ML20106F391

Human Factors Engineering Detailed Control Room Design Review In-Progress Audit,Cooper Nuclear Station

ML20106F391
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	12/28/1984
From:	Johnson G LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20106F394	List: ML20106F391
References
TAC-56114, NUDOCS 8502130522
Download: ML20106F391 (16)

Text

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ENCLOSURE l

HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW IN-PROGRESS AUDIT NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT COOPER NUCLEAR STATION

( Gary L. Johnson L. Rolf Peterson Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory December 28, 1984 l

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Human Factors Engineering Det&iled Control Room Design Review In-Progress Audit Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station

1. INTRODUCTION On November 27 through 30, 1984, Detailed Control (NPPD) for the Roon.Station.

Cooper Nuclear Design Review (DCRDR) by Nebraska Public will staff. (sprove the DCRDR and further its ultimate acc evaluation [1] of the Cooper DCRDR Program Plan [2].Of particul The audit team was composed of two persons from the RC Human Factors Laboratory, acting as consultants to the NRC. Engineering Branch

-During the course of the audit, the 15tC audit team discussed all aspects of the DCRDR program with NPPD and their DCRDR consultant, General Electric Assessment processofwas Documentation thereviewed ControlinRoom detail. Survey, Function and Task Analysis, and H

[ . ;. . visited the control room to audit the extent to which the survey discoveredA

,' and documented human engineering deficiencies (HEDs), and to evaluate how the Assessment process identified HEDs that are significant and warrant correction.

A discussion of NPPD activities in each DCRDR topic area, identified by Supplement I to.NUREG-0737, and the corresponding audit team assessment each area 'follows.

2. DISCUSSION 2.1. DCRDR REVIEW TEAM 2.1.1. Requirement multidisciplinary review team to conduct a DCRDR. Supplement Guidelines for review team selection are found 18.1 of the Standard in Plan, Review NUREG-0700, NUREG-0800 Draft NUREG-0801, and Appendix A to S i

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2.1.2. Audit Team Observations The core of the Cooper DCRDR team consists of:

e The Station Operations Manager e

A Shift Technical Advisor with previous experience as a Shift Supervisor A Senior Systems Engineer from General Electric e

A Human Factors Scientist as a Consultant to General Electric  ;

Each member activities, of this core team participated in the majority of DCRDR i

Individuals with expertise in the areas of operations, systems engineering, human to the corefactors team. engineering, and instrumentation, and control provided support DCRDR Manager. team management and administration is provided by the NPPD Dperations equipment, and facilities required to support the DCRDR effort.Th It was'noted General that most DCRDR documentation is currently in the possession of Electric.

2.t.3. Audit Team Assessment r-(,'- The raised audit resolved1.questions regarding the composition of the review team in Reference complied with the DCRDR team requirements of NUREG-0737, Su i NPPD should note that they will eventually be required to have copie i

documentation in the CNS files for quality assurance (OA) purposes. This s of DCRDR documentation should also be made readily available to the individuals and organizations responsible for correcting HEDs.

2.2. FUNCTIDN AND TASK ANALYSIS 2.2.1. Requirement Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires the applicant to perform systems function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks and to identify control room operator information and control requirements during emergency operations.

Supplesent 1 to NUREG-0737 recommends the use of function and operating procedures technical guidelines and plant-spe operating procedures to define these requirements.

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2.2.2. Audit Team Observations The DCRDR team identified operator instrument and control needs to per Operating Procedures (EOPs). emergency operations tasks defined in the C These E0Ps were derived from generic symptom-based Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) developed upby the BWR and included consideration of instrument loop accuracy during accident conditions in the establishment of operator action, control, and caution points.

and task analysis to support development of the EPGs and

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a varying degree of detail as determined necessary b conducting this effort.

accuracy, and the availability Characteristics related and of instrument to indicator control resolution or various loops under plant power supply and environmental conditions, generally were not identified.

carried through to emergency and normal procedur E0Ps and explicitly referenced by the E0Ps the event-based Emergency Procedures curren. This effort was not extended to performance of the E0Ps but referenced only implicitly before the E0Ps are finally im WPPD indicated that existing Emergency Procedures.plemented they may be revised to incorporate

- They also expect to make procedure chan

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i( Management Information System (PMIS),Plant requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97 (R.G.1.97).

and instrum 2.2.3. Audit Team Assessment ,

The acceptability of basing the definition of informa without reyfewing the supporting task analysis.

1 separate IstC review of the E0P Task Analysis. Branch of the The methodology used to define the characteristics of information required to perform the E0Ps was generally acceptable. s and This methodology was information and control characteristics were not adequ analysis should be supplemented as follows to resolve theseNPPDs concerns:. )

o Characteristics relating to operability requirements (e.g., *r quality should be and equipment qualification) under accident conditier.

defined.

' e Requirements relating to indicator resolution should be defined for tasks in which the operator must determine the value of a parameter 3

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or compare caution point. the value of a parameter against a action, , or control e .

The level of detail in which required information rol and cont characteristics analysis. are defined should be consistent throughout conducted through coordFnation with the Revaluation of in must ensure that R.G.1.97 indications req.G.1.97 program.tions umy be relationship to associated controls. suitably engineered n proper from aj i

support of the DCRDR. programs that will provide the required evaluatio operability in The Function and Task Analysis must be carried through to i referenced normal operating procedures required to support perf and existing alone proceduresEmergency after the E0Ps Procedures are in place. to the extent mance ofthey stand-E0Ps adil be u Revision of the E0P Task Analysis gency also may be req procedures.

Emergency with the,EOPs. Procedures are incorporated into the E0Ps or if the existing used in conjunction of SPDS and PMIS prThe Function and eTask Analysis process m suggested, however,ocedures that support emergency operations.n the generation procedures. It is that NPPD apply this technique to all SPDS and PMIS NPPD's Summary Report should address how resolu or will be incorporated into the DCRDR program, tion of these comments has b 2.3 1 i

INVENT 0RY

, COMPARIS0N OF CONTROL AND MDISPLAY RE 2.3.1. Reavirement Supplament 1 to NUREG-0737 requires the applicant to com )

! display and control requirements determined parefrom the task the operator control room inventory to determine missing analyses with the and displa controls i

l in NUREG-0700 instruments requirements.

also used and controls callstofor a review satisfy operator of the humaesuitability o ys. Guidance iaforfactors 4

mation and control 1

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1 2.3.2. Audit Team Observations 4

the E0P steps, were compared against athe the control room during a series of EOP walkthroughs.

r instrum e in During these walkthroughs E0P steps was subjec the human factors suitability of controls and displays su control room survey.tively evaluated by the review team, as a backup tongthe 2.3.3. Audit Team Assessment i

The audit team concluded the NPPD method for comparing operator c information requirements with the control room inventoryo can be used t satisfy the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.

However, detailed Function and Task Analysis.information Thus and control needs were not the rigorous and systematic r.ompar,ison required toe determine th instruments emergency conditions and controls are. suitable to perform all operator uring tarks d to address the concer. Therefore, as the Function and Task Analysis is revised ns raised in the previous section, this comparison of information and control requirements with the characteristics e requirements of insta instruments and controls should be repeated to ensure all identified by the Function and Task Analysis have been addressed .

The evaluation of human factors suitability conducted as part of the number of " survey type" HEDs identified during this effo 2.4 CONTROL ROOM SURVEY 2.4.1. Requirement j .

Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires that a control room survey be c identify deviations from accepted human factors principles. onducted to provides pidelines and criteria for conducting NUREG-0700 a control room survey objective of the control room survey is to identify for assessment . The and possible correction the characteristics of displays panel layout, annunciators and alarms, control room,layoutcontrols, equipment

, and control room ambient conditions that do not conform to good human engineering p 2.4.2 .

Audit Team Observa M ons The Cooper Control Room Survey was conducted in three parts:

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A survey by a BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) team in 1981 was but not conducted all, controlagainst room panels.the BWROG survey checklist and included most ,

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Completion of the BWROG checklist by the NPPD sDCRDR team not included in the original survey, and review of significant human factors deviations identified by the BWROG survey.

This effort took 5

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place in 1984 survey w0re not reviewed by the NPPD team. Items rated as low lev 3)

NPPD team control room survey against a supplemental BWROG checklist but in 1984 not in the original Owners' Group checklist. developed t i This was also done  ;

The plant computer consoles were not included in the control room survey l because the existing plant computer is to be replaced in the near future .

i the human factors principles containedInin man NUREG-0700The BWR the specific evaluation criteria are different and imprecise.y cases, however, The 1981 BWROG and the 1984 NPPD survey evaluated each control room against the supplement. principles and criteria contained in the BWROG checklist and rating between one and four for each panel evaluated The by th anumber' whole. rating assigned represented the degree of conformance for the pane Thus, a panel containing severe deviations from human factors principles could be deemed "nearly in compliance" by the reviewer if the number which the of-deviations principle applied.on the panel was small compared to the number of item generally not recorded except for items assessed to HED be significant to reviewallow team. clear identification of the problem by individua

. As noted previously, the survey was supplemented by additional NPPD review

team observations of human factors suitability during their comparison of inforination and control requirements with the control room inventory During a control room inspection, the audit team noted the following HEDs i areas where complete, or near complete, compliance with the corresponding) checklist principles was indicated by the NPPD and BWROG surveys

o Panels VBD-A and VBO-C:

Several switch directions of movement are reversed from expected convention and from other switches on the boards, e Panel VBD-A:

Suction Temperature Indicator. Nonlinear, homemade, scale on Reactor Fe

{ e Panels VBD-A and VRD-C:

view of position indices and labels on switch escutcheons.Roun e Panel VBD-C:

Test, Reset, and Ground Reset Switches.No demarcation of Switchya 6

i 2.4.3. _ Audit Team Assessment As discussed in References 1 and 3, the use of the BWRO can be used to fulfill the survey requirements of NUREG-0737. Supplement 1.

I The audit team concluded, however, that documenting the degree of compliance

as an " average" for an entire panel, and failing to document observed deviations from human factors principles in sufficient detail to establish a basis the surveyfor the degree of compliance ratings assigned, is a misapplication of guideline.

This averaging approach may have caused specific or individual items which should have been HEDs to be dropped without adequate assessment.

section. This concern will be discussed in more detail in the next  !

Further, finding the HEDs noted above, that were neither identified by the NPPD survey nor the NPPD review of the 1981 BWROG survey, causes the audit

, Survey was conducted. team some concern about the consistency with which the C NPPD should determine if the apparently und HEDs indicate a systematic problem with the Cooper survey process.ocumented We recousnend that their findings and actions be discussed in the Summary Report.

Resolution of these items may require resurvey of the Cooper control room.

' criteria comparable to the NUREG-0700 checklists would survey that is superior to the BWROG checklist criteria.

Since the PMIS and SPDS are not yet installed and thus conventions applied to the control room as well as the NUREG-0700 principles relating to computers are applied to these new additions.

The audit team noted that a number of changes that'may affect the control room j environment and couswnications are anticipated.

be adversely affected by the environment is to be installed.Also, new equipment that may After these modifications be repeated. Agairi are completed, the environment and consnunications surveys should basis for these surv,eys that is superior to the BWROG checklist.we sugge During breathing apparatus and respirators should be evaluated, resurvey The insufficient audittoteamallow Engineering is concerned to develop thatmodifications the level of detail that will in the HED reco i

adequately team. correct HEDs without significant input from members of the DCRDR l

possible that team input may not be available towards the en process. i of detail in which HEDs are documented to the point where e clearly understood from the written documentation alone.

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2.5. ASSESSMENT OF HEDS 2.5.1. Requirement l Supplement I to NUREG-D737 requires that HEDs be assessed to determine which HEDs are significant and should be corrected.

j for the assessment process. NUREG-0700 contains guidelines i

2.5.2. Audit Team Observations NPPD's DCRDR assessment of HEDs was conducted in two parts.

Deviations from human factors principles identified during the control room surveys were screened by multiplying a number (one to four) assigned to i the likelihood that violation of the particular principle involved result in operator error.

If the resultant, the Evaluation Product, was further assessment. greater than eight, the deviation was considered to be an HED and called Human Engineering Observations (HE0s) and dropped from fu consideration Surveys were c. Discrepancies identified by the Task Analysis or Operator process. onsidered to be HEDs and were not subject to the screening Cooper's DCRDR team then split EDs into two categories:

those that can be corrected by enhancement and those that will require a design modification to correct.

HEDs that can be corrected by enhancement.The DCRDR team is recomen I

medium, or low /none safety importance categories based i

potential interactiveimpact upon safe effects among HEDs. operations, potential for error, and cumulative and of high or medium safety significance be corrected and that many lowT significance'HEDs' also be corrected.

In particularly difficult ceses, a feasibility study is recomended as the first step towards HED correction .

2.5.3. Audit Team Assessment The auditcategorized they were team generally as such.agrees with MPPD's process for assessing HEDs once We believe, however, that the safety

significance of the lack of lamp test capability was understated and recomend 1

that the decision not to correct this HED be reevaluated.

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The audit team does not agree with the methodology for segregating HEDs and HEOs during the control room survey for the following reasons:

o The assignment of the degree of noncompliance number based upon the suveyor's mask judgment significant HEDs. of the " average" for an entire panel tends to i

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e Failure to document the specifics of the HE0s identified made the screening process unauditable by NRC General Electric Ouality Assurance, , NPPD Ouality Assurance, or o

The screening process masks HEDs that should be corrected'to conform with control room human engineering conventions. Cor,ventions, not applied uniformly, are not conventions at all.

NPPD may resolve this issue by documenting the specifics of each HED in their DCRDR not corrected. Summary Report and providing, for review, justification for each item BWROG position that HEDs identified by the control room survey w i

evaluated on an item-to-item basis [3).

j 2.6. SELECTION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS 2.6.1 Requirement Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires selection of control room design improvements that will correct significant HEDs.

It also states that improvements done promptly. that can be accomplished with an enhancement program should be 2.4.2.1 Audit Team Observations designated for correction by the assessment process,NPPD has no f

The Cooper DCRDR team has made specific recommendat bas about which HEDs 1 (- should be corrected. WPPD management has not yet approved these

, recommendations or made specific commitments to 15tC regarding correction of HEDs. -

The DCRDR team generally recommended that all high and moderate '

significance, and many of the less significant, HEDs be corrected. The following scheduling philosophy was noted in the DCRDR team's recommendation:

e Most enhancements the current outage. should be completed before return to power from e

l The most safety significant HEDs should be corrected prior to return to power from the next refueling, if design and equipment lead times permit.

within two operating cycles.All HEDs in this category are recommended f i

e Correction of moderate significance HEDs is recommended prior to

restart from the second refueling outage after the current one. A few items are deferred to the third refueling to allow coordination with other modifications.

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! The less significant HEDs to be corrected aae reconnended for

. correction within three operating cycles.

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complete by the fourth refueling after the current studies was recomended to identify appropriate In these modific cases, the ultimate schedule for correction will be developed by the studies 2.6.3. Audit Team Assessment .

The audit corrected andteam agrees scheduling completion with dates. the general philosophy for selecting HEDs t applied to the results of the HED assessment.The same philosophy should be i The recommendation to build a plant-specific simulator is commendable Training on this facility will provide further improvement in operator .

performance beyond that attainable by implementation of uniform contro conventions and correction of significant HEDs and HEOs.

provide schedule commitments for their cogletion.NPPDs and S 1

Where modification of cor'rective action and schedule for installation m approval Opon completion of the studies.

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Safety Feature particularly difficult. information and controls g neered e

located on feasibilit

\ _. schedules.y studies before committing to specific modifications implemented to correct these items.Nevertheless, we expect that timely mo 2.7 2.7.1. VERIFICATION Requirement OF CONTROL ROOM DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS design improvements will provide the necessary corr , will not oom risk, unreviewed safe *y questions, or reased temporary r 2.7.2. Audit Team Observations The process for verifying control room design improvements has not 1

' defined in g: eater detail than that provided in the program plan .

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2.7.3. Audit Team Assessment NPPD should Sumary Report. submit the details of the verification process as part of the Particular emphasis should be given to identifying differences between the final program and that described by the Program Plan and to addressing the mix of personnel involved in the verification.

2.8 2.8.1. COORDINATION Requirement OF CONTROL ROOM IMPROVEMENTS WITH OTHER PROGRAM

• i Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 requires that control r coordinated with changes from other programs; e.g.oom improvements be system (SPDS), operator trainir.g. Regulatory Guide 1.97 (R.G.1.97), and, safety paramete emergency operating procedures (EOPs).

2.8.2. Audit Team Observations NPPD has developed a overall schedule for arjor NUREG-0737, Sopplement 1 items.

audite. The stated goal of this schedule is "to complete f he 5D Regulatory Guide 1.97 assessment, and writing of plant-s operating procedures at approximately the same time . . pecific emergency,

. including any supplementary review" [4). work that is required as a result of the control room defian 2.8.3. Audit Team Assessment

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not apparent that NPPD has a positive program to ensure th happen in a coordinated manner.

the working come together. level for these projects may be necessary to make the schedul

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A schedule update for SPDS,~ PMIS, procedures,Teemor training, . . 1.97 and K G modifications required to support Report to show coordination tuong these itses. the EGPs should be included in the Surunary are that: Items of particular interest relabeling of control boards to establish nomenclature conventions happens concurrently with and are coordinated with procedure changes to ensure consistercy between control boards and procedures; installation of R.G.1.97

instrumentation required-to support E0Ps will be co@leted in time; and traihing will be adr.quately' coordinated with procedtfe an? Pardware . '; changes >

2.9 OTHER ITEMS '

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The DCRDR team conductsj en operating experiente reiiew experience at Cooper Station and identified no HEDs.

I of CNS operating experience-noted the good operating record of the plant.The eudit tea

{ identified no HEDs.is, therefore, not surprising that the DCRDR operating It experience revie The audit team suggests that review of operating '

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provide insight that would result in changed s andpriorities fexp or certain HEDs.

NPPD for CNS. is currently in the process of designing the re Although it is not currently a NRC requirementmote shutdown capability recomends that human engineering principles begn,applied to desi, the IftC au specification, the remote shutdownand selection panels. of equipment used for remote shutd conventions and nomenclature be maintained between the contr shutdown equipment.

om and remote For remote shutdown, PMIS, SPDS, and the Emergenc has a unique opportunity to infuse human factors priy Response Facilities, N nciples and plant conventions during the original design phase.

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3 CONCl.USIONS the DCRDR requirements of NUREG-0737, .

rected towards fulfillingSupplement 1 The ecceptsMiity evaluated. durin of basing the CNS Task Analysis upon E0P Cooper's EOPs. g- the audit. steps could not be of this review. Some revisions to the Task Analysis esult may be neede A number of concerns with the DCRDR process were identifi d b

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s' NRC audit team recommends, to NPPD, the following DCRDR program and foster its ultimate acceptance e

y the audit.acti ons to improve their The to these recommendations should be discussed as partNPPD's actions with re Report. .

of the DCRDR Summary e

characteristics for the E0Ps should:The task analysis defin e

Define requirements for operability noitions under accid instrument and control loops located in harshe en i e v ronments).

Identify requirements on indicator resolution at for tasks th require the operator to determine the value of a parameter o compare the value of a parameter against a action r caution point.

, control, or e

e Maintain a consistent level of detail throughout th e analysis.

i The Function and Task. Analysis shouldough be carried to:

thr j- e required to support performance of E0Ps. Normal Proc a are t

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in use after implementation of the EOPs. Existing Em Revised COPS, if significant revisions are required prior to implementation, e

SPDS E0Ps. and PMIS procedures required to support performance of The apparent oversights noted in the Control Room Survey e should reviewed to determine if they are indicative of a systematic proble with the survey process, and appropriate action should be taken ,

e The control room environment and consnunications survey should repeated after completion of planned modifications that will affect the environment (e.g., PMIS, SPDS, and a new communications system).

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, consnunicate respirators.- while wearing self-contained breath e

Human factors principles, conventions and plant nomenclature

- .. inconsistent the design of with thatand the SPDS used PMIS. in the control room should be implemen e

i t The be safety reassessed. significance of the lack of lamp test capability u sho ld e

The specifics of each HE0 identified by the Control Room Su

, should are be documented not corrected. and justification provided for any HEOs t e

It should be verified that R.G.1.97 instruments required for and that relabeling of Control Boards and proce happening the procedures in andaboards.

manner that ensures consistent nomenclature w en bet Certain portions of the DCRDR program were not sufficiently e time mature review.

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of audit to allow assessment beyond that provid i

in sufficientofdetail requirements to allow Supplement MRC review I to NUREG-0737 and have been determinati ems met.on whether the DCR

e Modifications planned to resolve HEDs should be described and completion schedule commitments provided.

A supplement to the Summary Report will be needed to provide descriptions and sch for modification plans resulting from feasibility studies e .

The shoulddetails of NPPD's verification process for HED corrections be included.

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e be included.An updated schedule for NUREG-0737 tasks.

This update shows the interrelationship, Sup s among these Finally, the audit team submits the f l consideration NtlREG-D737, in areas Supplement 1 not directly e relat do lowing suggestions f

. to the DCRDR requirements of DCRDR documentation should be obtaiCopi ysis worksheets, and other individuals and organizations ned from Generalrespoorganized Electric and team members and e modif1 cations and others. related effortnsible for HE HED records should be u T

adequate to provide nonpgraded so the writtene document each HED.

is W DCRDR team membersng aof clear un

. Any portions of the Control Room Sur e should omke use of the !WREG-0700 checklistsvey th

• Further coordination of SPDS e the working level shouldred. be c,onsidePMIS, DCRDR, R.

I The operating experience review should b e experience at other BWRs similar r. to Coopee extended to in Human factors engineering principles i of the panels. CNS remote shutdown capability e , including the remote shutd Design conventions and nomenclature a 1 equ.ipment should be consistent with thosepplied to remote s used in the control room.

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REFERENCES 1.

Nuclear Station Detailed Control Submittal," dated June 4, 1984

" ReviewRoom ew Program Plan Design of the Cooper 2.

Letter J. M.1Pilant Supplement March 1, 1984 (NPPD)

- Detailed to Room Control D."NUREG-0737,

, G. Design Eisenhut Review(NRC)

(DC

, dated 3 i Permit Holders, "NRC Staff ReviaLetter . Applic D. G. Eisenhut (NR Control Room Survey Program (generic letter Group (RWROG)83-18)w of the 4 , dated April 19, 1983 Letter J. M. P11 ant (NPPD) to D. G. Eisenhut (NRC 0737, Sup Station,"plement dated April 15,11983 Emergency Response Capability, Cooper N 9

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