ML20297A627

Issuance of Amendment No. 301 Removal of Cyber Security Plan License Condition

ML20297A627
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	12/04/2020
From:	Tanya Smith Reactor Decommissioning Branch
To:	Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co
Smith T
References
EPID L-2019-LLA-0251
Download: ML20297A627 (12)

Text

December 4, 2020 Mr. Bryan C. Hanson Senior Vice President Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nucleartbs1 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT:

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 301 RE: REMOVAL OF CYBER SECURITY PLAN LICENSE CONDITION (EPID L-2019-LLA-0251)

Dear Mr. Hanson:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 301 to Renewed Facility License No. DPR-50 for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1), in response to your application dated October 31, 2019 (Agencywide Document Access and Management System Accession No. ML19305A889.)

The amendment removes the Cyber Security Plan from TMI-1 License Condition 2.c.(3).

A copy of our related safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions next biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely, Theodore Smith, Project Manager Reactor Decommissioning Branch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recover, and Waste Program Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No. 50-289

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 301 to DPR-50

2. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv

ML20297A627 *concurrence by email OFFICE NMSS/DUWP/RDB/PM NSIR/DPCP/CSP/BC OGC NAME TSmith* JBeardsley* KGamin*

DATE 10/27/2020 08/06/2020 11/05/2020 OFFICE NMSS/DUWP/RDB /BC NMSS/DUWP/RDB/PM NAME BWatson* TSmith*

DATE 11/05/2020 12/04/2020 EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC DOCKET NO. 50-289 THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY LICENSE Amendment No. 301 Renewed License No. DPR-50

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensee), dated October 31, 2019, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to paragraphs 2.c.(2) and 2.c.(3) of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-50 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 301 are hereby incorporated in the license. The Exelon Generation Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

(3) Physical Protection Exelon Generation Company shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822), and the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans1, submitted by letter dated May 17, 2006, is entitled: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 3. The set contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21.

3. This license amendment is effective 488 days following the permanent cessation of power operation of TMI-1 and shall be implemented within 60 days of the effective date.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Bruce A. Watson, CHP, Chief Reactor Decommissioning Branch Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recover, and Waste Program Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachment:

Changes to the Renewed Facility License No. DPR-50 Date of Issuance:

December 4, 2020

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 301 THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1 RENEWED FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-50 DOCKET NO. 50-289 Replace the following page of the Renewed Facility License with the revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 3 3 4 4

Unit 1 to TMI Unit 2 under this provision shall be limited to: (1) outage-related items (such as contaminated scaffolding, tools, protective clothing, portable shielding and decontamination equipment); and (2) other equipment belonging to TMI Unit 1 when storage of such equipment at TMl-2 is deemed necessary for load handling or contamination control considerations; (4) Exelon Generation Company, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess at the TMI Unit 1 or Unit 2 site, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials that were produced by the operation of either unit.

Radioactive waste may be moved from TMI Unit 2 to TMI Unit 1 under this provision for collection, processing (including decontamination), packaging, and temporary storage prior to disposal. Radioactive waste that may be moved from TMI Unit 1 to TMI Unit 2 under this provision shall be limited to: (1) dry active waste (DAW) temporarily moved to TMI Unit 2 during waste collection activities, and (2) contaminated liquid contained in shared system piping and tanks. Radioactive waste that may be moved from TMI Unit 1 to TMI Unit 2 under this provision shall not include spent fuel, spent resins, filter sludge, evaporator bottoms, contaminated oil, or contaminated liquid filters.

The storage of radioactive materials or radwaste generated at TMI Unit 2 and stored at TMI Unit 1 shall not result in a source term that, if released, would exceed that previously analyzed in the UFSAR in terms of off-site dose consequences.

The storage of radioactive materials or radwaste generated at TMI Unit 1 and stored at TMI Unit 2 shall not result in a source term that, if released, would exceed that previously analyzed in the PDMS SAR for TMI Unit 2 in terms of off-site dose consequences.

c. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Section 50.54 and 50.59 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) DELETED (2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 301, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Exelon Generation Company shall maintain the facility in accordance with the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS).

Amendment No. 301 Renewed License DPR-50

(3) Physical Protection Exelon Generation Company shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822), and the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). The combined set of plans1, submitted by letter dated May 17, 2006, is entitled: "Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Revision 3." The set contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21.

(4) DELETED (5) DELETED (6) lnservice Testing - DELETED (7) Aircraft Movements - DELETED (8) Repaired Steam Generators - DELETED (9) Long Range Planning Program - DELETED Sale and License Transfer Conditions (10) DELETED (11) DELETED (12) DELETED (13) DELETED (14) DELETED 1

The Training and Qualification Plan and Safeguards Contingency Plan are Appendices to the Security Plan.

Amendment No. 301 Renewed License No. DPR-50

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 301 TO RENEWED FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-50 EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC.

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-289

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 20, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17171A151), pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.82(a)(1)(i), Exelon Generation Company, LLC. (Exelon) provided formal notification to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, or the Commission) that it planned to permanently cease power operations at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1) on or about September 30, 2019. Exelon permanently ceased power operations at TMI-1 on September 20, 2019. By letter dated September 26, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19269E480), Exelon certified that all fuel was permanently removed from the TMI-1 reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP) on September 26, 2019. Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR Part 50 license for TMI-1 no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite at the TMI-1 facility in the SFP.

Exelon plans to store the spent fuel in the SFP until construction of an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) is completed. Spent fuel will then be transferred to the ISFSI for dry storage until it can be transported offsite.

By letter dated October 31, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19305A889), Exelon requested a license amendment to Renewed Facility License No. DPR-50 for TMI-1. The proposed license amendment would remove reference to the Cyber Security Plan (CSP) and update the associated License Condition 2.c (3) (hereafter, the cyber security license condition) in the renewed facility license. This would allow Exelon to terminate the TMI-1 CSP and associated activities at the site. The proposed change is based on TMI-1s lowered risk profile for possible accidents or offsite radiological release due to its permanently defueled status and the continued radioactive decay of the remaining spent fuel.

The NRC staff initially reviewed and approved the licensees original CSP implementation Enclosure 2

schedule by Amendment No. 275 dated August 10, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861341), concurrent with the incorporation of the CSP into the facilitys current licensing basis. The NRC staff then reviewed and approved the licensees current CSP implementation schedule by Amendment No. 288 dated July 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15153A282) extending the completion date for Milestone 8 to December 31, 2017. The NRC staff then approved Amendment No. 289 by letter dated October 1, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15225A158) to correct language that was missing from the text in the issuance of Amendment No. 288.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The NRC staff considered the following regulatory requirements and guidance during its review of the October 31, 2019 license amendment application to remove the TMI-1 CSP license condition:

• The regulation under 10 CFR 73.54, Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks, requires that as of November 23, 2009, each licensee currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant under 10 CFR Part 50 submit a cyber security plan for Commission review and approval.

• SECY-12-0088, The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Cyber Security Roadmap, dated June 25, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12135A050), states, in part, that [b]y regulation, dry cask storage in [independent spent fuel storage installations] allows spent fuel that has already been cooled in the spent fuel pool for 1 year to be surrounded by inert gas inside a storage cask. Licensees that are subject to 10 CFR 72.212, Conditions of General License Issued Under § 72.210, (i.e., licenses limited to storage of spent fuel in casks) must also comply with specific portions of 10 CFR 73.55,

[Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors against Radiological Sabotage] requirements for physical security and the ASM

[additional security measure] Orders, but are not subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.54, which specifically applies to operating reactors and COL (combined operating license) applicants.

• A memorandum dated December 5, 2016, from the NRC Executive Director for Operations, Cyber Security Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants (ADAMS Accession No. ML16172A284) was prepared to inform the Commission as to how the staff intended to apply 10 CFR 73.54, Protection of digital computer and communications systems and networks, to nuclear power reactor licensees who have transitioned from an operating status to a decommissioning status.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Licensees Requested Change In its request dated October 31, 2019, Exelon requested the removal of the existing cyber security license condition from the TMI-1 renewed facility license.

In that request, Exelon stated that following permanent shutdown of TMI-1 and removal of spent fuel from the reactor, the spectrum of possible accidents is significantly reduced, and the risk of an offsite radiological release is significantly lower for a permanently defueled reactor. Exelon 2

asserted that the only design-basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological release at TMI-1 is the fuel handling accident which is predicated on spent fuel being stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Exelon stated that spent fuel at TMI-1 is currently stored in the SFP.

Exelon asserted in this configuration, the spectrum of possible accident transients and accidents is significantly reduced compared to an operating nuclear power reactor.

Exelon performed an analysis that concluded that 365 days after shutdown, the radiological consequence of the fuel handling accident would not exceed the limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. Exelon asserted that once TMI-1 has been permanently shut down for greater than 365 days, the possibility of an offsite radiological release from a design basis accident that could exceed the EPA PAGs is significantly reduced. Exelons analysis concluded that after sufficient cooling time following cessation of reactor operations (488 days), there is little chance that the spent fuel in the SFP could heat up to clad ignition temperature within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, which is sufficient time for mitigation strategies to prevent spent fuel heat-up damage.

Exelon further noted that this rationale is similar to the rationale used to justify a reduction of emergency preparedness requirements during decommissioning (as detailed in NUREG-1738, Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066)), and is documented in safety evaluations associated with decommissioning plant emergency preparedness exemption requests.

By letter dated July 1, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19182A104), and as supplemented by letters dated October 9, 2019, and December 10, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML19282C285 and ML19344C115, respectively), Exelon submitted an analysis to the NRC of the adiabatic heatup of spent fuel scenario in support of requested exemptions from specific requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 for certain emergency planning requirements as appropriate for a decommissioning facility. The analysis was reviewed and approved by the NRC staff who found that after 488 days, more than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> would be available before an offsite release might occur. Therefore, the effective date of the exemption to the emergency planning requirements at TMI-1 was modified to 488 days following the permanent cessation of power operations (ADAMS Accession No. ML20244A293). The conclusion that resulted from the NRC staffs analysis was that due to the length of time it would take for the adiabatic heat-up to occur, there is ample time for the licensee to respond to any partial draindown event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup, or providing spray. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is not deemed credible.

Exelon also asserted there is a reduced cyber security risk due, in part, to the fact there are fewer critical digital assets at a decommissioning reactor in comparison to the number of critical digital assets at an operating reactor. The licensee stated that once spent fuel is moved from the reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel pool, the digital computers and communication systems and networks that require cyber protection are primarily those associated with security and emergency preparedness functions, and those safety systems that support operation of the spent fuel pool. Once the spent fuel has sufficiently decayed, the potential consequences of a cyber-attack are significantly reduced.

3.2 NRC Staff Evaluation of Requested Change The NRC staff evaluated the Exelons application using the regulatory requirements and 3

guidance cited in Section 2.0 of this safety evaluation. The Cyber Security Rule, as contained in 10 CFR 73.54, applies to licensees currently licensed to operate a nuclear power plant. The NRC staff has determined that 10 CFR 73.54 does not apply to reactor licensees that have submitted certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel under 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) or 10 CFR 52.110(a)(1), and whose certifications have been docketed by the NRC. Since the certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel have been docketed, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the TMI-1 license no longer authorizes use of the facility for power operation or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that the Cyber Security Rule at 10 CFR 73.54 no longer applies to TMI-1.

Exelon further determined that, after 365 days from permanent shutdown the fuel will have cooled in the SFP for a sufficient amount of time such that no design-basis accident could have radiological consequences that exceed the EPA PAGs. Exelon completed site-specific analyses supporting the conclusion that a zirconium fire would be highly unlikely in the event of a beyond-design-basis draindown scenario. The NRC staffs previous reviews and approvals of Exelons associated analyses and the results are included in letter to Exelon dated December 1, 2020, (ADAMS Accession No. ML20244A292). The NRC staff previously verified analysis and calculations provided by Exelon that 488 days following permanent cessation of power operations, the spent fuel has decayed beyond the minimum cooling time that would allow sufficient time (10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) to mitigate an SFP drain down in the adiabatic case. Accordingly, if a cyber-attack were to result in the draining of the SFP, the consequences of a cyber-attack 488 days after permanent shutdown would be much lower than while the plant was operating or the fuel in the SPF was not as cool.

Based on its review of Exelons submissions, the NRC staff concludes that Exelons request to remove the existing cyber security license condition from TMI-1 Renewed Facility License No DPR-50 is acceptable and consistent with maintaining adequate protection of the public health and safety and the common defense and security.

3.3 Revision to License Condition Paragraph 2.c.(3)

By letter dated October 31, 2019, Exelon proposed to modify Paragraph 2.c.(3) of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-50 to remove the license condition requiring the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-approved CSP.

The license condition in Paragraph 2.c.(3) of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-50, for TMI-1 is modified to delete the following statement:

Exelon Generation Company shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54 (p).

The Exelon Generation Company CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 275 and modified by License Amendment No. 288.

This modification will take effect 488 days following the permanent cessation of power operations.

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4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvanias official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on November 5, 2020. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment relates solely to safeguards matters and does not involve any significant construction impacts. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on January 28, 2020 (85 FR 5053).

Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(12). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: S. Coker, NSIR Date: August 2020 5