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8 MR.*ROISMAN:      Mr. Ippolito, I would like to 9      start with you.          Do you have a copy of the June 11, 1984 10      letter that you sent to the hearing board? Well, I'll go 11 through it slowly enough so we'll be able to talk about the                            l 12      same thing.
8 MR.*ROISMAN:      Mr. Ippolito, I would like to 9      start with you.          Do you have a copy of the June 11, 1984 10      letter that you sent to the hearing board? Well, I'll go 11 through it slowly enough so we'll be able to talk about the                            l 12      same thing.
I 13 In that letter, you state on page 2 of the 14 i attachment -- and the letter that I'm referring to until I                              1 I
I 13 In that letter, you state on page 2 of the 14 i attachment -- and the letter that I'm referring to until I                              1 I
15 tell you different is the June 11, 1984 letter to the        .
15 tell you different is the {{letter dated|date=June 11, 1984|text=June 11, 1984 letter}} to the        .
16 hearing board that you signed, in which you transmitted to                        ~
16 hearing board that you signed, in which you transmitted to                        ~
17 them a copy of the comanche Peak plan for the completion of 18 outstanding regulatory actions dated May of '84. On page 2 19 of the plan you indicate "this plan proposes the.                                .'~
17 them a copy of the comanche Peak plan for the completion of 18 outstanding regulatory actions dated May of '84. On page 2 19 of the plan you indicate "this plan proposes the.                                .'~

Latest revision as of 08:19, 13 December 2021

Transcript of 851119 Meeting W/Case in Bethesda,Md.Pp 1-223. Supporting Documentation Encl
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UNiltu STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET 0:

MEETING OF NRC STAFF WITH CASE I.- -

\

LOCATION: BETEESDA, MARYLAND PAGES: 1- 223 DATE: TUESDAY. NOVEMBER 19, 1985

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

MEETING OP NRC STAFF WITH CASE

'4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue

. Room P-ll8

, 6 Bethesda, Maryland 7

Lesday, November 19, 1985 The meeting convened at 9:02 a.m., Clarence Chandler, 8

oggge, of.the Executive Legal Director, presiding.

9 ATTENDEES:

10 l ANNETTE VIETTI-COOK, NRR/DL/CPP T. A. IPPOLITO, AEOD i 11 H. H. LIVERMCRE, NRC - Reg. II C. J. HALE, NRC - Reg. IV l j,

' H. S. PHILLIPS, NRC - Reg. IV j C. E. McCRACKEN, NRC/NRR CHET POSLUSNY, NRC/NRR/DL/CPP 13 ANTHONY Z, ROISMAN, CASE / Trial Lawyers for Public 14 Justice .

i BILLIE GARDE, CASE / Trial Lawyers for Public Justice -

LAWRENCE J. CHANDLER, NRC/OELD j

15 j LARRY SHAO, NRC.

' JOSE A. CALVO, NRC l

- 16 VINCENT S. NCONAN, NRC GEARY S. MIZUNO, NRC-ELD  ;

1 II CHARLES M. TRAMMELL, NRC RICHARD H. WESSMAN, NRC I SHOU-NIEN HOU, NRC

. 18 R. W. HUBBARD, NRC  ;

V. P. FERRARINI, TRT

~ l 19 R. MASTERSON, TRT  !

- W. P. CHEN, TRT

  • 20 SPOTTSWOOD B. BURWELL, NRC/NRR/CPP  !

C. D. RICHARDS, TRT -

2I J. H. MALONSON, TRT M. W. ELI, TRT -

R. W. EONNENBERG, TRT 22 V. W. WATSON, TRT VICTOR L. WENCZEL, TRT 23 T. E. CURRY, TRT WILLIAM C. WELLS, TRT 24 DAVID L. MEYER, NRC/ADM/DRR/FOIA y, '% JOE CAWLEY, NRC/ADM/DRR/FOIA 23 AL SERKIZ, NRC/NRR/ DST PAUL KESHISHIAN, TRT-Consultant

-- continued --

i 1

. 1.1 1

ATTENDEES (Continued):

2 ROGER ROHR3ACHER, NRC/IE 3 IAN BARNES, NRC - Reg. IV TONY BUHL, SRT/TUGCO/IT Corp.

4 R. A. WOOLDRIDGE, Worsham, Forsythe, Sampels & -

Wooldridge, for TUGCO .

5 WILLIAM S. EGGELING, Ropes & Gray '

ROY P. LESSY, JR., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius ,

JOHN H. BUCK 6 R. K. GAD, III, Ropes & Gray .

WARREN E. NYER, TUGCO/NYER, Inc.

7 JACK D. REDDING, TUGCO M. SIVA KUMAR, Gibbs & Hill ,

8 DAVID C. 'GARLINGTON, Southern Engineering HOWARD A. LEVIN, CPRT -

l-9 BEN FINKELSTEIN, Spiegel & McDiarmid (Brozas G&T)  !

JOHN GUIBERT, CPRT/SRT I

JOHN KNOX, NRC/NRR  !

10 DONALD F. LANDERS, Teledyne Engineering Service ,

11 i

12 13 .

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PROCEEDIN,GS 2 MR. CHANDLER:

- Good morning, I'm Clarence 3 Chandler with the office of Executive Legal Director. This 4 morning there will 'be a public meeting which has been 5

agreed to between the Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory 6

Commission and Intervenor, Citizens Associati0n for Sound 7 Energy.

8 Citizens As'sociation for Sound Er segy this 9

morning is represented by Anthony Roisman and Ms. Billie 10 Garde.

I will turn it over to Mr. Roisman in a moment for 11 any opening comments or thoughts he may F. ave.

12 Notice of this meeting was provided -- and in i 13 addition I see representatives of the Applicant in the rear 14 l of the room. Mr. Noonan, in a moment, will make some 15 i opening comments, and further discuss the conduct of this 16 meeting.

17 Essentially, this meeting is being conducted as 18 outlined very generally in the joint stipulation of Staff 19 and Citizens Association for Sound Energy Request for l 20 Subpoenas, a document dated October 23, 1985, filed with t

21 the Atomic Safety. and Licensing Board in this proceeding on 22 that date.

23 'The general subject of this meeting will be a i

1 24 discussion and questioning by Citizens Association for .

25 Sound Energy on the matters discussed in the Staff's I

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supplemental safety evaluation reports 7 through 11, which 2

reflect the reviews and evaluations performed by the Staff's 3 technical review team, or TRT. This meeting is a joint 4

Docket 1 and Docket 2 meeting, and as agreed, CASE's {

5 Washington representatives will be asking questions in both 6 dockets.

7 With that, I will turn it over to Mr. Noonan for 8

any preliminary comments that he hay wish to make.at this 9

time and for introduction of the other Staff individuals. .

10 MR. NOONAN: Good morning, I'm Vince Noonen.

11 I'm the director of the Comanche Peak project for the 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff. Just a couple of 13 j things I would address to Mr. Roisman and Ms. Garde.

14 l The subject of intimidation and harassment, I 15 know that's part of this case. This particular group of l

16 I

people were not involved in that directly other than they 17 looked at allegations. As you know there was a special 18 report put out by my panel, and they addressed the subject 19 of intimidation and harassment. I have asked the Staff not 20 to use names of allegers even though they may have been 21 made public, ,since this is a public meeting I asked them 22 not to use names. If that's no problem I would like to 23 proceed that way.

24 At the end of this session today and also 25 tomorrow, I would ask the Applicant if they wish to make a ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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comment for the record. One last item of business, I would 2

like to provide some frequent breaks to the reporter so we 3

could stop for a snort period of time to allow her to take -

4 a quick break.

5 Other than that, Mr. Roisman, I don't have any 6 other opening rem. arks. Go ahead and proceed with your 7 questions. .

8 MR. ROISMAN: Okay, Mr. Noonan. Ms. Ellis asked 9 us to have included in the record a one-page statement 10 l which attaches the stipulation and simply explains her 11 ' understanding of the agreement. I've given the reporter 12 three copies, and I will give Mr. Chandler one and 13 j Mr. Noonan one, and one for the Applicant's lawyer.

14 .

Let me start'at the outset by saying what we 15 ) will do in the ne'xt two days is not cross-examingtion.

16 When we do cross-examination, it will take place in front

~

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17 of the hearing board.

Our purpose is a very benign purpose.

18 We simply want to find out in each of the areas that we are 19 interested in what was meant by statements that appear to "

20 us to be ambiguous, or it is not clear; and where the 21 ..

statement is clear, and it is not clear why the statement "

22 was made, to understand the basis.

23 our purpose is not to argue with you or to 24 attempt 'to pin you to the wall, so . co speak. There is a 25 time for that; this is not it. It is not our purpose here.

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This is in the nature of what lawyers talk about. This is 2 in the nature of a discovery deposition. I just want to 3

find out what you know, and in the words of Watergate, when 4 did you know it, and that is our only goal.

5 I realize ":here's a certain amount of tension 6

that precedes this meeting, and that's probably inevitable 7

en both sides, but I want you to know that at least Billie 8 i and I have no particular axe to grind. We come w~ith no

, 9 predisposition that any statements you made are clearly 10 I wrong or, unfortunately, that they are clearly right. What 11 we come for is information.

12 A lot of the information that underlies the wor <

t 13 ) that you have done has only very recently been made 14 l ava'1able 1 to us and even larger pieces have not been made 15 ! available at all. That's not the fault of any of you who 16 we'll be talking to, but there will be times when you will 17 think, why are they asking that, I had a 16-page memorandum 18 that explained it all. Just tell us that, that it is laid 19 out in something. l 20 We have this FOIA request which is being 21 responded to at a pace which is glacial, to say the least. l 22 Eventually, all the information will be there, and we will 23 try to not ask you questions that we should know the answer 24 to because we have the material in our hands.

25 The outline of how we intend to proceed is, to k-1 l

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start with, Mr. Ippolito, who is sort of the G~rindfather of 2

this project, let him explain to us how it got started, 3 what it is about. We will ask Mr. Ippolito to discuss in -

4 some detail the July 13, 1984 report, which was, for lack 5 of a better term, a mini TRT report. And we'll ask 6 Mr. Noonan very briefly to simply indicate to what extent

  • 7 the system that Mr. Ippolito put into place was changed, .

8 altered, relied upon or in any o:her way used for the b

9 remainder of what ultimately became the TRT's letters and 10 then after that the SSERs.

l 11 We'll then take the SSERs, essential.ly in 12' chronological order except the one that deals with 13 miscellaneous -- we'll probably do that just before we do 14 QA/QC, so we'll , start with nummer 7. then do' number 9, 10, 15 i 8 and 11, in that order. '

16 Now, if we are talking about matters that afe in 17 ene of your areas of expertise to someone who really is not 18 as expert and you want to speak up, it is okay with me. I.

19 don't know what Mr. Chandler or Mr. Noonan may have told '

20 you but it is quite all right with me if someone says, 21 that's not exactly it, or wait, let me explain, because I -

22 was there. That's fihe. I'm just tryi.ng to get 23 information, and I'll direct my attention to whoev.er 24 Mr. Chandler and Mr. Noonan say I ought to start talking to, 25 but if somebody else wants to speak up from the Staff, ACE-FEDERAI. REPORTERS, INC.

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( l 1 that's all right with us.

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2 Do you have any questions?

3 MR. CHANDLER:

Let me make one comment. That is

, 4 in fact the way the Staff intends to respond. To the a.

, 5 axtent -- and as you can see, there are quite a number of o 6 individuals here, you will be hearing from -- likely, from 7 more than simply ,the individuals at the table, to the 8

extent another individual may have information pertinent to 9 your question.

10 You alluded in your opening comment to the fact 11 that this is in the nature of a discovery deposition. Just '

12 again so the record is clear, this is in the nature of 13 informal discovery. These individuals, unlike a deposition, 14 j will not be placed under oath, and let's proceed on that i

15 i basis. ,

16 .

MR. NOO' NAN: One clarification, the Staff has 17 been instructed to speak up if somebody !.r. this room has 18 information that's available, they will speak up and tell 19 you that. If something is said wrong, we'll correct it 20 right at the time that we know about it. I want to ask one o' .

21 question: In reading the transcripts next week when we go 22 through them, if I find some errors, I will give them to 4

23 Mr. Chandler and he can communicate to you what those 24 errors are.

l l 25 MR. ROISMAN: We hoped you would do that. We l

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2 MR. CHANDLER: Will this document provided by 3

Ms. Ellis be filed in the proceeding or is it simply your 4

intention to have it attached? '

a 5 MR. ROISMAN:

Our intent was to have it bound in #

6 with the transcript. 2 '

7 MR. CHANDLER: I have no problem with that.

8 MR.*ROISMAN: Mr. Ippolito, I would like to 9 start with you. Do you have a copy of the June 11, 1984 10 letter that you sent to the hearing board? Well, I'll go 11 through it slowly enough so we'll be able to talk about the l 12 same thing.

I 13 In that letter, you state on page 2 of the 14 i attachment -- and the letter that I'm referring to until I 1 I

15 tell you different is the June 11, 1984 letter to the .

16 hearing board that you signed, in which you transmitted to ~

17 them a copy of the comanche Peak plan for the completion of 18 outstanding regulatory actions dated May of '84. On page 2 19 of the plan you indicate "this plan proposes the. .'~

20 formulation of a TRT to evaluate and resolve a number of 21 .-

technical issues, including allegations presently identified." ~

, 22 Can you expand a little bit.on the scope of what 23 you understood was your mission, and in particular, 24 distinguishing between issues that.you were going to look l 25 at that came to the Staf f as a direct result of an ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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alle gution, and other matters that you were going to look i

2 at that didn't have their origin in an allegation.

3 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. I think that AEOD stated it 4

. on March 12, established responsibility for managing all 5 licensing actions to NRR.

This included those actions s 6 necessary that are normally performed by the office of 7 investigation, INE: the region, the hearing issues, as 8

well as the licensing issues, and whatever allegations we 9 were aware of. It was principally these four areas that I 10 was responsible to coordinate, and resolve. The plan that 11 you have before you provides - it includes what a typical ..

12 plan does include, schedules, manpower estimates, it also 13 l includes an' estimate of the amount of work that has to be 14 done at the time'that plan was written.

I 15 -

MR. ROISMAN: , So that your perception at that 16 time of what the TRT's' output would be would be -

17 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm sorry, continue.

t 18 MR. ROISMAN: Your perception as of June 11 of 19 1984 of what the output would be was that it would in

~ .

20 effect be the total technical report on the plant?

21 MR. IPPOLITO:

What I described is my 22 responsibilities. As part of that, I establ_shed a TRT.

23 That is clearly stated in the plan. The .TRT was to 24 investigate the known and ex.isting allegations that were 25 known at the time, and I think that within that, you'll see 4

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1 the distribution.

2 My recollection is there's something like 300 or 3

so allegations that were being looked at, then there was

  • 4 something like about another hundred that were being ~

5 distributed to OI, that remained in the region, and I .

6 forget whatever is in there but the parceling of the 7 responsibilities are stated there. .

As part of the 8

enclosures there are the charts, schedules, with the people 9 responsible for them.

10 MR. ROISMAN:

i The part that puzzled me -- and 11 let me read the phrase again -- was, "this plan proposes 12 i the formation of a TRT to evaluate and resolve a number of

13 I technical issues, including allegations presently 14
identified."

Were there some technical issues that TRT was 15 going to look at that went beyond the scope of the

} 16 allegations?

17 MR. IPPOLITO: If you looked at the record here, 18 there are areas that are confusing as to what are 19 allegations and what are technical issues. By that I mean .

20 if one looks at what has been happenin'g at the hearings, 21 when you speak -- like, in particular I'm thinking about -

22 the Welch Doyle issues. These were tre.ated as issues to be 23 resolved.

24 I had to assemble the people to resolve those 25 issues, but when you looked at the allegations, what you

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KSW 11 I found is a total overlap. So I wasn't going to have people, 2

two groups of people reviewing pipe hanger design or cable 3

. tray hanger design, and it is within that context -- there 4

was an issue ongoing at the hearing that needed resolution.

, 5 To the extent that the TRT had overlepped in that area, 6 then we would cover it.

7 MR. ROISMAN: Were there any issues that related 8

to technical problems that the Staff was aware of at the 9

plant other than ones that would go to OI that the TRT was 10 not going to look at?

11 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

12 MR. ROISMAN:

You don't have to list them. Can 13 you categorize *them?

14 j MR. IPPOLITO: I would say the licensing issues.

15 For instance,.I'll name two that come to mind immediately.

16 One is t'he TDI, the diesel generators. There's a big 17 problem, there was a generic problem with TDIs. Then we 18 nad a request by the licensee on the paint to declare the 19 paint non-0 It was -- that review was not done by the TRT.

20 MR. ROISMAN: When you say licensing issues,

,- . 21 that's different than hearing issues?

22 MR. IPPOLITO: Correct.

23 MR. ROISMAN: Were there any issues -- was the 24 Staff trying to at least encompass all the technical 25 hearing issues within the scope of what the TRT would look ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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1 like?

2 MR. IPPOLITO: I just don't recall. There's a 3 nice chart in that plan unat lists responsibilities, and I

  • 4 think that we could save a lot of time if you just refer to
  • 5 that. That's what I attempted to do. -

6 MR. ROISMAN: I'm not good on charts and I can't

',. 7 ,

use the term " nice" for any of them. Why don't you tell me 8 which one you particularly liked?

9 MR. IPPOLITO: Look at figures 2 and 3 of the 4

10 plan.

11 MR. CHANDLER: So the record is clear, that was 12 figures 2 and 3 attached to the letter dated June --

13 MR. ROISMAN: Attached to the May '84 plan 14 attached to the letter of June 11, 1984.

15 , Did you participate in the decision on how to

) 16 divide the responsibilities between what the TRT would take, 17 what would be done outside the TRT and by other components 18 of the Staff and what would be done by consultants?

19 MR. IPPOLITO: ~

Yes, I did, but clearly, a part .

20 of my responsibilities - when I was appointed project 21 director, I was told to attempt to use the line 22 organization to the maximum extent that I could. In other s 23 words, those issues that are normally handled by a j 24 particular office, to the extent that I could, with 25 resources available and time, what have you, I should try ,

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  • KSW 13 l to coordinate their efforts. .

2 MR. ROISMAN: And in the preparation of this 3 division of labor, what, as you understood it then, what 4 was the operating criteria for whether a technical issue 5

was looked at by the TRT rather than by somebody else?

$ 6 MR. IPPOLITO: Say that again.

7 MR. ROISMAN: I'm trying to understand what was 8 the operating criteria by which you decided whether it was 9l to be looked at by the TRT or some other component.

10 MR. IPPOLITO: Other than those obvious things, 11 I think I looked to see whether the line organization had 12 sufficient expertise, knowledge available within time 13,J ctistraints to work on the job. If not, then I would 14 attempt to supplement the TRT with the right consultant to i

15 endeavor to meet those criteria.

f 16 ' MR. ROISMAN: Your answer makes me think I i

17 haven't made my question clear. Some issues were to be 18 resolved by the technical review team, whether by technical 19 review team members who were Staff people on assignment or 20 whether they were done by technical review team consultant 1.

. . 21 Some issues the technical review team was not supposed to 22 look at, someone elsa was supposed to. One class of those 23 issues was, for instance, all the issues that went to OI.

24 Was there some set of operating criteria that you knew of 25 or planned to develop that decided whether the issue was to k

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. 14 1 be looked at by the technical review team or by some other 2 component of the Staff?

3 q__._ MR. IPPOLITO: There were no criteria. I 4 decided -- excuse me.

5 MR. ROISMAN: If someone else has the answer, it .

6 may be more efficient to say. >

,7 MR. NOONAN: Staff can speak up if they want to. '

8 MR. CALVO: My perception was that we looked at 9  ;

all the issues available at the time, so whether they were 10 going to OI or other people, the technical merits, as far 1

11 as it relates to the meries, that was given to the 12 technical team.

13 ; MR. IPPOLITO: He's asking whether there existed 14 a set of criteria by which a decision was made as to who 15 would work on an item. M response is, like I say in the 16 j report here, I decided after examining the item to be 17 looked at where it should be looked at.

18 MR. ROISMAN: Let's talk for a minute about the 19 decision to give to OI the responsibility for lo.cking at ,

20 harassment and intimidation. Can you explain to me what it ,

21  :

was that you understood was the way that responsibility was -

22 to be divided? What was it that OI was going to look at as 23 opposed to what the TRT would look at?

24 MR. IPPOLITO: OI is responsible for looking at 25 wrongdoing.

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If there were elements of wrongdoing, they would

. 2 look at that portion of it. We would cooperate -- in their 3

review of investigating wrongdoing there were possible 4

technical issues involved, then we would cooperate with 5 each other. We would extract from that portion of the 6 issue, the technical issues. I would then transform them 7 into " allegations,"

and insert them into the technical 8 review team review process. But the technical review team,  !

9 or "NRR, as far as I know, looks at wrongdoing, and as I 10 understand it, intimidation and harassment is included as a 11 responsibility of OI.

I stand to be corrected but that was 12 '

.my understanding at the time.

13 ) MR. ROISMAN: Is it -- I'm troubled by the term i

14 l " wrongdoing." If a QC inspector -- if you , learn that a OC i

15 inspector approved something that shouldn't have been 16 approved -- you're doing a review, you find something, you 17 check back and see that he signed off on something as 18 satisf actory and it wasn't satisf actory, and it was a 19 mistake. Is that wrongdoing by the QC inspector, without 20 getting to the question of why he did it?

21 MR. IPPOLITO: I think it is a judgment call on 22 the part of whoever uncovers this. If 'it looks like a 23 typical human error, that's one thing. If it was 24 determined to be premeditated or whatever have you, 25 purposefully done, that's another matter. And if we ACE. FEDERAL R.EPORTERS, INC.

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  • 1 suspect that it is the latter, then we ask OI to look into 2 it.

3 MR. ROIS %N: I want to be clear that I ~

4 J understand your understanding of this.- The scope of what * '

5 . yo'u understand OI would look at is if somebody appeared to -

o

$ 6 do something wrong on purpose or as a result of somebody 7 .

else improperly forcing them to do it against their will, 8

that would be an OI concern, although you would still want 9

' to have the technical review team look. at the underlying 10 technical problem?

11 MR. IPPOLITO: That's correct.

12 ! MR. ROISMAN: Then you and OI would work i

13 together to the extent that they needed your input to 14' understand what had gone on, and they would give you the 15 benefit of anything they learned that might reflect on the 16 technical problem?

17 MR. IPPOLITO: 'That's correct.

18 MR. ROISMAN: Did you, at the time that you 19 ,

started this whole TRT process, did you perceive- that you .

20 would need to have the conclusions from OI before you would 21 '

be able to have the Staff reach final conclusions about the 22 plant safety? Was that linked in any way at the time you 23 started the technical review team process? l 3

24 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. If you read the plan, the l 25 plan identifies OI as a possible iupediment to meeting the I

i -

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KSW 17 1 intended schedule. I think I identified in there that 2 there are not sufficient people to complete these things in 3 time for us to reach a licensing decision around 1 October 4 of '84.

5

, MR. ROISMAN: And why was it necessary to wait 6,

for OI to finish its work in order f'cr the Staff to 7 complete its work on the review of the plan? .

8 MR. IPPOLITO: At the time, I thought it was 9 necessary.

10 MR. ROISMAN:

What was your reason or why did 11 you believe that?

12 MR. IPPOL1TO: Since effectively, I had the 13 responsibility for total integration of all issues to their 14 con' elusion, that's the primary reason for it. I thought I 15' t had to wait to see what affect the OI reports could have on 16 Comanche Peak. '

17 MR. ROISMAN: In your determination to divvy up 18 the responsibility for review between OI and the technical 19 review team on issues of wrongdoing, where did you place 20 the phenomenon, if it was one that you were aware of at the

. . 21 time, of employees who were not being forced to do 22 something that they didn't believe they, should do, but 23 employees who believed that management was insufficiently 24 supportive of their work and thus they were discouraged 25 from doinc their job as they thought they should do it?

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18 1 MR. IPPOLITO: You should realize that when I 2

assumed responsibility for Comanche Peak, I don't recall, 3

as project director, requesting of OI any -- I take that 4 back.

  • There were about two instances that I wrote OI and I

5 asked them to look' at something. Let's sgy a majority of 6

the effort that was being done by OI had already been 7 established there. I think we had some two, possibly three 8 j minor references for additional OI investigations as a 9

result of what we as a team uncovered.

10 MR. ROISMAN: What was your definition, what was 11 your working definition at that time, of what constituted 12 the wrongdoing of harassment and intimidation? And by "that 13 l time," I'm talking about around June 11 of 1984.

14 MR. IPPOLITO: I personally had a difficult time 15 in my mind separating management's style from intimidation.

16 And this is after having read some of the OI reports. This 17 uneasiness, I guess, stems from my personal background and 18 personal knowledge of management, both here in the 19 government, I mean in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ,

20 and with the Navy, nuclear power program. But intimidation 21 was defined, since it was the responsibility of OI, it was ~

22 defined by OI at the time.

23 - -

I think that subsequent to that, there were some 24 formal hearings, pleadings, or whatever they are called, 25 that established a definition of intimidation, so we l 1

l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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operated with that definition from that point on.

2 MR. ROISMAN: And this difficulty in your own 3

mind between intimidation on the one hand and management 4

style on the other, was it your perception that management's 5

style was benign but intimidation was something of concern,

, 6 and you just had a hard time drawing the line between the 7

two, or was it that you thought they were both unacceptable *

, 8; and therefore the line-drawing was not so important?

9 MR. IPPOLITO:

. We're speaking theoretically here.

10 There's an' obsessive type of management style which is 11 clearly unacceptable, but whether or not it results in 12 intimidation, that's another issue. That's my personal 13 i 1

feelings on the subject.

14 l MR. ROISMAN: 'Now, when OI was doing its work as 15 i a result either of matters that you had referred to them 16 because of what you were finding in your investigations or 17 1 as' preexisting work, was it your understanding that they 18 were operating independently of NRR or were they operating -

, 19 under NRR's supervision?

20 MR. IPPOLITO: Oh, they were independent. They

, , 21 are independent of NRR.

22 MR. ROISMAN: Now, on page 3 of the May 1984 23 plan, there's a reference to -- and it says, "The technical 24 review team may be called together for a specified period 25 of time, dispersed back to the individual's parent office ,

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and then reconstituted in whole or in part as needed to 2 complete resolution of like issues." What was your 3

understanding of what that meant and how you thought that __

4 the TRT was going to function?

  • 5 MR. IPPOLITO: As proje'ct director, at least, -

6 o one has to realize that the home offices for the pecple I'm 7

working on Comanche Peak with would like to have chair .

8 people back and functioning. That simply is a warning to 9

i everybody that I have on my technical review team that I 10 reserved the right to call these people back should 11 ;

something develop after they have, let's say, completed  ;

. 12 their initial assignment. It was just, you know, a caveat 13 , that says, I still have them if I need them. That's all.

s

  • 14 i It was just a thing of planning.

15 MR. ROISMAN: What wps your understanding, again 16' at that time - and I want to keep stressing that, I'm i

17 interested in understanding the breadth of the project, and 18 I may ask you later, certainly Mr. Noonan later, its

~

19 evolution - but at that time, what was your understanding ,

~

i 20 of what would happen with respect to technical issues that 21 arose as a result of allegations made after the date that

22 i

technical r,eview team was formalized? Who was going to 23 have responsibility' to look into those allegations, and 24 where would those be taken care of?

25 MR. IPPOLITO: All allegations - let me give ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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  • KSW 21 1 you some background. one of the first things I did, and I 2

think anybody would do, is to find out exactly what has to 3

be resolved, how much work there is out to be. completed.

4 e

One of the items was to try to reconstruct or to construct, 5

identify all of the allegations that we had in hand at the 6 . time. We did this. We categorized them into the five l

7 groups, and as you read the plan, -hat's what the plan t.ays.

8 i

What we did was that everything from, let's say, 9

around March or April, every allegation that came into the. '

10 technical review team, it was reviewed and categorized and 11 put into -- assigned to the appropriate group within the 12 technical review team. That's the way it functioned until 13 I left. -

. 14 'i *

  • MR. ROISMAN: Did you have -- let's assume that 15 something that didn't happen had happened, and I want to 16 know based on that assumption what you th*ought was going to 17 be the way the te'chnical review team would deal with it.

j 18 i sometime after the technical review team had completed its 19 work and issued its report, several allegations were made 20 to the NRC that require investigation. Did you expect that

, 21 if that sh'ould happen that that would be one of the 22 occasions on which you might reconstitute in whole or in '

i 23 part the technical review team to evaiuate those?

, 24 MR. IPPOLITO: No.

It was clearly my intent at 25 that point, in fact I was proceeding at the time of the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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fifth session, to discuss turnover of allegations back to i

2 region 4. It was just preliminary. We had intended to do 3 that.

They were going to revert back to region 4 and their

  • 4 normal course of doing -- I mean maintaining and reviewing
  • 5 the allegation tracking system and to proceed along those -

a 6 lines.

~

7 MR. ROISMAN: Was it your perception that the 8

' purpose of the technical review team was merely to provide 9! logistics support for the Staff to be able to deal with 10 what was becoming a large volume of work that could not be 11 handled in the normal channels, or did it have some i

12 . purposes beyond that?

13 MR. IPPOLITO: I think you used the word 14' j logistics, and clearly that's not correct, my understanding 15 of it. It is to provide resol"t$on of those issues. Is 16 there a problem or is thews ct i problem for those 17 allegations that we were ?.ackb . at? Clearly, that was it.

18-But you have to' remember, as I said earlier, that I was to 19 use', to the extent possible, the line organizations whose ,

l 20

! responsibility it was to perform the functions they did 21 perform, so once we caught up, then I expected the normal ~

22 functioning of each office to take over,and proceed and c

23 continue to do its business. - -

24 MR. ROISMAN:

. How did.you plan to deal with the 25 fact that people, let's say from other regions, who were i

i ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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working on assignment from TRT or from headquarters working 2 on assignment with the technical review team, and had 3 developed not only an expertise in the subject area but

~

4 also an expertise in this particular plant, how did you 5

perceive that they would be brought into a subsequent 6

evaluation of an allegation when it was only going to be .

7 done within region 4, as the technical review team didn't 8 exist? -

9 MR. IPPOLITO: I would think that when I turned 10 the thing back to the region, the region would manage it as 11 eney see fit. If they thought they needed that same 12 expertise that I had developed under the technical review 13 l team, they would ask for it and get it. These are just i

14 i guesses. I really don't know. I anticipated to return 4

i 15 ' tnis to the region and that they would manage.it as they 16 saw fit.

17 MR. ROISMAN: You did not feel that you needed 18 the technical review team because the region did not have 19 the technical expertise to evaluate some of these issues?

20 MR. IPPOLITO: Say that again.

21 MR. ROISMAN: Did you feel you needed a 22 technical review team in part because the region did not 23 have the technical expertise to evaluate.some of the issues?

24 . MR. IPPOLITO: Th_at was part of the 25 decision-making. The other was the large backlog. The ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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other was -- I think you recall the region was pretty.well 2

committed to providing much of their Staff to the Waterford 3

construction program, and there just were 'not enough people 4 around.

5 MR. ROISMAN: On page 5 of the May 1984 plan, 6

under the general heading " Inspections, regulatory actions," .

7 this sentenee appears:, "Particularly significant is the 8

retest / inspect ef fort as the applicant plans to rerun 9

approximately 25 preoperational tests to confirm system 10 I readiness sabject to various modifications and design l .

11 changes."

Fas it your understanding that what was being

,12 proposed to be done by the applicant was to use some form 13 of a readiness review of modification design change work in 14 l lieu of something else, to establish the adequacy of the

, 15 modificacions and the design? '

16 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't know. I'm not even 17 familiar with what you're saying.

18 MR. ROISMAN: You're not familiar with the .-

19 sentence? -

20 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm familiar with the sentence, .

21 but what you added to the sentence, I can't follow.

22 MR. ROISMAN:

Are you familiar with the concept ,

23 called readiness review? Does that have any meaning to you?

24 MR. IPPOLITO: Not right now, no.

25 MR. ROISMAN: Was it your understanding that the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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applicants were going to do these preoperational tests as a 2

substitute for some other regulatory re virement?

3 MR. IPPOLITO: My understanding of what this is, a

4 and if I -- I stand to be corrected -- and that is the i 5

applicant had run a large number of tests, but subsequent 6

. to those tests, the system had undergone modification,

'7 which placed into question the suitability of those tests, .

8 and as a result, they had to retest. This required 9

. additional manpower to rewitness or to inspect those tests, 10 and that is what this alludes to.

11 MR. WESSMAN: ' This is Dick Wessman from the 12 Staff. Fundamentally that's correct. This is typical of 13 i most power plants, they may run tests and may run over a 14 j couple of years, modifications may be made or test data may 15 be invalidated so they have. to rerun selected tests to 16 confirm that the plant or the systems meet the appropriate 17 criteria, and that was what was going on at this point in 18 time.

19 MR. ROISMAN: It wasn't your understanding that 20

. . the tests were being run as a substitute for confirming 21 that the modifications or design changes otherwise met 22 regulatory requirements?

  • 23 MR. WESSMAN:

I don't know about the term 24 " substitute." They were ~just having to rerun tests because 25 changes had been made to systems or test data had not been

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1 completely validated in a previous run of the tests.

2 MR. ROISMAN: I want to understand a little bit 3 more about the -- your understanding of the difference

  • 4 between the wrongdoings issue and its review by OI, and the
  • 5 ef fort by the technical review team. Let me try to .

6 approach it this way:

When the technical review team had 7 an allegation of a particular technical problem, let's .

8 assume that the allegation comes from someone who said, in 9

addition to the fact that I think this particular component 10 , of the plan is not properly built, the reason I never said 1

11; ' anything before was because I was being pressured to keep 12 quiet about it; so we have a technical problem and we have 1

13 i what I ass 2me would fit your definition of a wrongdoing.

14 { Was the technical review team supposed to find 15 out the answer to the question, why did this technical 16 problem, assuming that on investigation you found the

) ,17 technical problem was real, why this technical problem did 18 not get reported in the informal system of reporting at the 19 plant? Was that part of what the technical revi.ew team's .

20 mission *was to do?

21 MR. IPPOLITO: Part of the technical review

  • 22 team's mission was where a possible wro.ngdoing such as that 23 was uncov'ered, what we do is ask OI in a memorandum for OI 24 to initiate an investigation of that. Meanwhile, I would 25 follow that up with discussions, I or my immediate staff, ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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to assure that we had a coordinated review of that item, 2 both technical and wrongdoing.

. 3 The logic, I think, is clear.

1 If we go in first, 4

we stir up the information, the information may not be as 5

clean for the subsequent investigation, so if we both go in

- 6 at the same time, ask. our quest; ions quickly and of the 7

right people, then we both satisfy ourselves that we got 8

the best information possible to address the issue. So in 9

those cases we would try to coordinate our technical review 10

  • team effort and the,OI effort, and we did that a number of 11 { times on-site. .
12. MR. ROISMAN:

1 My question was, was part of the 13 ) technical review team's mission, as you understood it, to 14 ! antwer the question, why? Why is thi's technical problem, i

15 I assuming that after looking at the allegation you confirm t

16 that the technical problem had in fact not been previously 17 identified.and it was a real problem that should have been, 18 why it wasn't previously identified? Was the technical 19 review team ultimately supposed to have an answer to that 20 question?

21 MR. IPPOLITO: No. OI would have an answer to 22 that question. OI would investigate that wrongdoing.

23 MR. ROISMAN:

Let me change the example. Assume 24 that the problem arose, alleger came in to you, said 25 there's a technical problem over here that has not been Acs-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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detected before, and the reason was because the inspector 2

who was supposed to have detected it was not properly 3

trained and did not therefore understand that that was a 4 problem.

I take it that would not constitute an OI '

5 wrongdoing. Would you consider that the technical review -

6 team was supposed to not only determine whether the .

7 technical problem was real, but also try to determine why .

8 it was that the technical problem had not been reported? ~

9 KR. IPPOLITO: We would investigate the 10 suf ficiency or adequacy of the training program for those 11 people.

12

+

MR. ROISMAN: Was that in part in order to be 13 able to determine how much further beyond the allegation 14 you should look to determine - 'in other words, this 15 ' alleger only saw one thing and they only knew this one 16

. inspector who they thought had not been properly trained, 17 so they gave you that piece of information. You go out and i

18 investigate it and find that the technical problem is real. ,

19 1 You look at the inspector's qualifications and d.iscover he ,

20 really wasn't qualified, and therefore we think we can say 21 with a reasonable degree of confidence, the reason the *

\

l 22 technical problem was missed was the guy wasn't qualified. l 23 was it the technical review team's 24 responsibility to begin to look at all the other places 25 where the lack of qualification of that person might have ACE.FEDERAI. REPORTERS, INC.

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i produced a problem that no alleger had ever seen?

2 MR. IPPOLITO: I was following you right to the

, 3 end.

4 MR. ROISMAN:

. A problem that you didnt 5

otherwise know about, this same inspector inspected a 6 thousand things.

~

7 MR.'IPPOLITO: Using your example, the technical 8

review team would pursue the training to see, to try to 9

determine whether,or not in our opinion it was generic.

10 MR. ROISMAN:

You mean the inadequacy of 11 training?

, 4 12 < MR. IPPOLITO:

That's right. This is not to say 13 '

that we would go -- and let's say if there were 8000 people .

14 i

on site -- we would not go seat. the training records for 15 8000 people.

We would audit until we were satisfied that 16 it looks like there's a generic problem here. Once we were q

17 satisfied, that there was or wasn't, then we would stop.

18 That's the way we performed our responsibilities.

19

, , MR. ROISMAN: What about looking at the other 20 piece of it?

Let's assume that in your look, as a result 21 of this allegation, you found not only that this technical 22 problem had occurred, but that on this inspector, A, 23 inspector A was unqualified, and that it was a result of 24 something that didn't relate to other inspectors, only 25 inspector A was unqualified. He was really badly trained, i

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didn't know what he was doing. Would the technical review 2

team consider that part of what its responsibility was, 3

then, to go and inspect all of the things that that <

4  !

inspector had evaluated to determine whether other

  • 5 technical problems slipped by the process because this one -

6 .

untrained inspector was doing the inspections?

7 MR. IPPOLITO: No. , We identified -- the modus '

8 {

operandi, if you will, of the technical review team is to '

9 determine 'whether or not they feel, af ter doing their 10 i i

review, that there was or was not -- that the allegation 11 was substantiated or not. If it wasn't substantiated we 12 would stop there, and the burden as to the depth and 13 j breadth of that problem was placed on the licensee.

14 MR. ROISMAN: Do you know why that decision was 15 reached, why it was decided that the technical review team .

16 would stop at that point?

17 MR. IPPOLITO~: Because I could not possibly 18 follow that course of action in everything that technical 19 revi'ew team was doing.

The 40 or 50 people on s,ite was ,

20 totally inadequate to review each of the things for breadth 21 and depth. ..

That was not the way we set it up and clearly

  • 22 not the way -- we just couldn't afford it and,it was not or 23 responsibility.

24 The responsibility for. building that plant, for 25 building it safely, was the licensee's, and once we had the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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suspicion that they were possibly not comforming then it

, 2 was up to him to provide the depth and breadth and provide '

, 3 corrective action.

4 MR. ROISMAN: Why did you not stop with 5

confirming that the technical problem was real?. Why did 6

you even go the next step in our hypothetical and look to 7

see if the training program was generically defective?

8 MR. IPPOLITO:

a As far as I'm concerned that's 9 another technical issue.

4 It would be a QA/QC issue. Was 10 the training program adequate?

I 11 MR. ROISMAN: Isn't it also a technical issue as 12 to whether or not tr.at QA or that group of QC inspectors 13 may have missed a thousand other defects?

14 i MR. IPPOLITO: I've answere'd that. I've said we 15 looked into it to the extent that we ar's satisfied that 16 there is or is not a problem. If there is, if we're 17 convinced that there is, we don't go back to see if the man 18 had been there seven years, we don't go back seven years to 19 find out what the man did. That's up to the licensee to do 20 -

and that is what he was told to do.

j -

21 t

MR. ROISMAN: I understood the conclusion, I was 22 trying to understand the reasoning.

23 .

MR. IPPOLITO: The reasoning is it is impossible 24 for the technical review teaa or any other group to come in 25 .after the plant is built to try to -- we don't have enough t

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people nor enough time to go into that depth, and it is the 2

responsibility of licensee's, in any event.

3 MR. ROISMAN: I was trying to understand why the .

4 technical review team even took*on the responsibility of .

5 finding out whether in their judgment they thought tha t the .

6 problem was generic or not. .

Why wasn't that also treated 7 as the licensee's responsibility? Why wasn't it sufficient '

8 for you merely to confirm that the alleger's statement that 9

this particular defect had gone undetected was correct and 10 then say to the licensee you find out whether it is generic, 11 find out what caused it and do whatever reinspection or 12 rework that, leads you to.

13 i MR. IPPOLITO: I think I wanted to satisfy 1.4 myself that is this an isolated case or is this larger than 15 isolated.

Clearly, you are right, it takes us a step 16 further, but it still is an audit to the extent that we 17 could say, I believe it is generic or from what I have seen, 18 it is not generic.

19 MR. ROISMAN: As you went through the work you **

20 were doing, did you develop any opinion as to whether or 21 not you felt that the approach that the technical review

  • 22 team was taking, this distinction that ,we have been tr.1 king 23 about, wrongdoing goes to OI, we look for whether a problem 24 is generic but not necessarily the full breadth and depth, 25 whether you would be able at the end of the technical ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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review team to say with confidence that the facts justified 2

them, that the plant was safe or you felt that the only 3

4

' thing the technical review team could do was to determine 4

. whether it was indeterminate or unsafe?

5 MR. IPPOLITO:

I have no idea how to answer that 6 ' question. My personal opinion --

7 MR. ROISMAN: Did you think that the technical 8

review team was inherently incapable of saying this plant 9

is safe, was that really beyond what it could ever do?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: Clearly, the responsibility of 11 the technical review team was to identify those areas of 12 weakness that we discovered during our review. The 13 applicant. is responsible to take that and to determine the 14 extent and breadth of the problem.- Apparently that's 15 'h'appening now.

16 MR. ROISMAN: Is it correct that your immediate 17 supervisor, the one who established what would be your 18 marching order, so to speak, was Mr. Eisenhut?

19 MR. IPPOLITO: That's carrect. -

20 KR. ROISMAN:

And that you met with Mr. Eisenhut, 21 I assume, on a number of occasions even before you 22 developed the technical review team pla'n to determine how 23 you should approach this, is that how you approached that?

24 MR. IPPOLITO: The answer is I met with 25 Mr. Eisenhut many times between my initial assignment and ACE.FEDEPAL REPORTERS, INC.

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the development of the plan, but the responsibility for the 2 plan was mine.

What I needed was mine. How I would do it 3 was mine. I put it down on paper, and it went through the -

4 normal concurrence chain, and it was developed by me, and

  • 5 he concurred in it, and as you can see from the front of -

6 the plan, so did the other responsible office directors.

7 MR. ROISMAN: So the plan originated with you i

8 and then Mr. Eisenhut had to review it and approve it 9 ,

rather than he giving you the outlines of the plan, saying, 10 till in the details?

11 MR. IPPOLITO: That's correct.

12 MR. ROISMAN: Ms. Garde wants to ask you some 13 questions dealing with what we have called -- I don't know 14 what you call it -- the surprise visit ' in April of 1984, 15 and she will ask you some questions about that.

16 MS. GARDE:

f I have a cold, so if I am not coming 17

across clearly just ask me to repeat the question.

18 The report, your report dated -- the cover 19 letter is dated July 13 from Mr. Eis'enhut to Mr. Spence , "

20 which is the cover letter for the special review team 21 report.

It starts out with an executive summary and then

} 22 goes into the background for each section, and under 23 section A, management organization, you talk about an 24 entrance meeting, the afternoon of. April 3r and do you have 25 this report with you?

?

1 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTE,RS, INC.

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MR. IPPOLITO: No.

2

~

MS. GARDE: I'll read you the sentence then.

3 "The afternoon of April 3 the special review team arrived 4 on site unannounced. The team spent the afternooon of 5

April 3 and the morning of April 4 meeting with applicant's

~

6 senior corporate management, site management, site QA 7

management'and document control supervision, being briefed 8

on the organization functions and locations of areas under 9

their control." I have some questions on that.

10 MR. IPPOLITO: Go ahead.

11 MS. GARDE: In the categories of personnel that 12 l you met with, senior corporate management, did you attend 13 all these meetings? .

14 l MR. IPPOLITO: No.

15 MS. GARDE: We're you at the meeting with senior 16 corporate management?

17 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

18 MS. GARDE: Who was at that meeting?

19 MR. IPPOLITO: Oh, God.

, 20 MS. GARDE: Let me give you names. Was 21 Mr. Eisenhut with you?

22 .MR. IPPOLITO: ' For the Staff 7 I was senior 23 Staff representative there. Paul Bemis, the special team 24 leader, was also there. That's my recollection. We met 25 with Mr. Fiker, I think maybe John Merritt, to tell them, ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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we're here, we're going to do a job, we want your 2

cooperation, we don't want any impediments of doing a quick 3 look. .

4 MS. GARDE: This meeting was on the site? .

5 , MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. -

6 MS. GARDE: Mr. Fiker was on the site. .

7 MR. IPPOLITO: Correct.

8 MS. GARDE: Is that what you refer to when you 9

say applicant's senior corporate management?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. . The only time we met with 11 management was at the site.

12 MS. GARDE: So this -

13 MR. IPPOLITO: I call Lou Fiker corporate 14 management.

I think he was executive vice-president or 15 vice-president.

16 MS. GARDE: This paragraph, then, does not 17 include the reference to the meeting between Mr. Eisenhut, 18 Mr. Hayes and Mr. Britten, that's not referred to in there?

19 MR. IPPOLITO: No.

  • 20 MS. GARDE: Okay, then the next, do you remember t 21 .

anyone besides Mr. Fiker and Mr. Merritt being at that 22 aceting? Was Mr. Tolson at that meetin'g?

23 MR. IPPOLITO: I just don't recall.

24 MS. GARDE: The next category that you name -

25 going back to this meeting and to each of them that I talk ACE FEDERA1. REPORTERS, INC.

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1 about next, if there's minutes of this meeting --

2 MR. IPPOLITO: No.

3 MS . GARDE : There was none -- that you prepared?

4 MR. IPPOLITO:

There were, to my knowledge, 5 there were no minutes. The report that you see is intended o 6 to tell you the whole story of the special review team.

7 M3. GARDE: But there are drafts to this report?

8 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't know.

9 MS. GARDE: If the FOIA of fice says there are 10 drafts to this report -- .

11 HR. IPPOLITO: Then they exist.

12 MS. GARDE:

The next category is site management 13 which is dif ferent in this report than site corporate 14 management.

. Who does that refer to?

15 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't know.

16 MS. GARDE: Do you want to look at this?

17 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. Wait, she has one. What 18 page is it?

~

19 MS. GARDE: Actually, I think it is page 3 that 20 doesn't have a page number on it, right a,fter the table of

. 21 contents.

22 MR. IPPOLITO: It does have a page number.

23 MS. GARDE's Starts A, management organization.

24 Do you have that?

25 MR. IPPOLITO: Oh, you nave a different --

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4941.0 SW 38 1 MS. GARDE: Okay, I think we have the same thing 2

but you are back af ter the executive surunary.

3, MR. IPPOLITO: What I have is not - yours and .

4 ours are dif ferent. You must have a previous draft or -

5 something. .

  • 6 (Discussion off the record.) .

7 .

MR. NCONENs Back on the record.

8 MS. GARDE: Tom, during the break, we 9 coordinated our -

10 MR. IPPOLITO: Let me try to reconstruct what 11 happened.

12 ! MS. ' GARDE: Okay, that would be good.

13 .

MR. IPPOLITO:

The whole endeavor was for me as 14 i new project director to find out what was happening first l 15 hand as quickly and without any - try to make it as 16 complete a surprise as possible. When we hit the site,

l 17 often I have to talk to management, saying I'm here to do 18 i my thing,,and I would like certain things from you, and get 19 their cooperation. ~

And that was achieved. That was with '

20 senior corporate. Then we had a number of other meetings. '

21 My recollection is, like, the document control was unique 22 to Comanche Peak, so we got site manage'ent/ m head of 23 document control to describe the process to them. We tried 24 to do that up front so we could understand the system at 25 that plant at that time.

. These were these various levels i

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24941.0 KSW 39 l of meetings that we had. From that, we just, then, each of 2 the specialists that I had went out and started his 3 investigation.

4 MS. GARDE: Okay, let me back you up a little 5 bit. For senior corporate management you named Fiker and O

6 Merritt. Site management, that's where we broke, you 7 hadn't named anyone. Have you -- who was --

8 KR. IPPOLITO: I remember Vega was there.

9 George may have been there, should have been there.

10 MS. GARDE: You , don't remember?

11 MR. IPPOLITO: I just don't.

12 MS. GARDE: Site QA management?

13 MR. IPPOLITO: I guess that was Vega, wasn't it?

14 MS. GARDE: So your only recollection is 15 Mr. Vega?

16 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

17 MS. GARDE: You don't recall whether Mr. Tolson 18 was there? -

19 MR. IPPOLITO: No. -

20 MS. GARDE:

Document control supervision, 21 Mr. Hutchinson?

22 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't kno.w.

23 MS. GARDE: To the best of your knowledge 24 there's no notes of these meetings that would indicate who 25 was a't them?

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3W 40 l MR. IPPOLITO: No.

2 MS. GARDE: You said that you wanted this to be 1

3 as complete a surprise as possible. Was it a surprise?

4 MR. IPPOLITO: From the look on Mr. Fiker's face, -

5 it was. . -

6 MS. GARDE: What did you tell Mr. Fiker was your .

7 , task when you arrived?

8 MR. IPPOLITO: As stated in the report. We 9 wanted to determine the degree of management control over 10 construction, inspection and testing, and I wanted to get 11 information on which to base - help .me develop the plan. .

12 MS. GARDE:

, Did you tell him that you were going 13 to be looking at allegations?

14 MR. IPPOLITO: No. Excuse me, I said that - I 15 just told them two things as ' stated.

16 MS. GARDE: Management control and information 17 which would serve as a basis for --

18 MR. IPPOLITO: That's correct; that's all he

  • 19 knew. ' '

20 MS. GARDE:

Did you tell him that you were going .

21 to be going out on the site doing actual inspections?

22 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

23 MS. GARDE: And did you tell him you were going 24 to need access to documents from the vault?

25 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

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24941.0 KSW 41 1 MS. GARDE: What was --

2 MR. IPPOLITO:

I'm sorry, you're saying 3

something now -- we tried -- I think the answer to that is 4 no. I didn't -- our purpose is to try to hit the vault and 5

see what's there at the vault t the time without i 6 p re-k no,wledg.e . So to the extent that we could do this, we 7 did.

We knew where the vault was and that was the purpose.

8 of the initial meetings, get the lay of the landt where is 9 whatt how is it supposed to work. And then we hit the 10 vaults and we hit the different -- one or two, I think, of

,. 11 e the document control satellites, and the other things we 12 t did.

1 13 1 MS. GARDE: Mr. Ippolito, ,in your experience at 14 the NRC, how common is the type of surprise, unannounced 15 visit that you made on April 37 16 MR. IPPOLITO:

I personally do not know of any 17 other that's eve- been done. There may have been, but I'm 18 not familiar with them.,

19 MS. GARDE: Now, what was Mr. Piker's reaction?

20 MR. IPPOLITO:

~

His reaction was surprise but 21 cooperative.

22 MS. GARDE: Now, if you go t' hrough the next 23 several pages, a little over two pages, of your report, you 24 talk about management organizatton, how the project is set 25 up, and at page 2 you say, "The current positive management ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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4941.0 SW 42 I attitude is a strength exhibited at Comanche Peak for both 2

operations and the engineering and the construction sides of the company." What is the basis for that statement?

3 4

MR. IPPOLITO: Let me set aside that question .

5 for a moment. The very purpose of this report was not to

  • 6 resolve technical issues. It was to determine the degree -

7 of management control over the construction of that plant 8

and to give me infermation on which to base a plan to do 9 what I was asked to do. That's all it was. I personally --

10 if you want to go to that level of detail, I cannot go to 11 that level of detail. The people involved that were 12 involved in doing this could answer that, and that is the 13 team people themselves.,

14 i MS. GARDE: Well, Mr. Roisman is going to ask 15 the questions on the executive summary. Maybe it would be 16 appropriate for .you to go through those first, Tony, and 17 then I'll follow with the follow-up questions. We'll go 18 through the executive summary first, and then if you have .

19 not answered or there's something to be clarified, I'll '

20 pick it up. '

21 MR. ROISMAN: Let's start with, in light of what 22 you just said to Ms. Garde, are you the author of the 23 executive summary?

24 MR. IPPOLITO: No.

25 MR. ROISMAN: Who is?

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MR. IPPOLITO: Paul Bemis.

2 MR. ROISMAN: Do you endorse what's there?

3 MR. IPPOLITO:

Yes. I signed it.

4 MR. ROISMAN: Did you endorse it because you 5

. knew it was right or because you trusted Mr. Bemis wouldn't 6

have said it was there if it.wasn't right?

7 MR. IPPOLITO: I selected the peoplo. I had 8 good people. This was the conclusions of their findings, 9 and that was satisfactory with me. .

10

  • MR. ROISMAN: Looking at the executive summary 11 on page 4, this statement appears: "The team's findings 12 indicated that the applicant's management control over the 13 construction, inspection and testing programs is generally

, 14 ef fective and is receiving proper management attention."

15 What is meant by that statement?

16 MR. IPPOLITO:

Within the context of this quick 17 look, , the degree of control of the applicant's management, 18 I had to determine as to whether construction should 19 continue. Some of the information that I was receiving 20 early on was describing the construction control as out of 21 hand. I had to make the finding personally myself whether 22 or not this was in fact the case. Is construction out of 23 hand, and what that means is that, hey, we looked, 10 days t

24 or whatever it was, less than 10 days. What we saw, it is 25 not out of hand. That's all it says.

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4941.0 3W 44 1 MR. ROISMAN: Did you look to see whether 2

management was in proper control or was it only relevant 3 for purposes of this look? '

~

4 MR. IPPOLITO: This look only. .

5 MR. ROISMAN: To determine that they were in .

6 charge, not that they were od'ing the right thing, but .

7

, whatever was being done was being done at their direction?

8 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't know how to separate the 9 two.

10 MR. ROISMAN: For instance, to use a 11 hypothetical, I take it they could have been in control of 12 a massive program of harassment and intimidation, which 13 they were firmly behind, 100 percent, everybody in control 14 and everybody was marching in lock step to the orders that 15, came down from control. That would be controlled action, 16 correct?

17 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. That's not what I had in .

18 mind'. -

19 MR. ROISMAN: Tell me what you had in mind.

  • 20 MR. IPPOLITO:

What this report says, in total,

21 says we went and looked at various aspects. When we went ,

22 to look, we looked at -- and it identif'ies to you the 23 papers they looked at, the NCRs and the inspection reports 24 and packages out of document control. What I saw there 25 does not indicate to us that this is out of control. They ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. .

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24941.0 KSW 45 l examined them. They were in order for the most part.

2 What's here is not out of control.

3 l

. MR. ROISMAN: So your statement was intended not 4 only to communicate --

. 5 MR. IPPOLITO: Sorry, not my statement.

6 MR. ROISMAN: You signed it.

7 MR. IPPOLITO: All right, I see what you mean.

8 Fine.

9 MR. ROISMAN: If your signature on it means that 10 I shouldn't use the phrase, "your statement," tell me so 11 and I won't --

12 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm responsible for this document. .

13 ! MR. ROISMAN: Is it all right with you if I call 4

14 the statements yose statements?

15 MR. IPPOLITO: So you understand I'm responsible 16 for this ducument. I would have questioned anything that I 17 thought was not supported.

18 MR. ROISMAN:

You made an effort to determine 19 with respect to these statements what the ' basis was?

20 MR. IPPOLITO:

. Based on what the information is 21 here.

22 MR. ROISMAN: Just what we f'ind in the report 23 was the basis you used for determining that the executive 24 summary was or was not supported?

25 MR. IPPOLITO: That's correct.

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1 MR. ROISMAN:

You made no effort to evaluate 2 whether the report itself had a basis?

3 . , MR. IPPOLITO: I couldn't have. Six individuals .

! 4

- the logistics as well would not have allowed it.

j 5 MR. ROISMAN: Did you make an effort to take a

  • 6 fow isolated instances to see, in your judgment, you .

7 thought they had done the proper job reaching conclusions 8 '

based on what they had learned?

9 MR. IPPOLITO: Paul Bemis was satisfied that 10 these were in fact -- that in fact did happen.

11 MR. ROISMAN: Do you know whether Paul Semis 12 went to his individual people and in effect questioned them 13  : to make sure that tboyhadagoodbasisforwhattheywere 1 .

14 saying?

15 MR. IPPOLITO: That's my understanding.

16 MR. ROISMAN: Did you ever ask him that question, j 17 do you remember? '

l 18 MR. IPPOLITO:

No, but what I did say was I .

19 wanted to be sure that everyone on the team agreed to the '

20 report in its final standing, and they all agreed to the

  • 21 report in its final standing.
22 MR. ROISMAN

As written?

23 MR. IPPOLITO:

As written. Everybody agreed to 24 it.

25 MR. ROISMAN: Everybody thought it was right.

l i

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1 Is it your understanding that the basis for --

a .

2 just looking at this statement for a moment -- that the 3

. real basis for this statement is the material gathered by 4 and observed by the members of the special review team 5

which is just summarized in the report - ,these other data 6

that would form the basis for this, including their cwn '

observations?

4 7

8 MR. IPPOLITOh I think when you look through the 9 report, if you look through the report, it mentions what

, 10 they looked at. They looked at certain NCRs.

J I'm looking -

11 at page 34. " Review of the design calculations for pipe 12 support." They looked at support and list exactly what 13 they looked at. They told you exactly where it was.

This 14 is what they looked at, and based upon what they looked at, i

15 okay, and this is' exactly what they did. So it wasn't --

. 16 and here on page 28, conduits. They list exactly what 17 conduits they looked at.

18 MR. ROISMAN: I just wanted to be clear that it 19 is not the basis for this statement, and the same statement 20

, or an expanded version of it appears in the body of the ,

21 j

report on page 2, which is what Ms. Garde had read to you 22 before we went back to the epecutive summary, the basis is

. 23 not just what is in the report but it is also what the

[

24 report references as having ' been looked at?

25 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

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1 MR. ROISMAN: Do you know what criteria were 2

used for making the judgments as to whether, based upon t .

3 that data that was, looked at, one would say that management

4 did or didn't have control, did or didn't have a positive .

+

5 attitude?

6 3

MR. IPPOLITO: Information, I believe, is within .

7 this report.

What this report is telling you is that they 8 examined the program. Was the program all right? Talking 9 about management QA/QC, for instance.

We went, in fact, I 10 think Paul. Bemis himself went to corporate headquarters and t

11 looked at the QA/QC program.

t What it is supposed to be, 12 and based upon the plan that was approved by the 'NRC or the t

13 t

ASME codes, whatever the ASFR and the requirements were 14 established for whatever we're looking at, formed the basis 15 for them to look at.

16 MR. ROISMAN: I understand that, but if the 17 report had contained in it statements that said, we looked 18 at this particular drawing and the drawing conformed to 19 i

procedures, then I could understand without asking further * '

20 how it was that you could determine the drawing conformed -

21 to procedures. It is when the report includes statements ' l 22 l such 'as those that are more general, "M'anagement control j 23 over construction inspection and testing programs is 24 I

generally effective and is receivin'g proper management  !

25 attention."

Now did you know that you had looked at enough I

t i

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of the plant in that visit to be able to have a conclusion 2

on that?' What criteria were you using to decide whether 3

you could give a positive answer or give an indeterminate 4 or a negative? .

5 MR. IPPOLITO: I made a statement earlier about 6 what this report should be used for. .It was -- it was a 7 quick look at that moment in time. Does it look like there 8 is control? The technical review team did the rest of it.

9 This just allowed me to say it looks like they are in 10 sufficient control for them to continue while the technical 11 review team does its effort. I made this abundantly clear 12 in new reports, and Ms. Garde is fully aware of how this 13 report at the time was taken out of context. I placed it 14 in its proper context.

15 It is a very special report. ,

It was a quick 16 look to do two things and it did it. Didn't say to 17 establish acceptability of the QA/QC program forever and ,

1.8 over. The team did not have the knowledge of all of the 19 allegations of all of the issues when they- went down there.

20 They looked at just what they had' in their hands at the 21 time. It was a quick look.

22 MR. ROISMAN: I understand that. I'm not trying 23 to ask you the question of whether or not this report

, 24 represents the definitive answer to the question. What I'm 25 trying to understand is, what were the criteria that were ACE.FEDERA1. REPORTERS, INC.

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used for purposes of this report to be able to answer the 2 question at all. Did you, for instance, have in your head 3

before you went down there that if half of the problems 4

that were alleged to exist were found to exist that you -

5 couldn't make this kind of a positive statement about -

6 management control, or did you -- what criteria did you use -

7 to decide whether you could make the statement or not?

8 MR. IPPOLITO: I was prepared to report back to 9

Mr. Eisenhut if this team found that there was not 10 sufficient management control over construction, and I 11 would, based upon my judgment and the team's input, I would 12 make a recommendation to Mr,. Eisenhut as to what to do at 13 that point. That was clearly -- we thought of the 14 possibility of that and we were aware that that might 15 happen.

But based upon the various elements of ' this. report, 16 the five areas or six areas looked at, this is the sum of 17 those five or six areas. .

18 MR. ROISMAN: We're still passing in the night. ,.

19 I'm afraid that you are treating my questions as' a '

20 challenge to the correctness of the conclusion. That's not .

21 the purpose of it.

22 .

MR. IPPOLITO: No, no.

23 MR. ROISMAN: The purpose is to understand the l 24 basis for the conclusion. I can understand in the report

, 25 the basis for a conclusion that a pipe support base plate i

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design using concrete expansion anchor bolt requirements 2

was evaluated and a conclusion was made about it. There

.3

. are written criteria that deal with those issues. Your 4 people went down, presumably looked at the relevant 5

documentation, compared it to the requirements and came up 6 with a yes or no. This one I can't find any written 7 criteria, so I'm trying to find out what were the criteria.

8 How did you know that they didn't have management control?

9 What factors would you look for or what factors did you 10 look for to decide the answer to that question?

11 MR. IPPOLITO:

What we looked at were the 12 drawings, in fact, controlled effectively. That is, there 13 is a procedure set up to contrel drawings. We, the team, 14 became f amiliar with those procedures. Were they in fact 15 controlled according to those procedures? For ecch of the 16 ,

areas looked at that was the type received in storage, the 17 procurements, all things were looked at, the procedures 18 that established were accepted by the NRC Staff as an overall 19 program. The answer is yes.

20 MR. ROISMAN: I'm glad you mentioned drawings.

21 Let's take a look on page 6, still in the executive summary.

22 Page 6 under the general heading 'Quallty Assurance / Quality 23 Control," under the category 2, weaknesses, "Both of the 24 weaknesses' appear to relate to problems with drawings.

25 Number of the strengths, with the exception of now having l

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computer system for drawing control instead of stamped 2

drawings, relate specifically to that."

3 can you just discuss with me, as best as you ,

4 understand it, how the existence of the drawing weaknesses -

5 and whatever strengths there were form a basis for the

  • 6 conclusion that there was adequate management control with 7

respect just to the drawing question?

8 MR. IPPOLITO: My understanding of what they 9 found, for instance in part 2-B, if you will, the 10 weaknesses, is that the team really couldn't say that you 11 could not build a plant with 300 char.ges with the drawing.

12 They said it would De extremely difficult, not that it 13 couldn't be done. That's a weakness. They said i,t would 14 be difficult to do, and it is prone to error.

It is that 15 type of thing. It could be done. Then when you add that 16 to -- they went out and looked and whatever they looked at --

17 and when they went to look at certain -- from these 18 drawings they looked at the equipment itself, they found, ..

19 my recollection is that they found pretty good -- what was '

20 there was all right. What was built was satisfactory. .

21 MR. ROISMAN: Is it your understanding of what 22 they did was they took the. very packages in which they 23 found, let's say, 300 CMCs or DCAs and went out to look at

~

24 the component and determined, after having themselves gone 25 through all the DCAs and the CMCs for that packet, how this ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.

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was supposed to be built and they then did an inspection of 2 that thing, whatever it was? And they determined that 3

someone had properly worked their way through the 300 and 4 built it right?

Is that your understanding of what they 5 did?

6 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. i 7

MR. ROISMAN:, And that this was done with all of 8

the ones that they found that formed the basis for the 9 statement in 2-B7 10 MR. IPPOLITO: Whatever it was.

11 MR. ROISMAN: Is it your understanding that 2-A, 12 i i the one certain drawing packet issued to the field 13 ! containing nonapplicable CMCs and DCAs, that there also 14 they went into the field and determined that on those 15 packages it still had been buiit correctly?

16 MR. IPPOLITO:

That's my understanding.

17 MR. ROISMAN: Did the fact that those drawing 18 packages had these deficiencies in them, did you attempt or 19 did.the special review team attempt to find out why, why 20 that existed?

21 MR. IPPOLITO: One, our primary purpose was to '

22 determine whether or not this was under control; it was not 23 to try to determine root causes. Did they have enough 24 control over this thing? And if it fell out, it fell out.

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record that this repor't was given to the technical review 2 team to follow up on. All of the issues and everything 3

that was done in here -- there was a list of things, is my ,

4 recollection -- and that was turned over to the technical .

5 review team for more in-depth review. '.

6 MR. ROISMAN: Is it fair to say that the 7

existence of these document problems did not indicate that 8

there was adequate management control, at least as to those 9 documents?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: I guess that's right. Yes.

11 MR. ROISMAN: Would it be f air to say that based 12 upon what you looked at as to the question of management 13 control over documents,.that piece of the whole puzzle, 14 that what you saw indicated that there was not proper 15 management control over documents?'

16 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't believe so. I don't 17 think that's what this report says. I think it says that 18 there was. "There are some weaknesses in it, but management 19 knew what it was doing. That's what this report says. -

20 MR. ROISMAN: At the bottom of page 5 in -

21 executive summary under the review findings category, the 22 carry-over sentence goes to page 6, indicates there appears 33 to have been a coemu'nications problem on the on-site QA/QC 24 chain in the past, but'according to laterviews conducted 25 during this review, the problem has and is being corrected.

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To what does the reference, "a communication problem in the 2 on-site QA/QC chain in the past" refer?

3 MR. IPPOLITO: Apparently during the interviews --

4 and that's a section in this report, describes more clearly 5

. what that means -- that during these interviews, people did 6

identify that there had been some organizational changes.

7 My recollection is that when we arrived, they were in place, 8

and people ~ felt more comfortable with the people that were 9

at that time and place, and that's what the interviews 10 seemed to indicate and that's what he reported.

11 MR. ROISMAN: If the communication problem that 12 had existed in the past still had existed on the site when 13 you were doing dake review, would that have been a basis 14 i for concluding that management was not in control of -

15 construction, inspection and testing programs? '

16 MR. IPPOLITO: I won't say -- I won't answer 17 that. Tony, it depends upon what the facts are. I don't ,

18 know. You want to hypothesize? It all depends; the answer 19 is it all depends on how bad it is. -

l 20 MR. ROISMAN:

t

. Exactly whatever your people 21 learned in the past. What -if they heard everyching you're 22 telling me they heard about the past and the only thing 23 they heard different was that all the people they 24 interviewed said nothing has changed?

25 MR. IPPOLITO: Since we're hypothesizing, if I

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1 these interviews indicated the reverse, I think that I i 2

would have to look deeper into it before I would make the 3 conclusion that you're asking me to make.

4 MR. ROISMAN: Do you remember whether you .

5 _

yourself were aware at the time that you did this surprise . <

6 visit in April of '84 of an event called the T-shirt .

7 incident? .

8 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

9 MR. ROISMAN: You were aware of that?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

11 MR. ROISMAN: Do.you know the extent to which 12 your people investigated, if at all, the facts underlying

. 13 that?

4 14 MR. IPPOLITO:

What people?

15 MR. ROISMAN: The people on your special' review 16 team.

17 MR. IPPOLITO: This report tells you that as a 18 minimum we interviewed a number of them. I don't know how

, 19 many. And in fact, as a matter of record, you have the '

20 names of the people and their statements and their  :

21 involvement, so you know who-are the T-shirt people. You 22 know their names. You have their statements, their 23 unsanitized statements. That was provided you as a matter

-24 of record. You were there, I gatherr isn't that right?

25 MR. MIIUNO:

Yes, that was provided to Billie ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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57 I 1 Garde, I believe, in June of 1984. .

2 MR. ROISMAN: I want to be clear that what we 3

have here is all that special review ' team had for purposes 4

of evaluating that event and factoring it into the general 5 conclusions.

6 MR. IPPOLITO: That's it.

7 MR. ROISMAN: Still looking at page 6 in,the 3

executive surtmary, the statemient appears that " Management 9

and craf t at Comanche Peak appeared to be competent and 10 management to possess.a positive attitude which is a 11 strength of this project."

. What did you mean by the phrase 12 " positive attitude"?

4 13 MR. IPPOLITO: I meant by that that their whole 14 intent was to complete this project safely and on schedule.

15 And when there was a problem, *they attacked the problem 16 head on. That's what this says.

17 MR. ROISMAN: Is the basis for that, regarding 18 the management's possession of a positive attitude, is .that 19 from 'the interviews with the management people that were

,20 conducted by you and other SPRT?

21 , MR . IPPOLITO: It is not only that but you also 22 get this feeling from the interviews co'nducted. If you 23 read the report that's what it tells you.

24 MR. ROISMAN: I'm trying to understand. I've 25 read the report. I want you to tell me and I want you to ACE-FEDERAL- REPORTERS, INC.

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1 tell me straight up, is it everything that you saw there 2

that made you reach that conclusion or is it the interviews 3 that you had with che people? .

4 MR. IPPOLITO: Everything we saw.

5 MR. ROISMAN: When you looked at a document and -

6 found it was in order, that reinforced your conclusion or .

7 helped create the conclusion that management possessed a 8 positive attitude?

9 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

10 MR. ROISMAN:

In the statement under the general 11 category QA/QC, still in the executive summary on page 6, 12 !

under strength, the first strength is the QA/QC training 13 program is extensive and comprehensive. Was the review 14 that was done by the SPRT of the QA/QC training program

. 15 itself extensive and comprehensive?

  • 16' MR. IPPOLITO: Within the context of the purpose, 17 I would say it was, but within the context of total program, 18 forever, the answer is no.* It was just not enough time nor 19 enough knowledge of allegations and whatever have you to 20 make that finding. '

21 MR. ROISMAN:

Are you saying that what we 22 probably shouId do and what you intended that should be 23 done with the conclusion statements, wherever they appear 24 in the report, is that they should all be qualified by the 25 - statement, to the extent of our look, this is our ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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24941.0 KSW 59 1 conclusions. Not that we know that we looked enough to be 2

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able to make this as a definitive conclusion?

3 MR. IPPOLITO: Thank you for saying that. I 4

have been trying to say that since we started telling you.

5 That's the only purpose of this thing.

6 MR. ROISMAN: Did you ever, before you started 7

your look, did you have some criteria that you used to 8

decide how extensive your look would have to be in order to 9

reach any conclusion about anything?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: No. You are describing this as 11 though it were a rather sterile thing that has happened 12 before. This was a one-of-a-kind type thing.

It was a 13 technique I used to determine, and I repeat again, what 14 should I do with that plant? Where am I with that plant?

? 15 Who're are they with that plant? If the negatives were in 16 my judgment and the judgment of Paul Bemis and the 17 remainder of the team, if it brings that into question, 18 that would have deteruined the course of action different, 19 possibly, than what we did. We might have issued a show 20 cause order at that time if they were negative. We're not 21 sure. But clearly what this thing did, it gave se time to 22 develop what I call the plan and to execute the plan.

23 That's all this document does.

24 MR. ROISMAN: Is 'it fair to say that in that

, 25 short look, you might very possibly have missed items which ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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if you had seen them would have dramatically altered your 2 conclusions?

3 MR. IPPOLITO: .

I will agree to altered but not --

4 I can't use the word dramatically because I know that the .

5 technical review team did find things in the document .

6 control area, I think, and in other areas that were more 7

severe than what is described here. I'm saying, I think 8

that there are areas of weakness that were discovered over 9

and above this, and clearly, I was aware 'of this, that 10 there was this potential.

11' MR. ROISMAN: To the extent that the technical 12

' review team looked at' the same, either specific or general 13 questions that this SPRT looked at, is it your opinion that 14 reliance in trying to reach some conclusions about tKe 15 plant ,should be placed on what the technical review team 16 did rather than on what the SPRT did?

17 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't know what the technical 18 review team did after I left the program. But clearly it 19 was my intent that this was an input to the technical '

20 review team. They were given this report. They said, 21 given this report and the other information you have, go 22 pursue these areas. And I think that that's an input --

23 this was one of their elements as well as a whole bunch of 24 other inputs that they had to cons ~ider in their review 25 process. .

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24941.0 KSW 61 1 MR. ROISMAN: I'm not talking about the 2 underlying data.

As I understand it what the technical 3

review team was supposed to do is to take all the data that 4

the SPRT gathered and use that along with whatever data it '

5 gathered, and at sometime in the future reach some 6

  • conclusions about QA/QC, drawings, what have you. I'm 7 I asking just the conclusions portion of the SPRT. From what 8

you knew about the technical review team during the period 9

that you were in charge of it, is it fair to say that with 10 respect te any conclusion, whether it is positive or 11 negative, that's contained in the SPRT, that the better 12 basis and therefore the more reliable conclusion is the it.

conclusion of the TRT rather than the conclusion of the 14 SPRT7 l

i5 MR. IPPOLITO: The answer is the technical 16 i

review team conclusion has to be better. There was more 17 information, more time, more in-depth examination of the 18 area.

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 MR. ROISMAN:

Ms. Garde is going to have 21 questions in more detail about the body of the report.

22 MR. IPPOLITO: I wish you luck.

23' MS. GARDE: Thank you. C$n you go back to the 24 page that we switched back to Mr. Roisman on, A, under 25 management organization?

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MR. ROISMAN: This is in the body of the report.

2 MS. GARDE: Now, on page 2, I read you a 3

__ statement about the current positive management attitude.

4 Do you see that? That's the first full paragraph. '

5 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. .

6 MS. GARDE: Mr. Roisman proposed a similar 7 .

statement in the executive summary and I want to ask a 8 couple follow-up questions to that. When you say "the 9

positive attitude appears to manifest itself in the 10 attitudes of the workers, the training and its 11 consciousness for quality," is this opinion based on the 12 interview of the 21 QC inspectors?

13 j MR. IPPOLITO: Billie, what each of these 14 chapters attempts to -- it attempts to outline what they 15 did and what the conclusions were.

To that extent, it 16 stands on itself.

17 MS. GARDE: Let me back up a little bit then.

18 You didn't write this report. -

19 MR. IPPOLITO: .-

Correct. - '

20 MS. GARDE: Then Mr. Bemis wrote the whole 21 report?

22 MR. IPPOLITO: He was -- my' recollection -- he 23 had the management of this part A and was responsible for 24 integrating the total report. -

25 MS. GARDE
Okay, and the rest of these sections --

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  • gp 24941.0 KSW 63 l MR. IPPOLITO: Are primarily --

2 MS. GARDE: -- from the inspectors that went 3 with you.

4 MR. IPPOLITO:

Each inspector wrote their input.

5 MS. GARDE: Okay. There's attached to this 6

sanitized versions of the 21 interviews with QC inspectors.

7 In discovery we received the unsanitized versions.

8 MR. IPPOLITO: You received all of them.

9 MS. GARDE:

But that's all there is?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: No, no, no. If you read this 11 report --

12 MS. GARDE: Okay, we have all of them.

i 13 MR. IPPOLITO: The ones in the report are those 14 with a problem to be further investigated. The others that 15 were not a problem were not inc'luded.

16 MS. GARDE: We have in discovery all 21 17 interviews.

18 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

. 19 MS. GARDE: The conclusion, the positive 20 attitude in the, attitudes of workers -- to the best of your 21 recollection the only workers that your team people talked 22 to were the 21 that were officially interviewed?

23 MR. IPPOLITO: No. Each inspector or person on 24 the team talked to the craf ts and the QC inspectors when 25 they went to look at, say, a pipe hanger. They talked to ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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'941.0 114 64 1 the people themselves. How are things going? Whatever 2 have you. And I think if you -- my recollection is that 3

they have-indicated-in ~ there that each, I think, each of 4 ,

the groups that some of them do, things look pretty good.

5 These guys seem to be happy with what they are doing. '

6 MS. GARDE: To the extent that Mr. Hayes and 7 .

'Mr. Eisenhut talked to workers on the site, does this 8 ,

report, this statement include their opinions of what the 9 workers said?

10 MR. IPPOLITO:

{ No.

11 MS. GARDE: Did they ever share with you their 12 opinions about what the attitudes of the workers were? *

. 13 This is not a trick question.

14 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm trying to think of when.and 15 how Mr. Hayes or Mr. Eisenhut would know. My understanding 16 is that they were down at the site one time where they 17 talked to people, just one time, and I happened to be at 18

_, the site at the same time and I happened to be with them at 19 the same time. r 20 MS. GARDE:

But this statement is not intended ,

21 to reflect their opinions?

22 MR.* IPPOLITO:

That 's right.-

23 MS. GARDE: Okay, on the training, says, " positive 24 attitude appears to manifest itself in attitudes, workers

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  • 1 come from the inspectors' work in reviewing QA/QC training?

2 MR. IPPOLITO: That's my understanding, yes.

3 MS. GARDE: The last of that, "and its 4

consciousness for quality," how was that conclusion reached 5 to the best of your understanding?

6 MR. IPPOLITO: I think it is the sum total of 7 everything the person did.

8 MS. GARDE: What person?

9 MR. IPPOLITO: The person who wrote this section, 10 Bemis.

11 MS. GARDE: Are you saying that that statement 12  ; is Bemis' opinion?

I

  • 13 j MR. IPPOLITO: Where are you?

1 14 MS. GARDE: "Its consciousness for quality" --

15 I "its consciousness for quality."

'Is that a collective 16 4 opinion of everybody on your team or is it only Mr. Bemis' 17 opinion?

18 MR. IPPOLITO:

o That is a collection because

. 19 Mr. Bemis did not talk to everybody. He got inputs from 20 the various people on the team in this area.

21- XS. GARDE:

On page 2, Number 3, project 22 management meeting, this basically is a summary of a 23 Saturday -- apparently Saturday morning project management 24 meeting. '

i 25 MR. IPPOLITO ? - Yes -- we were there, and they ACE. FEDERAL. REPORTERS, INC.

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said if you want to sit in, fine.

2 MS. GARDE: How many of you sat in on the 3 ineeting? _.

4 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't remember. I know Paul '

5 Bemis did. Who else, I don't know. '

6 MS. GARDE:

Were you at the meeting?

7 MR. IPPOLITO: No.

8 .

MS. GARDE: Was anyone else besides Mr. Bemis at 9

the meeting, any of the other team people?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm not sure.

11 MS. GARDE: Okay, on page 3, quality assurance, 12 quality control, item number 1 gives a list of procedures 13 that were reviewed by your team to determine whether or not, 14 ,

1 as I understand what you explained to Mr. Roisman, there 15 was control of the nonconformance process, identification 16 of nonconformance process. Was there any attempt made to 17 look beyond NCRs to determine whether or not other 18 documents were being used to log nonconforming conditions?

19 MR. IPPOLITO: Like ira? I just don't; remember. "

20 I don't remember that at the time we had knowledge of that 21 problem. I'm not sure. ,

22 MS. GARDE: And you didn't look for that problem?

23 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't think it was known to me, 24 and therefore if it was not, it probably was not known to 25 this group at the time.

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24941.0 KSW 67 1 MS. GARDE: If you had an allegation -- you said l

2 you had about 300 allegations --

3 MR. IPPOLITO: Not at this time.

4 MS. GARDE: You hadn't looked at any allegations?

5 MR. IPPOLITO:

No, my people were in Washington 6

trying to come up with whatever that New Mexico one was.

7 This was not with me. That is what they were doing at the 8 time.

9 MS. GARDE: Knowledge that the Nuclear 10 Regulatory Commission as an organization had was not 11 necessarily transmitted to the team at all?

12

  • MR. IPPOLITO:

I That's correct.

13 f MR. CHANDLER: If I could ask you to wait until 14 - the request is through so we have the question on the 15 record and then the answer, rather than mid-way through the 16 question, it might help.

17 MR. IPPOLITO: I will do that.

18 MS. GARDE: Which of the members were in charge

. 19 of the quality assurance / quality control look?

20 MR. I.?POLITO:

- On page 3, executive summary, 21 Paul Bemis, sectica chief.

He had -- we tried to identify 22 who was expert in what area. -

23 MS. GARDE: Okay, I didn't understand that the 24 in the executive summary, the people's names with their 25 expertise necessarily would coordinate with wno did what in ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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2 MR. IPPOLITO: We tried. These were the 3 specialists.

We tried to use them in their specialty.

4 MS. GARDE: To the extent you remember, if you 5

could tell me that, if it was Mr. Bemis, that's your "

6 understanding for QA/QC.

7 MR. IPPOLITO: That was Mr. Bemis. That I am 8 sure of.

9 MS. GARDE: On QA/QC training,. who was that?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: I would guess it is Bemis, yes, 11 but, excuse me.

I think there's a Lou Jackson. Louio 12 Jackson I think was also involved in QA/QC, so I think 13 between the two of them, they covered, I think, all of the 14 j areas in QA/QC.

  • 15' MS. GARDE: I'm going to skip to the end of the 16 rep' ort now. On page 60, starting section I, formal 17 interviews of the QA/QC personnel.

18 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

19 MS. GARDE: ..

Tnis section is a narrative, I 20 assume, correct me if my assumption is wrong, a narrative ,,

21 of wnat was gleaned .from the interviews conducted with .

22 everybody?- -

h3 MR. IPPOLITO: That's my understanding.

24 MS. GARDE: Now, on page 62, there is an area in 25 this narrative which goes into the inspectors being ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.

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questioned regarding intimidat ion, and the inspectors' 2

ability to identify prob.lems w ith no suppression in this 3_ __ area.

4 MR. IPPOLITO: What paragraph?

5 MS. GARDE: Paragraph 3 talks about inspectors 6

questioned as 'to their ability to identify problems. Do 7 you see that?

8 MR. IPPOLITO: Okay.

9 MS. GARDE: And then next paragraph goes into 10 feedback, next paragraph goes into communications were 11 improving, and the assignment of a new site QA manager was 12 a positive step in improving communications, and the next 13 paragraph on, intimidation by craft. Now, your statement 14 to Mr. Roisman about how wrongdoing issues and how 15 harassment and intimidation was handled raises at least in 16 my mind some questions abcat who was pursuing the 17 harassment and intimidation questions with these inspectors 18 during these interviews. Was OI present at these

. 19 interviews?

20 MR. IPPOLITO:

The purpose of this exercise was 21 to determine whether the things that I had been hearing as 22 well as -- again, the basic objective, does management have 23 c' ontrol over this thing, what are the problems. One of the 24 problems that had been identified is that there had been 25 intimidation. So one of the things we did is that knowing ACE.FEDERA1. REPORTERS, INC.

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that this was a contention, if 'you will, asked the people, 2 do you have problems? Again, if they had said yes, we 3 would pursue the problem. The technical review team would --

4 meet with OI and pursue the problem.

5 It was just factfinding. Where are we? What 6 should I do, how much should I do? That was.the 7 questioning. Questioning these people that we did 8 indicated that they were not intimidated.

9 MS. GARDE: How were these people selected?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: I believe it tells you.

11 MS. GARDE: Says random but --

12 MR. IPPOLITO: There's one exception.

13 MS. GARDE: With the T-shirt.

14 I MR. IPPOLITO: That's right.

' 15 MS. GARDE: When you say randomly selected, you 16 don't mean statistically correct random sampling.

17 MR. IPPOLITO: Heavens, no.

18 MS. GARDE: Then how was your randout sampling 19 chosen? -

20 MR. IPPOLITO: Oh, gee -- what the reviewer or s 21 inspector tried to do was get'a few people from the 22 different areas, and coupled with the inputs from the other 2,3 team people' when they wanted to talk to individuals, and 24 you know, that was it, plus the instructions that they 25 should interview all of the T-shirt people on site.

l l

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. 24941.0 KSW 71 l MS. GARDE: Okay, on page 63, second paragraph, 2 "

. Interviews of management indicated they were very  ;

3 supportive _of_insectors and sensitive to inspector concerns." '

. 4 Who are you talking about in that?

5 MR. IPPOLITO:

Whoever the listing is that you 6 have. They should be there.

I'm not trying to be -- I 7 just don't remember. I was not there. I don't remember.

8 MS. GARDE: Okay, in the second to the last 9

paragraph, small letter b, "In addition to formal 10 ;

interviews, numerous informal discussions were held between 11 the NRC team personnel and site managers, craf t, inspectors, 12 engineers and office personnel." . Are those written up 13 , anywhere?

I

  • 14 j MR. IPPOLITO: No.

15 MS. GARDE: So to the best of your recollection, 16 there's no summaries of --

17 MR. IPPOLITO:

Excuse me. I don't believe there are. In other words, what you received do not contain l

18

, 19 these type of things. Whether or not ther.e are notes or 20 whatever, I have no idea.

21 MS. GARDE: Okay.

Just a minute.

22 (Discussion off the record.)-

q 23 MR. ROISMAN: A last question for you on the 24 SP RT. Is it fair to say that the purpose of the SPRT was 25 to make an evaluation of the current status of management 1

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control over the plant rather than to attempt to determine 2 whether and the extent to which it may not have been in 3 cont::ol in the past?

4 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

5 MR. ROISMAN: Following the SPRT work, I assume ".

6 you began your work on the development of what eventually 7 became the technical review team plan that we discussed 8 earlier this morning? .

9 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

10 MR. ROISMAN: After you had developed that plan, 11 its implementation until you were no longer head of the 12 technical review team was under your control and 13 supervision; is that correct?

14 , MR. IPPOLITO: . Yes.

15 l MR. ROISMAN: I want to ask you some questions 16 about the process that you were using for or having your 17 people use for the purpose of doing the evaluation. Let's 18 take a specific, if you want, and you can give me an l 19 example of one in particular, a technical allegation that 20 you had, and sort of walk me through. How did, from the 4 i 21 .

moment that you knew the allegation, how, as you understood 22 it, was it to function, how was the technical review team 23 supposed to look at that?

24 MR. IPPOLITO: Let me step back one' step before 25 that. Since we inherited so to speak, the team inherited a t

I f

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24941.0 KSW 73 1 group of allegations and technical issues, one had to 2 examine them, try to understand what they are saying and 3

then group them in some-fashion to make sure that things of 4

like subject are in the same area or in the same groupings, so that -- and from that effort, it looked like we can set 5

6 all of the allegations into five groupings plus some 7 miscellaneous.

8 Now that we had done that, and we had 9 established a shorthand, if you will, for each of these 10 categories, each allegation that came in subsequent to that 11 would be examined, was it a QA, electrical, whatever have 12 you. What we tried to do is we tried to state the 13 allegation. We would then give that to -- we would assign ,

14 it to a group and that would go to the group leader.

15 MR. ROISMAN: When you tried to state the 16 allegation, what did you use to determine exactly what that 4

17 allegation was?

18 MR. IPPOLITO:. As you know there are a number of

. 19 ways that we get allegations. Some make statements to the 20

. NRC and in the statement you will find, if you ca,refully 21 read it, you might find, although not specifically stated 22 allegation, you will find something that says something is 23 wrong here. We would go through that document and extract 24 from that document what we. believe to be some of the 25 problems that the person is trying to identify.

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MR. ROISMAN: Did you go, back to the alleger at 2

that point to make sure that at that point you had the 3 allegation clear? '

4 MR. IPPOLITO: Some, yes; others, no. It 5 depended, I think, considerably on what we had. '

In other 6

words, some of the allegers gave real detailed statements 7 that were transcribed --

8 MR. WESSMAN: Let me correct something there. I 9

think you are discussing the period in which we were still 10 identifying and sorting the initial list of allegations, 11 and at that time, we did not go back and talk with the 12 allegers.

Once we had the technical review team assembled 13 on site, we made a decision as to which allegations 14 ' required further pursuit, with the alleger to be sure we 15 understood what the issue was.'

16 MR. ROISMAN: So your first cut at trying to 17 develop what the allegations were was you took whatever 18 existed and made an effort to determine what the allegation 19 was from that, and then once that list was put together, 20 decisions were made by, in effect, by the technical review .,

21 team team leaders, I assume, should we ask this guy to be 22 clearer on this or -- - '

23 MR. IPPOLITO:

Excuse me, they were instructed 24 that if they based upon the information that they had, not 25 only the brief statement -- we kept an essential file, the 1

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total statements, so that the particular reviewer could 2

come and read the total statement to make sure that we, as 3

managers, y,ou know, properly took and placed it in its 4

proper context so they could read the total paragraph or 5

page or chapter or total statement to make sure that we had 6

characterized that allegation correctly. If even after 7

doing that, they had a problem, they should come to my 8

staff, and we would attempt in some way or other, either 9

meet, call or try to clear up the understanding of this.

10 MR. ROISMAN: You get your list of allegations, 11 those are put together, categorized, categories are then 12 assigned to people who have responsibility?

l 13 i MR. IPPOLITO: Correct.

14 MR. ROISMAN: Let's take one of those

~

15 allegations and sort of walk me through' in general the 16 process that was used to evaluate the validity of the l

17 allegation.

18 MR. IPPOLITOs I think that we issued 19 instructions to the technical review team.~ They were 20 dated --

21 MR. WESSMAN: June 5, 1984, technical review 22 team guidance.

23 MR. IPPOLITO: Within it are detailed 24 instructions of what 'they sh'ould do. But not only that, 25 the total team was briefed by both Darrell Eisenhut and Ben ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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Hayes about -- and I think these are the instructions that 2

come out loud and clear, is that each of the reviewers 3 should go behind the paper. Another expression used, go ,

4 kick the tires.

5 .

This was the modus that these people were -

6 supposed to use. Don't go look at that one NCR. Go look, .

7 pick a random sample, as well as that one that's identified 8 by the alleger. Get a random sample and then go beyond it.

9 Go make sure. Go interview people, talk to people, if they 10 are still around. And that type of review process is what 11 they used.

I think this document here tries to tell you 12 that.

13 MR. NOONAN:

When you used the word random, 14 that's not statistical random. That's just random, pick 15 things, put it together. Thank you. , -

16 MR. ROISMAN: Lawyers' random.

17 MR. NOONAN: Right.

18 MR. ROISMAN:

When the allegation was } assigned ,

19 to the particular person to look at, if when thd looked at

  • 20 that allegation they concluded that they didn't fully '
  • 21 understand it and they went to talk to the alleger to find 22 out what it meant, what if they didn't ' find the alleger

~

13 ,

right away? What would they do to find that alleger? -

24 MR. IPPOLITO: They themselves would not look; at i '25 the alleger. All they knew is that this was alleger X.

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They would come to either Annette or Dick Wessman or R.C.

2 Tank, who we had a master list, so to speak, and we would 3

attempt, one of the three wo,uld attempt to locate that~ ~

4 person.

We have taken whatever action we can, even sending 5

people on travel to other parts of the country once we 6 located the person to try to do this.

  • 7 MR. ROISMAN:

I guess there are several places, 8

as you probably know, where it indicates the alleger could 9 not be located. ~

10 MR. IPPOLITO: We tried the best we can with the i

11 1 data we had.

12 MS. VIETTI-COOK: We went 'o t the personnel files 13 on site to try to get their address, phone number, sent l -

14 i letters, et cetera.

Dick might remember some other things ,

l*5 we did.

16 MR. NOONAN:

Let's do this: On allegation, when 17 you get to me I can maybe explain what we did subsequent to 18 this time, if that.'s not too late for you.

19' MR. ROISMAN: No, but one of the questions t'll 20 ask you is the extent to which the work already done was 21 treated by you as done, and if what you tell me is 22 everything that Tom did, I reevaluated hnd redid and 23 therefore, what he did doesn't matter, then I can stop 24 asking questions about this,' but my understanding is some 25 of his work was relied upon by you, and continuation of his ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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1 work might have been done differently by you than by him.

2 MS. VIETTI-COOK: If we didn't contact him 3

before we looked at the allegation, we always tried to .

4 .

contact him in a feedback interview. We tried to contact 5,

i everybody in a feedback interview even if we didn' t contact '.

6 him initially because we felt we underst' cod the allegation. .

7 MR. ROISMAN: Did you work through, when you 8

were having dif ficulty finding people, did you work through 9

s Citizens Association for Sound Energy or through Ms. Garde 10 to locate people?

11 MS. VIETTI-COOK: Yes.

.12' MR. IPPOLITO: I personally called Ms. Garde for s

13 one or two names in particular, _and to. Juanita Ellis for 14 one or two as well.

In fact, Juanita Ellis found one or 15 two, they.were visiting her at the time and we were lucky 16 enough to find that individual.

17 MR. WESSMAN: We did talk with CASE several 18 times, and I remember on allegation identities that may 19 have been specified by case, we said we need to get a ~

20 particular individual that Citizens Association for Sound 21 Energy identified as allegers X or 2, and in some cases 22 they could help or in some cases they could not or would 23 not put us in contact with that alleger.

24 We did things like attempting to go to last 25 known address, last known telephone number, if relatives ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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. were identified in personnel records or whatever, we s sught 2 to contact them. We made what we felt was the best 3 possible effort. If all telephone efforts failed we would a

4 send a registered letter to the last known address in an 5 effort to have it forwarded, but I think we made a 6

reasonable effort to locate the individua'Is insofar as we 7 could.

8 MR. ROISMAN: Do have you any sense of what 9

percentage of the allegers you were unable to reach?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: I think Vince could answer that.

11 I think the final box score on that was completed under his 12 auspices.

13 MR. NOONAN: I'll ge't the number for you.

l 14 MR. IPPOLITO: I would think it is a majority, 15 right, Richard?

16 MR. WESSMAN: At the end of the effort, my 17 recollection is a total of nearly 70 allegers to "date, I 18 may be slightly off in the number, my recollection is at f*. 19 this time we probably have contacted in excess of 50 of 20 them.

Many of those are only in the close-out phase 21 because during the on-site phase, some of those, based upon 22 the statements and information we had, 'we determined we

~

! 23 didn't need to talk to them during the on-site portion as 24 we already discussed.

25 MR. NOONAN: I have the numbers available.

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MR. ROISMAN: Let's go back to the on-site 2 portion. How did your people proceed with the 3 investigation of an allegation on site? Let's assume that 4 .

they had an allegation that seemed on the surface to be 5

sufficiently clear, they didn't need to talk to the alleger 6

at that point, they went to the site to look at the thing ,

7 and found that didn't confirm 'the allegation. There didn't 8

appear to be anything there which was consistent with the 9 statement by the alleger. What was the next step to pursue, 10 if any, with respect to what the oncsite facts were?

11 MR. IPPOLITO: I don't know what I could add 12 over what I said earlier. If we had an allegation in a 13 ! particular area, one obviously goes and looks to see what i

14 ' are the requirements under which that thing is to be built, 15 '

desi'gned or whatever have you, understanding the basic 16 requirements, and doing whatever it takes to determine 17 whether or not that device or system or that paperwork is 18 in f act comfc..aing to those requirements.

19 4 MR. ROISMAN: Let's say that you have' an '

20 allegation that NCR 465 was improperly dispositioned by the .

21 supervisor, use as is, without any engineering evaluation, 22 although you needed an engineering evaluation to decide, 23 use as is, and your inspector -- that's a very clear one, 24 you presumably wouldn't have to go' to the alleger -- you go 25 to the NCR control, pull out the 465, take a look and find I

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the signature of an engineer on there, indicating that the 2

"use as is" disposition had an engineer's approval. What 3 would you do in that case?

4 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm hoping he would have started

~ ^

5 with an understanding of the NCR system and what it should 6 be. Given that, then he would then get a copy of the NCR 7

and understand it, go and examine the system. Then I 8

believe he would interview the people involved, if' they are 9

available, and try to find out what they can, you know.

10 Why was this signed off by the engineer. Go talk to the 11 engineer. What is the basis?

There's nothing apparent 12 here that justifies "use as is."

What is the rationale 13 ,

behind it? There's got to be something written that says, 1

1 14 l here's why I'm 'saying what I'm saying.

  • 15 MR. ROISMAN: My hypothetical was that the NCR 16 was dispositioned "use as is" without ever going to the 17 engineer.

Your person finds that it is signed off by an 18 engineer.

Let's assume there's a statement' on there that 19 explains why the engineer thinks "use as is" is okay. Your 20 person has a piece of paper that appears to be in direct 21 conflict with the statement that the alleger has made.

22 1

One possibility is that the alleger has the 23 wrong number.

. Another possibility is that the alleger has '

24 the right number and was incorrect, and tho third is that 25 1 the NCR was altered subsequent to the time that the alleger' '

(

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became aware of it and that the company has in effect 2

forged the document by adding a post-disposition engineerir.g 3 evaluation on it with the engineer's concurrence. How did '

4 your person investigste to determine which of those .

5 -

possibilities was the correct o.ne? .

6 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm not sure which of the many .

7 various examples, what he would do, but what his 8

instructions were is to look behind the paper. Don't only 9 take that one thing. If we can, talk to people, talk to 10 the alleger, talk to the people on site. Take a random 11 cample in and around that area because if that one seems to 12 be a problem, maybe there are others in that general area 13 at that general time frame. These are the techniques that 14 ,

a person would use but he would try to gc beyond it, and 15 including interviews.

16 MR. WESSMAN: We also went out and looked 17 physically at the components and made an engineering 18 judgment as to the adequacy of those engineering components 19 that are the subject of th'e NCR. - -

r 20 MR. SEAO ' It happened quite of ten that the NCR ,

21 is not properly closed and my people started looking and 22 tound out 2 ', was properly closed. In that case we went 23 back to the alleger. In many cases the alleger says, oh, 24 maybe I left, He lef t the site maybe a year or two ago.

25 He didn't know that it was properly followed up and in many 4

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cases the alleger accepted our finding.

2 MR. ROISMAN: Was that done during the time that 3

the people were still on site or af ter the site visit part

. 4 of the TRT was done?

5 MR. SEAO: In many cases it was done on-site but 6

some cases it.was done off-site. Happened many times.

7 MS. VIETTI-COOK: Or there was a lack of 8

communication between the QC inspector and the engineer 9 that wrote "use as is." They didn't bother to tell the QC 10 j inspector and I don't know that they had to, but he wanted 11 to know what the basis for that "use as is" was, and it was 12 not communicated to him, but eventually we communicated 13 that to him and at that point he was satisfied once he 14 understood the basis for "use as is."

I 15 MR. ROISMAN: All right, let's go on with the 16 example. Let's assume that your inspector evaluates the 17 allegation and finds that it was meritorious; that is, the 18 alleger said if you look at this thing, you will find a

. ~. 19 defect, and your man goes, and he looks, and he says, there l

20 is a defect. Now, at that point, as I understood from what 21 you talked about earlier, 'he would not try to find, if you 22 will, the root cause, the why of that. Is that correct?

l, ,23.

He wouldn't' try to find out why did this defect show up 24 here at a time when it should have been picked up six ll 25 months or a year, whatever it .is, a year ago.

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941.0 W 84 1 MR. IPPOLITO: That's correct.

? MR. ROISMAN: '

But that he would try to see what 3 the generic implications of that werer is that correct? .

4 MR. IPPOLITO:

Could this problem be in other 5 areas? ~

6 MR'. ROISMAN: How would he know which other '

7 areas to look at without knowing what caused the first one?

8 Let's assume again that it is an NCR that was not properly i 9 dispositioned.

10 MR. IPPOLITO: There are NCRs in the electrical 11 area, in the mechanical area, there are NCRs in the system 12 l area --

13 MR. CALVO I think we're missing a very .

14 important step. You jumped from the point of the NCR and 15 fouisd something wrong with it. The next step is you must 16 establish the safety significance of the find. If it is 17 safety significant you proceed to the implications, but if 18 you find no safety significance you can very well take care 19 of it at that time. -

t 20 MR. ROISMAN: Let me ask about that then. I ,

21 appreciate you telling me at what point that step comes in.

22 If you don't know what caused the failure to detect, how do 23 -you 'know whether or not, how did you know whether or not it 24 had safety significance?

25 MR. CALVO If I may, if I know the NCR and I '

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know the component of the system that the NCR was 2

addressing, then by knowing the component and the role that 3

the component plays in the plant safety, then I can assess 4 the safety significance.

5 MR. ROISMAN:

. Well, that's right, but --

6 MR. CALVO:

. For in'tance, s if the NCR has to do 7

with emergency lighting or a particular panel, and because 8

it has reference to that particular component and the 9

assessment is made, there's no reason to pursue it because 10 ,there was no safety significance. We acknowledged the fact 11 that this was an isolated case, and we like to know whether 12 this problem identified -- presumably the QC inspector 13 thought it was safety-related significance. We maybe 14 i

extended our review to include other NCRs that fall within 15 1 the same classification, "use as is." We did that many 16 times in many cases.

17 MR. ROISMAN: My concern -- and maybe I don't 18 fully understand the line between . safety-significant and 19 defect -- but I take it that there are procedures for doing 20 certain things at the plant, and one could, in retrospect, 21 in getting down with a microscopef take a look and decide 22

, while that one thing was supposed to have been done when we 23 really look at it now in great detail, it wasn't a 24 safety-important thing that it be done. Am I correct so

, 25 far?

l l .

l

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l 4941.0 SW 86 l MR. CALVO: That's correct.

2 MR. ROISMAN: How do you know if you don't find 3

out why did this thing which the QC inspector, let's say, .

4 .

mistakenly believed was safety significant, why did this 5 thing happen? How can you know whether or not it had an '

6 implication for safety significant matters even though it 7 is in itself not safety significant?

8 MR. SEAO:

i Let me give an example. Say we pour 9 concrete. The purpose of concrete is to achieve a final 10 ultimate strength of on pier site. But in order to achieve 11 the ultimate strength you pour concrete, make tests, 12 whatever is right. 'In the process there may be a lot of 13 , violations here and there. Maybe the wager /coment ratio 14 j

isn't right.' Maybe this inspector didn't look carefully, 15 but the bottom line is if the concrete had the right 16 strength that's what. really counts, even though they may

17 have had some safety violations. The final question is did 18 the concrete have the right strength, so even though you 19 s may have certain violations, they real1y don't have safety ,

20 significance if the final concrete has the right strength. ,

21 MR. ROISMAN: I can understand concrete, at 22 least a l'ittle bit of it. If t'he reason that the proper

,23 mixture between the concrete and the water was not -- that

2

.4 there was an improper mixture between the concrete and the 25 water and that was not detected, if the reason was that the 1

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concrete inspector.: had been directed by their bosses to 2

forget about that, they have been told, look, we're pouring 3

concrete, we have only five days to get this poured, I L 4

don't want a lot of nit-picking about the water / concrete l 5 mixture. When we're done we'll make sure it is 4000 psi, 6 So forget about it.

7 MR. SHAO:

. It is not good practice.

8 MR. ROISMAN:

I'm glad we agree on that. I take 9

it also that the presence of that attitude by the 10 supervisor that could have caused somebody to miss 11 something in another area where you ended up with a 12 deficient' component -- how, without finding out the 13 underlying reason for why the defect was not reported, how 14 will you know whether or not you have the safety-related 15 significance? .

16 MR. SEAO:

Very good question. We say now, you 17 have all kinds of violations. Maybe in this area you're 18 lucky, no problem in concrete. But maybe the same crew may

. . 19 work somewhere'else and somewhere else may. have problems, 20 so what we do is we say for this particular issue, number 21 16, whatever it is, we say no safety significance because 22 wa look at the final stress', but we put in appendix P, 23 applicant make sur'e this doesn't happen somewhere else. It 24 may have safety problems.

25 MR. ' ROISMAN: So not only -- well, let's go back.

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Then, really, during the SSER 7, 8, 9, 10 piece of the 2

E technical review team, the absence of knowing the answer to 3

the question why makes it not possible to know with '

4 certainty that there really are not other areas related --

5 ,

. other problems in that same area that were never detected '.

6 because of an underlying root cause which you are 7

transferring to SSER ll's responsibility; is that right?

8 MR. SHAO: We know something is wrong there. We 9

want applicant to address why the something wrong didn't 10 affect other places.

11 MR. ROISMAN:

, You are saying now that the 12 philosophy that' Mr. Ippolito tal'ked about earlier this 13 j morning, which is this responsibility is the applicant's, t -

14 continued right on through this TRT.

15 MR. SHAO: Applicant have to tell us why, if 16 they have a violation here, if it happens somewhere else, 17 why is it okay.

18 MR. ,ROISMAN: In your judgment, is the first 19 step, if the process were to have been carried forward by .

j 20 l

the staff as opposed to being transferred to the applicant, .

21 is the first step after you determine that there was a .

22 deficiency in the reporting system, although admittedly it 23 turned cut not to have safety significance, the first step 24 to carrying out the evaluations we have been talking about

, 25 is to determine why?

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, 1 MR. SHAO: Right.

2 MR. ROISMAN: Then having defined why, you can

. 3 then reinvestigate as to whatever why tells you to do, ac.3 4

4 I take it it would be very difficult in your judgment to do 5

it in the reverse order, which is to deal with the problem 6

without ever finding the why and then hold the answer to 7

, the question why until a year after you completed 8 correcting the known problems.

9 MR. CALVO: I missed that.

10 MR. ROISMAN -

, Let's stick with the concrete 11 example.

i You know when you are through that this 12 particular pour, this particular concrets aid not produce 13

, , an inadequate concrete strength, but you know that it was 14 not because of compliance with procedures, it was in spite j -

15 of failure to comply with the procedures. You've decided 15 that part of the responsibility of the technical review 17 team will not be to try to find out why didn't you comply 18 with the procedures.

That responsibility will be lef t 19 eventually to the applicant to find out why didn't they 20 comply with procedures.

21 MR. SEAO: It is our job to let applicant know 22 we find something wrong there, and they should give us an 23 '

answer why they did it and maybe it happened somewhere else 24 or not.

25 MR. ROISMAN: But if the applicant's approach is ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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to say we will never answer the question why for anything 2

we determine does not have safety significance, then you'll 3

never get the answer to your question; is that correct? "

~

4 MR. SHAO: No, applicant ~ is supposed to look at '

these issues in generic sense, and they have to decide 6

whether there is safety significance in other plant or not, 7 not limited to area. .

8 MR. ROISMAN: They can't do that until they know 9 why, can they?

10 MR. SEAO: They have to first, this happened 11 here, let's say in the auxiliary building. They have to 12 decide whether it' happened in other places and evaluate 13 accordingly.

14 MR. ROISMAN: Before they even decide where to 15 look and how much of the other concrete to look at, don't -

16 they have to first find out why didn't procedures get 17 follow'ed on this one pour?

18 MR. SHAO:

I think they should.

19 MR. ROISMAN: That was my question. Before you .

20 can decide whether we should look only at tho' pours in the 21

, auxiliary building or whether we should look only at pours .

22 that took place only in the month of March, you have to 23 know the why that this pour had the improper. procedures.

24 MR. SEAO: I agree you-have to look at why and 25 if the problem is localized or is not localized, what ACE FEDERAL. REPORTERS, INC.

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happened to one guy or maybe 10 guys.

2 MR. IPPOLITO: The breakdown in this control, if 3

you look at the instructions that the people, my technical 4

review team people were given and look at the 5

organizational structure, there's a dotted line that goes 6

from every group leader to Mr. QA/QC. When one finds a 7

technical problem and confirms it and the problem happens 8

to be no one is watching, whatever example you used --

9 avery morning I met with my group leaders and they were 10 told every morning that they have to be cognizant of the 11 fact that when they look at a technical area, it might 12 identify weaknesses in the control, the quality control and 13 quality assurance area. They are to make sure that dotted i

14 { line -- that the QA/QC knows of it. So in other words, if 15 there's a breakdown in the way they control whatever it was, 16 the water or what have you, then that control procedure

{ 17 i

i should have been identified to our QA/QC people as part of l 18 looking at all of the problems from the various groups.

. 19 MR. SEAO:

And it was identified in QA/QC.

20 MR. IPPOLITO:

' Right.

21 MRrROISMAN: The process of the movement of 22 these issues from the technical people 'looking at specific 23 ~

. hardware problems in QA'/QC, was it the technical people who 24 referred it to QA/QC or was .it QA/OC that reviewed the 25 findings and work of all of the technical ones and decided i

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which ones to look at and not both?

2 MR. IPPOLITO: We prefer the former,~not the 3 latter. -' '

4 MR. NOONAN: It was a combination of boch, a combination of both.

5 6 MR. SHAO: The table, appendix P was prepared by 7

  • the QA and the engineering people together.

8 MR. ROISMAN: Am I correct -- this may be for 9

both Mr. Ippolito and Mr. Noonan -- am I correct that after 10 your initial site visits which ended around September, that 11 the volume of people available --

12 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm sorry, October 12.

13 MR. ROISMAN:

Thank you. That the volume of 14 people available and the number of site visits that could 15 be made subsequent to that time was significantly reduced 16 over what could be done prior to that time, that you had 17 more resources to go do site visits?

18 MR. NOONAN: Not correct. -

~

19 MR. ROISMAN:

You had the same amount of -

20 capability or more? '

21 MR. NOONAN: Sama or more.

22 Let me go back to the why. The whys are 23 important, and I don't deny that, but it is possible in the 24 future the why might not be important. The applicant could 25 come to us and say, here's what we think is why but it ACE. FEDERAL. REPORTERS, INC.

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doesn't make that much difference, and we .might agree with 2 that. I don't want to lead you down the path that we'll 3

require him to go back and decide why for every specific

. 4 item that va id:ntiry. There might be some reason that we 5

would accept it is not important to look at the why, and 6

. when I face that I'll make that decision. Right at this 7

, point this time I want to leave that open.

8 MR. ROISMAN: Other than them coming back and 9

saying we're going to assume that the why is plant-wide and

  • 10 address it as a plant-wide failure, what other ways can you 11 imagine that the why might be irrelevant.

12 MR. NOONAN: Mr. Shao's situation might have 13 been limited to one thing. If that concrete has the right 14 1

strength yet, that group of people maybe did do things not 15 ' quite according to procedure, that why might not be as 16 important other than for that particular element. They 17 didn't follow the procedure but we know the hardware is 18 okay.

The why is not is important as if those same group 19 of people were used in other parts of the. plant. That's 20 kind of some logic. I can see a potential where a guy 21 could come back and tell us that. ~

22 MR. ROISMAN: But in the context of 23

. Mr. Ippolito's SPRT, look where he was looking at the 24 generic question of management control, how would the fact --

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1 connection to the rest of management on the site, which of 2

course is an impossibility of appendix B being complied 3

with - how could it not matter?

4 Let's say that it was 10 people, they had their '

5 own supervisor, own QA/QC people and werked only on the j 6 auxiliary building, and the applicant comes back and says, 7

we've checked the concrete strength for everything in the 8

auxiliary building and it all passed muster. We did not

, 9 find out why. In a number of pours we didn't look at the j 10 stuff but it doesn't matter because we know they only 11 worked on one building. Why is it not still important to 12 l

know, was the reason we didn't look at those whether they j 13 l themselves had a flaw or whether it was Ae.cause they were -

14 not properly instrdcted by the supervisors for concrete on 4

15

, the plant, or the supervisors for QA/QC on the plant or 16 something like that? .

17 MR. CHANDLER: I think we're veering off course 18 here somewhat and straying into what Staff may look to in

  • 19 the future in terms of requirements for activities we will 20 i

be looking at, in terms of get well programs, SPRTs, ,

21 whatever, rather than the retrospective of what the TRT did '

22 and how it did it, and why it did what .it did as documented 23 in. the various SERs, and 'rather than go into speculation as 24

to.what the Staff will be lookicg.for and why,.if we could 25 maybe keep our focus back on the point.

4 4

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24941.0 K5W 95 1 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Chandler, I looked at that 2

because Mr. Noonan raised it. I also looked at it because 3

I thought that Mr. Shao's sense of confidence in the work 4

done in his area was, and in Ippolito's confidence in his 5

people was in part based on a conviction that some day, 6

. somebody would answer the question why,.and therefore, 7

remove the last e,lement of uncertainty that may have 8 existed.

9 I don't think it is irrelevant, looking at the 10 past, to know whether everybody who did this thought that 11 was going to happen. And I thought it was useful, I'm not 12 getting into any detail with Mr. Noonan, I wanted to 13 understand what the scope of that statement was because all 14 of the people here who passed the ball first to 15 Mr. Livermore's group and later to the applicant may find 16 it relevant to know whether the why will ever be answered.

17 MR. CHANDLER: I haven't raised any concerns up 18- to this point. Unfortunately, in what the interchange 19 indicates now is that we're into a realm of speculation as 20 to future activities that likely go, I think, beyond the ,

21 realm of technical review team and thoughts and intentions 22 of that particular program. That's why'I raise that right' 23 now.

  • 24 MR. NOONAN: We are going to look at the whys.

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. I to think there might not be a case where I would say, I 2 won't look at the why. There might.

3 MS. GARDE: Mr. Ippolito, let me take you back 4 to May 1984. After you had written the plan, it was

  • 5 approved, according to the cover sheet, by Mr. De Young , .

6 Mr. Denton and Mr. Collins on June 5,1984, and about a 7

week later you sent it to the board via board notification. ~

8 Was there any modification to the plan that you initially 9 wrote up? Is this what you initia.lly wrote and sent 10 Mr. Denton for approval?

11 l MR. IPPOLITO: Yes. My recollection is there 's' 12 one revision; is that correct?

13 MR. WESSMAN: We did a revision on July 1 of 14 '

1984. My recollection was we changed the schedule, one of 15 those enclosu'res slightly. I don,'t think we did any real

16. changes in the text of the document!

17 MS . GARDE : This was after it was approved, not 18 before? -

19 MR. WESSMAN: It was revised af ter it was .

20 approved and all those who approved it were given a copy or

. 21 else participated in the decision to revise. I don't

  • 22 recall the exact sequence of events.

23 MS. GARDE: Did the plan as it'is written here, 24 and I've read this, but did Mr. DeYoung, Mr. Denton and 25 Mr. Collins all concur in the objective, to put the ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.

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objective of this plan, which was to put all the licensing 2

issues to bed, if your looks put all the allegations to bed?

3 Was that the objective of this project you proposed?

" ^

. 4 MR. IPPOLITO: What this plan attempts to do is 5

to take and integrate the responsibilities in all of the 6 areas. They are, by signing that, agreeing to a number of 7 things as stated in the plan. One, yes, they r'ecognize I 8I am going to orchestrate this effort. Secondly, it asks for 9

people, and that people are committed to this effort for at 10 least the period of time that I estimated initially there, 11 and whatever I chanced from that point on. That's what 12 they were concurring in. They recognized the existence of 13 this project, directorship, 'if you will, and their 14 agreement to support it as stated. That's what they were 15 concurring in.

16 MS. GARDE:

Now when you started pulling 17 together the individuals to take down to Comanche Peak, you 18 pulled together a team of around 50. individuals more or 19 less?

20 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

21 MS. GARDE: And you arrived, if I recall this 22 correctly, around the first part of July of '84. ~~

23 MR. IPPOLITO: July 9 -- July 8.

24 MS. GARDE: Now, .from then through the rest of 25 the summer, would you say that the field work done during ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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that time period was -- Vince, you may need to help answer 2

this, 50 percent of the field work done going to the SSERs?

3 What percentage?

4 MR. IPPOLITO: If not all, a very high .

5 percentage of all that was done. '

I left the project about 6 October, somewhere mid-October. My understanding is that .

7 the last group, which was the QA/QC, was pretty much off 8 site at the time. He may have gone back once or twice for 9 clean up, but most of the site work was done.

10 MR. NOONAN: I would say most of the site work 11 at that point in time was done, because when I came on 12 board I, talked to the group leaders and asked if they 13 needed to go back and most of the answers were no, with a i

(

14 few exceptions I think.

15 Ms. GARDE:

I want to focus on the area of your 16 work which responded to allegations. When this program 17 plan was written up it was addressing about 400 allegations, 18 I think. 'The number of allegations grew throughout your .

19 field works isn't that correct? '

20 MR. IPPOLITO: '

' Yes, and I think that when I left '

21 it got up to somewhere in the 600s, somewhere in that 22 neighborhood. '

2-3 MS. GARDEs And since that time period, 24 Mr. Noonan, if I'm correct, it has grown again.

l 25 MR. NOONAN:

Last count it was in the range of l

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around 900, although when I came on board it was at about 2 600. We asked the Staff to go back and recount. The 3 number changed pretty rapidly.

Some of them were broken so 4

what might have counted as one allegation was now counted 5

at two. It is around 900, in that ball park right now.

6 MS. GARDE:

Where new allegations were 7

identified, either in old documents or as you were.doing I

8 your work, was the field work and the plan to resolve those 9

allegations developed essentially on the spot? Did you 10 I during your visit say, this is how we're going to deal with 11 these plans -- excuse me, these allegations?

, 12 MR. IPPOLITO: I guess --

13 MS. GARDEL Let me back up.

When you h'ad an 14 j allegation, there was an allegation review sheet preparedt 15 is that correct?

16 MR. IPPOLITO:

. For the new ones, yes. This 17 document that I'm looking at here is --

18 MS. GARDE: What is it?

19 MR. IPPOLITO: A technical review team guidance, 20 and I think it is something that has been published. As l

21 part of that there was a sheet to be filled out for new 22 allegations and te21s you, this document tells you what to

23 do with them. They are fed into the system, and they are 24 given to the appropr
. ate team leader.

25 MS. GARDE: Okay, Mr. Chandler, we don't have

~

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1941.0 3W 100 I that document. That's one of the ones the FOIA office has 2

not yet released and that would be real helpful and would 3

have been in preparing for this meeting.

4 MR. CHANDLER:

I will take a look and see what 5 the status of that is. '.

6 MS. GARDE: If it would be possible for us to 7

look at it over lunch, that would help us along.

8 MS. GARDE: My understanding is that an 9 allegation review sheet was filled out?

10 MR. IPPOLITO: Yes.

11 MS. GARDE As new allegations were identified, 12 you had the 400 when you went down and the number increased.

13 '

Was the allegation plan, how to deal with the allegation 14 developed while you were there on the site?

15 MR. IPPOLITO: * '

The difficulty I'm having with

~

16 trying to answer your question is that your question seems 17 to say that there's one single theme, you know, in the 18 allegations.

The QA/QC, there could be many, many areas, 19 and many nuances to each of the areas. All I did as -

20 manager is say, here's your total work effort, team leader, .

21 .

organize it, get it done, work within this framework, and 22 some other general management. procedures that I had 23 established. How he factored -- dealt with a specific 24 add-on was pretty much his call.

25 Ms. GARDE: What documents would I have to look ACE.FEDERA1. REPORTERS, INC. '

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24941.0 KSW 101 1 at in order to determine what your team leaders did in July 2 and August of 19847 3

MR. IPPOLITO: I don't think -- I think the best

, 4

' you could do -- I think initially there was a lot of 5

investigation, nothing in writing. Digging, digging, 6 digging.

Then we got to the point where we could start 7

writing, and I think the SSERs or the write-ups for each 8

individual allegation or group of allegations is dated, so 9

the outcome of these write-ups is probably all that you 10 have.

11 MS. GARDE:

Let me give you an example.

12 MR. IPPOLITO: Ixcuse me. I'm reminded that for I

13 each allegation, we have a file. Within the file is all of 14 the information, all of the records that the person used to

. 15

-- that he used in developing his conclusions regarding 16 that or that family of allegations.

17 1 MS. GARDE: Okay, each allegation had -- let me 18 give ycu a hypothetical.

i You have an allegation that comes

,, , 19 from a newspaper article. That's the source of the 20 allegations.

What's the first step that your team followed 21 when they were faced with this allegation in the newspaper 22 article that takes it from the newspaper article to the 23 SSER? What's the first thing that was done?

l 24 MR. IPPOLITO:

i Pick one that in fact did happen 25 and I don't remember -- the allegation had to do with some ace.FEDERA1. REPORTERS, INC.

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That was assigned to the proper team leader.

2 As part of his review, he tries.to establish the genesis 3 for this.

We try to help him, meaning my group tries to '

4 4 help him.

Some of these newspaper articles did identify '

5 people. .

To the extent that we could talk to these people 6

and find out more about these things, we did. Other than 7 ,

that, we then tried to understand what the allegation was 8

about and proceeded to establish again what the accepted 9

i program would be, the procedures that implement that 10 i

program, and track it down that way.

11 MS. GARDE: Where does something get put on 12 paper in that process?

Where did the technical review team 13 members put something down on paper in that process?

14 MR. IPPOLITO: I'm not -- part of their review?

15 MS. GARDE: Yes.

Okay, I think we're talking

16 , across.each other. If I could go back in time, and I went 17 into the technical review team records in July of '84, okay, 18 what documents did the technical review team develop that l

19 identified the allegations? You have allegations coming .

4

20 from a lot of different sources -- newspaper articles, word i

21 of mouth, hearings -- you know, a whole group of areas. .

22 Bow did that get put on a piece of paper which then starts 23 its process through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and '

24 ands up in these SSERa7

! 25 MR. . IPPOLITO: I think I answered that one time.

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1 I'll repeat it.

What was done is that we would take the 2

item, be it from a statement made by somebody,, identify the 3

item, try to describe the item, create a file on that item

. 4 with its background and whatever we have that supports that.

5 i .

That file then would be given to the group leader for his i

6 work.

7 MS. GARDE: So there's no standardized form? If I

8 I went and looked at the allegation files there's no 9

standardized form in the allegation file which says "this 10 is what the allegation is" so that I could sit down myself, 11 4

look at the newspaper article and look at the way you 4

12 defined it and compare the two allegations?

l 13 ! MR. IPPOLITO: Yes, ycu can. You can take --

14 tho' final characteri.zation of the allegation is contained 13 in the SSER. So you could take that and you could go back 16 to our records and you should be able to find the genesis 17 for that, so in other words, you can check.

18 MS. GARDE:

I should be able to see each step.

,. - 19 MR. IPPOLITO: If you look at pages that go 20 l

i .

before and af ter this thing, that's not the way you would 21 read it, but that's the way we read it.

t You would be able 22 to tell that difference. -

23

, - MS. GARDE
Tony will finish up.
24 MR. ROISMAN: We talked earlier about the extent 25 to which you talked to allegers, and I'm interested in

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3 get' ting some sense of, to the extent that you know it*-to '

2 what ext'e nt were you able to talk to allegers before you , '

3 8-did site visits, before you did the on-sits work?

4 MR. IPPOLITO: I would say we did -- maybe about 5

20 percent of what we did was beforehand, if you will. '

6 MR. ROISMAN: How much cf it while on site? .

7 -

MR. IPPOLITO: Maybe another'10 or 20 percent.

8 Again, I have to remind you that where we thought we 9

understood it, where we had detailed statements or detailed 10 records of what the allegation is, we didn't feel the need 11 to do it, you know, at the f ront end. Those where wo 12 didn't understand, there was a standing direction; where 13 you didn't undee' stand, you got to try to find out and clear 14 that up. -

15 So I'm saying that's what's happen't g at the 16 site.

So you know, since all of the work was done, most of 17 the site work was done by the middle of October, I have to 18 assume that at least people believed that they understood 19 all of the allegt. tions or had asked to talk to people to ' ~2 20 make the clarifications, but nonetheless, we had started

21 before I lef t the closecut of these things, okay, and that 22 was carried on af ter I left. And I think Mr. Noonan can .

2,3 talk to that later, but you know, that's where we are on 24 that in that one area.

25

MR. WESSMAN
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we talked to somewhere between 15 and 20 allegers. Those 2

were the ones we felt we needed to talked to to clarify

. '3 iss0es they already raised or in a couple of occasions they 4 were identified to us as a new alleger during the course of 5 our time on site, w '

6 KR. ROISMAN: What was the value, in your 7 judgment, of site visits as compared to the work done af ter 8 'the site visit? What were your people getting by being on 9 site that they couldn't get if they didn't go to the site?

10 What sort of things?

11 MR. IPPOLITO: We had -- at the site we had all 12 that we needed. We had the documents eight there. Those 13 were the documents we wanted to see, not something that 14 could be sent .to us. The* systems were installed there. ,

15 Right there. Let's go look at them. Let's see beyond the 16 problem that was identified. In other words, if it is a 17 hanger in this area, let's look at hangers in other areas.

18 The third dimension is that you could not,get out of 19 working out of an office up here.

20 MR. ROISMAN In your judgment was it valuable 21 to be able to go in and see the whole file in which some

, 22 particular document that 'you may have been interested *in

  • 23 was placed, rather .than to. rely on the applicants to send 4

24 you the document?

25 MR. IPPOLITO: Our objective was to i

6

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1 independently, at random, try to establish whether or not 2

an allegation or issue was in fact substantiated. I think 3 that we had to do this.

4 MR. ROISMAN: I guess what I was driving at, .

5 sometimes at least, in our experience -- I don't know what 6

yours is -- sometimes when we ask the applicant for a 7

document, we get a document i.n a certain form. Then we s 8

learned the same document is available in another form, not 9

necessarily with the material that we got the first time 10 changed, but with more things attached to it.

11 Was it advantageous from your perspective -- if 12 you wa'nted to see an NCR, was it advantageous for you to be 13 able to go to the NCR file and see the NCR as it appeared 14 in the file rather than to say to the applicant, send the 15 NCR 465 or whatever? Were there some advantages to that?

16 MR. IPPOLITO: I guess if you speak of an NCR, 17- the NCR is what it is. You could make a photocopy of it or 18 whatever you want. It is still the NCR. I think that we 19 'did more than that. We independently selected not only '

20 that NCR, probably and randomly picked on either side of ,

21 that NCR a number of others.

i We did it ourssives, we '

22 didn't rely on someone else to pick our' sample, so I think 23 that's the advantage you have. You could look in and see a 24 document package that is maybe af 'oot thick, and you see 25 one that's only, you know, like three pieces of paper in it, ACE-FEDERAI. REPORTERSs INC.

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and you might say, that looks like one extreme and another 2 extreme.

I think I'll find out why. These are the type of 3

things that the reviewer can take advantage, of.

L 4 MR. ROISMAN:

.. . When you use the words " sample" 5

, and " random," you're using the lawyers' sense and not --

6 MR. IPPOLITO:

Yes. Vince's comment is still 7 appropriate.

8 MR. ROISMAN: Generally applicable.

9 .

We're happy to break for lunch unless you want 10 to hang here.

11 MR. IPPOLITO: Does tha't mean we're through with 12 me?

13 MR. ROISMAN: We're never through. It means 14 "

when we come back from lunch we don't intend to start -

15 asking you questions.

16 (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the meeting was 17 recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

18 '

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1 AFTERNOON SESSION (1:05 p.m.)

2  !

MR. CHANDLER: I would like for the record to 3

note that the Staff did provide to Ms. Garde a copy of the 4

document entitled " Technical Review Team Guidance," dated ,

5 June 1984, which she requested prior to the break. -

6 MR. ROISMAN: We're delighted, and for the -

7 record, this is the first time we've ever.seen.it.

8 Mr. Noonan, there came a time when you assumed 9 responsibility for the technical review team. What I would 10 like to know from you, first, is to what extent were any of 11 the procedures or processes that Mr. Ippolito discussed 12 this morning changed by you af ter you took over?

13 MR. NOONAN: Okay, when I took over basically 14 there were some instruction that Darrell Eisenhut gave me.

15 Number one, no changes in staff, at that point in time. I 16 shouldn't start restaffing with different people.

17 Number twc.. chat the work was done basically at 18 the site by the technical review team people, group leaders.

19 Their work was not totally completed but for a11' practical '

20 purposes was done. I should start working on getting the .

21 SSERs written.

22 Number three was allegations. I should become 23 personally involved in the allegations, go out and meet 24 l Ms. Ellis,uneet Ms. Garde, and ta'lk' to the allegers myself l 25 as .many as I could practica ly do, and then start thinking i

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4P 24941.0 KSW 109 I about the hearings and how we were going to handle them and 2 Staff positions.

So that was the four things.

3 My instructions to the Staff was basically to 4 write the SSERs. They had done the work. They know how to 5 write SSERs, do it.

. I didn't get involved in that process 6 at that time.

What I did was concentrate on the 7

allegations and I spent the first probably six weeks 8

getting familiar with the allegations, the system we had, 9

and I decided that I wanted to improve on that system by 10 providing better organization and recordkeeping. I wanted 11 to make sure that we had -- you'll hear it many tim's, e 12 auditable. file, for the allegations. I wanted the files to 13 be complete so that we knew how the allegation was handled, 14 if the allegation was indeed the way the allegers stated it, 15 the feedback, start. tracking where we were addressing SSERs 16 and .how it would be eventually closed out. The system was 17 changed from time to time. We put it into an organization.

18 Basically, we took the regional force system i

19 that they had at that time, brought it up -to Bethesda and 20

- started working with it from that point on to make it to 21 what I felt was more organizatio'n to the system and also 22 putting it on a computer link. That's kind of the way we 23 worked the allegations.

We did make some ground rules as 24 far as working with the allegers. The ground rules 25 basically were stated by me and they are in a document that ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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1941.0 iW 110 I we wrote. Basically, it is the agency policy on the 2 allegers. We asked individual technical people, when they 3

talked to the allegers, particularly when they provide .

4 feedback, treat the allegers with respect. Don't question

,5 their motivation, don't get involved in that. Treat it as '.

6 factual'until such time as you decide from a technical 7 basis ~that it is factual or not factual, and don't '

8 challenge the allegers.

9 Early on, I think we had a couple cases and I 10 can't-recall exactly what they were, but where the Staff 11 got argumentative with the alleger and it wasn't 12 necessarily Staff's fault, but I didn't want to get into 13 that kind of environment. If the alleger said it was that 14 way,'do*it that way. Provide the alleger with feedback 15 from the technica' l staff and 'see if the alleger agrees. If 16 he doesn't like it, find out why. Try to get it on the j 17 record why. If the allegation wasn't correct, tho' Staff i

! 18 misinterpreted the allegation, didn't write it down 19 correctly, whatever that was, then by God let's get it -

20 right and address the right allegation. ,

21 That process basically took us -- at least my 22 involvement was pretty deep until November and December, 23 and at this time, the Staf f was working on SSERs. I put 24 together a panel that was intimidation and harassment panel. '

25 I also put together a contention 5 panel. I set up a new ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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type of organization where I had basically just three 2 people reporting to me.

I should say four, because in this >

3 allegation I assigned a specific individual to be 4

, responsible for the allegation system rather than have all 5

the technical groups working on their own allegations and 6

eventually being coordinated into one group. I had one man 7

assigned to make sure the allegation system was put in a 8

form we could handle and deal with. The last was working 9

with the. utility on the set-up of the CPRT, putting out our 10 concerns, talking about, Mr. Utility, you now have all our 11 concerns addressed, we want you to come back -- and these 12 were the letters and finally the SSERs.

13 MR. ROISMAN: Let's go back to the allegers for 14 a second. At the time you took charge of the technical -

15 review team, essentially two of the technical review team 16 . letters, September and October, were already out.

. There 17 was a letter in November and finally one in January of 1985.

18 Explain 'to me how the changes that you made with regard to

~

19 dealing with the allegations of the allegers and the 20 allegers themselves, how did that change, if it did at all,

~21 tne development of the technical review team letters, the 22 development of the subsequent SSERs, or is this a separate 23 track done in some way separate fr'on that whole process?

24 MR. NOONAN: No~'they

, are tied together.

25 Basical'ly it didn't affect the two letters that had gone ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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4941.0 SW 112 1 out so much. It basically affected the SSERs because we 2

told all parties that while the letters were there there 3-

- werr st-11~1 additional things to bring forth, and those 4 .

could have been things we brought out while we were putting 9

5 this alleger system together. I looked for things where it '

6 said we couldn't contact' the allegers. Why couldn't we?

7 Let's fix the process to make sure we have a record to say .

8 we did contact them or if we didn't, why we didn't.

9 So in our files you should find something in 10 that file that says we contacted the alleger and there will 11 be a transcript there to indicate that or there will be a 12 letter there. If we did not contact the alleger there 13 would probably be a piece of paper saying we sent a 14 registered letter and got it back, and a few refused to 15 meet with us and that should be in 'there also. Anything 16 would be updated as far as what might have been in the 17 letters, but the SSERs should now reflect the current view 18 _ of the Staff.

19 MR. ROISMAN:

Can you give me some idea of what,

  • 20 or in some detail -- you went through it very quickly and .

21 .

I'm not sure I understood it and certainly didn't remember 22 it all.

What were the things you changed about. how 23 allegations from allegers were dealt with by the Staff from 24 what had existed before you came in?

25 MR. NOONAN: Organizational was the big thing.

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I felt we needed a system where we could find out the 2 allegation number.

We had given everybody a number because 3

we didn't want names to get out -- who was working on the 4

allegation, where it was addressed in the SSERs -- so it 5 was an organizational procedure.

6 Sometimes w~e need to provide closecuts, 7

everything will be closed out, there' has to be a record for.

8 my purposes at least of managing to make sure I know who 9 .

did it. Did they look at the right allegation, are we sure 10 it is right, and where is it closed out. We played back 11 what you call commission policy on allegers, put through 12 all of the technical people. We sent copies to every 13 technical person.

. We set the ground rule. When you talk 14 to allegers, technical people have a tendency to look at 15 ene technical answers, and I didn't want them to become 16 argumentative with the alleger. The' alleger believed what 17 he believed. He wasn't necessarily always right. I didn't 18 want to challenge him in a meeting like that.

~

I thought we l 19

~

could do it on paper. ~

l 20 Mk. ROISMAN: In the technical review guidance

~

21 team document we got dated June 1984, there are some 22 instructions in there for dealing with a'llegati ns' and the 23 alleger which appear -- sorry, there's no page number. It 24 is in attachment 3, and it 'ils on the third page of the 25 attachment under paragraph G. I want to know, are there i

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other instructions that you added to this beyond these that 2

dealt with how people should be dealing with the allegers?

3 If it is in a document, say I did this a supplement to this --

4 MR. NOONAN: I I believe I did read that when I j 5 came on board and put it in the file. Basically we started .

l l

6 with a set of instructions that followed much along the 7

Diablo Canyon lines, the treatment of the Diablo Canyon i j

8 allegers.

We took the policies followed on Diablo Canyon l 9 i and put together a document that said here's how we will 10 treat allegers from this day forward. It is different. I 11 don't want to call it a supplement because I didn't use it

~

12 as a basis for any other document..

13 MR. ROISMAN:

So we'll be able to find it and I 14 assume it is coming in the course of things, what is it 15 call &d? What should we look for? '

16 FROM THE FLOOR: I think procedures for closecut 17 of the allegers.

18 MR. ROISMAN:

, What did you do when in going 19 through your procedures yru identified an allegation which 20 in your judgment had not been properly closed out but was .-

21 already the subject of a published technical review team 22 letter. Did you go back and do a further site analysis, .

23 send people back on the site again?

~

24 MR. NOONAN: I would have made the people 25 available to the site if necessary. We always asked that, ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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do you need to go to the site to answer the allegation or 2 is this something you already covered. We provided

, 3 feedback to the person. I would have given it probably at 4 that time -- this time I was setting up kind of a different

~

5

. organization and I would have given it either to Mr. Shao 6 or Mr. Calvo.

. Those were the two people who were going to 7 become responsible for almost all of the technical work. I, 8

hadn't put the new organization in place yet, but I was 9 going in that direction.

10 MR. CALVO: To supplement what Mr. Noonan is 11 saying, we did in some cases follow up allegations, set up .

12 a team to go back to the site because new information 13 l

resulted from the allegers or new allegations altogether.

l- 14 So it was a judgment on our part whether we had to go to 15 the site or maybe the information we had was good enough in 16 our SSERs in some kind of way to cover that particular new 17 allegation or new ramification of that allegation.

18 MR. NOONAN: We had people at the site this

. 19 month looking at new allegations. .

20 MR. RdISMAN:

i The next question, what did you do 21 with allegations which you learned of subsequent to the 22 time of the original technical review t'eam site visit?

23

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. addressed in a formal supplement to another SSER, and I 2

think at that point in time, we hadn't officially put it 3 out. All the allegations we addressed over and above what 4

Richard looked at are covered in SSER 7 to 11, or will be .

5 covered in the next edition. I haven't fully decided. I '.

6 might put it into an appendix.

7 MR. CALVO: The electrical instrumentation group 8

give status on new allegations or follow-ups which come up 9 after the SSER number 7. We indicated which they were, and 10 in the process of evaluation gave the status, what 11 conclusion we had reached at that time. The process is 12 still going on. -

13 MR. NOONAN: As of September 15 we took the 14 allegation files, brought them back.into the region. The 15 region.now has responsibility for any allegation that '

~

16- appeared after September 15. We're handling the ones 17 before that time. The region will transfer to me if 18 there's a need for any technical evaluation?

19 MR. ROISMAN:

What would they look at-where -

20 there wouldn't be a need for technical evaluation. ..

21 MR. NOONAN: Depends.

Could be strictly an 22- inspection allegation that they could handle themselves.

23 MR. ROISMAN: Could you give'me a "for instance" 24 so I understand the distinction?

25 MR. NOONAN: Could be that something -- a cotter ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC..

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24941.0 KSW 1,17 l pin was left out in certain things. The region could look 2 at that themselves. If it was true they might want to get 3 the technical staff involved, but depends on what the 4 resolution of the region evaluation was. We ' re going to be 5 informed of all the allegations. We do know at this time 6 what all the allegations are, so it is communication 7

l between us and the region.

8 MR. ROISMAN: Is the region following your 9 guidelines in how to deal --

10 MR. NOONAN: In general. They we close them out 11 in terms of SSERs and they close them out in terms of 12 , inspection reports.

\

, 13 MR. ROISMAN: But how they do their 14 investigation, in the way in which they deal with the 15 allegers? Did the directives you gave to your technical -

16 ,

review team staff on how to deal with the allegers, 17 rewritten ones that you developed, have you given that 18 directive to region 47 19 MR. NOONAN: Yes. -

~

g, 20 MR. ROISMAN: Are they required to follow that 21 as a result of you giving it to them?

22 MR. NOONAN: I don't know abo'ut " required." I 23 fully expect them to follow it to the best that they can.

24 MR. ROISMAN: Are' you in effect auditing their 25 work on that?

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MR. NOONAN: No. I'm talking to them and I talk 2

to them almost daily, so communicating with them. .

3 MR. ROISMAN: Why did that alleger investigation 4

work get transferred to the region rather than staying in ,

5 your office? '

6 MR. NOONAN: That's the way it does business. .

7 The region normally looks to the allegations. We're

, 8 through most of the allegations. We've looked at almost 9 all of the allegers. You haven't seen the final, 10 disposition of some of the allegations, but as far as the 11 Staff work is concerned, most of it is completed.

12 MR. ROISMAN: Do you have a rough idea of h'ow  !

13 many allegations are contained in the already published 14 SSERs and how many allegations that your people will be 15 dealing with where there 'is still no published resolution?

16 MR. NOONAN: I'll give you numbers. I think l 17 around 700-some allegations that probably - yes, probably 18 closed in the SSERs. - Probably ano,ther 300-some being 19 basically worked on by my staff here, our staff, and - '!

20 there's a few down in the region now, less than a handful A-21 probably. -

22 MR. ROISMAN:

i What mechanism', formal mechanism 23 exists that if an allegation is received by the region

. 24 through the new system and has alle' gations that are already 25 being investigated that your people will be made aware of 4

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2 MR. NOONAN:

That's done through my allegation 3

, coordinator. I put one person in charge of allegations.

4

, That person basically communicates with the region 5

frequent 1y, sometimes more than once a day.

That 6 information is brought into our system. We know what's 7 being done and I have put together a system where we can 8 track not only allegations but board notifications. We 9 know who is doing what.

10 MR. ROISMAN: ,Do I understand it is not yet 11 determined _ what form the published resolution of the 300 or 12 so allegations you're still looking at will take?

13 . MR. NOONAN: No. The NRR Staff will close them 14 l out in future safety evaluations being written, an appendix I

15 - ; to the evaluation and the region 4 staff will receive them 9

16 "as inspection reports.

17 MR. ROISMAN: Not in one future SSER but maybe 18 as part of several future SSERs.

19 MR. NOONAN: As they are done. -

, 20 MR. ROISMAN: Those allegations, to the extent 21 they are related to that subject.

22 MR. NOONAN: Yes.

23 (Discussion off the record. )

24 MR. ROISMAN: You' expect them to be an appendix 25 to a future SSER.

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1941.0 iW 120 1 3 MR. NOONAN: Yes. We have what we call normal l 2 licensing activities to be resolved. SSER 12, the normal 3

3 SSER went out. The next one will more likely have an 4 appendix in them.

5 MR. ROISMAN: Those will not necessarily be -

6 related to the subject matter of the SSER; you use that as .

7 the convenient way of getting it out?

8 MR. NOONAN: Yes.

i 9

MR. ROISMAN: The allegations that have not yet .

10 been closed out in published SSERs, is there any way they l'1 are being treated that is different than the way in which 12 earlier allegations were being treated in teens of the 13 nature of the investigative work that you do or how you --

14 deal with the allegers or any of that?

15 ~

MR. NOONAN , Only in the respect that you always 16 try to change to improve the system. That's the kind of 17 '

changes that I would expect at this point in time, 18 something that we felt could have been-done better. We are 19 now doing better. -

20 MR. ROISMAN: To the extent that field .

21 investigations would have been done if- this were an 22 allegation that had been in Mr. Ippolito's hands in June of

~

23 1984, they would be field investigated now?

24 MR. NOONAN:

Yes, if required, Staff will decide  !

25 that.

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24941.0 KSW 121 1 MR. ROISMAN: There are no different set of 2 criter,ia, the same Mr. Ippolito used in deciding when to 3 field investigate would in effect be used?

4 MR. NOONAN: Yes.

~

5 MR. ROISMAN: You mentioned that you had -- one 6' of the changes that you had made was t'he establishment of 7 contention 5 in the harassment / intimidation packages. Can 8 you just put them into the context of the process that was 4

9 under your jurisdiction? Were they expected to participate

. 10 in the development of any of the SSERs to start with?

11 MR. NOONAN: No, not in development of the SSERs.

12 The contention 5 panel would be basically to see if the 13 Staff was adequately addressing the concerns related to the 14 allegations. Did we do a good job, wer.e there things that 15 we were not answering correctly, is the Staff position 16 articulated properly, does the Staff have a basis for that 17 position? The contention 5 panel was for that.

18 The everall charter contention 5 panel has been 19 published, to see what the effects would be on QA/QC.

20 In'timidation and harassment panel basically was a panel of 21 people put together to address those specific issues, not 22 look at the technical aspect but take what the Staff found 23 and treat it in terms of intimidation and harassment, and 24 that document stands by itself right now.

25 MR. ROISMAN: Well, the reason I was asking the ace-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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question is tilat it appears that having now seen the 2

published report of the harassment / intimidation panel, that 3

the panel essentially adopted the work done by the 4

consul. tant EG&G, which was itself an evaluation of 5

available materials as opposed to a raw research job., -

6 Started with what was available, looked at the record, ,

7 transcript and all the other available materials.

8 That, at least on its surf ace, appears to me to 9 be different than what appeared to have been the original' 4

10 mandate of the harassment / intimidation panel. And I wonder 11 with regard to 5, that there has been any similar 12 modification in the role that you see the contention 5 13 panel playing from what had been indicated in its original 14 I authorization documents. ,

15 MR. CHANDI.ER: I think once again we're str4ying 16 out in areas not related to the technical review team.

17 MR. NOONAN: There is a change, but you're right.

18 were getting off. Questions on intimidation / harassment; I -

19 would like to have that addressed to those people that "

20 worked on that. On the contention 5 document, panel, the -

21 document stands as it is. Those documents are in the -

22 record.

23 -

MR. ROISMAN: Talking about the original 24 document.  !

25 MR. NOONAN: Yes.

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MR. ROISMAN: Beyond what you described, what 2

. other. if any, modifications did you make in the approach 3

that had been taken in the development of the technical 4

_ review team when Mr. Ippolito was in charge of it, insofar 5

as either producing technical review team letters or 6 producing SSERsi 7

MR. NOONAN: I'm not sure there was any real 8 change in approach. I might have used different techniques.

9 I might have not been satisfied with the answers that I saw.

10 i I basically wanted to make sure that Staff had their 11 conclusions and that .they could articulate the basis for 12 'those. What do we need to do to do that job? That's what i

13 I would have"done. '

l ,

14 MR. ROISMAN: In the development of the work you 15 did, to what extent were the limited budget of the 16 technical review team constraints on the things you thought 17 you needed to do?

18 MR. NOONAN:

We as an agency always have 19 limitations. on budget. One thing I did do', when I came on

,- 20 board in October I also brought on board a contract person 21 so we could handle the contractual problems that we l

22 normally incur.

f By that I mean getting people on board and 23 available people and monies. Up to this point I haven't 24 really had any -- I had sufficient resources to do what I 25 needed to do.

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'941.0 iW 124 l MR. ROISMAN: I think we'll have no further 2

questions for you, and I would like to start on SSEn number

. 3 7 with Mr. Calvo.

4 MS. GARDE: Mr. Calvo, I'm going to ask my 5

questions based on SSER 7, which you also have in front of -

6 you.

On page beginning on page J-3 and going on to page J-4, ^

7 there's a description of the concern and allegation 8

tracking system and the review methodology. This document 9_

says that the technical review team determined the validity 10 l of each technical concern or allegation and assessed its 11 safety significance, its potential generic implications and 12 any indication of potential plant breakdown.

13 Going back through each one of these, could you 14 please describe what was the basis for the determination in 15 these areas in your category, which would be all the 16 electrical allegstions covered in here?

17 MR. CALV0: The basis of intimidation of the 18 validity? I guess we can go to J-7. I guess this is in 19 essence the electrical instrumentation group summary. We ~

20 had about nine categories. Next we have the subject matter -

21 for each category and the correct characterization, with 22 the characterization .of the concerns an'd the allegations in 23 those categories.

24 The first category was electrical cable 25 terminations. How do I determine the validity of each i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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What we did, we took all the available 2

allegations in the electrical instrumentation systems and 3

tried to put them in nine bins, in accordance to the type 4 of allegation there was. For instance, in the category 1 5

i

  • we put everything that had to do with electrical

. 6 terminations. Or hard. ware related, sometimes QA/QC related.

7 We went down the line. When we get to the electrical cable.

8 terminations, we look at the allegation and are trying to 9

det' ermine the validity of that allegation. If we have the 10 specificity it is very ' simple. Inspect the particular 11-l installation or look at a particular document but always go 12 l back to the installation; we try to do that.

13 i

Then that will determine the valfdity of that 14 '

. allegation.

Th'e question is, what we do after we ' determine 15 validity.

If it is determined to be adequately 16 substantiated then we try to determine what are the 17 ramifications of this particular allegation. What were the 18 generic implications?

Was any me.re problems like this on 19 the plant? "

. 20 MS. GARDE:

Before you go into that, when you 21 say if you determine that it was adequately substantiated, 22 '

now, what do you mean by the term " adequately substantiated"?

23 MR. CALVO The description or the 24 characterization of the allegation. For instance, the 25 allegation says, if the specificity will say cable XYZ was l

l i

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terminated improperly, we confirm that that particular 2

cable did not confirm with the drawings, we say it was an 3

allegation that -- it was adequately validated, adequately 4 substantiated. The allegation was correct. No further to 5 go into that if the specificity was there. '.

6 I must add, most of the allegations, they were .

7 mostly very general. There were very, very few -- count on 8

the fingers of y'our hand -- that had any specificity in it.

9 When you are confronted with that type of allegation, it 10 was a global allegation, I had to make a judgment where to 11 look to see whether it has some merit. I could not focus 12 on a.1y particular area. I must go to the plant and pick.an 13 I area of the plant where the greatest conglomeration of this 14 pa'rticular installation I could find.

15 In the electrical systems one place you found 16 the greatest concentration would be the cable room. In the 17 electrical termination we figured out the greater majority it of the cable termination was in those areas, and more 19 logically we will find the problems in there, and that's -

i 20 what we did. .

21 MS. GARDE: Let me restate what I think you said.

22 Where there was programmatic concerns raised with no 23 specific basis, cable number, drawing number, you would 24 design an inspection program which would give specific 25 information, come up with a set of examples or drawings to l

l -

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1 look at, then go look at those drawings to reach the 2 conclusion on the programmatic concern raised by the 'r ,:

3 alleger?

4 MR. CALVO: We call it approach to resolutions.

5 Those indicated how you go about tackling this particular

. 6 problem, what we should do with the allegation. Was it 7 specific or was it generic. We always try to go forward 8 enough, looking, reinspect enough to determine whether the 9 allegation, valid or not valid, it has some possible 10 generic implications.

11 MS. GARDE: Let's stick with a small number of 12 specific allegations. I want to make sure I understand.

13 Where you had, for example, cable termination numbers or 14 cable numbers, and I went and kicked the tires, as the term 15' ' has been used, and you found that that particular cable or .

16 cable termination was correct as you looked at it today or 17 July '84 when you looked at it, did you make any attempt to 18 determine if, between the time period when the allegation 19 was made, say the person lef t the site in January of '84,

, 20 and that is the extent of his knowledge, and July '84, when 21 you were looking at it, did you make an attempt to 22 determine whether between January and July those cables had 23 been corrected, NCRs had been written, the problem had been 24 found by the utility and adequately dealt with?

25 MR. CALVO: Not in the specific time frame. We ACE-FEDERAL. REPORTERS, INC.

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look at the installation up there at that time, could have 2

been done for the last 10 years. We look at that 3

information perta,ining.in that particular area we felt was 4 the problem area.

5 .

MS . GARDE : When you say a specific allegation

  • 6

. was not substantiated, that teen means that at the day you -

7 looked at it, that particular component was acceptable?

8 MR. CALVO: The particular component was 9 acceptable, in some cases.

In other cases I could not 10 i

reach that conclusion because it was not enough information 11 to reach that conclusion. In some cases I could say it.

12 l

If it was specific enough, told me exactly what it was, you

, 13 '

correct it.

14 ) MS. GARDE: That's the ones we're talking about 15 now, specific allegations?

16 MR. CALVO That's correct.

17 MR. NOONAN:

If I can just interrupt one second, 18 when the Staff looked at the allegation, "they made a 19 determination whether or not the allegation, they'could say '

20 that it was a -- they could validate the allegation. A lot "

21 of things could happen in the normal work process at the 22 plant that could have changed things from -- if there had 23 been a year span there could be a difference, so I guess 24-what I'm saying, normal work done at the plant could have

25 taken care of the some of the problems alleged by the time 1

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2 MS. GARDE:

I want to understand what his SSER 3 means. I already know what you think. Tony is going to 4 ask a clarifying question.

5 MR. ROISMAN:

I want to be clear about this. Do

, 6 I understand the way you did the investigation it is - -

7 possible that the following could happen: A worker sees a 8 condition in 1982 that is nonconforming. He attempts to 9 raise it with management and they reject it. Sometime 10 after that he leaves the plant site.- He eventually becomes 11 an alleger and his allegation shows up on your desk. After 12 the plant has been deemed to be completed, the defect is i

13 still there, still in the plant, still at the place he saw 14 it. But management learns that the alleger has gone to the l

15 . Nuclear Regul'atory Commission. Now they know that he is 16 pressing that issue.

17 They go in then, af ter all their inspection work 18 was presumably done, and they fix that problem.

You now -

19 show up sometime after June of '84, and y6u go to look, and

,, 20 you see the physical hardware, and it is not - no problem 21 anymore. That it is possible that at that point, you will 22 write on your sheet, this is not substa'ntiated, there isn't 23 a problem here, and never have gone back to find out in 24 paperwork whether the correction was made in the normal i

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applicant had represented that it had completed all of its 2

work on that component, and maybe only because of the 3

existence now of an external alleger. .

4 MR. CALVO: If we go back to the basis that you 5

have a specificity, the specificity was an NCR number, that "

6 would have forced me to go to the paperw'ork. If the 7

alleger was that pe'rson that you say that sometime in the 9

8 past brought up a particular problem that it was corrected, 9 then I think if the specificity was there on the paper, 10 whera that would force us to look into that.

11 If the problem was just the hardware item, no 12 paperwork tra11 for it, we did not go to verify the fact 13 i that, yes, it was truly an allegation corrected by 14 management because I would not know where to look at it. I 15 guess that particular aspect of it, I would consider that's 16 part of the QA/QC program. Looking at the programmatic 17 concerns, how things evolved throughout the plant. There 18 was not a way for me to recreate the crime and say, by the' ,

19 way, you are right, but they have corrected it.

  • If the 20 specificity -- .-

21 MR. ROISMAN: The normal course of the look at 22 allegations did not include an automatic look to see '

' 2.3 whether problems which the allegers, whether specific or 24 general, problems which the allegers said existed and which 25 on review of the hardware you found were not the re , there i

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wasn't an automatic, let's look and find out whether this 2

thing got fixed only in the last month o,e whether it got 3

fixed within a month of when the problem was raised and 4 this alleger just never knew it got fixed.

5 MR. CALVO:

, Even if we had done that it would 6 only apply to a handful of allegations because the 7 specificity was not there.

, There was no way I could 8

recreate that kind of trail.

9 MR. IPPOLITO: Isn't it a fact, unless one wants 10 to make the assumption that the applicant would totally s

11 violate all of his procedures, his QA/QC procedures, any 12 modification done on that plant would haves had a record of hB 13 !

some sort, regardless of whether it was done today, 14 .

yesterday, a week ago, a month ago, a year ago? Would 15 there not have been a record that a modificatio'n had been 16 performed and the time it was performed?

17 MR. CALVO Should have been. In the ideal

. 18 world, there should have been.

' ~

  • 19 MS. GARDE: My question assumed the paperwork '

20 was there.

It was more directed to when were corrections 21 made.

22 MR. IPPOLITO: I would be su'rprised then. You 23 did what you did, Jose. I would be surprised in looking 24 over that data, that control' package or data package, that 25 his people, and I know the people who were working on this, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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I would not have looked at the whole package, wou'Id not have 2

known that there were modifications done at a certain time.

3 MS. GARDE: You are going further than I think 4 my question is. When you say was adequately substantiated, 5 I wanted to understand that. -

6 MR. CALVO: The focus of my review was to 7 validate the allegation *, but I don't stop there. I went a 8 step further. I know that allegations reflecting this 9 issue, whether they were there or not. If it was not 10 validated, I would go the same way whether it was validated 11 or not validated. To satisfy myself if the allegacion was 12 an isolated case and also provide me the basis, what I will 13 tell the applicant to do to look in a more global way in 14 the plant.

15 MS. GARDE: In the case where you have specific

'16 information, component number, NCR number, you look at that 17 and everything looks all right, acceptable --

18 MR. CALVO With the standpoint of the NCR 19 paperwork I always double check by looking at the -

20 installation. I felt the paperwork was the QA/QC 21 responsibility. My job was the product. I want to be sure 22 that the product was okay regardless of'whether the 23 paperwork *was telling me one thing or the other.

24 MS. GARDE: Good. I'n' glad you clarified that.

25 If you had a specific allegation and you only had a handful ACE-FEDERAL REPOR17.RS, INC.

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of those with that type of specificity and it was not 2

substantiated as being a problem, you still expanded the 3 scope of that allegation.

So you looked at, for example, 4

cable numbers, if you had a particular cable number, and 5

that cable was acceptable, you still expanded the scope of 6

what you looked at so that you looked at other similar 7 cables. .

8, MR. CALVO: I did that on a general basis. Of 9 course there are ezceptions to the rule. It was a judgment 10 in one case to do it or not to do it. In most cases that's 11 what I did. I wanted to be sure I was looking ahead to the 12 future. Any new allegations in the future I wanted to be 13 sure I had the umbrella over these categories so I didn' t 14 : have to send the team back to Dallas again. We wanted to 15 be sure we put the arms around it. We spent enoUgh time 16 down there already.

17 MS. GARDE: Programmatic concerns. If you were 18 given a general allegation with not very much specificity, 19 you then developed a program to look at specific components, 20 documents which would tell you whether or not that 21 programmatic concern was substantiated; is that correct?

22 MR. CALVO You say programmatic concern, an 23 allegation has general connotations. Every time -- for 24 instance there were allegations on cable separation. '

25 Allegation says you have cable separation problems on the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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No other information than that in some cases. We

. 2 had a choice. We could go and pick up a little system in 3

the corner and find out that it may be representative of 4

the others, but on those we truly concentrated in three 5

areas, in the cable spreading room, in the control room and -

6 the shut-down panel. We thought if there were problems we

, 7 would find it there. We concluded there' were some generic -

8 implications, some cases we did find problems with generic 9 implications, but it was limited to it was my engineering 10 judgment and the people working for me at that time. It 11 was not a trail of a map that we draw, le.t's go from here 12 to there. It was just concentrated on the area, be sure to 1.3 pick up enough samples here and there and determine the 14 implications.

15 MS. GARDE: Going back to J-8 '- J-4. I want to 16 go through your process in this sentence because I have 17 other questions on generic implications and other things in 18 . the sentence. We've now gone over how they determined the 19 .

l validity of each technical concern or allegation; The next '

i 20 part of the sentence is "and assessed its safety significance." '

21 MR. CALVO Let me go back to determinations.

22 We can pick up any category and generalize it. A lot of 23 the allegations we had worsi in our judgment associated with 24

[ non-safety-related systems as defined in the FSAR. It also 25

. came to our attention that maybe the QC inspectors were

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I considering everything either safety or not safety. To 2

them it was safety so we felt they were treating them as 3

safety-related, the kind of quality must also be reflected

. 4 to be safety-related.

Every time, whether it was safety or 5

nonsafety, we also tried to 1cok at enough of those things 6

. around to find out there was not generic implications. Why 7 spend more on this.

We did what we could. We looked 8

farther into the safety-related even though there was no 9

allegation, and concluded whether it was safety or 10 nonsafety, that's what we ended up.

11 MS. GARDE: Where in the process did you assess 12 the safety significance of an allegation,'was it at the 13 beginning or at the end?

14 MR. CALVO: Neither, all through it. 'It was not 15

-- it was at the end when we write the conclusions. It was 16 when the process was going on if it was nonsafety-related, 17 although we agreed the QC inspector could not have made a 18 difference. I guess if it had been safety-related, maybe 19 my judgment, my generic implications, kind of arms around .

l '20 it maybe would have been a little bigger arms. I would say

  • ~ ' '

21 that's something to look further into it. Then we also 22 jump into safety-related features if we felt it was 23 . appropriate.

24 MR. IPPOLITO:

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significance at that specific or group of --

2 MR. CALVO:

It does, but it is a very general 3 form. It doesn't convey the kind of message.

Say the 4

significance is, say, something like the installation 5 appeared to be. undetermined. Doesn't add to the kind of 6 thinking we tried to do there. Most of the 7 characterization is not. Everything has safety

  • 8 significance.

The the degree is what we tried to determine 9

in relation to all the generic implications of the plant.

10 MS. GARDE: Going back to the general concerns 11 thnt didn't have a lot of specificity that we're talking 12 about, you used the term random, and am I right in assuming 13 ; that you are . net talking about statistical --

14 MR. CALVO: That would be with lawyers.

15 MS. GARDE: Is there any consistency to the '

16 number of documents you would look at to determine whether 17 a general concern was substantiated?

18 MR. CALVO To be honest I was more worried .

19 about things I found to be correct than not correct. Once

  • 20 I found problems with installations, then in my mind would .

21 think, well, appears that we have a problem. Appears it is 22 not an isolated problem. Appeared that the utility would 23 have to look into it. I would say that's on's for root

?.4 causes and for the generic implications. The ones I didn't 25 find problems I always worry, because I thought, do I look ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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137 1 at enough of them? Do I have to go further?

2 MS. GARDE:

I need to know how you reached the 3

conclusion, what was the basis for your conclusions not to 4 go further? What's your auditable trail?

5 MR. C.\LVO:

. I don't want to give you a litany.

6 You'want to ask me the ones that I found something wrong 7

with, whether I. felt it was enough that I didn't'have to go, 8 any further? I think the auditable trail, if I found 9

something wrong with a particular aspect, for instance 10 electrical separation we found problems, do you tr: .y -- it 11 is an auditable trail but the action required from the -

12 applicant is to inspect all the electrical separation for 13 f

that 'particular type of electrical system, that's better, 14 than-any auditable trail. The whole thing got to be 15 revisited in hundreds of numbers of magnitude.

i 16

, MS. GARDE: That's not my question. There are 17 things that you did not pursue, that you did not find a 18 problem with, and they kind of dead end. That's the end of

- - ~

19 it. -

20 MR. CALVO Right.

If I found a problem --

-~

21 MS. GARDE: What did you look at to make that 22 determination, how much?

23 MR. CALVO It's not numbers. Sometimes bias, 24 sometimes it is all contained in the SSERs. That's the 25 general auditable trail, and from here you go to the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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reference documents that we had as part of the allegations 2 package. That will support this auditable trail. Numbers 3 will mean nothing. wrfat Xreas they will look, in some 4

, cases you got numbers, but the question is whatever numbers 5

I give you, the important part is the actions that are '

I required. If I required no actions the question would be a 7 good question. But if I found problems with the separation 8

in the control room packages and I say - and that was 9

validated, I asked the applicant to reinspect every panel 10 for Comanche Peak, what hetter auditable trail do you need?

11 MR. ROISMAN: I want to ask you a question on 12 that issue. You seem to be making an assumption, sticking 13 i with your control panel, problem, that if you find a problem I

P4 l 1

in the control panel, asking the applicant to reinspect all 15 the control panels, reaches as far as you could conceivably 16 reach so there was no need to look farther yourself, but if

17 ' you don't know why t'here was a problem in the control panel, 18 how do you know making the applicant look at the control 19 packages would take care of the problems? If the why was -

20 equally applicable to noncontrol panel stuff, then your -

21 hundred percent look at the control packages would not have 22 made them look broad enough.

23 MR. CALVO You're right, but again I must look 24 at the allegations and put some boiands around them, you see.

25 I got.the allegation. I got problems with separation in c.+

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root cause why you had problems in there, therefore you 3 must have a problem somewhere else. The applicant could 4

look at this problem and determine whether he had problems 5

in the cable trays or whatever else, but as far as my scope 6

of work it was limited to the allegations having to do with 7 control panels.

8 MR. ROISMAN: There was an operating assumption 9

that, at least in your group, was used that the language of 10 the allegations as given you by the alleger defined the 11 outer limits of how far you would require the applicant to 12 go.

If the alleger had said, in every time the applicant 13 did an electrical inspe'etion of the plant, they disregarded 14 deficiencies if they would be time-consuming to repair.

15

.If that had been the allegation, and you had 16 gone to the alleger and said, how do I find that, and he 17 said, well, go to the control packages and you'll find 18 separation problems that never made it to NCRs, so you go 19 to the control panel, look and say, he's right, I found 20 these problems, but the scope of the allegation was that 21 they were dropping the ball on deficiencies all over, and 22 the one eiample that 'he happened to have for you was 23 control panel.

24 Would your operat'ing assumption make you then 25 require them tc reinspect the entire electrical system of ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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the plant or would you still have limited your requirement 2

to reinspect the control panels because.that was the only 3

specific area where you found the allegation confirmed?

4 MR. CALVO: No, I guess for instance, I think it 5 is yes and n'o. It goes back to the judgment, the .

6 significance of it. If I feel that the allegation provided .

7 me with some bounds, okay, normally we went outside the 8 bounds of the allegations to establish -- there was no 9 other problems in other areas of the plant.

10 The control room panels -- we don't ask them to 11 I fix the dentrol room panel, we ask them to do every panel 12 in the pinnt, so it will be enough from the standpoint of 13 . the argument, why get out of the control room because the 14 allegation did not tell me to go to the control room.

15 We went further. We felt if it was a problem in 16' a particular installation, we felt that maybe the same 17 problem will occur in other areas of the plant, so our 18 action was not only to concentrate on the enntrol room e it 19 is to go to all the panels 'in Comanche Peak and determine

  • 20 whether you had the same kind of a problem, so it was not -

21 what the allegation told us, it was what the judgment of 22 the group told us.

23 MR. ROISMAN: How do you know to stop at the 24 control panels all over the plant?' How do you know it l 25 should not have also included the cable spreading room or l

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how do you know it didn't include all of the --

2 MR. CALVO:

. It is a matter of experience, of 3 knowledge with this kind of installation. Had to do with 4 the separation between flexible conduits. We felt, based 5

upon what we foynd -- there were some drawings and

.6 specifications -- that the application of the regulatory 7 criteria was misinterpreted. We feel if it was 8

misinterpreted there, it may have been other places too.

9 Depends on the case in question.

10 i

MR. ROISMAN: The que'stion is, what's the basis 11 for deciding that if the procedure was misinterpreted for 12 let's say the ca'ble separation, if it was misinterpreted 13 for cable separation, it wasn't reflective of a failure 4

14 plant-wide to understand many different electrical 15 procedures, not just cable. How were you able to know that 16 you could -- that you had gotten your arms around the 17 entire problem with only the knowledge -- without ever 18 having answered the question, why did this procedure not 19 get understood?

How did you know whether'you had put your 20 arms around enough of the problems? #

21 MR. CALVO: If I understand you correctly, if 22 you had problems with the electrical separation procedures 23 why don't you have problems with the electrical term'ination 24

. procedures?

Every electrical NCR we had, that problematic 25 problem comes back to the QA/QC. If you look at the cable l

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separation, for instance, on page J-44, action to the 2

utility, evaluate the adequacy of the QA/QC program. This 3 .

is page J-44, has to do with the electrical category numb'er 4

3, electrical equipment separation, under actions required 5 by the utility. " Evaluate the adequacy of the QA/QC --

6 program as related to the deficiencies identified above to 7

establish root causes and appropriate corrective actions.

8 These actions shculd be integrated with other actions 9

addressed under the electrical instrumentation category 6, 10 electrical QC inspector training and qualifications and 11 QA/QC category 88 as built and QA/QC category 1, design 12

  • process."

The inference from one -- mistakes from one 13 procedure to the other, thac was feedback into the QA/QC, 14 the prog ammatic overview. What are the implications, what 15 else th'ey can make out of 'that based on the programmatic 16 assessment of the procedures?

17 MR. ROISMAN:

i Do you have a judgment as to how 18 you believe that process is supposed to be implemented?

19 Let's stick with the cable separation problems in control -

20 room panels.

At this point, I take it, you do not know why -

21 .

it was that the proper cable separation procedures were not 22 followed. All you know is 'that you looked at some and 23 found that they were not followed?

24 MR. CALVO: No.

In this particular case I know 25 why, but again it was not the why for me to resolve. I i

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know the why was a personal why, but I want to be sure that 2 that why was confirmed by the utility by looking further into 3 it. I know why. My personal opinion it was a 4 misunderstanding of the regulatory requirements versus the 5

electrical specifications as transcribed 1.nto the drawings.

6 That was our evaluation but there could have been other 7 reasons.

8 our scope was limited to identify those problems, 9

identify generic implications and then the monkey was back 10 on the utility's back for them to assess the root causes 11 and reevaluate whether we have generic implications.

, We 12 left it that way. That was the purpose of our review.

13 That was limited to do just that.

14  :

MR. ROISMAN: Would you consider it to be part 15 of an answer to the question why if it were true that the 16 reason for the misapplication of the regulatory requirement, 17 as put into the plant procedures, was an innate bias within 18 the plant procedure writers to always look for the least 19 aucunt of regulatory control? If that worn true, would 20 that be what you would call a "why did this happen"?

21 MR. CALVO: If I happened to know that. But how 22 can I ascertain by looking at the procedure whether that

, 23 was'a bias?

l 24 MR. ROISMAN I'w'asn't asking that. I was j 25 asking, is that the kind of answer which one ought to be ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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1 able to eithc r prove or negate in trying to answer the 2 question why? ,

3 __ --

MR. CALVO: Are you asking me for an opinion . ~

4 about that? .

5 MR. ROISMAN: Yes.

6 MR. IPPOLITO: An opinion of wrongdoing.

7 MR. CALVO Again, my review -- again, I'm not 8

trying to evade the answer -- concentrated into the work 9 product.

That was my main focus, was the work product.

10 Quality in the installation.

The installation hardware was 11 installed in accordance with requirements and I was using 12 the procedures available to how that'had been accomplished.

13 , Also we had the knowledge of what the requirements were so ,

14 we know what procedures were to be followed and translated 15 -into drawingn and in the installation. That was the focus.

16 Whether that could have been my opinion or not, I don't 17 know.

18 MR. ROISMAN: I'm not asking whether you hold 19 that opinion on the substantive issue, I'm just asking 20 whether in your mind if that were a fact, that the reason . 3 21 why the procedure got interpreted the way it got i 22 interpreted was because there was an innate inclination 23 built into the management attitude of the plant to look for 24 the minimum amount of regulatory control, is that the kind 25 of answer, if it is true, that you would expect to find in ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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a root cause investigation when you say to the utility, 2 find the root cause?

3 MR. CHANDLER: We're srvaying again.

4 MR. ROISMAN: We're right in the words of the 5 SSER.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the meaning 6 of the words in the SSER and I'm looking at words on J-44 7

which he read which include the word " root causes." If 8 you're not happy with the stipulation it is too late to 9 change them.

10 1

MR. CHANDLER: I would like to stick with the 11 ' stipulations.

12 MR. ROISMAN: It appears in paragraph F on page 13 J-44.

14 I MR. CALVO In this case, you're trying to 15 generalize. In this particular case, the hypothetical 16

, situation that you are setting up does not apply to this l'7 particular case because I was aware of the problems with 18 the interpretation of the regulations as reflected in the

.. 19 procedures in the internal memoranda. So- in this 20

,, particular case, that hypothetical situation that you are 21 trying to establish does not apply. That would be my 22 answer. If you're trying to say "what 'would you do," I 23 don't know. '

24 If I happened t'o' know that that was the case, 25 that I had printed as an allegation, I would have to look ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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1 further into it. You see, in this particular case the 2

hypothetical situation does not apply because I happen to ,!

3 know the root cause of that problem, so in essence I'm 4

asking the utility if I'm going to review their report and 5

evaluation of their root cause, I'm expecting to know what

  • 6 the root cause is for the particular case.

7 If you read the hypothetical situation, if I -

8 happen to know that that's the reason for it, then I need 9

more information to reach a conclusion. I cannot accept 10 that face value. I got to dig into it and reach a 11 conclusion and give you an opinion.

12 MR. ROISMAN: My question was, did that fact 13  !

exist, was that kind of thformation, would that fit -- if 14 it were true, would that fit what you call the root cause?

15 Is that the type of thing which could be a root cause?

16 MR. CALVO: Again, I'm not trying to evade the  !

i 17 question. i You're getting me outside the purpose of my 18 review, that is, to look at the quality of the installation. ,

19 You bring me to a different level that I have not had an '

20 opportunity to think about what I would do in those *- '

21 circumstances.

22 MR. IPPOLITO:

Using his typical example, he's 23 clearly indicating that you sense or smell or feel a degree  !

24 of improper action.

What you normally would do is to say 25 this feels like it is something that's wrongdoing, bring it ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. .

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24941.0 KSW 147 1 to my attention or Vince's attention. It then might be 2 referred to OI to look into.

3 MR. CALVO:

You can go further than that. If l

4 the situation is there, it wouldn't come to me because the 5

, way the system was set up that had been taken care of. I'm 6

here nice and clean, looking at the quality of the 7 installation. It will never reach my level because I only

.,, 8 look at the technical merits of the allegation, not if there was wrongdoing.

9 That's somebody else's 10 responsibility on that level.

11 MR. ROISMAN: Let me ask Mr. Ippolito a question.

12 l Is it' your understanding that to the extent that the root 13 l cause of a particular problem when traced all the way back 1

14 was that management had an attitude about safety . that was ,

15 not to do what the regulations required down the middle but 16 to try to get by as cheaply as possible, that if that were 17 the root cause, that that's a root cause which would be of 18 interest and the investigation would 'tw being done at OI 19 and not by the technical review team at all?

20 MR. IPPOLITO:

, , , You are coming at it rather 21 strangely.

We went out and looked at a number of 22 allegations. Some were proven to be co' erect.

We asked the 23 licensee, go and determine the root cause. We expect it.

24 Were they not 5054 floaters?

25 MR. CHANDLER: I don't think so.

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MR. IPPOLITO: We expect them to do exactly that, 2 find the root cause. If the root cause happens to be that 3

someone in their organization did something that he wasn't 4

supposed to, I expect to know about it or the NRC should .

5 expect to know about it. We are not defining root cause.

  • 6 We're not limiting it. They have to go find out what's .

7 wrong, to our, the Staf f's satisf action.

8 MR. CALVO: If you take the technical input, 9

whatever the determination was made, and combine those 10.

together, if you find out that it is valid, that wrongdoing, 11 then yes, for the sake of the discussion, that should be 12 considered the root cause, but I'm saying within my scope, 13 the only questions I'm prepared to give you a truth' answer 14 for is those I'm familiar with and those are only related 15 to technical merits.-

16 MR. ROISMAN: So in other words, your own 17 capabilities, your own competence really stops at the point i

18 that the root cause stops being completely confined in the ,

19 ~

technical area and enters the more non-technical area of '

20 management attitude or harassment, intimidation, or ,

21 falsification of documents or any of those kinds. It is 22 te111ng me, I can tell you what failed,'but I can't tell 23 you if you are talking about -- and why it failed 24 technically, but I can't tell you why it failed if you talk 25 about human failure.

i l

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What was the underlying allegation 2

to come to me to evaluate the technical merits? Whatever

~'

3 happened here, that part didn'.e come to me. The merits 4 only come to me. That has been the general rule.

I'm sure e 5 I had followed the thing up, maybe I don't know if it is to

. 6 the point that I got involved into the area. That could 7 have been a mistake.

. . That wasn't the intention. That was-

, 8 the way we perceive ourselves to do che job, just the 9 technical merits.

10 MR. IPPOLITO:

I'm assuming what you say by that

, 11 question, if Jose was doing an inspection and found or

i 12 suspected there was something wrong, in other words a 13 deliberate fals'ification or what have you, is that what 14 you're saying?

15 MR. ROISMAN: No, I'm assuming he has no 16 particular suspicions. I'm saying if you take any of the 17 examples as they actually appear in SSER 7, you can 18 postulate the possibility that the reason, the real reason f 19 why the condition existed was something that gota back to, i .

20 for lack of a better term, management attitude, an approach 21 to safety that was different, and what I'm understanding

! 22 '

Mr. Calvo as saying is, if that's true, the scope of his

. 23 investigation stops before he would ever know that answer.

l 24 MR. CALVO But also provides an input for 25 somebody else's decision, that conclusion.

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MR. ROISMAN: Okay. I 2

MS. GARDE: Mr. Calvo, I would like to continue 1 i

3 this line of questioning with a specific example. Let's l

4 take allegation number AQE-1. On page,J-19 the ,

5 ,

characterization of the allegation is that an electrical '

6 inspector was pressured not to write nonconformance reports .

.7 in several instances. In one case the QC supervisor .

8 instructed him not to write an NCR for control room cables 9

removed out of proper documentation. Now, let me ask a 10 preliminary question.

There are a number of words that to 11 me flag wrongdoing. Was there referral of this allegation l 12' to OI?

Is there anything in here -- I read through the 13 allegation disposition. It doesn't say anything about that.

14 -

MR. NOONAN: We made sure anything that should 15 be referred to OI was referred to OI.- Everything in this 16 SSER that might involve OI work, that's my knowledge.

17 MS. VIETTI-COOK: Can I input to this? When we 18 first pulled these allegations together, the way that we 19 did it was we asked OI, give us all the OI reports that you '

20 have done to date. Dick Wessman and I reviewed those OI .

21 reports, and they had completed their work. OI had 22 completed their work as far as wrongdoing was concerned.

23 We looked at it from the technical standpoint. What could f

24 this mean to the plant? What could what OI hasn't covered 25 mean to this plant?

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standpoint and that's a big bulk of the allegations that 2 came from OI reports. .

3- MS. GARDE: This may have in fact come from an 4 OI report.

5 MS. VIETTI-COOK:

, I can tell you it did.

6 MR. QALVO The intimidation panel on a search 7

for the conclusions went through the allegations and 8

contacted every group leader and determined where was the 9 technical merits of that allegation.

10 MS. GARDE: When did you and Dick do that? When 11 did you do that review of the OI reports?

12 l MS. VIETTI-COOK:

Prior to the technical review 13 team being joined together. This was the very beginning.

14 When we compiled the list of allegations we read OI reports.

15 We looked at prior region 44 inspection reports, hearing 16 records --

17 MS. GARDE: This is before you got to the site

~

18 in July?

19

, MS, VIETTI-COOK: Right, and we put together 20 files t. tat put maybe pages of the transcripts in the file 21 that gave them, you know, the words of what the allegation 22 was.

23 P.R. NOONAN: Since the SSER has been written, 24 where the Staff might have said this has been turned over 25 to OI, I made sure it had been. We have gone through that ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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2 MS. GARDE: In theory at least, all these 3

technical allegations that have wrongdoing flag words in 4

them, if you will, there should be a conclusion and a -

5 response by OI on the wrongdoing issue?

  • 6 MR. NOONAN: In general, the OI report should .

7 address that issue. Did we miss some? Probably.

8 MR. IPPOLITO: Wait a minute. There either has 9 or there is, is what they are saying.

10 MS. GARDE: Has been.or will be or is now, but I 11 h'aven't seen it?

12 MR. IPPOLITO: Right.

13 MR. ROISMAN:

i Mr. Noonan, when you get the 14 report back from OI, if OI reports back and says, yes, this 15 person was pressured, it is correct, there was wrongdoi~ng, i

16 does that get fed back into a determination of how the root 17 cause investigation is supposed to *ake place?

18 MR. NOONAN: The way the process should work, if 19 that determination is made by OI, depending on wiiere it '

20 sits, it would go back to the technical group. If it .

21 hasn't been incorporated into the program plan, it will be, 22 by some mechanism.

23 MR. ROISMAN: You mean to make sure that the 24 look for root causes and for generic implications now takes 25 i into account at least one of the deficiencies that ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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Mr. Calvo had determined technically had merit, now appears 2

to have been caused at least at one level by pressure as 3

opposed to caused by bad training or an inspector who was 4 an agleep or some other cause system.

5 MS. COOK But the bulk of these, OI had already

. 6 done their work. Then we picked up the technical part of 7 what they had already done. When we found something that 8 OI maybe hadn't done yet, we turned that over to them.

9 MS. GARDE: Now if you turn to pagw J-49. You 10 find that AQE-1 becomes part of a large category of 11 allegations detailed on that page. Your resolution of .

12 these allegatio'ns and what you did to determine whether or j 13 not there was validity, safety significance, generic 14 implications is then supposedly detailed on this page, 15 right, on these pages?

16 MR. CALVO Let me explain a little bit.

If you 17 i

look at the table, I did a little different than maybe 18 everybody else, but it will give you an idea to understand 19 how these allegations work. J-19 gives you the allegations 20 and give you the categories and sometimes one number before 21 the other number. The category with the allegation is in 22 the first number to your left. As the ' allegation has other 23 ramifications to other areas, other categories, I put it in i

24 the next number to the right.

25 so AQE-1 only looks like.it is addressed to I

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category number 5 but keep'in mind this is nonconformance 2 repcets. This is just a quick look, a limited look at some 3

of the implications of tue nonconformance with the 4

electrical installing, but mostly for the purpose to relate .

5 it back to support up the installation itself. As you see

  • 6 at the end, this is terminated that -- wait until you see -

7 what the QA/QC has done before an overall conclusion is t 8

j reached on nonconformance.

9 So in that context you must look at AQE-1.

10 Based on what they say, I could not do very much with it.

11 It is very general, very global and doesn't tell me exactly 12 what to look for.

13 MS. GARDE: Let me stop you there. I would like 14 a specific answer if you can give one.

J If you can't just 15 because you can't remember, just clarify that. In this 16 case, either did you or would ycu have' gone back and talked 17 to this electrical QC inspector? Would you have 18 interviewed hba to datermine what more details he could 19 give you about that allegation? ~

~

20 MR. CALVO I tried. I can not give you a -

21 specific.

g I tried to talk to everyone who came up with an 4

22 allegation. I tried to talk to everybod' y about the 1 -

I i 23 foundation of these allegations. If it was available and t i

24 they were willing, yes, I would ask them, not only do I 25 talk to him to tell me more about it, but when I write the l '

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SSERs I say this is what I did with the allegations. It 2 has to do with, in essence, if I'm to give credit to an 3 AQE-1 alleger, a lot of this will be found in the 4

electrical, you may have contributed to some of the things

, 5 we found because it could have been anyone..

. 6 Maybe we found NCRs wrong, maybe it was .because 7 of what this person said in here. If we go through most of.

8 them, probably some of the things we found for one also may 9 apply to this one, so it is. very difficult because of the

10 generalization of the allegation whether you had answered 11 or talked to him, we did try to talk to everybody.

12 MS. VIETTI-COOK Were you referring to AQE-417 13 MR. CALVO AQE-1.

14 '

MR. NOONAN: Let's take a 10-minute break. .

15 (Recess.)

16 MR. NOONAN: Let's go back on the record.

17 MR. CALVO I want to say something for the 18 record. You asked me a' question.

We had contacted the allegers responsible for AQE-1.

19 We tried 'to contact him on 20 January 29, 1985 and were unable to contact him. That's 21 all the information that I had.

22 MS. GARDE: Okay, I'm going to continue en page

, 23 J-49 for a couple of minutus. We were talking about AQE-1 1

24 as an example of the process ~ that you followed in making

' 25 certain decisions and evaluations. Now, the list of.the 1

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allegations that are in item number 4, I assume coordinate 2

with the numbers that are given in item number 2. Is that 3 a correct assumption? These allegations as listed will -

4 match with the numbers?

  • 5 MR. CALV0: .

Right, right.

6 MS. GARDE: When you go into the description of -

7 how you responded to all of these various allegations,

  • 8 which were characterized as the validity of the generation 9

and disposition of electrical nonconformance reports was 10 suspect. That's how you characterize all'these different 11 allegations.

You indicate you pulled a random sample of 75 12 electrical NCRs and conducted numerous interviews with QA 13 and QC engineering personnel. When I, go to the documents 14 which hopefully will be made available, will the 75 15 electrical NCRs and notes of your interviews be in that 16 material?

17 MR. CALVO I don't know offhand. Sometimes we 18 did keep the NCRs. Sometimes we just went to the vault, .

19 would look at the NCRs and put them back and did'n' t make '

20 copies of them.

{ Sometimes we don't note it.

21 MS. GARDE: You may or may,not be able to 22 l

, reconstruct what you looked at to form the basis of your 23 opinion.

24 MR. CALVO: Offhand, I don't know, okay?

25 MS. GARDE: Also says that you reviewed 25 of l

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the 75 NCRs to determine if the QC inspectors who closed 2 ou'. the NCRs were qualified to do so. How did you go about 3 doing that? How did you look at their qualifications?

4 MR. CALVO:

In essence the same as what we did 5

in the electrical instrumentation number 6, but again we 6

were trying to handle this particular allegation. I

~

7 believe these particular allegations are coupled with the 8 other categories in the SSER. I was trying to find out 9

AQE-4, if that was coupled with something else. Only 10 belongs to this one so it was not coupled to that one, but 11 we conducted this because the same person who did this did 12 the QC inspection certification for the 25 cases, but keep 13 in mind, I don't,know what your interdst in this is, goes 4

14 ,

back to the conclusion where AQE-6 is all extensive. We 15 required that all the electrical QC inspectors' files be 16 assessed and the impact on plant safety will be determined, 17 so we have to be revisiting this, regardless of the outcome 18 of the 25.

~

I 19 MS. GARDE: You mean that the QA/QC --

20

,. , MR. CALVO Not in this case. In this case I 21 didn't pass it to the QA/QC. In this case we kept it -- we 22 set forth actions based on the electrical QC inspector, .

23 highlighted generic implications to others. That will be 24 forwarded and addressed in the QC training.

25 MS. GARDE: You are jumping a little bit ahead.

i l

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It looks to me as if this was not referred to the QA/QC.

2 MR. CALVO: I agree, but the subject matter is 3 the same '.s what I'm saying. Maybe it has not been 4 referred but the subject matter is the same.

5 MS. GARDE: The subject matter is referred to

  • 6 QA/QC7 7 -

MR. CALVO: AQE-4 is characterized by the 8

) closing out of NCRs by qualified inspectors. I'm saying, 9

the technical review team found that in all 25 cases, the 10 QC electrical inspectors were qualified. Their 11 certification files were current ACE-4. In the 25 out of 12 the 75 cases we selected -- but again that problem doesn't 13 go away because we made a conclusion. You still have the 14 overall conclusion of the electrical and inspection 15 qualifications,' training and qualifications where we make a 16 more f ar reaching conclusion where yes, you have problems 17 with them. So you say here we miss it because we selected '

18 25, but here we caught it, and the conclusion is that you ,

19 .

must ascertain the quality, the qualifications and training -

20 of all QC electrical inspectors irregardless of where they

  • 21 found it.

22 MS. GARDE: How does that resolve the question 23 -

raised in AQE-1, that an electrical inspector was pressured 24 not to write nonconformance reports in several instances?

25 How does resolving AQE -

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24941.0 KSW 159 1 MR. CALVO That's not.

2 -

MS. GARDE Okay, according to the chart in 3 appendix P, AQE-1, -2, -3 are not referred, and there's a~~

4 lot of them that are not, but that is not referred to QA/QC.

5 MR. CALVO Everything in this allegation

, 6 category, not the individual allegations, the whole

~

7 electrical'nonconformance activities, I refer to QA/QC.

8 Look on page J-53.

9 MS. GARDE: The' whole category is?

10 MR. CALVO: Regardless of what the fund was.

11 MS. GARDE: When you referred this whole 12 category to the QA/QC part of the technical review team, is 13 it your understanding that they would come to understand 14 why this happened? ~

15 MR. CALVO No, to pick up the conclusions in 16 the findings and couple it with -- arrive at a

! 17 programmatical assessment. That also is coupled eventually 18 with B, so if you look on $3, really, you have the QC 19 inspection, category C, QA/QC, that's how the whole 20 electrical was done. In fact, in most cases, because it 21 was just a little input to the overall programmatic, input 22 from the mechanical and the electrical, and the QA/QC would 23 put that together and come up with the overall conclusions.

24 MS. GARDE: I wa'nt to repeat what we think you 25 are saying.

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24941.0 K5W 160 1 MR. ROISMAN: Whatever extent the AQE number 1 2

is investigated, it is investigated either in an OI report 3

. or it is investigated in your evaluation, and there's no ,

4 further investigation of it that you are aware of t. hat's .

5 done by the Staff, but the conclusions of those 6

investigations are passed on to QA/QC for SSER 11 to .

7 determi'ne what, if any, broader implication should be drawn 8

from what we have already found out to have yet another 9 investigations is that correct?

10 MR. CALVO: That's correct.

11' MS. GARDE: Let's go back, then, to the i

12 beginning.

13 MR. NOONAN:

  • i . -

You understand now when you talk 14 ab.'ut the OI things, that I am in the process of looking to 15 make sure that anything in the SSER, we thought there was 16 an OI action that indeed was communicated to OI and that 17 process is ongoing. That's not part of the technical 18 review team. .

19 MR. ROISMAN: Is there supposed to be~ a place 20 where all that will be ultimately drawn together?

21 Let's t .' -

say you find 15 percent of the items that OI had previously '

\

22 looked at, you now think in light of what Mr. 'Calvo and tho' 23 other people did that they ought to look again, and you ask .

24 them to look, and they complete th~at and all the other  ;

25 ongoing looks and there are a whole bunch of conclusions ACE.FEDERA1. REPORTERS, INC.  !

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24941.0 K8W 161 l from that. Is there a place where all that gets fed back 2 into some future SSER or will each stand by themselves to 3 be. evaluated, not in some single Staff document?

4 MR. NOONAN: Talking about the technical parts?

5 MR. ROISMAN:

, , The consequences of the OI look at

. 6 wrongdoing.

~

7 MR. NOONAN:

That's a separate office. I can't 8 really say. When their results come out, I think right now 9 all that I'm aware of -- hang on a second.

10-1 (Discussion off the record.)

~11 MR. NOONAN: There are only a few reports that 12 are not out now, so the technical review team probably had 13 access to that kind of information. Is there a single 14 point that it comes together? I don't know y.et. I don't 15 kno'w. -

, 16 MR. ROISMAN: The question was, how does the 17 technical review team -- or let's deal with the past.

How 18 did the technical . review team integrate into any 19 conclusions that are reached in the SSERs' prior 20 determinations made by OI, beyond looking at any technical 21 probleas OI may have identified that you have not 22 pre'iously loo.ked at, and let's say OI concluded that this

. 23 person got harassed and intimidated by this person. Was 24 that integrated into --

25 MR. NOONAN: Not in the technical review team, ace. FEDERAL RiPORTERS, INC.

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2 MR. ROISMAN: Just stands for use by the 3

licensing board or.any party to the proceeding for whatever 4

purpose they want to make of it, not in something that the -

5 technical review team is supposed -to do?

  • 6 MR. NOONAN: That's correct. .

7 MR. IPPOLITO: Excuse me, I have to add to this.

8 The normal functions, or the normal interface rather 9

between OI and the program officers, particularly NRR, is 10 that a suspicion or allegation of wrongdoings is provided 11 to OI usually'through the regional administrator or through 12 Dirks. He performs -- OI performs an evaluation and '

13

  • submits a report to The - my recollection is to the 14 applicable regional. administrator -- Bill Dirks and I think 15 there are three copies. Anyway, if the conclusion of the 16 OI report is that there is wrongdoing is confirmed, it now f

l 17 becomes a matter for INE or the region to take action 18 against the licensee .and/or the person who does the 19 wrongdoing. That's the wrongdoing part, enforcement action.

20 MR. NOONAN: I'm referring to the technical .'-

21 review team now.

~

22 MR. IPPOLITO: That's the wr'ongdoing end of it, 23 handled through enforcement action's. What we have done, 24 i

and since the - as Annette said, there was a large number 25 OI reports, 10, 12, done when we first came aboard and we l

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l extracted from those reports the technical part of. it, so 2 the total picture is being resolved. There have been some 3 enforcement actions .resulting from OI reports form the 4 technical things that have now been addressed in the

, 5 technical review team reports. There's nothing left that's

. 6 not done.

7 MR. ROISMAN: That's only if y'ou use what 8

appears to be the operating assumption that you're using, 9 which is that wrongdoing is always limited to whatever OI 10 finds someone did wrong and there's never a generic 11 implication of wrongdoing. What you're saying is that you 12 never assume a generic implication to a wrongdoing finding.

13 You never assume that anything else in the wrongdoing 14 example that OI confirmed has affected any other part of 15 the planer is that right? -

16 MR. IPPOLITO: The wrong - no, no. The 17 wrongdoing itself - and that's what you determine, a 18 degree of the enforcement action. If it is pervasive you 19 will see a large enforcement action and it will be so

, , , 20 written up and so cited and they will be so fined.

21 MR. ROISMAN: But the scope of the wrongdoing is 2.2 limited by the allegation'that the OI p'eople are looking at.

. 23 MR. IPPOLITO: Whatever it takes to identify

24 that there is wrongdoing ati (the site. It all depends on 25 what the item is. '

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1 I 4941.0 SW 164 l MR. ROISMAN: What I'm trying to understand is 2 when you were incorporating into the orginal technical 3

review team the results of OI investigations, some of which  !

4 had findings of wrongdoing and proposed fines were issued .

5 or are still outstanding with regard to that, the technical -

6 review team did not use those as generic implication .

7 indicat' ions to define the scope of how far you would look 8 to see how bad the problem was.

9 MR. NOONAN: Let me interrupt here a second.

10 I'll take an example. .If there was a wrongdoing finding by 11 OI that says a QA inspector falsified records, it would be 12 our responsibility-to see what that QA inspector did to 13 find out how that work was affected. That's what the 14 ~

process calls for. That's what we're doing. .

i 15 MR. ROISMAN: What do you do with a finding that 16 the inspector was harassed by a high level supervisor? Do 17 you look ac all the people that high level supervisor 18 supervised to determine whether their work was also 19 affected? -

20 MR. NOONAN: Our process calls for us to look at +

21 the quality of that plant. How was the quality of that 22 plan't affected by that intimidation. That's what the 23' process calls for us to do.

24 MR. SEAO: The question'is, how did you handle 25 the OI findings on Messrs. Dunham and Atchesen?

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24941.0 KSW 165 l MR. NOONAN: I can't remember Dunham. I think 2

you need to ask the particular group leader.

3 MR. ROISMAN:

And Mr. Atcheson?

4 MR. NOONAN: Mr. Shao. He would look at those 5

particular allegations, technically.

. 6 MR. ROISMAN: Both those gentlemen are public.

7 We can speak without fear.

8 MR. CHANDLER: We have made commitments to 9

various individuals not to disclose their names, 10 irrespective with the arrangement you have with them.

11 MR. NOONAN: I do have at least verbal promises 12 we would not use people's names.

13 FROM THE FLOOR: Can we strike the names from 14 l the transcript?

15 MR. CHANDLER: . Off the record.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 MS. GARDE: I'm not going to ask anymore 18 questions

  • on AQE-1. Let's go back to the beginning. I'm s

19 still on the first sentence on J-4. We go't up through

. 20 potential generic implications.

The next phrase is "any 21 indication of potential management breakdown."

Now, how 22 did you determine that, whether there was indication of 23 potential management breakdown?

24 MR. CALVO: I think I based -- I don't remember 25 that I addressed that subject, but I believe that the SSER ACE-FEDERAI. REPORTERS, INC.

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actions provided an input to the QA/QC to factor this into 2 the overall programmatic assessment. There is nothing in 3

here that addresses the potential management breakdown. It , l 4

is just the to:hnical output, the conclusions and the .

5 findings in the referral to the QA/QC for further looking

  • 6 into which may presumably address the management breakdown. ~

7 MS. GARDE': Mr. Calvo, on page 11 and 12, J-ll 8

and 12, you have the scope of concerns and allegations by 9

category, and categcry 6 on page J-12 is management 10 attitude.

11 MR. CALVO: You're getting into the area of the 12 test program, group summary, and I'was not the group leader 13 for that particular revin. .

14 MS. GARDE: Who was?

15 MR. CALVO: Keinig was responsible. Richard 16 Keinig.

17 MS. GARDE: Is he region 4?

18 MR'. CALVO: Region 1.

19 MR. CHANDLER: I think it was our understanding

  • 20 that you didn't have questions in this area. "

21 MS. GARDE: No.

22 MR. CHANDLER: Misunderstanding?

23 MS. GARDE: We asked for someone who was in 24 charge of each SSER and we though'~that t they would be able 25 to answer the questions contained in that SSER.

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1 MR. NOONAN: Let's go off,the record.  !

t 2

(Discussion off the record.)

3 MS. GARDE: Any, indications of potential 4

management breakdown, to the extent of your work in SSER 7, 5

. will have been kicked over to QA/QC7

, 6 MR. CALVO: That's correct.

~

7 MS. GARDE: Did you make conclusions on 8 i management breakdown and give Mr. Livermore your opinions 9

on where you saw potential management breakdown from your 10 SSER, or did you just give him the conclusions of your 11 individual inspections and investigations?

12 i MR. CALVO: No, I don't believe I had done that, 13

, because it would have been a limited conclusion based on a 14 very limited review I had done with the electrical i

15 allegations so it was hard to see how I reached that J

16 conclusion based on the investigations I did.

17 MS. GARDE: You relied on Mr. Livermore to reach ~

18 conclusions on potential management breakdown based on your 19 factual findings? -

I l

20 MR. CALVO:

_ When you read potential management 21 breakdown on this SSER number 1, I think the review 22 methodology may be applicable to all of' them and may not be 23 applicable to me because of the limited scope of the 24 allegation.

Whether he h'as done it or not, SSER number 1, 25 that subject is addressed in there, if I remember.

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14941.0 CSW 168 1 MS. GARDE: Page J-8, under 3.1.3, the second 2 paragraph, do you see that?

3 MR. CALVO: Yes.

4 MS. GARDE: You say that "The generic .

5 implications of the findings and the root cause of each -

6 situation as appropriate are also presented." Now, when 7

did you'-- is it through this docume'nt that you are sending -

8 your conclusions to the applicant?

9 MR. CALVO That's correct.

10 MS. GARDE: Okay, and before this there was the 11 letter, which I think was the September 18 letter.

12 MR. CALVO: Also brings up the subject 'the root 13 causes and generic implications to the applicant.

14 MS. GARDE: Now the bottom paragraph of this 15 I page gives a list of concerns raised by allega'tions which 16 either could not be substantiated or have no safety 17 significance with respect to the items identified. We 18 discussed befora the definition of " substantiated." We've 19 talked about safety significance. You had a clarifier on

  • l 20 the end of this which says "with respect to the items

{ -

21 identified.' Now --

22 MR. CALVO: Talking about the last paragraph on 23 page 87 24 MS. GARDE: Yes.

25 MR. CALVO That's right. .

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24941.0 KSW 169 l MS. GARDE: Let me take, for example, regarding 2 the installation of electrical cables. You had an allegation regarding installation of electrical cables.

3 I

4 think there may have been more than one in that area.

5 MR. CALVO: Yes.

Go ahead.

6 MS. GARDE:

If your conclusion was that there 7

. was no " safety significance, was it limited only to those 8 items that you specifically look at there that are 9 identified in the SSER?

10 MR. CALVO:' That's correct. And also to 11 whatever generic umbrella we put around them. Everything 12 is limit'ed to the allegations a.nd the umbrella we put 13 ; around them.

I 14 MS. GARDE: The size of the umbr'ella should be .

15 i i

in this and supported by documents?

16 MR. CALVO: That's correct.

17 MR. ROISMAN: On page J-9 at the end of the 18 first paragraph, you indicate that the E&I group concludes

19 that there are concerns about the adequacy of TUEC's, at 20 the end of the first paragraph. The same statement appears s

21 at the end of the third paragraph. Now, just so we will ~~ --

. 22 know, are all the bases for that conclusion contained in or 23 referenced in this SSER?

24 MR. CALVO: That's correct.

25 MR. ROISMAN: Did you make any determination not ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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revealed in the SSER as to why these inadequacies in the QC 2 inspection program existed? .

3 MR. CALVO:

No. Again, my review scope is to .

4 assess the quality of the electrical installation as 5 defined by the allegations in the umbrella provided to '

6 establish generic implications. If we found deficiencies 7

in thos~e areas, we referred the matter to the QA/QC' group .

8 for further look into the programmatic consequences of it; 9 so all this in here, all he does is summarize in each 10 category of SSERs Jose's - this is another input for QA/QC 11 for them to reach the overall assessment.

12 MR. ROISMAN: At the bottom of J-9, you do offer 13 your own at least tentative generic implication finding '

14 with respect to the inadequate qualification of some 15 electrical QC inspectors; right. ~

16 MR. CALVO That's correct, but I'm also 17 referring to QA/QC category 4, training and qualifications.

18 MR. ROISMAN: So sometimes when it seemed to be 19 fairly obvious that there was a programmatic or generic -

20 implication, you did not feel constrained and were .

21 perfectly willing to say so, even though you were then 22 going to leave the final word to the,OA/QC people? .

23 MR. CALVoi That's correct.

24 MR. ROISMAN: You were not attempting to, in

'25 reaching that conclusion, define the scope of what the eY ACE-FEDERAI. REPORTERS, INC.

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generic failure might be nor the scope of what the root' 2 cause mighti be. ,

3 MR. CALVO: Agreed.

4 MR. ROISMAN: What you tried to do in the SSER 5

. is wherever you had enough information that you felt like 6

. you could articulate an opinion that would be useful, you 7 gavg it'.

8 MR. CALVO: That's right.

9' MR. ROISMAN:

If you didn't think you had enough 10 and your mandate didn't call for you to get that additional 11 information you referred it over to somebody else and said, 12 you find out what the generic implication of this might be.

13 I don't have an opinion.

14 i MR. CALVO: This is my findings, couple it with '

15 yours and you come up with an overall assessment. That was 16 the way the technical groups were coupled with the QA/QC 17 group. That's the way it was.

18 MR. NOONAN: I would like to clarify something.

19 You are hearing Staff say this appears . in ,the QA/QC SSER or 20 it has been turned over to QA/QC. The process we went 21 through, the information that Jose would have had that'we 22 would call QA/QC implications was given to Livermore to see 23 whether or not they might affect his conclusions, not that 24 he would go in and reinvestigate anything at this point in 25 time. They were there to see what impact they would have ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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on the work he did and his conclusions and to tabulate them 2 in the SSER. That would be given to the applicant and the 3

applicant told to address these things.

4 MR. ROISMAN: I can assume tomorrow when we get 5

to Mr. Livermcre, your answer that you take ther conclusions -

6 from the other SSERs at face value without independent 7

assessment, the answer will be yes, I took them at face '

8 value without independently investigating that?

9 MR. LIVERMORE: Ask me that tomorrow.

10 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Calvo, on page J-10, the next

. 11 to last paragraph, you have this statement: "The E&I group 12 conclusion that the problems found with electrical <:able 13 terminations, electrical equipment separation and cont-rol 14

  • room ceiling fixture supports, together with the findings 15 concerning inadequate training and qualification of 16 electrical QC inspectors are an indication of programmatic 17 weakness in QC." First question: What does the phrase 18 " programmatic weakness" in QC mean?

What are you taeaning 19 to convey with that statement? -

20 MR. CALVO: Okay, " programmatic" indicates that _

21 it may be - that based on the concerns highlighted by the 22 .

allegations, appears as an indication that it may be some 23 problems, maybe not only with these things that we found '

24 wrong; maybe there are some others- that may also be wrong, 25 so he may cut on the wide access.

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1 MR. ROISMAN: Are you suggesting that by the use 2

of the term " programmatic" that they could appear in every 3

part of QC where those kinds of considerations would be 4 relevant?

5 MR. CALVO: I'm trying to remember what I did 6 mean by putting that in there.

. It indicated that in 7

essence' the electrical system in my opinion did not have a 8

clean bill of health yet but looks like further looking into 9 these areas and the implications in other areas more would 10 be ascertained to determine whether the concerns 11 highlighted by the allegations are isolated cases or they 12 cascaded into the other areas. I'.m not saying that it is, 13 ; I'm not saying that it is not. I'm saying it is an 14 indication of it. The question is that we need an answer 15 to find'out how far-reaching it is. That's.what I mean.

16 MR. ROISMAN: Did you form any opinions or do 17 you have any now as to what the process is that would have 18 to be undertaken to answer the question which you are in effect posing by that statement?

19 20 MR. CALVO: Every SSER in each category provides l

21 certain actions. Those actions, how those actions are 22 going to be accomplished and the feedback resulting from 23 -thoto actions will give the Staff a clue whether this l 24 statement can be supported or not supported. We have not l

l 25 gone quite far enough. We raised the flag at this point.

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Th'ose actions, the implementation of those actions will 2

determine whether this is just an isolated case given by 3

the allegations or it has more far-reaching, you know, .

4 far-reaching --

5 MR. ROISMAN :- In this document you have '

6 .

recommended what courses of action you think need to be 7 taken.

  • 8 MR. CALVO: That's correct.

9 MR. ROISMAN: Can you direct me to those that 10 you think are the ones that particularly need to be taken 11 in order to answer this concern?

12 MR. CALVO: I guess you can look at each item if 13 you want it.

, I guess the one that seems to be -- we can go 14 to page 31. I guess we found some problems with the '

15 terminal locks and we want to take and -- we have to 16 evaluate and find out' which other problems are in the area 17 and if we found other problems in addition to those we are 18 building this case, and we go back to Number 2 and got some 19 problems in here with butt splices. And I guess ~the butt 20 splices brings another concerns the question is how many '

21 more of those things do you have? If it is 1Laited, the 22 action by the applicant indicated that it is only limited 33 to those areas in the control panel where we found the butt  !

24 splices, we found additional splices in the cable traces, 25 that will have far-reaching ramifications.

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1 So the actions are taken, you build your case into

. 2 the programmatic problems where you have more problems than 3

was expressed in the SSER or are you going to stop there.

l 4 i We're trying to establish whether it is an isolated case

,' ~

5 that goes down deep instead of wide.

6 MR. ROISM'AN:

, Looking on J-31 as illustrative, 7 at 6 E, is there someplace else where you have articulated' 8 what your criteria are for the applicants to evaluate t'he 9 adequacy of the QC inspection program to establish root 10 causes and appropriate corrective actionc?

i Is that 11 documented somewhere?

12 l FROM THE FLOOR: J-35.

13 MR. CALVO:

The documentation, I'm sorry, where

\

14 set forth the criteria we would like the applicant to 15- follow to establish root causes -- no, there"s no criteria 16 that I believe that we formulated. In the SSER as well as

~

17 our letters prior to the SSER we used those general terms; j , 18 and again, we are waiting for the applicant's response and i

i i

. 19 when that response comes, we are in the process of 20 reviewing it and will determine whether this has been 21 properly covered.

But there was no criteria that I know of 22 at least in the electrical SSERs, and I don't believe in 23 the others, that set forth that criteria for establishing l 24 how you should go look into root causes, whether you should 25 consider the technical merits or other aspects.

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MR. ROISMAN: When you use these causes, did you 2

have in your head -- as you told me earlier about one of 3

the root causes; that you'aiready had a pretty good idea 4

what you thought the root cause was, you were going to see 5

. if they found it -- did you have a good. idea as to item 6-C, -

6 how you wanted them to go about establishing root causes?

7 .

MR. CALVO:. If I give you my opinion, more or 8

less is result-oriented. I'm not asking sauebody, if I 9

found a problem, like in this problem of but splices or 10 cable separation -- two concerns that were highlighted more I

11 of ten than any other in the elec'trical systems -- I just 12 pinpoint the problem area, and if I want to know whether 13 this particular area becomes just like a little pimple or a 14 c'ancer I want the applicant to lock aurther into it. If he 15

~

finds further problems in the plant, the results, if he 16 finds problems with separation or butt splices, again the 17 case has been built.

18 Maybe it is not only with this area that the 19 ".

' technical revi=w team has identified; you have Le in other 20 areas of the plant, and then maybe you can couple the .

21 things up and you establish, find out why it was that kind 22 of a problem, and maybe you concluded af ter you finish that i 23 you may have to go further because it appears what you did 1 24 here may also cut across other disciplines.

25 The point in question, you asked me before how 1

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.l 24941.0 KSW 177 1 you reached in some cases your root causes. Because I have 2 enough information to reach that conclusion with the 3 electrical QC training and qualifications. There was

~4 enough supporting information that we reached that 5 conslusion of possible problems of certification with the 6 records. How you go from there to the others, it was a 7 possibility that it may be also a problem in the other 8

disciplines, but you don't know until you check the other 9 disciplines and compare with the results in those 10 disciplines also.

Cast the same kind of doubt that the QC 11 electrical qualifications and training files was discovered-12 by the technical review team.

13 MR. ROISMAN: Was it ,your intent here that a 14 . root cause investigation could be foreshortened or 15 eliminated if at an early stage it was determined that the 16 particular deficiencies were no longer safety-related?

17 MR. CALVO Say that again.

i-18 MR. ROISMAN: If in the applicant's c

'i ' 19 investigation, looking at the items on J-31, if their 20 investigation determined that all of the identified

  • 21 deficiencies were in areas which can now be reclassified as 22 not safety-related, in effect, backfitting enginee' ring 23 judgment says not safety-related, if that conclusion can be i .

t 24 reached, was it your understanding that no root cause 25 needed to be found?

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1 MR. CALVO: Again, all depends on the situation.

2 If I know that, like I said before, we considered the 3

allegations nonsafety-related allegations but we say, the .

4 reason it was provided to us was'nonsafety-related but used 5

safety-related procedures to identify safety-related piece 6

of equipment we want to be sure that didn't precipitate into 7 a safety-related area.

8 So the combination of the nonsafety-related and 9

you didn't find it with the safety-related, you reach the 10 i conclusion that you don't need to go further. If the 11 allegation indicates it was truly safety-related I think we 12 would have gone a little further to ascertain, a little 13 father down the way. Depends again on the situation.

14 Depends upon the concern. The area.

15 But keep.in mind that at the end, it is not the 16 individual contribution. It is the integral approach, all 17 the things combined, that come forward and tell you what 18 was the root cause. Whaterver you learn from the electrical, 19 the mechanical, you can couple those things back and forth:

20 and the integrated approach for all this cumulative -

21 findings, whether they are good or bad or in between, that

22 will give you was there a root cause there or was there not 23 a root cause.

24 MR. ROISMAN:

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which you would make preliminary root cause conclusions in 2

order to define the next level of look which might require

.3 you to then redefine and move on until you knew you had it 4 on?

5 MR. CALVO: You asked for my opinion. Yes, that 6 would have been my opinion.

7 MR. ROISMAN: Now, in going back to J-10 and 8

this portion of the paragraph that we're looking at, where 9

would you direct me to find, if it is in that document, the 10 bases for your conclusion that there was an indication of 11 programmatic weakness in QC7 12 MR. CALVO: On page J-10.

13 MR. ROISMAN: Says "The gr'oup concludes the 14 problems found with this together are an indication of 15 programmatic weakness in QC."

I know where to find the 16 conclusions for each of those. I'm looking for, is there a 17 place where I would find the basis for your belief that 18 given that those problems are found in those areas, there

.' 19 is an indication of programmatic weakness -in QC?

20 MR. CALVO:

There is not stated as such, but it i

21 is my judgment as I finish that review that I come to that 22 conclusion. From the standpoint of safety, it was a safety 23 conclusion. I felt that we found enough things in there 24 that I feel comfortable enough that my review was 25 far-reaching that I felt another look should be taken a,t it, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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and this is reflected in all the actions. I felt that we 2 should go a little further than we had.

3

, MR. ROISdAN: Did you consult with your staff ,

4 with regard to that conclusion?

5 MR. CALVO: Not ,in a direct way, but just a '

6 routine basis: Every day we set up the goals, if we find 7 problems, where to look next, et cetera. So we were  !

8 looking for these problems in installation we were looking 9: for maybe it was generic implications. It was reflected in 10 the way we did it.

11 MR. ROISMAN:

Do you feel this part of the 12 conclusion is essentially a consensus from those of you who 13 worked on the electrical, or is this Jose Calvo relying on 14 that underlying information without the concurrence?

15 'MR. CALVO:

I gsess I would say it is mine.

16 MR. ROISMAN:

, Now, I want you in particular 17 looking now at section 3.1.4, overall assessment and 18 conclusions, how did this, part of the report get written, ,

1 19 and to what review, if any, was it subjected and how much 20 of what we see here are your words and how much are  :

21 somebody else's?

22 MR. CALVO: , This was identic'la to my words, and 23 there was quite a discussion on those words. But my words 24 prevailed at the end, so it was n'o t changed for all 25 practical purposes.

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24941.0 KSW 181 l MR. ROISMAN: Was this discussed among your team?

2 MR. CALVO: No, it was only another team member 3 that came late that we discussed -- only two of . us 4 discussed this. We finished earlier. They promised me if 5

. I finished the Comanche Peak review they would let me go, 6

but they broke the promise anyway, so we didn't quite 7

finish earlier in the tour, and so it was mainly me and l i 8

somebody else who -- and Angelo Marinos helped me put this 9 together. When we had problems we called the the i 10 consultants over the telephone and discussed them.

i Asked 11 them for their concurrence in each of the SSERs. So these

, 12 reflect 'our thoughts, ideas, conclusions. It was not 13 changed.

14 MR. ROISMAN: As you know, we will get, although

. 15 we don't yet have, the drafts, if any, of this SSER.

16 MR. CALVO:

, For the SSERs. This is the summary.

17 That was done by me and Mr. Marinos.

18 MR. ROISMAN:

This essentially, if it is there 19 in earlier versions -- the earlier versions are yours, the ,

, 20 medium and the last version is yours?

21 MR. CALVO: That's correct.

22 MR. ROISMAN: Is there a portion of this SSER 23 which was not put together that way, with it essentially 24 being your words and not anybody else's; and if so, can you 25 identify that?

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. 182 l MR. CALVO: All the SSERs, I through 9, we had a 2

reviewer, and I was the group leader, so the initial draf ts 3

were done by the reviewer and I just approved them and .

4 participated in writing those things up in connection with .

5 what was required by the project. The technical merits, '

6 the findings, what happened, the flavor has not changed but 7 the raw material was always there. ~

8 MR. ROISMAN: I We don't have one in front of us 9

so maybe I should wait for another day. If you can offhand 10 take me to one and illustrate one where the reviewer had 11 some words, and then those words, although in your judgment 12 the substance stayed the same, the words changed.

13 MR. CALVO: I don't know if they are available 14 I don't have it with me.

or not. '

15 MR. ROISMAN: The draft?

16 MR. CALVO: The draft. But we have in the 17 record or it will be in the record the signature by the 4 .

18 reviewer, the group leader, the director' of the SSERs 19 before they were put into this book. -

20

~

MS. VIETTI-COOKS I understand the letter was 21 1 sent from the freedom of information branch to you on 22 Friday, so the information was dumped into the PDR on 33 Friday for electrical. It just went in.

1 24 MR. CALVO: You have draf ts signed by the 25 reviewers that made up this report.

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,24941.0 KSW 183 l MS. GARDE: I don't have it yet. I got a call 2 saying the electrical stuff w.as coming down to the PDR but 3 I don't have that yet.

4 MR. ROISMAN:

We had earlier boxes on structural 5 but we don't have the drafts.

6 At the top of U-15, under the general title 7 " actions required at TUEC," is it your understanding that --

8 MR. CALVO: Hold on. That's - if you go back 9 to page J-11 you're talking about the test program again 10 and that's outside - the man who did that is not here ~

11 today. It is the same as you were asking before. Item 4, 12 i that refers back to -- I'm sorry, the heading. I take that 13 ,

back.

14 MR. ROISMAN: I'm still trying to deal with the

,15 generic thing. I understand that that. person is not here.

, 16 Is it your understanding that the total of the -- that the 17 way in which TUEC is responding to this recommendation is 18 to come to you within the confines of the CPRT7

[ . 19 MR. CALVO Correct. -

20 MR. ROISMAN: You were not expecting and as far 21 as you know have not gotten some independent response to 22 this that does fit within the confines of the CPRT7 23 MR. CALVO: Say that again. I'm sorry.

d 24 MR. ROISMAN: I'm trying to understand where you 25 are expecting to find that TUEC will be responding within i

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1 the context of the CPRT.

  • 2 MR. CALVO: That's correct. i 3 MR. ROISMAN: Turning to page J-16, under 4

electrical equipment separation, did you in the course of 5

, your evaluation draw any conclusions about the applicant's -

6 compliance with the NRC's requirements regarding the use of l 7

covered cable traces as substitutes for conduit covering of ,

8 electrical cables, and whether the separation between 9

covered cable traces could be the same one inch that was 10 allowed by NRC regulations for electrical cable to '

11 redundant trains runn!.ng through conduit?

12 MR. CALVO: The criteria governing the 13 sephration is contained in IEEE 384, as augmented by reg 14 I-1.75. That criteria is set forth that physical' 15 dimensions on redundant systems must be separated, but it' 16 also provides - also accepts analysis as a way around 17 physical dimensions.

We found out that that there was some 18 _ disagreement between the electrical specifications ES-100 19 and this criteria contained in the IEEE 384; however, .

20 analysis could have been substituted to justify the ,

21 physical dimensions welde.n't have to apply in this case.

22 We would advise, and we found out that analysis has been on 23 the files. However, we indicated that analysis had not 24 been submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We 3 25 indicated tnee did not so we requested as one of our ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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actions for them to provide the analysis to the Nuclear 2 Regulatory Commission for review. That will determine 3

whether the snalysis substantiates the fact that if the 4

analysis can substantiate through fire testing that this is 5

adequate, then the analysis will supersede the physical 6 dimensions, so that is an action item.'

7 MR. ROISMAN: It 'is yet to be done? You did not 8 complete' work on it? .

9 MR. CALVO: We s'ubstantiated the allegation, wet l 10 agreed with it. We're trying to find out whether at the 11 time it was sufficient to justify the fact that you don't 12 have to substantiate the physical separation.

13 MR. ROISMAN: Did you-say the analyses were not 14 in existence?

15 -

. MR . CALVO: Were ' in existence at the tim's we .

16 lo~oked at it.

17 MR. ROISMAN: '

Did you make an effort to 18 determine whether they had been in existence at the time

~

19 that ES-100 was promulgated? -

20 MR. CALVO

- * . No, but I'm not quite sure but I 21-think the record will indicate the dates, but our 22 augmentation to support this allegation in here - I don't 23 recall. Agaln, I was looking again at the work- product, I 24 was not concerned with the- history, how it got there.

25 MR. ROISMAN:

When we look at the underlying ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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documentation of work that went into the SSER, how much 2

will we find in there that will show us, for instance, I 3

just want to be clear, I know Ms. Garde asked you this 4

earlier, I wanted to make sure I understood the answer. .

5 How much will we know, if you say we looked at 75 NCRs, 6

which ones you looked at; will you have recorded the number 7 oven if you don't have a copy in the file?

8 MR. CALVO:

In the majority of the cases, we did, 9 but in the particular case you were asking me I was not 10 quite sure.

In the majority of the cases -- as a matter of j 11 fact, when you go to the public document room and get those 12 SSERs signed by the reviewer, it is a' Iso a reference in 13 ! there, and from those references, the NCRs are listed. A 14 decision was made when this was published not to include 15 the references. '

16 MR. ROISMAN: As I, understand it, the auditable ~

17 trail should make it possible for us to determine what you 18 looked.at if we want to try to understand what you were

~

19 seeing', and therefore what you had as a basis for your -- .

20 MR. CALVO I hope so or I's in trouble.

21  :

MR. ROISMAN: And it is auditable, not audible.

e =

22 We're not looking for a tape of what you did?

23 MR. CALVO Maybe both.

24 MR. NOONAN: Let's break about five minutes.

25 (Recess.)

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MR. NOONAN: Back on the record.

2 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. Calvo, is it correct that to

, 3 the extent that you have referred implications of the

. 4 various -findings that you have made in SSER 7 to 5

Mr. Livermore, that it was your intent and understanding

~

6 .

that he would be responsible for evaluating the ,

7 implications of those findings, generic or determining if 8 it was appropriate root causes or whatever, and that that 9 burden was not yours?

10 MR. CALVO: No, those were provided to the QA/QC.

11 group as input. What they did with them is whatever the 12 group leader decided, whether he looked into the root 13 causes, that was his decision. It was no clear lines of 14 i demarcation what they were going.to do. It'was his choice..

1 '

15 i MR. ROISMAN: It would have been possible and 16 not i

inconsistent with your understanding that a finding you made in vWach you said there was an indication of 17 18 prograns.atic weakness in QC would end up with Mr. Livermore l , ,

- -- 19 and he would do nothing with it?

20 MR. CALVO: It is possible, but the proof of the

) -

21 pudding is.SSER number 11, and we all looked at it and we 22 all commented on it and were aware that our concerns were .

23 covered in there. -

24 MR. ROISMAN: Were there any conclusions reached 25 in there regarding electrical and instrumentation control l

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matters that you did not agree with, that you do not agree 2 with?

3 MR. CALVO: I don't think so. There was mostly 4 programmatic and QA/QC problems. There was nothing in here 5 that impacted what I had done in electrical. They were 6 looking at the paperwork, looking*at the hardware. Insofar 7

as I know, had I read it, I may have some comments on it; 8

but insofar as anything he has that invalidated what he has -

9 done, I don't remember that I found any of those.

1G MR. MC CRACKEN: We're ready to go on to SSER 11 number 9. Thank you, Mr. Calvo.

12 MR. ROISMAN: Mr. McCracken, can you just tell 13 us who you are regularly employed by when not working on 14 this Comanche Peak technicai review team? Are you a

.15 full-time NRC Staff employee? Which region, or 16 heedquarters, all that sort of stuff?

17 MR. MC CRACKEN: I'm full-time employed at NP.R.

18 At the time I was working on this particular effort, I was 19 the, section chief of the chemical and corrosion technology '

20 section in the chemical engineering branch of NRR.

21 MR. ROISMAN:

Have you been involved with the 22 paint coatings issue here since the formation of the 23 technical review ' team?

24 MR. MC CRACKEN: No.

25 MR. ROISMAN: When did you get involved?

4 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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KSW 189 l MR. MC CRACKEN: I picked up the technical 2 review team function in, as I recall, early November of '84.

3

. MR. ROISMAN: Who was your predecessor?

4 MR. MC CRACKEN: Phil Matthews.

. When the

., 5 technical review team was formed, I would normally functionally have taken over that particular area, but I 6

7 was tied up in another project rather full-time, so Phil 8

Matthews, who had been my predecessor in the job that I had.

9 at the time, he was requested by me to take over this job, 10 I and he agreed that he would do so, and pending me being 11 released or getting enough work done on the other project 12 that t could then take it over at some point.

l'_3 MR. ROISMAN: Did you have no involvement with 14 supervising his work from that period of, I gdess, around l

15 i May until early November of '84? -

16 MR. MC CRACKENs No, I didn't supervise his work 17 at all. I was aware of what he did. We had discussions 18 periodically. When he had a site visit he would always 19 come back_ and spend time talking to me about what he had 20 done and what was going on, because I knew eventually I

.. . 21 would pick it up, but I did not supervise him or tell him 22 what to do.

. 23 MR. ROISMAN: Given that timing, is it correct 24 that the bulk of the on-site investigation and the 25 interviews with the allegers and the sort of gathering of ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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the raw data was done under his supervision rather than 2 under yours?

3 MR. MC CRACKEN: The gathering of the raw data __

4 and the interviews with allegers on site were conducted

  • 5 under him. The feedback interviews with people after the 6 work had been completed was done by me. .

,7 MR. ROISMAN: This SSER has essentially got two 8 appendices to it.

The first, correct me if I'm wrong, 9 essentially deals with the applicant's request for an 10 exemption of the paint coatings for post-accident 11 performance and qualification of paint coatings, and the 12 secon6 appendix deals with deficiencies found in the 13 application of paint coatings during the time the paint 14 coatings were safety-related and had certain safety-related 15 requirements; is that correct? Do I und,erstand this?

16 MR. MC CRACKEN Not quite.

l Appendix L is a 17 function that was performed through the normal NRC chain of 18 command normal offices. It was not a technical review team 19 function. That's the first one you refer ~enced. .

The seconc

  • 20 one, which is appendix M, does not only deal with 21 deficiencies, it deals with our evaluation of the '

l 22 allegations and of the overall coating system at Cemanche 23 Peak.

24 MR. ROISMAN

v -

But L is the one where the Staff l

25 has set forth the basis for its conclusion regarding the t-l l

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KSW 191 L paint coatings exemption request of the applicant's; is 2 that right?

3 MR. MC CRACKEN: L is the one where the 4 applicant's request to' remove coatings from the Q list was

. 5 evaluated.

6 MR. ROISMAN:

Was that also done under your 7 supervision, that evaluation?

8 MR. MC CRACKEN: That evaluation was ongoing, 9 and had not been completed until about the time the 10 technica). review team evaluation was completed. At the end,,

l 11 I directly supervised the pulling together of both of them.

12 MR. ROISMAN: But there's someb.ody else, then, ,

13 who made the investigation and the final substantive 14 conclusions that are contained in appendix L, not yours'sif; f 35 is that correct?

. 16 MR. MC CRACKEN: The contributors to appendix L 17 are listed on page 1-3. That includes, as I recall, 18 approximately 12 or 14 various staff members. They 19 provided their individual inputs to me. ,

I then pulled them 4

20 together in a total safety evaluation report.

,.- 21 MR. ROISMAN: Well, as I read this, it appears 22 , that you didn't author these words that are in ' appendix L, 23 that.they did. When you say you pulled the two together, 24 they are two entirely different and separate appendices.

25 MR. MC CRACKEN: I was talking about appendix L ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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4941.0 SW 192 l only right now. The people listed as contributors are 2 listed on 1-3. They orSvided the inputs to me, and I 3 pulled them together.

4 MR. ROISMAN: .

The judgments are theirs, not 5 yours? .

~

6 MR. MC CRACTEN: .

That's correct. However, in my 7

function as section chief of that section which had the 8-responsibility for that, I signed off on the overall 9.

appendix L,"which means I concur with and agree with their 10 judgments.

11 MR. ROISMAN: That's because you rely on what 12 they did, not because you independently verified it.

13 MR. MC CRACKEN: That's hot correct. I did go 14 and independently verify a lot of what they did.

15 i MR. ROISMAN: ' What didn't you verify?

16 MR. MC CRACKEN: I can't give you a~ simple 17 answer to that. I did not accept, as I typically do not la , accept, any product at face value.

I at least 1ccx into it.

19 How much I did look into or how much I questioned, I can't' '

20 tell you. ~

21 MR. ROISMAN:

Was there a team leader among the 22 contributors to appendix L7 -

23 MR. MC CRACKEN: No.

24 MR. ROISMAN: Who decided which tasks each 25 person would undertake?

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l 1 MR. MC CRACKEN The review of appendix L was 2 initiated, as I recall, in June of '84. Typically, when 3 .

. something like that comes in, tho' licensing project manager 4 will inform each of the affected branches, the branches -

. . 5 that he feels would be involved in that particular 6 evaluation. Those branches will then assign individuals 7 who will go and hear what's said. It is up'to them to then-8 put in their individual inputs to safety evaluation, which 9

is tnen compiled within the division licensing by the 10 project manager.

11 MR. ROISMAN: Who decided which people would 12 work on appendix L questions?

13 MR. MC CRACKEN: That's decided by their own 14 management, their various divisions, engineering, systems 15 integration, so on. -

16

  • MR. ROISMAN:

. Who decided which divisions to

, 17 bring into the appendix L evaluation?

18 MR. MC CRACKEN: The project manager. That was 19 at the time, I think, Spots Burwell.

20 MR. ROISMAN: Were any of the people in appendix 21 L people who worked under your supervision?

22 MR. MC CRACKEN: The last one listed, Frank Witt, 23 W-i-t-t. .

24 MR. ROISMAN: I take it that the position that 25 you hold normally, not your role in the technical review Acs. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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team or in this SSER, it would not normally be the 2

responsibility of your division or the thing that you are 3 in charge of to decide the question that appendix L seeks 4 to' decider is that correct? It is somebody else's 5 responsibility? ~

6 MR. MC CRACKENs That's incorrect. My normal 7

function would have been to decide the question asked by 8 appendix L. That would have been coordinated through me 9

because i*: is a section which ecmes under chemical 10 engineering and specifically chemical technology, therefore 11 it would have been my function normally to do so. As I

, 12 said, I was assigned full-time on another project at the 13 time this particular effort came in, both appendix L and 14 . appendix M.

There was -- the L part was initiated by Frank

15 ; Witt, who is in my section, in my absence' from that .

16 particular function. . -

17 MR. ROISMAN: I take it that the nature of the 18 kinds of issues that appendix L raises, a substantial part 19 of what's involved there are issues enat would not normally '

20 fall within the expertise of the people who work under you, 21 -they relate to post-accident environment conditions and '

22 water flow and things of that nature that are not directly 23 related to coatings. Is that correct?

24' , MR. MC CRACKENs The chemical engineering branch 25 is responsible for a lot of areas in the post-accident ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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knowing what those environments are that coatings have to 3

survive under by necessity fall into chemical engineering.

, 4 MR. ROISMAN: You take input as to what those

- . 5 post-accident inputs will be rather than making independent 6

judgments as to what the post-accident temperature will be 7

. or how much iodine you'll have in the environment; is that 8 not correct? '

9 MR. MC CRACKEN: That's not necessarily correct.

10 In some cases, we take independent input from other 11 individuals. In some cases we do it ourselves. Part of 12 our function is looking at the environmental conditions in 13 , containment after an accident.

14 f MR. ROISMAN: Looking at them or* deciding ;nat 15 I they are? ,

16 MR. ,MC CRACKEN: Looking at them to decide what 17 they cculd be based on in different accident scenarios.

l 18 MR. CHANDLER: It is unclear to me that appendix 19 L is' something really within the ambit, I think, of the 20 agreement between Staff and Citizens Association for Sound 21 Energy. as far as this informal meeting is concerned. I 22 don't know how far you intend to pursue. it.

23 MR. ROISMAN I'm happy to focus on appendix M 24 as long as you understand that Citizens Association for 25 Sound Energy in Docket I will not have yet had a chance to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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explore in detail the basis for the exemption requirement.

2 MR. CHANDLER: I understand that, and that's why 3 I have not interjected at this point. The technical review 4

team effort, as Mr. McCracken indicated, is appendix M.

5 MR. ROISMAN:

I'm happy to limit it to that, but .

6 I want to make sure it is within the body of the SSER. I 7

have one question as to the interrelationship. Is there 8

any extent to which the conclusions reached in appendix M 9l were influenced, either during the course of their 10 development or in the final version, by any assumptions 11 1 about.whether paint coatings would ultimately be found to 12 be Q or not Q for this plant?

13 MR. MC CRACKEN: No.

14 MR. ROISMAN: You treated whatever was 15 ! originally deemed to be a safety-related requirement for 16 paint. coatings in making safety-related paint coatings 17 evaluations; is that correct?

18 MR. MC.CRACKEN: Yes.

19 MR.. ROISMAN: Can you explain to me the role of

  • 20 the Battell - I'm sorry, Brookhaven, in evaluating the .

21 paint coatings issue as it fit into what the technical 22 review team has finally done in appendix M7 23 MR. MC CRACKEN The Brookhaven role, I.think, 24 is discussed in category 1 of appendix M, specifically 2!j starting on page M-24 and 11-25, where we go through the Acz-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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background of the backfit test program and the scope.

2 Brookhaven was on site before the technical

, 3 review team was formed. They were w'orking for the region

, 4 in that particular case.

They had done some preliminary

., 5 investigation themselves, had issued a preliminary report, 6

and when the technical review team was formed, we picked up 7 on what they had done.

We took the allegations that they 8

had listed and worked basically from those allegations.

9 MR. ROISMAN: But my question in particular was, .

10 as originally formulated, there was not only to have been 11 an interim report but actually Battelle was to have had a 12 final report, and as I understand it -- Brookhaven, excuse 13 me -- and that the creation of the technical review team 14 . superseded that responsibility for Brookhaven; is that 15 correct 1 16 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

17 MR. ROISMAN: Why was that done?

18 MR. MC CRACKEN: You have to ask somebody in

,, 19 management that issue.

20 MR. ROISMAN: Is Mr. Ippolito qualified? He's 21 about to give ,an answer, and I didn't know whether that i

22 meant that he was in management or not. I don't know -- {

23 MR. NOONAN: Hang on a second. Let me ask.

- l 24 (D'scussion off the record. )

25 MR'. IPPOLITO: It was just -- the review of the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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adequacy of the paint coatings was, as McCracken identifies, 2

was an ongoing review initiated by region 4 who was using 3

Brookhaven as their consultants to review the adequacy of .

4 the coating, the coating procedures, coating QA/QC. When I -

5 4

took over, I said, fine, we'll make that a team within the 6 technical review team, and we took over the contract and 7

assigned an NRR team leader to it and we made sure that the Sj allegations that relate to the coatings were all included

~

9 in their review, and proceeded down that peth.

10 MR. ROISMAN: As I understand it, the final 11 conclusions that are contained in appendix M, t'o the extent 12 that they are conclusions that were preliminarily 13 l investigated by Brookhaven, are not Brookhaven conclusions, 14 i they are conclusions by the technical review team; is that .

I 15 ' correct?

16 MR. IPPOLITO: At that point in time, 17 g Brookhaven's responsibilities changed and they became 18 consultants just like Parameter provides consultants to the 19 technical review team and a number of other companies. -

20 They became a consultant for the technical review team 21 working for the technical review team team leader and were .

22 redirected at that point.

23 MR. ROISMAN: Did they issue a final report to 24 the tschnical review team which then formed a part of the 25 basis for appendix M7 i

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199 1 MR. IPPOLITO: No.

2 MR. RO!SMAN:

How would we document Brockhaven's 3

further input into the technical review team if there's not 4 a final report from them?

. Mr. McCracken?

5 MR. MC CRACKEN:

The Brookhaven people who 6

remained involved were contributors to the various 7

categories in the back of appendix M, which is attachment 2 8 to it.

The names of those individuals are listed upon page 9 l-3, again with their various affiliations.

i 10 MS. VIETTI-COOK: Instead of reporting to 11 region 4 they reported to Phil Matthews as technical ~ review 12 team team leader.

13 MR. MC CRACKEN Yes.

14 MR. ROISMAN,3 But when they were s'aporting to a 15 region 4 they issued an , interim report and when they 16 reported to Phil Matthews there's no document ti, hat they 17 signed and sent to represent their final conclusions on 18 this; is that correct?

So in that sense they changed their 19 role.

20 MR. IPPOLITO: That's exactly what I said.

21 MR. MC CRACKENs The role changed for the 22 sections, the categories that they were responsible for in 23 appendix M, they signed them.

Those were transmitted to us 1 24 and signed by them.

25 MR. ROISMAN:

If I want to see what is their 4

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final report all I need is a road map of which of the 2 sections they authored within appendix M, and that will be 3 the Battelle output -- I'm sorry, Brookhaven. Sorry. Is 4 that correct?

  • 5 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

6 MS. VIETTI-COOK There would be an SSER like it 7 is in there with their signa'ture at the bottom. It would 8 be the identical one with their signature. ~

9 MR. ROISMAN: Did they actually author Phose 10 sections or did they just concur in someone else's 11 l authoring them?

12 MR. MC CRACKEN: They authored them. The 13 signature package you're looking for will list the author 14 j and myself and Vince Noonan.

  • 15 MR. ROISMAN:

. In the paint coatings documents, 16 when we finally see them, we will see these Brcokhaven

, 17 identifiable -

3 18 (Discussion off the record.)

19 MR. ROISMAN: Then, except to the extent that -

20 Brookhaven became part of a bigger evaluation, they 21 completed the work that they originally agreed to do with .

22 region 4, and rather than having their work changed, either 23 narrowed, broadened or in some other way altered; is that {

l 24 correct?

25 You said they completed the MR. MC CRACKEN:

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  • KSW 201 1 work they were originally contracted for in region 4?

2 MR. ROISMAN: That's correct.

3 MR. MC CRACKEN:

. I don't think so. I think Tom l

4 said the scope of what they were going to do was altered so

., 5 ' hey-did not complete what they originally contracted for t

+

6 from region 4. The contract scope was changed when they 7

were secunded to the total technical review team effort.

8 MR. ROISMAN: Scope was narrowed or broadened?

9 MR. IPPOLITO: Broadened to include all of the 10 allegations that wa were able to identify in this coatings 11 ; area, any new allegations that came along.

12 1 MR. ROISMAN: Did they become de facto the l

13 j principal authors of appendix M in terms of the real input 14 l into appendix M7 I ,

. 15 ! MR. MC CRACKEN: No, they were contributors.

16 They contributed to some of the categories of appendix M, ..

17 ' but everybody was working as a team. There are seven 18 categories, individuals were assigned as the lead on 19 certain categories, but nobody was the principal author

  • 20 other than the individual assigned to the' lead on that '

.- - 21 category.

22

  • MR. ROISMAN: Le t 's go to M-3.

Under the 23 category 2.2,. review approach and methodology, at.the 24 bottom of the page, there's a discussion -- at the end of 25 each two-week session you updated the concern' allegation ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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4941.0 SW 202 1 tracking system to reflect the status, et cetera, of each

'2 concern or allegation as well as any new ones that had been 3 added. What was your procedure with regard to new ones 4

that were added while this investigation was still open? -

5 Did you add them to your then current investigation list?

6 MR. MC CRACKEN: New ones that were added 7

through the time that the technical review team was on the 8 site would be added to one of the seven categories that 9 were originally established.

l If one came in on training, 10 it would go into the training category and the individual 11 doing training would then have that to do as part of his 12 normal function.

l 13 l MR. ROISMAN: What if the allegation were one 1

14 l that came to your attention subsequent to the time that you l

15 l were on sita during the on asite phase? How was that dealt 16 witb?

17 MR. MC CRACKEN: Subsequent to the on-site phase 18 there was only one instance where someone came to me and 19 discussed an additional potential allegation in the -

20 coatings area. I would guess that was sometime around 21 February or so of this year. That particular allegation 22' was very close to other allegations that we had looked at.

23 MR. ROISMAN: And --

'24 MR. MC CRACKEN: And I didn't add it to the list.

25 MR. ROISMAN: On page M-4, you discuss daily ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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meetings during which progress was assessed and the like.

2 I take it these are meetings among the people working on

, 3 appendix M only?

4 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

5 MR. ROISMAN:

This was all at a time before you 6 were personally involved, correct?

7 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

8 MR. ROISMAN: Your undarstanding is that 9

eserybody was sort of kept up to speed on what everybody 10 else was finding or doing through this process each day?

11 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

12 MR. ROISMAN: And the Brookhaven people were i 13 l i

part of the group that was on the site during that .

14 ; investigation?

15 MR. MC CRACKEN's Yes. .

16 MR. ROISMAN: 'As I'm sure you know, there we're t

,. 17 lots of allegations of improprieties in the paint coating 18 area. It was very controversial among OC inspectors. A 19

., lot of people saying, he did this, and other people saying, 20 he didn't do this. Bow did you -- how were you able to

. 21 determine when you had people telling you diametrically 1

22 opposed things which One was telling you the truth? What 23 did you do to try to find that out?

24 MR. MC CRACKEN: When I picked up the technical 25 review team function for coatings, I was receiving the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.

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initial inputs for the various categories from each of the 2 individual reviewers. Part of what they provided was a 1 l

! 3 background package which has then gone into our document -

4 control room or whatever it is called, and that background

  • 5 package is something I would look through when I looked ~

6 through their individual category inputs to see if I 7

concurred with the conclusions that they were drawing.

8 MR. ROISMAN: What did you do when you had -- if 9 an inspector who later became an alleger said that a 10 certain thing had been said to him, and the person who it 11 was alleged to have said it to him said, I didn't say it to 12 him, did you have any process by which you could determine 13l or try to determine who'was right?

14 i NR. MC CRACKEN: I think you need to look a

)

4 15 little further back in appendix M to see how we handled the

! 16 entire area of coatings. On page M-7, we discuss in the 17 second paragraph that the technical review team protective 18 coatings group conducted a generic review in each of the

19 areas, the seven areas that we had defined as having
  • 20 allegati7ns in. As part of that generic review, we looked 21 at the specific allegations. .

We tried to determine in each IIl 22 case if a specific allegation was substantiated or not. '

In 23, some cases like the one you were just, I think, f

24 hypothetically trying to come up with, the answer is if 25 somebody says somebod'y did something wrong and that person

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says, no, I didn't, and there are no other witnesses or

'2 documentation to support it, that would be indeterminate.

3 MS. VIETTI-COOK: I would like to supplement 4 that.

Primarily, OI had completed OI investigations'on the 5

"wno shot John" for, you know, the protective coatings area, 6

and what we did is we provided Brookhaven copies of those 7

OI reports, and they pulled out *.that they thought were the 8 technical allegations from OI reports, but OI d'id the

'9

.

  • groundwork or the, you know, this guy said something and 10 this guy said somethihg different and tried to sort those 11 facts out before the technical review team got into it.

12 MR. IPPOLITO: That's right.

13 MR. ROISMAN: I don't know if you have read --

14 l there's a harassment / intimidation panel report that's out I

15 enat tries to look at allegations of harassment / intimidation, 16 and cne of them relatea to some deal with allegations 17 related to paint coatings. I want to make sure that I 18 understand the implications of the statement on page M-8,

,, 19 the first paragraph beginning with the words: "The 20 technical review team did not investigate allegations of 21 concerns or issues of improper management pressure, 22 intimidation, harassment or wrongdoing."

23 Am I correct that by saying that you did not 24 investigate them that yo': also did not look for the 25 . implications for the plint coatinga program if they were i

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KSW 206 l true or if they were false?

2 MR. MC CRACKEN: No. You are making a broad 3

statement without using specific examples of what you are -

4 discussing.

  • 5 MR. ROISMAN: Okay, there was an allegation that -

, ,,$. a supervisor told the paint coatings , inspectors following 7

an inspection in one of the rooms that he thought was .

8 overly detailed that he would not put up with any .

9 nit-picking and that he would essentially nit-pick the 10 person off the site, and some of those paint coatings 11 1 inspectors who were at that meeting charged that that

, 12 incident occurred and that it was an attempt to intimidate 13 them from doing their job as they saw it.

14 Assuming for a moment that that is subsequently 15

, confirmed by the appropriate offices of ,the Nuclear ,

16 Regulatory Commission, that the event took place, that it 17 did have the effect of creating an intimidating atmosphere 18 and that the inspectors who were there could have been 19 a'ffected by it, what, if any, consideration of that -- of

  • 20 the existence of that phenossonon is given in the.

21 evaluations of the paint coating program in appencix M7

~

22 MR. MC CRACKEN In appendix M, and I forget 23 right now the particular categories it is discussed'in, 24 that particular incident in that room, the technical review 25

. team went to the room that was discussed and looked at the 4

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coatings in that area and tried to make an evaluation as to 2

whether the coatings in that area were acceptable. As I 3 recall, that particular room had been subsequent to the 4 incident you are' discussing, was scraped back down and 5 started over and repainted.

6 MR. ROISMAN:

. That tells us that you looked to 7

make sure that the paint coatings in that room were 8 appropriate. And you found, I take it, from what your 9 recollection is, that they were.

10 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

11 MR. ROISMAN: But in terms of trying to identify 12 the extent of failures in the paint coatings QC program, 13 l what, if any, consideration did you give to the facts that i

  • 14 j we have just discussed of the events that took plac'e in 15 '

that room as having implications for other paint coatings 16 work that these inspectors were responsible for?

17 MR. MC CRACKEN: Because we did a generic review 18 in each of the areas of coatings, and any influence or 19 effect, whether it was due to somebody believing he had l 20 been* intimidated or if it was due to poor training was 21 picked up by the method we used in evaluating the overall 22 coatings program as opposed to looking at specific i

3 23 indivi' dual allaghtions, i

l 24 As we state, I believe in the end of category 1, 25 that 61 of the 62 allegations really accounted for an I

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insignificant amount of the total coatings area because 2 they were talking about small areas. They were specific 3

examples of areas a couple of square feet instead of large 4 areas of coated surfaces. If we had only look'd e at the -

5 individual allegations instead of doing a broad caneric 6 review of the coatings area, we would have come to a .

- 7 totally different conclusion, I suspect.

8! MR. ROISMAN: In doing a broad generic review, 9

you did not go back and reinspect the entire paint coatings 10 in the plant; is that correct?

11 MR. MC CRACKEN: No.

12 MR. ROISMAN:

You made a judgment as to what you 13 i

would look at to be able to say that you could make some 14 i generic conclusions about the paint coatings program?

15 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

16 MR. ROISMAN:

Where in this document have you 17 set out the criteria you use for deciding whrc that 18 investigation should look like to know that it would be 19 adequate to draw generic conclusions from it? +.

20 MR. MC CRACKEN: We did not set out those '

21 criteria in this document. Those determinations were made 22 by the group of people who were assigned to the TRT who 23 were put there because of their expertise in this area.

24 MR. 23ISMAN: Did they document that? Will I 25 have to go through the paint coatings documents, assuming -

4 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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that the document was produced, to find a document or group 2

of documents that will articulate their thinking process?

. 3 MR. MC CRACKEN: Not to my recollection. You 4

will find the basic documents which support what is

. 5 provided in Tppendix M.

6 M1.. ROISMAN: But not that will support the 7 nature and scop c' the kind of investigacion that was done 8

to reach those conclusions?

9 MR. MC ORACKEN: No, that was based on the 10 engineering judgment of the people doing the job.

11 MR. ROISMAN: Did you evaluate that engineering 12 judgment before you signed off on appendix M7 13 J MR. MC CRACKEN: I evaluated the input into each 14 of the seven categories from the individuals involved. I 15 '

looked,back through a substantial amount of the background 16 documentation and records that they provided and I 17 concurred with what they had done.

18 MR. ROISMAN:

You independently determined that 19 you too thought that the scope of their investigation was 20 adequate to be able to make the generic conclusions?

21 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

22 MR. ROISMAN: Can you tell me what your basis 23 was for your engineering judgment in that regard? If it is 24 easier, maybe we could go to one particular place where 25 instead of reinspecting it all you looked at something less ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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think it is necessary to go through every single piece, but j 3 why don't you give me an illustrative example in your mind?

4 MR. MC CRACKEN: Category 6, which is on page M ~

5 j

117, which discusses the coatings exempt log. If you go to

  • 6 page M 118 and 119, which discuss the conclusions in 7

category 6, which is in the coatings exempt log, the .

8 quantity of coatings that appear in the coatings exempt log, 9

or should be entered into the coatings exempt log as 10 defined in here, are significantly higher than what we see 11 j reported from other power plants by a margin high enough, a 4

12 factor of probably 20, that I considered that sufficient to 13 substantiate the conclusions that were reached by the ,

14 individuals in the other areas.

l '

15 MR. ROISMAN: Now, this is an instance where by 16 j looking at a smaller set of all the possible data, you were I 1 17 able to reach a negative conclusion. You were able to say, 18 I now have seen enough to know that there's a problem and I 19 can now throw, in effect, throw the ball back to them to do .

20 more work rather than my people having to do it. How did .

,21 you deal with it where you were reaching a positive -

22 conclusion, where whon you took a look based upon your ,

23 engineering judgment of how far you had to look, you were

24 not seeing anything that was negative? Did you 25 automatically broaden your look further or did that also ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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define the secpe of your look and you came to a conclusion 2

that in this area, the program was okay?

3 MR. MC CRACKEN: In the majority of categories in coatings, we did find deficiencies. Therefore, the 4

5 question you are coming up with really didn't come about 6 very frequently.

7 MR. ROISMAN: Well, let's look at number ,6.

8 Your une.: standing of the output that you will get from 9

TUEC, do you understand that they will reinspect all the 10 paint coatings that are now in the CEL and give you back a -

11 report that indicates how many of them they think they can 12 justify as properly being in that CEL7 13 MR. MC CRACKEN: We defined in the seven 14 i categories, areas where the applicant has to go back and 15 review what they have done. We , summarized that on M-13 and 16 M-14, and it lists four specific actions that they have to 17 take to go back and define the quality of coatings in some 18 areas or the amount of coatings that should be in the

. 19 coatings exempt log or various other things they have to do 20 4 .

to establish what the status of the coatings are as of 21 today or tomorrow, whenever they complete that particular 22 effort.

23 The intent of that is that they have a clear 24 understanding of which coatings are clearly in,the coatings 25 exempt log so that when they do the inspections that are ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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being required of them through appendix L that they will have the prime areas to look at.

2 3 MR. ROISMAN: So at least in this regard, the '

4 conclusicns of appendix L regarding the classification of .

5 paint coatings as not Q do impact on the scope of what ',

6 appendix it is reconmending?

7 MR. MC CRACKEN: The findings in appendix L 8

impact the a*ctions required of the Applicant.

9 MR. ROISMAN: Right, okay, so to take an exsmple, 10 if the final conclusion had been that the paint coatings 11 ' could not be exempted so that appendix L had come out the 12 opposite way, would the scope of the' action required in 13 ,

category 6 have had to require a reinspection of all of the 14 paint coatings contained in the CEL because in your 15 l judgment the basis for putting paint coatings into the CEL '

16 , was not sufficiently well defined that their presence in 17 the exempt log could be used as a justification for not 18 worrying about them?

19 MR. MC CRACKEN: The amount of coatings in the '

20 coating exempt log were higher, as I said earlier, than we l

21 typically see reported. The appendix L conclusion was that 22 if all the coatings failed, they would_not adversely impact 23 emergency core cooling systems.

If appendix L had not been 24 able to conclude that all the coatings could have failed, I 25 believe the next step probably would have been, how much ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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coatings can fail, which would then be, what is in the 2

coatings exempt log and where is it in relation to sums and 3 so on.

4 MR. RLISMAN:

You might have had a conclusion in 5 appendix L that enough of the coatings could fail without O

6

. having an effect o'n the emergency core cooling system and

~

7 the nature of where they were in the plant that what was on 8

the coatings exempt log would be, admittedly after the fact, 9

okay, even though the way it got on the exempt log was not 10 okay?

11 MR. P.C CRACKEN: I don't think I concluded in 12 too many cases that the way it got on the coatings exempt 13 l log was okay. There were some cases that we felt things 14 should be on the coatings exempt log that were not, but I 7

15 ! don't think we concluded that anything put on the coatings 16 exempt log was incorrectly put on there.

17 MR. ROISMAN: Then I need you to explain on M 18 119 you have a statement, and maybe it is the difference

.. , 19 between calling something indeterminate and making a .

20

  1. ~

conclusion about it, but the next to last paragraph says 21 "The implication of the 20 percent CEL value is that the 22 remaining 80 percent of the costings are of satisfactory 23 quality.

However, such an implication cannot be considere*d

  • 24 valid until the resolution of other technical review team '

25 concerns such as assurance of DBA qualifications of ACE. FEDERAL. REPORTERS, INC.

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  • O 24941.0
<SW 214 1 coatings and their traceability is reached."

2 Is what you're saying is that the status of the 3

coatings on the coatings exempt log, unless we get the DBA 4 exemptions with respect to that is indeterminate and that .

l 5 there's a problem there? Am I just misreading what you .

6 said?

  • 7 MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes. '

8 MR. ROISMAN: Why don't you explain it so I will 9 understand.

10 MR. MC CRACKEN: What that says is that we are 11 making a statement that we believe, based on the applicant 12 doing a few more things, up to 20 percent should be .in the 13 i coatings exempt log. That statement is then saying, the i

14 remaining 80 percent of the coat'ings. is not necessarily 15 ,

qualified, just because it is not in the coatings exempe 16 log. There are stil} issues of traceability and DBA 17 qualification that have to be satisfied before you could 18 conclude that the other 80 percent was in fact qualified.

19 We were trying not to let somebody look at the 20 percent ,,

20 in the exempt log and automatically assume because that's

(

21 all we talked about that the other 80 percent was in fact '

22 qualified.

23 MR. ROISMAN: Then maybe it is the preceding 24 -paragraph that concludes that technical review team finds 25 that this value, meaning the amount of paint coatings in

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KSW 215 l the exempt log, is excessive when compared to other 2 applicants. What did you me'an by that? What are the

. 3 implications of saying you think it is excessive?

4 MR. MC CRACKEN: The implication of that is with 5

an amount of coatings this large in the coatings exempt log, 6 we would have to assume.that that coating'would fail under

~

~

7 DBA conditions. Otherwise, it wouldn't be in the exempt 8 log. With that quantity of coating being assumed to fail, 9

we would need to have assurances that that coating, if it 10 failed, would not adversely impact ECCS systems.

11 MR. ROISMAN: In determining, the safety 12 significance of paint coatings, are there safety-related 13 implications of paint cea, tings beyond their ability to 14 remain on the wall in the event of a design basis accident?'

15 Are there other reasons for the coatings being on the pipes 16 or wherever it might be?

  • 17 MR. MC CRACKEN: There are reasons that you 18 apply coatings. .They are not necessarily safety

, 19 significance. The safety significance of coatings is if 20 you apply them, are they going to stay on and not interfere i

22 HR. ROISMAN: What if they come off in the event 23 of a design basis accident, and while they don't interfere 24 with the emergency core cooling system, they do leave 25 surfaces such that a subsequent clean-up of the plant by ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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employees would create as low as reasonably achieve.ble 2

problems for the employees cleaning it up? Is that a

! 3 safety-related concern of the paint coatings failing*e 4

MR. MC CRACKEN: There is not a requirement that

  • 5 you coat a containment or that you coat certain structures .

6 because of ALARA, A-L-A-R-A, all caps.

7 MR. ROISMAN: Is it specifically excluded or I

8 simply not mentioned? * ,

9 MR. MC CRACKEN: It is mentioned in reg guide 8.8 10 as a potential benefit to be gained from coatings. To the 11 best of my knowledge, there has never been a cost benefit 12 analysis conducted which would show the not gain in coating 13 versus the amount of additional exposure in going in and 14 ) scabbling, s-c-a-b-b-1-i-n-g, concrete for removing 'any 15 , contamination that may be in there. .

16 MR. ROISMAN: I take it one reason why that 17 would not have been done at least before Comanche Peak was 18 that before Comanche Peak, all plants for other reasons '

19 -

\

already had to' have qualified paint coatings in them *-

1 20 because of the design basis accident concern. Is that a I i

21 fair assumption? ,

22 MR. MC CRACKEN:

, No, that's not a fair 23 assumption.

24 MR. ROISMAN: Is it known whether or not. there 25 is a cost-benefit balance or analysis that is going to be 1

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done on this plant before a final sign-of f on paint 2 coatings?

3 MR. CHANDLER; Are you continuing on L7 4 MR. ROISMAN:

No, we're really on Mr we're 5

trying to understand if the items on the exempt logs, the 6

. way the number of those remains on the exempt loo' ting -

7 MR. MC CRACKEN: I didn't understand the 8 question.

9 MR. ROISMAN: Do you know whether there is a 10 plan with regard to this plant to do an ALARA cost benefit 11 balance to determine whether for reasons unrelated to the 12 design basis accident you must have qualified paint 13 coatings in the plant?

14 I MR. MC CRACKEN: I don't know of any plans oc

  • 15 ' '

requests to have such a plan.

16 MR. ROISMAN: What about with respect to 17 .

protection from corrosion or rust, are any of those to your 18 knowledge safety-related reasons for having paint coatings?

.- 19 MR. MC CRACKEN:

Not really. ,

20 MR. ROISMAN:

e , Now on page M-4, at the bottom of 21 the page, the statement is made, " Based on these reviews 22 and interviews, the technical review team determined the 23 validity of each technical concern or allegation and 24

. assessed its safety significance and ies potential generic 25 implications." Was it your ine.ent to look for the generic ACE. FEDERAL. REPORTERS, INC.

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1 implications or potential generic implications of what you 2

found in paint coatings beyond paint coatings?

3 MR. MC CRACKEN: No. '

4 MR. ROISMAN:

3 Did you expect that that generic

  • 5 implication, if any, would be looked at by some part of the '

i

, 6 technical review team?

  • 7 MR. MC CRACKEN:

When we completed the SSER 9 8 and with it appendix L and M, we had concluded that * '

9l coatings did not have to be qualified. However, because 10 the coatings were supposed to have been applied as

11 qualified and that was the way the review was conducted, we 12 felt that deficiencies that we pointed out in the seven 13 categories we looked at should not be ignored but should be i 14 l considered as a factor in what was done by overall QA/QC.

! i 15 i Therefore, I discussed those with Herb Livermore, and I 16 4

told him that I felt we should transfer the results of our 17 evaluation, not that he should relook at anything we 18 already looked at but that he should look at the results, 19 and it,' for instance, in training he found nothing in any . -

20 l other areas he gould say, it was isolated to training -- I i

21 ,

mean the training problem was isolated to coatings. If he 22 found that it was related to deficiencies in other areas, 23  !

he could then use that information in any way that he 24 needed.

25 MR. ROISMAN
Were you -

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2 (Discussion off the record.)

3 MR. ROISMAN: In looking for potential generic 4 implications, were you looking for potential generic 5 implications within the paint coatings area?

6 MR. MC CRACKEN Yes.

7 MR. ROISMAN:

In addition, you were transferring 8

over to Mr. Livermore the task of seeing whether there were 9

generic implications outside paint coatings?

10 ~MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

11 MR. ROISMAN: In looking for potential generic 12 implications within paint coatings, did you attempt to 13 ' answer the question: Why does this problem exist?

14 MR. MC CRACKENs No.

15 MR. ROISMAN:

Explain to me how you could look 16 at or determine generic implications, if you didn't know 17 1 the answer to the question, why did the problems exist.

18 MR. MC CRACKEN: If we found that procedures

. . 19 were inadequate, whether they were in' adequate due to, poor 20 training, poor procedures, or intimidation, that really et -

21 would not influence the fact that they were inadequate.

22 What we had to determine was technicall,y were they or were 23 they not adequate.

24 MR. ROISMAN: Let's say that you, hypothetically 25 you had an allegation that the procedures with respect to ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.

m m .2 m

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1 14941.0 *

. (SW 220 J

1 the application of a particulge type of coating were 2 inadequate. You had an alleger who told you that and said i t 3

which kind of procedures they were and said, these 4

procedures are a mess and no one can work to them, and you

  • 5 found that the alleger was right, those procedures were .

6 deficient. Did you need at that point any additional data 7

in order to determine whether there was a generic .

8 implication to that finding that that procedure was

~9 inadequate?

10 MR. MC CRACKEN: We would look at the specific 11 procedure, the number of revisions that had gone to it, 12 J '

when they had been in place and. try to make an assessment 13

, as to how much coating had been applied or when it was 14 applied under that specific procedure.

15 MR. ROISMAN: After that, would the generic'

16 implication be totally related to whether one-tenth of 1 17 percent of the plant had been painted had that procedure 18 been in effects is that what you mean when you say "the 19 generic implication" of'it? ' '

20 -

MR. MC CRACKEN: Yes.

21 MR. ROISMAN: Not,the generic implication of 22 whether or not this procedure was deficient, whether other 23 procedures might also have been deficient with regard to

'24 paint coating?

25 MR. MC CRACKEN: The number of procedures ACE.FEDERAi. REPORTERS, INC.

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24941.0 .

KSW 221 ,

1 associated with paicts and coatings are not that many.

2 There are a very specific list of what applie's to the i

3 paints and coatings.

'4 MR. ROISMAN:

But you found that one was 5 deficient. My question is:

How would you know whether 6

s . should you find a generic implication that they were all i

7 deficient by looking at only the one?

8 MR. MC CRACKEN:

The basic procedures for 9

applying the coatings, the ones that are used were 10 referenced in either one or more allegations. So the 11 coatings procedures that were used with their revi.* ions 12 , were reviewed.

i j 13 MR. ROISMAN: What you are saying, my example 14 l doesn't work because you looked at all'the procedures anyway?

! 15 MR. MC CRACKEN:

To the best of my knowledge, wo 16 looked at the procedures associated with applying coatings

17 i

throughout the time they were applied.

18 MR. ROISMAN:

Well, to save time, why don't you

.. 19 give me an instance in which you did not look at everything 20 related to paint coatings but looked at a piece of it and 21 found that piece deficient and then help me understand how, 22 if you never got to the reason why the piece was deficient, i

23

! yo'u knew that you had found the breadth of' the generic 24 implications.

! -. 25 MR. MC CRACKENs The sampling that we took I i l

l l

l l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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14941.0 CSW 222 1

across the seven categories we considered sufficient to 2

conclude that the paints and coatings area had difficulties 3 3 in virtually all the seven categories: that the amount of 4

coatings in the exempt log were excessive, so we had'

  • 5 broadened the scope of our review to well beyond any -

6 specific allegation or procedure in making those 7 conclusions.

8 MR. ROISMAN: .

Is there any -- if I had asked you 9

divide the paint coatings area into categories, would there 10 be any additional categories you would have to put in to 11 cover all of it char. the seven li,sted on pages 7 and 8 of 12 the SSER7 13 MR. MC CRACKENs No, that covers the total area 14 or things you would consider in applying coatings.

15 MR. ROISMAN: Is it fair to say the total 16 generic implication of the SSER conclusions is that the 17 entire paint coatings area was deficient?

18 MR. MC CRACKEN: That the documentation and 19 traceability that is inadequate to demonstrate that it is '*

20 qualified.

21 KR. ROISMAN:

So that the entire area is '

22 indeterminant because of traceability documentation 23 deficiencies.

  • 24 MR. MC CRACKEN: Large areas. We did not go to 25 the point of trying to determine how much is qualified

. n9 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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KSW 223 1

because once we had concluded in appendix L that it no 2'

longer needed to be qualified, that wasn't a necessary step.

3 But you could go through and try to detennine how much is 4 qualified. t 5 MR. ROISMAN: Why don't we E t op there for the 6 nigt.

. and start again in the mor'ning. ' Thank you very much.

7 MR. NOONAN: I have a few things for the record.

8 Tomorrow Mr. Keimig will be here in the morning.

9 MR. ROISMAN:

W'e can take him after we finish 10 here.

11 MR NOONAN: For the racord, the applicant has -

12 indicated they do not wish to comment at'this time.

13 4 Finally, we're going to meet at the Holiday Inn in Bethesda 14 at 9:00. One block away. .

15 *

(whereupon, at 5:10. the meeting was concluded, 16 to reconvene at 9:00 a.*m., Wednesday, November 20, 1985.)

17 -

18 19 20 .

.a 21 22 23 24 25 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

n2 3c.nco Nadoemde Coveruse soo D M add - --

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

  • This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY -COMMISSION in the matter of

, NAME OF PROCEEDING: MEETING OF NRC STAFF WITH CASE DOCKET NO.:

PLACE: . BETHESDA, MARYLAND DATE: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1985 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transc ipt thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory CommJ.ssion.

I

< si.tu ) a 00,64

,. (TYPED)

RATRIE S. WELLER Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Reporter's Affiliation i

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  • 11/19/85 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WCLEAR RE3ULATORY COPE:SSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al.

(Application for an (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Operating License)

Station, Units 1 and 2)  !

CASE's (Docket 1) Comments -

to Be Bound into Transcript of 1RC Staff / CASE Meeting in Bethesda

  • November 19 and 20, 1985 CASE (Docket 1) ask that this pleading and the attached 10/23/85 Joint Stipulation of Staff and CASE (Request for Subpoenas) be bound into the t

transcript of the November 19 and 20 meeting. ,

As noted in the attached Stipulation, this is to be a joint Docket 1 and 2 seating and no other siallar meeting will be sought by CASE, as to the issues discussed at the meeting, with these staff persons; and CASE's Washington representatives (Mr. Roissan and Ms. Garde) will be asking questions for both dockets. CASE in Docket 1 will rely upon our representatives in Docket 2 to sesure themselves that the terms of the Scipulation have been fully met.

CASE also wants to remind the Staff that (as CASE's primary representative in Docket 1 stated during the discussions prior to the

,10/23/85 Joint Scipulation), CASE in Docket 1 might went to ask a few additional questions either in writing or informally (although we will not seek any other similar meeting'as to the issues discussed at the seecing, 1

1

._,,__.._,..,-,____-,,.,,,-.,_,_c..,_.,--.,,., _ . . _ _ _ . , - - , . _ . _ - , , , , , , , _ , , . - _ _ . . _ , , - - - _ , - _

4 I

1

, with these staff persons) af ter we have received, and had time to review, the transcipt of the November 19-20 meeting.

l .

Respectfun y subaltted, p s.) Juanita Ellis, President

_-h_. fA$h '

  • CASE (Citizens Association for Sound .
- Energy) 1426 S. Folk -

Dallas, Texas 75224 214/946-9446 I

Atesebment ces Service List

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e 0

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_ . . ..- - - ___._y_.-_3-,.,_.%,.m..e.,_ _ _ , , , . ._ .7__,,.--_w-,..---.--,y

l October 23, 1985 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

  • NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION v ,

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

r )

  • TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING ) Docket Nos. 50-445-1 & 2 COMPANY, et al. )

) and 50-446-1 & 2 (Comanche Peak Steam Electric )

Station, Units 1 and 2) )

JOINTSTIPULATIONOFSTAh'FANDCASE *

(Recuest for Subcoenas)

Tnis stipulation is to confirm the agreement that we have reached in regards to CASE's Request for Subpoenas.

1. CASE agrees to withdraw the pending request for
subpoenas.

4

2. The informal meeting with the staff which had been scheduled for October 21 and 22 will be held November 19 and 20,

.i

, 1985. The meeting will be held at the NRC's Bethesda offices g , (time and place to be announced by the staff) . The meetings will be open to the public, and will be transcribed.

3. The staff agrees to produce the documents requested in the subpoenas as soon as reasonably practicable. To the excent the docu-ment's requested are produced in response co'the' outstanding FOIA request, such production will fulfull this obligation by the staff.

t I

l l

l

l

4. The staff agrees that it will not issue any final cyproval of the Applicant's CPRT program plan until CASE has conducted the November 19, 20, 1985 meeting and had a reasonable opportunity to forward *its conunents on the Issue specific Action ,

Plans. .

5. The meeting will be a joint Docket 1 and 2 meeting and '

no other similar meeting.will be sought by CASE, as to the issues i discussed at the meeting, sith these staff persons. CASE's .

Washington representatives will be asking questions for both dockets. ,

4. The arrangements for this meeting do not in any way preclude either the staff or CASE from asserting their separate positions about other issues now pending before the Board, including the question of whether or not relevancy questions are to be determined by docket or the overall case.

WW f /

4 tuart Treby, Esy. # Anthony I R is ,

Esq. _

Nuclear Regulat p Cesumisisen .- Citizens oci tion for l Sound rgy /

l ,

\

l. ,

b l . '

4 1

I

' _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -

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