05000456/FIN-2011003-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Potential Design Control Violation Related to Safety-Related Door Impairment |
Description | The inspectors identified an Unresolved Item (URI) related to the licensees control of barrier doors during activities that involved the transport of equipment between spaces. Specifically, the licensees barrier impairment program permitted barrier doors to be open for up to 30 minutes for the transport of station equipment without the performance of an evaluation. At the conclusion of this inspection period, the licensee had not provided a regulatory basis for the allowance. While reviewing IR 1185016, Non-Conservatisms in the Turbine Building HELB [High Energy Line Break] Analyses, the inspectors questioned the policy for moving equipment through a door that protects 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, safety-related systems and components from the effects of fire, flooding, and a high energy line break, or that provides a ventilation barrier needed to support a safety function. Step C.10 of BwAP 1110-03, Plant Barrier Impairment Program, Revision 20, stated Doors MAY be opened without a PBI (Plant Barrier Impairment) PERMIT during normal passage (30 minutes maximum) of personnel or equipment. The door SHOULD be closed at termination of attendance. If the door must be blocked or tied open, then a PBI PERMIT SHALL be required. Plant alarms or special controls SHOULD be considered before holding a door open. When actions were implemented to address the non-conservatism issues in IR 1185016, the licensee issued Revision 21 to BwAP 1110-03, which added the phrase With the exception of HELB doors... to the beginning of Step C.10, which had the unintended effect of prohibiting all passage through HELB doors without a PBI evaluation. This issue was identified by the inspectors and was entered into the licensees CAP. Procedure CC-AA-201, Plant Barrier Control Program, Revision 6, defined an impaired barrier as, A barrier that is inoperable such that it cannot fully perform its intended design function. Regulatory Guideline 1.189, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, defined an impairment as, The degradation of a fire protection system or feature that adversely affects the ability of the system or feature to perform its intended function. Additionally, the inspectors were not convinced that the licensee had established adequate measures to ensure design basis events (e.g., HELB, fire, flooding, etc.) would not impact safety-related or augmented quality structures, systems, and components in a unacceptable manner as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. For instance, the licensee had not provided adequate assurance that a HELB door would shut, post event, if the licensee was moving a large piece of equipment through a door (e.g. breakers, scaffold poles, hoses, etc). At the end of the inspection period, it was unclear if the licensees policy was an adequate design control measure with an acceptable exception. The scope of this issue was limited to the transport and passage of equipment, and did not apply to personnel. This URI will remain open pending a more detailed review of the licensees policy, NRC regulatory requirements, and accepted standards and practices. (URI 05000456/2011003-05; 05000457/2011003-05, Potential Design Control Violation Related to Safety-Related Door Impairment) |
Site: | Braidwood |
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Report | IR 05000456/2011003 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
Type: | URI: |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop A Garmoe B Bartlett B Palagi E Duncan J Benjamin J Nance M Learn M Perry R Jicklin T Go V Megania Garmoed Betancourt E Duncan J Benjamin J Gilliam J Robbins M Perry N Adorno N Feliz Adorno R Ng T Bilik T Go V Meghani |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2011003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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