05000263/FIN-2014002-08: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = B Jose, C Zoia, J Beavers, J Corujo, | | Inspector = B Jose, C Zoia, J Beavers, J Corujo Sandin, K Riemer, K Walton, M Bielby, M Jones, M Ziolkowski, P Voss, P Zurawski, S Bell, A Shaikh | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The licensee identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions. Criterion XVI requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, on February 11, 2014, the licensee identified that they had failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality where a single failure could result in the EDGs picking up load on the essential busses in a time frame longer than what is required by TS SR 3.8.1.12. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.12 states that when required, the EDGs auto-start and energize permanently connected loads in approximately 10 seconds. Specifically, after the NRC identified an NCV on May 8, 2012, where required time delay limits would be exceeded in the sites EDG/1AR degraded voltage transfer logic, the licensees extent of condition failed to identify and correct a deficiency where relays in the EDG/1AR loss of voltage transfer logic could result in the EDGs energizing the connected loads in a slightly longer time period than allowed (< 11 seconds). The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Design Control and Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding represented a loss of system and/or function as defined for the EDGs in the TS bases; however, a detailed risk evaluation determined that there was no change in core damage frequency because exceeding the time delay would not impact the Probabilistic Risk Assessment function to respond to a loss of offsite power event. As a result, the inspectors concluded that the finding had very low safety significance. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP, and declared both EDGs inoperable until action was taken to remove 1AR from service, and relays with acceptable time delays could be installed. | | description = The licensee identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions. Criterion XVI requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, on February 11, 2014, the licensee identified that they had failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality where a single failure could result in the EDGs picking up load on the essential busses in a time frame longer than what is required by TS SR 3.8.1.12. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.12 states that when required, the EDGs auto-start and energize permanently connected loads in approximately 10 seconds. Specifically, after the NRC identified an NCV on May 8, 2012, where required time delay limits would be exceeded in the sites EDG/1AR degraded voltage transfer logic, the licensees extent of condition failed to identify and correct a deficiency where relays in the EDG/1AR loss of voltage transfer logic could result in the EDGs energizing the connected loads in a slightly longer time period than allowed (< 11 seconds). The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Design Control and Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using IMC 0609, the inspectors determined that the finding represented a loss of system and/or function as defined for the EDGs in the TS bases; however, a detailed risk evaluation determined that there was no change in core damage frequency because exceeding the time delay would not impact the Probabilistic Risk Assessment function to respond to a loss of offsite power event. As a result, the inspectors concluded that the finding had very low safety significance. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP, and declared both EDGs inoperable until action was taken to remove 1AR from service, and relays with acceptable time delays could be installed. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:50, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2014002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Jose C Zoia J Beavers J Corujo Sandin K Riemer K Walton M Bielby M Jones M Ziolkowski P Voss P Zurawski S Bell A Shaikh |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |