05000456/FIN-2011003-07: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.19 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.19 | ||
| Inspector = A Garmoe, D Betancourt, E Duncan, J Benjamin, J Gilliam, J Robbins, M Perry, N Adorno, N Feliz, | | Inspector = A Garmoe, D Betancourt, E Duncan, J Benjamin, J Gilliam, J Robbins, M Perry, N Adorno, N Feliz Adorno, R Ng, T Bilik, T Go, V Meghani | ||
| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was self-revealed on April 21, 2011, when licensee personnel failed to suspend a reactor vessel head lift after it became apparent that there was a large deviation between the cranes actual load cell indication and the expected indication. Immediate corrective actions for this issue included resetting the head on the reactor vessel flange, and resolving the load cell indication issue prior to lifting the head again. The licensee also entered this issue into the corrective action program as IR 1206020. The inspectors determined that the failure to adhere to a station quality procedure was a performance deficiency. This issue was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, and determined that the finding was Green since it did not require a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Decision Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area (H.1(b)) because licensee personnel failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making after identifying a large deviation between actual and expected load cell indications during a head lift evolution. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was self-revealed on April 21, 2011, when licensee personnel failed to suspend a reactor vessel head lift after it became apparent that there was a large deviation between the cranes actual load cell indication and the expected indication. Immediate corrective actions for this issue included resetting the head on the reactor vessel flange, and resolving the load cell indication issue prior to lifting the head again. The licensee also entered this issue into the corrective action program as IR 1206020. The inspectors determined that the failure to adhere to a station quality procedure was a performance deficiency. This issue was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, and determined that the finding was Green since it did not require a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Decision Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area (H.1(b)) because licensee personnel failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making after identifying a large deviation between actual and expected load cell indications during a head lift evolution. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2011003 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Garmoe D Betancourt E Duncan J Benjamin J Gilliam J Robbins M Perry N Adorno N Feliz Adorno R Ng T Bilik T Go V Meghani |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |