretestingperiod.)Theguidanceof.NRCGenericLetter(GL)87-09,entitled"Sections

3.0and4.0oftheStandardTechnical

Specifications

(STS)ontheApplicability

ofLimitingConditions

forOperation

andSurveillance

Requirements",

wasfollowed.

,Boththe"A"and"B"DGswereavailable

toperformallintendedfunctions

throughout

thediscovery.

andsurveillance

testingperiod.Thistestingdemonstrated

end-to-end

operability

oftheunder-voltageprotection

system.Itverifiedundervoltage

signalstosafeguards

components,

andundervoltage

inconjunction

withSIsignaltotheComponent

CoolingWater(CCW)pumps.Initialtestingofthe"B"CCWpumpundervoltage

/SItriplogicwasindeterminate.

Atthattime,the"B"CCWpumpwasdeclaredinoperable,

untilfurthertestingwasconducted.

Thepumpwassubsequently

verified,to

befullyoperable,

andwasreturnedtoserviceapproximately

twelvehourslater.Thetestingconducted

onOctober11-12,incombination

withthesurveillance

testsconducted

duringthe1993outage,mettherequirements

ofTS4.6.1.e.3.(a),

andverifiedthatthesafeguards

functions

wouldhaveperformed

asrequired.

Letter:Page3Subja't:Violation

Response93-21-01Date:January10,1994RG&Epersonnel

subsequently

reviewedtherequirements

ofTS4.6.1,andcomparedtheserequirements

withsurveillance

proce-dures.Noothernoncompliances

wereidentified.

(3')thecorrective

stepsthatwillbetakentoavoidfurtherviolations:

000AreviewofSection4oftheGinnaTSwillbeperformed

toensurethatthereareimplementing

procedures

foreverysurveillance

requiredbyTS.Thisreviewwillbecompleted

priortocompletion

ofthenextscheduled

refueling

outage.Resultsofapreliminary

reviewofSection4havedetermined

thattherearesufficient

procedural

controlsforimplementing

Section4requirements.

Areviewoftheidentified

implementing

procedures

willbeperformed

toensurethattheseprocedures

do,infact,implement

theTSrequirements.

Thisreviewwillbecompleted

priortocompletion

ofthenextscheduled

refueling

outage.Procedures

thatverifyloadsheddingcapability

willbeupgradedtoincludesafeguards

loads,forconditions

ofundervoltage

andSI,priortocompletion

ofthenextscheduled

refueling

outage.(4)thedatewhenfullcompliance

willbeachieved:

Fullcompliance

withTS4.6.1.e.3.(a)

wasachievedon.October12,1993,atthecompletion

ofsurveillance

testing.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)PWRProjectDirectorate

I-3Washington,

DC20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

RegionI475Allendale

RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector

Attachment

1PT-9.1SeriesTestDetailsThepurposeofthistestwastoverifyundervoltage

safeguards

loadsheddingcapability.

MonthlyTSsurveillance

test'ingcurrently

ensureseachsafeguards

breakercanbestrippedfromthebususingthetripcoil.Toverifytheundervoltage

stripping

capability,

allthatwasnecessary

wastoverifytheintegrity

oftheundervoltage

logiccontactsandassociated

circuitry,

tothetripcoils.ZumperswereusedtosimulateSIfortheCCWpumpsbecausetheirbreakerstriponundervoltage

coincident

withSIsignal.TestingSequence:

1~Manipulate

testswitchesanddevelopanundervoltage

condition

usingtestequipment.

2~Verifyauxiliary

outputrelaysenergizetocausethetripfunction,

initiated

byappropriate

operation

oftheintermediate

digitalcontrollogiccircuitry.

3~4~5.Returntestswitchestonormalandremovetestequipment.

Verifycomponent

beingtestedisnotinservice.Measurethecontinuity

ofwiringbetweentheundervoltage

auxiliary

relaysandthebreakerswitchgear,

usingDCvoltagemeasurements

toground.6.Verifynormallyopenoutputrelaycontactsusingresistance

measurements.

7~8.Locallytriptheassociated

auxiliary

relayandverifyproperindicator

lampresponseandrelaycontactsindicateclosedbyresistance

measurement.

Resettheauxiliary

relayandverifyrelaycontactsindicateopenbyresistance

measurement.

9.Repeatsteps1-8forallfourchannels(27/X,27/BX,27D/X,and27D/BX).Onetestanomolywasidentified,

asnotedintheviolation

response.

Relay86-16B,associated

withthe"B"CCWpumpbreaker,failedtomeetthespecified

resistance

acceptance

criteria.

Emergency

Maintenance'rocedure

EM-778wasperformed

toverifythecontactdidinfacttrip.thebreaker.Afterbeingverified,

thecontactwasreworkedbysimpleburnishing

ofexposedcontactsurfaces.

~l