05000306/FIN-2011005-02: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Appendix R Fire Barrier Degraded Between Fire Areas 118 | | title = Appendix R Fire Barrier Degraded Between Fire Areas 118 and 128 | ||
| docket = 05000306, 05000282 | | docket = 05000306, 05000282 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000306/2011005 | | inspection report = IR 05000306/2011005 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.05 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.05 | ||
| Inspector = C Moore, C Thomas, D Passehl, D Szwarc, J Beavers, J Jandovitz, K Riemer, K Stoedter, M Phalen, P Zurawski, R Langstaff, V Myers, A Dunlop, A Shaikhr, | | Inspector = C Moore, C Thomas, D Passehl, D Szwarc, J Beavers, J Jandovitz, K Riemer, K Stoedter, M Phalen, P Zurawski, R Langstaff, V Myers, A Dunlop, A Shaikhr, Bakers Bell, D Mcneil, D Oliver, K Riemer, K Stoedter, M Phalen, P Voss, P Zurawski | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a URI due the failure to have an adequate fire barrier between Fire Areas 118 and 128. Description: During an inspection of Fire Areas 118 and 128 on November 8, 2011, the inspectors identified that the barrier between the two fire areas was degraded such that it failed to provide the required 3-hour fire rating. Fire Area 118 contained electrical bus 26 which was used to power Train B safeguards 4160 V equipment. Fire Zone 128 contained electrical bus 27 which was used to provide power to the 121 motor driven cooling water pump. Plant design allowed electrical bus 27 to be powered from either electrical bus 25 (Train A safeguards 4160 V equipment) or electrical bus 26. The inspectors questioned licensee personnel regarding the adequacy of the fire barrier between Fire Areas 118 and 128. The licensee confirmed that the beam at the top of the wall between the two fire areas was not filled with a fire rated material and, therefore, could not be considered a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The licensee initiated CAP 1312153, documented the fire impairment, and established an hourly fire watch as a compensatory measure. The fire watch remained in place at the conclusion of the inspection period. As discussed above, electrical bus 27 can be powered from electrical bus 25 or electrical bus 26. The electrical configuration of the bus used to supply power to electrical bus 27 was controlled through the use of a KIRK-KEY switch. The use of a KIRK-KEY switch also prevented electrical bus 27 from being powered by electrical bus 25 and electrical bus 26 at the same time. The licensee had previously assumed that a fire in Fire Area 118 or Fire Area 128 would result in the failure of Train B safeguards equipment. On December 9, 2011, the licensee identified the potential for a loss of direct current (DC) control power to electrical bus 25 (Train A) if a fire occurred in Fire Area 128 and electrical bus 27 was powered by electrical bus 25. Due to the degraded fire barrier between Fire Area 118 and Fire Area 128, the same fire could also result in a loss of electrical bus 26. This resulted in a condition the licensee had not analyzed. The licensee initiated CAP 1316877 to document this concern. The licensee continued to evaluate this concern at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspectors planned to review the licensees evaluation to determine whether the licensee was in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R. As a result, this issue was determined to be unresolved pending the inspectors review of the licensees evaluation results | | description = The inspectors identified a URI due the failure to have an adequate fire barrier between Fire Areas 118 and 128. Description: During an inspection of Fire Areas 118 and 128 on November 8, 2011, the inspectors identified that the barrier between the two fire areas was degraded such that it failed to provide the required 3-hour fire rating. Fire Area 118 contained electrical bus 26 which was used to power Train B safeguards 4160 V equipment. Fire Zone 128 contained electrical bus 27 which was used to provide power to the 121 motor driven cooling water pump. Plant design allowed electrical bus 27 to be powered from either electrical bus 25 (Train A safeguards 4160 V equipment) or electrical bus 26. The inspectors questioned licensee personnel regarding the adequacy of the fire barrier between Fire Areas 118 and 128. The licensee confirmed that the beam at the top of the wall between the two fire areas was not filled with a fire rated material and, therefore, could not be considered a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The licensee initiated CAP 1312153, documented the fire impairment, and established an hourly fire watch as a compensatory measure. The fire watch remained in place at the conclusion of the inspection period. As discussed above, electrical bus 27 can be powered from electrical bus 25 or electrical bus 26. The electrical configuration of the bus used to supply power to electrical bus 27 was controlled through the use of a KIRK-KEY switch. The use of a KIRK-KEY switch also prevented electrical bus 27 from being powered by electrical bus 25 and electrical bus 26 at the same time. The licensee had previously assumed that a fire in Fire Area 118 or Fire Area 128 would result in the failure of Train B safeguards equipment. On December 9, 2011, the licensee identified the potential for a loss of direct current (DC) control power to electrical bus 25 (Train A) if a fire occurred in Fire Area 128 and electrical bus 27 was powered by electrical bus 25. Due to the degraded fire barrier between Fire Area 118 and Fire Area 128, the same fire could also result in a loss of electrical bus 26. This resulted in a condition the licensee had not analyzed. The licensee initiated CAP 1316877 to document this concern. The licensee continued to evaluate this concern at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspectors planned to review the licensees evaluation to determine whether the licensee was in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R. As a result, this issue was determined to be unresolved pending the inspectors review of the licensees evaluation results | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:43, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000306/2011005 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Moore C Thomas D Passehl D Szwarc J Beavers J Jandovitz K Riemer K Stoedter M Phalen P Zurawski R Langstaff V Myers A Dunlop A Shaikhr Bakers Bell D Mcneil D Oliver K Riemer K Stoedter M Phalen P Voss P Zurawski |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |