05000456/FIN-2011003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Follow Procedural Standards Related to the Storage of Outside Material that could Impact Offsite Power Availability |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when licensee personnel failed to adhere to housekeeping and severe weather abnormal operating procedures to ensure specified materials were not stored in the vicinity of the station offsite power transformers. The licensee had implemented these standards to reduce the possibility of material impacting offsite power during severe weather conditions, such as high winds. Corrective actions included the immediate removal of the material from the prohibited areas, reinforcement of the procedural standards to the licensees staff, and entering the issue into the corrective action program as Issue Reports (IRs) 1221226 and 1221435. The inspectors determined that the failure to adhere to procedural standards was a performance deficiency. This issue was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, and because this finding was associated with the Transient Initiator area of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area (H.4(c)) because the licensee did not ensure adequate supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety was supported. |
Site: | Braidwood ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000456/2011003 Section 1R01 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Garmoe D Betancourt E Duncan J Benjamin J Gilliam J Robbins M Perry N Adorno N Feliz Adorno R Ng T Bilik T Go V Meghania Garmoeb Bartlett D Szwarc E Duncan J Benjamin J Robbins M Perry R Langstaff R Ng T Go V Meghani |
CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2011003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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