ML20077M100

Control of Heavy Loads (C-10),Cooper Nuclear Station, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20077M100
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	09/08/1983
From:	Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Singh A NRC
Shared Package
ML20077M104	List: ML20077M100
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07982, TAC-7982, TER-C5506-346, NUDOCS 8309120152
Download: ML20077M100 (24)

Text

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5 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT

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i. CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10) s NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT t

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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION F

5 NRCDOCKETNO. 50-298 FRC PROJECTC$508 I'f NRC TAC NO. 07982 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13

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• NRC CONTRACT NO NRC4Mt.130 FRCTASM 346 E '

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5 Preparedby E

[ Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger F. Vosbury

[ 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 ,

FRC Group Leader: I. H. Sargent

[ Prepared for

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

7 Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh, T. Chan

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September 8, 1983 E

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Govemment nor any agency thernof, or any of their

"' employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal !!acility or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, cf any information, appe.

• ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third

__ party would not infringe privately owned rights.

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (C-10)

NEBRASKA' PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT COOPER NUCLEAR STATION NRC DOCKET NO. 50-298 PnC PROJECT C5506 ,

07982 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 I NRCTACNO.

NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-CM1-130 FRC TASK 346 ,

Prepared by Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger, F. Vosbury 20th and Race Streets ,

Philadelphia, PA 19103 .

FRC Group Leader: ' I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead N AC Engineer: A. Singh.

T. Chan September 8, 1983 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States i

Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information. acoa-ratus. product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infnnge privately owned rights.

Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by:

A/.L,g ) Ir.>&Ly YN V. W (E^

, Principal AutNor Project Manager Department Director h7)

I Date. 4/e/e5 Date: W//d3 Date: NU

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TE3H:5506-346

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CONTE 3rfS 1

Section Title Page 1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 2 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Interia Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 14 3 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.1 General Provisions for Load Handling . . . . . . 17 3.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 17

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4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 i

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TFJK5506-346 FORINORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission (Office of tu;1 ear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical cecistance in support of NN: operating reactor licensing actions. The-technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by th3 NBC.

Mr. F. Vosbury, Mr. C. Bomberger, and Mr. I. E. Sargent contributed to

• tho technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WEST 2C Services, Inc.

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1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEN This technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at the Nebraska Public Power l i

District's (MPPD) Cooper Nuclear Station. This evaluation was performed with j the following objectives o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of ,

NUREG-0612, " Control of Neavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1] ,

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of NUREG-0612, Section 5.3.

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1.2 GENERIC BICEGROUND Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the Nuclear l Regulatory Commission (NBC) staff to systematically examine staff iicensing criteria and the adequact of measures in effect at operating nuclear power ch:sta to assure the saffe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by I

the NE staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to,all power reactor licensees, requesting I information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Noclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was .that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.

In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy l

loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosghy. The first part of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling l

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TE3kC5506-346 cystems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their prob- ,

ability of failure is uniformly. small and appropriate for the critical tasks is wenich they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, cchieved through guidelines identified in NmWG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through l 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are pro-vided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to ensure ,

that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents

• indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

l Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four cccident analysis evaluation criteria.

A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to casure that all load handling qiystems are designed and operated so that their probabilityoffailureisapdopriatelysmall. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the following: ,

1. define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment

2. provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 cf NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be

, initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

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l 1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACEGROUND On December 22,1980, the NN: issued a letter [3] to NPPD, the Licensee for Cooper Nuclear Station, requesting that MPPD review provisions for hcndling and control of heavy loads at Cooper Station, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain cdditional information to be used for an independent determinat.1on of ranidin Research Center A Desumen af he nessen suunse

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TEA-C5506-346 conformance to these guidelines. MPPD responded to this request on June 30, ,

IS81 [4] and October 9, 1981 [5]. In response to the December 7,1981 conference call with the NBC, the rMiewer, and MPPD, 'the Licensee provided coditional information on May 14, 1982 [6], July 25, 1983 [7], and september 1, 1983 [8]; the information has been incorporated into this final technical evaluation.

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2. EVALukTItal 1

This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at Cooper Nuclear Station with respect to NE staff guidelines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the l

general guidelines of NUAEG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interia measures of NUMEG-0612, Section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interia measure is presented, Licensee-provided inforestion is sununarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional )

action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1.

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established geven general guidelines to provide the defense-in-depth appropriate'for the safe handling of heavy loads. Thuy are identified under the following topics in Section 5.1.1 of NUMEG-0612:

Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths ,

Guideline 2 - Load Bandling Procedures Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed)

Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)

Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

These seven guidelines abould be satisfied by all overhead handling cystems and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop any damaga safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verification of the catent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and an independent evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

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2.1.1 overhead Beavy Load Bandline systems

o. Suasary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions ,

The Licensee's review of overhead load handling systems identified the following cranes as subject to the general guidelines of NOREG-0612:

o reactor building crane o intake structure crane o control building hoist (E-7).

Other load handling devices identified by the Licensee have been excluded from compliance with NUREG-0612 for the following reasons:

1. No safe shutdowrvdecay heat removal equipment or irradiated fuel is located in proximity to the load handling devices o reactor building jib crane / trolley o, MK-I containment project 4.5,-ton hoists (2) and 7.5-ton boist

o reactor building hoist / monorails (E-10 and 5-12).

2. The load handling de'v ice has a sole purpose maintenance function such that a load drop will damage only equipment which is already out of service for maintenance: ,

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o reactor building hoists / monorails (B-9A, $-9B, E-13, B-14, and C2) l o diesel generator monorail (C-4).

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b. Evaluation The Licensee's exclusion of certain load handling systems from compliance with Section 5.1.1 is consistent with the intent of the NUREG-0612 objective to improve load handling reliability.

2.1.2 Safe Load Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(1)]

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" safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor ers, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

, Deviations from defined load patha abould require written alternative '

procedures approved by the plant safety review commiittee."

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c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has provided general arrangement drawings identifying safe load paths foc the reactor vessel head, reactor vessel plugs, dryer / separator pool plugs, drywell head, and bellows shield. % e safe load paths for the steam dryer and steam separator are defined by the layout of dryer and separator ctorage pool since the dryer and separator follow and are not lif ted out of the

, otorage pool. Se load paths for the concrete plugs follow, to a great estent, ctructural floor members. Novement'of the drywell head and reactor pressure vessel head follows' structural floor members before angling to the respective laydown areas. S e loads are moved in a manner to minimise the potential to impact irradiated fuel and are not moved over safe shutdown equipment. De load paths will be added to their respective procedures and written alternatives a

will be approved by the Cooper Station Operations Review Committee. Marking load paths on the floor will not be done as it is not good practice in terms of Cooper Station radiation and. contamination control procedures. However, a crane signalman, whose duties are delineated in procedures, is used to direct the crane operator along the designated load paths.

Further, procedures are being revised to minimize the exposure of safe chutdown equipment to damage from loads dropped from control building hoist E-7.

b. Evaluation Safe load paths on the refueling floor are consistent with the intent of Section 5.1.1(1) of NUREG-0612.

Since the load path for control building monorail E-7 is fixed by the path of the rail, the Licensee's commitment to procedurally limit the exposure cf safe shutdown equipment to potential damage from a load drop is consistent with the guidance in NUREG-0612,

c. . Conclusion Development of safe load paths at Cooper Nuclear Station is performed in e manner consistent with Guideline 1 of NUREG-0612.

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TFJbC5506-346 2.1.3 Load Bandline Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(211 *

• Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or oculd be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a : minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should includes identification of required equipments inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the loads defining the safe paths and other special precautions."

c. Suasary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

' The Licensee has stated that load handling procedures specify the equipment required, inspection and acceptance criteria required prior to load movement, the sequence of events, precautions and limitations, knd safe load paths for the major loads in accordance with Section 5.1.1(2) of NUREG-0612.

Station Procedure 7.6.1 *Cperation of Reactor Building Crane and Miscellaneous Reactor Building Boists,* controls the operation of the reactor building crane arad other miscellaneous hoists in the reactor building. This i

i procedure requires that a special procedure be written any time heavy loads not covered by a specific procedure are to be moved over or near the open vessel, fuel pool, or safety equipment. Station Procedures 7.4.1 through 7.4.6 and 7.4.19 have precautions to ensure that load handling operations remain within the safe load paths. Station Procedure 3.7 and Special Procedure 77-3 show the horizontal controlled path of the spent fuel eask. Tne service water pump is covered by Procedure 7.2.15, which states that no pump or actor parts shall l be lifted where a load drop could result in damage to the other pumps and t

actors or associated safety-related equi; ment. The residual heat removal service water booster pumps are covered by Procedure 7.2.14, which states that no pump and actor parts shall be lifted where a load drop could result in damage to the other pumps and actors or associated safety-related equipment.

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l b. Evaluation Load handling procedures used at Cooper Nuclear Station meet the intent cf 'Section 5.1.1(2) of NUREG-0612 based on the Licensee's description of the i existing procedures.

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c. Conclusion

Procedures at Cooper Nuclear Station have been dev91oped in a manner consistent with Guideline 2.

2.1.4 Crane operator Trainine (Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, section 5.1.1(311

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI 330.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [9]."

c. Suussary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that a new procedure has been written to ensure that ANSI B30.2-1976 has been met with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct. Any conduct not in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976 will disqualify an employee as a crane operator.

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b. Evaluation Crane operator training at Cooper Nuclear Station meets the intent of Section 5.1.1(3) of NOREG-0612 based on verification by the Licensee of

.i compliance with the training requirements in Ch.pter 2-3 of ANSI E30.2-1976.

c. Conclusion l

I Crane operator training at Cooper Nuclear Station is consistent with t I

I requirements of Guideline 3.

l l 2.1.5 Special Lifting Devices (Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4)]

! "Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [9).

This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy 1cada in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material '

requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in 12eu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the rankhn Reneerch Center A Onmuun af The Pommen humuse

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1 stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of 1 the intervening components of the special handling device."  !

. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has identified the following special lifting devices used in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment at Cooper Nuclear beations o reactor pressure vessel head strongback o dryer and separator sling ,

o strongback for concrete' shield plugs o redundant crane adapter and pins o spent fuel cask redundant lifting yoke.

Design analyses have been performed for each of these lifting devices.

Design safety factors for the concrete shield plug strongback, the crane compter, and the steam dryer'and separator sling are in conformance with'the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978. Design safaty factors for the upper and lower concrete dryer / separator plugs strongback are less than those required and

therefore will be modified in accordance with ANSI N14.6-1978. Finite element analysis of the reactor pressure vessel head strongback has identified two creas where the factors of safety are less than 5.0 for ultimate strength.

Bowever, these areas are close to the required value (actual values 4.6 and 4.8), and no further modifications are considered necessary.

3egarding continuing compliance, the Licensee states that all special I alfting devices were load tested to 125% of rated load or greater. In addition, a program of nondestructive examination (NDE) of the load bearing l

welds will be developed and conducted at 5-year intervals. The inspections trill use liquid penetrant or angnetic particle examinations.

l l The Licensee provided calculaticas and analyses performed by GE for the spent fuel cask redundant lifting yoke.

b. Evaluation The spent fuel cask redundant lifting yoke meets the intent of Section 5.1.1(4) of NUREG-0612 with respect to design and fabrication.

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Information provided by the Licensee indicates that the remaining lifting devices have been designed (or will be modified) with safety factors that will provide a degree of lead handling reliability consisten't with the requirements -

of this guideline. In addition, performance of initial 1254 load tests, combined with the Licensee's program of periodic NDE, will provide reasonable ccourance of the continued integrity of these devices.

c. Conclusion

The design and continuing compliance programs for special lifting devices in use at Cooper Nuclear Station are consistent with the requirements of Guideline 4.

2.1.6 Lif ting Devices Not Specially Designed [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(51)

" Lifting devices that ar's not specially designed should be install,ed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [11].

However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. 19 tere this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings abould be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be used.'

O. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that slings at Cooper Nuclear Station are colected and used in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. The procedure for 7 election, storage, and inspection of slings includes a factor of 1.5 times the dead weight of the load to accommodate dynamic loading conditions.

b. Evaluation t

Sling selection and use at Cooper Nuclear Station meet the intent of NUREG-0612 based on verification by the Licensee of ccepliance to ANSI R30.9-1971. Further, the Licensee has considered dynamic loadig effects in sling selection.

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Sling selection and use at Cooper Nuclear Station are performed in a manner consistent with Guideline 5.

2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testino, and Na*.ntenance) [ Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(611  ;

"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI 230.2-1976, ' overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the

'xception e that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for, periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly.;5For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use) ."

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a. Suasary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions 6

The Licensee has, stated that ANSI B30.2-1976 has been invoked under e Cooper Nuclear Station Maintenance Procedure 7.2.32, " Crane Boist, Sling and Cable Inspection." The individual procedures for the intake structure and the reactor building cranes call for further inspection before the cranes are used.

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• b. Evaluation ,

I crane inspection, Waaintenance, and testing at the Cooper Nuclear Station are consistent with Section 5.1.1(6) of NOREG-0612 based on the Licensee's commitrent to the guidance in ANSI B30.24976.

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~( c. Conclusion Crane maintenance and inspection programs at Cooper Nuclear Station are consistent with the requirements of Guideline 6.

I.1.8 Crane Design iGuideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(7))

"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and G'intry m d; _13 dll!,u4mFrankan.n n rch conser q.7 n-m -

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Crr.nes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [121. . An alternative to a specification in AMil B30.2 or CMAA-70 any be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if.the intent of the  ;

specification is satisfied."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that the cranes at Cooper Station comply with the guidelines of CMAA-70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI R30.2-1976.

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b. Evaluation and Conclusion Design of cranes at Cooper Nuclear Station is consistent with Guideline 7 requirements.

2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION W.ASURES The N1C has established six interia protection measures to be implemented ct operating nuclear paver plants to provide reasonable assurance that no 4

heavy loads will be handled over th'e spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the ,

core or spent fuel pool. Pour of the six interim seasures of the repo:t consist of general Guideline 1, safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Load Bandling Procedurest Guideline 3, Crane operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) . The two remaining interim asasures cover the follWing criteria:

1. Heavy load technical specifications

2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.

Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection -

measures are contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.

2.2.1 Technical Specifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (1)1

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof

. overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include

.m k 1. Frenidin Reneerth Cereur l

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TEM 506-346 a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7, .

' crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, - ' Crane Travel,' for BNR's, to prohibit i

handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 [of NUREG-0612]."

c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has stated that the overhead crane in the fuel pool area is l considered single failure proof. As stated in Section 9.2 of the Safety i Evaluation 3eport of Cooper Nuclear Station dated February 14, 1973, "The failure of any single component would not result in the dropping of the (spent ,

fuel) cask." Therefore, the additional technical specification is not' required.

I

b. Evaluation and Conclusion l Based on the fact that the NT': has reviewed the modified Cooper Station reactor building crane and concluded that it meets the intent of Branch Technical Position (BIP) Auxiliary Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9-1, Cooper Nuclear Station complies with Interia Pr'otection Measure 1.

2.2.2 Administrative controls IInteria Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3 (2)-5.3 (511 l l

" Procedural or administrative measures (including safe load paths, load. l

handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection] ...

can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of ,

Section 5.1 of [NUREG-0612] .* I

c. Evaluation The specific requirements for load handling administrative controls are l contained in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6. The Licensee's compliance with these guidelines has been evaluated in Sections i 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7, respectively,.of this report.

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4 Ulldu Frankihi Reneerch Center A themen af The Pommen summe

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TEA-C5506-346 j

b. Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions and recommendations concerning the Licensee's compliance with 1 these administrative controls are contained in sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7 of this reput. l l

l 2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core (Interia Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (611 -

I

'Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and i personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel l internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include l the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and novement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructiont are clear and  !

conciser (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, j slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies ,

i that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and i l replacement of defective ocoponent's; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been proparly trained and are familiar with specific procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures.*

O. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions

- The Licensee has stated that revisions to pertinent procedures which call fcr visual inspection of special lifting devices and crane hoists, slings, and cables have been drafted. These revisions also provide for the appropriate repair or replacement of defective components.

b. Evaluation In light of the responses to Guidelines 2 and 3, it is apparent that procedures for handling loads over the core and operator training have been reviewed and upgraded as appropriate. In addition, design of special lifting devices and cranes at Cooper Station and programs for selection and use of cliras have been reviewed and found to comply with NUREG-0612.

c. Conclusion Cooper Nuclear Station complies with Interia Protection Measure 6.

UU6.F.rankNn ew Renee.rch

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TED=C5506-346

3. COtCIUSION This summary is provided to consolidate the result.s of the evaluation contained in Section 2 concerning individual NE staff guidelines into an

. overall evaluation of heavy load handling at Cooper Nuclear Station. Overall conclusions and reccomended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUEG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations for interia protection (NORG-0612, Section 5.3) . ,

3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR I,OAD BANDLING The NE staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for h ndling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or' decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have 1

developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load i travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator i i

training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment j inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it Las been found that load handling operations at the Cooper Nuclear Station can be expet;ed to be conducted in a highly reliable manner i consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines. ]

l

! 3.2 INTERIM PRO 1'ECTION MEASUES The NEC staff Las established certain measures (NURG-0612, Section 5.3) that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy l loads will be performea in a safe manner until implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit the handling of

, UuNFrenidn Reneerch Center A h af he Piemman am

, _ _ , . . . . . _ - . . _ _ _ . _ , . _ _ - . _ _ . . . . _ . . . . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . , _ _ . . ~ . _ _ _ , . , _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ . .

l TfD-C5506-346 i

I heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools ccepliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, iIx:1uding component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to i eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. Actions needed 1 to satisfy NUREG guidelines for safe load paths have been previously addressed l in Section 3.1 of this evaluation. Evaluation c'. the information provided by j l

the Licensee indicates that the Licensee substantially complies with the staff's measures for interim protection. .

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4. EEPEEENCES 1

1. NEC

" Control of Beavy Loads et Nucle'ar Power Plants" July 1980 l

) NUEEG-0612

2. V. Stello,~ Jr. (ME)

) Letter to all licensees Subjects Request for Additional Inf'ormation on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Puel 17 May 1978 ,

3. D. G. Eisenhut (NBC)

Letter to All operating Beactors

$2bject: Control of Beavy Loads 22 December 1980 4 ., J. M. Pilant (NPPD) ,

Letter to D. G. Eisenhu$ (NE)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads 30 June 196'1 J. M. Pilant (MPPD)

5. '

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (ME) -

Subject:

Control of Beavy Loada 9 October 1981

6. J. M. Pilant (MPPD)

Letter to D. G. Eisenhut (NE)

Subjects control of Heavy Loads 14 May 1982 -

7. L. G. Kunci (MPPD)

Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NE)

Subject Control of Heavy Loads 25 July 1983

8. Tele @one conversation involving B. Siegal, A. Singh (NE); J. Weaver (MPPD); and C. Bomberger (FE/MSI)

Subject:

Control of Beavy Imads 01 September 1983

9. American National Standards Institute

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes

• New Yorks 1976 ANSI R30.2-1976 A h af he Faumen summe

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10. American National Standards Institute

" standard for special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI M14.6-1978

., 11. American National standards Institute

_ " slings" ANSI R30.9-1971

12. Crane Manufacturers Association of America

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes

• Pittsburgh, PA CMAA-70 ,

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