IR 05000333/2022010

Reissued Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000333/2022010

ML22178A137
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	06/27/2022
From:	Mel Gray Division of Operating Reactors
To:	Rhoades D Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear
Gray M
References
IR 2022-010
Download: ML22178A137 (16)

Text

June 27, 2022

SUBJECT:

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - REISSUED DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2022010

Dear Mr. Rhoades:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) identified one factual error in Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000333/2022010, dated June 2, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22153A261). The cover letter and report cover page listed the inspection end date as May 20, 2022, whereas the inspection ended on May 19, 2022. As a result, the NRC has reissued the report in its entirety to correct the error.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket No. 05000333 License No. DPR-59

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000333

License Number:

DPR-59

Report Number:

05000333/2022010

Licensee:

Constellation Energy Generation, LLC

Facility:

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

Location:

Scriba, NY

Inspection Dates:

May 2, 2022 to May 19, 2022

Inspectors:

C. Bickett, Senior Reactor Inspector

J. Brand, Reactor Inspector

P. Cataldo, Senior Reactor Inspector

E. Dipaolo, Senior Reactor Inspector

E. Eve, Senior Reactor Inspector

J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector

Approved By:

Mel Gray, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of 'B' Station Battery Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000333/2022010-01 Open/Closed

[H.8] -

Procedure Adherence 71111.21M The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion XI, Test Control, because Constellation personnel did not perform battery testing in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1) the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite; 2) technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing; 3) the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge; and 4)records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at various stages of the test were not included in the official test record.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)

=

The team evaluated the following components, permanent modifications, and operating experience during the weeks of May 2 and May 16, 2022.

For the components, the team reviewed the attributes listed in IP 71111.21M, Appendix A, Component Review Attributes, such as those listed below. Specifically, the team evaluated these attributes as per IP 71111.21M, Appendix B, Component Design Review Considerations and 71111.21M, Appendix C, Component Walkdown Considerations. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Documents Reviewed section.

(1) Loss of AC Bus 10500 Initiating Event

• Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)

• Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures

• Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures

• Maintenance records and corrective action history

• Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)

• Surveillance testing and test results

• System and component level performance monitoring

• Equipment protection from fire, flood, water intrusion, or spray

• Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation

• Control logic

• Component adequacy for minimum voltage

• Protection coordination (load in-rush and full load current)

• Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation

• Operator actions

• Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)

• Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electrical Loads, and Motor Control Centers (MCCs).

(2) High Pressure Coolant Injection System (Failure to Run)

• Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)

• Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures

• Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures

• System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history

• Surveillance testing and test results

• System and component level performance monitoring

• Control logic

• Operator actions

• Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)

• Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.

(3) Containment Venting (Loss of Function)

• Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)

• Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures

• Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures

• System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history

• Equipment/environmental controls and qualification

• Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)

• Surveillance testing and test results

• System and component level performance monitoring

• Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray

• Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation

• Control logic

• Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation

• Operator actions

• Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)

• Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.

(4) B 125 Vdc Battery (SB-2) and Battery B Control Board (BCB-2B)

• Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)

• Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures

• Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures

• Maintenance records and corrective action history

• Equipment/environmental controls and qualification

• Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)

• Surveillance testing and test results

• System and component level performance monitoring

• Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray

• Ventilation for temperature control and hydrogen removal

• Circuit breaker and fuse ratings

• Component adequacy for minimum voltage

• Protection coordination (load in-rush, full load current, and short-circuit protection)

• Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation

• Operator actions

• Energy source availability (charger availability, capability, and reliability)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electric Loads, and Motor Control Centers (MCCs).

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) B Loop Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray (Loss of Function)

• Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)

• Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures

• Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures

• System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history

• Equipment/environmental controls and qualification

• Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)

• Surveillance testing and test results

• System and component level performance monitoring

• Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray

• Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation

• Control logic

• Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation

• Operator actions

• Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)

• Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)

(1) EC 626665, Replace 10MOV-26B Double Lead Screw Form Stem with Single Lead Screw Form Stem

(2) EC 627111, Torus Wide Range Pressure Transmitter 27PT-101A Replacement

(3) EC 628065, 72MOD-101B(OP) Replacement with New Model Operator

(4) EC 629418, Evaluate Use of 3 Basket Hold Down Bolts in ESW Strainer

(5) EC 632618, Evaluate Replacement of 23HPI-149 from Vogt Ball Check to a Velan Piston Check

Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) NRC Information Notice 2019-01: Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations

(2) NRC Information Notice 2020-02: FLEX Diesel Generator Operational Challenges; Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2020/01 was used to inform the inspection sample

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of 'B' Station Battery Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems

Green NCV 05000333/2022010-01 Open/Closed

[H.8] -

Procedure Adherence 71111.21M The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because Constellation personnel did not perform battery testing in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1) the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite; 2) technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing; 3) the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge; and 4)records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at various stages of the test were not included in the official test record.

Description:

Constellation completed a battery modified performance discharge test on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) on September 18, 2020, to satisfy Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.3, to verify adequate battery capacity to support emergency loads, and TS SR 3.8.4.4, to verify battery capacity was > 80 percent of the manufacturers rating. Per the TS SR 3.8.4.4 Bases, the acceptance criteria for battery testing are consistent with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 450, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, 1995 (IEEE 450).

The team reviewed the documentation for the battery modified performance discharge test performed in accordance with Constellation procedure MST-071.24, Station Battery B Modified Performance Test, Revision 19. The team identified several instances where the test procedure was not followed and/or the problem was not entered into the corrective action program.

First, the battery terminal voltage before starting the test did not meet the test prerequisite.

MST-071.24, Prerequisite Step 8.13 required that the battery be on a float charge with battery terminal voltage between 131 - 133V DC. Actual voltage was 136V DC due to the battery being charged by the swing charger and technicians believed the swing charger voltage could not be adjusted to the required range. This was discussed with the on-shift senior reactor operator and the decision made to continue with the test. The actual voltage of 136V DC was within the equalizing charge range. IEEE 450 specifies that the battery be on a float charge for a minimum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following being on an equalizing charge prior to starting the discharge test.

Second, technicians did not ensure that adequate and reliable power was available for test equipment as stated in the test prerequisites. MST-071.24, Prerequisite Step 8.11 required technicians to Ensure an AC outlet (nominal 120 VAC, 20 Amp) is available for test equipment and other outlets on circuit are not used during test except to power test equipment. Tag other outlets as necessary. The purpose of this step was to ensure a reliable control power source to the battery test equipment during the performance of the test.

Constellation personnel did not adequately perform this step. As a result, at approximately 16 minutes into the test, the power supply was lost to the test equipment. This resulted in an 11.53 minute pause in testing. IEEE 450 only provides for one short duration pause in testing (10 percent of the test duration or 6 minutes, whichever is shorter) for the specific purpose of disconnecting a battery cell that is approaching reversal of polarity early in the test. Test data showed that battery terminal voltage was higher when the load was reapplied than prior to the pause in testing. This demonstrated that the battery recovered during the pause and that the battery test would indicate a higher battery capacity than if no pause occurred. The team noted that technicians did not initiate a corrective action issue report (IR) for this problem encountered during the testing.

Third, the 11.53 minute duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge. This resulted in a higher and non-conservative calculated battery capacity versus actual capacity.

Fourth, records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at the beginning of the test, at specified intervals, and at the completion of the test per the guidance contained in IEEE 450 were not included in the official test record.

Specifically, personnel did not comply with Step 10.7 which stated to Obtain a printout of the individual cell voltages from the Alber BCT 2000 test equipment and include in work package.

Corrective Actions: Constellations short-term corrective actions included performing a technical evaluation (EC 636754) to assess battery operability and capacity of the B 125V DC station service battery and entering the issues into their corrective action program.

Factoring in the pause in the testing and other considerations, Constellation staff determined that the worst-case battery capacity was 101.08 percent (as compared to the battery capacity of 106.8 percent recorded following the test in September 2020). This demonstrated that the battery had margin to the TS required > 80 percent capacity and that the battery did not show signs of degradation (i.e., capacity was not greater than 10 percent lower than the previous modified performance discharge test).

Corrective Action References: IRs 4497226, 4497328, 4497663, and 4497832.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to conduct modified performance discharge testing on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) on September 18, 2020, in accordance with written test procedures consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria contained in IEEE 450. Specifically, the test was started with battery terminal voltage in the equalize range, technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing, the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge, and records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages were not included in the official test record.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Though the performance deficiency occurred while the plant was shut down, the assessment of risk was best represented by using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, of IMC 0609, Appendix A. The team determined that this finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of mitigating structures, systems, or components, where the structures, systems, or components maintained their operability or functionality. Although not performed consistent with the acceptance criteria of IEEE 450, the test did demonstrate with reasonable confidence that there was sufficient margin to the TS required battery capacity of > 80 percent. Therefore, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, Constellation personnel did not follow the modified performance discharge test procedure when performing the test on the B 125V DC station service battery on September 18, 2020.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Constellation was committed to perform battery modified performance discharge testing consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria of IEEE 450 and required to perform battery modified performance discharge testing of the B 125V DC station service battery in accordance with MST-071.24, Station Battery B Modified Performance Test, Revision 19.

Contrary to the above, on September 18, 2020, Constellation personnel did not perform battery modified performance discharge testing on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) in accordance with written test procedures consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria contained in IEEE 450. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1)the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite (required range 131-133V DC versus actual 136V DC and was in the equalizing charge range which was not consistent with IEEE 450); 2) technicians did not ensure that adequate and reliable power was available for test equipment as stated in the test prerequisites (the loss of power to test equipment during the test resulted in an 11.53-minute test interruption which was not consistent with IEEE 450); 3) including the 11.53 minute duration of the pause in testing from the total duration of the battery discharge resulted in a higher and non-conservative calculated battery capacity versus actual capacity; and 4) records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at the beginning of the test, at specified intervals, and at the completion of the test per IEEE 450 guidance were not included in the official test record. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into Constellations corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 05000333/20220010-01, Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of B Station Battery)

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On May 19, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. Timothy Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.21M Calculations

JAF-CALC-15-

00031

FLEX Strategy - Portable Generator System Sizing

Revision 0

JAF-CALC-CAD-

04481

Design Basis Calculations for the Torus Inner and Outer

Exhaust AOVs 27AOV-117 & 27AOV-118 at FitzPatrick NPP

Revision 0

JAF-CALC-

ELEC-02016

25V DC System Short-Circuit Calculation and Coordination

Evaluation

Revision 1

JAF-CALC-

ELEC-02551

Determination of Float and Equalize Voltage for Station

Batteries 71SB-1 & 71SB2

Revision 1

JAF-CALC-SWS-

04170

Local Wall Thinning Evaluation for ESW Strainers 46STR-

5A/B

Revision 2C

Corrective Action

Documents

04036374

04176609

221269

246355

252619

252625

266619

290349

04319445

04323766

04335008

04339876

04347868

04348143

04369686

04371604

04371715

04372411

04372680

04373277

04374549

04377286

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

04381156

04384096

04384807

04385340

04389930

04394054

04401931

04407061

04425606

04425805

04428931

04455782

04467798

04483344

04483639

04483997

04496433

04496616

04497610

CR-JAF-2007-

03363

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

04497169

04497226

04497328

04497349

04497394

04497395

04497409

04497663

04497664

04497672

04497680

04497832

04497910

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

04497962

04497964

04497965

04497967

04497969

04497970

04497997

04498019

04498006

04498022

04498129

04498210

04499080

04500102

04500121

04500293

04500320

04500330

04500418

04500553

04500554

04500555

04500563

04500635

04500821

Drawings

FE-1H Sh. 4

4160V One Line Diagram Emergency Bus 10500

Revision 14

FM-20A

Residual Heat Removal System Flow Diagram

Revision 73

FM-25A

High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Diagram

Revision 75

Miscellaneous

DBD-023

Design Basis Document for the High Pressure Coolant

Injection System

Revision 12

E406-0001

200 KW FLEX Diesel Generator

Revision 1

G185-0029

Instruction Manuals for 60 Cells NCN-33 or NCN-35 (GNB

Industrial Power)

dated

9/11/11

JAF-SPEC-MISC-

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Piping

Revision 15

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

00334

Specification

NRC Information Notice 2017-06

Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current

Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution

System

dated

9/26/17

OP-AA-102-106,

Att. 1

Operator Response Time Validation Sheet

performed

11/12/20

P319-0047

Three-Phase Magnetic Amplifier Controlled CP Battery

Charger

Revision 8

RHR 2B 10E-2B

Preliminary Report of Eddy Current Inspections

dated

11/20/13

SDLP-23

High Pressure Coolant Injection System

Revision 28

ST-1CA

Outside Primary Containment Isolation Valve Exercise Test

(IST)

performed

3/16/22

ST-2AK

RHR Loop B Containment Spray Headers and Nozzles Air

Test (ISI)

performed

9/23/12

ST-2AM

RHR Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST)

performed

3/10/21 &

3/8/22

Procedures

AOP-18

Loss of 10500 Bus

Revision 18

AOP-19

Loss of 10600 Bus

Revision 18

CC-JF-118

Site Implementation of Diverse and Flexible Coping

Strategies (FLEX) and Spent Fuel Instrumentation Program

Revision 5

EP-6

Post Accident Containment Venting and Gas Control

Revision 13

OP-13

Residual Heat Removal System

Revision 100

OP-15

High Pressure Coolant Injection

Revision 69

Work Orders

205886

00340684

04655870

04806288

04806289

04915450

04938333

04938334

04938915

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

04943427

04964506

05043091

05047158

05131958

05131959

05150464

05150801

2606584

2705256

2740044

99-01814-00