IR 05000333/2022010: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML22005A023
| number = ML22153A261
| issue date = 01/05/2022
| issue date = 06/02/2022
| title = Information Request for a Triennial Baseline Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Team); Inspection Report 05000333/2022010
| title = Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000333/2022010
| author name = Gray M
| author name = Gray M
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DORS
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DORS
| addressee name = Rhoades D
| addressee name = Rhoades D
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Generation Co LLC, Exelon Nuclear
| addressee affiliation = Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Constellation Nuclear
| docket = 05000333
| docket = 05000333
| license number = DPR-059
| license number = DPR-059
| contact person = Gray M
| contact person = Gray M
| document report number = IR 2022010
| document report number = IR 2022010
| document type = Inspection Plan, Letter
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| page count = 7
| page count = 17
}}
}}


Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:January 5, 2022
{{#Wiki_filter:June 2, 2022


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INFORMATION REQUEST FOR A TRIENNIAL BASELINE DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAM); INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2022010
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2022010


==Dear Mr. Rhoades:==
==Dear Mr. Rhoades:==
The purpose of this letter is to notify you that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
On May 20, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. On May 19, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Timothy Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Region I staff will conduct a Design Bases Assurance Inspection (DBAI) at FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Joe Schoppy, a Senior Reactor Inspector from the NRCs Region I Office, will lead the inspection team. The inspection will be conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71111.21M, Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Team), dated December 8, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16340B000).


The inspection will evaluate the capability of risk-significant/low-margin components to function as designed to support proper system operation. The inspection will also include a review of selected modifications, operating experience, and as applicable, operator actions.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.


During a telephone conversation on January 3, 2022, with Mr. Mark Hawes, FitzPatrick Regulatory Assurance, we confirmed arrangements for an information-gathering site visit and the two-week onsite inspection. The schedule is as follows:
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
* Information-gathering visit: Week of March 7, 2022
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
* Onsite weeks: Weeks of May 2 and May 16, 2022 The purpose of the information-gathering visit is to meet with members of your staff to identify risk-significant components, modifications, operator actions, and operating experience items.


Information and documentation needed to support the inspection will also be identified. Dave Werkheiser, a Region I Senior Risk Analyst, will support Joe Schoppy during the information-gathering visit to review probabilistic risk assessment data and identify components to be examined during the inspection.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.


Experience with previous baseline design/modification inspections of similar depth and length has shown this type of inspection is resource intensive, both for the NRC inspectors and the licensee staff. In order to minimize the inspection impact on the site and to ensure a productive inspection for both parties, we have enclosed a request for information needed for the inspection.
Sincerely, Digitally signed by Melvin Melvin K. K. Gray Date: 2022.06.02 Gray 14:22:32 -04'00'
Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000333 License No. DPR-59


It is important that all of these documents are up-to-date and complete in order to minimize the number of additional documents requested during the preparation and/or the onsite portions of the inspection. Insofar as possible, this information should be provided electronically to the lead inspector. The information request has been divided into two groups:
===Enclosure:===
* The first group lists information necessary for our initial inspection scoping activities.
As stated


This information should be provided to the lead inspector by March 7, 2022.
==Inspection Report==
Docket Number: 05000333 License Number: DPR-59 Report Number: 05000333/2022010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-010-0045 Licensee: Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: Scriba, NY Inspection Dates: May 2, 2022 to May 20, 2022 Inspectors: C. Bickett, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Brand, Reactor Inspector P. Cataldo, Senior Reactor Inspector E. Dipaolo, Senior Reactor Inspector E. Eve, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure


By March 14, 2022, the lead inspector will communicate the initial selected set of components and modifications.
=SUMMARY=
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at James A.


* The second group of documents requested is those items needed to support our in-office preparation activities. This set of documents, specific to the selected components and modifications, should be provided to the lead inspector at the Region I Office no later than April 25, 2022. During the in-office preparation activities, the team may identify additional information needed to support the inspection, and those items will be communicated directly to Mark Hawes.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.


If there are any questions about the inspection or the material requested in the enclosure, please contact Mr. Joe Schoppy at 610-337-5286 or via e-mail at jgs@nrc.gov.
===List of Findings and Violations===


This letter does not contain new or amended information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, Control Number 3150-0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget Control Number.
Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of 'B' Station Battery Cornerstone            Significance                                Cross-Cutting      Report Aspect              Section Mitigating            Green                                      [H.8] -            71111.21M Systems                NCV 05000333/2022010-01                    Procedure Open/Closed                                Adherence The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XI, Test Control, because Constellation personnel did not perform battery testing in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1) the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite; 2) technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing; 3) the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge; and 4)records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at various stages of the test were not included in the official test record.


This letter and its enclosure will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
===Additional Tracking Items===
None.


Sincerely, Digitally signed by Melvin K.
=INSPECTION SCOPES=


Gray Melvin K. Gray Date: 2022.01.05 09:44:56-05'00'
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000333 License No. DPR-59 Enclosure:
Document Request for Design Bases Assurance Inspection cc: Distribution via ListServ


ML22005A023 x Non-Sensitive  x Publicly Available x SUNSI Review Sensitive  Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DORS RI/DORS RI/DORS NAME JSchoppy DWerkheiser MGray DATE 1/4/22 1/4/22  1/4/22
==REACTOR SAFETY==


DOCUMENT REQUEST FOR DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION Inspection Report: 05000333/2022010 Onsite Inspection Dates: May 2, 2022 through May 6, 2022; and May 16, 2022 through May 20, 2022 Inspection Procedure: Inspection Procedure 71111.21M, Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Team)
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Lead Inspector:  Joe Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector 610-337-5286 jgs@nrc.gov I. Information Requested for Selection of Components and Modifications The following information is requested by March 7, 2022, to facilitate inspection preparation.
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)
===
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.21|count=4}}
The team evaluated the following components, permanent modifications, and operating experience during the weeks of May 2 and May 16, 2022.


Feel free to contact the lead inspector as soon as possible if you have any questions regarding this information request. Please provide the information electronically in pdf files, Excel, or other searchable formats, preferably on some portable electronic media (e.g.,
For the components, the team reviewed the attributes listed in IP 71111.21M, Appendix A, Component Review Attributes, such as those listed below. Specifically, the team evaluated these attributes as per IP 71111.21M, Appendix B, Component Design Review Considerations and 71111.21M, Appendix C, Component Walkdown Considerations. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Documents Reviewed section.
CD-ROM, DVD). The files should contain descriptive names, and be indexed and hyperlinked to facilitate ease of use. Information in lists should contain enough information to be easily understood by someone who has knowledge of light water reactor technology.
: (1) Loss of AC Bus 10500 Initiating Event
* Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
* Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
* Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
* Maintenance records and corrective action history
* Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
* Surveillance testing and test results
* System and component level performance monitoring
* Equipment protection from fire, flood, water intrusion, or spray
* Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation
* Control logic
* Component adequacy for minimum voltage
* Protection coordination (load in-rush and full load current)
* Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation
* Operator actions
* Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
* Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)
The team used Appendix B guidance for Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electrical Loads, and Motor Control Centers (MCCs).
: (2) High Pressure Coolant Injection System (Failure to Run)
* Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
* Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
* Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
* System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history
* Surveillance testing and test results
* System and component level performance monitoring
* Control logic
* Operator actions
* Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
* Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.
: (3) Containment Venting (Loss of Function)
* Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
* Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
* Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
* System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history
* Equipment/environmental controls and qualification
* Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
* Surveillance testing and test results
* System and component level performance monitoring
* Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray
* Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation
* Control logic
* Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation
* Operator actions
* Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
* Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.
: (4) B 125 Vdc Battery (SB-2) and Battery B Control Board (BCB-2B)
* Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
* Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
* Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
* Maintenance records and corrective action history
* Equipment/environmental controls and qualification
* Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
* Surveillance testing and test results
* System and component level performance monitoring
* Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray
* Ventilation for temperature control and hydrogen removal
* Circuit breaker and fuse ratings
* Component adequacy for minimum voltage
* Protection coordination (load in-rush, full load current, and short-circuit protection)
* Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation
* Operator actions
* Energy source availability (charger availability, capability, and reliability)
The team used Appendix B guidance for Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electric Loads, and Motor Control Centers (MCCs).


1. The site probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) System Notebook and latest PRA Summary Document.
===Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)===
: (1) B Loop Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray (Loss of Function)
* Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
* Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
* Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
* System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history
* Equipment/environmental controls and qualification
* Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
* Surveillance testing and test results
* System and component level performance monitoring
* Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray
* Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation
* Control logic
* Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation
* Operator actions
* Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
* Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)
The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-


2. Risk ranking of top 250 basic events sorted by Risk Achievement Worth (>/= 1.3).
===Built System.
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)===
: (1) EC 626665, Replace 10MOV-26B Double Lead Screw Form Stem with Single Lead Screw Form Stem
: (2) EC 627111, Torus Wide Range Pressure Transmitter 27PT-101A Replacement
: (3) EC 628065, 72MOD-101B(OP) Replacement with New Model Operator
: (4) EC 629418, Evaluate Use of 3 Basket Hold Down Bolts in ESW Strainer
: (5) EC 632618, Evaluate Replacement of 23HPI-149 from Vogt Ball Check to a Velan


Include values for Risk Reduction Worth, Birnbaum Importance, and Fussell-Vesely (as applicable). Please provide in an excel spreadsheet or other sortable format, and include an understandable definition of the coded basic events.
===Piston Check Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)===
: (1) NRC Information Notice 2019-01: Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations
: (2) NRC Information Notice 2020-02: FLEX Diesel Generator Operational Challenges; Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2020/01 was used to inform the inspection sample


3. Risk-ranking of top 100 components from site specific PRA sorted by Large Early Release Frequency.
==INSPECTION RESULTS==
Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of 'B' Station Battery Cornerstone            Significance                              Cross-Cutting      Report Aspect            Section Mitigating            Green                                      [H.8] -            71111.21M Systems                NCV 05000333/2022010-01                    Procedure Open/Closed                                Adherence The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because Constellation personnel did not perform battery testing in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1) the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite; 2) technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing; 3) the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge; and 4)records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at various stages of the test were not included in the official test record.


4. If you have an External Events PRA Model, provide the information requested in Item 2 for external events. Provide narrative description of each coded event, including flood zone description.
=====Description:=====
Constellation completed a battery modified performance discharge test on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) on September 18, 2020, to satisfy Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.3, to verify adequate battery capacity to support emergency loads, and TS SR 3.8.4.4, to verify battery capacity was > 80 percent of the manufacturers rating. Per the TS SR 3.8.4.4 Bases, the acceptance criteria for battery testing are consistent with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 450, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, 1995 (IEEE 450).


5. List of time-critical and/or risk significant operator actions.
The team reviewed the documentation for the battery modified performance discharge test performed in accordance with Constellation procedure MST-071.24, Station Battery B Modified Performance Test, Revision 19. The team identified several instances where the test procedure was not followed and/or the problem was not entered into the corrective action program.


6. List of emergency and abnormal operating procedures.
First, the battery terminal voltage before starting the test did not meet the test prerequisite.


7. If available, any pre-existing evaluation or list of components and associated calculations with low design margins (e.g., pumps closest to the design limit for flow or pressure, diesel generator close to design required output, heat exchangers close to rated design heat removal).
MST-071.24, Prerequisite Step 8.13 required that the battery be on a float charge with battery terminal voltage between 131 - 133V DC. Actual voltage was 136V DC due to the battery being charged by the swing charger and technicians believed the swing charger voltage could not be adjusted to the required range. This was discussed with the on-shift senior reactor operator and the decision made to continue with the test. The actual voltage of 136V DC was within the equalizing charge range. IEEE 450 specifies that the battery be on a float charge for a minimum of 72 hours following being on an equalizing charge prior to starting the discharge test.


Enclosure
Second, technicians did not ensure that adequate and reliable power was available for test equipment as stated in the test prerequisites. MST-071.24, Prerequisite Step 8.11 required technicians to Ensure an AC outlet (nominal 120 VAC, 20 Amp) is available for test equipment and other outlets on circuit are not used during test except to power test equipment. Tag other outlets as necessary. The purpose of this step was to ensure a reliable control power source to the battery test equipment during the performance of the test.


DOCUMENT REQUEST FOR DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION 8. If applicable, copy of any self-assessments and/or Quality Assurance assessments of low margin structures, systems and components (SSCs) completed since August 1, 2019.
Constellation personnel did not adequately perform this step. As a result, at approximately 16 minutes into the test, the power supply was lost to the test equipment. This resulted in an 11.53 minute pause in testing. IEEE 450 only provides for one short duration pause in testing (10 percent of the test duration or 6 minutes, whichever is shorter) for the specific purpose of disconnecting a battery cell that is approaching reversal of polarity early in the test. Test data showed that battery terminal voltage was higher when the load was reapplied than prior to the pause in testing. This demonstrated that the battery recovered during the pause and that the battery test would indicate a higher battery capacity than if no pause occurred. The team noted that technicians did not initiate a corrective action issue report (IR) for this problem encountered during the testing.


9. List of available design margins in both the open and closed direction for valves in the motor-operated valve and air-operated valve programs (related to GL 96-05, looking for resultant output - matrix of risk vs margin for MOVs and AOVs, as applicable).
Third, the 11.53 minute duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge. This resulted in a higher and non-conservative calculated battery capacity versus actual capacity.


10. The age and capacity of the safety-related DC batteries.
Fourth, records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at the beginning of the test, at specified intervals, and at the completion of the test per the guidance contained in IEEE 450 were not included in the official test record.


11. The In-Service Testing (IST) Program Basis document identifying the in-scope valves and pumps, and the associated IST Program requirements for each component (e.g.,
Specifically, personnel did not comply with Step 10.7 which stated to Obtain a printout of the individual cell voltages from the Alber BCT 2000 test equipment and include in work package.
IST valve table identifying category, active/passive function).


12. Access to IST trend data for the following pumps: HPCI, RCIC, RHR, and ESW. [Note:
Corrective Actions: Constellations short-term corrective actions included performing a technical evaluation (EC 636754) to assess battery operability and capacity of the B 125V DC station service battery and entering the issues into their corrective action program.
needed for each discrete component (e.g. for each RHR pump)]
13. Listing of MR (a)(1) systems, date entered into (a)(1) status, and brief description of why (a)(1).


14. List of MRFFs evaluations completed since August 1, 2019 (include those determined not to be a MRFF).
Factoring in the pause in the testing and other considerations, Constellation staff determined that the worst-case battery capacity was 101.08 percent (as compared to the battery capacity of 106.8 percent recorded following the test in September 2020). This demonstrated that the battery had margin to the TS required > 80 percent capacity and that the battery did not show signs of degradation (i.e., capacity was not greater than 10 percent lower than the previous modified performance discharge test).


15. A copy of the most recent System Health and/or trending reports for the following systems (as applicable): SR 4KV, SR 600 Vac, HPCI, RCIC, RHR, ESW, SR 125 Vdc, SR 419 Vdc, SLC, EDGs, and RHRSW.
Corrective Action References: IRs 4497226, 4497328, 4497663, and 4497832.


16. A copy of the most recent Program Health and/or trending reports for the following programs, as applicable: GL 89-10 (MOVs), GL 89-13, IST, AOVs, breakers, relays.
=====Performance Assessment:=====
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to conduct modified performance discharge testing on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) on September 18, 2020, in accordance with written test procedures consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria contained in IEEE 450. Specifically, the test was started with battery terminal voltage in the equalize range, technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing, the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge, and records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages were not included in the official test record.


17. List of open operability evaluations.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Though the performance deficiency occurred while the plant was shut down, the assessment of risk was best represented by using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, of IMC 0609, Appendix A. The team determined that this finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of mitigating structures, systems, or components, where the structures, systems, or components maintained their operability or functionality. Although not performed consistent with the acceptance criteria of IEEE 450, the test did demonstrate with reasonable confidence that there was sufficient margin to the TS required battery capacity of > 80 percent. Therefore, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green).


18. List of current operator work arounds/burdens.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, Constellation personnel did not follow the modified performance discharge test procedure when performing the test on the B 125V DC station service battery on September 18, 2020.


19. List of permanent plant modifications to SSCs that are field work complete since August 1, 2019. For the purpose of this inspection, permanent plant modifications include permanent: plant changes, design changes, set point changes, equivalency evaluations, suitability analyses, and commercial grade dedications. The list should contain the number of each document, title (sufficient to understand the purpose of the modification), revision/date, and the affected system.
=====Enforcement:=====
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Constellation was committed to perform battery modified performance discharge testing consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria of IEEE 450 and required to perform battery modified performance discharge testing of the B 125V DC station service battery in accordance with MST-071.24, Station Battery B Modified Performance Test, Revision 19.


20. List of calculation changes (including new calculations) that have been issued for use since August 1, 2019.
Contrary to the above, on September 18, 2020, Constellation personnel did not perform battery modified performance discharge testing on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) in accordance with written test procedures consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria contained in IEEE 450. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1)the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite (required range 131-133V DC versus actual 136V DC and was in the equalizing charge range which was not consistent with IEEE 450); 2) technicians did not ensure that adequate and reliable power was available for test equipment as stated in the test prerequisites (the loss of power to test equipment during the test resulted in an 11.53-minute test interruption which was not consistent with IEEE 450); 3) including the 11.53 minute duration of the pause in testing from the total duration of the battery discharge resulted in a higher and non-conservative calculated battery capacity versus actual capacity; and 4) records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at the beginning of the test, at specified intervals, and at the completion of the test per IEEE 450 guidance were not included in the official test record. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into Constellations corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.


21. Corrective Action Program procedure.
(NCV 05000333/20220010-01, Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of B Station Battery)
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.


22. Procedures addressing the following: modifications, design changes, set point changes, equivalency evaluations or suitability analyses, commercial grade dedications, and post-modification testing.
==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS==
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
* On May 19, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. Timothy Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.


DOCUMENT REQUEST FOR DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION 23. List of corrective action documents (open and closed) since August 1, 2019, that address permanent plant modifications issues, concerns, or processes.
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED=


24. Any internal/external self-assessments and associated corrective action documents generated in preparation for this inspection.
Inspection Type              Designation  Description or Title                                      Revision or
 
Procedure                                                                                            Date
25. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specifications, Technical Specifications Bases, and Technical Requirements Manual.
71111.21M Calculations      JAF-CALC-15-  FLEX Strategy - Portable Generator System Sizing          Revision 0
 
00031
26. Electrical simple one-line drawings for 4KV, 600V, 345KV, & 115KV (11 X 17 preferred).
JAF-CALC-CAD- Design Basis Calculations for the Torus Inner and Outer  Revision 0
 
04481        Exhaust AOVs 27AOV-117 & 27AOV-118 at FitzPatrick NPP
27. Copy of Exelons internal response to the following NRC Information Notices: 2019-01, 2019-02, 2020-02, and 2020-04.
JAF-CALC-    125V DC System Short-Circuit Calculation and Coordination Revision 1
 
ELEC-02016    Evaluation
28. Copy of FitzPatricks internal response to MPR Associates Part 21 - Basler Electric SBSR AVR Card Solder Joints (dated 9/21/07).
JAF-CALC-     Determination of Float and Equalize Voltage for Station  Revision 1
 
ELEC-02551    Batteries 71SB-1 & 71SB2
29. A list of NRC Part 21 Reports, determined to be applicable to FitzPatrick, since August 1, 2019.
JAF-CALC-SWS- Local Wall Thinning Evaluation for ESW Strainers 46STR-  Revision 2C
 
04170        5A/B
30. An electronic copy of the following DBDs (if applicable & available): SR 4KV, SR 600 Vac, HPCI, RCIC, RHR, ESW, SR 125 Vdc, SR 419 Vdc, SLC, EDGs, and RHRSW.
Corrective Action 04036374
 
Documents        04176609
II. Information Requested to Be Available by April 25, 2022 This information should be separated for each selected component and modification, especially if provided electronically (e.g., a folder for each component and modification named after the component or modification that includes the information requested below).
221269
 
246355
Items 1 through 11 are associated with the selected components and Item 12 is for the selected modifications.
252619
 
252625
1. List of corrective action documents associated with each selected component since August 1, 2019.
266619
 
290349
2. Maintenance history (e.g., corrective, preventive, and elective) associated with each selected component for the last five years. Identify frequency of preventive maintenance activities.
04319445
 
04323766
3. Aging Management Program documents and/or License Renewal committed inspection results applicable to each selected component.
04335008
 
04339876
4. List of calculations associated with each selected component, excluding data files. Pipe stress calculations are excluded from this request.
04347868
 
04348143
5. System Health Report (last completed) and Design Basis Document associated with each selected component, as applicable.
04369686
 
04371604
6. Access to or copy of vendor manual(s) for each selected component.
04371715
 
04372411
DOCUMENT REQUEST FOR DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION 7. List of open temporary modifications associated with each selected component, if applicable.
04372680
 
04373277
8. Trend data/graphs on the selected components performance since August 1, 2019 (e.g., pump performance including IST, other vibration monitoring, oil sample results).
04374549
 
04377286
9. List of normal operating and alarm response procedures associated with each selected component.
Inspection Type              Designation  Description or Title Revision or
 
Procedure                                                      Date
10. Last completed tests and surveillances for each selected component performed since August 1, 2019. For those tests and surveillances performed at a periodicity of greater than three years, provide the latest test performed.
04381156
 
04384096
11. Schedule of surveillance testing of selected components that occur during the onsite inspection weeks.
04384807
 
04385340
12. For each selected modification, copies of associated documents such as modification package, engineering changes, 50.59 screening or evaluation, relevant calculations, post-modification test packages, associated corrective action documents, design drawings, and new/revised preventive maintenance requirements.
04389930
 
04394054
4
04401931
04407061
04425606
04425805
04428931
04455782
04467798
04483344
04483639
04483997
04496433
04496616
04497610
CR-JAF-2007-
03363
Corrective Action 04497169
Documents        04497226
Resulting from    04497328
Inspection        04497349
04497394
04497395
04497409
04497663
04497664
04497672
04497680
04497832
04497910
Inspection Type          Designation    Description or Title                                  Revision or
Procedure                                                                                      Date
04497962
04497964
04497965
04497967
04497969
04497970
04497997
04498019
04498006
04498022
04498129
04498210
04499080
04500102
04500121
04500293
04500320
04500330
04500418
04500553
04500554
04500555
04500563
04500635
04500821
Drawings      FE-1H Sh. 4    4160V One Line Diagram Emergency Bus 10500            Revision 14
FM-20A        Residual Heat Removal System Flow Diagram              Revision 73
FM-25A        High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Diagram          Revision 75
Miscellaneous DBD-023        Design Basis Document for the High Pressure Coolant    Revision 12
Injection System
E406-0001      200 KW FLEX Diesel Generator                          Revision 1
G185-0029      Instruction Manuals for 60 Cells NCN-33 or NCN-35 (GNB dated
Industrial Power)                                      9/11/11
JAF-SPEC-MISC- James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Piping        Revision 15
Inspection Type        Designation    Description or Title                                        Revision or
Procedure                                                                                          Date
00334          Specification
NRC Information Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current          dated
Notice 2017-06  Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution 9/26/17
System
OP-AA-102-106,  Operator Response Time Validation Sheet                    performed
Att. 1                                                                     11/12/20
P319-0047      Three-Phase Magnetic Amplifier Controlled CP Battery        Revision 8
Charger
RHR 2B 10E-2B  Preliminary Report of Eddy Current Inspections              dated
11/20/13
SDLP-23        High Pressure Coolant Injection System                      Revision 28
ST-1CA          Outside Primary Containment Isolation Valve Exercise Test  performed
                                      (IST)                                                      3/16/22
ST-2AK          RHR Loop B Containment Spray Headers and Nozzles Air        performed
Test (ISI)                                                 9/23/12
ST-2AM          RHR Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST)                performed
3/10/21 &
3/8/22
Procedures  AOP-18          Loss of 10500 Bus                                          Revision 18
AOP-19          Loss of 10600 Bus                                            Revision 18
CC-JF-118      Site Implementation of Diverse and Flexible Coping          Revision 5
Strategies (FLEX) and Spent Fuel Instrumentation Program
EP-6            Post Accident Containment Venting and Gas Control          Revision 13
OP-13          Residual Heat Removal System                                Revision 100
OP-15          High Pressure Coolant Injection                            Revision 69
Work Orders 00205886
00340684
04655870
04806288
04806289
04915450
04938333
04938334
04938915
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure                                        Date
04943427
04964506
05043091
05047158
05131958
05131959
05150464
05150801
2606584
2705256
2740044
99-01814-00
14
}}
}}

Revision as of 00:24, 10 June 2022

Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000333/2022010
ML22153A261
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/02/2022
From: Mel Gray
Division of Operating Reactors
To: Rhoades D
Constellation Energy Generation, Constellation Nuclear
Gray M
References
IR 2022010
Download: ML22153A261 (17)


Text

June 2, 2022

SUBJECT:

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2022010

Dear Mr. Rhoades:

On May 20, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. On May 19, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Timothy Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Digitally signed by Melvin Melvin K. K. Gray Date: 2022.06.02 Gray 14:22:32 -04'00'

Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000333 License No. DPR-59

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000333 License Number: DPR-59 Report Number: 05000333/2022010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-010-0045 Licensee: Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: Scriba, NY Inspection Dates: May 2, 2022 to May 20, 2022 Inspectors: C. Bickett, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Brand, Reactor Inspector P. Cataldo, Senior Reactor Inspector E. Dipaolo, Senior Reactor Inspector E. Eve, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at James A.

FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of 'B' Station Battery Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.8] - 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000333/2022010-01 Procedure Open/Closed Adherence The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion XI, Test Control, because Constellation personnel did not perform battery testing in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1) the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite; 2) technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing; 3) the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge; and 4)records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at various stages of the test were not included in the official test record.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams) The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)

=

The team evaluated the following components, permanent modifications, and operating experience during the weeks of May 2 and May 16, 2022.

For the components, the team reviewed the attributes listed in IP 71111.21M, Appendix A, Component Review Attributes, such as those listed below. Specifically, the team evaluated these attributes as per IP 71111.21M, Appendix B, Component Design Review Considerations and 71111.21M, Appendix C, Component Walkdown Considerations. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the Documents Reviewed section.

(1) Loss of AC Bus 10500 Initiating Event
  • Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
  • Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
  • Maintenance records and corrective action history
  • Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
  • Surveillance testing and test results
  • System and component level performance monitoring
  • Equipment protection from fire, flood, water intrusion, or spray
  • Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation
  • Control logic
  • Component adequacy for minimum voltage
  • Protection coordination (load in-rush and full load current)
  • Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation
  • Operator actions
  • Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
  • Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electrical Loads, and Motor Control Centers (MCCs).

(2) High Pressure Coolant Injection System (Failure to Run)
  • Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
  • Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
  • System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history
  • Surveillance testing and test results
  • System and component level performance monitoring
  • Control logic
  • Operator actions
  • Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
  • Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.

(3) Containment Venting (Loss of Function)
  • Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
  • Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
  • System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history
  • Equipment/environmental controls and qualification
  • Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
  • Surveillance testing and test results
  • System and component level performance monitoring
  • Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray
  • Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation
  • Control logic
  • Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation
  • Operator actions
  • Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
  • Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-Built System.

(4) B 125 Vdc Battery (SB-2) and Battery B Control Board (BCB-2B)
  • Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
  • Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
  • Maintenance records and corrective action history
  • Equipment/environmental controls and qualification
  • Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
  • Surveillance testing and test results
  • System and component level performance monitoring
  • Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray
  • Ventilation for temperature control and hydrogen removal
  • Circuit breaker and fuse ratings
  • Component adequacy for minimum voltage
  • Protection coordination (load in-rush, full load current, and short-circuit protection)
  • Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation
  • Operator actions
  • Energy source availability (charger availability, capability, and reliability)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Instrumentation, Circuit Breakers and Fuses, Cables, Electric Loads, and Motor Control Centers (MCCs).

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) B Loop Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray (Loss of Function)
  • Material condition and installed configuration (e.g., visual inspection/walkdown)
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures
  • Consistency among design and licensing bases and other documents/procedures
  • System health report, maintenance records, and corrective action history
  • Equipment/environmental controls and qualification
  • Adequacy of design (calculations and modifications)
  • Surveillance testing and test results
  • System and component level performance monitoring
  • Equipment protection from fire, flood, steam, water intrusion, or spray
  • Heat removal, cooling water and ventilation
  • Control logic
  • Range, accuracy, and setpoint of installed instrumentation
  • Operator actions
  • Process medium availability (water, air, electrical signal)
  • Energy source availability (electricity, steam, fuel, air)

The team used Appendix B guidance for Valves, Pumps, Instrumentation, and As-

===Built System.

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)===

(1) EC 626665, Replace 10MOV-26B Double Lead Screw Form Stem with Single Lead Screw Form Stem
(2) EC 627111, Torus Wide Range Pressure Transmitter 27PT-101A Replacement
(3) EC 628065, 72MOD-101B(OP) Replacement with New Model Operator
(4) EC 629418, Evaluate Use of 3 Basket Hold Down Bolts in ESW Strainer
(5) EC 632618, Evaluate Replacement of 23HPI-149 from Vogt Ball Check to a Velan

Piston Check Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) NRC Information Notice 2019-01: Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations
(2) NRC Information Notice 2020-02: FLEX Diesel Generator Operational Challenges; Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2020/01 was used to inform the inspection sample

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of 'B' Station Battery Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.8] - 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000333/2022010-01 Procedure Open/Closed Adherence The team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because Constellation personnel did not perform battery testing in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1) the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite; 2) technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing; 3) the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge; and 4)records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at various stages of the test were not included in the official test record.

Description:

Constellation completed a battery modified performance discharge test on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) on September 18, 2020, to satisfy Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.3, to verify adequate battery capacity to support emergency loads, and TS SR 3.8.4.4, to verify battery capacity was > 80 percent of the manufacturers rating. Per the TS SR 3.8.4.4 Bases, the acceptance criteria for battery testing are consistent with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 450, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for Stationary Applications, 1995 (IEEE 450).

The team reviewed the documentation for the battery modified performance discharge test performed in accordance with Constellation procedure MST-071.24, Station Battery B Modified Performance Test, Revision 19. The team identified several instances where the test procedure was not followed and/or the problem was not entered into the corrective action program.

First, the battery terminal voltage before starting the test did not meet the test prerequisite.

MST-071.24, Prerequisite Step 8.13 required that the battery be on a float charge with battery terminal voltage between 131 - 133V DC. Actual voltage was 136V DC due to the battery being charged by the swing charger and technicians believed the swing charger voltage could not be adjusted to the required range. This was discussed with the on-shift senior reactor operator and the decision made to continue with the test. The actual voltage of 136V DC was within the equalizing charge range. IEEE 450 specifies that the battery be on a float charge for a minimum of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following being on an equalizing charge prior to starting the discharge test.

Second, technicians did not ensure that adequate and reliable power was available for test equipment as stated in the test prerequisites. MST-071.24, Prerequisite Step 8.11 required technicians to Ensure an AC outlet (nominal 120 VAC, 20 Amp) is available for test equipment and other outlets on circuit are not used during test except to power test equipment. Tag other outlets as necessary. The purpose of this step was to ensure a reliable control power source to the battery test equipment during the performance of the test.

Constellation personnel did not adequately perform this step. As a result, at approximately 16 minutes into the test, the power supply was lost to the test equipment. This resulted in an 11.53 minute pause in testing. IEEE 450 only provides for one short duration pause in testing (10 percent of the test duration or 6 minutes, whichever is shorter) for the specific purpose of disconnecting a battery cell that is approaching reversal of polarity early in the test. Test data showed that battery terminal voltage was higher when the load was reapplied than prior to the pause in testing. This demonstrated that the battery recovered during the pause and that the battery test would indicate a higher battery capacity than if no pause occurred. The team noted that technicians did not initiate a corrective action issue report (IR) for this problem encountered during the testing.

Third, the 11.53 minute duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge. This resulted in a higher and non-conservative calculated battery capacity versus actual capacity.

Fourth, records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at the beginning of the test, at specified intervals, and at the completion of the test per the guidance contained in IEEE 450 were not included in the official test record.

Specifically, personnel did not comply with Step 10.7 which stated to Obtain a printout of the individual cell voltages from the Alber BCT 2000 test equipment and include in work package.

Corrective Actions: Constellations short-term corrective actions included performing a technical evaluation (EC 636754) to assess battery operability and capacity of the B 125V DC station service battery and entering the issues into their corrective action program.

Factoring in the pause in the testing and other considerations, Constellation staff determined that the worst-case battery capacity was 101.08 percent (as compared to the battery capacity of 106.8 percent recorded following the test in September 2020). This demonstrated that the battery had margin to the TS required > 80 percent capacity and that the battery did not show signs of degradation (i.e., capacity was not greater than 10 percent lower than the previous modified performance discharge test).

Corrective Action References: IRs 4497226, 4497328, 4497663, and 4497832.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to conduct modified performance discharge testing on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) on September 18, 2020, in accordance with written test procedures consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria contained in IEEE 450. Specifically, the test was started with battery terminal voltage in the equalize range, technicians did not ensure that an adequate and reliable power supply was available for test equipment as required in the test prerequisites which resulted in a pause in testing, the duration of the pause in testing was inappropriately included in the total duration of the battery discharge, and records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages were not included in the official test record.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Though the performance deficiency occurred while the plant was shut down, the assessment of risk was best represented by using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, of IMC 0609, Appendix A. The team determined that this finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of mitigating structures, systems, or components, where the structures, systems, or components maintained their operability or functionality. Although not performed consistent with the acceptance criteria of IEEE 450, the test did demonstrate with reasonable confidence that there was sufficient margin to the TS required battery capacity of > 80 percent. Therefore, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, Constellation personnel did not follow the modified performance discharge test procedure when performing the test on the B 125V DC station service battery on September 18, 2020.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Constellation was committed to perform battery modified performance discharge testing consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria of IEEE 450 and required to perform battery modified performance discharge testing of the B 125V DC station service battery in accordance with MST-071.24, Station Battery B Modified Performance Test, Revision 19.

Contrary to the above, on September 18, 2020, Constellation personnel did not perform battery modified performance discharge testing on the B 125V DC station service battery (71SB-2) in accordance with written test procedures consistent with the recommendations and acceptance criteria contained in IEEE 450. Specifically, the test deficiencies included: 1)the initial battery terminal voltage did not meet the test prerequisite (required range 131-133V DC versus actual 136V DC and was in the equalizing charge range which was not consistent with IEEE 450); 2) technicians did not ensure that adequate and reliable power was available for test equipment as stated in the test prerequisites (the loss of power to test equipment during the test resulted in an 11.53-minute test interruption which was not consistent with IEEE 450); 3) including the 11.53 minute duration of the pause in testing from the total duration of the battery discharge resulted in a higher and non-conservative calculated battery capacity versus actual capacity; and 4) records of individual cell voltages and battery terminal voltages required to be read and recorded at the beginning of the test, at specified intervals, and at the completion of the test per IEEE 450 guidance were not included in the official test record. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into Constellations corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 05000333/20220010-01, Inadequate Test Control for Modified Performance Discharge Testing of B Station Battery)

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On May 19, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. Timothy Peter, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.21M Calculations JAF-CALC-15- FLEX Strategy - Portable Generator System Sizing Revision 0

00031

JAF-CALC-CAD- Design Basis Calculations for the Torus Inner and Outer Revision 0

04481 Exhaust AOVs 27AOV-117 & 27AOV-118 at FitzPatrick NPP

JAF-CALC- 125V DC System Short-Circuit Calculation and Coordination Revision 1

ELEC-02016 Evaluation

JAF-CALC- Determination of Float and Equalize Voltage for Station Revision 1

ELEC-02551 Batteries 71SB-1 & 71SB2

JAF-CALC-SWS- Local Wall Thinning Evaluation for ESW Strainers 46STR- Revision 2C

04170 5A/B

Corrective Action 04036374

Documents 04176609

221269

246355

252619

252625

266619

290349

04319445

04323766

04335008

04339876

04347868

04348143

04369686

04371604

04371715

04372411

04372680

04373277

04374549

04377286

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

04381156

04384096

04384807

04385340

04389930

04394054

04401931

04407061

04425606

04425805

04428931

04455782

04467798

04483344

04483639

04483997

04496433

04496616

04497610

CR-JAF-2007-

03363

Corrective Action 04497169

Documents 04497226

Resulting from 04497328

Inspection 04497349

04497394

04497395

04497409

04497663

04497664

04497672

04497680

04497832

04497910

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

04497962

04497964

04497965

04497967

04497969

04497970

04497997

04498019

04498006

04498022

04498129

04498210

04499080

04500102

04500121

04500293

04500320

04500330

04500418

04500553

04500554

04500555

04500563

04500635

04500821

Drawings FE-1H Sh. 4 4160V One Line Diagram Emergency Bus 10500 Revision 14

FM-20A Residual Heat Removal System Flow Diagram Revision 73

FM-25A High Pressure Coolant Injection Flow Diagram Revision 75

Miscellaneous DBD-023 Design Basis Document for the High Pressure Coolant Revision 12

Injection System

E406-0001 200 KW FLEX Diesel Generator Revision 1

G185-0029 Instruction Manuals for 60 Cells NCN-33 or NCN-35 (GNB dated

Industrial Power) 9/11/11

JAF-SPEC-MISC- James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Piping Revision 15

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

00334 Specification

NRC Information Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current dated

Notice 2017-06 Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution 9/26/17

System

OP-AA-102-106, Operator Response Time Validation Sheet performed

Att. 1 11/12/20

P319-0047 Three-Phase Magnetic Amplifier Controlled CP Battery Revision 8

Charger

RHR 2B 10E-2B Preliminary Report of Eddy Current Inspections dated

11/20/13

SDLP-23 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Revision 28

ST-1CA Outside Primary Containment Isolation Valve Exercise Test performed

(IST) 3/16/22

ST-2AK RHR Loop B Containment Spray Headers and Nozzles Air performed

Test (ISI) 9/23/12

ST-2AM RHR Loop B Quarterly Operability Test (IST) performed

3/10/21 &

3/8/22

Procedures AOP-18 Loss of 10500 Bus Revision 18

AOP-19 Loss of 10600 Bus Revision 18

CC-JF-118 Site Implementation of Diverse and Flexible Coping Revision 5

Strategies (FLEX) and Spent Fuel Instrumentation Program

EP-6 Post Accident Containment Venting and Gas Control Revision 13

OP-13 Residual Heat Removal System Revision 100

OP-15 High Pressure Coolant Injection Revision 69

Work Orders 00205886

00340684

04655870

04806288

04806289

04915450

04938333

04938334

04938915

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

04943427

04964506

05043091

05047158

05131958

05131959

05150464

05150801

2606584

2705256

2740044

99-01814-00

14