ML17309A613

Forwards Response to NRC Request for Info Re Adequacy & Availability of Design Bases Info,Per 10CFR50.54(f)

ML17309A613
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	02/07/1997
From:	SMITH R E ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9702140141
Download: ML17309A613 (168)

Text

CATEGORYj.REGULAT.FORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONTEM(RIDS)ACCESSONNBR:9702140141DOC.DATE:97/02/07NOTARIZED:YESDOCKETFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterG05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONSMITH,R.E.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

ForwardsresponsetoNRCrequestforinforeadequacy6availabilityofdesignbasesinfo,per10CFR50.54(f).DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A074DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLS1ZE:TITLE:Responsesto50.54(f)Req.forDesignBasisInfoNOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).05000244ERECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3.PDINTERNACENTER01EXTERNAL:NRCPDR,COPIESLTTRENCL11113311RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAME"VISSING,G.NRR/DRPM/PGEBCOPIESLTTRENCL1111DENNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE'ONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESKIROOMOWFN5D-5(EXT.415-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBER'FCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR8ENCL...8 ANnROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATION~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,N.Y.14649-0001ROBERTE.SMITHSeniorVicePresidentEnergyOperotionsAREACODE716724-8074FAN716724-8285February7,1997U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555

Subject:

ResponsetoNRCRequestforInformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)RegardingAdequacyandAvailabilityofDesignBasesInformationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

Reference:

NRCletterJ.M.TaylortoR.W.Koberdated10/9/96,re:RequestforInforma-tionPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)regardingAdequacyandAvailabilityofDesignBasesInformationOnOctober9,1996,theNuclearRegulatoryCommissionissuedtheReferencedletterrequestingthatlicenseesprovideinformationthatcanbeusedtoverifycompliancewiththetermsandconditionsoftheirlicenseandNRCregulations,andtoverifythattheplantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisreport(UFSAR)properlydescribestheirfacility.SpecificallytheNRCrequestedthefollowinginformation:(a)Descriptionofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.(b)Rationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.(c)Rationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.(d)Descriptionofprocessesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actiontopreventrecurrence,andreportingtoNRC.(e)AssessmentoftheoveralleffectivenessofRG&E'scurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthatplantconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbases.9702140141970207PDRADQCK;,05000244P'.'I,tr,yPDR kfq

("f")InadditiontheNRCalsorequestedthatRG8cEindicatewhetherwehaveundertakenanydesignrevieworreconstitutionprograms;rationalefornotimplementingifsuchprogramshavenotbeenimplemented;andadescription,status,andscheduleasapplicableforsuchprograms.TheattachedreportisourresponsetotheNRC'srequest.~ForRequestedAction(a),wehaveprovidedasummarydiscussionofourlicensing,designandconfigurationcontrolprocesses.~ForRequestedActions(b)and(c),wehavefocusedonthenumerousprogramsandprojectsconductedfrominitialplantoperationtothepresenttoconfirmandenhancethephysicalandfunctionalcharacteristicsoftheplantwithrespecttotheirdesignbases.WealsodiscussourrecenteffortstoconfirmconsistencybetweentheUFSAR,plantproce-dures,andplantconfiguration.~ForRequestedAction(d),wehaveprovidedsummarydescriptionsofourcorrectiveactionprocessesforidentificationanddeterminationoftheextentofproblems,aswellasforimplementationofcorrectiveactionsandreportingtotheNRC.~ForRequestedAction(e),wehavecompiledandevaluatedtheresultsofvariousreviewsintendedtoscrutinizeourprocessesandcontrolsandleadtocontinuousimprovement.Theseincludein-lineprocesscontrolsandreviews,internalQualityAssuranceauditsandsurveillances,andthirdpartyreviewsandinspections,includingthoseconductedbytheNRC.Additionally,wehaveprovidedabriefsummaryofouron-goingdesignreviewandretrievaleffortswhichcenteraroundreviewingtheUFSARforaccuracywithrespecttoplantproceduresandequipmentandretrievingandreviewingdesignbasesdocumentationfromtheplant'soriginalNSSSsupplierandArchitect/Engineer.Theinformationpresentedherein,inconjunctionwithRGEcE'scultureofopennessandwillingnesstoaddressissues,hasgivenRG&EreasonableassurancethattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantisbeingoperatedandmaintainedwithinitsdesignbases,thatitisfullycapableoffulfillingitssafetyfunctions,andthatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicisbeingprotected.Verytrulyyours,TZRobertE.Smith It Attachment,xc:Director,OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555Mr.GuyVissing(MailStop14C7)ProjectDirectorate1-3Washington,D.C.20555Mr.H.J.Miller,NRCRegionalAdministrator.U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406Mr.P.DrysdaleGinnaSeniorResidentInspector UNITEDSTATESNUCHU'ttRREGULATORYCOMMISSIONXntheMatterofRochesterGas.&ElectricCompanyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant))DocketNo.50-244)))Mr.RobertE,Smith,beingdulysworn,statesthatheisSeniorVicePresident,EnergyOperationsofRochesterGas&ElectricCompany:thatheisauthorizedonthepartofsaidcompanytosignandfilewiththeNuclearRegulatoryCommissionthedocumentattachedhereto;andthatthedocumentistrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge,information,andbelief.RobertE.ShSubscribedandswornbeforeme,inandfortheStateofNewYorkandtheCountyofMonroe,this~Dayof1997MyCommissionexpires:r~/PFINotaryPublicLORETTAMARSHALLPARKERNotaryPublicmtheStateofNewYorkMONROECOUNTYCommissionExpiresDec.12.19'Jl..

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ROCHESTERGAS4,ELECTRICCORP.10CFR50.54(f)RESPONSE970214014110CFR50.54(f)Response-SummaryRcportFinalRcportTitlePage2/787

~J'-,~Itt' TABLEOFCONTENTSPageA~~CRONYMSooosooooooooooeoooooooooooooooooooosooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooeoeooooooooooooooSUMMARYREPORT............................................................................1INT'RODUCTIONoeoooooooooooooooooeooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooeoooooooeoosos~1DEVELOPMENTOFRG&E'sRESPONSE.............................2REPORTOVERVIEWeooooosooooososssssssssoooooooooeosoosssosossssoooooooeeosooos~3IOCFR50.54(f)RESPONSE........................................................4RESPONSE(a)................................................................4SPONSE(b)................................................................5RESPONSE(C)oooooooooooooooooeoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo7RESPONSE(d)................................................................10RESPONSE(e).................................................................13REx/ccsssxRESPONSE(P)oooooooooooooooeooooooooooooooooooooooooooeooooooooooooeooeoeo15ATTACHMENTA.................................................................................18ATTACHMENTB..................................................................................36ATTACHMENTCeeoosoooooooeoooooos~~sso~~~esses~~~ooooeooooe~soooso~~oooooe~~esses~~eooeoo~oooo~44TTACHMENTD...'...............................................................................62ATTACHMENTE.................,................................................................69A10CFR50.54(f)Response-SununasyReportFinalRcportPagei2/7/97

'CZC099L86O'E'K'K,ZT0TCCVT9;K9TL'I8'K6TOZ ACRONYMSThefollowingisalistofacronymsusedinthisreportandtheirmeanings:A/EACRSACTIONADFCSAECAFWALARAAMSACASFIASMEATWSCATSCCWCFRCIECMISCOLRDBDDCRECCDECCSEDGEDSFIEOPEPCEPIPEQERGESFASEWRFSARGLGORRGSMHPESHVACININPOIPIRISIISTITSLARLCOLERLOCALTOPICATIONREPORTCTIONARCHITECTENGINEERADVISORYCOMMITTEEONREACTORSAFETYABNORMALCONDITIONTRACKINGINITIATIONORNOTIFADVANCEDDIGITALFEEDWATERCONTROLSYSTEMATOMICENERGYCOMMISSIONAUXILIARYFEEDWATERASLOWASREASONABLYACHIEVABLEATWSMITIGATIONSYSTEMACTUATIONCIRCUITRYAUXILIARYSYSTEMFUNCTIONALINSPECTIONAMERICANSOCIETYOFMECHANICALENGINEERSANTICIPATEDTRANSIENTWITHOUTSCRAMCOMMI'IMENT&ACTIONTRACKINGSYSTEMCOMPONENTCOOLINGWATERCODEOFFEDERALREGULATIONCHANGEIMPACTEVALUATIONCONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENTINFORMATIONSYSTEMCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORTDESIGNBASISDOCUMENTDRAWINGCHANGEREQUESTELECTRICALCONTROLLEDCONFIGURATIONDRAWINGEMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMEMERGENCYDIESELGENERATORELECTRICALDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEMFUNCTIONALINSPEEMERGENCYOPERATINGPROCEDUREEMERGENCYPROCEDURECOMMIITEEEMERGENCYPLANIMPLEMENTINGPROCEDURESENVIRONMENTALQUALIFICATIONEMERGENCYRESPONSEGUIDELINESENGINEEREDSAFETYFEATUREACTUATIONSYSTEMENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTGENERICLETTERGINNAOWNERSREVIEWREPORTGINNASTATIONMODIFICATIONHUMANPERFORMANCEENHANCEMENTSYSTEMHEATING,VENTILATION,4,AIRCONDITIONINGINFORMATIONNOTICEINSTI'HITEOFNUCLEARPOWEROPERATIONINTERFACEPROCEDUREINSPECTIONREPORTINSERVICEINSPECTIONINSERVICETESTINGIMPROVEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSLICENSEAMENDMENTREQUESTLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORTLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTLOWTEMPERATUREOVERPRESSUREPROTECTION10CFR50.54(f)Response-SummaryRcportFinalReportPageii2/787 4rl~~srpmr,preF MDAFWMDCNMOVMRMRPIMTCNDNEINERPNOGNOVNRCNSM.NSARBNSSSODCMOEPAIDPCRPIRPORCPTLRQAQAPSOQCRCMRCSRGBRHRRMRPRPSRSACRSES/GSAFWSARSBOSCAQSESEPSERSEVSFPSGRPSIPESQUGSRSSCSSFISTSTASWSROPSWMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERMODIFICATIONDESIGNCHANGENOTICEMOTOROPERATEDVALVEMAINTENANCERULEMICROPROCESSORRODPOSITIONINDICATIONMODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENTNUCLEARDIRECTIVENUCLEARENERGYINSTITUTENUCLEAREMERGENCYRESPONSEPLANNUCLEAROPERATIONSGROUPNOTICEOFVIOLATIONNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONNUCLEARSAFEIYBcLICENSINGNUCLEARSAFETYAUDITANDREVIEWBOARDNUCLEARSTEAMSUPPLYSYSTEMOFF-SITEDOSECALCULATIONMANUALOPERATINGEXPERIENCEPIPING4,INSTRUMENTATIONDIAGRAMPLANTCHANGEREQUESTPORCINDEPENDENTREVIEWERPLANTOPERATIONSREVIEWCOMMIITEEPRESSUREATEMPERATURELIMITSREPORTQUALITYASSURANCEQAPROGRAMFORSTATIONOPERATIONSQUALITYCONTROLRELIABILITYCENTEREDMAINTENANCEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMROCHESTERGASANDELECTMCRESIDUALHEATREMOVALRESPONSIBLEMANAGERRADIATIONPROTECTIONREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMRELOADSAFEIYANALYSISCHECKLISTRELOADSAFEIVEVALUATIONSTEAMGENERATORSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSAFETYANALYSISREPORTSTATIONBLACKOUTSIGNIFICANTCONDITIONADVERSETOQUALITYSYSTEMENGINEERSYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMSIGNIFICANTEVENTREPORTorSAFETYEVALUATIONREPORTSAFETYEVALUATIONSPENTFUELPOOLSTEAMGENERATORREPLACEMENTPROJECTSIGNIFICANTINFREQUENTLYPERFORMEDEVOLUTIONSEISMICQUALIFICATIONUTILITYGROUPSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT/ORSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEM,STRUCTUREAND/ORCOMPONENTSAFEIYSYSTEMFUNCTIONALINSPECTIONSURVEILLANCETESTSHIFTTECHNICALADVISORSERVICEWATERSYSTEMRELIABILITYOPTIMIZATIONPROGRAMSERVICEWATERlOCFR50.54(0Rcsponsc-SummaryReportFinalRcportPagerll2/7/97

SWSOPITAVETDAFWTPCNTRMTSRUFSARUSQVTMWOGWRfIRSERVICEWATERSYSTEMOPERATIONALPERFORMANCEINSPECTIONAVERAGEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMTEMPERATURETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERTEMPORARYPROCEDURECHANGENOTICETECHNICALREQUIREMENTMANUALTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONSVENDORTECHNICALMANUALWESTINGHOUSEOWNER'SGROUPWORKREQUESTffROUBLEREPORT10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-SuretyRcportFinalRcportPageiv2/7/97 10CFR50.54(f)RESPONSESUMMARYREPORTINTRODUCTIONOnOctober9,1996,theNRCissuedaletterrequestingthatlicenseesprovideinformationthatcanbeusedtoverify1)compliancewiththetermsandconditionsoftheirlicenseandNRCregulationsand2)thattheplantUFSARproperlydescribestheirfacility.SpecificallytheNRCrequestedthefollowinginformation:(a)Descriptionofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50;(b)Rationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures;(c)Rationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases;(d)Descriptionofprocessesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actiontopreventrecurrence,andreportingtoNRC;and(e)Assessmentoftheoveralleffectivenessofyourcurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthattheconfigurationofyourplantisconsistentwiththedesignbases.("f')Inaddition,theNRCalsorequestedthatRGB.Eindicate:~whetherwehaveundertakenanydesignrevieworreconstitutionprograms,~ifnot,arationalefornotimplementingsuchaprogram,~ifdesignrevieworreconstitutionprogramshavebeencompletedorarebeingconducted,adescriptionofthereviewprograms,includingidentificationofthesystems,structures,andcomponents(SSCs),andplant-levelattributes(e.g.,seismic,high-energylinebreak,moderate-energylinebreak),includinghowtheprogramisintendedtoensurethecorrectnessandaccessibilityofthedesignbasesinformationforourplantandthatthedesignbasesremaincurrent,~iftheprogramisbeingconductedbuthasnotbeencompleted,animplementationscheduleforSSCsandplant-leveldesignattributereviews,theexpectedcompletiondate,andmethodofSSCprioritizationusedforthereview.NotethatthisrequestdidnotcarryaletterdesignationintheNRCletter;however,forreference,itwillbereferredtoas("f")herein.ThisreportisRochesterGasandElectric's(RGEcE's)responsetotheNRC'srequest.IOCFR50.54(t)Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPagei2/7/97 4~J,1re>~4Ua/gal0)IV0N DEVELOPMENTOFRG&E'sRESPONSETocoordinatethepreparationofthisresponse,RG&EassembledadedicatedteamoffourseniorengineersfromNuclearSafety&Licensing(NS&L).ThisNS&Lteamwassupportedbytheeffortsofoverfiftysubjectmatterexperts(SMEs)whocontributedinformationregardingspecificprocesses,programs,activities,andassessments.ManagementandtechnicaloversightwereprovidedbytheactiveparticipationofNOGEngineering,Operation's,andNuclearAssessmentmanagement.RG&E'sapproachtothisreportwasdevelopedto1)ensurethatitwouldbefullyresponsivetotheNRC'sj'equest,and2)establishconfidencethatthereportwouldrepresentthecollectiveknowledgeofthosemostcloselyassociatedwiththeoperating,maintenance,andengineeringactivitiesthatsupportthesafeandreliableoperationofGinna.Specifically,RG&E'sresponsedevelopmentproceededasfollows:~TheNS&Lteamdevelopedanoutlineofthemostrelevanttopics(programsandprocesses)usedtomaintainGinnaStation.~SMEsweredesignatedforeachtopiconthislistbasedupontheirfamiliaritywiththetopic.Forhistoricaltopics,SMEsweretypicallyselectedbasedontheirroleintheactivityatthattime,regardlessoftheircurrentfunctionwithinRG&E.~ThelistoftopicsandassignedSMEswasthendistributedtotheSMEsalongwithinformationregardingtheNRC10CFR50.54(f)request,thefindingsandconclusionsoftheNRCleadingtotherequest,andmanagementexpectationsforRG&E'sresponse.~EachSMEdevelopedasummarydescriptionofthetopicassigned.~ThededicatedNS&Lteamcollectedthesedescriptions,compiledthem,andfurthereditedandsummarizedthemintoadraftoftheRG&Eresponse.~ReviewoftheresponseincludedtwofullreviewsbytheSMEs,includingafinalattestationofthoroughnesstoRG&Emanagement.~ThePlantOperatingReviewCommittee(PORC)reviewedbothanearlydraftandthefinalreportandprovidedarecommendationofapprovaltotheSeniorVice-President,EnergyOperations.~TheNuclearSafetyAuditandReviewBoard(NSARB)conductedanextensivereviewanddiscussionoftheresponse.TheNSARBgavespecificassignmentstothenon-NOGmembersoftheNSARBtomaximizethequalityoftheinputfromoutsidemembers.TheNSARBreviewincludedSeniorManagersfrombothRG&EandotherutilitiesaswellasamemberoftheRG&EBoardofDirectors.TheNSARBdiscussionresultedinarecommendationofapprovaltotheSeniorVice-President,EnergyOperations.~Finally,themethodsusedtodevelopthisresponsewereindependentlyreviewedbyateamconsistingofanRG&ENuclearAssuranceengineerandaNiagaraMohawknuclearlicensingengineer.Byfollowingthethoroughdevelopmentandreviewprocessdescribedabove,RG&EhasconcludedthatthereissubstantialevidenceforreasonableassurancethattheGinnaStationisbeingoperatedandmaintainedwithinitsdesignbases,thatdeviationsareresolvedinatimelymanner,andthatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicisbeingprotected.10CHU0.54(f)Response-SummaryRcportFinalReportPage22/7/97

'j4 REPORTOVERVIEWThisdocumentconsistsofaSummaryReportoftheinformationprovidedinresponseto.theNRC'srequestwhichbrieflyexplainsforRequests(a)through(e)l)theprocessesinplaceforlicense,design,andconfigurationcontrol,2)theprogramsandprojectsthathaveconfirmedandenhancedtheconsistencybetweendesignbases,plantprocedures,plantconfiguration,andplantoperations,3)theprocessestoidentifyandresolveproblems,and4)ouroverallassessmentoftheireffectiveness.TheSUMMARYREPORTendswith(),adescriptionofouron-goingdesignreviewandreconstitutioneffortswhichcenteraround1)reviewingtheUFSARforaccuracywithrespecttoplantproceduresandequipment,2)retrievingandreviewingdesignbasesdocumentationfromtheplant'soriginalNSSSsupplierandArchitect/Engineer(A/E),and3)confirmingcorrectdocumentationofchangestotheoriginaldesignandlicensingbasesasaresultoflaterplantmodificationsandadditionstoourNRCdocket.FollowingthissummaryreportareaseriesofAttachmentsthatprovideadditionaldetailsforRequestedActions(a)through(e)fromtheNRC.Specifically:ATTACHMENTA:SupportinginformationforRequestedAction(a).TheAttachmentprovidesabriefdiscussionofourlicensing,designandconfigurationcontrolprocesses.ATTACHMENTB:SupportinginformationforRequestedAction(b).TheAttachmentdiscussesseveralprojectsundertakentoupdateplantproceduresaswellasourrecenteffortstoconfirmUFSAR-to-procedureconsistency.ATTACHMENTC:SupportinginformationforRequestedAction(c).TheAttachmentfocusesonthenumerousprogramsandprojectsconductedovertheyearssinceinitialplantlicensingtomaintainandenhancethephysicalconfigurationandfunctionalcharacteristicsoftheplantwithrespecttothedesignbases.ATTACHMENTD:SupportinginformationforRequestedAction(d).TheAttachmentprovidesabriefdescriptionofourcorrectiveactionprocessesforidentificationanddeterminationoftheextentofproblemsaswellasimplementationofcorrectiveactionsandreportingtotheNRC,asappropriate.ATTACHMENTE:SupportinginformationforRequestedAction(e).TheAttachmentcompilestheresultsofvariousreviewsintendedtoscrutinizeourprocesses/controls/configurationandleadtocontinuousimprovement/enhancement.Theseincludein-lineprocesscontrolsandreviews(includingself-assessments),internalQualityAssuranceauditsandsurveillances,andthirdpartyreviews/inspections(includingthoseconductedbytheNRC).lOCFR50.54(l)Response-SununatyReportFinalReportPage32fl87

'i4~-~pa,~wc~jr 10CFR50.54(f)RESPONSETheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantisa480MWWestinghousetwolooppressurizedwaterreactor,plantlocatedontheshoreofLakeOntarioinwesternNewYork.ItisownedandoperatedbyRochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RG&E).Itwaslicensedin1969.RG&E'sintentionalapproachtothedesign,operation,andmaintenanceofGinnaStation(plannedandsystematicactionsnecessarytoprovideadequateconfidencethatastructure,system,orcomponentwillperformsatisfactorilyinservice)givesRG&EconfidenceandassurancethatGinnaisfullycapableoffulfillingitssafetyfunctions,i.e.,thatGinnaisoperatedandmaintainedwithinitsdesignbases.ThefollowinghasbeenRG&E'sapproach:~Ginnawaslicensedto.asetofregulationsandcodes.~RG&Edevelopedprograms(includingthequalityassuranceprogramandadministrativeprocedures)tomeetthoseregulations.~Wedevelopedbothfeedbackmechanismsandacorrectiveactionprocessintendedtoensurethatthoseprogramscontinuetomeetthatsetofregulations.~Self-assessmentsandthirdpartyreviewssupplementourinternalfeedbackmechanisms.~Whenregulationschangeorareadded,ourprogramsaremodifiedtoaddressourcommitmentstothenewrequirements.ThisReportisintendedtoprovidetheNRCwiththeinformationrequested.However,itisnotcomprehensive.RG&Ehasattemptedtofocusonthoseprocessesandprogramshavingthemostsignificantimpactonplantdesignbasesconfigurationandconductofoperations.InrespondingtotheNRC'srequest,RG&Ehasattemptedtoprovidebothhistoricaldataanddescriptionsofourcurrentdesign/configurationcontrolandcorrectiveactionprocesses.Ourprocessesareunderconstantevaluationandsubjecttochangetoincorporateimprovements.Asaresult,processesmaybedifferentinthefuturefromwhatisdescribedherein.NOTE:Inthefollowingdescriptions,referencesinparenthesesrefertotheAttachmentsandSectionnumberswithintheAttachments.Forexample,item"(A.l.G)"willbefoundinAttachmentA,Section1.G;item"(C.2.K)"willbefoundinAttachmentC,Section2.K,etc.(a)Descriptionofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,IOCFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFR50:Theprocessesthatimplementtheseandsimilarregulatoryrequirementscanbecategorizedasthosethat1)controllicenserequirementsand2)controlengineeringdesignandconfiguration.1.TheprocessestocontrollicenserequirementsresideindirectivesandprocedureswhichcontrolLicenseAmendments(A.l.A),TechnicalSpecificationBaseschanges(A.l.B),SafetyReviewsandSafetyEvaluations(A.l.C),UFSARupdates(A.l.D),changestoQualityAssurancerequirements(A.1.E),changestotheSecurityPlan(A.l.F),changestotheEmergencyPlan(A.l.G),ASMECodereliefrequests(A.l.H),andRegulatoryIOCPRSO.S4(QResponse-SummasyReportFinalReportPage42/7i97

~4,14'4katl Commitmentchanges(A.l.I).Additionally,astheNRCprovidesgenericregulatoryguidanceoridentifiesnewconcerns,RG&EevaluatestheirapplicabilitytoGinnaandassesseswhether.theconcernsarealreadyknownandbeingaddressed.Ifapplicable,andnotalreadycoveredbyon-goingactivities,RG&Etracksandincorporatesappropriatechanges(A.l.J)tolicensingdocumentsandafFectedprocedures/practices.2.Theprimaryprocessesforengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolinclude.thePlantChange(permanentmodification)process(A.2.A),theTemporaryModificationprocess(A.2.B),andtheprocessesfortheadministrativecontrolofprocedures(A.2.C)anddrawings(A.2.F).TheMaintenanceWorkControlSystem(A.2.D)isintendedtoensurethatproperengineeringcontrolsarebroughttobearonequipmentproblemsandthatequipmentiscorrectlyrestoredtoserviceaftermaintenance.TheProcurementEngineeringProcess(A.2.G)isintendedtoensureproperengineeringcontrolsareexercisedinthepurchase,specification,receiptinspection,andstorageofcomponents,parts,andmaterialsusedtomaintainandmodifytheplant.TheOperatorWork-Aroundcontrolprocess(A.2.E)looksforplantconfigurationswhichcanimpacttheoperationoftheplantandcausetheOperatorstousecompensatorymeasures.RG&EalsoevaluatesrecommendationsregardingequipmentwhicharecommunicatedviaNRCgenericcommunicationsorindustrynotices(A.l.J).Asappropriate,RG&Ewillimplementtheserecommendationsand.incorporatethemintothedesignbasisoftheplant.[Note:otherprogramsrequiredbyourlicenseorbyregulationarediscussedinsection(c).]Ourprocessesincorporatedefense-in-depth,includingmulti-disciplinedreviews,whichprovideindependentandbalancedperspectives.CompliancewiththeseprocessesispartoftheRG&Eculture.Thatcultureandtheseprocessesaretheproductofcontinuousimprovement.RG&EisresponsivetonewindustryandNRCinitiatives/developmentsandincorporatesthem,asapplicable,tokeepourprocessescurrent.TheNuclearOperationsGroupstafF(A.3)istrained,insessionstailoredtotheusergroups'pecificneeds,touseengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessescorrectly.(b)Rationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures:RG&Ehasestablishedaseriesofadministrativecontrolsforprocesseswhichcontrolproceduresorinstructions.TheseincludethePlantChangeProcess(B.l.A,A.2.A)todeterminetheimpactofmodificationsonplantproc'edures,theprocedurechangeprocesswithitsassociated10CFR50.59review(A.2.C),andtheMaintenanceWorkControlSystem(B.1.C,A.2.D)withitsmulti-disciplinedreviewsofprocedures/instructionsbeingincorporatedintoworkpackages.Inarelatedmanner,theOperatingExperienceprocesscanenhance/updatethedesignbasis(B.1.D),inthatRG&EreviewsandaddressesNRCgenericcommunicationsandincorporates10CFR50.54(l)Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPage52f7/97 CtZaL>>eLV8, resultingRG&Ecommitmentsintoplantproceduresandprograms.ThesearetrackedtoclosureviatheCommitmentandActionTrackingSystem(CATS).Designbasisrequirementsareincorporatedintoprocedureswhichgoverntheoperation,maintenance,andtestingofplantsystems,structuresandcomponents(SSCs).Examplesofthisareheatup/cooldownlimitationsinOperationsstartup/shutdownprocedures,restrictionsinEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andacceptancecriteriainsurveillancetestingprocedures.RG&Ehasundertakenaseriesofcomprehensiveprojectstoupgradeprocedures,makingthemmoreusableandverifyingthecorrectimplementationofrequirements.TheseeffortshavegivenRG&Econfidenceinthevalidityofimportantplantdocumentation.ExamplesincludethedevelopmentofplantEmergencyOperatingProcedures(B.2.A),theCalibrationProceduresandMaintenanceProceduresUpgradeProjects(B.2.B),theupgradeofInserviceTestingprocedures(B.2.C),theImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)implementationplan(B.2.D)whichareintendedtoensurethatsurveillancerequirementswereproperlyaddressed,andRG&E'sresponsetoGenericLetter(GL)96-01(B.2.E)regardingcompletenessofcircuittesting.RG&Ehasundertakenseveralsamplingprojects(B.3.A,B.3.B,B.3.C,B.3.D)tocheckifinformationintheUFSARisaccuratelyreflectedinplantproceduresandtodetermineifon-goingcommitments(someofwhicharereflectedintheUFSAR)canbetracedbacktotheoriginalrequirements.Generally,wheredifferenceshavebeenidentifiedandevaluatedforresolution,theplantimplementingdocumentsandtheplantconfigurationhaveaccuratelyreflectedthedesignbasesandtheUFSARhasnotbeenupdatedproperly.ThisgivesRG&Econfidencethat,eventhoughtheUFSARhasnotalwaysbeenuptodate,importantconfigurationcontrolanddesignbasisinformationhasbeencorrectlytranslatedtotheplantequipmentandprocedures.Nonetheless,RG&Erecognizestheneedto1)correcttheUFSARintheshorttermand2)improveprocessestomaintainlongtermUFSARaccuracy.RG&EnotesthatonereasonfordifferencesbetweenplantprogramsandtheUFSARisthetimingofupdates.Newinformationresultingfromplantchangesissentdirectlytoprogramadministrators,whoseprogramsareauditedforcomplianceseparatelyfromtheUFSAR.RG&EhasnotrequiredthattheUFSARbeupdatedasquicklyastheprogramsitdescribes.Consequently,theUFSAR,withitsrefuelingcycleupdate(since1984;seerelatedUFSARhistory(A.l.D)),hasnotbeenusedasareal-timeconfirmationofimpactonthedesignbasis.TheNuclearOperationsGroupstaffisformallytrained(B.4)onprocedurestomaintaintheirknowledgelevelandkeepthemabreastofchanges.Forsomenewproceduresandevensomeprocedurechanges,theResponsibleManagerdeterminesthatformaltrainingofaffectedstaffisrequired.Appropriateindividualsarethentrainedontheprocedure/changeaswellasitsbases.Thistraininghelpscommunicatedesignbasisinformationthroughouttheorganization.Note:Additionalinformationregardingself-assessments,internalreviews,andthirdpartyreviewswhichsupportourconclusionsinthissectionarefoundinsection(e).10CFR50.54(riResponse-SummaryReportFinalReportPage62f187

~.V,'"4If'IIf,'gI0f~<<PefI~y~<<>q1 (c)Rationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases:RGBhasensuredthatGinnaStationaccuratelyreflectsitsdesignbasesbyimplementingprogramstokeeptheplantconfigurationconsistentwithdesignbasisinformation,performinginspectionstoidentifyconfigurationdiscrepancies,andinitiatingandcompletingaseriesofprojectswhichhaveenhancedtheknowledgeanduseofdesignbasisinformation.IP~rorams~Operationsperformsperiodicverificationsofsafeguardssystemsconfiguration(C.l.A)intendedtoensurethatthevalve,breaker,andinstrumentationalignmentsofthemajorflowpathsneededforsystemoperationareconsistentwiththedesignbases.~TheSurveillanceTestprogram(C.1.B)isintendedtoensureequipmentoperabilityinaccordancewithitsdesignbasesforequipmentrequiredbytheImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(includingrelocatedpreviousTechnicalSpecificationrequirements).~ThePreventiveMaintenanceprograms(C.l.C)atGinnaareestablishedtomonitorandmaintaincriticalplantequipmentsuchthatin-servicefailuresareminimizedandperformancereliabilityisenhanced,thusbetterassuringthatequipmentimportanttothesafeoperationofGinnaisavailablewhenrequired.Theperformanceofmanycomponentsistrendedtodetectdegradationbeforefailure.~,TheSafetyClassificationprocess(C.l.D)isintendedtoidentifyandclassifyplantcomponentswhichperformsafety-relatedfunctions.Thisinformationisusedinvariousplantprocessesincludingplantmodifications,procurement(especiallyforcomponentsandparts),andmaintenanceplanning~TheElectricalLoadGrowthControlprogram(C.l.E)isintendedtoensurethatacceptablelevelsofmarginaremaintainedontheelectricaldistributionsystempowersupplies.~TheEnvironmentalQualificationprogram(10CFR50.49)(C.l.F)isintendedtoensurethataharshenvironment,resultingfromapostulatedaccident,willnotbeacommoncauseofequipmentfailureforelectricalequipmentneededtocopewiththataccident.~The10CFR50,AppendixRandFireProtectionprogram(C.l.G)isintendedtomaintainconfigurationcontrolofequipmentnecessarytomitigatetheconsequencesoffires.s~TheImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsTransientMonitoringprogram(C.l.H)tracksreactorcoolantsystemtransientstoensurethattheASME.ClassIcomponentfatiguedesignbasisismaintained.lOCFR50.54(QRcsponsc-SunnnaryRcportFinalRcportPage72fI/97 al-~~I'4h

~TheHeavyLoadsProgram(C.1.I)controlsliftingactivitiestoavoidorminimizedamage'hatcouldresultfromdroppingaloadgreaterthan1500poundsontosafety-relatedequipment.~TheMotorOperatedValve(MOV)program(C.l.J)isintendedto,establishthedesignconditionsandrequiredthrustvaluesforeachMOVbaseduponreviewofaccidentanalyses,normalandabnormaloperation,andEmergencyOperatingProcedures.~TheNuclearFuelsReloadprocess(C.l.K)isintendedtoensurethatthereloadpatternwillproducetherequiredenergyandwillbeboundedbythecoreparametersassumedintheaccidentanalysis.I~nsections~SystemEngineer(SE)periodicwalkdowns(C.3.A)aredesignedtotakeadvantageoftheSE'sknowledgeofthedesignconfigurationofthesystemtohelpmaintainsystemconfigurationcontrol.s~TheSystemEngineerperformancemonitoringprogram(C.3.B)consistsofmonitoringinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.65,theMaintenanceRule.Thisprogramassesses,onanon-goingbasis,theeffectivenessofmaintenanceonkeysystems,structures,andcomponentsinordertoidentifyandcorrectperformanceproblems.~TheShiftTechnicalAdvisororDesignatedPlantManagementPlantTours(C.3.C)containastatedobjectiveofcheckingforunauthorizedmodificationstothefacility.P~ro'ects~TheImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsProject(C.2.A)consolidatedmuchofGinna'slicensingbasis.Significantmulti-disciplinedreviewwasperformedtoensurethatappropriateoperabilityrestrictionswereplaceduponequipmentassumedintheUFSARaccidentanalysis.~TheSystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)(C.2.B)provided1)an-assessmentofthesignificanceofdifferencesbetweenthethen-currentNRCtechnicalpositionsonsafetyissuesandthedesignbasesoftheplant,2)abasisforNRCdecisionsregardingresolutionofthosedifferences,and3)adocumentedNRCevaluationofoverallplantsafetywithrespecttothereviewedtopics.~TheInstrumentSetpointVerificationProject(C.2.C)wasintendedtoestablishthedesignbasisandensuretheadequacyofexistingsetpointsandcalibrationvaluesforimportantplantinstrumentandcontrolloops.lOCFRSO.S4(0Rcsponsc~SununaryRcportFinalRcportPa8c82/7/97 0h4CPPygik'~,,4tpg

~ComprehensivePipingandInstrumentationDrawing(P&ID)andElectricalControlledConfigurationDrawing(ECCD)upgradeprojects(C.2.DandC.2.E,respectively)whichfieldverifiedcontrolledconfigurationdrawingsagainsttheplant.~TheStationBlackoutanalysis(C.2.F),EWR4520,showshowGinnameetsthesafeshutdownrequirementsof10CFR50.63,LossofAllAlternatingCurrentPower.~TheDCFuseCoordinationStudy(C.2.G)wasintendedtoensurethattheDCdistributionsystemmaintainsitsdesignbasisconfigurationandtodemonstratethattheDCsystemwillbeabletomeetitsdesignrequirements.~TheSeismicUpgradeProject(C.2.H)consistedofextensivepiping/supportanalysesandappropriatefieldmodificationstoupgradesupportstomorecurrentstandards.~SeismicQualificationUtilityGroup(SQUG)reconstitutionprogram(C.2.I)isbeingperformedtoupgradetheseismicqualificationdesignbasisforequipmentontheGinnaSafeShutdownEquipmentListtotheSQUGGenericImplementationProcedure.~TheT,reduction/18monthfuelcycle/UFSARChapter15reanalysis(C.2.J)reestablishedtheaccidentanalysisdesignbasis.~InresponsetoGL89-13,RG&EperformedaseriesofactionstointendedtoensuretheacceptableperformanceofplantServiceWater(SW)Systems(C.2.K).TheseactionsincludedevaluationstoconfirmthattheSWsystemiscapableoffulfillingitsdesignbasisfunction,enhancedmaintenancetopreventdegradation,andtestingtodemonstrateperformance.ActionsincludedimplementationofaZebraMusselcontrolprogramandaServiceWatererosion/corrosionmonitoringprogram.~RG&EhasreconstitutedmajorpartsoftheGin'nadesignbasesasfollows:0replacedsteamgenerators(S/Gs)(C.2.L)in1996.InthecourseofdesigningthereplacementS/Gsandplanningtheirinstallation,RG&Eretrievedthedesignbasesforseveralaspectsoftheplant.TasksofsignificancetodesignbasisverificationincludedtheSafetyEvaluationforthetask,retrievingthecontainmentdesignbasistopermitcuttingholesinthetopofthedome,andreconstitutingthedesignbasisstructuraladequacyofthecontainmentspraysystem(thelatterbeinganemergentasanissueduringtheS/Greplacementoutage).0performedanInstrumentAirSystemfunctionalreview(C.2.M)0upgradedtheOff-sitePowerSystem(C.2.N)0upgradedtheSpentFuelPool(SFP)CoolingSystembyaddinganothercoolingloop(C.2.0)0performedaContainmentIsolationSystemreview(C.2.P)0upgradedtoaSteamGenerator(S/G)AdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)(C.2.Q)0upgradedtoaMicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(MRPI)System(C.2.R)10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-SummaryRcportFinalRcportPage92/787

0addedAnticipated-Transient-Without-Scram(ATWS)MitigationSystemActuationCircuitry(AMSAC)(C.2.S)0addedaStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwater(SAFW)System(C.2.T).TheNuclearOperationsGroupstafFisformallytrained(C.4)toreportdeficienciesinconfigurationorperformanceofSSCsviaRG&E's.correctiveactionprogram.Note:Additionalinformationregardingself-assessments,internalreviews,andthirdpartyreviewswhichsupportourconclusionsinthissectionarefoundinsection(e).(d)Processesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actiontopreventrecurrence,andreportingtoNRC:CORRECTIVEACTIONPROGRAMRG&EhasrecentlyimplementedacorrectiveactionprocessandprogramfocusedontheRG&EAbnormalConditionTrackingInitiationorNotification(ACTION)Report.Thisprocessintegratesallaspectsofproblemidentification,evaluation;andresolutioninitiationintoasingleprocessthatcanbetrackedandtrendedtoassistinassessingtheeffectivenessofvarious.programs,processes,andorganizations,andthatcanbereadilyimprovedthroughmanagementoversightandcommunicationofexpectations~1TheACTIONReportprocessiscurrentlyimplementedviaIP-CAP-1,AbnormalConditionTrackingInitiationorNotification(ACTION)Report.TheACTIONReportingprocessisasinglecorrectiveactionprogramfortheidentificationandresolutionofanyconditionevent,activity,concern,oritemthathasthepotentialforaffectingthesafeandreliableoperationoftheGinnaNuclearplant.RG&E'sACTIONReportprocessmaybeusedbyanyindividualwhoobservesorisawareofsuchacondition.Theprocessincludesrequirementsandprovisionsfor:~Identificationofproblemsandconcerns~Initialscreeningofidentifiedconditionsforimmediatesafetyand/oroperationalconcernsandprioritizationoftheconditionforresolution~Dispositionandcausedeterminationfortheconditionincludingclassificationoftheconditionfortrackingandtrending~Implementationofcorrectiveactionsasappropriatefortheconditionincluding.remediationofthecondition,andlongtermactionstopreventrecurrence~RequirementsforreportingappropriateconditionstotheNRC,e.g.,asrequiredby10CFR21.Section(D.1)ofthisreportprovidesanexplanationoftheRG&EACTIONReportingprocess.lOCFR50.54(f)Response-SumnuryRcportFinalRcportPage102/7/97

~ce1~sI TheunifiedandintegratedACTIONreporting,whichreplacedanumberofoldercorrectiveactionprocesses,haspermittedRG&Emanagementtobettermanagetheprocessandtoconsciouslydrivedowntheproblemidentificationthreshold.Thislowerthresholdisintendedtoensurethatmoreconditions,eventhosewhich,takenseparately,appeartobeoflowsignificance,arebeingreportedfortracking/trendingand,asappropriate,correctiveaction.Theprocess(D.3)forclassifyingareportedconditionasadversetoqualityornon-conforming,aswellasevaluatingthesignificanceofthecondition,ispartoftheACTIONReportprocess.SpecificguidanceisprovidedinattachmentstoIP-CAP-1.ConditionsfoundtobeSignificantConditionsAdversetoQuality(SCAQ)areevaluatedtodeterminetheeffectofcontinuingactivity.Ifcontinuedactivitywouldobscureorprecludetheidentificationofthedeficiency,increasetheextentofthedeficiencyorleadtoanunsafecondition,stopworkactionistaken.TheACTIONReportprocessdirects,whenappropriate,theuseofIP-CAP-2,RootCauseAnalysis,todeterminetheextentofproblemsaswellastheactionstopreventrecurrence,andtheuseofA.61,10CFR21Screening,Evaluating,andReportingtodeterminereportabilityunder10CFRPart21.NuclearAssessmentisresponsiblefortrendingidentifiedproblemsandcorrectiveactions(D.4)perND-CAP,CorrectiveActionProgram,basedupondatafromACTIONReports.TrendingprovidesRG&Emanagementwithameasureoftheoveralleffectivenessofthecorrectiveactionprocessandhowwellmanagementexpectationforreportinganduseofthesystemarebeingcommunicatedtocognizantpersonnel.TrendingalsocontributestoRG&E'sunderstandingofhowwellotherprocesses,includingthosefordesignandconfigurationcontrol,arefunctioningandwhereimprovementandenhancementsareprudent.OPERABILITYASSESSMENTRG&Ehasestablishedformaladministrativeprocessesfordeterminingtheoperabilityofsystemsandequipment(D.2).Theseprocessestracksafety-relatedequipmentout-of-serviceaswellascertaininoperablenon-safety-relatedequipmenttoensurethattheaggregateimpactofmultipleminordeficienciesinmorethanonesystemorsubsystemdoesnotplacetheplantoutsideitsdesignbasesandImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS).InadditiontoitsassociationwiththecorrectiveactionprocessatGinna,evaluatinganddeterminingoperabilityofsystems,structures,andcomponentswithrespecttoplantTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsanddesignbasesisanintegralpartoftheprocessesthatdirectlyaffectplantconfigurationandperformance,e.g.,workcontrol,inservicetesting,modifications.10CFR50.54(0ResPonse-SummasyReportFinalReportPagell2/787 T1IcaIll,y,,P'iplg7~gs'IIjI~

REPORTINTTHENRCRG&EmeetsapplicableNRCReportingRequirements(D.S)forbothimmediateandwrittenreports.Arev'iewofRG&E'sreportstotheNRCandNRCenforcementhistoryconfirmsthatappropriatereportshavebeenmade.Inaddition,RG&Ehassubmittedatleastelevenvoluntaryreports,whichdidnotmeetthethresholdforNRCreporting,since1988.ThereiscontinuousinteractionandcommunicationbetweenRG&EandtheNRC(D.6).Exceptforsomeperiodicreporting,normalcommunication,whichbecomespartoftheGinnadocket,istypicallybetweentheVicePresident,NuclearOperationsandtheNRC.Informalcommunicationoccursatvariouslevelsoftheorganization.ExamplesincludeNRCattendanceatPORCoratNSARBanddiscussionswiththeNRCResidentInspectors,NRCProjectManager,orothermembersoftheNRCstaffTRAININGTheNuclearOperationsGroupstaffhareceivedformaltrainingontheACTIONReportprocess(D.7).TheACTIONReportprocesstrainingencompassesconditionsadversetoqualityandnon-conformingconditions.OperationsreceivesperiodictrainingontheoperabilityprocessandonreportingtotheNRC.RootcauseanalysistrainingisconductedforselectedstaffTrainingsupportsmethodstopreventrecurrencebyre-training,asappropriate,andbytrainingonlessons-learnedfrompreviouscorrectiveactions.CONFIDENTIALEMPLOYEECONCERNSForanyemployeeorcontractorwhodesiresanonymityorwhofeelsaconcernisnotbeingaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprogramdescribedabove,RG&EhasanEmployeeConcernsProgram(D.8).RG&Econsidersthattheverysmallnumberofconcernsrequiringuseofthe"EmployeeConcernsForm"or"NRCForm3",coupledwiththelargenumbersofACTIONReportsgenerated(currentlyaveragingabout100permonth),isevidenceofoursuccessincommunicatingdirectlywithouremployeesaboutsafetyconcerns.Theattitudeofbothouremployeesandmanagementistoencouragetheidentificationofpotentialsafetyissues.Weareconstantlyimprovingourproblemidentificationprocessestoencourageself-reportingby,forexample,loweringthereportingthresholdforACTIONReportsandrewardingemployeesforidentificationofsignificantissues.r10CFRSO.S4(t)Response-SummuyRcportFinalRcportPage122/7/97 "Q4W<",o0~f (e)Theoveralleffectivenessofourcurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthattheconfigurationofourplantisconsistentwiththedesignbases:RG&EhasreasonableassurancethattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantisfullycapableoffulfillingitssafetyfunctions,i.e.,thatitisoperatingsafelyandcancontinuetooperatesafely,andthatitsconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbases.-Thethreeprimaryreasonsforreachingthisconclusionare:1.Ourprogramsareintentionallydevelopedtomeetapplicableregulations,aretheproductofcontinuousimprovement,andhavebeenstrengthenedbytheincorporationofthirdpartybestpractices.Consider,forexample,oneofthemostfundamentalprocessesthatcanimpacttheconfigurationoftheplantwithrespecttothedesignbases,theplantchange(modification)process:~Ourdesigncontrolprocessisintendedtoensurethattheaffecteddesignbasesrequirementsareresearchedandunderstoodbeforetheplantismodified.~Ourdesignverificationprocess(E.l.A)providesanin-linereviewtoensurethatthedesigncontrolprocesswasperformedcorrectly.~PORC(E.l.B)approvalof10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationsformodificationsandrelatedoperationalissuesisintendedtoensurethattheplantconfigurationiskeptconsistentwiththedesignbases.~NSARBoversightofstationoperationandPORCactivitiesgivesfurtherassurancethatapropersafetyfocusismaintainedthroughouttheprocess.Ourprogramshavewithstoodthetestofinternalandexternalassessment.BothRGBQA(E.2.D)andtheNRChaveidentifiednumerousprocessstrengths.Specifically,areviewofNRCInspectionReports(E.3.A)revealsthefollowingrecurringthemes:~areferencetostrongmodificationcontrolandcorrectiveactionprocesses,and~goodsupportandreviewbybothEngineeringandthePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC).Wheretherehavebeenweaknesses,deficiencies(E.2.C),orNoticesofViolation(E.3.B),ourcorrectiveactionprogramhasbeeneffectiveinrestoringcomplianceandpreventingrecurrenceoftheproblems.2.Asignificantsamplingofsystemshasbeendoneinthepast("verticalslice"designbasisaudits).Despitesomediscrepancies,thedetailedinspectionresultsconsistentlyshowthatplantsystemsareoperableandconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbases.RGB'nitiateditsfirstSafetySystemFunctionalInspections(SSFIs)withtheAuxiliaryFeedwatersystemin1988.ThiswasfollowedbyanAuxiliarySystemFunctionalInspectionoftheInstrumentAirsysteminresponsetoNRCGenericLetter88-14.TheNRCconductedSSFIsoftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)systemin1989andtheElectricalDistributionsystem(EDSFI)andServiceWatersystem(SWSOPI)in199110CFR50.54(f)Response-Sun@naryReportFinalReportPage132/7/97

'CIl'"icIr,y1'I (E.3.C).Althoughweaknesseswerenoted,theteamsdidnotidentifyanysituationswherethecitedweaknesseshadadverselyaffectedthecapabilityofthesystemstofunction..tIn1989,RG&EperformedacomprehensiveassessmentoftheRHRSSFIfindingswhichledtoenhancementsinRG&E'sdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessestobroadlyaddresstheweaknessescitedintheSSFIs.Specificimprovementswere:~animprovedPlantChangeProcesswasimplemented~'DesignBasisDocumentRetrievalprojectwasinitiated~asearchablemasterlistofDesignAnalyseswascreatedaspartoftheConfigurationManagementInformationSystem(CMIS)~commonprocedureswerecreatedforengineering/plantinterfacingactivities~DesignEngineerswereassignedsystems(preparationforbecomingSystemEngineers)~ahydraulicmodelfortheServiceWatersystemwasdeveloped/validated~atestprogramformoldedcasecircuitbreakerswasdeveloped~anelectricalloadgrowthcontrolprogramwasdeveloped.3.RG&Ehasundertakenlargescaleeffortsindesignbasisreconstitutionandhasfurthereffortsunderway.Examplesinclude:~acomprehensiveevaluationandextensivereanalysisofGinna'sUFSARChapter15accidentsinordertosupportareductioninT,andan18monthfuelcycleaftersteamgeneratorreplacement,~analysiscompilationfortheBasesandprocedurevalidationassociatedwithconversiontotheImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,~upgradesviatheSystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP),includingamajorseismicupgrade,~acomprehensivereviewoftestingofthereactorprotectionsystem(RPS)andengineeredsafeguardsfeatureactuationsystem(ESFAS)intendedtoensurethatcircuitsaretestedend-to-end(responsetoGenericLetter96-01),~majorPipingandInstrumentationDrawing(P&ID)andElectricalControlledConfigurationDrawing(ECCD)upgrades,~asafetyinstrumentationsetpointreanalysis,~acomprehensiveDCfusecoordinationstudy,and~arigoroussafetyclassificationprocess,whichcharacterizedthesafetyfunctionsofplantequipment.RG&Ehasexpendedconsiderableeffortthroughoutthelifeoftheplanttokeepdesigninformationcurrent.Ourprogramsaretheproductofcontinuousimprovement,andtheywillcontinuetoimproveinthefuture.Asproblemsarise,wearecommittedtousinggoodengineeringjudgmenttoboundandsolvethem,expandingthesolutionintoaprogrammaticlook,asnecessary.WevaluecontinuedinputfromboththeNRCandtheindustrytomaintainsafeandreliableplantoperation.10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-SummaryRcportFinalRcportPage142/7/97 N~~.~1e)~v.

("P')TheNRCrequestalsocontainedarequesttoindicatewhetherwehaveundertakenanydesignrevieworreconstitutionprogramsorarationalefornotimplementingsuchprogram(s):RG&EisconfidentintheabilityofGinnaStationtoperformitsintendedsafetyfunctionsandprotectthehealthandsafetyofthepublicintheeventofanaccident.Nevertheless,inrespondingtoNEIinitiative96-05,wenotedthatdescriptiveinformationintheUFSARhasnotalwaysbeenrigorouslymodifiedinaccordancewithplantorprocedurechanges.RG&E,therefore,intendstoundertakeavoluntaryinitiativetoperformathoroughUFSARreviewduringtheNRCs2-yearEnforcementDiscretionperiodforself-identificationofdiscrepancies(expectedcompletiondateofOctober18,1998).RG&EwillimplementamethodofUFSARreviewwhichwillmeetorexceedtheguidanceofNEI96-05,GuidelinesforAssessingProgramsforMaintainingtheLicensingBasis,buttheapplicationwillbeextendedtotheentireUFSAR.BasedonourexperiencewithverticalslicedesignbasisauditsandwithperformanceofthepilotNEI96-05initiativeatGinna,aminimumimpactonsafetyfunctionscanbeexpectedfromourUFSARsearch.RG&E'sdesignbasisretrievaleffortstodatehavebeenfocusedprimarilyontopicalareasinsteadofonsystemDesignBasisDocuments(DBDs)[seesection(c)];however,RG&EhasdevelopedpilotDBDsforthefollowingsystemsandtopicsinanefforttofindtheprocessandformatthatwouldaddthemostvalue:~ReactorCoolantSystem~SafetyInjectionSystem~ChemicalVolumeandControlSystem~ReactorProtectionSystem~AuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem~InstrumentAirSystem~AppendixR/FireProtection.Baseduponexperiencewiththeaboveefforts,RG&EconcludedthatthesourcedocumentsneededforDBDdevelopmentwerenotreadilyavailabletoRG&E.Asaresult,RG&EinitiatedanefforttoretrievetheoriginalsourcedocumentationfortheplantdesignbasesfromtheNSSSvendorandthestationArchitect/Engineer.Thisinformationisalsobeing.supplementedwithrecordsofplantmodificationsandchanges,aswellaswithformalcorrespondencebetweenRG&EandtheNRC.RG&Ealsoconcludedthatcompilingdesignbasisinformationinseparate,hardcopyreportswasnotthemosteffectivemeansformaintainingordistributingdesignbasisinformationtoourNuclearOperationsGrouptechnicalstaffAsaresult,theaboveDBDswerenotacceptedasControlledConfigurationDocuments(CCDs)forGinna.Rather,RG&Eispursuingthefollowingcourseofaction:IOCFRSO.S4(f)Rcsponsc-SummaryRcportFinalReportPagelS217i97 "PlI11eIII9Il',x~tI~w MakedesinbasisinformationavailableelectronicalltoGinnatechnicalstaff'pecifically,RG&Ehasrecentlycompletedretrievingandconvertingtoelectronicimagestheoriginaldesignbasissourcedocumentsandcalculationsformerlyheldby'Westinghouse(ourNSSSsupplier)andGilbert/CommonwealthAssociates,Inc.(ourArchitect/Engineer).RG&Ehasretrievedabout8,500and7,800designbasissourcedocumentsfromWestinghouseandGilbert/CommonwealthAssociates,Inc.,respectively.Weexpectthesedocumentstobeinasearchable/retrievableelectronicformatbythethirdquarterof1997.ItisRG&E'sintenttousethisinformationinelectronicformtoincreasethedesignandlicensingbasisknowledgelevelofNuclearOperationsGrouppersonnelandtoprovidethetoolsandtrainingtofacilitateself-identificationandresolutionofpotentialNUREG-1600"OldDesignIssues."ThiswillbeaccomplishedbyprovidingelectronicaccessforNuclearSafety&Licensingpersonneltoourlicensingcorrespondence,aswellas,inthenearfuture,byprovidingelectronicaccesstovalidatedoriginalNSSSandA/EdocumentationforNOGpersonnel.CollateandvalidateselectedinformationforsecificsstemsandtoicsandlinkthiselectrnicallwiththeSARRG&Eintendstoexaminethesedesignbasessourcedocumentstoverifydesignbasesinformationforhigh-andmedium-risksignificantsystemsbaseduponourplantProbabilisticSafetyAssessment(14systemstotal)aswellasselectedsafety-relatedtopics.Thefocusofthiseffortwillbedesignbasesasdefinedin10CFR50.2consistentwiththeSECY-91-364emphasisthat"Designbases...includeonlythedesignconstraintsthatformthebasesforthestafFssafetyjudgments."Plantmodificationsandourlicensingdatabasewillalsobeexamined.Theorderforreviewisintendedtobethesameasthatusedfortheoriginaldesignoftheplant,namelystartingwiththeReactorCoolantSystem(whichsetsdesignparametersforothersystems)andworkingoutwardfromthere(withtheexceptionofeffortsinsupportofthetwointernalSSFIsin1997whicharediscussedbelow).Anydiscrepancieswillbedocumented,evaluated,reported,anddispositionedinaccordancewithourcurrentcorrectiveactionprocedures.ThisverifiedinformationwillthenbemadeavailableviaelectroniclinkstoappropriatesectionsoftheUFSAR.RG&E'sscheduleforcompletionoftheaboveexaminationandverificationofsystemandtopicaldesignbasesinformationhasnotbeenestablishedyet.RG&Eintendstodevelopafirmscheduleinthethirdquarterof1997basedonexperiencegainedintheinterimfromconductoftheUFSARreview,theSSFIsscheduled,andourcontinuingeffortatdesignbasissourcedocumentreviewandwillprovidethescheduletotheNRCatthattime.Severalprocessweaknesseswerealsohighlightedbythis10CFR50.54(f)revieweffort.Accordingly,RG&Ewilldevelopprocessimprovementsinthefollowingareas:~Developameansoftrackingcommitmentsinprocedurestoensurethatlicensingcommitmentsarecontrolled~Enhancecurrentprocesses,whichcanpotentiallyaffectinformationintheUFSAR,torequiretimelygenerationofUFSARChangeNotices10CFRSO.S4(0Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPagei62/7/97 WP)Ih~~a'MaL"E'00~1J,*=bSDl~$~

~AddUFSARaccuracyrequirementstoself-assessmentsandQAaudits/surveillances.TheseprocessimprovementswillbedevelopedandimplementedconcurrentwithRGBsreviewoftheUFSAR,i.e.,tobecompletebyOctober18,1998.RGB'asscheduled,andincorporatedintoourbusinessplanfor1997,theperformanceoftwointernalSSFIs.SystemsselectedfortheseSSFIsaretheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SystemandtheServiceWater(SW)System.TheseSSFIswillprovideanadditionalmeasureoftheeFectivenessofourcurrentprocessesandprograms,manyofwhichhavebeenimplementedand/orenhancedsinceourlastseriesofSSFIs.RG&Ewillidentifyandresolveanydeficienciesorweaknessesusingournormalcorrectiveactionprocess.BasedontheresultsoftheseSSFIs,wewillalsoassesstheneedtoconductadditionalSSFIsinconjunctionwiththeotherdesignbaseseffortsdescribedabove.Ourtrainingprogramswillsupportimplementationoftheprocessimprovementslistedabove.WealsowilluseourtrainingprogramstoinformappropriateNuclearOperationsGroupp'ersonnelregardingnewandenhancedunderstandingsofsystemsdesignbasesastheyareidentifiedbyourSSFIinvestigationsanddesignbasessourcedocumentreviews.10CFR50.54(t)Response-SummaryReportFinalReportPage172/7/97 1P4ill<'1~IIl%*

10CFR50.54(f)RESPONSEATTACHMENTA(a)Descriptionofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendix8to10CFRPart50.NOTE:THISATTACHMENTISSUPPORTINGDOCUMENTATIONTHATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTIONWITHITSCORRESPONDINGSECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISN~TASTAND-ALONEDOCUMENT.ThisAttachmentisorganizedasfollows:A.1.PROCESSESTOCONTROLLICENSEREUIREMENTSA.l.A.LicenseAmendments(10CFR50.90)A;1.B.ImprovedTechnicalSpecificationBasesControlProgram/ControlofCOLR,PTLR,andTRMA.l.C.SafetyReviewsandSafetyEvaluations(10CFR50.59)A.l.D.UFSARUpdates(10CFR50.71(e))A.l.E.ChangestoQualityAssurance(10CFR50.54(a))A.l.F.ChangestotheSecurityPlan(10CFR50.54(p))A.1.G.ChangestotheEmergencyPlan(10CFR50.54(q))A.l.H.ASMECodeReliefRequests(10CFR50.55a)A.l.I.RegulatoryCommitmentChangesA.1.J.Tracking/IncorporationofGenericRegulatoryandIndustryConcernsA.2.PRESSESFRENINEERINDESINANDNFIGATINONTROLA.2.A.PlantChangeProcesses(10CFR50,AppendixB)A.2.B.TemporaryModificationsA.2.C.AdministrativeControlofProceduresA.2.D.MaintenanceWorkControlSystemA.2.E.OperatorWork-Arounds/ChallengesA.2.F.DrawingChangeControlProcess(DCRs)A.2.GProcurementEngineeringProcessA.3.TRAININGIOCFR50.54(0Response-AttachmentAFinalRcportPage182/7/97 A.1.PROCESSESTOCONTROLLICENSEREUIREMENTSA.1.A.LicenseAmendments(10CFR50.90)Alicenseamendmentrequest(LAR)isconcernedwithchangestotheGinnaStationFacilityOperatingLicenseandAttachmentAtothatlicense.(AttachmentAisreferredtoastheImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS),adocumentrepresentingalargeportionoftheGinnalicensingbasis,sinceitrequiresequipmenttobeoperableasassumedintheUFSARChapter15accidentanalysis.)WithrespecttotheITS,aLARisrequiredfor1)anyITSchangethatisnotabasisstatementand2)thosebaseschangeswhichinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.[Notethatallbaseschangesrequireatleasta10CFR50.59SafetyReview.]PerRG&E'sadministrativerequirementsforLARs(ND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl,EP-2-S-700,LicenseAmendmentRequests,andA-601.7,Preparation,Approval,andImplementationofAmendmentstoTechnicalSpecifications),LARsarereviewedandrecommendedforapprovalbyPORC,reviewedbytheNSARB;andarethensubmittedtotheNRCbytheVicePresident,NuclearOperations,oranotherofficeofthecorporation,underoathoraffirmation.A.I.B.ImprovedTechnicalSpecificationBasesControlProgramIControlofCOLR,PTLR,TRMDesignbasesassociatedwiththeGinnaImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsaredocumentedintheITSBasesportionoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Also,inaccordancewith10CFR50.36aspartofGinnaITSimplementation,designbasessubjecttoperiodicchange,e.g.,duetocorefuelreloadandthoserelatedtonon-designbasisaccidentanalysis,havebeenremovedfromtheITSandarenowcontainedinaseriesofassociateddocuments.RG&Ehasimplementedaprocesstocontrolandevaluateproposedchangestothesedesignbasesdocuments.UnliketheGinnaoriginalTechnicalSpecifications,theITSBasesareunderRG&EcontrolsuchthatITSBaseschanges,e.g.,resultingfromnecessaryclarificationsandinterpretations,canbeimplementedbyRG&EwithoutpriorNRCapproval.TheITSBasescanbechangedviatheTechnicalSpecificationBasesControlProgramperIP-LPC-2,UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportandAssociatedDocumentsControl.Underthisprogram,RG&EevaluatesproposedBaseschangespriortoimplementationtoensuretheydonotchangeaLimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)orinvolvea10CFR50.59unreviewedsafetyquestion(USQ).IfeitherachangetoanLCO,oraUSQisidentified,theproposedchangewouldrequireaLicenseAmendmentasdescribedin(A.l.A)above,approvedbytheNRC,priortoimplementation.InadditiontotheITSBases,threeotherdocuments,directlyrelatedtotheITS,arealsocontrolledbyRG&EundertheITSBasesControlProgram.Theseare:10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttaclnncntAFinalRcportPage192/787

~4~+0I'a'aItr4il1'll1

~Core0eratinLimitsReortCOLR:Thisdocumentcontainscycle-specificparameterlimitsrequiredbytheITSthatmaychangeasaresultofarefuelingoutage.ThevaluesmaybechangedbyRG&EprovidedthevaluesaredeterminedinaccordancewithNRC-approvedmethodologyspecifiedwithintheadministrativecontrolsoftheITS.InadditiontoITSrequirements,theCOLRcurrentlycontainsatablelistingmajorparametersusedbytheaccidentanalysis.~PressureandTemeralureLimitsReortTLR:ThisdocumentcontainsspecificvaluesrequiredbytheITSthatarerelatedtoreactorpressurevesselpressureandtemperaturelimits,includingRCSheatup/cooldowncurves,andthelowtemperatureoverpressure'rotection(LTOP)systemforthecurrentfluenceperiod.ThevaluescannotbechangedwithoutNRCapproval;however,anLicenseAmendmentRequesthasbeensubmittedtoplacethisdocumentunderRG&EcontrolsimilartotheCOLR.~TechnicalReNirementsMammal:ThisdocumentcontainspreviousrequirementsthathavesincebeenremovedfromTechnicalSpecificationsandplacedunderRG&Econtrol.Typically,theseitemsrelatetonon-designbasisaccidentanalysisassumptionswhicharerequiredbyaNRCregulationandthatrelatetotheplantOperationsstaffe.g.,fireprotectionmeasuresrequiredby10CFR50,AppendixR.A.1.C.ISafetyReviewsandSafetyEvaluations(10CFR50.59)The10CFR50.59processissub-dividedintotheSafetyReviewandtheSafetyEvaluation,implementedbyIP-SEV-1,Preparation,Review,andApprovalofSafetyReviews,andbyIP-SEV-2,Preparation,Review,andApprovaloflOCFR50.59SafetyI"valuations,respectively.Thevariousprocesseswhichcontrolplantactivities(suchasthePlantChangeProcess,procedurepreparation/revision,andACTIONReports)includerequirementstoconsidertheirimpactonnuclearsafetyinaccordancewiththeSafetyReview/SafetyEvaluationprocess.ITheSafetyReviewincludesanestablishedsetofscreeningquestionswhichareusedtodetermineifaSafetyReviewissufficienandthatasubsequent10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationisnotrequired.Thesescreeningquestionsareintendedtoensurethatproposedchangesdonotaffectnuclearsafety,donotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion,anddonotinvolveachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.ExamplesinwhichaSafetyReviewsufficesincludecaseswhereanotherexistingSafetyEvaluationaddressesthechangeandcaseswherethechangeisinconsequential,e.g.,spelling,grammar,oralistofpersonnelnames.The10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationisa.formal,written,technicalevaluationperformedwhenaproposedactivitydoesnotmeetthescreeningcriteriaoftheSafetyReviewsothatrelevantchangestoproceduresortosystems,structures,andcomponentsdescribedintheUFSARmaybe"specificallydefinedandevaluated.Theevaluationusesaprescribedformatintendedtoensureproposedplantchangesareevaluatedwithrespecttosafetyconsiderationsofthecurrentplantdesignbasis,preservetheUFSAR,andconformtoTechnicalSpecifications.10CFR50.54(0Response-AttachmentAFinalReportPage202/7/97 0,I':F4a,~'g'y~g~,~

AqualifiedindividualindependentlyreviewstheadequacyoftheSafetyEvaluationagainstthelicensingbasisandtheUFSAR.TheManager,NuclearSafety&Licensing,reviewsandapprovestheSafetyEvaluation.SafetyEvaluationsarethenpresentedtotheon-sitereviewfunction(PORC)fortheirreviewandrecommendationofPlantManagerapproval.AsummaryofapprovedSafetyEvaluationsisprovidedtotheNRCinaccordancewith10CFR50.59(b)(2).A.1.D.UFSARUpdates(10CFR50.71(e))HistooftheGinnaUFSARGinnaStationreceiveditsoriginalProvisionalOperatingLicensebasedontheinformationprovidedtotheAECinthePreliminaryFacilityDescriptionandSafetyAnalysisReportin1966,aswellastheanswersprovidedinresponseto'.AECandACRSquestions.ThiscompilationofinformationwasconsolidatedintotheFinalFacilityDescriptionandSafetyAnalysisReport("FSAR")in1969.TheProvisionalOperatingLicensewasissuedonSeptember19,1969.TwosupplementstotheFSARwereissuedin1971and1973;otherwise,therewasnochangetotheFSARuntilafterthepublication/implementationof10CFR50.71(e).Atthattime,RG&EcompileddocketedcorrespondenceregardingGinnaStationanddescriptionsofmodificationsperformedsinceplantstartuptoevaluatewhatinformationtoaddtotheFSARtobringitinlinewith10CFR50.71.Aspartofamajorupdatein1984,RG&EalsoenhancedthedescriptiveinformationintheFSAR.Thisresultedintheoriginal3volumeFSARexpandingintoan8volumeUpdatedFSAR(UFSAR).PeriodicupdatesoftheUFSARhavebeensubmittedtotheNRCsincethattimewiththelatest,Revision13,havingbeensubmittedinDecember,1996.ChanestotheUFSARChangestotheUFSARarecontrolledbyND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl.Thisdocumentdescribestherequirementsof10CFR50.71(e)andtaskstheNuclearSafety&Licensing(NS&L)groupwithoverseeingtheprogram.IP-LPC-2,UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportandAssociatedDocumentsControl,establishestheinstructionsforsubmitting,reviewing,andprocessingchangesandrevisionstotheUFSAR.IP-LPC-2providesdirectiononwhentoprepareachangetotheUFSARandliststhetypesofinformationtobereviewedforinclusionintheUFSAR.Eachrequestforachangeissupportedbyachangepackageofsupportingdocumentation.Changepackagesarereviewedbycognizantpersonnel,includingNuclearSafety&Licensing,SystemsEngineering,andOperations.ApprovedchangepackagesarethenincorporatedintothenextUFSARrevisionper10CFR50.71(e).A.1.E.ChangestoQualityAssurance(10CFR50.54(a))ChangestoNuclearDirectives(NDs)whichmayafFectcommitmentsmadetotheNRCinthe.QAProgramforStationOperations(QAPSO)areev'aluatedinaccordancewithND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl,byQAandNuclearSafety&Licensingper10CFR50.54(a)prior10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentAFinalReportPage212/7/97

'C~1'>4hkk>>'<k'"4~~~'ww toimplementationofthechange.Changeswhich,throughevaluation,cannotsubstantiatenNoimpact"oncommitmentsareconsideredtobereducti'onsincommitment.ChangesevaluatedtobecommitmentreductionsneedreviewandconcurrencebytheNRCpriortoimplementation.Annually,QApreparesaQAPSOtransmittalwhichidentifiesthefollowing:~Thechangesandreasonstheyweremade.~Thebasisforconcludingthattherevisedprogramcontinuestosatisfythe10CFR50AppendixBcriteriaandtheexistingNRC-endorsedprogramdescriptioncommitmentsPerQA-LPC-1,RevisionandControloftheQAProgramforStationOperations,acopyofthetransmittalisforwardedtotheNSARB,thePORC,NS&L,theVicePresident,NuclearOperations,andtheSeniorVicePresident,Energy.Operationsforreview.'henallcommentshavebeenresolved,theoriginalofthesubmittalissignedbytheVicePresident,NuclearOperations,oranotherofficerofthecorporation,andtransmittedtotheNRC.A.1.F.ChangestotheSecurityPlan(10CFR50.54(p))ChangestotheSecurityPlanarecontrolledbyND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl.AnychangestotheGinnaStationPhysicalSecurityPlanwhichdonotresultinareductionofphysicalsecurityeffectivenessaremade'inaccordancewith10CFR50.54(p).ThesechangesarereviewedandapprovedbytheSupervisor,NuclearSecurityandthenbythePORCpriortobeingsubmittedtotheNRC,asrequiredbyND-LPC.ChangestotheSecurityPlanwhichwouldresultinareductionofphysicalsecurityeffectivenessmustbemadeundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.90.ThesechangesarereviewedbytheSupervisor,NuclearSecurity,PORC,andtheNSARB.ThechangesmustthenbeapprovedbytheNRCpriortoimplementation.Inadditiontotheappropriatereviewofchanges,twoother-annualreviewsareconducted:~QA-"ApplicabilityandAdequacyoftheSecurityPlanandAssociatedSecurityActivities"(Requiredby10CFR73.55(g)(4))~Operations/Security-the'SecurityPlanandContingencyPlan(toevaluatetheirpotentialimpactonplantandpersonnelsafety).10CFRSO.S4(0Rcsponsc-AttachmentAFinalRcFcttPage222/7/97 tktl A.1.G.ChangestotheEmergencyPlan(10CFR50.54(q))ND-LPC,LicenseProgramControl,andA-205.2,EmergencyPlanImplementingProceduresCommittee,governchangestotheNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(NERP)andtotheEmergencyPlanImplementingProcedures(EPIPs).NERPorEPIPchangesarereviewedbytheEPIPcommittee,asasubcommitteetoPORC.ThiscommitteecurrentlyhasrepresentativesfromEmergencyPlanning,Operations,Engineering,RadiationProtectionandChemistry,Maintenance,Training,andPublicRelations.ThecommitteeisintendedensurethatNERPandEPIPprocedurechangesdonotdecreasetheeffectivenessoftheplanandthatthechangesmeetthestandardsof10CFR50.54(q).ChangesarereviewedbytheCorporateNuclearEmergencyPlannerandareapprovedbyPORC.AppendixHoftheNERPcontainsacross-referenceoftheemergencyplanningrequirements(foundinNUREG-0654)tothesectionoftheNERPthatmeetstherequirement.ThisisintendedtoensurethatchangestotheNERPandEPIPsarereviewedagainsttheplanrequirementandthattheplanrequirementsreflecttheemergencyplanningbasesprescribedbytheNRCinNUREG-0654.A.1.H.ASMECodeReliefRequests(10CFR50.55a)InserviceInspectionandInserviceTestingprogramsareimplementedbyND-IIT,InserviceInspectionandTesting.ND-IITappliestotheexamination,repair,replacement,modification,andtestingofClass1,2,and3systemsandcomponentsinaccordancewiththeAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,1986Edition(theCode).ASMECodereliefrequestsareusedtoobtainNRCapprovalofapositiondifferent'thanthatdescribedbytheapplicableCode(primarilywithrespecttotheISI/ISTprogram).Reliefrequestsusuallyinvolvetestingandacceptancecriteria,buttheycanalsobeusedtoresolveorchangedesignorconstructionrequirements.RequestsaredevelopedbythecognizantISI/ISTEngineerandLaboratoryInspectionServicespersonnel.NuclearSafetyA,Licensingreviewstherequest.TherequestisthensenttoNRCforreviewandapprovalwithacopytotheGinnaSeniorResidentInspector.Approvedreliefrequestseffectivelyprovidealternatemethodsofmeetingdesignbasisrequirements.A.1.I.RegulatoryCommitmentChangesTheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocess(involvinggeneratingnewcommitmentsanddeletingormodifyingexistingcommitments)isdetailedinseveralNuclearDirectives,InterfaceProcedures,andengineeringdepartmentprocedures.Thisprocessisintendedto1)controlamendmentstotheFacilityOperatingLicenseandchangestoprogramsthatimplementlicenseconditions,commitments,orregulations,and2)assignresponsibilityforimplementingtheserequirements.t10CFR50.54(QRcsponsc-AttachmentAFinalRcportPage232/7/97 II~t+ge1w~'>\re>la~~~bLNa><<'igI4' ACommitmentandActionTrackingSystem(CATS)wasimplementedin1989asanaidtoensurethatregulatorycommitmentsandactionitemsaretracked'tocompletion,areadequatelydocumented,andaresearchable.GuidelinesforprocessingdocumentsthroughCATSareprovidedinEP-3-S-701,CATSDocumentProcessing.CATScontainsopenactivecommitments,aswellasone-time,completedcommitmentsmadesince1989.Additionally,aspartofourdesignbasisdocumentationprogram,docketedcorrespondencefrominitialplantlicensingthrough1994hasbeencataloguedandiscontainedwithinanothersearchabledatabasewhichenablestheusertoelectronicallysearchforadesiredtopicandthenviewtheimageoftherelateddocument.Correspondencesince1994isbeingadded.TherequirementtoevaluateeffectsonregulatorycommitmentshasbeenincorporatedintochangeprocessesatGinnasuchasthe10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationprocessandthechangeimpactevaluationportionofthePlantChangeRequest(PCR)process.A.1.J.Tracking/IncorporationofGenericRegulatoryandIndustryConcernsThegenericregulatoryprocessenhances/updatesthedesignbasesinthatRG&EreviewsandaddressesNRCgenericcommunicationsandincorporatesanyresultingRG&Ecommitmentsintoplantproceduresandprograms.TheseinitiativesaretransmittedbyNRC,e.g.,viaInformationNotices(INs),Bulletins,andGenericLetters(GLs).TheitemsaretrackedwithinRG&EusingtheCommitmentandActionTrackingSystem(CATS).TheadministrativeproceduresgoverningimplementationoftheCATSareintendedtoensurethatsuchgenericregulatorydocumentsareappropriatelyreviewedfortheirspecificapplicabilitytoGinna,includinganyefFectonplantoperations,procedures,andconfiguration.RG&Ereviewofsuchgenericregulatorycorrespondencehasresultedindesignbasisplantenhancementssuch~Enhancedinstrumentationhardwareandoperatingprocedurestominimizethepotentialforlossofdecayheatremovalcoolingduringrefuelingandespeciallyduringreducedinventoryoperations(GL88-017)~Enhancedpumprecirculationpipingandtestprocedurestominimizelongterm~degradationoftheRHRpumpsduetoperiodictestingatverylowflow(Bulletin88-004)~Revisedmaintenanceproceduresandguidelinesintendedtoensureanddocumentthatvaporbarriersandsealsarereinstalledforelectricalequipmentaftermaintenancetominimizethepotentialforwaterintrusionintoelectricalenclosures(IN89-063).RG&Ehasalsoestablishedanadministrativeprocess(A-1404,OperatingExperienceProgram,ascontrolledbyIP-LPC-1,CommitmentandActionTracking)forscreeningandevaluatingOperatingExperience(OE)(consistingofindustryeventsandvendornotices)forapplicabilitytoGinna.Theprocessisintendedtoensurethatthesenoticesarereviewedforimpactonoperability,possibleunreviewedsafetyquestions,potentialdegradationof,or10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponao-AttachmentAFinalRcportPage242/7/97

=I"g'IIIII'Iie~I challengesto,safetysystems/equipment,andpossibleeffectsonimplementationofEmergencyOperatingProcedures.Forvendornotifications,theprocessalsodetermineswhether10CFR21reportabilityisrequired.ITheon-goingOEreviewprocessassistsintheevaluationoftheneedtoupgradetheplantdesignbases.Abriefreviewofpast(since1990)OEitemsfoundapplicabletoGinnaandinvolvingconfigurationcontrolordesignbasisissuesidentifiedapproximately30itemsofsignificancetoGinna.TheOEreviewprocessdeterminedwhethertheitemwasalreadyunderevaluationandbeingresolvedbyRG&E.Ifnot,theitemswererecommendedforfurtheractionandtrackedundertheCommitmentandActionTrackingSystem.ExamplesofindustryeventsscreenedasapplicabletoGinnawhichinvolveconfigurationcontroltopicsinclude:~SER91-007,FailuretoControlValveLineupStatusResultinginaReactorCoolantDrainDote~SER91-021,PlantTransientsCausedbyIn-HouseDistributionTransformerFailures~SER95-008,Service8'aterSpillinSwitchgearArea/LossofPhysicalSeparationBettveenSafety-RelatedElectricalFacilities.A.2.PROCESSESFORENGINEERINGDESIGNANDCONFIGURATIONCONTROLA.2.A.PlantChangeProcesses(10CFR50,AppendixB)BACKGROUNDTheprimaryprocessforensuringconsistencybetweenplantdesignbases,plantconfiguration,andconductofoperationhasbeentheRG&Edesigncontrolprocess.Overthelifeoftheplant,thedesigncontrolprocesshasundergoneseveralevolutionarychangesintendedtoimprovethequalityofdesigncontrolandtoensurethatappropriateaspectsoftheprocesswereappliedtochanges,includingthoseoflesserscope.Duringthelaterstagesofplantconstructionandthefirstfewyearsofplantoperation,changestotheplantweremadebytheNSSSsupplier,theA/E,andbyRG&E.Theseearlychangesmadepriortoadoptionof10CFR50,AppendixB,werenotalwayscapturedindetail,becausetheconfigurationdocumentationrequiredatthetimewasfarlessthancurrentlyisexpected.ManyoftheconfigurationmanagementeffortsdiscussedinAttachmentCaidedinproperlydocumentingtheseearlierchanges.Also,severallargedesignprojectswereperformedbytheA/Eintheearly1970susingtheGinnaStationModification(GSM)package.Inthe1970s,theEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)becamethemajorprocessforplantmodifications.TheEWRwaslatersupplementedbyplantprocessesforTechnicalStaffRequests,TechnicalEvaluations,andTemporaryModifications.In1994,theEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)modificationprocesswasreplacedbythePlantChangeRequest/Record(PCR)process.Theunderlyingrequirementsfortheseprocesseshavebeenapplicableportionsof10CFR50AppendixB,theRG&EQAprogram,andANSI45.2.11requirements.Thebasicstepsinthedesigncontrolprocessareasfollows:10CFR50.54(0Rcsponsc-AttachmentAFinalReportPage252/7/97 Igi't~Mil~l+a~)qIC,gVygaewe~1a P~ldfiii-fiiiififiifiifiIiifififitdeficiencyortoimproveuponanexistingcondition.~DesinInutDeveloment-Thefunctionalanddesignbasisrequirementsfortheaffectedsystems,structures,andcomponentsar'edevelopedtotheextentrequiredtoperformthedesignchangeandassurethatoverallplantdesignbasesandfunctionshavenotbeenadverselyaffected.Forlesser,self-containedmodifications(componentparts.equivalency),thismaybequitelimited;however,forcomplexchanges,designinputdevelopmentcanrepresentamajordesignbasisreconstitutionefforttodetermineeffectsonsystemperformance,interactionbetweensystems,andphysicalproximityconcernsforotherwiseunrelatedcomponentsandsystems.ForGinnamodifications,acontrolledDesignCriteriadocumentisrequiredwhichdocumentstheresultsoftheseefforts.~10CFR50.59SafetEvaluation(describedelsewhereinthisdocument)-BasedupontheDesignCriteriaforthemodification,thesafetyscreening/evaluationisintendedtoensurethatthechangeisnota10CFR50.59UnreviewedSafetyQuestion,thatnoTechnicalSpecificationchangesarerequired,andthatitiswithinthecurrentlicensingbasisforGinna.Ifnot,aLicensingAmendmentRequestmustbesubmittedto,andapprovedby,NRCpriortoimplementationofthechange.~EnineerinDesinOututs-BasedupontheDesignCriteriaandSafetyEvaluationforthechange,engineeringdesignoutputsaredeveloped.Someoutputsaretodemonstratethatthedesignisconsistentwiththedesignbases.Thesearetypicallydesignanalyses,calculations,andtechnicalreports.Otherdesignoutputscommunicatehowthedesignchangeistobeimplementedsothattheresultingconfigurationwillreflectdesignbases.Thesetypicallyincludedrawings,sketches,andspecificationsincludingacceptancecriteria.~IndeendentDesinVerification-Areviewofthedevelopmentandresultsofthedesignchangetoconclude,independentofthecognizantdesignpersonnel,thatthevariousoutputsofthedesigncontrolprocesshaveindeedmettherequirementsofthedesigninputs,specificallytheDesignCriteriaandSafetyEvaluation.Verificationmayincludemultiplereviewersforcomplex,interdisciplinarychangesandissometimescomplementedbyOperationsandMaintenanceimpactreviews.~ConstructionandFabricationOututs-Thesearedetailedoutputs,basedupontheEngineeringOutputs,usedtocommunicatetothefabricatorandinstallerhowthechangeshouldbeimplementedandintendedtoensurethattheresultingconfigurationwillreflectthedesignbases.Thesemayincludefabricationandinstallationdrawings,procedures,workorders,vendordocuments,billsofmaterial,andqualityassuranceinspectionandtestplans.~ConfirationChanes-Thesearechangenoticesissuedtoensureconsistentconfigurationcontrolofdocumentsandprocessesaffectedbythedesignchangetheymayinclude,butarenotlimitedto,changestooperating,maintenance,andperiodictest10CFR50.54(t)Response-AttachmentAFinalReportPage262/7/97 (glC~A4I procedures,trainingmodules,drawingsandspecifications,safetyclassificationlists,applicablevendordocumentfiles,andUFSARdescriptions.Proceduralguidanceisprovidedforthepriorityandtimingofsuchchangesrelativetotheimplementationofthedesignchange.~ImlementatinofModification-Theconstructionandfabricationoutputsareusedtobuildandinstallthechange.InstallationactivitiesaregovernedbytheplantworkcontrolprocessesandincludeprovisionsforestablishingequipmentholdsandtaggingwithconsiderationforcomplyingwithImprovedTechnicalSpecificationandequipmentoperabilityconcerns,processesforconsiderationoffieldchangestothedesignandimplementationbasedonemergingfieldinformation(ModificationDesignChangeNoticesPvK)CNs]andTemporaryProcedureChangeNotices[TPCNs]),andrecordsupdaterequirementstoensurethechangeisdocumentedaspartoftheappropriateequipmenthistoryrecords.~Post-ModificationTestin-Functionaltestingoftheequipmentand/orsystem(s)isperformedtodemonstratethatactualperformancemeetsthedesignbasesrequirementsfollowingimplementationofthedesignchangeandpriortorelyinguponthedesignchangeandassociatedsystemstoperformsafety-relatedfunctions.~Close-Out-Afinalconfirmationthatallaspectsofthedesignchangehavebeenproperlyimplemented,completed,anddocumented.Close-outisintendedtoassurethatfinalconfigurationandproceduresassociatedwithoperationofthemodifiedsystemareconsistentwiththedesignbasesforthechangeasdocumentedinthedesigncriteriaandSafetyEvaluation.Itisalsointendedtoensurethatthebasesandconfigurationresultingfromthechangearereadilyavailableforfuturereference,bysubmittingtheappropriatedocumentationtorecords.RG&EPLANTCHANGEREVESTCRTheprocedurewhichdescribestheflowofengineeringwork,organizationalresponsibilities,andimplementingproceduresfordeveloping,reviewingandapprovingtheEngineeringdocumentsrequiredforaplantchangeisIP-DES-02,PlantChangeProcess.Interfacesbetweendesignandimplementingactivitiesarealsoaddressedincludinginstallation,testingandturnover.IP-DES-02alsocoversprocessingofaPlantChangeRecord(PCR),whichisusedtodocumentplantchanges.ThePCRprovidesflexibilityinitsusetomostefFectivelyaccommodatetheneedsofaspecificplantchange.Screensareusedtodevelopeachplantchangepackagewiththetechnicalandadministrativecontentcommensuratewiththenatureofthechange.Forsimple,smallerscopeplantchanges,thePCRmaybeusedasa"stand-alone"document.Forlarger,morecomplexplantchanges,thePCRisusedprimarilyasadesignrecord.ThePCRformisintendedtobeelastic.Thatis,itcanbeexpandedtoincludenecessaryandapplicableinformationtodocumentandsummarizetheplantchange,oritcanbecompressedtoomittopicsorinformationwhicharenotapplicable.10CFR50.54(QRcsponsc-AttadrrncntAFinalRcportPage272/7/97 ProceduresanddocumentswhichimplementportionsofthePCRprocessandwhichmaybeusedforaPCRinclude:EngineeringandInterfaceProceduresEP-2-P-1-10,EP-2-P-111,EP-2-P-112,EP-2-P-114,EP-2-P-117,EP-3-P-121,EP-3-P-122,EP-3-P-123,EP;3-P-124,EP-3-S-125,EP-3-P-126,EP-3-P-131,EP-3-P-132,EP-3-P-133,EP-3-P-137,EP-3-P-138,EP-3-P-139,EP-3-P-140,EP-3-P-151,EP-3-P-162,EP-3-S-304,EP-3-P-306,EP-3-P-700,EP-3-S-901,IP-SEV-1,IP-SEV-2,VendorTechnicalDocumentControlProcessCMISd'cFireProtectionProgramDatabases,DataInputGuideUFSARChangeRequestsComponentSafetyClassification.DocumentChangeRequestDesignControlDesignAnalysisDrawingControlEngineeringSpecificationDesignVerificationEquivalencyEvalualionALARADesig7ReviewFireProtection!AppendixRConformanceReviewHumanFactorsReviewComputerSoftwareControlErosion/CorrosionConlrolProgramEnvironmentalQualificationProgramModificationDesigvChangesProcurementASMEXfRepair,Replacementd'cModificationProgramImplementation8'orkPrioritizationChangeImpactEvalualionLicenseAmendmentRequestsRecordsandDocumentControlPreparation,ReviewandApprovalofSafetyReviewsP-R-Aof10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluations2.GinnaStationProceduresA-302.2,A-401,A-601,A-606,A-1303,A-1603.0,EvaluationofPartstoDetermineSafetyClassificationControlofProcurementDocumentsPreparedforGinnaStationProcedureConlrolDrawingChangeRequeslsStoraged'cPreservationofMaterialsandEquipment-GinnaStationOverviewoftheGimtaStation8'orkControlSystemIOCFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachrncntAFinalRcportPago282fl/97

~ll'Ir 3.QualityAssuranceProceduresQA-603,ControlledDocumentDistributionQA-1702,RecordsNuclearTrainingManualTR-5.5.1,TrackingPlantChanges5.GinnaStationSimulatorProceduresGSS-1.1,SimulatorModificationControlThespecificresponsibilitiesoftheEngineer(s)assignedthePCRinclude:~InitiatethePlantChangeRecord(PCR)~Determinethetypeoftheplantchange~Determinethesafetyclassificationoftheplantchange~PerformEquivalencyEvaluation(whenapplicable)~PerformaSafetyRevieworinitiateaSafetyEvaluationoftheplantchange(whenrequired)~Determineinterfaces/supportrequiredfortheplantchangedesigndevelopmentandensurethatsupportpersonnelareinformedaboutandinvolvedinthedesignasitisdeveloped~PerformaChangeImpactEvaluation(CIE)todetermineandidentifytheadministrative,engineeringandsafetyrequirementsfortheplantchange~Specifythedesigninputrequirements(includingdevelopingDesignCriteria,ifnecessary)~Developtherequireddesignoutputdocuments(suchasdrawings,specifications,designanalyses,billofmaterials,andvendordocumentation)~Obtainrequiredreviews,verificationandapprovaloftheplantchangepackage~Supportplantchangeimplementationactivities~Updateaffectedengineeringdocumentstoreflecttheplantchange~Confirmthataffectedsystemsdrawingshavebeenupdatedandthatneworrevisedsystem/plantprocedureshavebeencompleted~CoordinateanyresultingtrainingissueswiththeTrainingDepartment~Facilitatetheidentificationofreliability,operability,maintainabilityandtestabilityissuesforassignedsystems~Contributetopost-modificationsystemorcomponenttestingrequirements~Assistintheresolutionoftestinganomalies~AssesstheimpactoftheplantchangeontheMaintenanceRuleprogram~Reviewdesignoutputstoconfirmthatdetailswillnothaveanadverseeffectonplantsafetyoroperation~Monitorprogressofchangeinstallation10CFR50.$4(QRcsponso-AttaclmrcntAFinalRcportPage29,2/7/97 I.A

~SubmitthePCRandrelatedrecordsanddocumentstoRecordsManagementforretentionand/ordistributionAppropriatereviewsandapprovalsfortheaboveactionsareincludedintheassociatedprocedures.USEOFANDCONTROLOFOUTSIDEENGINEERINGRESOURCESRG&Eunderstandsthat,asthelicenseeforGinnaStation,weareultimatelyresponsibleforthedesignanddesignbasesoftheplant.WemaintainalimitedprofessionalrelationshipwithbothourNSSSsupplierandoriginalA/E.However,onlyourNSSSsupplierperformsregularengineering'tasks,andthesearelimitedto1)fuelreloadandassociatedaccidentanalysesand2)owner'sgroupactivities.MostplantChangesaredevelopedandimplementedusingRG&Eengineeringresources.Forlargerprojects,RG&Edoesmakeuseofoutsideengineeringresourcesbasedupon1)theirknowledgeandexpertiseatthespecifictask,2)theirgeneraloverallknowledgeofGinna,and3)theirpastperformance.Whenoutsideengineeringisused,RG&EformallyexercisesdesignresponsibilitythroughthedevelopmentandcontrolofthedetailedDesignCriteriaandSafetyEvaluationdocuments,aswellasthroughappropriateengineeringanddesignreviewsofoutputsproposedbyourengineeringservicessuppliers.Forexample,fortheSteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP),RG&EelectedtoprocurereplacementsteamgeneratorsfromafabricatorotherthanouroriginalNSSSsupplier.RG&EworkedcooperativelywithboththesteamgeneratorfabricatorandtheinstallertodeveloptheDesignCriteria,theSafetyEvaluationreports,andthedetailedequipmentspecificationthatestablishedthedesignbasesandcriteriaforthegeneratorsandtheirinstallation.ApprovalandcontrolofthesedocumentsweremaintainedbyRG&E.Further,RG&Eperformeddetaileddesignreviewsofthetechnicalreports,analyses,andoutputdocumentsdevelopedfortheSGRP.TheSGRPwascompletedintheSpringof1996onscheduleandunderbudget,withnomajortechnicalproblems,andwithanadequatelydocumentedconformancetodesignbases.TheseaccomplishmentswereinnosmallpartduetoRG&E'sextensivetechnicalinvolvementthroughoutthecourseoftheproject.A.2.B.TemporaryModiTicationsA-1406,ControlofTemporaryModifications,isusedformosttemporarymodificationinstallationsandprovidesrequirementsfortheircontrolanddocumentation.Itisintendedthatthescope,number,anddurationoftemporarymodificationsshouldbeminimized.Temporarymodificationsaredefinedastemporaryminoralterationsmadetoplantequipment,components,orsystemsthatdonotconformwithapproveddrawingsorotherdesigndocuments.Thesealterationsaretemporaryinthattheyareexpectedtobeinstalledforoneoperatingcycleorless.Thefollowingareexamplesoftemporarymodifications:~liftedleads~pullcircuitcards~disabledalarms~temporarypowercables(notextensioncords)10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentAFinalReportPage302/7/97 c.k'y'll'QP0i*10

~setpointchanges~mechanical.jumpers,suchasspoolpieces,hoses,tubing,pipingorvalves~temporaryleakrepairs(e.g.,mechanicalclamps)~installedorremovedblankflanges~disabledreliefvalvesorsafetyvalves~installedorremovedfiltersorstrainers~pluggedorcoveredfloordrains~temporarypipesupports~temporaryspecialriggingattachmentstosafety-relatedsystems/components/structures~temporarycomputersoftwarechangesthatperformaMainControlBoardalarmcontrolfunction.Temporarymodificationscontrolledbyotherapprovedprocedures,e.g.,certainjumpersinstalledtosupporttestingandremovedaspartofrecoveryfromthattest,areexcludedfromtherequirementsofA-1406.ProposedtemporarymodificationsarepreparedbyanassignedEngineerusingtheapplicabledesigninputsfortheaffectedsystem/component(s).Althoughproceduralrequirementsdiffersomewhat,theresponsibilitiesoftheassignedEngineerareconsideredtobesimilarto,andassignificantas,thoselistedaboveforpermanentplantchanges.Theapplicabledesigninputsandtheirevaluationaredocumentedaspartoftheproceduralprocess.Testingrequirements,ifany,forthetemporarymodificationareidentifiedbytheassignedengineer.ASafetyReviewisperformedforeachTemporaryModification.ASafetyEvaluationisperformed,iftheSafetyReviewscreeningindicatesthatoneisneeded.Anyrequiredmoderestrictionsarenoted.TheassignedEngineerdeterminestheprocessforpermanentresolution(suchasconditionsforremoval,EWR,TSR,WR/TR,etc.)andtheexpectedremovaldate.TheselecteddesigninputsandevaluationarereviewedbyasecondEngineerexperiencedintherelatedsubjectmatteroraffectedsystem.Theresultsofthereviewaredocumented.Selecteddocumentation,e.g:,OperatingProcedures,andcontrolroomcopiesofP&IDsarechangedtoreflectthetemporarymodifications.Forexample,affectedcontrolroomP&IDsareaffixedwithalabelindicatingthetemporarymodificationanditsidentificationnumber.A.2.C.AdministrativeControlofProceduresProceduralHierarchTherequirementsforthedevelopmentofproceduresassociatedwithGinnaStationareestablishedinND-PRO,Procedures,Instructions,andGNidelines.ThebasicorganizationandhierarchyofproceduresisestablishedbyND-NPD,NuclearPolicyandDirectivesManualDescription,andareasfollows:~LiceninDocuments-Documents(suchastheFacilityOperatingLicense,UFSAR,andImprovedTechnicalSpecifications)whichhavebeendevelopedasamethodforRG&Etoshowcompliancewithregulatoryrequirements/guidelines,industrystandards/practices,andcommitmentsmadetoregulatoryagencies.lOCFR50.54(t)Response-AttachmentAFinalReportPat,c312/7/97 P,kCfFY,~'l>*we-UkE

~NuclearPolicies-Highlevelstatements'ofcommitmentandendorsementfromseniorcorporatemanagementtothemajorprinciplesofNuclearSafetyandQualityAssurance,assigningcorporateresponsibilityfortheseprinciples.~NuclearDirectivess-Providemanagementdirectionforimplementationofcommitmentstoregulatoryrequirements,industrystandards,andcorporatepolicy.~NuclearInterfaceProcedures-Governactivitiesinvolvinginterfacesbetweenorganizationaldepartmentsandactivitiesperformedbymorethanonedepartmentwhereacommonmethodologyisdesired.~

DeartmentandSectionAdministrativeProcedures-Definetheorganization,

assignresponsibilitieswithindepartments,andprescribemethodsofaccomplishingdepartmentalactivitiesbelowtheleveladdressedinNDsandIPs.~TechnicalProcedures-Step-by-stepprocedureswhichprescribemethodsforaccomplishingactivitiesoutlinedinhighertierdocumentswithinanindividualsection.ExamplesofTechnicalProceduresareOperatingProcedures,RadiologicalProtectionProcedures,MaintenanceProcedures,andSurveillanceProcedures.ND-PROalsohasprovisionsfor,andrestrictionson,otherproceduralvehiclessuchasInstructions,Guidelines,TemporaryProcedures,andContractorProcedures.ProcedureDevelomentandhanesND-PRO,Procedures,Instructions,andGuidelines,includesrequirements,regulatoryguidance,andmanagementexpectationsfortheadministrativecontrolofprocedures.NeworrevisedproceduresrequiredbytheAdministrativeControlsSectionofImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,orotherwiseimportanttosafety,receiveaSafetyReview.IfaSafetyReviewidentifiespotentialchangesthatmayaffectnuclearsafetyorthataredescribedintheUFSAR,a10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationisperformed.Typically,aprocedurechangerequiresdocumentationdetailingthereasonforthechange,impactonequipment/systemsandtheiroperability,effectonplantoperatingmodesoroperatingequipmentrequirements,potentialimpactonaffectedNuclearOperatingGrouporganizationsandtheirspecificactivitiesandresponsibilities,andeffectonnuclearsafety.Inadditiontotheaboverequirements,majorchangestoEmergency/Abnormalproceduresrequireamoreextensiveverificationandvalidation.Inadditionto'thetypicaltechnicalaccuracyreviewtoverifyincorporationofandcompliancewithappropriatetechnicalinformationsuchastheUFSARandImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,thisvalidationprocessutilizeseitherthesimulatororawalk-throughtophysicallytesttheproceduresteps.ThechangesarealsoreviewedbytheEmergencyProceduresCommittee(EPC)fortechnicaladequacy,programmaticrequirements,andsafetysignificance.TheEPCismulti-disciplined,includingrepresentativesofOperations,SystemsEngineering,Training,andNSEcL.10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachrncntAFinalRcportPage322/7/97 q~e A.2.D.MaintenanceWorkControlSystemTheMaintenanceWorkControlsystemcanpotentiallyimpacttheconfigurationoftheplant.A-1603.3,WorkOrderPlanning,providesdirectionfortheMaintenancePlannersthatmaterialsubstitution,partmodifications,setpointchanges,andplantchangesarenotpermittedwithoutanengineeringevaluation,whichprovidesforasafetyreview.Post-Maintenance/ModificationTesting(PMT)isperformedtoverifythatequipment/componentsfulfilltheirdesignfunctionwhenreturnedtoservicefollowingmaintenanceormodification.TheMaintenancePlannerisprovidedwithdirectionfromproceduresA-1603.3andA-1603.6,Post-Maintenance/ModificationTesting,forPMTrequirements.PMTassociatedwithmodificationsisspecifiedintheassociatedengineeringdesignoutputs.A.2.E.OperatorWork-Arounds'/ChallengesRG&Ehasestablishedaformaladministrativeprocess(A-52.16,Operator8'ork-AroundIChallengeConfro/)toevaluatelongtermequipmentdeficiencieswhich,althoughtheydonotinthemselvescompromisetheabilityoftheplanttooperatewithinImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,havethepotentialtoaffectOperatordecision-makingand/orresponsetime.Theprocessestablishesscreeningcriteriaandtrackingrequirementsforitemswhicharepotentialwork-arounds.ItemsclassifiedasWork-Aroundsaregivenincreasedpriorityforevaluationandresolution.ManagementawarenessismaintainedbyquarterlyPORCreviewsoftheWork-Aroundsandperiodicallydiscussing/listingtheminthedailyplantmanagement/staffmeeting(typically,onceperweek).PORCreviewsde-classificationorresolutionofallWork-Arounds;additionally,anyitemsunabletobeappropriatelyresolvedaresubmittedtoPORCforresolution.Itemsnotevaluatedastrue'Work-Aroundsnbythescreeningcriteriamaybetrackedas"Challenges"andareconsideredfortheiraggregateeffectonOperations.A.2.F.DrawingChangeControlProcess(DCRs)DrawingsareupdatedperQE-324,Preparation,Revie~,andDispositionofDentingChangeRequests.Whentheneedforchangesisidentifiedviafieldwalk-down,completionofamodification,ordiscoveryoftypographicalerrors,aDCRisusedtoimplementthesechanges.TheDCRprocessincludesprecautionsintendedtoensureadesignchangeisnotinadvertentlyimplementedviaDCR.AResponsibleEngineerdispositionsaDCRasfollows:t~Checkforcompletenessandaccuracy,~VerifythattheDCRdoesnotaffectplantoperationoranyexistingdesignbases,(ForcasesinwhichthefieldconditionreportedviaDCRdoesaffectoperationordesignbases,10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentAFinalRcportPage332/7/97 0~v'+~ggl'.4l~)IL4p(~Astyl~tc~CQ' appropriateactionistakentoresolvetheproblem,e.g.,aplantorprocedurechangeorACTIONReport.)~IdentifyadditionaldrawingspotentiallyaffectedbytheDCR,screentheDCRper10CFR50.59,andincorporatethechange(s)intotheaffecteddrawings.A.2.GProcurementEngineeringProcessesND-PES,ControlofProcurementActivities,establishestherequirements1)fortheprocurement,verification,andacceptanceofitemsandservices,and2)forthequalificationandperformanceevaluationofsuppliers.IP-PES-2,ControlofProcurementDocumentsPreparedforGinnaStation,providesinstructionsforpreparation,review,andapprovalofprocurementandupgradedocumentsforsafety-relatedandsafetysignificantmaterials,parts,components,andservicesforGinnaStation.Theprocessincludesrequirementstodeterminethesafetyclassificationofitemstobepurchased.Forsafety-relatedand/orsafetysignificantitems,theprocessspecifiesrequirementsforpartssafetyclassificationbasedupon1)thecomponent'ssafetyclass,2)evaluationofthecomponentssafetyfunction(s),and3)afailuremodesandeffectsanalysisofthecomponent.Technicalandqualityrequirementsforthepurchasearedeveloped,aswellasreceiptinspectionandacceptancecriteria.Forreceiptinspection,especiallyforcommercialitemsdedicatedbyRG&Etosafety-relatedservice,RG&Emakesextensiveuseofourin-houseLaboratoryandInspectionServicesmetallurgicalandmaterialsexpertise.Thisincludesin-houseelectronmicroscopywithx-rayspectroscopytodeterminematerialcompositions.Forexample,duringtheGinnaSteamGeneratorReplacementProject,RG&Eperformeditsownindependentmetallurgicalevaluationsofeachlotofsafety-relatedtubingasitwasproducedandpriortoitsactualinsertionintothereplacementsteamgenerators.TheRG&Eprocurementprocessesalsogovernsspecificationandimplementationofspecialstoragerequirements,shelfliferestrictions,andin-storageperiodicmaintenanceasrequired.Asneeded,processesalsorequireTechnicalEvaluationswhichareintendedtoensurethatprocurementactivitiesdonotinadvertentlyresult'inadesignchangetothefacility.Specifically,TechnicalEvaluationsassessreplacementcomponents,parts,andmaterialsforequivalency.Differencesaffectingconfigurationand/ordesignareidentifiedandevaluatedforimpact.TheprocurementprocessalsorequiresreviewofOperatingExperienceinformationforpastindustryexperiencewiththeitemstobeprocured.A.aTRAININGInordertoachievecompliancewiththeadministrativeandproceduralrequirementsgoverningtheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesandprogramsdiscussedinresponsestoRequestedActions(a)through(e),RG&EhasestablishedanoverallintegratedtrainingprogramandadedicatedNuclearTrainingDepartment.TheTrainingDepartment'sresponsibilityistoprovideatrainingprogramwhichensuresNuclearOperationsGroup10CFRSO.S4(QRcsponsc-AttachmentAFinalRcportPage342l7/97 kaI.)),0m~-y~*II personnelareknowledgeableandfamiliarwiththerequirements,objectives,andmanagementexpectationsfortheseprocesses,baseduponusergroups'pecificneeds.Ginna'strainingprogramisaccreditedbytheNationalNuclearAccreditingBoardandmustundergoperiodicaccreditationrenewal.Eachestablishedtrainingusergrouphasacommitteethatidentifiesthecurriculumforthenecessarytrainingofthatgroup.Trainingincludesinitialintroductiontoselectedprocessesaswellason-goingupdatesformajorchangesand/orlessonslearned,asapplicableforjobperformance.Trainingobjectivesandcontentvarytofocusontargetedpopulations(Operations,Maintenance,Planning,Engineering,etc.).Specificinformationisoutlinedinlessonplans,qualificationsignaturerecords,andself-studyassignments.Trainingisalsoextendedtocontractpersonnel,dependingonassignedduties.TheNuclearTrainingDepartmenthasdevelopedandimplementedadministrative.configurationmanagementprocessesintendedtoensuretrainingmaterialsandmodulesarekeptcurrentwithactualplantconfigurationandoperation.'innaStationhasconstructedandoperatesastand-alonecontrolroomsimulatorforthetrainingofplantlicensedoperators.Thesimulatortrainingisintendedasonepartofoperatortrainingtoensureoperatorsarefamiliarwithcontrolroomconfigurationandprocedures,sothatplantoperationisconsistentwithrequirements.RG&EhasalsousedtheGinnasimulatortoassistinthevalidationofnewprocedures(e.g.,theEmergencyOperatingProcedures)andsystemmodifications(e.g.,feedwatercontrolstuningfortheSteamGeneratorReplacement).10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentAFinalReportPage352/7/97

~eh~eI,~ee' 10CFR50.54(f)RESPONSEATTACHMENTB(b)Rationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.NOTE:THISATTACHMENTISSUPPORTINGDOCUMENTATIONTHATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTIONWITHITSCORRESPONDINGSECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISNOTASTAND-ALONEDOCUMENT.ThisAttachmentisorganizedasfollows:B.l.PRESSESWHICHNTROLPROEDB.l.A.PlantChangeProcessB.l.B.ProcedureChanges(10CFR50.59Reviews)B.1.C.MaintenanceWorkControlSystemB.l.D.OperatingExperienceB.2.PRORAMSfPROESSESTOUPRADEPROCEDURESB.2.A.EmergencyOperatingProcedure(EOP)DevelopmentProgramB.2.B.CalibrationandMaintenanceProcedureUpgradeProgramsB.2.CInserviceTest(IST)ProcedureUpgradeProgramB.2.D.ProcedureValidationtoImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsB.2.E.RG&EResponsetoGenericLetter96-01B.3.SAMPLINGPROJECTSFRREUIREMENTS-TO-PROCEDURESB.3.A.UFSARValidationinaccordancewithNEIGuidelinesB.3.B.UFSAR-to-ProceduresReviewB.3.C.RadiationProtectionGroupReviewofUFSARB.3.D.On-GoingCommitmentSamplingProgramsB.4.TRAINlNGANDTRAININGCONFIGATIONMANAGEMENTB.1.PROCESSESWHICHCONTROLPROCEDURESB.1.A.PlantChangeProcessThePlantChangeProcessisdiscussedinA.2.A.Theprocessincludesareviewforpotentialimpactsonplantproceduresandprogramsandrequiresthatchangesbeprocessedtoensureproceduresandprogramsarerevisedtoreflecttheimpactofthechange.10CFR50.54(f)Response-Attachment8FinalRcportPage36217/97 9'te+4M~'I1<<get B.1.B.ProcedureChanges(10CFR50.59Reviews)ThecontrollingprocessforprocedurecontrolandchangeisdiscussedinAttachmentA(A.3.C).TheprocessincludesrequirementsforaSafetyReview,andaSafetyEvaluationasappropriate,ofproposedprocedurechanges.Thisprocessisintendedtoensurecompliancewith10CFR50.59.B.1.C.MaintenanceWorkControlSystemGinna'sworkcontrolprocessisdiscussedinAttachmentA(A.2.D).Theworkcontrolprocessincludesprovisionsformulti-disciplinaryreviewsofworkinstructionsandworkpackages,aswellasoperationsreviewforimpactonplantoperatingandImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsystemsandequipment.Theworkcontrolprocessalsodeterminespost-maintenancetestingrequirementsintendedtoensureequipmentreturnedtosafetyrelatedserviceisoperablefollowingimplementationofmaintenanceinstructionsandprocedures.TheWorkControlprocessisestablishedwithadministrativecontrolsintendedtoensuremaintenancedoesnotinadvertentlyaltertheplantdesignorconfigurationunlessspecificallyauthorizedbythedesignchangeprocessasdiscussedherein.B.1.D.OperatingExperienceTheRGBOperatingExperience(OE)processisdiscussedinAttachmentA(A.1.J).TheOEprocessprovidesameansforRG8cEtocompareGinna-specificproceduralmethodsagainstlessons-learnedthroughouttheindustryandalsoagainstgenericsafetyconcernsoftheNRC.SomespecificexamplesofeventscitedbyOEforreviewatGinnahavebeen:~BoronDilutionJventsatPNb(INPOSOER94-002,NRCIN93-32)-RG&Ereviewedtheplantdesignandassociatedprocedurestoensurethepotentialforover-dilutionwasllliilimized.~InadequateTestingofEmergencyDieselGenerators(NRCIN91-013)-RG8cEreviewedtheEDGtestprocedurestodetermineiftestingdemonstratedoperationatpeakloadingconditions.ThereviewresultedinadynamicloadstudyfortheEDGsandafullloadtestatarepresentativepowerfactorin1992.IOCFR50.54(f)Rcsponsct-Attachment8FinalRcpottPage372/7/97 B.2.PROGRAMS/PROCESSESTOUPGRADEPROCEDURESB.2.A.EmergencyOperatingProcedure(EOP)DevelopmentProgramInresponsetoNUREG-0737,ItemI.C.1,theWestinghouseOwnersGroup(WOG)developedEmergencyResponseGuidelines(ERGs)toserveasstandardtemplatesfortheconstructionofplant-specificEOPs.RG&Einitiatedaprogramtodevelopplant-specificEOPsbasedupontheWOGguidelines.Thegenerationofeffectivesymptom-basedEOPsfromtheseguidelinesrequiredacoordinatedeffortbetweenengineeringandoperationstoaddressaspectsofplantoperationthatcouldnotbesatisfactorilyresolvedonagenericbasis.TheprogramwasintendedtoensurethattheWOGERGswouldbeeffectivewiththespecificplantconfigurationanddesignatGinnaStation.B.2.B.CalibrationandMaintenanceProcedureUpgradeProgramsIntheperiod1989-1992,RG&EupgradedandenhancedthemajorityoftheGinnaMaintenanceandCalibrationProcedures.Amongtheobjectivesoftheseupgradeeffortswere1)toprovideadequatedetailtoensuremaintenanceandcalibrationwereperformedcorrectly,2)toensuretheproceduresreflectmanufacturer'srecommendedmaintenancepracticesorthatdeparturesfromsuchpracticeswereclearlyidentifiedandevaluated,3)toincorporatelimitsandprecautionsneededtoensurecompliancewithUFSARandTechnicalSpecificationrequirements,and4)forcalibrationprocedures,toensuretheuseofaccuratesetpointsandtolerancesaccountingforloopuncertainties.Supplementaltothiseffort,RG&EalsoundertooktoupgradethecontrolofVendorTechnicalManualsforplantequipment(C.l.L).B.2.C.InserviceTest(IST)ProcedureUpgradeProgramDuringNRCInspectionNo.88-10,concernswereidentifiedwithRG&E'sInservicePumpandValveTestingProgram;specificallythattheprogramdidnotcomplywithcertainrequirementsofASMECodeSectionXI,andthatimplementingprocedures,insomecases,didnotcomplywiththeProgram.RG&EinitiatedCorrectiveActionReport(CAR)1877toidentifythecausesoftheseproblemsandtoresolvethem.TheCARfound'thattheproblemswerecausedby1)inadequatereviewofmodificationsaffectingtheISTProgram,2)adesignbasisfunctionalreviewofallpumpsandvalvesatGinnaStationtodetermineinclusionintheprogram,3)lackofacomprehensiveselectioncriteriaforinclusionintheprogram,4)lackofindependentassessmentoftheprogram,5)lackofdetailedtestspecifications,and6)misinterpretationofCoderequirements.Thecorrectiveactionsincluded1)areviewofASMECodeSectionXIrequirementsagainstplantequipmentdesignandconfiguration,2)areviewofISTimplementingprocedurestoidentifydiscrepancies,augmentedtesting,maintenance,andinspectionstoenhancetheISTProgram,3)arevisedISTProgramandprocedurestoresolveidentifieddiscrepancies,and4)revisionstotheplantchangeprocesstoensurefuturereviewforimpactontheISTProgram.Inaddition,responsibilityoftheISTProgramwastransferredtoEngineeringfromQualityAssurancetoenhancethecoordination10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentDFinalRepottPage382l7i97

.f,i'W<~it.g,,

oftheISTProgramwithproposedplantchangesandtoallowforindependentassessmentoftheProgramviafutureQAauditsandsurveillances.AsaresultoftheeffortsunderCAR1877,theISTProgramwasenhanced,wasbroughtintocompliancewith,andismaintainedincompliancewithlicenserequirementsandactualplantconfigurationanddesign.B.2.D.ProcedureValidationtoImprovedTechnicalSpeciTicationsTosupportGinna'sconversiontoImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)inFebruary,1996,RG&Econductedareview(usingateamassembledfromOperations,MechanicalMaintenance,ElectricalMaintenance,Testing,Chemistry,andReactorEngineering)toverifythatproceduresproperlyimplementandreferencetheITS.Thisreviewdeterminedthatapproximately1370procedureswouldrequirechanging(about25%oftheproceduresreviewed).AsofDecember,1996,783procedureshavebeenrevised(allthoseforwhichtheITSrequiredmajororminorchangestotheproceduralinstructionsandsomereferencechanges).Thoseremainingtoberevised(about590)onlyrequireareferencechangefromoldtoImprovedTechnicalSpecifications;proceduralguidanceisnotaffected.Theseremaining590arebeingtrackedtoensureproperclose-out.(Note:across-referencebetweenoldandImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsiscontainedwithinallcontrolledcopiesoftheITS.)B.2.E.RGdkEResponsetoGenericLetter96-01Duringthe1996springoutage,ateamwasformed(withrepresentationfromElectricalEngineering,NuclearSafety&Licensing,Instrumentation&Control,Results&Test,andSystemEngineering)inresponsetoNRCGenericLetter(GL)96-01,TestingofSafety-RelatedLogicCircuits,toidentifyandreviewprocedureswhichimplementedImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)SurveillanceRequirements(SR)forsafety-relatedlogiccircuits.Thisreviewcomparedelectricalschematicdrawingsandlogicdiagramstosurveillancetest(ST)procedurestoensurethatthelogiccircuitryisadequatelytestedandthatallSRsaresatisfied.FindingsidentifiedduringthereviewwereclassifiedasOmissions,Deficiencies,Weaknesses,orProactiveInitiatives.OmissionsorDeficienciesindicatedthatthefailureofanuntestedlogiccomponentcouldadverselyaffectarequiredsafetyfunction;WeaknessesorProactiveInitiativescouldnotadverselyaffectarequiredsafetyfunction.ThefindingswerezeroOmissions,16Deficiencies,21Weaknesses,and7ProactiveInitiatives.ACTIONReportswereinitiatedtotrackthefindingstoresolution.Priortostartupfromthe1996outageandpriortotheaffectedcomponenthavingtobeoperable,pertheITS,the16deficiencieswerecorrectedviaeitherpermanentortemporaryprocedurechanges,andtheaffectedcomponentsweresuccessfullytested.Noneoftheaffectedcomponentswasfoundtobeinafailedstate.BaseduponPORC'sreviewoftheACTIONReportsforthe1610CFR50.54(f)ResPonse-Attachment8FinalReportPage392/7/97

>vv deficienciesandtheirresultingrecommendation,RG&EreportedthiseventtotheNRCinLER96-005.nTheGenericLetterconcludesthattherootcauseforthefindingswasthatpersonnelhadassumeditwasadequatetouseindustry-acceptedmethodsfortestingofsafety-relatedlogiccircuitstomeetITSSRandthattheneedtotestparallelcircuitsandmultiplecontactswasnotrecognized.ThespecificityofGL96-01,includingexamplesforindividualcontacts,providedtheclarificationneededtoidentifytheprogramdeficiencies.WhileprecipitatedbyaweaknessintheSTprogram,thesubstantial,thoroughreviewandsubsequentupgradeofSTprocedureshasleftourSTprogramstrongerthanbeforeandhasgivenusadditionalconfidencethatourSTproceduresconfirmthatequipmentwillperformaccordingtothedesignbases.B.3.SAMPLINGPROJECTSFORREUIREMENTS-TO-PROCEDURESB.3.A.UFSARReviewinaccordancewithNEIGuidelinesRG&EelectedtoparticipateinNEIs96-05UFSARpilotinitiative(NEIIndustryInitiativetoAddressLicensingBasisConformanceIssues)byreviewing5systemsforUFSAR-to-procedureandUFSAR-to-plantaccuracyandsampling18changeprocesses.Theassessmentisintendedtodeterminetheadequacyoftheadministrativecontrolscurrentlyinuseformaintainingthelicensingbasisinordertoidentifymissingorincorrectlyappliedprogrammaticelementsthatcanleadtolicensingbasisdifferences.Theassessmentconsistsofathree-tieredsamplingdata-gathering(data-gathering)phase,afterwhichresultsaredocumented,andanevaluationphase:U~PSARSii-ifIdpffi(ii*piy-Id'ksignificantsystemsinrevision13-1oftheUFSAR(ServiceWater,Containment,AuxiliaryFeedwater,SpentFuelPoolCooling,andOff-SitePower)bycognizantindividualsfromNuclearEngineeringServicesandOperations/PerformanceTesting.todetermineifthe.UFSARstatementsareaccuratewithrespecttooperationalpractices.~ProrammaticSamlin-areviewofasampleofcompletedorinprocesschangestodetermineifexistingcontrolswithinthevariouschangeprocessprograms(drawingchanges,modifications,procedurechanges,etc.)areadequatetomaintainconformancebetweenoperationalpractices/configurationsandtheUFSAR.~Non-ProrammaticSamlin-areviewofasampleofotheritemstodetermineifanypotentialchangesindesignbasisoroperationalpracticesmayoccurthatarenotproperlydocumentedinapprovedchangecontrolprograms.Thisareaincludedsuchitemsas;10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-Attaetmtent8FinalReportPago402/7/97 4;k'~es4~-e~s,*e1 operatorwork-arounds,equipmentbeingoperatedinmanual,andlong-standingequipmentisolations.~Evaluation-todeterminethesignificanceofidentifieddifferences.AprocessfordeterminingsafetysignificanceisbuiltintotheUFSARevaluationphase.ItscornerstoneisareviewbytwoindividualswithSeniorReactorOperator(SRO)experienceusingthefollowingguidanceforsafetysignificancescreeningfromNUMARC90-12,DesignBasisProgramGuidelines:0DoesthediscrepancyappeartoadverselyimpactasystemorcomponentexplicitlylistedinTechnicalSpecifications?0DoesthediscrepancyappeartocompromisethecapabilityofasystemorcomponenttoperformasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport?0Doesthediscrepancyappeartoadverselyimpactanyapplicablelicensingcommitments?SignificantfindingsorfindingsofindeterminatesignificancebecomeACTIONReports,theprocessingofwhichincludesanoperabilityreviewandareportabilityreview.Differencesarebeingcategorizedinordertodrawconclusionsabouttheadequacyofparticularprogrammaticcontrolsformaintainingthelicensingbasis(forenhancementrecommendations).Todate,thereviewhascheckedapproximately1260statementsandresultedinapproximately290netidentifieddifferences(anumberofthesebeingduplicateddifferences).Ofthedifferences,96%wereoflowsignificanceandwerecategorizedasnclarificationsn(72%),nUFSARnotupdated"(14%),ornUFSARupdateincomplete"(14%).TheclarificationsweregenerallyaresultoftherecentpracticeofplacingincreasedemphasisonthedetailintheUFSARandthemoregeneralnatureoforiginalUFSARstatements.Thelackof,orincomplete,updatestotheUFSARcanbeattributedtothenumberofscatteredlocationsthatitemsappearinvarioussections.Theremaining4%ofthedifferencesresultedinamorein-depthevaluationinaccordancewiththecorrectiveactionprocess(6ACTIONreports),andtheseweredeterminednottoinvolveaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant.ThereviewoftheProgrammaticandNon-Programmaticsamplinginvolvedapproximately130individualchangeprocesspackagesoritemsfrom18changeprocesses.Ofthese,therewere13differences,andtheyweredeterminedtobeoflowsafetysignificance.TheUFSARassessmenthasshownthattheplantandproceduresareingeneralagreementwiththeplantdesignbasis,althoughtherearesomeminorinconsistenciesthatareofalowsafetysignificance.Actionstoaddresstheseinconsistenciesareinsection("f')ofthesummaryreport.10CFR50.54(f)Response-Attachment8FinalReportPape412/7i97 4~

B.3.B.UFSAR-to-ProceduresReviewAnRG8cECorrectiveActionAnalystisperformingacomprehensivereviewoftheUFSARforUFSAR-to-procedureaccuracy.TheanalysisoftheUFSARstatementscontaininginformationwhichappearedtorequireincorporationinplantproceduresisapproximately20%complete(60ofthe300statements).Preliminaryresultshaveshownthat,todate,100%ofthestatementswereincorporatedintoappropriateprocedures,butthattherearenoexplicittrackingmechanismsthatwouldpreventastatementorprocedurefrombeingdeleted(onestatementwasfoundinanowdeletedprocedure).Actionstoaddressthisprocessweaknessaredescribedinsection('T')ofthesummaryreport.B.3.C.'adiationProtectionGroupReviewofUFSARTheGinnaRadiationProtection(RP)grouprecentlycompletedareviewoftheUFSARwithspecificfocusonequipmentconfigurationandproceduresaffectingplantRPactivities.Thereviewidentified84separatedifferencesbetweentheUFSARtextandtheactualconfigurationand/orproceduralguidanceforRP-relatedactivitiesatGinna.Manyofthedifferencesidentifiedwereincorrectdocumentreferencesthatresultedfrommovingoff-sitedoserequirementsfromtheTechnicalSpecificationstotheOff-siteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM),asaresultoftherecentlyimplementedITS.Othersinvolvedstationfacilitiesabandoned(e.g.,thelaundry)oradded(e.g.,theResinStorageArea).However,noneoftheidentifieddifferencesrepresentedasignificantnon-conformingconditionordegradationofthesafefunctionofplantsystems,andnodesignbasisdeficiencieswereidentifiedduringthisreview.ManyofthediscrepancieswereresolvedintheDecember,1996,Revision13totheUFSAR.TheremainderareunderevaluationandwillberesolvedbyournormalUFSARreviewandcorrectiveactionprocess.B.3.D.On-GoingCommitmentSamplingProgramsNuclearSafety&Licensingundertookaninitiativetoreviewasampleofon-goingcommitments.Thesampleshowedthatsuchcommitmentswerereflectedinourprocedures;however,italsoshowedthatthecommitmenttrackingand/orprocedurecontrolprocess(es)shouldbestrengthenedtoensurethatprocedurerevisionsdonotinadvertentlyalterthelinkstocommitments.IOCFRSO.S4(f)Rcaponsc-Attachment8FinalRcportPage422/787 Ag'a>*4'~I~1I B.4.TRAININGANDTRAININGCONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENTTheprocessesfor,andextentof,personneltrainingatGinnaisdiscussedinAttachmentA(A.3).TheNuclearTrainingDepartmenthasdevelopedandisimplementingadministrativeconfigurationmanagementprocessesintendedtoensuretrainingmaterialsandmodulesarekeptcurrentwithplantactualconfigurationandoperation.GinnaStationhasconstructedandoperatesastand-alonecontrolroomsimulatorforthetrainingofplantlicensedoperators.RG&EhasalsousedtheGinnasimulatortoassistinthevalidationofnewprocedures(e.g.,theEmergencyOperatingProcedures).10CFR50.54(QRcsponsc-Attaclnncnt8FinalRcportPage432/787 C,JI.elH*tIp)Yll~'e)le,)(sF~~~asw IOCFR50.54(f)RESPONSEATTACHMENTC(c)Rationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.NOTE:THISATTACHMENTISSUPPORTINGDOCUMENTATIONTHATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTIONWITHITSCORRESPONDINGSECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISNOTASTAND-ALONEDOCUMENT.ThisAttachmentisorganizedasfollows:C.l.ON-GOINGPRRAMTHATENSCONFIURATIONANDPERFORMANCEARECONSISTENTWITHDESIGNBASESC.l.A.OperationsSafeguardsSystemsVerificationProgramC.l.B.SurveillanceTestProgramC.l.C.PreventiveMaintenanceandTrendingProgramC.l.D.SafetyClassificationProgramC.l.E.ElectricalLoadGrowthControlProgramC.l.F.EnvironmentalQualificationProgram(10CFR50.49)C.l.G.AppendixRFireProtectionProgramC.l.H.TransientMonitoringProgramC.l.I.HeavyLoadsProgramC.l.J.MotorOperatedValve(MOV)ProgramC.l.K.NuclearFuelsReloadAnalysesC.l.L.VendorTechnicalManualProgramC.2.PROJECTEFFORTSWHICHHAVEENHANCEDPLANTCONFIGURATIONONSISTENCYWITHDESIGNBASESC.2.A.ImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)ProjectC.2.B.SystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)C.2.C.InstrumentSetpointVerificationProjectC.2.D.Piping&InstrumentationDrawing(P&ID)UpgradeProjectC.2.E.ElectricalControlledConfigurationDrawing(ECCD)UpgradeProjectC.2.F.StationBlackoutProjectC.2.G.DCFuseCoordinationStudyC.2.H.SeismicUpgradeProgramC.2.I.SeismicQualificationProjectC.2.J.T,Reduction/18MonthFuelCycleAccidentAnalysisC.2.K.ServiceWater(SW)SystemGenericLetter89-13ResponseC.2.L.SteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)C.2.M.InstrumentAir(IA)SystemReviewC.2.N.OF-sitePowerUpgrade10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachrncntCFinalRcportPage442/7/97 4tI\l~it@0-e4I~IP'I"'(

C.2.0.SpentFuelPool(SFP)CoolingSystemUpgradeC.2.P;ContainmentIsolationSystemReviewC.2.Q.SteamGeneratorAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystemADFCSInstallationC.2.R.MicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(MRPI)InstallationC.2.S.AnticipatedTransientWithoutSCRAM(ATWS)MitigationSystemandActuationCircuitry(AMSAC)UpgradeC.2.T.StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwater(SAFW)SystemAdditionC.3.INPETIONSTHATASSISTINMAINTAININGFIELDCONFIGURATIONCONSISTENTWITHDESIGNBASESC.3.A.SystemEngineer(SE)WalkdownsC.3.B.SystemEngineeringPerformanceMonitoringProgramC.3.C.ShiftTechnicalAdvisor/StaffInspections'.4.TRAININGANDTRAINlNGCONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENTC.1.ON-GOINGPROGRAMSTHATENSURECONFIGURATIONANDPERFORMANCEARECONSISTENTWITHDESIGNBASESC.i.A.OperationsSafeguar'dsSystemsVerificationProgramOperationsperformsperiodicverificationsofsafeguardssystemsconfiguration(viatheS-30seriesofproceduresand0-6.13,DailySurveillanceLog)intendedtoensurethatthevalve,breaker,andinstrumentationalignmentsofthemajorflowpathsneededforsystemoperationareundisturbed.C.1.B.SurveillanceTestProgramThesurveillancetestprogramisintendedtoensureequipmentoperabilityinaccordancewithitsdesignbases.SurveillanceslistedinImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)andtheTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM)areperformedatspecifiedfrequencies.PumpsandvalvesmeetingtheInserviceTesting(IST)Programselectioncriteriaaretestedasrequired.PumpsaremonitoredfordegradationperASMEcodecommitmentsasreflectedinISTProgramrequirements.AcceptancecriteriafromtheITSorTRMareincorporatedintotheassociatedtestprocedures.Determinationofwhetherequipmentisoperable/operativeisbasedondesignbasisrequirementsorASMECodeallowablelimits,whicheverismorerestrictive.Asanenhancement,acceptancecriteriabasesarecurrentlybeingincorporateddirectlyintothetestprocedures,afterbeingresearched,documented,andreviewedbytestsupervisorsandtheIST10CFR50.$4(l)Rcsponsc-AttachrncntCFinalRcportPage452/787 0ths',ywCIJe~ogi,lM"II-'%F,i'I~

Engineer.Testproceduresareupdatedwhenplantmodifications,designbasischanges,orASMEcodemandatedchangesoccur.C.1.C.PreventiveMaintenanceandTrendingProgramThePMprogramsatGinnauseaReliabilityCenteredMaintenance(RCM)approach.TheequipmentincludedintheprogramandthePMfrequenciesselectedarebaseduponinputfromvarioussourcesincludingTechnicalSpecifications,theEQProgram,regulatorycommitments,equipmentoperatingconditions,engineeringrecommendations,and,maintenancehistorytrends.ThepurposeofRCMistofocusresourcesoncriticalequipmentbyevaluatingthecriticalityofafailure,afterperformingaFailureModesandEfFectsAnalysis.ThePMprogramsareestablishedtomonitorandmaintaincriticalplantequipmentsuchthat,in-servicefailuresareminimizedandperformancereliabilityisenhanced(run-to-failureisallowedfornon-criticalequipment).Thus,equipmentimportanttothesafeoperationofGinnaisbetterassuredtobeavailablewhenrequired.ThePMprogramsatGinnaincluderotatingmechanicalequipment,heating,ventilating,andairconditioning(HVAC)equipment,valves,electricalequipment,heatexchangers,environmentallyqualified(EQ)equipment,andinstrumentationandcontrolequipment.Typesofmaintenanceperformedincludepredictive(vibrationanalysis,oilanalysis,thermography,acousticmonitoring,hipottesting,meggering,andsurgetesting),preventivetimedirectedtasks(cleanandinspect,lubricate),calibrations,surveillancetests,functionaltests,andwalkdowninspections.TrendingofPMdataisintendedtoidentifyadversetrendsinperformancepriortoacomponentnotmeetingitsdesignrequirements.TrendingofPMdatahasresultedinidentifyingandcorrectingnumerousequipmentproblems.Forexample,vibrationanalysishelpedtoremedyseveralproblemsassociatedwithpumps(safetyinjection,auxiliaryfeedwater,servicewater,charging)andfans(containmentrecirculatingfans,busductcoolerfans).Oilanalysishashelpedtoidentifyproblemswithmotors(condensate,feedwater,servicewater),theemergencydieselgenerators,theelectro-hydrauliccontrolsystem(highparticulates),andaircompressors.Thermographyhasidentifiedandpermittedeliminationofproblemswithvalveseatleakage,stationservicetransformerhotconnections,equipmentcouplingalignment,andsteamtrapblow-by.Trendingof.instrumentationandcontrolequipmentcalibrationdatahasresultedinreplacementofinstrumentsthathaveshownanadversetrend(priortofailureorlossoffunction).C.1.D.SafetyClassiTicationProgramIn1991,RG&EinitiatedthePlantEquipmentSafetyClassification(Q-List)Projecttoconfirm,document,andmakeavailableforeasyuseinimplementingplantprocesses(e.g.,maintenanceandprocurement)theidentityandfunctionalclassificationofplantcomponentswhichperformsafety-relateddesignfunctions.TheprocessutilizedatGinnawassimilartothatdescribedinEPRINP-6895,GuidelinesfortheSafetyClassificationofSystems,10CFRSO.S4(f)Response-AttaclrrncntCFinalReportPage462f187 45Ihji~ff'AMO'A~at~VI*44/ll~Js.Artli~P5"~'is~I'f~c>.<s Components,andPartsUsedinNuclearPowerPlantApplications(NCIG-I7),withthefunctionalboundaryandsystemsafetycriteriadescribedinANSVANS-51.1-1983,NuclearSafetyCriteriaForTheDesignOfStationaryPressurized8'aterReactorPlants.Specifically,plantsystemandstructuresafetyclassificationswerebasedupondesignfunctionsperformedwhilepreventingormitigatingtheconsequencesofthedesignbasisandspecialeventsdescribedinChapter15oftheUFSAR.Eachsystemandstructurewaslinkedtotheprimaryorauxiliaryfunctionswhichtheymustaccomplishtoachievethedesiredsafetyfunction.Plantsystemswerethenexaminedtodeterminesystemfunctionalboundaries.Thiswasintendedtoensurethatthedevicesnecessarytoachieveasystem'snuclearsafetyfunctionswereidentifiedandaccountedfor.AAerthefunctionalboundarieswereestablished,thesystemswereanalyzedtoaccountforthespecificcontributionsoftheindividualcomponents.Carefulaccountingoftherelationshipbetweentheaccidents,transients,andeventsdetailedinthelicensingbasisandtheplantsystemandcomponentfunctionsprovidesassurancethattheplantconfigurationismanagedconsistentwiththedesignbasis.Reviewandupdateofsafetyclassificationshasbeenintegratedintovariousplantprocessesincludingplantmodifications,procurement(especiallyforcomponentsandparts),andmaintenanceplanning.EP-2-P-114,ComponentSafetyClassification,definestheprocesstoaddorchangethesafetyclassificationofcomponents.C.1.E.ElectricalLoadGrowthControlProgramThepurposeoftheElectricalLoadGrowthControlProgramistoensurethatacceptablelevelsofmarginare'maintainedontheelectricaldistributionsystempowersupplies(bothACandDC).EP-3-P-504,LoadGrowthControl,providesinstructionsformonitoringthecumulativeefFectsofloadchangesonGinnaStationloadcentersandrevisingimpacteddesignanalyseswhenpredeterminedmarginsarereached.ADesignEngineerperformingamodificationthatimpactselectricalloadingprovidesdetailedinformationregardingtheloadchangeincludingtheloadcenterimpacted,thespecificloadschanged,theupstreampowersource,thetypeofchange,magnitudeofloadingchange,themodeinwhichequipmentistobeoperated(duringESFactuation,stationblackout,etc.),andtheexpectedin-servicedateofthemodification.Theloadcoordinatorreviewsthisinformationandassessestheimpact.Theloadcoordinatoralso,assesses,theimpact,ofmultiple,loadadditionsthatcanoccuroverthelongterm.Ifthecumulativeloadchangereachesspecifiedmargins,thenanyapplicableelectricalanalysesarerevised.Theprogramisalsointendedtoensurethatappropriateactionsaretakenshouldanyloadcenterapproachitsdesignlimits.TheElectricalLoadGrowthControlProgramisintendedtoensurethatmodificationswillnotresultinpowersupplyloadingsexceedingtheirdesignlimits.Thisisintendedtoensurethatthedesignbasisrequirementsofthedistributionsystemarenotdegraded.TheLoadGrowthControlProgrammonitorsloadadditionsonbothsafety-relatedandnon-safety-relatedpowersupplies.10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentCFinalRqertPage472/7/97 P<<Iga$iq,*J'>0I)rArprg" C.1.F.EnvironmentalQualiTicationProgram(10CFR50.49)TheEQprogramhasbeenestablishedpertherequirementsof10CFR50.49.Theprogramisintendedtoensurethataharshenvironment,resultingfromapostulatedaccident,willnotbeacommoncauseofequipmentfailureforelectricalequipmentneededtocopewiththataccident.TheEQprogramevaluatedsystemsneededtosupporttheGinnaaccidentanalyses(UFSAR,Chapter15)toidentifyequipment/partsofthosesystemswhichweresubjecttoaharshenvironmentandwereneededtomitigatethoseaccidents.SystemelectricalequipmentwasincludedintheEQProgram,iffailureduetoharshenvironmentalconditionswouldcauselossofthesafetyfunctionandiftheequipmentissusceptibletoaccelerateddegradation/failurewhenexposedtoaharshenvironment.Equipment-specificprogramrecordsaremaintainedwhichdemonstrateacceptableequipmentperformanceunderharshenvironments.Suchrecordsincludevendorqualificationfiles,maintenancehistoryfiles,andfilesofsparequalifiedequipmentforfutureuse.EQprogramrequirementsaredocumentedinND-EQP,EnvironmentalQualificationProgram,andareimplementedthroughagroupofrelatedprocedures,specifications,andasetofdiagrams.Theseincludeproceduralrequirementsforsuchactivitiesasplantmodifications,maintenanceandworkplanning,andpartsprocurement.C.1.G.FireProtectionProgramand10CFR50,AppendixRRequirementsfortheAppendixRandFireProtection(FP)ProgramaredocumentedinND-FPP,FireProtectionProgram.Thisprogrammaintainsconfigurationcontrolofequipmentnecessarytomitigatetheconsequencesoffiresbyensuringthat:~InstalledplantFPsystemsareproperlytestedandmaintained,'V~FPsystemimpairmentsarereviewedandnecessarycompensatorymeasuresare-implemented,~Plantfirebarriersaremaintainedinacceptableconfigurations,~ExistingplantFPprogramcomponents,fireresponseplansandprocedures,anddesignatedsafeshutdownsystemsandstrategiesarenotadverselyaffectedbymodificationactivities,~Welding,burningorcuttingactivitiesareadequatelycontrolledtominimizethepotentialforafireandIOCFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentCFinalRcPertPage4$2/7/97 4H4be.g~ArIyl1'

~Fireprotectionfeaturesareprovided,andthatsafeshutdowncanbeachievedandmaintained,inamannerconsistentwiththerequirementsofSectionIII.G,J,and0ofAppendixR.C.i.H.TransientMonitoringProgramImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsrequireaprogramtotrackreactorcoolantsystemdesigntransients.ThisincludesITS/UFSARdesignbasestransientssuchasplantheatupandcooldown,steploadchanges,reactortrip,andprimaryhydrostatictests,aswellasfifteen:othertransientsofinterest.ThepurposeoftheprogramisintendedtoensurethatASMEclass1componentsareoperatedwithintheircyclicdesignbases.Atransientlogismaintainedonaday-to-daybasisbytheReactorEngineerand:totalsaretabulatedandreportedto=managementperiodically.C.i.I.HeavyLoadsProgramTheheavyloadsprogram(theA-1305seriesofprocedures)isaprogramtocontrolequipmentandproceduresinvolvedincarryingloadsgreaterthan1500poundsoversafety-relatedequipment.ItwasdevelopedandimplementedasaresultofGenericLetter81-07.Theprogramconsistsof1)safeloadpathsforoverheadcranes,2)administrativerequirementsforjibcranes,thebridgecranesovertherefuelingcavityandthespentfuelpool,monorailsoversafety-relatedequipment,andspecialinstructionswhenriggingtoexisting,buildingstructureswhereoverheadhandlingsystemscannotbeutilized,3)craneandliftingequipmentconditioninspections(performedonascheduledbasisusingcontrolledproceduresbyqualifiedpersonnel),4)trainingofmechanicalmaintenancepersonnel,and5)PORCapprovalofcertainheavyloadliftsperA-1305.5,ControlofHeavyLoadsinSafety-RelaledAreas.(Note:theTechnicalRequirementsManual(TRM)alsocontainssomeheavyloadrequirementsfortheSpentFuelPool.)C.1.J.MotorOperatedValve(MOV)ProgramInresponsetoon-goingconcernsfromtheNRC(e.g.,Bulletin86-05,GL89-10andsupplements,GL95-07,GL96-05)regardingperformanceofMOVs,RGB'stablishedtheMOVQualificationProgram.Thisprogramestablishesthetechnical,operational,periodicinspection/testingandadministrativerequirementsneededtoensurethereliableoperationofapplicableMOVs.TheprogramestablishesthedesignbasisfunctionofeachMOVbaseduponreviewofaccidentanalyses,normalandabnormaloperation,andemergencyoperatingprocedures.Withproperconsiderationofvalvephysicallimits,thermalbinding,pressurelocking,andelectricalsupplydegradation(reducedvoltage),MOVoperatorsetpointsfortravellimitsandtorqueswitchesareestablishedtoensureperformanceofdesignbasisfunctions.AppropriatemaintenanceandfunctionaltestingarespecifiedtoensurethatactualconfigurationisinaccordancewiththedesignbasisforeachMOVintheprogram.Testing10CFR50.54(QResponso-AttachmentCFinalReportPago492f7/97

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resultsarefedbacktoEngineeringforconfirmationofdesignbasisassumptionsandperformancetrending.AnNRCinspectioninAugust,1996,determinedthatRG&EdidnotproperlyincorporaterelevantindustryfeedbackintoitsMOVprogram,andthuscertain'valvefactorsusedintheprogramapparentlywerenotsetconservatively.RG&Eperformedextensivecorrectiveaction,includingcompletionofaHumanPerformanceEnhancementSystem(HPES)investigation,recalculationofavailablethrustandmarginsforallMOVsintheprogram,anddevelopmentofaMOVProgramManualwithallnecessaryMOVdatainaccessibleform,usingcurrentlyacceptablemethodology.Theseefforts,combinedwithourcontinuedactiveparticipationinindustryforumsrelatedtoMOVs,giveusassurancethatMOVswilloperatewhenneededduringnormaloperationsandtomitigatedesigntransients/accidents.C.1.K.NuclearFuelsReloadAnalysesAfteracontractforfuelhasbeensigned,thevendorandRG&Edeveloptheplant-specificinputdata(e.g.,pressurizervolume,pumpflows,etc.)necessarytodotheaccidentanalysis.ThemostimportantparametersarecapturedinTable1oftheCOLRandtheImprovedTechnicalSpecifications.Basedoncoredesignexperience,boundingcor'eparameters(e.g.,moderatortemperaturecoefficient(MTC),rodworth,peakingfactors,etc.)areassumed.Therangeoftheseparametersisintendedtobelargeenoughtoboundanyfutureloadingpatternspecificparameters.Theaccidentanalysisisthendoneusingtheplant-specificinputandboundingcoreparameters.TheresultsoftheanalysisaresummarizedandsubmittedtoRG&Eforreviewandapproval.ThissummarybecomesthebasisofaSafetyEvaluationfortheaccidentanalysisandfollowsthenormalRG&EreviewandapprovalprocessforSafetyEvaluations.Foraspecificreload,Ginnadeterminestheenergyrequiredbasedonoutagedate,cyclelength,andassumedcapacityfactor.Thevendorthendesignsaloadingpatternthatproducestherequiredenergyandisboundedbythecoreparametersassumedintheaccidentanalysis.ThecomparisonofparametersisdocumentedintheWestinghouseReloadSafetyAnalysisChecklist(RSAC)whichissenttoRG&Eforcomment.Areviewisthenmadeoftheaccidentscomprisingthelicensingbaseswhichcouldpotentiallybeaffectedbythefuelreload.ThisisdocumentedinthecyclespecificReloadSafetyEvaluation(RSE).TheRSEbecomesthemajorportionofthebasisofaSafetyReview/SafetyEvaluationforthespecificcycle.PlantprocedurechangesbasedontheSafetyReview/EvaluationandspecificcoreparametersaretheninitiatedbytheReactorEngineer.C.i.L.VendorTechnicalManualProgramVendorTechnicalManuals(VTMs)typicallyformaportionoftheengineeringbasesforoperatingandmaintainingequipmentandarereferencedfordesignchanges,procurement,andmodifications.Inthe1990-1993timeframe,RG&Eimplementedaprojectto:10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentCFinalRePcrtPage502/7/97 0"IE4rbQ,"II'C%I%41CPl(gI'I 1.EstablishabaselineoftechnicallycorrectVTMsforplantequipment2.DevelopclearandconciseprocedurestomaintaincontrolofthebaselinedVTMsandtoprocessnewandrevisedVTMsduetoplantmodifications.3.Provideacontrolledmethodofcross-referencingbetweenequipmentintheplantandVTMs.AtthecompletionoftheinitialVTMProject,theon-goingprogramtomaintaincontrolofVTMswasproceduralized(currentlyinEP-2-P-110,VendorTechnicalDocumentControlProcess).ThisprocedureincludesrequirementsforprocessingchangestotheVTMs,performingengineeringandtechnicalreviewsofnewandrevisedVTMs,andcross-referencingVTMstoplantequipment(viaEquipmentIdentificationNumber)inRG&E'sConfigurationManagementInformationSystem(CMIS).Inaddition,requirementsforperiodic(typicallybiennial)contactwithsafety-relatedequipmentvendorsisestablishedviaEP-2-S-900,VendorTechnicalManualsPeriodicVendorContact.C.2.PROJECTEFFORTSWHICHHAVEENHANCEDPLANTCONFIGURATIONCONSISTENCYWITHDESIGNBASESC.2.A.ImprovedTechnicalSpeciTications(ITS)ProjectTheITSProjectreplacedthepreviousGinnaStation"custom"TechnicalSpecificationswiththenewindustrystandard.GinnaStationwasthefirstWestinghouseplanttoconvertto,andactuallyimplement,thenewITS.Thiswasaverylargeprojectwithsignificantmulti-disciplinedinvolvementwithinRG&Esuchthatover20,000manhourswereexpendedinthedevelopmentandimplementationofITS.In1995,achangeto10CFR50.36specifiedfourcriteriaforwhatmustbecontainedwithintheLimitingConditionsforOperations(LCOs)ofalicensee'sTechnicalSpecifications.ThesecriteriawereusedinthedevelopmentofrevisedstandardTechnicalSpecificationsfortheindustry(NUREG-1431)which,thenformedthestartingpointfortheGinnaStationITS.TheITScontainLCOswhichcontrolthemostimportantequipmentandassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysisfordesignbasisaccidents.ItwasimperativethattheITSmatchtheaccidentanalysisassumptions.Therefore,allNRCSafetyEvaluationsontheGinnadocket,amajorportionofthelicensingbasisforGinna,wereidentifiedandkeywordindexed.Also,Table1oftheCOLRwasdevelopedtoidentifyandcontrolthemostsignificantequipmentperformancefeaturesandparametersusedintheUFSARaccidentanalysis.NUREG-1431andCOLRTable1wereusedtoidentifyspecificequipmentrequirementstobeplacedwithintheITSLCOsandbases.10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentCFinalReportPat,c512l7/97 "4A'JI/gal'pj"k~Ht'fl4Je%V~-t,iPsa$',stt~,~Ll4f~NlAW1P~$

ThedraftLCOsandbaseswerethenreviewedindetailbyaShiftSupervisor,LicensedOperatorInstructor,andPORCmember,alldedicatedtotheproject.Additionalreviewerswerealsousedasnecessary,includingWestinghouse(forreactorpowerdistributionlimitsandreactivitycontrolrequirements)andaNSARBsubcommitteecomposedofthreeNSARBmembers.ThefinalpackagewasthenpresentedchapterbychaptertoPORCforapproval.TheNSARBwasinvolvedinoversightoftheprocess,andQAperformedauditsintendedtoensurethethoroughnessofreviewpriortoITSimplementation.AspartofITSimplementation,RG&Eidentifiedrequiredprocedurechanges.Inaddition,anelectronicsearchandupdateoftheUFSARwasperformed.UFSARdeficienciesregardingnomenclatureandotherhistoricalinformationrelatedtotheImprovedTechnicalSpecificationswereidentifiedandwerecorrectedintheUFSARupdatefollowingtheITSimplementation.TheITSProjectconsolidatedmuchoftheGinnalicensingbasis.Significantmulti-disciplinedreviewwasperformedtoensurethisconsolidatedbasismatchedtheactualconfigurationoftheplant.C.2.B.SystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)TheNRCundertookamajorreassessmentoftheGinnadesignandlicensingbasisthroughitsSEPreview.SEPwasinitiatedbytheNRCin1977toreviewthedesignsofearly-licensedplantstoreconfirmanddocumenttheirsafety.TheSEPprovided1)anassessmentofthesignificanceofdifferencesbetweenthethen-currentNRCtechnicalpositionsonsafetyissuesandthedesignbasesoftheplant,2)abasisforNRCdecisionsregardingresolutionofthosedifferences,and3)adocumentedNRCevaluationofplantsafety.Thereviewspannedfiveyears,withthefinalreport(NUI&G-0821)beingissuedin1982.SEPconsideredover800differenttopicsforreview.Thesewereconsolidatedinto137topicsformoredetailedreview.Afterconsideringtopicsbeingreviewedunderothergenericprograms(suchasNUREG-0737andNUIKG-0933),92issueswereselectedfordetailedSEPreview.Thesedesignbasisreviewsincludedsuchtopicsasseismicdesigncriteria,highenergylinebreaksinsideandoutsidecontainment,configurationofcontainmentisolationvalves,designbasisfloodingandtornadoes,safetyclassification,designcodes,reliabilityofresidualheatremoval(RHR)andemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)systems,containmentdesign,internalflooding,systemsrequiredforsafeshutdown,loadingofdieselgeneratorsandbatteries,spentfuelstorage,andcapacityofventilationsystems.AllofthesetopicalareaswerereviewedagainsttheStandardReviewPlan,andasummaryofdifferencesandtheirsafetysignificancewereidentifiedintheSafetyEvaluationReport.DecisionsonbackfittingweremadeduringtheIntegratedAssessmentphaseoftheprogram,usingtheprinciplesof10CFR50.109,engineeringjudgment,andlimitedprobabilisticriskassessmenttechniques.Resultantmodificationsweremadetohardware,procedures,andengineeringprograms,includingseismicandtornadoprotection,electricalpenetrationcircuit10CFRSO.S4(t)Rcsponsc-AttachmentCFinalRcportPageS22/7/97 AC~~,V~~tv-*0>.'t~IWl0k protection,inserviceinspectionofstructures,highenergylinebreakprotection,andadditionofselecteditemsintotheTechnicalSpecifications.C.2.C.InstrumentSetpointVerificationProjectTheInstrumentSetpointVerificationProjectwasintendedtoestablishthedesignbasisandensuretheadequacyofexistingsetpointsandcalibrationvaluesforimportantplantinstrumentandcontrolloops.Thescopeoftheprojectincludedgroupingsofsimilarsafety-relatedinstrumentationandcontrolsandsafetysignificantinstrumentationrequiredtoverifycompliancewithTechnicalSpecifications.Inaddition,theprojectalsoreviewed.setpointsnotdirectlyrelatedtoTechnicalSpecifications,e.g.,theEOPoperatoractionpointsandrecommendedlimitswithinplantoperatingprocedures.FindingsresultingfromtheSetpointVerificationProjecthavebeenreviewedforimmediatesafetysignificanceandpotentialimpactonoperabilityundertheapplicablecorrectiveactionprogramandidentifiedforfutureresolutionunderRG&EEWR10300.C.2.D.Piping8t,InstrumentationDrawing(PEcID)UpgradeProjectTheGinnaP&IDPipingandInstrumentationDrawingUpgradeprojectwasintendedtoensurethattheP&IDdrawingsreflectedtheplantsystemdesignbasis,includingsafetyclassboundaries,systemconfigurationandalignment,componentidentification,systemfunctionalcapability,systemcomponentinteraction,andproceduralrequirements.Theapproximately190drawingswerewalkeddowninthefield,reviewedbyEngineeringforconsistencywithintendedoperatingandsafetyfunctions,andthensenttotheoriginalA/E(Gilbert-Commonwealth)forconfirmationoforiginalsafetyclassboundarylocationsandnotationoftheapplicablelinespecifications.Inaddition,amechanicalequipmentdatabasewithdetailedcomponentandconfigurationinformationwasdevelopedandeventuallybecamethebasemechanicalinformationintheRG&E'sConfigurationManagementInformationSystem(CMIS).Over1200genericandspecificissueswereidentifiedoverthe'courseoftheproject.Allbutoneissuehasbeendispositioned.Thatissuehasbeenreviewedforimmediatesafetysignificanceandpotentialimpactonoperabilitythroughthecorrectiveactionprogram,wasfoundtobeoflowsafetysignificance,andhasbeenidentifiedforfutureresolution.TheP&IDsaremaintainedasControlledConfigurationDrawings.10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentCFinalReportPage532/l/97 pEAt~~

C.2.E.ElectricalControlledConfigurationDrawing(ECCD)UpgradeProjectApproximately3200ElectricalControlledConfigurationDrawingswereproducedand/orrevisedduringtheECCDproject.Theprojectgoalswere1)toverifythetechnicalaccuracyofthedrawingsviaengineeringreviewofdesignandfunctionaswellasfieldwalk-downsand2)toenhancetheirusefulnessbychangingtheirformat.Areaswalkeddownincludedthemaincontrolboard,relayandinstrumentracks,motorcontrolcenters,andbusunits.Inaddition,detailedfieldwalkdowninformation,equipmentandcomponentdata,andconfigurationinformationwascompiledandeventuallybecamethebaseelectricalinformationintheRG8:E'sConfigurationManagementInformationSystem(CMIS).C.2.F.StationBlackoutProject10CFR50.63,LossofAllAlternatingCurrentPower,isconsideredabeyondoriginaldesignbasisaccident.Thisregulation(furtherexplainedinRegulatoryGuide1.155)requiresthateachlight-watercoolednuclearpowerplantbeabletowithstand,bymaintainingcorecoolingandappropriatecontainmentintegrity,andrecoverfromastationblackout(SBO)ofaspecifiedduration.ThetermSBOreferstothecompletelossofACpowertotheessentialandnon-essentialswitchgearbusesinanuclearpowerplant.Ginna'sSBOanalysis,EWR4520,documentsthestrategiesandtheirbasesbywhichthestationcomplieswith10CFR50.63.AsummaryofEWR4520isfoundintheUFSAR,section8.4.1.4.C.2.G.DCFuseCoordinationStudyTheentireDCdistributionsystemwasreviewedunderEWR-3341,DCSystemEvaluation.Underthescopeofthisprojectthesystemdesignwasvalidatedandtheprocessformaintainingcontrolofthedesignwasimplemented.Thefollowingitemsweredevelopedtobothverifytheacceptabilityoftheexistingdesignandtoestablishcontrolsintendedtoensurethedesignismaintainedinthefuture:~EngineeringSpecificationEE-100,FuseRequirements~ControlConfigurationDrawingSeriesforDCSystem~DesignAnalysestoevaluatespecificdesignattributesoftheDCdistributionsystem.ThedesigncontrolsimplementedfortheDCFuseCoordinationStudyareintendedtoensurethattheDCdistributionsystemmaintainsitsdesignbasisconfigurationandthatitwillbeabletoperformitsdesignfunctions.10CFR50.54(0Response-AttachmentCFinalRcportPage542/7/97 eI4ICg C.2.H.SeismicUpgradeProgramBetween1979and1990,RG&Eperformedareanalysisandmodificationofcriticalseismicpipingsystems.ThisSeismicUpgradeProgramwasavoluntaryinitiativewhichwasaresultofissuesarisingfromNRCBulletins79-02and79-14,aswellastheNRC'sSystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP),TopicsIII-6andIII-11.-ThepurposeoftheSeismicUpgradeProgramwastoupgradecertainseismicpipingsystemsatGinnaStationtomorecurrentrequirementsandtoprovideaseismicdatabaseforusewithmodifications,theISIprogram,andNRCrequests.AnalyticaltechniquesandcomputermodelsatthetimeoftheSeismicUpgradeProgramhadimprovedconsiderablycomparedtowhatwasavailableatthetimeofplantconstruction.Floorresponsespectraweredevelopedformajorfloorelevationsinaffectedbuildings,usingthen-currentNRCcriteria.Pipingwasanalyzedusingcriteriaconsistentwiththephilosophyoftheoriginalconstructioncode,butreflectingtheconceptsofASMESectionIII.PipesupportswereevaluatedusingtherequirementsofASMESectionIII,SubsectionNF.Thisextensiveeffortbroughttheseismiccapabilityofcriticalpipingsystemstoalevelconsistentwithnewerplants.C.2.I.SeismicQualiTicationProjectTheSeismicQualificationUtilityGroup(SQUG)initiatedaprogramtoaddressUnresolvedSafetyIssue(USI)A-46,whichdealswithseismicqualificationofelectricalandmechanicalequipment.Theconcernwasthatequipmentinstalledinolderplantshadnotbeenreviewedtothe(thencurrent)1980-81seismicqualificationlicensingcriteria.In-scopeequipmentatGinnawaswalkeddown,inspected,andevaluatedinaccordancewiththeSQUGGenericImplementationProcedure(GIP).Theresultingevaluationswereenteredinadatabase.OutlierstotheGIP"rules"weredocumentedandevaluatedbeforetheGinnaSQUGsubmittalwenttotheNRC(onFebruary1,1997).Outlierswillbedispositioned,inaccordancewithourcurrentcorrectiveactionprocedures.AschedulefordispositionhasbeenprovidedintheRG&ESQUGsubmittal.TheintentofthisprojectistoupgradetheseismicqualificationdesignbasisforselectedequipmenttotheSQUGGIP.Thiswill1)resultinaconsistentqualificationbasisforequipmentontheGinnaSafeShutdownEquipmentListand2)providefortheuseoftheSQUGGIPforverificationofseismicadequacywhenprocuringnewandreplacement,equipment(theSeismicEquipmentQualificationprogram).SeismicqualificationsareprimarilycontrolledthroughtheChangeImpactEvaluationform,whichscreenspotentialmodificationsforseismicreview.IOCFRSO.S4(f)Response-AttaclnncntCFinalRqertPageSS2/7/97

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C.2.J.T,,Reduction/18MonthFuelCycleAccidentAnalysisInordertotakeappropriateadvantageoftheimprovedheattransfercapabilityandenhancedreliabilityoftheGinnaReplacementSteam'enerators,RG&EundertookeffortstosupportoperationoftheReactorCoolantSystematareducedtemperature(toimpedecorrosionmechanisms)andtosupportafuelloaddesigncapableof18monthsfullpoweroperationbetweenreloads.TheT,reduction/18monthfuelcycle/UFSARChapter15reanalysisreestablishedtheaccidentanalysisdesignbasisforGinna.Theeffortinvolvedreconstitutingtheaccidentanalysisinputdataandassumptions.Westinghouserequestedplant-specificinputdata.RG&Esuppliedtherequestedinformationbasedonequipmentperformance,Ginnaconfiguration,drawings,andlimitingoperatingparameters.Bycontract,Westinghousesuppliedcopiesofcalculationnotes,microficheoftheLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)computerruns,andinputfilestothecomputercode(LOFTRAN).Areviewoftheanalysisandassociatedcalculationnotesshowshowtheanalysiswasperformed,howtheinputswereused,andwhatassumptionsweremade.ThemajorinputsintheaccidentanalysisdesignbasisarenowdocumentedintheCoreOperatingLimitsReport(COLR)toprovidegreatervisibilitytotheinputsused.ThisinformationallowsRG&Etobetterunderstandtheaccidentdesignbasisandassesswhenequipmentperformanceoroperatingpracticesmightinfringeontheaccidentdesignbasis.C.2.K.ServiceWater(SW)SystemGenericLetter89-13ResponseGenericLetter89-13specifiedaseriesofactionstoensuretheacceptableperformanceofplantSWSystems.TheseincludedaconfirmationthattheSWsystemiscapableoffulfillingitsdesignbasisfunction,enhancedmaintenancetopreventdegradationoftheconfiguration,andtestingtodemonstrateperformance.InresponsetoGL89-13,RG&EdevelopedtheSWSystemReliabilityOptimizationProgram(SWSROP).In1991,theNRCconductedaSWSystemOperationalPerformanceInspection(SWSOPI)atGinna.Amajorityoftheteam'sfindingswereassociatedwiththeneedforconfirmatoryanalysestoassureconformancewiththedesignbasesoftheSWsystem.Inresponse,RG&Eembarkeduponaneffortofcombinedanalysesandtestingtoresolvetheconcernsraised.Basedupontheseefforts,RG&EhasdeterminedthatthereisreasonableassurancethattheUFSARreflectsthedesignbasesoftheSWsystemandthecurrentSWsystemconfiguration.ThisdeterminationissupportedbyRG&E'srecentevaluationoftheUFSAR.Specifically,RG&EselectedtheSWsystemfortheNEIpilotinitiativeregardingUFSARfidelity,asdiscussedelsewherewithinthisdocument.Althoughmanyclarificationswereneeded,onlyonepotentialdifferenceresultedintheneedforamorein-depthevaluation,andthiswasdeterminedtonotinvolveaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Thispotentialdifference,regardingtheminimumrequirednumberofSWpumps,wasfirstidentifiedduringtheSWSOPI,andresolutioniscurrentlyunderreviewbytheNRC.Additionally,RG&Ehasreviewedheatexchangertestdataandperformedfinalcalculationswhichfavorablycomparedperformancetorequirements.lOCFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentCFinalRcportPage562/7/97

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C.2.L.SteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)IntheSpringof1996,GinnaStationreplacedsteamgenerators(S/Gs).Designandplanningforthisreplacementbeganin1992andcontinuedthroughtheSpring,1996,Outage.InthecourseofdesigningthereplacementS/Gs(RS/Gs)andplanningtheirinstallation,theSGRPretrievedthedesignbasesforseveralaspectsoftheplant.Tasksofsignificancetodesign,basisverificationincluded:~RS/GFabricationandSafetEvaluation-AsapartofthisefFort,itwasnecessarytoretrievethedesignbasisforthesteamgeneratorstoassurealike-in-kindreplacement.Further,aspectsoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)andoverallplantperformancewithrespecttolicensingaccidentanalysiswasevaluatedtoassurenoadverseefFectonplantsafetyasaresultofS/Greplacement.RG&EelectedtosubmitasupplementalUFSARrevisioninJuly,1996toincorporatesignificantchangesthatresultedfromtheSGRP.~InstallationandConstruction-InordertoinstalltheRS/Gs,itwasnecessarytocutlargeconstructionopeningsinthetopofthecontainmentdome.Manyaspectsofthecontainmentdesignbasiswereretrievedtodevelopdesigncriteriaforthework.FollowingS/Greplacement,afullpressurestructuralintegritytestwasperformedontherestoredcontainment.Thetestacceptancecriteriaweremet.~EmerinOutaeIssues-VibrationsfromcuttingtheconstructionopeningsinthecontainmentdomeloosenedsomeofthehangerssupportingtheContainmentSpray(CS)systemheadersontheinteriorofthedome;consequently,theSGRPpersonnelreviewedthestructuraldesignbasisoftheCSsystemheaders.Intheprocessofrepairingthisdamage,RG&Ediscoveredthattheheaderconfiguration(pipingsupportwelds,plates,bolts,andspacers)didnotmeettheconfigurationdepictedonthesystemandcomponentdrawings.(TheCSheadershadnotbeenaccessiblefordetailedconfigurationverificationpriortoS/Greplacement.)ThisdiscoveryledRG&Etoperformaconfigurationwalkdownoftheheadersandtocomparetheas-foundconfigurationwiththatusedinthestructuralanalysesoftheheaders.Analyseswereperformedthatdemonstratedthattheas-foundconfigurationdidmeettheacceptancecriteriaandthereforewasconsistentwiththeheaders'esignbases.C.2.M.InstrumentAir(IA)SystemReviewInresponsetoNRCGL88-14,RG&EretrievedthedesignbasesfortheIAsystem,testedthesystemtodemonstratecriticaldesignrequirements,andconductedanIASystemFunctionalInspectionreviewingmaintenancepractices,alarmresponseprocedures,emergencyprocedures,andtraining.ThroughtheseefForts,RG&EwasabletoverifythattheIAsystemwasreliablydeliveringenoughhighqualityairtoloadstomakesystemdesignconsistentwiththeoriginaldesignspecificationsandrequirements.10CFRSO.S4(f)Rerponsc-AttachmentCFinalReportPageS72/787 N,Vif4tel~n),p0'p,<>i<~5w4+yA4 C.2.¹Off-sitePowerUpgradeGinnaStationwasoriginallylicensedbaseduponanoff-sitepowersupplysystemwithasingletransformerplustheabilitytoestablishabackfeedthroughtheauxiliarytransformer.Specifically,failureofthe12Atransformerrequiredrelianceuponthedieselgeneratorsuntilpowercouldbemanuallybackfedfromthe115kVlinesthroughtheunitauxiliarytransformer(811).Following.the1987RefuelingOutage,theoff-sitepowersupplywasre-configuredbysplittingthe34.5kVon-sitebusandsupplyingoff-'sitepowerthroughtwoenergizedtransformers(12Aand12B).Asaresultoftheseefforts,RG&Ehasreviewed,confirmed,andenhancedthedesignperformanceoftheplant'soff-sitepowersupplysystem.C.2.0.SpentFuelPool(SFP)CoolingSystemUpgradeInordertoincreasethecapacityoftheoriginalSFPcoolingsystemtoaccommodateincreasednumbersofstoredassemblies,asecondpermanentcoolingloop(thenBnSFPloop)wasinstalledin1988underEWR1594.Thiscoolingloophadessentiallydoublethecapacityoftheoriginal(nAn)loop.Thenewloopwasdesignedtomorecurrentdesignstandards(seismiccategoryI,ASMEsectionIII,class3)ascomparedtotheoriginalnon-seismicforfunctionsystem.ThismodificationsignificantlyupgradedtheSFPcoolingsystemwithbothincreasedcapacityandtheaddedredundancyoftwopermanentlyinstalledsystems;hence,thedesignbasesfortheupgradedSpentFuelCoolingSystemaremoreconsistentwithcurrentregulatoryandindustryrequirements.C.2.P.ContainmentIsolationSystemReviewAspartofLicenseAmendments52and54,RG&Econductedathoroughreviewofthecontainmentisolationboundariesandtheirdesignbases.Detailedschematicsofeachpenetrationweredeveloped,verified,andincorporatedintotheUFSAR.Procedureswerereviewedagainstthisinformationtoensureperiodictestingwasdemonstratingconformancetodesignfunctionforeachpenetration.Asaresultoftheseefforts,containmentisolationboundariesandtheirbaseshavebeenclearlydocumented.C.2.Q.SteamGeneratorAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)InstallationIn1991,RG&EinstalledanenhancedS/Gwaterlevelcontrolsystem.S/Gwaterlevelisnowcontrolledbyadigitalmicroprocessor-controlledautomaticS/GfeedwatercontrolsystemtermedtheADFCS.AspartofS/Greplacementin1996,RG&EdidadditionalmodelingandtestingtoconfirmoperationoftheADFCSwiththereplacementS/Gs.Asaresultofthismodification,thelevelcontrolcapabilityandreliabilityofthesteamgeneratorswereenhancedasevidencedbyasignificantreductioninfeedwater-relatedtransients.Inaddition,theDesign10CFR50.54(QRcsponsc-AttachmentCFinalReportPa8c582/787 IJ'0I1,f Criteriadevelopedforthemodificationaddedtotheoverallunderstandingofthesystem'sdesignbases.C.2.KMicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(MRPI)InstallationUnderEWR3797,RG&EreplacedtheoriginalanalogrodpositionindicationsystemwiththeMRPIsystemtoimprovethesystem'sperformancewithrespecttosystemresistancetotemperatureandnoiseeFectsandtoreducerequiredmaintenanceandpotentialforcedoutagetime.Asaresultofthismodification,thereliabilityoftheplantwasenhanced.Inaddition,theDesignCriteriadevelopedforthemodificationaddedtotheoverallunderstandingofthesystem'sdesignbases.C.2.S.AnticipatedTransientWithoutSCRAM(ATWS)MitigationSystemandActuationCircuitry(AMSAC)UpgradeAsrequiredby10CFR50.62,RG&EinstalledanAMSACsystem.TheAMSACisbasedonalowfeedwaterflowlogic.Itisanon-Class1Esystemdesignedtotriptheturbineandstartthemotor-driven(MDAFW)andturbine-driven(TDAFW)auxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsifmainfeedwaterflowislostwithreactorpowerabove40%.Asaresultofthismodification,thecapabilityoftheplanttorespondtoafailureofthereactortripsystemwasenhanced.Inaddition,theDesignCriteriadevelopedforthemodificationaddedtotheoverallunderstandingofthesystem'sdesignbases.C.2.T.StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwater(SAFW)SystemAdditionAsoriginallydesigned,theauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)systemintheIntermediateBuilding(IB)couldbesusceptibletocommonmodedamagebyahighenergylinebreak(HELB).(Note:HELBwasnotpartoftheoriginalGinnalicensingbasis.)RG&E,therefore,augmentedtheexistingAFWsystemwithanadditionalSAFWsystemwhichisindependentoftheAFWsystemandlocatedremotelytoprecludedamagefromapipebreakintheIB.Asaresultofthismodification,thereliabilityoftheplant'sAFWsystemswasenhanced,inthattherenowexistsa600%-capacitydiversemeansofdeliveringAFWtotheS/Gs.C.3.INSPECTIONSTHATASSISTINMAINTAININGFIELDCONFIGURATIONC.3.A.CONSISTENTWITHDESIGNBASESSystemEngineer(SE)WalkdownsSEsconductwalkdownsoftheaccessibleportionsoftheirassignedsystemsonaperiodicbasis(generallyquarterly).(Systemsinsidecontainmentarewalkeddownduringrefuelingoutages.)RG&Ehasestablishedwrittenguidelinesandstandardsforthesewalkdowns.The10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentCFinalRcportPage592/7/97 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primarypurposeofthesewalkdownsistoverifyacceptablematerialconditionofthesystems,configuration/statusoftemporarymodifications(includinginstalledscaffolding),andhousekeeping.Thewalkdownshelptoensurethatthesystemsarebeingadequatelymaintainedsothatdesignfunctionsarenotcompromised.BecauseoftheSE'sknowledgeofthedesignconfigurationofthesystem,theseperiodicwalkdownshelpmaintainsystemconfigurationcontrolaswell.Abriefreviewofrecentwalkdownsindicatesthefollowingconfigurationdiscrepanciesidentifiedforresolution:~Capmissingfrom,CCWdrainline,and~InconsistenciesinEmergencyLightingdrawings.SuchconfigurationdiscrepanciesareidentifiedandresolvedviatheRGBcorrectiveactionprocess(D.l).C.3.B.SystemEngineerPerformanceMonitoringProgramInadditiontopredictivemonitoring,thermalperformance,erosion-corrosion,performancetesting,andISUIST,theSystemsEngineers(SEs)conditionperformancemonitoringinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.65,theMaintenanceRule(MR).TheintentoftheMRistoassess,onanon-goingbasis,theeffectivenessofmaintenanceonkeysystems,structures,andcomponents(SSCs),namely:~Safety-related(SR)SSCs~Non-SRSSCsthatmitigateaccidentsortransientsh~Non-SRSSCsthatareusedintheEmergencyOperatingProcedures~Non-SRSSCswhosefailurepreventsSRSSCsfromfulfillingtheirsafetyfunction~Non-SRSSCswhosefailurecausesscramsoractuatesSRsystems.EachoftheSSCswithintheMRscopeiscoveredbyapreventivemaintenance(PM)program,asdefinedbyNUMARC93-01,Rev0,toprovidereasonableassurancethatSSCswillbeconsistentlycapableofperformingtheirintendedfunctionwhenrequired.Anassessmentofeffectivemaintenanceisperformedbymonitoringand'trendingSSCs'erformanceagainstestablished'performancecriteria(PC)(whicharebasedondesignbasisfunctionsand/ordesignbasiscriteria)chosentoreflectgoodperformance(whichismaintainedbyappropriatemaintenance).AppropriatemaintenancewillresultinalownumberoffunctionalfailuresandhighSSCavailabilityand/orgoodperformancerelativetodesiredengineeringoroperatingparameters(conditionmonitoring).WhereperformanceduetomaintenancehasdeclinedandaSSCisnotmeetingitsPC,theSSCisplacedinadegradedMRcondition(category(a)(1)).Specificperformancegoals,increasedmonitoring,and/orcorrectiveactionsarethenrequiredtoreturnthedegradedSSCtoaconditionofacceptableperformance.10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentCFinalRepottPage602/787 eewc~

C.3.C.ShiftTechnicalAdvisor/StaffInspectionsA-54.4,ShiftTechnicalAdvisororDesignatedPlantManagementPlantTour,containsastatedobjectiveofcheckingforunauthorizedmodifications,tothefacility.Toassessthevalueofthesetourstoconfirmthatsystem,structure,andcomponent(SSC)performanceremainconsistentwiththedesignbasis,asampleofmorethan200toursconductedbymorethan20STAsandgroupmanagerswasreviewed.Somedeficienciesidentifiedbythesetoursincluderestricted.floordrains,scaFoldsnotconformingtoseismiccriteria,tubingsupportdeficiencies,firebarriersnotintact,instrumentindicationanomalies,andflexiblehosebendradiusdeficiencies.Thesetours,alongwithinspectionsperA-54.7,FireProtectionTour,andM-1306,GinnaSt'ationMaterialConditionInspectionProgram,giveRG&Econfidencethatdeficienciesarebeingself-identifiedtoassistinmaintainingproperplantconfigurationandperformance.FindingsaredocumentedviatheRG&Ecorrectiveactionprocessandassignedtoanappropriategroupforresolution.C.4.TRAININGANDTRAININGCONFIGURATIONMANAGEMENTTheprocessesfor,andextentof,personneltraining'atGinnaisdiscussedinAttachmentA(A.3).Thisincludestrainingwhichaidesinkeepingconfigurationconsistentwithdesignbases,e.g.,MaintenanceRuletraining,trainingontheImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,andtrainingassociatedwithspecificmodificationsandchangestotheplant.TheNuclearTrainingDepartmenthasdevelopedandisimplementingadministrativeconfigurationmanagementprocessesintendedtoensuretrainingmaterials,modules,andthesimulatorarekeptcurrentwithplantactualconfigurationandoperation.GinnaStationhasconstructedandoperatesastand-alonecontrolroomsimulatorforthetrainingofplantlicensedoperators.RG&EhasalsousedtheGinnaSimulatortoassistinthevalidationofsystemmodifications(e.g.,ADFCScontrolstuningfortheSteamGeneratorReplacement).10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponre-AttachmentCFinalRcportPage612/7/97 eu4.t 10CFR50.54(f)RESPONSEATTACHMENTD(d)Processesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actiontopreventrecurrence,andreportingtoNRC.NOTE:THISATTACHMENTISSUPPORTINGDOCUMENTATIONTHATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTIONWITHITSCORRESPONDINGSECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISNOTASTAND-ALONEDOCUMENT.ThisAttachmentisorganizedasfollows:D.l.CRRECTIVEATIONPROCESSANDPROCEDUREGINNAACTIONREPORTD.2.OPERABILITYDETERMINATIONSD.3.CONDITIONSADVERSETOUALITYORNON-CONFORMINGONDITIONSD.4.ACTIONREPORTDATATRENDINGD.S.REPORTINGTOTHENRCD.6.NTINUOUINTERACTIONANDMMUNIATINWITHNRPROJECTMANAGERESIDENTINSPECTORSANDOTHERNRCSTAFFD.7.TRAININGD.8.EMPLYEENERNPRRAMD.1.CORRECTIVEACTIONPROCESSANDPROCEDUREGINNAACTIONREPORIn1994,RG&EimplementedanewcorrectiveactionprocessandprogramfocusedontheRG&EAbnormalConditionTrackingInitiationorNotification(ACTION)Report.Thisprocessintegratesallaspectsofproblemidentification,evaluation,andresolutionintoasingleprocessthatcanbetrackedandtrendedtoassistinassessingtheeffectivenessofvariousprograms,processes,andorganizations,andthatcanbereadilyimprovedthroughmanagementoversightandcommunicationofexpectations.10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentDFinalReportPage622fl/97 t~EA~&%l~4~lef Priorto1994,RG&Ehadseveral,separatecorrectiveactionprocessesforsuchitemsasnon-conformingitems,potentialconditionsadversetoquality,engineeringidentifiedconcernsandpotentialconditionsadversetoquality,QAidentifiedconcerns,andprocurementandreceiptinspectiondeficiencies.Basedonbothourinternalauditingandassessments,third-partyreviews,andprocessevaluationviasafetysystemfunctionalinspections(SSFIs),RG&Econcludedthat,althoughthevariousprocessesmetregulatoryrequirements,bytheirverynumber,theyposedapotentialweaknesstoeffectivecorrectiveaction.AsaresultofRG&E'srecognitionoftheabove,RG&Eimplementedthe'ACTIONReportprocesswhichsupersededtheseveralpreviouscorrectiveactionprocesses.ERIEFRRETITINPRTheACTIONReportprocessiscurrentlyimplementedviaIP-CAP-1,AbnormalConditionTrackingInitiationorNotij7cation(ACTION)Repon.TheACTIONReportingprocessisasinglecorrectiveactionprogramfortheidehtificationandinitiationofresolutionofanyconditionevent,activity,concern,oritemthathasthepotentialforaffectingthesafeandreliableoperationofGinnaStation.Theprocessincludesrequirementsandprovisionsfor:~Identificationofproblemsandconcerns~Initialscreeningofidentifiedconditionsforimmediatesafetyand/oroperationalconcernsandprioritizationoftheconditionforresolution~Dispositionandcausedeterminationfortheconditionincludingclassificationoftheconditionfortrackingandtrending~Implementationofcorrectiveactionsasappropriateforthecondition,includingremediationoftheconditionandlongtermactionstopreventrecurrence~RequirementsforreportingappropriateconditionstotheNRC,e.g.,asrequiredby10CFR21.ThefollowingisanexplanationoftheRG&EACTIONReportingprocess:I~ANACTIONReportsareissuedperIP-CAP-l,whichmaybeusedbyanyindividualwhoobservesorisawareofaconditionorpotentialconditionthatcausesconcernaboutthesafe,efficientandreliableoperationofGinnaStation,includinganyunusualcondition,potentialTechnicalSpecificationviolation,orconditionwhichmayneedtobereportedtotheNRCortomanagement.ACTIONReportsmayalsobeinitiatedforeventsorconditionsthatareofverylowriskorsignificance,butwhichwouldprovideusefulprecursorinformationiftrackedandtrendedforrepeatoccurrence.RG&Emanagementintentionallykeepsthethresholdofreportinglowforthepurposeofensuringthatproblemsarereadilyidentifiedandaddressed,frommajorindividualeventstominoreventsandconditionsdetectedonlybyadversetrendsandmultipleoccurrences.lOCFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentDFinalRcportPage632/7/97 IP4\k'h-'lI'lA.ef.'>-~~0:,pf=s@~VAI%1~ts1q...i,tv'd4" ToensuretimelycommunicationofconditionsidentifiedviaACTIONReporttotheNOGstaff,newACTIONReportsaretypicallydiscussedatthemorningmanagement/staffmeetingandlistedinthemeetingnotes.INITIALSCREENINGSACTIONReportsareinitiallyscreenedbyOperationsforpotentialimmediatesafetyconcerns.Operations(oftenwithShiftTechnicalAdvisorinput)performsanoperabilityevaluation,"identifiesanyTechnicalSpecificationsLCOsand/ormoderestrictions,determinesiftheidentifiedconditionrequiresfurtherevaluationandprocessing,'andmakesappropriatenotifications.Forcomplexconditionsincludingmanydesignbasesquestions,OperationsmayrequestassistancefromEngineeringinevaluatingoperability.ThePORCChairmanordesigneethenassignsaprioritylevelandaResponsibleManager(RM)fordispositionandcorrectiveaction.TheChairmanalsodeterminesiftheACTIONReportneedstoreceiveaPORCmulti-disciplinedreviewafterdispositionand/orfollowingcorrectiveactionimplementation.DIPITIONANDCASEDETERMINATINTheACTIONReportprocessdirectstheRMtoinitiallydetermineiftheconditionreportedrepresentsanon-conformingitemwhichmayrequireimmediaterestrictionsuponitsuseorpotentiallybereportableinaccordancewith10CFR21.TheRMthenpreparesadispositionwhichidentifiescorrectiveandpreventiveaction(s),asappropriate,toaddresstheidentifiedconditionanditscause(s)andtopreventrecurrenceoftheabnormalcondition/event.RelatedprocedureIP-CAP-2,RootCauseAnalysis,describestheprocessforperformingarootcausesanalysis.Multi-disciplinedgroupsareused,asappropriate.Appropriateprocessesareinitiatedtoresolvethecondition,e.g.,modificationprocess,procedureordocumentchangeprocess.TheRMalsoensuresthattheconditionisclassifiedbothintermsofthecause(CauseCode),andastheconditionrelatestoimplementationoftheMaintenanceRule,e.g.,maintenancepreventablefunctionalfailure,sothattheconditionismorereadilytracked/trended.TheRMobtainsmulti-disciplinaryconcurrencewiththedispositionasappropriateorrequiredbytheprocess,i.e.,QA,QC,RP,SystemEngineer,PORC,etc.ORRECTIVEACTIONIMPLEMENTATIONCorrectiveactionisimplementedbythegroupresponsibleundertheappropriateengineeringorworkprocess,e.g.,modification,workorder,procedurechange.Whenthecorrectiveactionsarecompleteorscheduledviaappropriateprocess,e.g.,modification,procedurechange,orworkorder,theRMreviewstheACTIONReportdocumentationreceivedfromeachimplementinggroupandobtainsorganizationalconcurrencewiththeclosureoftheACTIONReportasappropriateandasrequiredbyprocedure,i.e.,QA,QC,etc.10CFR50.54(t)Rcsponsc-AttachmentDFinalRcportPage642/7/97 REPORTABILITYRG&Eisrequiredtoreportcertainconditions,items,andeventstotheNRCunderanumberofregulations.ReportingassociatedwithconditionsidentifiedviaA'CTIONReportsisproscribedbytheACTIONReportinstructionstoensuretimelyassessmentandappropriatereporting.RG&E'soverallprocessforreportingsuchconditionstotheNRCisdiscussedinD.Sbelow.D.2.OPERABILITYDETERMINATIONSRG&Ehasestablishedformaladministrativeprocesses(A-52.3,SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram,A-52.4,ControlofLimitingConditionsforOperatingEquipment,andA-52.12,InoperabilityofEquipmentImportanttoSafety)forevaluatingtheoperabilityofsystemsandequipment.Theseprocessesareintendedtoensurethatinadvertentchanges(e.g.,duetoequipmentfailures)orminorchangestoconfiguration(e.g.,toallowformaintenance)donotcompromisethefidelityoftheplant'sconfigurationtoitsdesignbases.TheseprocessesalsotrackinoperableequipmentimportanttosafetytoassurethateventheaggregateimpactofmultipledeficienciesinmorethanonesystemorsubsystemdoesnotplacetheplantoutsideitsdesignbasesandImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS).Operationsdeterminesequipmentoperabilitywhenthereareoperatingdeficiencies,failuretomeettestrequirements,orfailuretoperformanintendedfunction.OperabilityconcernsformorecomplexissuesaretypicallyresolvedbySystemsEngineeringorNuclearSafety&LicensingundertheSafetyReview/Evaluationprocess.ProceduresspecifythatappropriateITSLimitingConditionsofOperability(LCOs)areinvokedforequipmentandsystemsfoundtobeinoperable.RG&EhasalsodevelopedproceduralguidanceforvoluntaryentryintoITSLCOsforon-linemaintenance/testing.D.3.CONDITIONSADVERSETOUALITYORNON-CONFORMINGCONDITIONSDuringtheinitialscreeningofACTIONReportsforprioritization,conditionsadversetoqualityandnon-conformingitemsareevaluatedbythePORCChairmanforsignificanceinaccordancewithIP-CAP-l,AbnormalConditionTrackingInitiationorNotification(ACTION)Report.Aconditionadversetoqualityornon-conformingitemdeterminedbyevaluationtobesignificantisidentifiedasaSignificantConditionAdversetoQuality(SCAQ)bythePORCChairman.SCAQsareevaluatedtodeterminetheefFectofcontinuingactivity.Ifcontinuedactivitywouldobscureorprecludetheidentificationofthedeficiency,increasetheextentofthedeficiency,orleadtoanunsafecondition,stopworkactionistaken.D.4.ACTIONREPORTDATATRENDINGTheNuclearAssessmentorganizationisresponsiblefortrendingidentifiedproblemsandcorrectiveactionreportdata.ThecorrectiveactiontrendingprocessisdescribedinND-CAP,CorrectiveActionProgram.TheprocessisbasedupondatafromACTIONReports.Data10CFR50.54(t)Response-AttachmentDFinalRcportPage652/7/97 HI,~I'II1W..U,'Xt<<rIyy~:"I usedincludecausecodes,systemcodes,componentcodes,equipmentidentificationnumbersandorganizationalcodes.Onaperiodicbasis,typicallyquarterly,ananalysisisperformedonthemajorcausecodesenteredintotheACTIONReportdatabaseforthepriorperiod,typically12monthsormore.TrendingisperiodicallyreviewedbytheQA/QCSubcommitteeofNSARB.TwoACTIONReportmajorcausecodestypicallyassociatedwithdesignbasisandplantconfigurationissuesare"ChangeManagement"and"DesignConfiguration/Analysis"baseduponnomenclatureestablishedbytheInstituteforNuclearPowerOperations(INPO).Duringthe1996calendaryear,thesetwomajorCauseCodesrepresented5%and12%ofthecausesforACTIONReports(totalof37and94eventsrespectivelyoutofatotalofapproximately1200).NotethattheACTIONReportsincludedunderthesecausecodesrangefromsignificant(auxiliaryfeedwatervalvesfailedtothrottletothedesignbasisflowrangeduringtestingduetoinadequateselectionof"equivalent"replacementparts)tominoradministrative(incompletereviewforminprocedurechangenoticepackage/nomenclaturedifferencesinplantinformation).D.5.REPORTINGTOTHENRCRG&Ehascr'eatedamatrix(inEP-2-P-164,ReceiptofandResponsetoNRCCorrespondence)thatlistsapplicableNRCReportingRequirements,thetimeframeforreporting,andthegrouporindividualatRG&Ewhoisresponsibleforthereport.Proceduresexisttoidentifyandcontroltheprocessforcomplyingwiththesereportingrequirements,including0-9.3,NRCImmediateNotification,A-25.6,NRC8'ritlenNotification,A-61,10CFR21Screening,Evaluating,andReporting,aswellasEP-2-P-164.ForACTIONReports,0-9.3isreferenced,ifneeded,bytheShiftSupervisororOperationsmanagementtomakeapromptdeterminationofreportability,andA-25.6isreferenced,ifneeded,bytheShiftTechnicalAdvisorregardingwrittennotification(e.g.,aLicenseeEventReport).Afterthepromptreportabilitydetermination,directionisprovidedtoconsultwithNuclearSafety&Licensing,ifOperationsrequiresclarificationoradditionalinformation.FurtherdeterminationofreportabilityincludesconcurrencebythePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC).AreviewofRG&E'sreportstotheNRCandNRCenforcementhistoryconfirmsthatappropriatereportsaremade,includingsomereportsthatarebelowthethresholdofNRCreportability.ExamplesofsuchvoluntaryLicenseeEventReports(LERs)submittedinthepastfewyearsinclude:P~LER88-009HeatConductionThroughConduitSupports~LER89-007SafetyInjectionPumpsInoperableduetoFlowMeterCalibrationErrors~LER91-004Pre-plannedManualStartofEmergencyDieselGenerators~LER91-008ComponentFailurewithRedundantEquipmentOperableandAvailable~LER91-010InvalidDataUsedforHeatBalanceCalorimetric10CFR50.54(l)Response-AttachmentDFinalReportPago662/7/97 Nos<Q!gI~,g~~-gCC~,I~~g,~l~~9/TT

~LER93-003DegradationofValveIsolationCapabilityFor10CFRPart21reportability,theACTIONReportprocessdirectsthedispositionertodeterminewhethertheconditionreportedisanon-conformingcondition.Ifso,thedispositionerisreferredtoA-61,10CFR21Screening,Evaluating,andReporting.Thedispositionerisdirectedtoperformascreeningtodetermineifa10CFR21evaluationisrequired.Ifso,thedispo'sitionerperformsanevaluation,asspecifiedinA-61,todeterminewhetherthenon-conformingconditionrepresentsaSubstantialSafetyHazardinaccordancewith,10CFR21.Suchevaluationsmustbecompletedwithin60daysoftheDiscoveryDateoranInterimReportmustbeissued.Iftheevaluationconfirmsthatadefectorfailuretocomplyper10CFR21exists,ProcedureA.61specifiesresponsibilitiesandtimeframesforreportingtheconditiontoNRC,includingPORCreviewandconcurrencewiththedispositioner'sevaluationVoluntaryreportstotheNRCHeadquartersOperationsOfficehavealsobeenmade,includingseveralconservativeapplicationsof10CFR21criteria.Reportsinclude:~3/23/92FieldCalibrationSourceInaccuracy(10CFR21)~7/20/93HeatExchangerDesignDeficiency(10CFR21)~7/14/95PumpPerformanceInadequacy(10CFR21)~9/25/95MismatchBetweenValveDesignandInstallationConfiguration(10CFR21)~1/20/94PowerReductionDuetoLowCirculatingWaterBayLevel(verbalreport)D.6.CONTINUOUSINTERACTIONANDCOMMUNICATIONWITHNRCPROJECTMANAGERRESIDENTINSPECTORSANDOTHERNRCSTAFFRG&EpersonnelcommunicatewiththeNRCbothformallyandinformally.ItisRG&E'smanagementphilosophytoattempttokeeptheNRCinformedofactivitiesandissuesattheplant.FormalcommunicationbecomespartoftheGinnadocket.IncomingformalcommunicationistypicallyreceivedanddistributedbytheVicePresident,NuclearOperations.Withtheexceptionofsomeroutinereports,outgoingformalcommunicationisnormallytransmittedtotheNRCbytheVicePresident,NuclearOperations.ThesecommunicationsmaybeinresponsetoNRCrequestsofRG&EorRG&ErequestsoftheNRC.SuchcommunicationistypicallytrackedinRG&E'sCommitmentandActionTrackingSystem(CATS).Informalcommunicationoccursatvariouslevelsoftheorganization.Itisprimarilyverbalandinvolvesnocommitmentsorofficial.positionstatements.Itisgenerallyusedtoclarifyorprovidedetail/backgroundregardingon-goingactivitiesandemergingissues.ExamplesofhowthisinformalinteractionoccursincludeNRCattendanceatGinna'smorningstaffmeetingoratPORC,anddiscussionswiththeNRCResidentInspectorsorNRCProjectManager.10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentDFinalRcportPage67217/97 09CCZL0-6ZGC600LOOOGK;0-9LC06001000009CCZ'K0-LVOOG'K0-9LCV60'06ZGC60'0LTO'K0KZ0'K0'K,OKZ'K'K D.7.TRAININGTheprocessesfor,andextentof,personneltrainingatGinnaisdiscussedinAttachmentA(A.3).Trainingincludestrainingontheimplementationoftheproblemreportingprocess,rootcausedeterminationprocessandotherassociatedprocessesdescribedinthisAttachment.D.SEMPLOYEECONCERNSPROGRAMRG&EhaslonghadinplaceanEmployeeConcernsProgramforconfidentialidentificationofproblems,bothatacorporatelevelandforitsNuclearOperationsGroup(NOG).Employees,aswellascontractors,areencouragedtoexpresstheirconcernswithrespecttosafetyorcompliancewithapplicablelaws.Weencourage,employeestoattempttoresolvetheirconcernsbydirectcommunicationwiththeirsupervisors.Ifsuchestablishedlinesofcommunicationarenotpreferredby,orappeartobeineffectiveto,theemployees,theyareencouragedtousethe"EmployeeConcernsForm."Theprogramallowsemployeestoraiseconcernsandreceiveresponsestothoseconcernswhileensuringthattheprivacyoftheemployeeisprotected.Weareconstantlyimprovingourproblemidentificationprocessestoencourageopen,self-reporting,forexample,byloweringthereportingthresholdforACTIONReports.RG&Econsidersthattheverysmallnumberofconcernsrequiringuseofthe"EmployeeConcernsForm"or"NRCForm3",coupledwiththelargenumbersofACTIONReportsgenerated(currentlyaveragingabout100permonth),isevidenceofoursuccessincommunicatingdirectlywithouremployeestheimportanceofidentifyingsafetyconcerns.RG&Eattributesthissuccesstothecloseandactivetiebetweenmanagementandworking-levelpersonnel(atleastpartlytheresultofthefewlayersofmanagementpresentintheRG&ENuclearOperationsGroup).Theattitudeofbothouremployeesandmanagementistofostertheidentificationofpotentialsafetyissues.Open,frank,andevenheatedtechnicaldiscussionsareacceptedandencouraged.RG&Erewardsemployeesforidentificationofsignificantissueswithmonetaryrewards,plaques,preferentialparkingspaces,etc.10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentDFinalRcportPat,c682/7/97

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10CFR50.54(f)RESPONSEATTACHMENTE(e)Theoveralleffectivenessofyourcurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthattheconfigurationofyourplantisconsistentwiththedesignbases.NOTE:THISATTACHMENTISSUPPORTlNGDOCUMENTATIONTHATISTOBEREADINCONJUNCTIONWITHITSCORRESPONDINGSECTIONINTHESUMMARYREPORT.ITISNOTASTAND-ALONEDOCUMENT.IThisAttachmentisorganizedasfollows:,E.l.IN-LINETI-DISCIPLINARYREVIEWSE.l.A.DesignVerificationE.l.B.PORCE.l.C.NSARBE.2.RG&EASSESSMENTSE.2.A.Self-AssessmentsE.2.B.QAAuditsandSurveillancesE.2.C.ProcessWeaknessesIdentifiedbyQAE.2.D.ProcessStrengthsIdentifiedbyQAE.3.THIRDPARTYREVIEWSOFR&EPROCEEE.3.A.NRCInspectionsandResultsE.3.B.EvaluationofNRCNOVsE.3.C.SafetySystemFunctionalInspectionsE.1.IN-LINEMULTI-DISCIPLINARYREVIEWSE.l.A.DesignVeriTicationSafety-relatedandsafetysignificantdesignchangesunderthePlantChangeProcessaredesignverifiedinaccordancewithEP-3-S-125,DesignVerificalionandTechnicalReview.Designverificationistheprocessforindependentlyreviewing,confirming,orsubstantiatingthedesignbyoneormoremethodstoprovideassurancethatthedesignmeetsthespecifiedinputs.ThedesignverificationincludesacompletetechnicalreviewandisintendedtofulfilltherequirementsofANSIN45.2.11.Theverifiermustbecompetentandmustnothavebeeninvolvedindevelopingthecontentofthedesign.Thescopeoftheverificationisscaledtothescopeofthedesignbeingreviewed.Thedesignverificationprocessisintendedtoprovidea10CFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentEFinalRcportPage692/7/97 peerreviewofeachproposeddesignthatcouldafFectthesafetyfunctionoftheplantandtoensurethateachdesignhasbeenperformedcorrectly.E.i.B.PORCThePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC)isdescribedintheRG&EQualityAssuranceProgramforStationOperationandND-NPD,NuclearPolicyandDirectivesManualDescription.PORC'sfunctionsaretoprovidetimelyandcontinuingmonitoringofoperatingactivitiestoassistthePlantManagerinkeepingabreastofgeneralplantconditionsandtoverifythatday-to-dayoperatingactivitiesareconductedsafelyandinaccordancewithapplicableadministrativecontrols.PORCalsoreviewsfacilityoperationstodetectpotentialnuclearsafetyhazards.PORChasestablishedseveralindependentreviewersforSafetyReviewsand10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluations.EachSafetyReview/EvaluationmustbereviewedbyadesignatedPORCIndependentReviewer(PIR).EachSafetyEvaluationmustbereviewedbyPORC.ForSafetyReviews,thePIRmaydesignatethatPORCevaluatetheSafetyReviewpriortotheproposedchange/activityproceeding.PORCisintendedtoensurethatexperienced,supervisory-levelplantoperationspersonnelscrutinizetheday-to-dayactivitiesoftheplantandproposedchangesthathavethepotentialtoafFectnuclearsafety.PORCprovidesforplantsupervisoryoversightoftheeffectivenessofthedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesdiscussedwithinthisreport.E.i.C.NSARBTheNuclearSafetyAuditandReviewBoard(NSARB)isdescribedintheRG&EQualityAssuranceProgramforStationOperationandND-NPD,NuclearPolicyandDirectivesManualDescription.NSARBisanindependentcorporate-levelauditandreviewgroupresponsibleforperiodicreviewoftheactivitiesofPORC,fordirectingauditsandevaluatingtheirresults,andforthemanagementevaluationofthestatusandadequacyoftheQualityAssuranceProgramatGinna.ThecompositionoftheNSARBcomplieswithANSIStandardN-18.71976,Section4.3.2.Inaddition,thecurrentcompositionincludesregularmembershipfromoutsideofRG&E,bothutilityandconsultant,withexperienceinnuclearoperations,engineering,andengineeringmanagement.TheNSARBisintendedtoprovideindependentmanagementoversightoftheorganizationsandprocessesthatreviewandcontrolthesafety-relatedactivitiesatGinnaandtoprovidetomanagementanindicationoftheefFectivenessoftheseactivitiesinensuringthesafeoperationoftheplant.IOCFR50.54(QResponse-AttachmentEFinalReportPage702/7/97 eQ~QWII-w/tr E.2.RG&EASSESSMENTSE.2.A.Self-AssessmentsND-ASU;AssessmentsandSurveillances,establishesandimplementsaprogramofplannedandperiodicindependentassessmentsto1)confirmthatactivitiesaffectingqualitycomplywiththeQualityAssuranceProgram,ImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,andothergoverningprogramsandplansand2)confirmthattheseprogramshavebeeneffectivelyimplemented.ND-ASUprovidesarecommendedmethodforimplementationofself-assessment.Self-assessmentisanevaluationofaparticulartask,process,practice,orfunctionalareainitiatedbytheareaorprocessowner.ND-ASUdefinetheresponsibilities,process,conductoftheassessment,post-assessmentactivities,assessmentreportandrecordsassociatedwithperformanceofself-assessments.Self-assessmentsmayalsousepeersfromother.organizationswithspecificexpertiseintheareaunderreview.Thefollowingisalistofsomeoftheself-assessmentsperformedbyRG&Eduringthe1995-1996timeframe;~MaintenanceRulePreparations~ActionReportProcess~MaintenanceForeignMaterialExclusion~PlantChangeProcess~RootCauseProcess~Procurement~MaintenanceHumanPerformance~CorrectiveActionProcess~ForcedOutage~PlantChangeIntegrationAdequacy~LicensedOperators/STA/SSProgram~PORC~QCPackageReviews~ProcedureAdherence/Adequacy~RCSSafetyValveOutageE.2.B.QAAuditsandSurveillancesInternalauditsofselectedaspectsofquality-affectingactivitiesareperformedatafrequencycommensuratewithsafetysignificanceandmanagementconcerns.Eachauditrequiresthedevelopmentofanauditplantoprovideinformationabouttheaudit,suchascharacteristicsandactivitiestobeassessed,acceptancecriteria,areviewofpreviousassessmentfindings,areviewofindustryandNRCissues,namesofthosewhowillperformtheaudit,schedulingarrangements,andthemethodofreportingfindingsandrecommendations.Auditsoftenincludetechnicalspecialistsfromanareaotherthanthatbeingreviewed,includingfrequent10CFR50.54(0Rcsponsc-AttachmentEFinalRcportPage712/7/97

~'84ZT'9006896'K0'005099'K0-Z>8C600000005099T0-TCLL'KZ'0-ZZGCTG0Z08C6004'K0T0T80T0T,O'ZTT useofspecialistsfromotherutilities.AssessmentresultsaredocumentedinACTIONReportsandarereportedtotheassessor'smanagement,thesupervisoranddivisionheadhavingresponsibilityintheareaassessed,and,foraudits,totheNuclearSafetyAuditandReviewBoard.Thepersonhavingsupervisoryresponsibilityintheareaassessedisrequiredtoreviewtheresults,takenecessaryactiontocorrectthedeficienciesidentifiedbythereport,andthendocumentandreportthecorrectiveaction.QAprovidesfollow-upactiononauditresponsesintendedtoensurethatcorrectiveactionisadequate,assignedtargetcompletiondatesaretimely,andthatcorrectiveactionisimplementedforeachfindingrequiringaresponse.E.2.C.ProcessWeaknessesIdentifiedbyQAInthecourseofperformingtheirindependentoversightandauditingfunctions,RG&EQAhascitedorganizationaldeficienciesandweaknesses.Forexample,areviewofAnnualQAAuditsfor1994-1996(viadatabasequery)identifiedthefollowingconfigurationcontrolandcorrectiveactionconcerns/deficiencies:ConfigurationControl-The1994QAauditofconfigurationcontrolidentifiedaconcernthatresponsibilitiesforvendormanualcreationandreviewwerenotclearlydefinedbetweenEngineeringandProcurement.TheChangeImpactEvaluation(CIE)formofIP-DES-02,PlantChangeProcess,nowallowstheEngineertoclearlyindicatetheresponsibilityforVTMs.The1995QAauditidentifiedfiveconcernsandonedeficiency.QAconcernsregardingevaluationofchangeimpact,especiallyfor"equivalent"changes,resultedinrevisionstotheCIEformandassociatedproceduresfor1)considerationofimpactonISI/ISTprogramsand2)theadditionofmicroprocessor-controlledcomponentstoitemstobeconsideredforpotentialsoftwarechangeimpacts.AdeficiencyregardingpostingoftemporarymodificationsintheControlRoomleadarevisiontoA-1406,ControlofTemporaryModifications,toindicatethatlabels,providedintheassociatedWorkPackage,aretobeaffixedtotheControlRoomP&IDstoreflectthetemporarymodifications.CorrectiveAction-The1995QAauditidentifiedfourconcerns,includingoneregardingtheneedtoclarifythedefinition.ofnon-conformingitemstoensurethatallsuchitemsare,reviewedinaccordancewith10CFR21andthatadequatecontrolsareplacedontheuseofsuchitemswhiletheyarebeingdispositioned.,Asaresult,IP-CAP-02,AbnormalConditionTrackingInitiationorNotification(ACTION)Report,wasrevisedtoclarifythedefinitionofnnon-conformingitem"andtosetatimelimitforthedispositionertodetermineifanon-conformingitemisinvolved.Thetimelimitiscommensuratewith10CFR21reportingrequirementsaswellastheneedtoimposeappropriateandtimelycontrolsontheuseofnon-conformingitems.The1996QAauditofcorrectiveactionidentifiedadeficiencyinRG&E'sabilitytotrackandtrendlowlevel(ofsignificance)plantequipmentdegradation.Specifically,theauditfoundnumerousWorkOrdersforvalveleaks,includingseveralidenticalvalve-typegroupswithmultiplepackingleaks.Asaresultofthisfinding,RG&EhasraisedtheawarenessofSystemsEngineeringregarding10CFR50.54(l)Rcsponsc-AttachmentEFinalRcportPage722/7/97 h41Ei&M~~t%\c/x~

multipleproblemswithinagivensystem,eventhoughtheyareinsignificantwhentakenseparately.Also,theACTIONReportprocesswasrevisedtoaddanewlow-level-of-significancecategoryfortrendingonly(CategoryD)toassistplantpersonnelintheidentificationandtrendingoflowlevelplantequipmentdegradationconcerns,TheaboveQAauditfindingsandresultingcorrectiveactionsprovideexamplesthatRGB'sconstantlyevaluatingtheeffectivenessofprocessesandlookingformethodstoincreasethateffectivenessthroughselfevaluations.E.2.DPROCESSSTRENGTHSIDENTIFIEDBYAThefollowingisa,samplingofthestrengthscitedbyRG&EQAasaresultofauditsconductedwithinthelastthreeyears:~AttentiontodetailintherequiredcontentandreviewoftheASMESectionXIRepairandReplacementProgramdocumentation(GORRForms)bytheISIorganization.~Baseduponreviewbytechnicalspecialistsfromotherutilities,thenewplantdesigncontrolprocess(PCR)incorporatesseveralstandardfeaturesthatshouldimprovetheaccuracyofchangeimpactevaluationsandthequalityofdocumentationforplantchanges.~ThePORCChairman'sreviewandprioritizationofACTIONReportsfordispositionfocusesorganizationalresourcesandattentiononsignificantconditions./~GinnausesACTIONReportcausecodetrendingandnotjustcase-by-caserootcauseevaluationsasameansofearlydetectionofadversequalitytrends.~Thelevelofattentionpaidtoplantfireprotectionsystemshasresultedinmostimpairmentstothesesystemsbeingplannedevolutionsformaintenance/operatingactivitiesratherthanbeingcausedbyequipmentfailures.Thedurationofmostsuchimpairmentsisshort(lto3shifts).Theseeffortshaveminimizedrelianceuponfirewatches.~TheconductofSignificant,InfrequentlyPerformedEvolutions(SIPEs)hasbeenstrengthenedbythoroughpreparednessandopennessduringpre-SIPEbriefingswithOperations.E.3.THIRDPARTYREVIEWSOFRG&EPROCESSESE.3.A.NRCInspectionsandResultsNRCInspectorsperformcontinuousinspectionsatGinna.TheseinspectionsareconductedpertheNRCInspectionManualandInspectionProcedures,whichdefinecoreinspections.IOCFR50.54(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentEFinalRcPcrtPage732/7/97 G008EZ0-99ZC'KG0C809GT0-CG6C6000000C809GT0-GOCSTZ0-99ZC'KG0CG6C600LT0T0E8070'K07'KET AlthoughconfigurationmanagementisanelementofallinspectionsbytheResidentInspectors,itistheNRCRegionalOfficewhichperformsdesign,engineering,andprogrammaticconfigurationmanagementinspections(atleastthreeengineeringinspectionsperSALPperiod).NRCInspectionReports(IRs)arereceivedandreviewedbytheVicePresident,NuclearOperations,whoassignsresponsibilityforactionitemsandhasthemtrackedbytheCommitmentandActionTrackingSystem(CATS)untiltheyarecompleted.ThevariousprocessesandprogramsdiscussedhereinuponwhichRG&EreliestomaintainplantconfigurationandoperationconsistentwiththedesignbaseshavebeenscrutinizedbytheNRConaregularbasis.Asonemeasureoftheadequacyoftheseprocessesandprograms,RG&EreviewedNRCIRsforGinnafor,thepastsixyears(1990-1996).NRCinspectionsandassociatedreportshavebeenvaluableinfocusingattentiononweaknessesanddeficiencieswithinourprocessesandprograms;however,thereportsalsoindicateanumberofareasinwhichthesesameprocessesandprogramsareproceedingsatisfactorily.Specificrecurringthemesare:~ReferencetoconsistencybetweentheUFSARandtheplantandtoadequatelymaintaineddesignbases(NRCIRs93-03,93-09,93-13,93-23,94-03,94-07,94-14,95-01,96-02,and96-05).~Referencetoanadequatemodificationcontrolprocess(NRCIRs90-05,90-17,91-02,91-05,92-12,93-19,93-22,94-02,94-07,94-12,94-14,94-15,95-02,95-02,95-15,95-20,and96-05).~Referencetoanadequate10CFR50.59evaluationprocess(NRCIRs90-09,90-17,93-16,and94-11).~Referencetoanadequatecorrectiveactionprocess(NRCIRs94-09,94-12,94-16,95-01,and96-05)~SatisfactoryoversightandreviewbyEngineering,QA,thePlantOperationsReviewCommittee(PORC),andtheNuclearSafetyAuditandReviewBoard(NSARB)andappropriateself-assessments(NRCIRs91-29,92-09,92-10,92-12,92-15,93-06,93-12,94-07,94-09,94-10,94-11,94-26,and94-27).TheNRChasalsoscrutinizedourproceduresforcompliancetoregulationsanddesignbases.AreviewofNRCInspectionReports(IRs)since1990indicatesthefollowingstrengthswithrespecttoplantprocessesandprocedures:~Referencetoastronginserviceinspection(ISI)programwhichmeetsregulatoryrequirements(NRCIRs92-06,90-06,91-20,92-11,and93-02)lOCFRSO.S4(f)Rcsponso-AttachmentEFinalRcportPage742/7/97 e4~ljE~:0QBQS

~Referencetoastrongandtechnicallyadequateerosion/corrosionprogram(NRCIRs92-09,90-06,91-20,and92-11)~Referencetoprocesseswhichresultinadequateandtimelyresolution/implementationofNRCconcernsandnoticesincluding:0Spentfuelpooldesignbasesacceptability(NRCEs96-03and96-05)0PumpminimumrecirculationflowprovisionsperBulletin88-04(NRCE90-24)0Provisionsforlow-loop/mid-loopoperationsperGL88-17(NRCIR91-18)0ResponsestoNRCInformationNotices(INs)asindicatedbysamplingresponsestovariousINsincluding92-53,91-29,91-51(NRCEs93-21and94-26)0Effectiveimplementationof10CFR21requirements(NRCIR93-12)0AdequateOperatorWork-Aroundprogram(NRCIR96-005)E.3.B.EvaluationofNRCNoticesofViolation(NOVs)OverthelifeofGinnaStation,RG&Ehasdevelopedandimplementedthepractices,processes,andprogramsdiscussedaboveaspartofourcontinuingefforttomaintainplantconfigurationandoperationconsistentwiththedesignbases.TheNRChasconductednumerousinspectionsofGinnaanditsoperation.Asonemeasureoftheeffectivenessofourefforts,RG&EreviewedtheNOVsreceivedoverthepast15years.ByreviewingNRCInspectionReportsbeginningin1982,RG&EidentifiedNOVswhichappeartobetheresultofincorrectorinadequateknowledgeoftheplantdesignbases.AdditionalNOVswereselectedwhichciteplantconfigurationsorconditionswhichappeartobeinconsistentwiththedesignbases.Ofthelatter,abouthalfaretheresultofprogramdeficiencies,andhalfaretheresultoffailuretofollowprocedures(bothrepresentaconditioninwhichknowndesignbasesinformationwasnotadequatelycommunicatedforimplementationinthefield).RG&E'sevaluationoftheseNOVsresultingfromincorrectlyorinadequatelycommunicateddesignbasesinformationindicatesthat,althougheachoftheserepresentedaproblemwiththeassociatedequipment,theactualimpacttopublichealthandsafetywas,ineachcase,minimal.ThisisnottosaythattheviolationswerenotofconcerntoRG&Eorthatvigorouscorrectiveactionwasnotwarrantedortaken.Rather,itisanindicationoftherobustnessoftheplant'sdefense-in-depthwhichaddstoourconfidenceinthesafetyoftheplantanditssafetysystems.Additionally,manyoftheNOVswere1)self-identifiedbyRG&Eor2)detectedwithinaveryshorttime(1day)ofthedeficiencyoccurring.ThisgivesRG&Econfidencethatsurveillancesandself-checkingcontributetothecontinuedsafetyoftheplant.110CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentEFinalRePettPage752/7/97 O'K999L9C'0L809T900000000999L9C'0-L80979'00LTOE0L80'K0'K0T0T.L TheNRC-cited.violationsregardingdesignbasesproblemsappeartobedividedintotheareasofunderstandingourdesignbases,ourabilitytocommunicatedesignbasesinformation,andourabilitytocomplywithspecifieddesignbasesrequirements.RG&EcontinuesefFortstoimproveineachoftheseareas,e.g.,bydesignbasesdocumentretrievalanddevelopment,UFSARverificationeForts,andemphasisonproceduralcompliance.Insummary,ourreviewofNOVsindicatesthat,inthoseincidentsinwhichconfigurationhasnotbeensatisfactory,thepotentialimpactonpublicsafetyhasbeenminimal,theproblemshavebeencorrected,andourprocesseshavebeenimprovedtominimizethepotentialforrecurrence.E.3.C.SafetySystemFunctionalInspections(SSFIs)RESIDUALHEATREMOVAL'SYSTEMTheNRCconductedanSSFIoftheRHRSystemanditssupportingsystemsoverafive-weekperiodduringNovemberandDecemberof1989(NRCIR89-81).Thesix-memberNRCteamdidnotidentify'anyconditionsthatwouldprohibittheRHRsystemfromperformingitsintendedfunctionsundernormalordesignbasisaccidentconditions.Themajorityoftheteam'sfindingswereassociat'edwiththetopicof"engineeringassurance",whichreferr'edtoitemssuchascontrolofdocumentation,engineeringdesigninterfaces,andengineeringcommunicationswithexternalorganizations.Concernswithengineeringassurancealsoincludedlackofconsistencyintheimplementationofapprovedengineeringproceduresamongthevariousdepartmentsandweaknessesintheprocessforresolvingsafetyconcernsraisedoutsidethemodificationprocess.-Thelackofthoroughdesignbasisdocumentationwasalsonotedasagenericweaknessinthedocumentationanddesignprocessexistingatthetime.BothofthetwoviolationsissuedasaresultoftheSSFIinvolvedcontroloftechnicalinformation.SubsequenttotheRHRSSFI,RG&EperformedacomprehensiveassessmentoftheSSFIfindings.ThatassessmentledtomajorprocessimprovementstocorrecttheweaknessescitedintheSSFIInspectionReport.Specifically:~AnimprovedPlantChangeProcesswasimplementedtoenhancethecontrolofmodifications.~AnewcomputerizedConfigurationManagementInformationSystem(CMIS)wasdeveloped.~AsearchablelistofdesignanalyseswasstoredinCMIS.~ADesignDocumentRetrievalprojectwasinitiated.~Commonproceduresweredevelopedforcertainproce'ssesapplicableto.bothEngineeringandPlantpersonnel.10CFR50.S4(f)Rcsponsc-AttachmentEFinalRcportPage76217/97 w>4nl"~'-0T'/'KT

~DesignEngineerswereassignedindividualsystemresponsibilities.ThiswasafirststeptowardimplementingaSystemsEngineeringgroup.~AsingleentrypointreportingprocesswasrecommendedtopermitpersonnelwithinallgroupssupportingGinnaStationtoraiseissuesofconcernandtohavethoseconcernstrackedtoresolution.ThislaterbecametheGinnaACTIONReport.~RG&Edevelopedatestprogramformoldedcasecircuitbreakers.Acceptabilityoftheprogramwasconfirmedinthe1991NRCElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspection(EDSFI).~Engineeringprocedureswererevised.toadequatelycontrolchangestobatteryandemergencydieselgeneratorloadings.ELECTRICALDISTRIBUTION'SYSTEMFUNTIONALINSPECTIONDSFITheNRCconductedanSSFIoftheElectricalDistributionSystemanditssupportingsystemsoverafive-weekperiodduringMayandJuneof1991.Thesix-memberNRCteamconcludedthattheGinnaelectricaldistribution,systemwascapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionandtheengineeringorganizationprovidesadequateengineeringsupportforthesafeoperationoftheplant.OneNotice.ofViolationandonetwo-partNoticeofDeviationwereissuedasaresultoftheEDSFI.Issuescitedintheviolationwereresolvedbyadditionalanalysesandconfirmatorytesting.TheportionofthedeviationconcerningtheconfigurationofbustiebreakerBT17-18wasresolvedbychangingthecomponentconfigurationandrevisingthesupportingprocedures;theportionconcerningcontrolcablestotheComponentCoolingWatersystempumpswasresolvedviaamodificationperformedduringthefollowingrefuelingoutage.NumerousaspectsoftheelectricaldistributionsystemanditssupportingsystemswerereviewedbytheNRCinspectionteam.Althoughanumberofconcernswerenoted,theteamjudgedthatthesewereeitheroflowsignificanceorwerenotsafetyissues.SERVICEWATERSYSTEMOPERATIONALPERFORMANCEINSPECTION~SWSOPIn1991,theNRCconductedaSWSOPIatGinna.Thesix-memberSWSOPIspentthreeweeksassessingtheoperationalperformanceoftheSWsystem.Amajorityoftheteam'sfindingswereassociatedwithapparenterrorsandomissionsinthedesignbasesfortheSWsystem.TheNRCSWSOPIteamconcludedthatapresumptionofoperabilitywaswarrantedfortheGinnaSWsystemwhileSWSOPIissueswereresolved.OperabilitywasconfirmedbysubsequentanalysesandtestswhichdemonstratedthattheSWsystemwascapableofperformingitsdesignbasisfunctions.InresponsetoGL89-13andtheSWSOPI,RG&Eembarkeduponanextensiveeffortofcombinedanalysesandtestingtoresolveconcernsraised.Basedupontheseefforts,RG&EbelievesthereisreasonableassurancethattheUFSARreflectsthedesignbasesoftheSW10CFR50.54(f)Response-AttachmentEFinalRcPettPage772fl/97 00CTT89C0-C809T90000089COG60CTC89C'0-C809E900LTO'K0T'0T0C0TTTT systemandthatthecurrentSWsystemconfigurationisconsistentwiththosedesignbases.Asdiscussedelsewherewithinthisdocument,RG&EselectedtheSWsystemforthepilotNEIpilotinitiativeregardingUFSARfidelity.Althoughmanyclarificationswereneeded,onlyonepotentialdifferenceresultedinamorein-depthevaluation,andthiswas'determinednottoinvolveaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Thispotentialdifference,regardingtheminimumrequirednumberofSWpumps,hasbeenanalyzedbyRG&E,submittedtotheNRC,andiscurrentlyunderreview.AUXILIARYFEEDWATERAFIn1988,RG&EinitiatedEWR4749toperformitsfirstinternalsafetysystemfunctionalinspection(SSFI).TheAFWsystemwasselected.TheSSFIwasconductedbyathird-partyconsultantandrepresentedmorethan1500man-hoursofeffortoverathreemonthperiod.TheresultsofthatSSFIindicatedthatthelackofeasilyaccessibledesign,operational,andmaintenanceinformationwasaprogrammaticdeficiencywhichwastherootcauseofamajorityofthefindingsofthatSSFIinspection.TheSSFIresultedin73observations.Eachobservationwasevaluatedandarecommendationforresolutionwasmade.Theobservationswereeithersatisfactorilyresolvedortrackedlong-termbyRG&EQA/QC.TheAFWSSFIalertedmanagementtotheneedfor,andinitiated,manyoftheconfigurationanddesignbaseseffortsconductedbyRG&Einthe1990s(describedelsewhereinthisreport).SpecificobservationsmadeduringthisSSFIwere:~Lackof"adequatetestingofsystemmotor-operatedvalves(MOVs)andcheckvalves~Needforimproveddocumentcontrol~Needforincreaseddetailintheworkcontrolprocedures~Needforupgradetothemaintenancehistoryfiles~Needforimproveddesigncontrol,includingchecklistsforuniformityofdesign~Needforimprovedworkprioritizationandtracking~Needforenhancedrootcausetracking,trending,andanalysis.INSTRUMENTAIRIAAspartoftheresponsetoindustryconcernsaswellasNRCrequirements(GenericLetter88-14)forreviewofIAsystems,RG&EperformedanAuxiliarySystemFunctionalInspection(ASFI)oftheIAsystemsatGinna.Thisinspectionwasanin-depthinvestigationintothedesignadequacyandoperationalreadinessoftheIAsystem.TheASFIwasconductedbyathird-partyconsultantwhoconcludedthattheIAsystemwascapableofreliablydeliveringhighqualityairtoIAloadsinsufficientvolumetomeetdesignrequirements.Nodeficienciesaffectingtheabilityofsafety-relatedequipmenttoperformdesignfunctionswerediscoveredduringtheASFI.TheASFIdidrecommendthatRG&Eperformarepairvs.replacementcost-benefitanalysisforthecompressors.The"C"IAcompressorwassubsequentlyreplacedwithanew,screw-typecompressor.10CFRS0.54(f)Response-AttachmentEFinalRcportPage782/1/97

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