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{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20153D644 | |||
| issue date = 02/18/1986 | |||
| title = SALP Rept 50-293/85-99 for Oct 1984 - Oct 1985 | |||
| author name = | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000293 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-293-85-99, NUDOCS 8602240206 | |||
| package number = ML20153D628 | |||
| document type = SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 54 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000293/1985099]] | |||
=Text= | |||
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I U. S.: NUCLEAR REGU'LATORY COMMISSION | |||
; REGION I~ | |||
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! SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE | |||
: INSPECTION REPORT 50-293/85-99 | |||
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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY | |||
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PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION | |||
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ASSESSMENT PERIOD: OCTOBER 1,-1984_- OCTOBER'31, 1985 | |||
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BOARD MEETING DATE: . DECEMBER 18,'1985 | |||
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ' | |||
Page | |||
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................... ~1 | |||
A. Purpose and 0verview:....................................... 1 | |||
8. SALP Board Members ......................................... 1 | |||
C. Background ................................................. 2 | |||
II. CRITERIA ........................................................ 4 | |||
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS .............................................. 6 | |||
A. Facility Performance ....................................... 6 | |||
B. Ove ra l l Faci l i ty Eval ua t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 | |||
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ............................................ 9, | |||
A. Plant Operations .......................................... 10 | |||
B. R a d i o l o g i c a l Co n t ro l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 | |||
C. Maintenance and Modifications ............................. 20 | |||
D. S u rv e i l l a n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 | |||
E. Emergency preparedness ............................. ...... 26 | |||
F. Security and Safeguards .... .............................. 28 | |||
G. Refueling and Outage Menagement ........................... 30 | |||
H. Li cen si ng Acti vi ti e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 | |||
V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES ...................................'35 | |||
A. Investigation and Allegation Review ....................... 35 | |||
B. Escalated En forcement Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 | |||
C. Management Conferences ..... .............................. 35 | |||
D. Licensee Event Reports .................................... 36 | |||
E. Operating Reactors Licensing Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 | |||
TABLES | |||
Table 1 Tabular Li sting of LERs by Functional Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T1-1 | |||
Table 1? LER Synopsis ............................ .............. T2-1 | |||
a | |||
Tt'le 3. Inspection Hours Summary ................................ T3-1 | |||
~ | |||
Table 4 Enforcement Summary ..................................... T4-1 | |||
Table 5 Enforcement Data ........................................ ~TS-1 | |||
Table 6 Inspection Activities ................................... T6-1 | |||
Table-7 Plant Shutdowns ......................................... T7-1 | |||
FIGURE | |||
Figure 1 Pilgrim Unplanned Plant Shutdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F1-1 | |||
c___________-_-__--_--_____---__--------------------------------------------- | |||
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4 | |||
I. INTRODUCTION | |||
. | |||
A. Purpose and Overview | |||
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an integrated | |||
NRC staff' effort to collect the available observations and data on a i | |||
periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based upon this.in- | |||
formation. SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory processes-used to | |||
ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations. SALPlis intended to | |||
be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for' allocating | |||
NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance to the licensee manage- | |||
ment to promote quality and safety of~ plant operation. | |||
' | |||
An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members-listed below, met on | |||
December 18, 1985, to review the collecticn of. performance observations | |||
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and data to assess the licensee performance in accordance witn-the guid- | |||
ance.in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Per- | |||
fo rma nce" . A summary of the guidance and evaluation criteria is provided | |||
; in Section II of this report. | |||
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of'the licensee's safety per- | |||
formance at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for.the period October 1,-1984 | |||
through October 31, 1985. | |||
B. SALP Board Members | |||
Chairman: | |||
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP) | |||
Members: | |||
0. Ebneter, Director,-Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) | |||
W. Kane, Deputy Director, DRP | |||
E. Wenzirger, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3, DRP | |||
J. Joyner,-Chief Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division | |||
of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS) (part time) - | |||
R. Bellamy, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection | |||
Branch, DRSS (part time) | |||
L. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A,.DRP | |||
M. McBride, Senior Resident Inspector t | |||
W. Minners, Chief, Safety Protection Evaluation Branch, NRR | |||
P. Leech, Project Manager, NRR | |||
Other Attendees | |||
J.^ Johnson, Chief, Operational: Programs Section, DRS | |||
. G. Meyer,-Project Engineer, DRP | |||
W. Pasciak, Chief, Effluent Radiation-Protection Section, DRSS (part time) l | |||
+ l | |||
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--_._a-.-_-_.- - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , . _ . ~ . _ - .- - _ - . _ _ _ _ . _ . - - , - _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - | |||
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2 | |||
D. Sullivan, Performance Appraisal Section, Office of Inspection and | |||
Enforcement (OIE) | |||
13. Sharkey, Performance Appraisal Section, 0IE | |||
W. Lazarus, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, DRSS (part time) | |||
C. Background | |||
1. Licensee Activities | |||
The SALP a;sessment period began during a recirculation piping re- | |||
placement outage, ihe outage began in December 1983 and ended on | |||
December 24, 1984. Fuel was reloaded into the reactor core in | |||
November 1984. A hydrostatic pressure test of the reactor ccolant | |||
system and an integrated leakage test of the primary containment | |||
were' conducted in December 1984. On December 24, 1984, reactor | |||
criticality was established and a slow startup sequence was initi- | |||
ated. The reactor was briefly shut down on December 25, 1984, due | |||
to fluctuating reactor water level instruments. | |||
On January 1, 1985, the reactor was shutdown for seven days when | |||
loose debris was detected in the standby liquid control system | |||
(SLCS). Maintenance on leaking torus to drywell vacuum breakers | |||
was also conducted during the shutdown. The reactor was restarted | |||
on January 7, 1985 and reached full power on January 30, 1985. | |||
The reactor was subsequently shutdown between February 9 and 15, | |||
1985, to repair bearings in the "A" recirculation pump notor. | |||
During the startup on February 15, a primary coolant system leak | |||
was detected in a weld in the reactor vessel drain line. The | |||
shutdown was continued until February 17, 1985 when repairs were | |||
completed on the line. | |||
The reactor scrammed on March 15, 1985 due to a sticking reactor | |||
water level instrument manifold valve during a routine surveillance | |||
test. While the reactor was shut down, maintenance was conducted | |||
on the reactor water sample system (needed for a subsequent hydrogen | |||
injection test) and on secondary containment dampers. The plant | |||
was restarted on March 20, 1985, and operated until April 4, 1985 | |||
when the reactor scrammed due to high main turbine vibration. The | |||
plant was returned to service on April 5, 1985. | |||
On June 14, 1985, the reactor scrammed during low power maneuvers | |||
due to an inadvertent high reactor water level isolation. The plant | |||
was restarted on June 15 and operated until September 1,1985 when | |||
the reactor scrammed following a generator load rejection. The | |||
reactor was restarted five days later, following repairs to the "B" | |||
recirculation pump seal. The startup was halted and the reactor | |||
shutdown on September 5, 1985 for additional repairs to the "B" | |||
recirculation pamp seal. On September 7, 1985, the reactor was | |||
restarted and it operated until the end of the assessment period. | |||
.. , . . . . . .- , . . . ~ | |||
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A hydrogen injection experiment was conducted between May 9 and 13, | |||
1985 to test the effect of. feedwater hydrogen on plant . radiation | |||
levels. .The annual emergency preparedness _ exercise was' conducted | |||
< | |||
on September 5, 1985. Hurricane Gloria was in the vicinity of.the | |||
< | |||
plant on September 27, 1985. Wind speed. reached-75 miles per hour: - | |||
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onsite. Power was reduced to less than 25% and the generator was | |||
taken off.line. No. storm damage to the station occurred. | |||
< | |||
2. Inspection: Activities | |||
' | |||
Two NRC' resident inspectors-wsre assigned to the Pilgrim Nuclear- | |||
Power' Station between October 1984 and July 1985. One resident | |||
inspector was assigned between July and the end of the assessment | |||
period. The total-NRC inspection effort for the period was 3793 | |||
hours, distributed in the appraisal functional areas as shown in | |||
Table 3. This represents 3501. hours per twelve month pe. Ud. | |||
. | |||
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Team inspections were conducted during the assessment'pe'iad r to. | |||
examine the following areas: * | |||
-- | |||
Plant readiness for-restart from the 1984. recirculation pipe | |||
replacement outage, | |||
-- | |||
Emergency plan remedial drill, | |||
) -- | |||
Emergency planning program, | |||
-- | |||
Health physics program, | |||
( | |||
-- | |||
Licensee-vendor interactions, | |||
l | |||
-- | |||
Annual emergency plan' exercise, | |||
-- | |||
Radiochemistry program (using the NRC mobile laboratory), and | |||
3 | |||
-- | |||
Refuel bridge damage ~ . | |||
' | |||
Tabulations of violations and inspector activities are presented | |||
, | |||
in Tables 4 and 6, respectively. | |||
The area of fire protection was not rated this period since there l | |||
was no overall . inspection of the program. ' Inspection hours in this | |||
area were primarily limited to resident inspector observations in- | |||
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the plant'. Housekeeping was. considered in each of the appropriate | |||
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functional areas. ' | |||
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_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - __ - __ __:_- -_ .-_= | |||
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4. | |||
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4 | |||
II. CRITERIA | |||
Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional ar.eas, depending on; | |||
whether the facility is in a construction, preoperational, or operating phase. | |||
' | |||
Each functional , area normally represents areas significant. to nuclear. safety. | |||
and the environment, and are normal orogrammatic areas. Special areas may | |||
be added to highlight significant observations. | |||
One or more of the following evaluation criteria were used to assess each | |||
functional area. | |||
1. Management involvement and control in assuring quality | |||
2. Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint . | |||
. | |||
3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives | |||
: 4. Enforcement history | |||
5. Reporting and analysis of reportable events | |||
6. Staffing (including management) | |||
7. Training and qualification effectiveness | |||
Based upon the SALP Board assessment each functional-area evaluated is clas- | |||
sified into one of three performance categories. The definitions of these | |||
performance categories are: | |||
' | |||
Category 1. Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee management | |||
1 | |||
. | |||
attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety; | |||
licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high level of | |||
performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved. | |||
Category 2. NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. Licensee | |||
management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuc- | |||
. lear safety; licensee resources are adequate and reasonably effective so that | |||
! | |||
satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved. | |||
Category 3. Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased. Licensee | |||
management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety, | |||
I | |||
but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be strained or not | |||
effectively used so that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to | |||
. | |||
operational safety is being achieved. | |||
i The SALP Board also assessed each functional area to compare the licensee's | |||
a | |||
performance during the last quarter of the assessment period to that during | |||
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" | |||
the entire period in order-to determine the recent. trend for each functional | |||
area. The trend categories used by the SALP Board are as fol'ows:. | |||
. | |||
*- | |||
R | |||
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5 | |||
Imoroving: Licensee performance has generally improved over the last quarter | |||
of the current SALP assessment period. | |||
Consistent: . Licensee performance has remained essentially constant over the- | |||
last quarter of the current SALP assessment period. | |||
Declining: Licensee performance has generally declined over the last quarter | |||
of the current SALP assessment period. | |||
i | |||
. | |||
6 | |||
. III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS | |||
A. Facility Performance | |||
CATEGORY CATEGORY | |||
LAST THIS RECENT | |||
FUNCTIONAL AREA PERIOD * PERIOD ** TREND | |||
1. Plant Operations 2 3 Consistent | |||
2. Radiological Controls 3 3 Improving | |||
3. Maintenance & Modifications 1 2 Consistent | |||
4. Surveillance 1 2 Consistent | |||
5. Emergency Preparedness 3 3 Consistent | |||
6. Security & Safeguards 2 2 Consistent | |||
7. Refueling / Outage Activities 1 1 No Basis | |||
8. Licensing Activities 1 1 Consistent | |||
* | |||
July 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984 | |||
** | |||
October 1, 1984 to October 31, 1985 | |||
B. Overall Facility Evaluation | |||
Recovery from the recirculation piping replacement outage was conducted in | |||
a slow, cautious manner with active. involvement of both onsite and corporate | |||
management. The outage highlighted the licensee's commitment to upgrade plant | |||
hardware. Replacement of the piping also resulted in an extensive plant de- | |||
contamination program. Similarly, upgrading of plant hardware to satisfy NRC | |||
regulations-regarding environmental qualification was noteworthy. When con- | |||
sidering each of the functional areas assessed, the licensee's commitments | |||
to a plant betterment program is evident. Notwithstanding the clear evidence | |||
in hardware improvements, there are symptoms which are indicative of: problems | |||
associated with personnel staffing and supervisory / management oversight. | |||
These are discussed below. | |||
One of the. significant outcomes noted during the SALP Board deliberations was | |||
the recurrent issue of staffing. In the areas of operations, security, main- | |||
tenance and radiological controls, the adequacy of staffing supervisory, pro- | |||
fessional and crafts positions was noted to be weak. In a similar vein, the | |||
oversight of BECo supervisors of work in progress by either BEco staff.or | |||
contractors was noted to be insufficient. Whether this is due to a lack of | |||
supervisors or lack of a policy to foster such work habits' by supervisors is | |||
not clear. However, review of the enforcement history (Table 5) clearly high- | |||
lights a number of recurring problems attributable to either poor procedural | |||
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d | |||
B | |||
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7 | |||
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adherence, poor administrative practices or failure on the part of managers | |||
and supervisors to ensure proper planning, scheduling and performance of re- | |||
quired tests or maintenance. Similarly, a review of plant shutdowns (Table | |||
7) shows that some of the four automatic scrars and five plant shutdowns can | |||
be attributed to similar causes. | |||
Another. observation relates to the lack of critical self-assessment. During | |||
the assessment period, significant NRC interaction was required to identify | |||
problems and subsequently to get appropriate corrective action. In some cases, | |||
corrective actions tended to be superficial in that they addressed only the | |||
~ | |||
symptoms but not the underlying reason for the problem. A complicating factor | |||
, in this regard is the management attitude toward perceived weaknesses; a de- | |||
fensive posture is frequently taken with respect to NRC as well as licensee | |||
' | |||
self-identified weaknesses. This defensive posture inhibits a thorough and | |||
critical evaluation with subsequent delays in resolving the problem (s). Con- | |||
sequently, problems tend to linger for long periods until drastic measures | |||
are taken. The radiological improvement program is an example of a drastic | |||
corrective measure. In response to an NRC order, BEco is developing a frame- | |||
work for improved performance, but nonetheless, NRC oversight and action are | |||
still required to assure proper development and implementation. For example, | |||
the licensee repeatedly failed to correct a problem identified by the licen- | |||
' | |||
. | |||
see's independent radiological assessor until the NRC staff took action. | |||
Similar problems have been observed in the ecergency planning program; the | |||
> | |||
self-critique of the annual exercise was not thorough, the commitment to ade- | |||
quate emergency facilities required NRC action, and lack of personnel con- | |||
tinues to hinder program improvements. Another lingering problem is the ade- | |||
quacy of licensed operator staffing. | |||
In summary, there has been an improvement in plant hardware over the last | |||
several years. However, the SALP results indicate that further improvements | |||
are not readily achievable until the staffing / personnel situation is resolved. | |||
This, in our view, can be accomplished by a more aggressive posture and fol- | |||
lowup by management to ensure better training, procedural adherence, planning | |||
and supervision of work. | |||
Training | |||
There are no training programs at Pilgrim that have been accredited by INP0 | |||
during the appraisal period. Over the year, there has been a continuing im- | |||
provement in the number of senior reactor operators but this has resulted in | |||
shortage of reactor operators which now is becoming acute. There were two NRC- | |||
administered exams during the appraisal period. In December 1984, 4 of 7 SR0 | |||
candidates were licensed, 2 of 3 R0 candidates were licensed. The 3 SR0 and | |||
1 R0 failures were retested in May 1985 with satisfactory results. This ex- | |||
perience indicates that (1) the number of R0 candidates taking the exam is | |||
very low and (2) the SR0 training program was deficient as evidenced by the | |||
failure rate. The licensee has managed to overcome SRO shortages; unfortu- | |||
nately, this was at the expense of R0s. The licensee's screening and/or | |||
. | |||
! | |||
training program for R0s is not effective in resolving this long standing l | |||
problem. Consequently, operator overtime has been relied on to continue - | |||
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8 | |||
operations and there is less flexibility to place experienced staff in support | |||
organizations. During the next appraisal period, NRC audit of the licensed | |||
operators' requalification program will provide further insights into training | |||
effectiveness. Training of the non-licensed staff has not been specifically | |||
inspected; INPO accreditation should assure that programs are in place. Sub- | |||
sequent NRC inspections will focus on effectiveness as evidenced by operator / | |||
worker practices in the plant. Based on the performance results noted in this | |||
SAlp, there may be a need for additional training for first line supervisors | |||
to properly manage and oversee activities. Such efforts are an effective | |||
means of assuring adherence to procedures, minimizing personnel errors, and | |||
identifying design weaknesses. | |||
Quality Assurance | |||
The assurance of quality is a responsibility of every individual at the plant. | |||
One of the mechanisms available to managers is the use of a quality assurance / | |||
control program to monitor work in progress and to audit programs. QA/QC per- | |||
sonnel were actively involved in reviewing plant operations during the assess- | |||
ment period. However, there was a lack of timeliness of plant managers and | |||
staff to correct problems identified in the QA/QC findings. This lack of re- | |||
sponsiveness indicates that management is not taking full advantage of the | |||
QA/QC program. It is not obvious whether this is a result of poor attitudes | |||
or insufficient resources; however, it does require senior management atten- | |||
tion to resolve the problem. | |||
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* | |||
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9 | |||
, | |||
IV. . PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS | |||
A. Plant Operations (1100 hours, 29%) | |||
1. Analysis | |||
During the previous assessment period, problems were identified-in | |||
the areas of safety system valveLposition monitoring, independent | |||
verification of safety system conditions, uncorrected Quality As- | |||
surance (QA): findings, and licensed operator staffing. | |||
No subsequent valve position ~ concerns were identified _during the | |||
current assessment period, indicating'that licensee corrective ac- | |||
tions were adequate. Additional NRC effort was. required to obtain | |||
an acceptable corrective action for the uncorrected QA findings | |||
(termed by the licensee " Operational Surveillance" findings)._ Ad- | |||
ditional NRC effort was also required.to. resolve the independent | |||
verification concern. The operator staffing problem became more | |||
l acute during the current assessment period and is discussed below. | |||
The operators conducted routine power reductions-largely without | |||
l | |||
incident, demonstrating their ability to handle the plant in a pro- | |||
! | |||
fessional manner. Control room atmosphere was generally quiet with | |||
nonessential business diverted-to an administrative annex. Ap- | |||
proaches to safety issues were conservative and no significant | |||
problems were icentified. -Weaknesses were identified in.the areas | |||
of licensed operator staffing, corrective actions, and occasional | |||
lapses in operator attention to detail. | |||
A chronic shortage of licensed reactor operators grew worse during | |||
the assessment period due to promotions, job transfers, and the | |||
death of one individual. At the end of the assessment period, only | |||
nine reactor operators and one-senior operator (functioning as a | |||
! reactor operator) were staffing five' operating shifts. To compen- | |||
sate for the shortage, operators routinely exceeded-the overtime | |||
guidelines in NRC Generic Letter 82-12. Senior licensee management | |||
, | |||
! | |||
did not become aware of the full extent of operator overtime until | |||
after one individual's time' card indicated that he worked 97 hours | |||
in a seven day period. A continuing weakness in the overtime ap- | |||
r proval process caused operators to repeatedly (thirty-five instances) | |||
l | |||
exceed overtime guidelines without station management's prior knowl- | |||
, | |||
1 | |||
edge or approval. NRC concern about the implementation of.the ' | |||
overtime guidelines was discussed with -the licensee :in early 1985. | |||
l | |||
The need for additional NRC action in this area demonstrates inade- | |||
! quate'long range planning and. staffing, weaknesses in policy imple- | |||
mentation, and lack of effective corrective action for a recurring | |||
problem. | |||
The lack of a sufficient number of licensed operators-has been a: | |||
repeated NRC concern over the past four years. This concern was | |||
discussed in the 1983 SALP report and highlighted in the.1984 SALP | |||
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report. Despite these concerns,. senior-licensee management did not | |||
act to ensure that an.adequa.e number of individuals with appropri- | |||
ate backgrounds / capabilities entered.the reactor operator training | |||
program pipeline. Finally, in the latter part of'this assessment | |||
period, the licensee recognized that the operator shortage problems | |||
would require -a substantial manpower commitment to resolve. As a | |||
result, ten new staff ~ positions for licensed reactor operators were | |||
added to the Opefations Department. Unfortunately, the effect of | |||
this staffing increase will not be realized until the licensing | |||
process'is complete in 1987. If additional attrition takes place; | |||
or if the current candidates do.not pass the .next scheduled NRC' | |||
license examination in May 1986, the operator shortage could con- | |||
tinue into 1987 or beyond. Continued management attention to re- | |||
cruiting, training, and retaining licensed reactor operators.is | |||
imperative to prevent the current operator shortage from becoming | |||
more acute. | |||
The licensee instituted six shifts of senior reactor operatorsLdur- | |||
ing the assessment period, demonstrating improvement in this area. | |||
However, the licensed operator shortage may require the diversion | |||
of some SRO's to operator positions, decreasing the SRO shifts to | |||
five. | |||
Imprnvement in the operations program such as reorganizing valve | |||
lineup procedures, valve tagging,.and the development of operations- | |||
oriented system drawings were planned by the licensee, but not im- | |||
plemented during the assessment period due to. support staff limita- | |||
tions. While the licensee previously increased clerical assistance | |||
in the Operations Department to help with routine activities, pro- | |||
fessional-level support remains minimal. The lack of professional | |||
support coupled with the shortage of licensed personnel-(available | |||
for collateral duties) has severely hampered operational program | |||
_ | |||
initiatives. | |||
The quality of the licensee's operator training program was judged | |||
acceptable, with seven senior reactor operators and three reactor | |||
operators licensed during the assessment period. Three of the | |||
senior operators and one operator failed portions of their initial | |||
written examinations, but successfully passed subsequent makeup | |||
exams. The material sent to Region I for preparation of the ;origi- | |||
nal and makeup operator examinations was of poor quality and did | |||
not identify all current plant modifications or procedure changes. | |||
New operator and senior operator training lesson plans are being | |||
developed in accordance_with INP0 performance elements. The new | |||
lesson plans should improve training' program effectiveness. The- | |||
licensee should expedite this development and finalize the lesson | |||
plans prior to the next scheduled examination in May 1986. Con- | |||
struction of a simulator is continuing and should be completed ~ by | |||
late 1986 or early 1987. | |||
H | |||
I | |||
- | |||
- | |||
.. | |||
1- ... | |||
' | |||
11 | |||
Lapses in operator attention to detail involved the_use of. nuclear | |||
instrumentation during refueling operations (bypassing one SRM and | |||
not continuously monitoring another SRM), the assessment of drif ting | |||
reactor protection-system instrumentation (main steam line radiation | |||
monitors), and an' inadvertent reactor scram from low power due to , | |||
inadequate reactor water level control. Additional operator atten-- | |||
tion could have prevented the loss of secondary containment integ ' | |||
* | |||
rity while the plant was at power. Circumstantial evidence'indi- | |||
cates that increased operator attention might have-prevented re- | |||
fueling equipment from being damaged during fuel movement at:tre | |||
end of the assessment period. ' | |||
While the licensee's response to NRC initiatives was generally ade- | |||
quate, considerable NRC effort was required to resolve control room | |||
' | |||
manning issues and to ensure that adequate corrective actions were | |||
taken following the discovery of refueling equipment damage. The | |||
response to these issues, which involved handling of personnel, | |||
contrasted to the licensee's usual approach to safety issuesLin- | |||
volving hardware. Hardware issues were' typically; approached in a | |||
manner which stressed safety. For-example, the licensee set the~ | |||
main steam line high radiation monitor trip points to conservative- | |||
l values between test runs during hydrogen' injection experiments, be- | |||
yond technical specification requirements. Licensee management-ac- | |||
tions on personnel related issues as well as the ~ failuref to antici- | |||
: pate the shortage in licensed reactor operators indicates inadequate | |||
management sensitivity to the effect of personnel. decisions on plant | |||
operations. | |||
A detailed evaluation of LER quality using' a sample of 10 LERs is- | |||
< | |||
sued curing the assessment period was made using a refinement of | |||
the basic methodology presented in NUREG/CR-4178. In general, they. , | |||
I | |||
4 | |||
found these LERs to be of acceptable quality based on the require- | |||
ments contained in 10 CFR 50.73. There were nine LERs submitted ~ | |||
for this functional area; they were for a variety of causes. There | |||
were no adversa trends noted. A generally conservative-approach | |||
is taken in reporting under 10 CFR 50.73. | |||
The 1984 SALD report expressed a concern-about the large amount of. | |||
time spend by licensee managers in safety committee duties. The | |||
licensee has taken steps to reduce the impact of the onsite Opera- | |||
tions Revies Committee (ORC) by changing ORC membership and _ reducing | |||
the review workload. The plant manager no longer chairs ORC-meet- | |||
ings, but cantinues to review and approve ORC recommendations. ORC | |||
workload will be decreased by identifying station procedures that | |||
do not need ORC approval. .These efforts are important and should | |||
continue. ' | |||
Licensee 06 audit activities associated with operations were,gener- | |||
ally adr,uaca during the assessment ' period,' demonstrating a continu- | |||
ing comn.it.nent in this area. QA staffing was maintained with.few | |||
. - | |||
--' | |||
o | |||
' | |||
. | |||
:. | |||
.-- | |||
12 | |||
vacancies. However, licensee managemen't was someti.ies slow in re- | |||
sponding to QA surveillance and audit findings. .This-lack of re- | |||
~ | |||
sponsiveness indicates that management is not taking full . advantage | |||
of the quality assurance program. . Senior licensee management has | |||
not ensured that management support for the QA process is evident | |||
and that plant personnel have the appropriate attitudes and-resources | |||
to effectively respond to'QA findings, maximizing the usefulness | |||
of theJQA program. | |||
In summary,' lack of effective management action onLlicensed ' operator | |||
staffing has permitted the number of licensed operators .to drop to | |||
minimally acceptable' levels. If the shortage worsens, plant cpera- | |||
tions may be disrupted. Theistaffing problems combined with a lack | |||
of-alternative operational program support has' delayed action on | |||
1 several operational improvement 1tems. These items could improve- | |||
operator efficiency and reduce the chance of safety-significant | |||
operator errors. Lack of operational support may have weakened the | |||
4 | |||
plant-staff's attitude towards the QA program, also slowing the re- | |||
solution of QA findings. Although plant performance during the_as- | |||
sessment period was' acceptable, the-board believes that these prob- | |||
lems are significant and that future plant-performance and safety | |||
may be degraded without senior management action to strengthen this | |||
functional area. No significant weaknesses were identified in the | |||
licensed operator training program. | |||
2. Conclusion | |||
. | |||
Rating: Category 3. | |||
Trend: Consistent. | |||
1 | |||
The performarce rating in this category is not intended to imply | |||
concern about individual operator performance. The rating is pri- | |||
marily a reflection of inadequate senior management response to | |||
personnel related matters such as licensed operator staffing, | |||
operations department support, and control room manning. | |||
3. Board Recommendation: | |||
' '; Licensee: | |||
-- | |||
Develop-contingency and long term staffing plans for licensed | |||
operators. | |||
-- | |||
Assess the adequacy of Operations' Department staffing and sup- | |||
port including: licensed personnel, support staff, and training | |||
staff. | |||
, | |||
. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
13 | |||
-- | |||
Assess the adequacy of management information systems for mid- | |||
level managers that could preclude problems such as unauthorized | |||
operator overtime. | |||
NRC: | |||
-- | |||
Closely monitor status of licensed operator training program. | |||
-- | |||
Arrange for a corporate management meeting which includes | |||
senior licensee corporate management, upper Region I management, | |||
and representatives of the NRC program offices to discuss | |||
operations staffing problems. | |||
. # | |||
~ | |||
. | |||
14 | |||
. | |||
B. Radiological Controis (513 hours, 14%) | |||
1. Analysis | |||
During the previous assessment period, weaknesses were noted in the | |||
evaluation of radiological incidents, ALARA program, description | |||
of personnel authorities and responsibilities, technician retraining | |||
program, alpha radioactivity monitoring program, and radioactive | |||
waste transportation program. A Category 3 rating was assigned. | |||
Improvements have been noted in these areas during the current | |||
assessment period due to an extensive Radiological Improvement Pro- | |||
gram (RIP) instituted in 1985. | |||
There were seven inspections conducted by radiation specialists this | |||
assessment period and periodic coverage by the resident inspectors. | |||
Areas examined included: radiation protection; radioactive waste | |||
management and transportation; effluent controls and monitoring; | |||
l chemistry; and radiochemistry. There were three special inspections: | |||
two to review circumstances, licensee evaluation and corrective | |||
actions for unplanned personnel exposures; and an inspection of the | |||
licensee's implementation of NUREG-0737 post-accident sampling, | |||
analysis, and monitoring requirements. An Order Modifying License | |||
was issued in November 1984 for correction of problems associated | |||
with an August 1984 unplanned personnel exposure during control rod | |||
drive work. An Enforcement Conference was held in January 1985 to | |||
discuss problems associated with a December 1984 unplanned personnel | |||
exposure during sludge lancing. | |||
2. Radiation Protection | |||
The licensee continued to experience problems in the area of self | |||
identification of problems and initiation of prompt, comprehensive | |||
corrective actions to resolve identified problems and prevent re- | |||
currence. The deficiencies appear to be associated primarily with | |||
the licensee's oversicht of contractor activities. Examples are: | |||
-- | |||
In December 1984, a contractor employee made an unauthorized | |||
entry to a tank to perform sludge lancing. The licensee's | |||
oversight of this nigh radiation area work was less than ade- | |||
quate in that: established high radiation area controls were | |||
not implemented, appropriate additional procedures were not | |||
established, nor was supervisory oversight of this activity | |||
effective. A Health Physics supervisor eliminated established | |||
high radiation area controls and failed to revise a radiation | |||
work permit accordingly. This problem existed for several days | |||
prior to NRC identification. Effective licensee corrective | |||
actions were implemented in response to this incident after | |||
NRC concerns were identified. | |||
l | |||
l | |||
l | |||
1 | |||
I | |||
l | |||
i | |||
e | |||
_ _ . _ | |||
L | |||
, | |||
... | |||
.: | |||
. | |||
15 | |||
-- | |||
A second example involved the licensee's oversight of~ spent | |||
fuel pool work. NRC review of contractor cutting of. highly | |||
radioactive components (e.g. control rod. blades) found that: | |||
unapproved contractor procedures were~being~used for the acti- | |||
vity; discrepancies existed between unapproved contractor and | |||
~ | |||
licensee approved procedures for the work; and personnel were | |||
not trained or qualified. in all appropriate procedures. Simi- | |||
lar problemr were identified during licensee and NRC' review. , | |||
of two unplanned' personnel exposures sustained by-contractors | |||
during control rod drive work last assessment period; . The 2 | |||
licensee's corrective actions for fuel pool work were " job- ' | |||
specific" and not comprehensive. As a result, additional NRC - | |||
effort was needed to obtain an acceptable resolution of prob-- | |||
lems associated with'this work. | |||
-- | |||
A third example involved failure to correct high radiation area | |||
surveillance deficiencies. The problem involved failure to | |||
clearly specify the Technical Specification required.high | |||
radiation area surveillance frequency on radiation' work permits' . | |||
This. problem was brought to the licensee's attention on a num- | |||
ber of occasions. The licensee's final 2 corrective actions have | |||
not yet been received and reviewed-by NRC. | |||
Due to the number and nature of problems identified in 'the radio-- , | |||
logical controls area last assessment period, ian Order Modifying , | |||
License was issued. This Order required that at comprehensive review | |||
of-the radiological controls program be performed by.the licensee. | |||
and that-the findings of this ' review be addressed by a Radiological- | |||
Improvement Program (RIP). NRC monitoring of Order implementation | |||
found that the licensee performed an indepth review of.the radio- | |||
logical controls and established a RIP to address deficiencies. | |||
The RIP,-as established,' addresses fourteen major areas of the | |||
radiological controls program and includes in excess of 200 com- | |||
mitted primary action items. Although licensee senior management | |||
is closely monitoring status and progress of the action items, .im- o | |||
plementation and effectiveness are not' closely monitored. Although | |||
no major problems were identified by the NRC in licensee implemen- | |||
tation of the Order, problems were~noted with the RIP failure to | |||
address high radiation area access key controls and some failures | |||
to generate acceptable procedures.to meet. RIP commitments. . Work | |||
is still ongoing with the most corrective actions scheduled to be | |||
implemented by December 1985. The licensee has considerable work | |||
yet to do in the area of ALARA Program establishment; procedures; > | |||
management oversight; and corrective action system. .The actions | |||
taken"to date are indicative of senior management's effort to im- | |||
prove the radiological controls program at Pilgrim. | |||
At the end of-the assessment period, the licensee was actively re- | |||
-cruiting to fill a number ~of vacancies. These' included it chief | |||
radiological supervisor and the chief chemical engineer. The lic- | |||
_ | |||
_ _-__ _ _ - _ ______- _-__ _ ______-_ .-_ __ ___ _ _ _ - | |||
_ | |||
. | |||
. | |||
16 | |||
ensee was using a large number (about one licensee to four contrac- | |||
tors) of contractor radiation protection technicians to implement | |||
radiological controls. Some problems were identified with contrac- | |||
tor technician efforts involving inadequate oversight of radiological | |||
work on a monitor tank. | |||
Findings of radiological occurrence reports (ROR) were not always | |||
handled in a timely, comprehensive manner. Corrective actions for | |||
ROR findings were sometimes late and superficial. These problems | |||
were apparent in the areas of radiation protection procedure ad- | |||
herence and high radiation area key control. Repeat problems con- | |||
tinue to be identified by the licensee's Radiological Assessors. | |||
In one case, NRC action was required to ensure that recurring prob- | |||
lems identified by the Radiological Assessor were corrected. The | |||
lack of timely corrective action indicates that mid-level management | |||
is either not prioritizing work effectively or does not have suf- | |||
ficient resources to respond to problems. The licensee is currently | |||
revising the radiological occurrence report procedure to address | |||
these problems and ensure action is taken to prevent recurrence. | |||
The licensee has implemented temporary measures to address tl is | |||
problem pending procedure revisions. | |||
Occupational radiation exposures at Pilgrim continue high, 4,082 | |||
person-rem in 1984, due partly to a high radicactive source term | |||
in the plant. No major problems with the ALARA program were. iden- | |||
tified during the assessment period, but the high levels of radi- | |||
ation in the plant makes ALARA practices particularly important at | |||
Pilgram. | |||
During the current assessment period, the licensee conducted an ex- | |||
tensive decontamination program for large areas of the process | |||
buildings. This cleanup effort significantly improved the access | |||
to safety equipment and should continue. However, recontamination | |||
of the clean areas is an ongoing problem. The licensee was develop- | |||
ing a long term program to address the recontamination problem at | |||
the end of the assessment period. More containments of water leaks | |||
are being used than in the past, but uncontained leaks of potentially | |||
radioactive water are still noted in the quadrant rooms of the re- | |||
actor building. Continued management attention will be required | |||
to develop a program that will prevent plant conditions from de- | |||
grading (as a minimum) and to continue to reduce area contamination | |||
levels. As long as ALARA practices are employed during decontami- | |||
nation activities, the benefits of better access to plant equipment | |||
should outweigh the radiation expos,re costs of decontamination. | |||
The radiation protection technician training program has been sig- | |||
nificantly upgraded, in response to RIP commitments. Training for | |||
radiation protection supervisors and contractor technicians has also | |||
been upgraded. These program now contain defined objectives and | |||
l | |||
* } | |||
. . . | |||
s | |||
. | |||
17 | |||
training outlines and appear effective. The retraining program for | |||
- | |||
technicians is-not well developed. . General- employee' training is | |||
aggressive. | |||
3. Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation | |||
- -In response to the previously- discussed Order Modifying! License, . | |||
c the licensee-performed a comprehensive review of the' radioactive | |||
waste management and transportation areas. _iiinor. deficiencies | |||
identified have been included in the license:'s Radiological.Im- | |||
provement Program. NRC review found that program improvements have- | |||
_ | |||
been implemented on schedule. : Improvements have been made'in the | |||
areas of establishment of Program Policies; ransolidation of radio- | |||
active waste storage areas; designation of, approved storage.loca- | |||
tion; and shielding and isolation of waste. In an effort to upgrade | |||
the quality of the radioactive _ waste shipping' procedures, the:lic- | |||
ensee is currently reviewing and revising them. These actions by | |||
the licensee should enhance the quality of his radioactive Waste | |||
Management and. Transportation Program. | |||
Overall, no significant problems were' identified in this area. :The | |||
licensee has been implementing a generally effective radioactive | |||
waste management and transportation program. | |||
; 4. Chemistry / Radiochemistry and Effluent Monitoring and Controls | |||
The licensee was found to have an effective chemistry / radiochemistry | |||
and effluent monitoring and control program. As part of the re- | |||
organization initiated as a result of the Radiological Improvement | |||
Program, the licensee has reorganized the chemistry group and has | |||
created and filled additional positions. Staffing was.found to be | |||
adequate. Technician knowledge and understanding of' procedures- | |||
was apparent. | |||
. | |||
As part of the routine inspection program the licensee was requested | |||
to analyze split samples and pre prepared samples (both radioactive | |||
and non-radioactive). ' Licensee technicians performed acceptable | |||
analysis of samples provided thereby demonstrating licensee cap- | |||
ability to perform satisfactory analysis of effluents. | |||
The licensee experienced a number of unplanned releases this as- | |||
sessment period. Two-involved releases of-liquid and gaseous ef- | |||
fluents from a machine shop. A portion of a normally " clean" ma- | |||
chine shop was converted.to a hot machine shop without the benefit | |||
of an adequate review of the potential for unmonitored, uncontrolled | |||
release from the hot shop. .In one event,. liquid' radioactive mate- | |||
' | |||
rial was introduced into normally clean station sewage. In another | |||
event, the normal ventilation system in the shop released unmoni-- | |||
tored contaminated air to the environment. Although the situation | |||
was licensee identified, the licenseeLfailed to perform adequate i | |||
1 | |||
t | |||
' ',. | |||
wi__..'__.__ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - | |||
' | |||
. | |||
. | |||
18 | |||
reviews of normally uncontaminated systems in accordance with IE | |||
Bulletin 80-10. Such reviews were to be performed to prevent and | |||
readily detect situations similar to the one which occurred. The | |||
-third release involved malfunction of sewage pumping equipment which | |||
led to an inadvertent overflow of sewage to storm drains. It was | |||
quickly repaired by the licensee. No apparent release in excess | |||
of allowable limits occurred during the three releases. | |||
A special inspection of the licensee's post accident sampling, an- | |||
alysis, and monitoring capabilities relative to NUREG-0737 require- | |||
ments found that the licensee met the requirements specified in the | |||
NUREG with few exceptions. This reflected good coordination between | |||
the engineering groups and the site. Some procedural deficiencies | |||
and a deviation " volving a failure to install protective conduit | |||
on the drywe'. ~ .igh range monitor detector cables were identified. | |||
Training of technicians on the operation of the post accident pri- | |||
mary coolant and containment atmosphere sampling system was com- | |||
mendable as evidenced by demonstrated performance capabilities. | |||
5. Summary | |||
In summary, the licensee continues to experience problems in the | |||
area of oversigh- of radiological work and self identification and | |||
resolution of problems to prevent their recurrence. Despite ongoing | |||
program improvements under the RIP, these problems indicate that | |||
weaknesses were still present in the radiation protection program. | |||
Weaknesses in the identification and-correction of problems indi- | |||
cates that upper management initiatives in this area are not fully | |||
understood by mid-level managers or that human resources may not | |||
be sufficient. Program improvements being made to satisfy RIP com- | |||
mitments should considerably improve the overall quality of the | |||
program. | |||
6. Conclusion | |||
Rating: Category 3. | |||
Trend: Improving. | |||
7. Board Recommendations | |||
Licensee: | |||
-- | |||
Upgrade the process used to self identify radiological problems | |||
to ensure timely resolution and prevent their recurrence. | |||
Maintain independent reviews of the radiation protection pro- | |||
gram. | |||
-- | |||
Contir.ue to vigorously implement initiatives and/or recommen- | |||
dation contained in the Radiological Improvement Program. | |||
-- | |||
, | |||
' | |||
19 | |||
-- | |||
Fill identified vacancies and minimize reliance on contractor | |||
personnel providing oversight of radiological work. | |||
NRC: | |||
Maintain increased inspection effort in this area. Hold a manage- | |||
ment meeting with the licensee to review the status and effective-- | |||
ness of the Radiological Improvement Program. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
A | |||
20 | |||
C. Maintenance and Modificatic's (820 hours, 22%) | |||
1. Analysis | |||
During the last assessment period, a lack of ,rocedural guidance | |||
for electrical bus transfers was identified c a weakness. The | |||
+ licensee olans to address this concern prior to the next refueling | |||
outage. ibis action is considered timely. The SALP board also | |||
recommended that the licensee continue initiatives in maintenance | |||
trending and tracking. While no significant additional actions have | |||
been taken in this area, no recurring maintenance problems were | |||
identified that indicate weakness in the licensee's trending program. | |||
During the current SALP period, specialist inspections reviewed | |||
previous ins, action findings and water hammer events that occurred | |||
in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. No signifi- | |||
cant problems were identified during these reviews or during routine | |||
resident inspections of this functional area. | |||
Licensee approaches to maintenance and modifications were generally | |||
thorough and continued to emphasize the identification of root | |||
causes to problems. Despite weaknesses in the areas of vendor in- | |||
teractions 4,id preventive maintenance, the overall performance in | |||
this functional area was considered strong. | |||
Good control was demonstrated over extensive online plant modifica- | |||
tions which have been conducted with the reactor at power. With | |||
the exception of one security problem (See section G), significant | |||
plant modifications have been installed without incident during the | |||
current operating cycle. | |||
A review of the licensee vendor interface program identified several | |||
weaknesses. The licensee program did not systematically address | |||
correspondence from vendors other than General Electric. Additional | |||
problems involving the scope of reviews of vendor information, the | |||
timeliness of the reviews, and the documentation of the reviews were | |||
identified. However, no significant equipment deficiencies were | |||
identified resulting from these program weaknesses. | |||
Licensee corrective actions for maintenance findings were typically | |||
comprehensive and timely. Licensee actions to correct recurring | |||
problems appeared generally effective. Two isolated instances of | |||
untimely corrective action were identified during this period. In | |||
one case, the licensee did not plan to complete corrective action | |||
to prevent the defeat of safety systems during crmponent isolations | |||
until 1995. Additional NRC effort was required , obtain timely | |||
action ir. this case. The licensee has also been slow to repair the | |||
backup 125V and 250V station battery chargers. These chargers have | |||
been out of service since the 1984 outage. This could be a problem | |||
if battery charger reliability degrades. The backup chargers are | |||
. | |||
-. | |||
. | |||
21 | |||
. | |||
not required to be operable by the technical specifications. The | |||
licensee occasionally has been slow to repair equipment-that was | |||
not required to be operable by the technical-specifications, e.g., | |||
post accident monitoring equipment. The lack of timely response | |||
to out of service safety _ equipment (not covered by technical spect- | |||
fications) may indicate a weakness in scheduling second and third | |||
- | |||
priority maintenance. | |||
Corporate management was actively involved in site' activities. A | |||
i site representative of the_ corporate engineering department helped | |||
' | |||
coordinate engineering input to the site and minimized interface | |||
problems. One interface problem-between the corporate staff and | |||
the site was identified. Contractors reporting to offsite licensee | |||
engineers -improperly installed a test instrument on the high pres- | |||
sure coolant injection (HPCI) system, which made the system in- | |||
. operable. The improper installation was found after the HPCI system | |||
failed a subsequent routine surveillance test. _The licensee took | |||
prompt corrective action after the problem was identified. | |||
Corporate management was actively involved in the assessment of HPCI | |||
water hammer events. The engineering approaches-used to evaluate | |||
' | |||
and correct the water hammer problem were judged to be conservative | |||
and effective. In contrast, previous licensee-responses to water- | |||
hammers in the HPCI steam exhaust line were limited in scope and | |||
were not consistent with documented vendor recommendations. | |||
- | |||
At the end of the assessment period, the licensee brought mainten- | |||
ance and modification groups together under a newly created manage- | |||
ment position, the Maintenance Section Head. This action should | |||
' | |||
help coordinate station activities and provide additional management | |||
oversight for the groups. The Chief Maintenance Engineer was ap- | |||
pointed to the Section Head positior., creating a significant vacancy | |||
in the maintenance department. | |||
The licensee also strengthened the maintenance program by adding | |||
three maintenance planner staff positions. These individuals are | |||
responsible for planning maintenance activities and coordinating | |||
' | |||
maintenance logistics in the plant. First line maintenance super- | |||
visors will be freed of these duties and should be able to spend | |||
more time in the plant directly supervising work. | |||
The backlog of outstanding-maintenance req"ests has been reduced | |||
since the end of the last outage demonstrating licensee initiative. | |||
' | |||
Maintenance management tracks the open maintenance requests-and | |||
actively seeks to reduce the second and third priority maintenance | |||
items. However, ongoing environmental qualification modifications | |||
to plant equipment have impacted Maintenance Department priorities, | |||
hampering efforts to reduce the backlog. The licensee has recog- | |||
nize' a staffing weakness and is considering enlarging the mainten- | |||
anct .aff, in part due to additional plant modifications scheduled | |||
during the coming years. This demonstrates licensee initiative'in | |||
; anticipating future maintenance staffing needs. | |||
. | |||
_ __ | |||
, | |||
, | |||
b | |||
. | |||
22 | |||
The licensee's commitment to establishing a comprehensive preventive | |||
maintenance program was evident, although plant modification work | |||
has prevented the completion of some routine maintenance. Minor | |||
administrative weaknesses in the preventive maintenance program were | |||
identified duiing the assessment period. Preventive maintenance | |||
scheduled for the next refueling outage for valve motor operators | |||
has not been proceduralized. Also, preventive maintenance for the | |||
emergency diesel generators which is currently supervised by a con- | |||
tractor had not been proceduralized. The licensee plans to formal- | |||
ize both programs during 1986. A weakness in the computer-based | |||
scheduling system for preventive maintenance was identified at the | |||
end of the assessment period. Continued-licensee efforts are needed | |||
to ensure that the preventive maintenance program is adequately | |||
documented and implemented. | |||
, | |||
Maintenance worker training appeared adequate to support station | |||
activities with few errors. The maintenance training program is | |||
being formalized in preparation for INP0 accreditation, with program | |||
submittal expected by the beginning of 1986. Special training | |||
courses for maintenance staff included valve and motor operator | |||
training, fundamentals of pressure and temperature, and environmen- | |||
tal qualification training. | |||
2. Conclusion | |||
Rating: Category 2. | |||
Trend: Consistent. | |||
3. Recommendations | |||
None. | |||
I | |||
l | |||
. | |||
l | |||
t. i | |||
. | |||
. | |||
23 | |||
D. Surveillance (646 hours, 17%) | |||
1. Analysis | |||
The previous assessment period did not identify major deficiencies | |||
in the surveillance program However, few surveillance tests were | |||
observed because a major outage coincided with the assessment period. | |||
During the current assessment period, three specialist inspections | |||
were conducted in the areas of containment leak rate testing and | |||
startup physics t esting. Post modification testing was reviewed | |||
during a special team inspection prior to startup from the 1984 | |||
outage. Routine resident reviews of surveillance testing were also | |||
conducted. | |||
Procedures for containment leakage testing were clearly written and | |||
technically accurate. All pnases of test activities, especially | |||
access to the reactor building, were well controlled by the Test | |||
Coordinator. Initiation of leak searches during temperature | |||
stabilization were prudent and timely. Water leakage discovered | |||
during the +.est was well controlled. QA/QC coverage of containment | |||
leakage testing activities was appropriately planned, technically | |||
useful, comprehensive, and well documented. | |||
During power operation, performance was mixed. Strength was demon- | |||
strated by the successful completion of an unusually large number | |||
of compensatory surveillance tests required by ongoing environmental | |||
qualification modifications to plant safety equipment. The licen- | |||
see's approach to surveillance testing demonstrated a consistent | |||
concern for safety, particularly in the area of secondary contain- | |||
ment damper testing. However, weaknesses in the areas'of startup | |||
test scheduling, test adequacy, compliance with procedural require- | |||
ments, and response to abnormal test results were also observed. | |||
The licensee conducted a slow startup from the 1984 pipe replacement | |||
outage to provide time for extensive startup testing. While the | |||
startup test program demonstrated an organized approach to the | |||
startup, eight surveillance tests required by the technical speci- | |||
fications were not conducted in a timely manner. The tests were | |||
missed due to scheduling omissions and procedural deficiencies. | |||
The scheduling omissions indicate a weakness in the licensee's com- | |||
puter scheduling system, the Master Surveillance Tracking Program | |||
(MSTP). While normally adequate to ensure that surveillance tests | |||
are conducted in a timely manner, the MSTP was not able to adequately | |||
schedule tests during a prolonged startup. | |||
The procedural deficiencies involved the failure to completely test | |||
some safety system components. Deficiencies were identified in | |||
testing neutron instrumentation and certain other reactor protection | |||
system instrumentation. An additional example of an incomplete | |||
, | |||
. | |||
. | |||
24 | |||
surveillance test procedure was reported in LER No. 85-26. The | |||
licensee's staff had difficulty in some cases determining which | |||
one of several overlapping test procedures fulfilled regulatory | |||
requirements. These problems indicate that additional effort should | |||
be made to verify the technical adequacy of surveillance test pro- | |||
cedures. | |||
Another problem with the startup tests involved the timeliness of | |||
followup to quality assurance (QA) audit findings. A QA finding | |||
identified two surveillance tests that did not meet technical | |||
specification requirements two months prior to the startup from the | |||
1984 outage. The licensee did not resolve the finding until after | |||
the startup, which was within QA program timeliness guidelines but | |||
which demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the-finding. Subsequent | |||
NRC action could have been avoided if the finding wa; resolved prior | |||
to startup. Additional licensee attention should be given to en- | |||
suring that QA findings that involve regulatory concerns are re- | |||
solved in a timely manner. | |||
Licensee personnel generally conducted surveti tance tests in a com- | |||
plete and timely manner. However, deficiencies were identified | |||
during the assessment period which involved a lack of attention to | |||
detail. In one case, operators failed to correct known deficiencies | |||
in a station battery surveillance test procedure, which subsequently | |||
caused a technical specification surveillance test to be missed. | |||
Lack of attention to detail was also evident in the inadvertent | |||
return to service of an uncalibrated local power range neutron | |||
monitor during surveillance tests. Arithmetic errors were noted | |||
in several salt service water system surveillance tests and a com- | |||
puter program error was identified which falsely lowered vacuum | |||
breaker ',eak rate results b9 a factor of sixty. Licensee corrective | |||
actions were prompt in each case, and no problems of this type were | |||
identified during the latter portion of the assessment period. | |||
The licensee did not always react promptly to abnormal surveillance | |||
test findings. The lack of action was usually related to delays | |||
in reporting abnormal results to the control room via the licensee's | |||
Failure and Malfunction Reporting system (F&MR). Delays in sub- | |||
mitting F&MR's to the control room caused secondary containment | |||
integrity to be lost for a day while the reactor was at power and | |||
caused a delay in conducting compensatory surveillance tests for | |||
an inoperable emergency diesel generator. A delay in submitting | |||
an F&MR on abnormal inservice inspection results for safety system | |||
pipe hangers delayed the licensee's response to those test results. | |||
Technical evaluations of abnormal surveillar.ce test results were | |||
generally thorough and demonstrated an adequate regard to safety. | |||
Concern for safety was particularly evident when the licensee in- | |||
creased the frequency of secondary containment damper inspections | |||
after finding failed dampers during routine surveillance. However, | |||
in one case, considerable NRC effort was needed to resolve abnormal | |||
< | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
.._ . . .. . - | |||
.. | |||
- .. | |||
' 25 | |||
surveillance test results. In this_ case, the safety implications | |||
of drifting main steam line radiation monitors were not recognized ~ | |||
by the licensee. In addition, the licensee was slow to correct _a | |||
potential weakness in.the surveillance-test program involving-the | |||
-uncontrolled removal of safety related instruments from service for. | |||
calibration and testing. | |||
- The inservice test (IST) program was not fully implemented during | |||
_ | |||
the assessment period. The deviations from the program submitted | |||
to the NRC were minor, but indicated a need for additional attention | |||
to~the program. | |||
A new halon fire suppression system for the cable spreading room | |||
had not been declared operational at the-end of the assessment | |||
period because of the lack of a surveillance test for several months. | |||
- | |||
Continued management effort should be directed to placing this sys- | |||
tem in operation. | |||
In summary, performance-in this functional area was mixed, with | |||
strength noted in the conduct of compensatory surveillance testing | |||
for inoperable equipment and in the conduct of _ the 1984 primary | |||
containment integrated leakage test. However, weaknesses were noted | |||
in the response to abnormal surveillance test results, in surveil- | |||
_ | |||
lance test procedural adequacy, and in startup test scheduling. | |||
j Responses to NRC and QA findings in this' area were'sometimes slow. | |||
Personnel performance errors contributed to most of these weaknesses. | |||
: Additional emphasis on attention to detail would improve test time- | |||
liness and help minimize problems in this-functional area. | |||
2. Conclusion | |||
Rating: Category 2. , | |||
f | |||
Trend: Consistent. | |||
3. Board Recommendation | |||
; | |||
Licensee: | |||
. | |||
-- | |||
Develop better control of startup surveillance testing to en- | |||
sure better timeliness and adequacy. | |||
-- | |||
Assure that measures exist to provide for prompt evaluation | |||
of abnormal test results and followup actions (if necessary). | |||
{ NRC | |||
f | |||
I None. | |||
l | |||
i | |||
e | |||
d | |||
I | |||
_ | |||
_ | |||
- - , | |||
:w | |||
. | |||
26 | |||
E. Emergency Preparedness (310 hours, 8%) | |||
1. Analysis | |||
During the-previous assessment period the licensee-was rated as- | |||
Category 3 in Emergency Preparedness, due principally to observa- | |||
tions made during the August 1984 exercise. Weaknesses were.iden- | |||
tified in the preparation and plar.ning for the exercise and-in com- | |||
' | |||
mand and control in-the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Based | |||
on the. performance during this exercise, a remedial-drill was held | |||
in October 1984, to reassess the licensee's dose assessment cap- | |||
abilities and decision making process. | |||
During this assessment interval, the remedial drill was observed, | |||
a routine EP follow-up inspection was performed, and the September | |||
1985 exercise was observed. The remedial-drill demonstrated im- | |||
provements in the areas of dose assessment and decision making, | |||
which had been identified as weaknesses during the August 1984 | |||
exercise. | |||
During the December routine inspection, two problems were identified | |||
concerning implementation of provisions of the Emergency Plan. | |||
(Failure to mail information brochures to the general public and | |||
failure to perform an annual update-to the Emergency Plan and pro- | |||
cedures). During the review of the scenario package submitted for | |||
the 1985 exercise, it became apparent that the scenario package did | |||
not contain sufficient detail. It was recommended the the exercise | |||
be postponed in order to take time to clarify and complete the | |||
exercise scenario. The licensee agreed to delay the exercise from | |||
August 1 to September 5, 1985 to make the necessary improvements | |||
to the scenario package. | |||
During the exercise, two significant areas of concern were identi- | |||
fled b: the NRC. The first involved a lack of evaluation or control | |||
of rad ation exposure for re-entry teams sent into the plant for | |||
various tasks. Serious overexposures would very likely have resulted | |||
from tie actions taken if this had been an actual situation. The | |||
second concern involved the fact that there were no procedures in | |||
effect 'or relocation of the EOF to the alternate location, in spite | |||
of the fact that the trailers which presently' function as the EOF | |||
are positioned near the stack with no shielding or ventilation fil- | |||
tering. Improvements were evident over the 1984 exercise, however, | |||
a remedial drill was required to demonstrate the ability to evaluate | |||
and control radiation exposures of re-entry team personnel. The | |||
licensee has indicated that plans for construction of an off-site | |||
EOF are nearing completion, which will help solve some of the con- | |||
cerns relating to the facility. | |||
In summary, some improvements in emergency facilities and in the | |||
annual emergency exercise were noted during the assessment period. | |||
However, performance was only minimally acceptable in this func- | |||
i | |||
. m.. . . _ _ _ ._ , . . | |||
. . | |||
"L | |||
r | |||
. . . | |||
' | |||
- | |||
27. | |||
P | |||
tional area-fortthe second year in a row. -Portions of the annual | |||
exercise were unsatisfactory-and had to be demonstrated in a sup- | |||
. plementary drill. The lack of ' thorough exercise critique was?a l | |||
,_ recurring p'roblem. . Personnel errors were evident;during the' exer- . | |||
cise and may reflect weaknesses .in program staffing and training. | |||
!. 2. . Conclusion | |||
' | |||
, | |||
Rating: : Category 3. | |||
. Trend: -Consistent. | |||
; | |||
3. Board Recommendation | |||
Licensee: - | |||
] | |||
~ - - | |||
Promptly implement plans for construction of off-site EOF. | |||
t | |||
!' -- | |||
Assess staff resource commitments for this area to assure that | |||
it receives adequate attention between exercises and drills. | |||
' | |||
i | |||
. | |||
j. | |||
i | |||
I' | |||
! | |||
1 i | |||
i | |||
i | |||
i | |||
1 | |||
! | |||
, - | |||
~ | |||
1 | |||
t- | |||
1 | |||
t | |||
i | |||
! | |||
1 | |||
I | |||
i | |||
i | |||
1 | |||
1 e | |||
i | |||
I | |||
J | |||
' | |||
, | |||
. | |||
1 . , | |||
,- - - . ~ | |||
. | |||
'' | |||
. | |||
28 | |||
F. Security and Safeguards (100 hours, 3%) | |||
1. Analysis | |||
During the previous assessment period, weaknesses in the'Itcensee's | |||
oversight of the contractor security force were noted. No further | |||
problems in this area were identified during the current period, | |||
indicating that licensee supervision'of the contractor-guard force | |||
has improved. The previous SALP report also identified a weakness | |||
l~ in reporting. security events-to the NRC. .-Nine security event re- | |||
! | |||
ports were reported to the NRC during this assessment period demon- | |||
; | |||
strating an improvement in the reporting program. | |||
l | |||
During the curront assessment period, one routine unannounced | |||
l physical security inspection and one special inspection were per- | |||
formed by region-based inspectors. Routine resident inspections * | |||
cor.tinued throughout the period. One severity level III violation, | |||
for which a civil penalty was proposed, was identified as a result | |||
of the special inspection. | |||
Licensee corrective actions for reportable events were sometimes | |||
weak. For example, six events were reported this year which in- | |||
volved the failure to promptly compensate for security equipment | |||
failures. The recurring problem demonstrates both a staffing de- | |||
ficienciy and a lack of effective corrective action. Additional- | |||
security program. weaknesses were appcrent during a review of open- | |||
ings in a security vital area barrier. .These weaknesses included- | |||
inadequate control over contractee construction activities adjacent | |||
to the barrier, an incomplete licensee evaluation of the barrier, | |||
and the use of material to repair a barrier opening that did not | |||
meet requirements. Previous' licensee evaluations of barrier integ- | |||
rity were conducted in 1982 and were inadequate. Considerable NRC | |||
attention, including escalated enforcement action, was. required to | |||
obtain comprehensive corrective action. In both instances, the | |||
licensee failed to establish guidelines to implement security ob- | |||
jectives. In the first case, the licensee did not establish cri- | |||
teria for timeliness of compensatory actions. In'the second case, | |||
no guidelines were established for judging acceptable site openings | |||
in security barriers. Licensee management should be more aggressive | |||
in establishing guidelines and ciarifying security program objec- | |||
tives. | |||
Staffing of the program by the licensee and the security centractor- | |||
appears adequate with the possible exception of. shift manning. | |||
Shift manning was increased at the end of the assessment period to | |||
ensure that timely compensatory ' action is taken for security system ! | |||
equipment failures. The security contractor also increased shift ' | |||
supervision by adding a second supervisor to each shift. The second | |||
shift supervisor provides the capability for patrolling the site | |||
! | |||
l | |||
i | |||
. | |||
. | |||
29 | |||
to assess personnel performance and the general status of security | |||
features. The security contractor provided several formal manage- | |||
ment training seminars to supervisory personnel during the assess- | |||
ment period. The security contractor also engaged a consultant to | |||
revies its overall training program. These actions have apparently | |||
been effective as evidenced by improved morale and a significant | |||
reduction in security force personnel errors during this assessment | |||
period. | |||
Maintenance of security systems hardware and software received con- | |||
siderable management attention during this assessment period. The | |||
licensee has assigned two dedicated instrumentation and calibration | |||
technicians to maintaining the system and provided two software and | |||
two hardware computer technicians on 24 hour call. | |||
The annual security program audit appeared to be more comprehensive | |||
l in scope and detail than previous audits. In contrast to previous | |||
l years, the audit teams included a consultant with nuclear power | |||
i | |||
plant security expertise. Previous audits were largely compliance | |||
oriented. Additional program effectiveness could be achieved by | |||
reviewing the security plan, procedures, and systems and by focusing | |||
on NRC security objectives during the audits. The security program | |||
; was included in monthly QA surveillances. Monthly backshift in- | |||
i spections were being conducted by the security supervisor and/or | |||
l a corporate security investigator who was assigned to the site | |||
during this period. The corporate security investigator provided | |||
management with another perspective on the effectiveness of the | |||
program and demonstrated management initiative. | |||
In summary, weak corrective actions and a staffing deficiency were | |||
noted in this area. While improvements in contractor training and | |||
QA auditing were apparent, additional clarification of security | |||
objectives and emphasis on timely corrective action to meet these | |||
objectives is needed. | |||
2. Conclusion | |||
Rating: Category 2. | |||
Trend: Consistent. | |||
3. Board Recommendation | |||
j Licensee: | |||
Clarify security program objectives and review causes for untimely | |||
corrective actions. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
30 | |||
G. Refueling and Outage Management (303.5 hours, 8%) | |||
1. Analysis | |||
Strong outage management was evident during the previous assessment | |||
period for the conduct of the 1984 pipe replacement outage. Con- | |||
tinued good performance was noted during the current assessment | |||
period. The pipe replacement outage ended during the first quarter | |||
of the assessment period on December 24, 1985. As a result, no | |||
last quarter trend was noted for this functional area. Plant power | |||
was increased slowly over a period 'of several weeks, demonstrating | |||
a cautious a, oroach to the startup and a concern for safety. | |||
A team inspection at the start of the assessment period reviewed | |||
the readiness of the licensee for startup from the outage. No major | |||
program deficiencies were identified during the inspection. | |||
Strengths were noted in updating operator training, drawings, pro- | |||
cedures, and technical specifications to reflect plant modifications. | |||
Weaknesses in the turnover of modifications from the construction | |||
to the preoperational test groups, verification of system-configura- | |||
tion following preoperational testing, control over nonconforming | |||
material, and the lack of a station drawing for the air start system | |||
; on the emergency diesel generators were noted. Licensee response | |||
to the inspection results was prompt and acceptable. | |||
' | |||
Numerous last minute changes were made to valve lineups for safety | |||
systems just prior to startup, in part due to the simultaneous | |||
close-out of many maintenance work packages. The last minute valve | |||
lineup verifications and changes were a significant burden on the | |||
; plant management. No actual lineup problems were identified after | |||
these verifications indicating that, although rushed, they were | |||
successful. Additional planning in this area would minimize the | |||
impact of maintenance close-out reviews on the plant staff, con- | |||
trituting to more thorough reviews. | |||
The startup test program in December 1984 was well controlled and t | |||
well doucmented. Startup test procedures,' including physics testing | |||
procedures were technically sound. The reactor engineering staff | |||
was judged knowledgeable and responded readily to NRC suggestions | |||
for improvements in the testing program. The QA staff conducted | |||
a post fuel load core verification and agreed to participate in | |||
startup physics tests. | |||
A significant lack of housekeeping control was indicated by the | |||
presence of articles of protective clothing and masking tape in the | |||
main and test tanks of the standby liquid control system (SLCS) l | |||
early in the assessment period. The debris likely fell into the ' | |||
tanks during the 1984 outage. A reactor shutdown in January 1985 | |||
was required while the SLCS system was ilushed and the debris re- | |||
l moved. The presence of loose items on the floor of the reactor | |||
. | |||
l | |||
F | |||
. 1 | |||
. | |||
31 | |||
building (protective clothing, trash, and loose tools) .s a con- | |||
tinuing intermittent problem at the station. Management should | |||
increase the emphasis on housekeeping to help prevent SLCS type | |||
problems from recurring. | |||
2. Conclusion | |||
Rating: Category 1. | |||
Trend: No basis. | |||
.3. Board Recommendations | |||
None | |||
i | |||
i | |||
! | |||
! | |||
! | |||
; | |||
l | |||
l | |||
! | |||
! | |||
I | |||
l | |||
'- | |||
____ | |||
O | |||
. | |||
32 | |||
H. Licensing Activities | |||
1. Analysis | |||
During the previous assessment period, the need to resolve inaccu- | |||
rate and inappropriate technical specifications was noted. Speci- | |||
fication changes were subsequently submitted to NRR regarding plant | |||
organization, a reactor water level trip setting, and primary con- | |||
tainment inerting makeup requirements. These changes demonstrate | |||
responsiveness to NRC concerns. However, continuing efforts are | |||
needed to clarify and correct the technical specifications. Licen- | |||
see responses to concerns about technical specification clarity were | |||
slow during the current assessment period and are discussed below. | |||
Throughout the rating period the utility's management has demon- | |||
strated a high level of interest in licensing mattere by active | |||
participation in the important issues. An example of this was the | |||
participation by the Senior Vice President and other management in | |||
a briefing of NRR on BEco's efforts to environmentally qualify | |||
electrical equipment and the need for a schedular extension beyond | |||
March 31, 1985 for completion of this work. A senior executive | |||
signs all letters to the NRC, thus ensuring management involvement | |||
in licensing activities. The Senior Vice President-Nuclear fre- | |||
quently visits both the engineering offices and the plant site and | |||
the utility now has a vice president in charge at each of these | |||
locations. | |||
The licensee's submittals during this period have been more complete | |||
technically than some in the past, which reflected the additional | |||
attention being given to them by review committees and licensing | |||
personnel. | |||
The If:ensee's management and staff have demonstrated a clear un- | |||
derstanding of technical issues involving licensing actions. Sub- | |||
mittals normally exhibited conservatism from a safety standpoint. | |||
On occasions when the licensee took the position that 1 modifica- | |||
tion would be of marginal benefit compared to its cost, it has pro- | |||
vided a sound technical approach accompanied by credible analysis | |||
to support its position. This was the case with implementation of | |||
automatic switchover of RCIC suction to the suppression pool when- | |||
ever the condensate storage tank level is low, as called for by | |||
NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.22. | |||
In order to develop acceptable resolutions to important technical | |||
issues, the licensee has frequently consulted the staff and this | |||
approach has proven beneficial to both parties. For example, in | |||
meetings with the staff concerning masonry walls, fire protection, | |||
environmental qualification of electrical equipment, and hydrogen | |||
addition to reactor coolant, the licensee provided clear presenta- | |||
tions of proposed solutions to these issues. | |||
I | |||
. | |||
. | |||
33 | |||
BECo has had a Long Term Plan (integrated schedule) in effect since | |||
July 1984 which includes target dates for plant modifications re- | |||
quired by NRC rules or orders (Schedule A) and other plant modifi- | |||
cations, procedure revisions, or changes to staffing requirements | |||
(Schedule B) for which BECo has committed to implementation dates. | |||
With the exception of minor changes in several Schedule B items that | |||
were agreed to by NRR, BECo has met all such requirements and com- | |||
mitments during this assessment period, demonstrating management | |||
initiative in this area. However, meeting the December 31, 1986 | |||
date for completion of control room design modifications is in doubt | |||
since the licensee is overdue in establishing a date for submittal | |||
of a supplement to its Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary | |||
Report. | |||
The licensee was prompt in responding to NRC requests for informa- | |||
tion or gave logical reasons for delay and establishes a new date. | |||
During this rating period, the licensee provided appropriate infor- | |||
' | |||
mation which enabled NRR to conclude its review of several important | |||
issues. Among these were Radiological Environmental Technical | |||
Specifications, the Mark I Containment Program, Environmental Quali- | |||
fication of Electrical Equipment, the B-41 Appendix R Fire Protec- | |||
tion Exemptions, Control of Heavy Loads over the Spent Fuel Pool, | |||
and Post Accident-Sampling System (PASS) modifications. However, | |||
the submittals for several other issues (notably hydrogen recombiner | |||
capability and IST), which are in review, were very sicw in forth- | |||
coming. The resolutions proposed have generally been acceptable, | |||
but several have required considerable NRC effort to resolve. | |||
An area where responsiveness could be improved concerns clarifica- | |||
tions and corrections of technical specifications. These could be | |||
proposed and handled more quickly if BECo's decision process were | |||
modified to simplify its review of administrative changes. Cur- | |||
rently, even minor changes in technical specification wording re- | |||
quire several months to prepare and submit to NRR. Current techni- | |||
cal specification problems include vaguely worded action statements | |||
and incomplete definitiens. In some cases, the licensee uses stand- | |||
ard technical specification requirements to interpret vaguely worded | |||
station specifications. Also, the licensee could have shown more | |||
initiative in requesting changes regarding surveillance technical | |||
, | |||
' | |||
specifications that require additional testing (as compared to | |||
Standard Technical Specifications) when components are made inoper- | |||
able. This change could have resulted in less equipment testing | |||
and wear when components were made inoperable during on-line EQ | |||
modification work. | |||
The licensee maintained a larpe licensing staff to deal with NRC | |||
and other agency requirements. During this rating period, members | |||
of the licensing staff participated in simulator training, the | |||
l | |||
Reactor Safety Course at MIT, and a course in licensing procedures. | |||
< | |||
. | |||
. | |||
34 | |||
In summary, there was consistent evidence of prior planning, man- | |||
agement involvement, and thorough audits. Design work is generally | |||
timely and complete records are usually available. The licensee | |||
has generally proposed technically sound and conservattve resolu- | |||
tions of the issues and these resolutions have been timely in most | |||
cases. Acceptable resolutions to NRC initiatives are generally | |||
proposed, but some responses have been slow in coming. Nevertheless, | |||
only a few long standing issues remain to be completed. The com- | |||
pletion of a long term plan reflects good planning and a respon- | |||
siveness to NRC initiatives in this area. | |||
2. Conclusion | |||
Rating: Category 1. | |||
Trend: Consistent. | |||
3. Board Recommendation | |||
None. | |||
. | |||
m | |||
.- . . . ~. . . - | |||
g .. | |||
I | |||
I | |||
-e | |||
l' 35 | |||
: | |||
i | |||
! | |||
V. SUPp0RTING DATA AND SUMMARIES | |||
t i | |||
A. Investigation and Allegation Revies , | |||
; No investigations were conducted during the assessment period, | |||
i | |||
Three allegations were' received and reviewed. One was unsubstantiated. | |||
; A second involved lack of! control of core drilling in the reactor build- | |||
l ing floor. A citation was issued in connection with this concern. .A | |||
l third allegation involved health physics records. . Documentation was | |||
subsequently modified to resolve this concern. | |||
l | |||
8. Escalated Enforcement Actions : | |||
1. Civil Penalties | |||
A fifty thousand dollar civil penalty was proposed during the as- | |||
~ | |||
, | |||
sessment period in connection with unidentified openings in a | |||
security vital area barrier. A special inspection by a regional | |||
specialist inspector identified weaknesses in control of contractor | |||
personnel, inspections of the barrier, and corrective actions. | |||
2. Orders | |||
An Order Modifying License was issued on November 29, 1984 in con- | |||
nection with recurring weaknesses in the radiation protection pro- | |||
gram. The order confirmed implementation of an extensive Radio- | |||
logical Improvement Program (RIP). ' | |||
3. Confirmatory Action Letters. | |||
A Confirmatory Action Letter was issued on October 26, 1984 in con- | |||
. | |||
nection with recurring radiation protection program weaknesses. | |||
l The letter outlined licensee plans for evaluating and correcting | |||
these weaknesses. | |||
C. Management Conferences | |||
Enforcement conferences were held on November 20, 1984, January 31, 1985, | |||
and August 27, 1985 in the Region I office. Weaknesses in the control | |||
l and monitoring of neutron instrumentation during' refueling were discussed | |||
during the first conference. An unplanned occupational radiation expo- | |||
sure was discussed at the second conference. The licensee's response | |||
' to abnormal surveillance findings and a degraded vital area barrier were | |||
discussed during the third conference. Management meetings with Region | |||
I personnel were also held at the licensee's reque'st to discuss various | |||
program improvements. | |||
One management meeting with NRR was held on March 26, 1985 regarding the | |||
licensee's request for schedular extension to November 30, 1985 for com- | |||
pletion of' environmental qualification of electrical equipment important | |||
to safety. | |||
f | |||
I . | |||
, | |||
. | |||
. | |||
36 | |||
D. Licensee Event Reports | |||
1. Tabular Listing | |||
Type of Events: | |||
A. Personnel Errors , | |||
4 | |||
B. Design / Man./Const./ Install 10 | |||
C. External Cause 0 | |||
D. Defective Procedure 1 | |||
E. Management / Quality Assurance | |||
Deficiency 0 | |||
X. Other 20 | |||
Total 35 | |||
LERs Reviewed | |||
LER No. 84-13 to 85-27 | |||
2. Causual Analysis | |||
Two sets of common mode events were identified: | |||
a. LERs 84-14, 84-15, 84-17, 85-06, 85-15, and 85-17 reported | |||
inadvertent safety system actuations caused by maintenance | |||
or surveillance activities. | |||
b. LERs 85-02, 85-05, 85-16, 85-20 and 85-24 involved missed | |||
surveillance tests. | |||
. | |||
1 | |||
1 | |||
a | |||
c- - | |||
, | |||
.* , | |||
: . | |||
37 | |||
. | |||
1 | |||
E. Operating Reactor Licensing Actions | |||
1. Schedular Extensions Granted | |||
' | |||
March 28,.1985- - extension until November 30, 1985 for com - | |||
pletion of electrical equipment environmental | |||
qualification | |||
l | |||
l | |||
2. Reliefs Granted. | |||
* | |||
l . | |||
I | |||
August 8, 1985 - relief from implementation.of automatic | |||
switchover of RCIC suction per NUREG-0737 | |||
Item II.K.3.22 | |||
3. Exemptions Granted | |||
l December 18, 1984 - exemption from certain requirements of | |||
I | |||
Appendix R, Section III.G. | |||
i | |||
L 4. License Amendments Issued | |||
, t | |||
! | |||
Amendment No. 81, issued October 9, 1984; deleted License Condition | |||
3.D " Equalizer Valve Restriction" | |||
Amendment No. 82, issued October 10, 1984;. revised Technical Spect- | |||
fications relative to RPV thermal and pressurization limits | |||
i | |||
Amendment No. 83, issued November 7, 1984; revised Technical Speci- | |||
fications for surveillance instrumentation on suppression chamber | |||
water temperature, torus water level,. containment pressure and high | |||
radiation, and vents. | |||
l ' | |||
. | |||
Amendment No. 84, issued November 27, 1984; revised Technical Spec- | |||
l , ifications to apply to Halon fire suppression system which replaced | |||
i carbon dioxide system in the cable spreading room. | |||
I , | |||
Amendment No. 85, issued December 17, 1984; added License Condition | |||
3.I requiring the installation of a post-accident' sampling system - | |||
, | |||
and a containment atmospheric monitoring system by June 30, 1985. | |||
Amendment No. 86, issued April 5, 1985; revised Technical Specifi- | |||
cations to permit changes in the normal . full power background trip | |||
level for the main steam-line hign radiation scram and isolation i | |||
setpoints to accommodate a short-term test of operation with hydro- ~ | |||
l | |||
gen injection into the reactor coolant. ' | |||
' | |||
Amendment-No. 87, issued April 22, 1985; revised Technical Specifi- | |||
cations by reducing the maximum permitted oxygen concentration in t | |||
the primary containment during plant operation from 5%-to 4%. | |||
' | |||
-s ) | |||
1 | |||
l . | |||
., | |||
t | |||
-. . . . _ , _ . . - | |||
-. | |||
_ | |||
:. | |||
38 | |||
; | |||
Amendment No. 88, 1ssued August 14, 1985; revised Technical Speci - | |||
fications to reflect changes in reporting requirements per 10 CFR - | |||
50.72 and 50.73 and Generic Letter 83-43 and to recognize changes | |||
in title, organization and responsibilities. | |||
Amendment No. 89, issued August 30, 1985; revised radiological ef- ' | |||
fluents sections of the Technical Specifications to meet Appendix | |||
I requirements. | |||
Amendment No. 90, issued October 9, 1985; revised Technical Speci- | |||
!- fications by changing the Reactor Low Water Level (inside shroud) | |||
-trip requirements. | |||
~ | |||
l | |||
l | |||
4 | |||
- | |||
I | |||
4 | |||
t | |||
u | |||
i | |||
l | |||
l | |||
' | |||
l | |||
l _ _ . -- __ _ - __ - - _- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _. | |||
.. -. . . . - . . ~ - . - . - . . | |||
, . . _. - | |||
., - | |||
* | |||
4 | |||
1 | |||
' | |||
T-1-1 | |||
1 - | |||
. | |||
' TABLE 1. | |||
a i. | |||
, TABULAR LISTING OF LERS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA ' | |||
: . PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION ' | |||
, | |||
< | |||
t | |||
' | |||
Area Number /Cause Code Total | |||
A. Plant Operations' 18, 8X | |||
' | |||
'' 9 | |||
d | |||
B. Radiological Controls IX 1 | |||
$: C. Maintenance & | |||
Modifications 3A, 68, 10,'2X 12 | |||
l' . | |||
D. Surveillance IA, 3B, 8X 12 e | |||
i. E. Fire Protection / | |||
Housekeeping IX 1 * | |||
i | |||
j F. Emergency Protection None O' , | |||
; G. Security and Safeguards None , O ' | |||
< 's, | |||
' | |||
, H. Refueling & Outage | |||
;. Management None 0 | |||
1. Licensing Activities None O' | |||
* | |||
Total ' i lc i 35 | |||
9 | |||
- | |||
'f | |||
, r | |||
4 | |||
' | |||
Cause Codes: A - Personnel Error b | |||
B - Design,-Manufacturing, Construction or Installation Error | |||
' | |||
C - External Cause t' | |||
D - Defective Procedures ' * | |||
E - Management / Quality Assurance Deficiency : | |||
X - Other " | |||
. | |||
- | |||
, | |||
,; | |||
f | |||
L . | |||
;- | |||
i | |||
5 | |||
' | |||
. ., | |||
)* | |||
' | |||
. | |||
-._-_._-..-.__s ----------.-_---_.-____.-----_-__-.-x..____. | |||
_ | |||
. | |||
. | |||
T-2-1 | |||
TABLE 2 | |||
LER SYNOPSIS (10/1/84 - 10/31/85) | |||
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION' | |||
LER Number Summary Description | |||
84-13 Jet pump instrumentation nozzle indications | |||
84-14 Inadvertent RPS actuation (bus transfer) | |||
84-15 Inadvertent containment spray actuation | |||
84-16 Loss of power to 120 V AC bus Y-4 | |||
84-17 Loss of offsite power - unclanned diesel generator start | |||
84-18 Inoperable motor operator for LPCI injection valve MD-1001-28A | |||
84-19 MSIV isolation during startup | |||
84-20 MSIV isolation during startup, LPCI valve npt fully seated | |||
35-01 SLCS system inoperable due to debris | |||
85-02 Missed surveillance tests | |||
85-03 Completion of a shutdown | |||
85-04 Reactor vessel drain line leak | |||
85-05 Missed surveillance test | |||
85-06 Reactor scram during surveillance test | |||
85-07 Secondary containment dampers inoperable | |||
85-03 HPCI system inoperable | |||
85-09 Reactor scram on turbine high vibration signal | |||
85-10 Secondary containment dampers inoperable | |||
85-11 Absolute versus gauge containment pressure transmitters | |||
85-12 HPCI system inoperable; 5/18 trip, 5/23 isolation 6/6 trip 4 | |||
! | |||
85-13 HPCI' isolation on false high steam flow signal | |||
! | |||
, | |||
n r | |||
- . .- . -- . .. . . .. - - - _ . . -~ | |||
, | |||
:.: | |||
.- | |||
, .T-2-2 | |||
l | |||
l | |||
l | |||
t | |||
' | |||
'LER Number Summary Description. | |||
65-14' Reactor scram due to an inadvertent high water'1 eve 1 ~ tso'lation ~' | |||
85-15 Secondary containment isolation due'to personnel error.during | |||
during a surveillance test | |||
, | |||
! 85-16 Missed surveillance - reactor building vent gross' radioactivity ! | |||
analysis | |||
85-17 Secondary containment isolation due to personnel error-during | |||
a surveillance test | |||
85-18 Failure to meet technical specification requirements --inoper-- | |||
able secondary containment damper | |||
85-19 Secondary containment dampers inoperable | |||
85-20 Failure to conduct' compensatory . surveillance tests for inoper- | |||
able zA' diesel generator .; | |||
85-21 Main steam line monitors "B" and "C" outside. technical speci- t | |||
fication limits ; | |||
85-22 Hot shop ventilation contamination | |||
85-23 HPCI system inoperable | |||
85-24 Missed surveillance test - station batteries | |||
85-25 Reactor scram after load rejection | |||
85-26 Inadequate surveillance procedure for control rod position | |||
indication | |||
' | |||
85-27 LPCI injection valve inoperable | |||
.. | |||
l | |||
l | |||
l | |||
+ | |||
! ~ . | |||
. | |||
.. . | |||
. | |||
. | |||
T-3-1 | |||
TABLE 3 | |||
INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY (10/1/84 - 10/31/85) | |||
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION | |||
HOURS % OF TIME | |||
A. Plant Operations ..................... 1100 29 | |||
B. Radiological Controls ................ 513* 14 | |||
C. Maintenance & Modifications .......... 820 22 | |||
D. Surveillance ......................... 646 17 | |||
E. Emergency Preparedness ............... 310 8 | |||
F. Security and Safeguards .............. 100 3 | |||
G. Refueling & Outage Management ........ 303.5 8 | |||
H. Licensing Activities ................. ** ** | |||
__ | |||
Total 3792.5 100% | |||
* | |||
Includes hours for nonradiological chemistry inspection. | |||
** Hours expended in facility license activities not included with direct | |||
inspection effort statistics. | |||
1 | |||
i | |||
! | |||
l | |||
I | |||
l | |||
l | |||
I | |||
: | |||
l | |||
-_a__ -_____l | |||
. | |||
. | |||
T-4-1 | |||
TABLE 4 | |||
ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY (10/1/84 - 10/31/85) | |||
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION | |||
Severity Levels | |||
FUNCTIONAL AREAS I II III IV V DEV Total | |||
A. Plant Operations - - - | |||
4 2 - | |||
6 | |||
B. Radiological Controls - - | |||
1 1 1 2 5 | |||
C. Maintenance & Modifications - - - | |||
1 | |||
- - | |||
1 | |||
D. Surveillance - - - | |||
9 2 1 12 | |||
E. Emergency Preparedness - - - | |||
2 - - | |||
2 | |||
F. Security & Safeguards - - | |||
1 - - - | |||
1 | |||
G. Refueling & Outage Management - - - - - - | |||
0 | |||
H. Licensing Activities - - - - - - | |||
0 | |||
Totals by Severity Level 0 0 2 17 5 3 27 | |||
' | |||
______ . - _ . .- - _ . - - - - _ _ - - _ . . - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - . - - - . - - - - - - - . - - - . - - - - - | |||
. __ _ | |||
. | |||
. | |||
T-5-1 | |||
' | |||
TABLE 5 | |||
ENFORCEMENT CATA | |||
PILGRIM NUCLEAR p0WER STATION | |||
Insp. Insp. Severity Functional | |||
No. Date Level Area ~ Violation | |||
84-36 11/1-11/85 IV Plant . | |||
Failure to conduct an adequate | |||
Operations . shift turnover for control room i | |||
personnel during refueling | |||
IV Plant Failure to continuously monitor | |||
Operations _ ' source range monitors during | |||
, | |||
refueling | |||
84-39 11/21- IV Surveillance Failure to promptly identify | |||
12/31/84 conditions adverse to quality | |||
(i.e. failure to initiate Failure | |||
and Malfunction Reports) | |||
84-41 12/10-13/84 IV Emergency Failure to diseminate emergency | |||
; Preparedness planning information | |||
, IV Emergency -Failure to update the emergency | |||
j Preparedness plan and procedures | |||
84-44 12/18-19/84 III Radiological Failure to' follow radiation work | |||
: Controls permit instructions and failure | |||
to establish a procedure for a | |||
, remote reading teledosimetry | |||
system | |||
' | |||
! | |||
85-01 1/1-31/85 V Plant Failure to maintain control room | |||
; Operations staffing:at levels required by | |||
10 CFR 50.54 | |||
4 | |||
IV Surveillance Failure to test the containment | |||
cooling subsystem immediately | |||
when the low pressure coolant | |||
injection system was inoperable | |||
85-03 2/1/85- IV Surveillance Failure to conduct surveillance | |||
; | |||
3/4/85 tests for the reactor protection | |||
system (six examples) | |||
l | |||
Surveillance ' | |||
' | |||
' | |||
IV Failure to conduct rod block | |||
surveillance tests (five examples) | |||
, - | |||
____.__.______m._~__ _.___.______________._.____.__.-__.__________.________.______..m__.____a________l-_. '_____.___._ __ _ ____ _ _ _._ _ ._______ _ .._u__.___._____m__ | |||
o | |||
. | |||
T-5-2 | |||
Insp. Insp. Severity Functional | |||
No. Date Level Area Violation | |||
IV Plant Failure to promptly correct con- | |||
Operations ditions adverse to quality (i.e. | |||
failure to take timely action | |||
on Quality Assurance surveillance | |||
findings) | |||
V Surveillance Failure to use the most current | |||
revision of a surveillance test | |||
procedure | |||
V Surveillance Failure to calibrate test equip- | |||
ment within the calibrated period | |||
85-06 3/5/85- V Plant Failure to maintain an uncali- | |||
4/1/85 Operations brated local power range monitor | |||
in a bypassed state | |||
IV Maintenance Failure to conduct a dioctyl | |||
phthalate test of HEPA filters | |||
following maintenance on the | |||
standby gas treatment system | |||
85-13 5/20-23/85 V Radiological Failure to have the Operations | |||
Controls Review Committee (ORC) review | |||
two radiological procedures and | |||
failure to control work in the | |||
fuel pool with a maintenance | |||
request | |||
Deviation Radiological Failure to conduct an adequate | |||
Controls review of systems that could | |||
generate an uncontrolled, un- | |||
monitored radioactive effluent | |||
release, as recommended in IE | |||
Bulletin 80-10 | |||
85-17 6/13/85- IV Surveillance Failure to conduct a surveillance | |||
7/15/85 surveillance test of the 250 V | |||
battery system required by the | |||
technical specification and to | |||
follow station procedures for | |||
additional battery tests | |||
IV Radiological Failure to specify high radiation | |||
Controls area surveillance frequencies | |||
on radiation work permits | |||
. | |||
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ | |||
. | |||
. . | |||
T-5-3 | |||
Insp. Insp. Severity Functional | |||
No. Date Level Ar ea Violation | |||
Deviation Surveillance Failure to conduct inservice | |||
tests as specified in an NRC | |||
submittal | |||
85-20 7/16/85- IV Surveillance Failure to maintain the trip | |||
8/19/85 level setting for the "B" and | |||
"C" main steam line high radi- | |||
ation monitors within technical | |||
specification limits | |||
. | |||
85-21 7/16/85- IV Surveillance Failure to maintain secondary | |||
7/30/85 - | |||
containment | |||
IV Surveillance Failure to test alternate safety | |||
system when an emergency diesel | |||
generator was found to be | |||
inoperable | |||
IV Surveillance Failure to initiate Failure and | |||
Malfunction Reports as required | |||
by station procedures | |||
85-24 8/6-8/85 III Security Failure to maintain an adequate | |||
vital area barrier | |||
85-26 8/20/85- IV Plant Failure to properly authorize | |||
9/23/85 Operations excessive licensed operator | |||
overtime as required by station | |||
procedures (thirty-five instances) | |||
85-27 9/16/85- Deviation Radiological Failure to install a protective | |||
9/20/85 Controls conduit | |||
1 | |||
i | |||
! | |||
l | |||
,J | |||
_ | |||
. , . _ .. .,_ | |||
. | |||
, | |||
, , | |||
- | |||
T-6-1 | |||
TABLE 6 { | |||
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES (10/1/84 - 10/31/85) | |||
PILGRIM NUCLEAR p0WER STATION | |||
Inspection Inspection | |||
Rep;rt No. Hours Areas Inspected | |||
_ | |||
84-28 259 Plant readiness for restart, team. inspection | |||
29, 30, 31, 32 --- | |||
Cancelled | |||
' | |||
33 174.5 Resident inspection, plant operations | |||
34 --- | |||
1984 SALP Report | |||
35 88 Emergency preparedness, ra ec'ial drill | |||
36 41 Special inspection, source range monitor | |||
i operation during refueling activities | |||
37 18 Operator license examination | |||
, 38 64 Containment integrated and local leak rate | |||
testing | |||
< | |||
* | |||
39 402 Resident inspection, plant startup follow-- | |||
ing a recirculation pipe replacement outage | |||
. | |||
(see also inspection no. 85-01) | |||
' | |||
40 46 Startup test program | |||
41 75 Emergency preparedness program | |||
42 29 Startup physics testing | |||
43 -- | |||
Cancelled | |||
, 44 13 Special inspection, radiological controls | |||
i for desludging the "C" monitor tank (see | |||
.also inspection no. 85-02) | |||
i | |||
85-01 293 Resident inspection, plant startup follow- | |||
ing a recirculation pipe replacement outage | |||
(see also inspection no. 84-39) | |||
. | |||
< | |||
02 58 Special inspection, followup on radiologi- , | |||
, cal controls actions (see also inspection | |||
no. 84-13) | |||
: | |||
1 . | |||
, _ . , , ,,,,_e , - , . , , , _ _ . . , , ., y . , , , .. ,, , . - | |||
_ | |||
.. .- | |||
4 | |||
e. | |||
e. | |||
.T-6-2 | |||
- | |||
Inspection Inspection | |||
. Report No. Hours Areas Inspected | |||
03 179 Resident inspection, plant operations | |||
04 38 physical security programs | |||
05 24 Nonradiological chemistry program | |||
06 195 Resident inspection, plant operations | |||
07 64 Special inspection, followup on radiologi-- | |||
cal controls actions, bulletins and cir- | |||
culars, and high reading TLDs | |||
08 134.5 Resident inspection, plant operations | |||
09 138 Vendor-licensee interface | |||
10 --- | |||
Cancelled | |||
11 216 Resident inspection, plant operations | |||
12 27 Plant modifice.tions and operations | |||
13 70 Radiological controls program | |||
14 30 Followup on previous inspection findings, | |||
plant operations | |||
' | |||
15 xx Operating license examination | |||
16 28 Special-inspection, unauthorized mainten- | |||
ance and modification activities on the- | |||
high pressure coolant injection (HPCI). | |||
system- | |||
17 98 Resident inspection, plant operations | |||
18 37 Followup.to HPCI waterhammer events and | |||
pipe snubber. inspection progrTm , | |||
19 147 Emergency prepa-edness, annua. exercise | |||
20 132.5 Resident inspection, plant operations- | |||
21 24- Special inspection, review of licensee | |||
response to-two abnormal surveillance test- | |||
results | |||
~ | |||
L'<_.- -,n - | |||
a | |||
, | |||
. | |||
T-6-3 | |||
Inspection Inspection | |||
Report No. Hours Areas Inspected | |||
22 35 Radiological controls program | |||
23 109 Radiochemistry program, mobile laboratory | |||
24 12 Special inspection, review of licensee | |||
response to a degraded vital area barrier | |||
25 6 Enforcement Conference, concerning NRC | |||
inspection nos. 85-21 and 85-24 | |||
26 86 Pcsident inspection, plant operations | |||
, | |||
27 140 Post accident sampling system and related | |||
accident monitoring system review | |||
28 148 Resident inspection, plant operations | |||
29 114 Special inspection, refuel bridge damage | |||
followup | |||
_ | |||
. | |||
. | |||
T-7-1 | |||
TABLE 7 | |||
PLANT SHUTDOWNS | |||
Shutdown Period Description Cause | |||
Dec. 11, 1983 to Refueling and recirculation pipe --- | |||
Dec. 24, 1984 replacement outage. | |||
Dec. 24, 1984 Startup from the outage. --- | |||
Dec. 25, 1984 Shutdown from low power due to Design (trapped air possible | |||
erratic. indication of reactor in instrument lines) or | |||
water level instruments during the procedure weakness (venting | |||
startup. Trapped air in instru- instrument lines following | |||
ment reference legs is a long an extended. outage not ade- | |||
standing problem. quate). | |||
Jan. 1, 1985 to Shutdown due to the presence of- Poor housekeeping (SLCS) | |||
Jan. 7, 1985 debris in SLCS and for maintenance and component malfunction | |||
on torus to drywell vacuum (vacuum breakers). | |||
breakers. | |||
Feb. 9-15, 1985 Shutdown to replace failed recir-' Component-malfunction and | |||
culation pump bearings. The bear procedure weakness (response | |||
ing failure was caused by a loss to a hi/lo oil level alarm | |||
of pump lubricating oil inventory. not adequate). | |||
The oil loss was caused by a leak | |||
in an oil packing gland that sur- | |||
rounds a cooling water line. | |||
Feb. 15-18, 1985 Shutdown to repair a leaking weld Component malfunction. | |||
in the reactor vessel drain line. | |||
March 15-20, 1985 Scram from 100% power on a false Design weakness (instrument | |||
high reactor pressure signal valves prone to stick)"or- | |||
caused by a sticking. instrument personnel- error (valve | |||
valve. The shutdown was continued overtightened). | |||
to complete maintenance on.the | |||
reactor water sample system and | |||
secondary containment dampers. | |||
June 14, 1985 Scram from less than 10% power due Personnel error. l | |||
to a high reactor water level ' | |||
isolation during low power | |||
maneuvers. j | |||
April 4-S, 1985 Scram from 85% power due to a . Design weakness ~(turbine | |||
false turbine high vibration trip logic;is one out of | |||
signal. n). | |||
) | |||
, | |||
d | |||
._ _ _._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - - - _ - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | |||
c- | |||
e | |||
G | |||
9 | |||
T-7-2 | |||
Shutdown Period. Description Cause | |||
Sept. 1-5, 1985 Scram from 32% power due to high Design weakness (portions | |||
reactor prassure following a of switchyard must be washed | |||
generator load rejection. The live). | |||
load rejection was caused when a | |||
ground fault occurred in the sta- | |||
tion switchyard during washing ac- | |||
tivities. The fault was caused | |||
by a buildup of ocean salt on | |||
switchyard insulators. A leaking | |||
recirculation pump seal was re- | |||
placed while the reactor was shut | |||
down. | |||
Sept. 5-7, 1985 Shutdown to replace an additional Design or maintenance | |||
leaking recirculation pump seal. weakness. | |||
_ | |||
. _ _ - _ | |||
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, | |||
-h. p ' | |||
3 | |||
FIGUPI 1. Pilgrim Unplanned Reactor Shut Downs | |||
20 | |||
. | |||
- | |||
_ . . | |||
. | |||
. | |||
10 _. | |||
^ | |||
1 \ 2 | |||
" ;s ' 5 N X | |||
Shut Down | |||
~ \ \ 1 | |||
\ | |||
N N 5 N | |||
, | |||
N N N N | |||
N N N \ | |||
\ \ N N | |||
O N \ \ \ | |||
DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT | |||
1984 1985 | |||
* Number of shut downs per month. The recirculation pipe replacement outage ended on | |||
December 24, 1984. | |||
? | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ __ | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 00:17, 18 December 2020
ML20153D644 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Pilgrim |
Issue date: | 02/18/1986 |
From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20153D628 | List: |
References | |
50-293-85-99, NUDOCS 8602240206 | |
Download: ML20153D644 (54) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1985099
Text
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I U. S.: NUCLEAR REGU'LATORY COMMISSION
- REGION I~
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! SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
- INSPECTION REPORT 50-293/85-99
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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
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PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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ASSESSMENT PERIOD: OCTOBER 1,-1984_- OCTOBER'31, 1985
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BOARD MEETING DATE: . DECEMBER 18,'1985
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TABLE OF CONTENTS '
Page
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................... ~1
A. Purpose and 0verview:....................................... 1
8. SALP Board Members ......................................... 1
C. Background ................................................. 2
II. CRITERIA ........................................................ 4
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS .............................................. 6
A. Facility Performance ....................................... 6
B. Ove ra l l Faci l i ty Eval ua t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ............................................ 9,
A. Plant Operations .......................................... 10
B. R a d i o l o g i c a l Co n t ro l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
C. Maintenance and Modifications ............................. 20
D. S u rv e i l l a n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3
E. Emergency preparedness ............................. ...... 26
F. Security and Safeguards .... .............................. 28
G. Refueling and Outage Menagement ........................... 30
H. Li cen si ng Acti vi ti e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES ...................................'35
A. Investigation and Allegation Review ....................... 35
B. Escalated En forcement Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
C. Management Conferences ..... .............................. 35
D. Licensee Event Reports .................................... 36
E. Operating Reactors Licensing Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
TABLES
Table 1 Tabular Li sting of LERs by Functional Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T1-1
Table 1? LER Synopsis ............................ .............. T2-1
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Tt'le 3. Inspection Hours Summary ................................ T3-1
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Table 4 Enforcement Summary ..................................... T4-1
Table 5 Enforcement Data ........................................ ~TS-1
Table 6 Inspection Activities ................................... T6-1
Table-7 Plant Shutdowns ......................................... T7-1
FIGURE
Figure 1 Pilgrim Unplanned Plant Shutdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F1-1
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I. INTRODUCTION
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A. Purpose and Overview
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an integrated
NRC staff' effort to collect the available observations and data on a i
periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based upon this.in-
formation. SALP is supplemental to normal regulatory processes-used to
ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations. SALPlis intended to
be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a rational basis for' allocating
NRC resources and to provide meaningful guidance to the licensee manage-
ment to promote quality and safety of~ plant operation.
'
An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members-listed below, met on
December 18, 1985, to review the collecticn of. performance observations
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and data to assess the licensee performance in accordance witn-the guid-
ance.in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Per-
fo rma nce" . A summary of the guidance and evaluation criteria is provided
- in Section II of this report.
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of'the licensee's safety per-
formance at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for.the period October 1,-1984
through October 31, 1985.
B. SALP Board Members
Chairman:
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
Members:
0. Ebneter, Director,-Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
W. Kane, Deputy Director, DRP
E. Wenzirger, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3, DRP
J. Joyner,-Chief Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division
of Radiation Safety and Safeguards (DRSS) (part time) -
R. Bellamy, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection
Branch, DRSS (part time)
L. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A,.DRP
M. McBride, Senior Resident Inspector t
W. Minners, Chief, Safety Protection Evaluation Branch, NRR
P. Leech, Project Manager, NRR
Other Attendees
J.^ Johnson, Chief, Operational: Programs Section, DRS
. G. Meyer,-Project Engineer, DRP
W. Pasciak, Chief, Effluent Radiation-Protection Section, DRSS (part time) l
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D. Sullivan, Performance Appraisal Section, Office of Inspection and
Enforcement (OIE)
13. Sharkey, Performance Appraisal Section, 0IE
W. Lazarus, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, DRSS (part time)
C. Background
1. Licensee Activities
The SALP a;sessment period began during a recirculation piping re-
placement outage, ihe outage began in December 1983 and ended on
December 24, 1984. Fuel was reloaded into the reactor core in
November 1984. A hydrostatic pressure test of the reactor ccolant
system and an integrated leakage test of the primary containment
were' conducted in December 1984. On December 24, 1984, reactor
criticality was established and a slow startup sequence was initi-
ated. The reactor was briefly shut down on December 25, 1984, due
to fluctuating reactor water level instruments.
On January 1, 1985, the reactor was shutdown for seven days when
loose debris was detected in the standby liquid control system
(SLCS). Maintenance on leaking torus to drywell vacuum breakers
was also conducted during the shutdown. The reactor was restarted
on January 7, 1985 and reached full power on January 30, 1985.
The reactor was subsequently shutdown between February 9 and 15,
1985, to repair bearings in the "A" recirculation pump notor.
During the startup on February 15, a primary coolant system leak
was detected in a weld in the reactor vessel drain line. The
shutdown was continued until February 17, 1985 when repairs were
completed on the line.
The reactor scrammed on March 15, 1985 due to a sticking reactor
water level instrument manifold valve during a routine surveillance
test. While the reactor was shut down, maintenance was conducted
on the reactor water sample system (needed for a subsequent hydrogen
injection test) and on secondary containment dampers. The plant
was restarted on March 20, 1985, and operated until April 4, 1985
when the reactor scrammed due to high main turbine vibration. The
plant was returned to service on April 5, 1985.
On June 14, 1985, the reactor scrammed during low power maneuvers
due to an inadvertent high reactor water level isolation. The plant
was restarted on June 15 and operated until September 1,1985 when
the reactor scrammed following a generator load rejection. The
reactor was restarted five days later, following repairs to the "B"
recirculation pump seal. The startup was halted and the reactor
shutdown on September 5, 1985 for additional repairs to the "B"
recirculation pamp seal. On September 7, 1985, the reactor was
restarted and it operated until the end of the assessment period.
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A hydrogen injection experiment was conducted between May 9 and 13,
1985 to test the effect of. feedwater hydrogen on plant . radiation
levels. .The annual emergency preparedness _ exercise was' conducted
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on September 5, 1985. Hurricane Gloria was in the vicinity of.the
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plant on September 27, 1985. Wind speed. reached-75 miles per hour: -
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onsite. Power was reduced to less than 25% and the generator was
taken off.line. No. storm damage to the station occurred.
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2. Inspection: Activities
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Two NRC' resident inspectors-wsre assigned to the Pilgrim Nuclear-
Power' Station between October 1984 and July 1985. One resident
inspector was assigned between July and the end of the assessment
period. The total-NRC inspection effort for the period was 3793
hours, distributed in the appraisal functional areas as shown in
Table 3. This represents 3501. hours per twelve month pe. Ud.
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Team inspections were conducted during the assessment'pe'iad r to.
examine the following areas: *
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Plant readiness for-restart from the 1984. recirculation pipe
replacement outage,
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Emergency plan remedial drill,
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Emergency planning program,
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Health physics program,
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Licensee-vendor interactions,
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Annual emergency plan' exercise,
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Radiochemistry program (using the NRC mobile laboratory), and
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Refuel bridge damage ~ .
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Tabulations of violations and inspector activities are presented
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in Tables 4 and 6, respectively.
The area of fire protection was not rated this period since there l
was no overall . inspection of the program. ' Inspection hours in this
area were primarily limited to resident inspector observations in-
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the plant'. Housekeeping was. considered in each of the appropriate
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II. CRITERIA
Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional ar.eas, depending on;
whether the facility is in a construction, preoperational, or operating phase.
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Each functional , area normally represents areas significant. to nuclear. safety.
and the environment, and are normal orogrammatic areas. Special areas may
be added to highlight significant observations.
One or more of the following evaluation criteria were used to assess each
functional area.
1. Management involvement and control in assuring quality
2. Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint .
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3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives
- 4. Enforcement history
5. Reporting and analysis of reportable events
6. Staffing (including management)
7. Training and qualification effectiveness
Based upon the SALP Board assessment each functional-area evaluated is clas-
sified into one of three performance categories. The definitions of these
performance categories are:
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Category 1. Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee management
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attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear safety;
licensee resources are ample and effectively used so that a high level of
performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved.
Category 2. NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. Licensee
management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned with nuc-
. lear safety; licensee resources are adequate and reasonably effective so that
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satisfactory performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved.
Category 3. Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased. Licensee
management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers nuclear safety,
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but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear to be strained or not
effectively used so that minimally satisfactory performance with respect to
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operational safety is being achieved.
i The SALP Board also assessed each functional area to compare the licensee's
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performance during the last quarter of the assessment period to that during
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the entire period in order-to determine the recent. trend for each functional
area. The trend categories used by the SALP Board are as fol'ows:.
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Imoroving: Licensee performance has generally improved over the last quarter
of the current SALP assessment period.
Consistent: . Licensee performance has remained essentially constant over the-
last quarter of the current SALP assessment period.
Declining: Licensee performance has generally declined over the last quarter
of the current SALP assessment period.
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. III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
A. Facility Performance
CATEGORY CATEGORY
LAST THIS RECENT
FUNCTIONAL AREA PERIOD * PERIOD ** TREND
1. Plant Operations 2 3 Consistent
2. Radiological Controls 3 3 Improving
3. Maintenance & Modifications 1 2 Consistent
4. Surveillance 1 2 Consistent
5. Emergency Preparedness 3 3 Consistent
6. Security & Safeguards 2 2 Consistent
7. Refueling / Outage Activities 1 1 No Basis
8. Licensing Activities 1 1 Consistent
July 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984
October 1, 1984 to October 31, 1985
B. Overall Facility Evaluation
Recovery from the recirculation piping replacement outage was conducted in
a slow, cautious manner with active. involvement of both onsite and corporate
management. The outage highlighted the licensee's commitment to upgrade plant
hardware. Replacement of the piping also resulted in an extensive plant de-
contamination program. Similarly, upgrading of plant hardware to satisfy NRC
regulations-regarding environmental qualification was noteworthy. When con-
sidering each of the functional areas assessed, the licensee's commitments
to a plant betterment program is evident. Notwithstanding the clear evidence
in hardware improvements, there are symptoms which are indicative of: problems
associated with personnel staffing and supervisory / management oversight.
These are discussed below.
One of the. significant outcomes noted during the SALP Board deliberations was
the recurrent issue of staffing. In the areas of operations, security, main-
tenance and radiological controls, the adequacy of staffing supervisory, pro-
fessional and crafts positions was noted to be weak. In a similar vein, the
oversight of BECo supervisors of work in progress by either BEco staff.or
contractors was noted to be insufficient. Whether this is due to a lack of
supervisors or lack of a policy to foster such work habits' by supervisors is
not clear. However, review of the enforcement history (Table 5) clearly high-
lights a number of recurring problems attributable to either poor procedural
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adherence, poor administrative practices or failure on the part of managers
and supervisors to ensure proper planning, scheduling and performance of re-
quired tests or maintenance. Similarly, a review of plant shutdowns (Table
7) shows that some of the four automatic scrars and five plant shutdowns can
be attributed to similar causes.
Another. observation relates to the lack of critical self-assessment. During
the assessment period, significant NRC interaction was required to identify
problems and subsequently to get appropriate corrective action. In some cases,
corrective actions tended to be superficial in that they addressed only the
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symptoms but not the underlying reason for the problem. A complicating factor
, in this regard is the management attitude toward perceived weaknesses; a de-
fensive posture is frequently taken with respect to NRC as well as licensee
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self-identified weaknesses. This defensive posture inhibits a thorough and
critical evaluation with subsequent delays in resolving the problem (s). Con-
sequently, problems tend to linger for long periods until drastic measures
are taken. The radiological improvement program is an example of a drastic
corrective measure. In response to an NRC order, BEco is developing a frame-
work for improved performance, but nonetheless, NRC oversight and action are
still required to assure proper development and implementation. For example,
the licensee repeatedly failed to correct a problem identified by the licen-
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see's independent radiological assessor until the NRC staff took action.
Similar problems have been observed in the ecergency planning program; the
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self-critique of the annual exercise was not thorough, the commitment to ade-
quate emergency facilities required NRC action, and lack of personnel con-
tinues to hinder program improvements. Another lingering problem is the ade-
quacy of licensed operator staffing.
In summary, there has been an improvement in plant hardware over the last
several years. However, the SALP results indicate that further improvements
are not readily achievable until the staffing / personnel situation is resolved.
This, in our view, can be accomplished by a more aggressive posture and fol-
lowup by management to ensure better training, procedural adherence, planning
and supervision of work.
Training
There are no training programs at Pilgrim that have been accredited by INP0
during the appraisal period. Over the year, there has been a continuing im-
provement in the number of senior reactor operators but this has resulted in
shortage of reactor operators which now is becoming acute. There were two NRC-
administered exams during the appraisal period. In December 1984, 4 of 7 SR0
candidates were licensed, 2 of 3 R0 candidates were licensed. The 3 SR0 and
1 R0 failures were retested in May 1985 with satisfactory results. This ex-
perience indicates that (1) the number of R0 candidates taking the exam is
very low and (2) the SR0 training program was deficient as evidenced by the
failure rate. The licensee has managed to overcome SRO shortages; unfortu-
nately, this was at the expense of R0s. The licensee's screening and/or
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training program for R0s is not effective in resolving this long standing l
problem. Consequently, operator overtime has been relied on to continue -
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operations and there is less flexibility to place experienced staff in support
organizations. During the next appraisal period, NRC audit of the licensed
operators' requalification program will provide further insights into training
effectiveness. Training of the non-licensed staff has not been specifically
inspected; INPO accreditation should assure that programs are in place. Sub-
sequent NRC inspections will focus on effectiveness as evidenced by operator /
worker practices in the plant. Based on the performance results noted in this
SAlp, there may be a need for additional training for first line supervisors
to properly manage and oversee activities. Such efforts are an effective
means of assuring adherence to procedures, minimizing personnel errors, and
identifying design weaknesses.
Quality Assurance
The assurance of quality is a responsibility of every individual at the plant.
One of the mechanisms available to managers is the use of a quality assurance /
control program to monitor work in progress and to audit programs. QA/QC per-
sonnel were actively involved in reviewing plant operations during the assess-
ment period. However, there was a lack of timeliness of plant managers and
staff to correct problems identified in the QA/QC findings. This lack of re-
sponsiveness indicates that management is not taking full advantage of the
QA/QC program. It is not obvious whether this is a result of poor attitudes
or insufficient resources; however, it does require senior management atten-
tion to resolve the problem.
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IV. . PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Plant Operations (1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />, 29%)
1. Analysis
During the previous assessment period, problems were identified-in
the areas of safety system valveLposition monitoring, independent
verification of safety system conditions, uncorrected Quality As-
surance (QA): findings, and licensed operator staffing.
No subsequent valve position ~ concerns were identified _during the
current assessment period, indicating'that licensee corrective ac-
tions were adequate. Additional NRC effort was. required to obtain
an acceptable corrective action for the uncorrected QA findings
(termed by the licensee " Operational Surveillance" findings)._ Ad-
ditional NRC effort was also required.to. resolve the independent
verification concern. The operator staffing problem became more
l acute during the current assessment period and is discussed below.
The operators conducted routine power reductions-largely without
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incident, demonstrating their ability to handle the plant in a pro-
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fessional manner. Control room atmosphere was generally quiet with
nonessential business diverted-to an administrative annex. Ap-
proaches to safety issues were conservative and no significant
problems were icentified. -Weaknesses were identified in.the areas
of licensed operator staffing, corrective actions, and occasional
lapses in operator attention to detail.
A chronic shortage of licensed reactor operators grew worse during
the assessment period due to promotions, job transfers, and the
death of one individual. At the end of the assessment period, only
nine reactor operators and one-senior operator (functioning as a
! reactor operator) were staffing five' operating shifts. To compen-
sate for the shortage, operators routinely exceeded-the overtime
guidelines in NRC Generic Letter 82-12. Senior licensee management
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did not become aware of the full extent of operator overtime until
after one individual's time' card indicated that he worked 97 hours0.00112 days <br />0.0269 hours <br />1.603836e-4 weeks <br />3.69085e-5 months <br />
in a seven day period. A continuing weakness in the overtime ap-
r proval process caused operators to repeatedly (thirty-five instances)
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exceed overtime guidelines without station management's prior knowl-
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edge or approval. NRC concern about the implementation of.the '
overtime guidelines was discussed with -the licensee :in early 1985.
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The need for additional NRC action in this area demonstrates inade-
! quate'long range planning and. staffing, weaknesses in policy imple-
mentation, and lack of effective corrective action for a recurring
problem.
The lack of a sufficient number of licensed operators-has been a:
repeated NRC concern over the past four years. This concern was
discussed in the 1983 SALP report and highlighted in the.1984 SALP
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report. Despite these concerns,. senior-licensee management did not
act to ensure that an.adequa.e number of individuals with appropri-
ate backgrounds / capabilities entered.the reactor operator training
program pipeline. Finally, in the latter part of'this assessment
period, the licensee recognized that the operator shortage problems
would require -a substantial manpower commitment to resolve. As a
result, ten new staff ~ positions for licensed reactor operators were
added to the Opefations Department. Unfortunately, the effect of
this staffing increase will not be realized until the licensing
process'is complete in 1987. If additional attrition takes place;
or if the current candidates do.not pass the .next scheduled NRC'
license examination in May 1986, the operator shortage could con-
tinue into 1987 or beyond. Continued management attention to re-
cruiting, training, and retaining licensed reactor operators.is
imperative to prevent the current operator shortage from becoming
more acute.
The licensee instituted six shifts of senior reactor operatorsLdur-
ing the assessment period, demonstrating improvement in this area.
However, the licensed operator shortage may require the diversion
of some SRO's to operator positions, decreasing the SRO shifts to
five.
Imprnvement in the operations program such as reorganizing valve
lineup procedures, valve tagging,.and the development of operations-
oriented system drawings were planned by the licensee, but not im-
plemented during the assessment period due to. support staff limita-
tions. While the licensee previously increased clerical assistance
in the Operations Department to help with routine activities, pro-
fessional-level support remains minimal. The lack of professional
support coupled with the shortage of licensed personnel-(available
for collateral duties) has severely hampered operational program
_
initiatives.
The quality of the licensee's operator training program was judged
acceptable, with seven senior reactor operators and three reactor
operators licensed during the assessment period. Three of the
senior operators and one operator failed portions of their initial
written examinations, but successfully passed subsequent makeup
exams. The material sent to Region I for preparation of the ;origi-
nal and makeup operator examinations was of poor quality and did
not identify all current plant modifications or procedure changes.
New operator and senior operator training lesson plans are being
developed in accordance_with INP0 performance elements. The new
lesson plans should improve training' program effectiveness. The-
licensee should expedite this development and finalize the lesson
plans prior to the next scheduled examination in May 1986. Con-
struction of a simulator is continuing and should be completed ~ by
late 1986 or early 1987.
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Lapses in operator attention to detail involved the_use of. nuclear
instrumentation during refueling operations (bypassing one SRM and
not continuously monitoring another SRM), the assessment of drif ting
reactor protection-system instrumentation (main steam line radiation
monitors), and an' inadvertent reactor scram from low power due to ,
inadequate reactor water level control. Additional operator atten--
tion could have prevented the loss of secondary containment integ '
rity while the plant was at power. Circumstantial evidence'indi-
cates that increased operator attention might have-prevented re-
fueling equipment from being damaged during fuel movement at:tre
end of the assessment period. '
While the licensee's response to NRC initiatives was generally ade-
quate, considerable NRC effort was required to resolve control room
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manning issues and to ensure that adequate corrective actions were
taken following the discovery of refueling equipment damage. The
response to these issues, which involved handling of personnel,
contrasted to the licensee's usual approach to safety issuesLin-
volving hardware. Hardware issues were' typically; approached in a
manner which stressed safety. For-example, the licensee set the~
main steam line high radiation monitor trip points to conservative-
l values between test runs during hydrogen' injection experiments, be-
yond technical specification requirements. Licensee management-ac-
tions on personnel related issues as well as the ~ failuref to antici-
- pate the shortage in licensed reactor operators indicates inadequate
management sensitivity to the effect of personnel. decisions on plant
operations.
A detailed evaluation of LER quality using' a sample of 10 LERs is-
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sued curing the assessment period was made using a refinement of
the basic methodology presented in NUREG/CR-4178. In general, they. ,
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found these LERs to be of acceptable quality based on the require-
ments contained in 10 CFR 50.73. There were nine LERs submitted ~
for this functional area; they were for a variety of causes. There
were no adversa trends noted. A generally conservative-approach
is taken in reporting under 10 CFR 50.73.
The 1984 SALD report expressed a concern-about the large amount of.
time spend by licensee managers in safety committee duties. The
licensee has taken steps to reduce the impact of the onsite Opera-
tions Revies Committee (ORC) by changing ORC membership and _ reducing
the review workload. The plant manager no longer chairs ORC-meet-
ings, but cantinues to review and approve ORC recommendations. ORC
workload will be decreased by identifying station procedures that
do not need ORC approval. .These efforts are important and should
continue. '
Licensee 06 audit activities associated with operations were,gener-
ally adr,uaca during the assessment ' period,' demonstrating a continu-
ing comn.it.nent in this area. QA staffing was maintained with.few
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vacancies. However, licensee managemen't was someti.ies slow in re-
sponding to QA surveillance and audit findings. .This-lack of re-
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sponsiveness indicates that management is not taking full . advantage
of the quality assurance program. . Senior licensee management has
not ensured that management support for the QA process is evident
and that plant personnel have the appropriate attitudes and-resources
to effectively respond to'QA findings, maximizing the usefulness
of theJQA program.
In summary,' lack of effective management action onLlicensed ' operator
staffing has permitted the number of licensed operators .to drop to
minimally acceptable' levels. If the shortage worsens, plant cpera-
tions may be disrupted. Theistaffing problems combined with a lack
of-alternative operational program support has' delayed action on
1 several operational improvement 1tems. These items could improve-
operator efficiency and reduce the chance of safety-significant
operator errors. Lack of operational support may have weakened the
4
plant-staff's attitude towards the QA program, also slowing the re-
solution of QA findings. Although plant performance during the_as-
sessment period was' acceptable, the-board believes that these prob-
lems are significant and that future plant-performance and safety
may be degraded without senior management action to strengthen this
functional area. No significant weaknesses were identified in the
licensed operator training program.
2. Conclusion
.
Rating: Category 3.
Trend: Consistent.
1
The performarce rating in this category is not intended to imply
concern about individual operator performance. The rating is pri-
marily a reflection of inadequate senior management response to
personnel related matters such as licensed operator staffing,
operations department support, and control room manning.
3. Board Recommendation:
' '; Licensee:
--
Develop-contingency and long term staffing plans for licensed
operators.
--
Assess the adequacy of Operations' Department staffing and sup-
port including: licensed personnel, support staff, and training
staff.
,
.
.
.
13
--
Assess the adequacy of management information systems for mid-
level managers that could preclude problems such as unauthorized
operator overtime.
NRC:
--
Closely monitor status of licensed operator training program.
--
Arrange for a corporate management meeting which includes
senior licensee corporate management, upper Region I management,
and representatives of the NRC program offices to discuss
operations staffing problems.
. #
~
.
14
.
B. Radiological Controis (513 hours0.00594 days <br />0.143 hours <br />8.482143e-4 weeks <br />1.951965e-4 months <br />, 14%)
1. Analysis
During the previous assessment period, weaknesses were noted in the
evaluation of radiological incidents, ALARA program, description
of personnel authorities and responsibilities, technician retraining
program, alpha radioactivity monitoring program, and radioactive
waste transportation program. A Category 3 rating was assigned.
Improvements have been noted in these areas during the current
assessment period due to an extensive Radiological Improvement Pro-
gram (RIP) instituted in 1985.
There were seven inspections conducted by radiation specialists this
assessment period and periodic coverage by the resident inspectors.
Areas examined included: radiation protection; radioactive waste
management and transportation; effluent controls and monitoring;
l chemistry; and radiochemistry. There were three special inspections:
two to review circumstances, licensee evaluation and corrective
actions for unplanned personnel exposures; and an inspection of the
licensee's implementation of NUREG-0737 post-accident sampling,
analysis, and monitoring requirements. An Order Modifying License
was issued in November 1984 for correction of problems associated
with an August 1984 unplanned personnel exposure during control rod
drive work. An Enforcement Conference was held in January 1985 to
discuss problems associated with a December 1984 unplanned personnel
exposure during sludge lancing.
2. Radiation Protection
The licensee continued to experience problems in the area of self
identification of problems and initiation of prompt, comprehensive
corrective actions to resolve identified problems and prevent re-
currence. The deficiencies appear to be associated primarily with
the licensee's oversicht of contractor activities. Examples are:
--
In December 1984, a contractor employee made an unauthorized
entry to a tank to perform sludge lancing. The licensee's
oversight of this nigh radiation area work was less than ade-
quate in that: established high radiation area controls were
not implemented, appropriate additional procedures were not
established, nor was supervisory oversight of this activity
effective. A Health Physics supervisor eliminated established
high radiation area controls and failed to revise a radiation
work permit accordingly. This problem existed for several days
prior to NRC identification. Effective licensee corrective
actions were implemented in response to this incident after
NRC concerns were identified.
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15
--
A second example involved the licensee's oversight of~ spent
fuel pool work. NRC review of contractor cutting of. highly
radioactive components (e.g. control rod. blades) found that:
unapproved contractor procedures were~being~used for the acti-
vity; discrepancies existed between unapproved contractor and
~
licensee approved procedures for the work; and personnel were
not trained or qualified. in all appropriate procedures. Simi-
lar problemr were identified during licensee and NRC' review. ,
of two unplanned' personnel exposures sustained by-contractors
during control rod drive work last assessment period; . The 2
licensee's corrective actions for fuel pool work were " job- '
specific" and not comprehensive. As a result, additional NRC -
effort was needed to obtain an acceptable resolution of prob--
lems associated with'this work.
--
A third example involved failure to correct high radiation area
surveillance deficiencies. The problem involved failure to
clearly specify the Technical Specification required.high
radiation area surveillance frequency on radiation' work permits' .
This. problem was brought to the licensee's attention on a num-
ber of occasions. The licensee's final 2 corrective actions have
not yet been received and reviewed-by NRC.
Due to the number and nature of problems identified in 'the radio-- ,
logical controls area last assessment period, ian Order Modifying ,
License was issued. This Order required that at comprehensive review
of-the radiological controls program be performed by.the licensee.
and that-the findings of this ' review be addressed by a Radiological-
Improvement Program (RIP). NRC monitoring of Order implementation
found that the licensee performed an indepth review of.the radio-
logical controls and established a RIP to address deficiencies.
The RIP,-as established,' addresses fourteen major areas of the
radiological controls program and includes in excess of 200 com-
mitted primary action items. Although licensee senior management
is closely monitoring status and progress of the action items, .im- o
plementation and effectiveness are not' closely monitored. Although
no major problems were identified by the NRC in licensee implemen-
tation of the Order, problems were~noted with the RIP failure to
address high radiation area access key controls and some failures
to generate acceptable procedures.to meet. RIP commitments. . Work
is still ongoing with the most corrective actions scheduled to be
implemented by December 1985. The licensee has considerable work
yet to do in the area of ALARA Program establishment; procedures; >
management oversight; and corrective action system. .The actions
taken"to date are indicative of senior management's effort to im-
prove the radiological controls program at Pilgrim.
At the end of-the assessment period, the licensee was actively re-
-cruiting to fill a number ~of vacancies. These' included it chief
radiological supervisor and the chief chemical engineer. The lic-
_
_ _-__ _ _ - _ ______- _-__ _ ______-_ .-_ __ ___ _ _ _ -
_
.
.
16
ensee was using a large number (about one licensee to four contrac-
tors) of contractor radiation protection technicians to implement
radiological controls. Some problems were identified with contrac-
tor technician efforts involving inadequate oversight of radiological
work on a monitor tank.
Findings of radiological occurrence reports (ROR) were not always
handled in a timely, comprehensive manner. Corrective actions for
ROR findings were sometimes late and superficial. These problems
were apparent in the areas of radiation protection procedure ad-
herence and high radiation area key control. Repeat problems con-
tinue to be identified by the licensee's Radiological Assessors.
In one case, NRC action was required to ensure that recurring prob-
lems identified by the Radiological Assessor were corrected. The
lack of timely corrective action indicates that mid-level management
is either not prioritizing work effectively or does not have suf-
ficient resources to respond to problems. The licensee is currently
revising the radiological occurrence report procedure to address
these problems and ensure action is taken to prevent recurrence.
The licensee has implemented temporary measures to address tl is
problem pending procedure revisions.
Occupational radiation exposures at Pilgrim continue high, 4,082
person-rem in 1984, due partly to a high radicactive source term
in the plant. No major problems with the ALARA program were. iden-
tified during the assessment period, but the high levels of radi-
ation in the plant makes ALARA practices particularly important at
Pilgram.
During the current assessment period, the licensee conducted an ex-
tensive decontamination program for large areas of the process
buildings. This cleanup effort significantly improved the access
to safety equipment and should continue. However, recontamination
of the clean areas is an ongoing problem. The licensee was develop-
ing a long term program to address the recontamination problem at
the end of the assessment period. More containments of water leaks
are being used than in the past, but uncontained leaks of potentially
radioactive water are still noted in the quadrant rooms of the re-
actor building. Continued management attention will be required
to develop a program that will prevent plant conditions from de-
grading (as a minimum) and to continue to reduce area contamination
levels. As long as ALARA practices are employed during decontami-
nation activities, the benefits of better access to plant equipment
should outweigh the radiation expos,re costs of decontamination.
The radiation protection technician training program has been sig-
nificantly upgraded, in response to RIP commitments. Training for
radiation protection supervisors and contractor technicians has also
been upgraded. These program now contain defined objectives and
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. . .
s
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17
training outlines and appear effective. The retraining program for
-
technicians is-not well developed. . General- employee' training is
aggressive.
3. Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation
- -In response to the previously- discussed Order Modifying! License, .
c the licensee-performed a comprehensive review of the' radioactive
waste management and transportation areas. _iiinor. deficiencies
identified have been included in the license:'s Radiological.Im-
provement Program. NRC review found that program improvements have-
_
been implemented on schedule. : Improvements have been made'in the
areas of establishment of Program Policies; ransolidation of radio-
active waste storage areas; designation of, approved storage.loca-
tion; and shielding and isolation of waste. In an effort to upgrade
the quality of the radioactive _ waste shipping' procedures, the:lic-
ensee is currently reviewing and revising them. These actions by
the licensee should enhance the quality of his radioactive Waste
Management and. Transportation Program.
Overall, no significant problems were' identified in this area. :The
licensee has been implementing a generally effective radioactive
waste management and transportation program.
- 4. Chemistry / Radiochemistry and Effluent Monitoring and Controls
The licensee was found to have an effective chemistry / radiochemistry
and effluent monitoring and control program. As part of the re-
organization initiated as a result of the Radiological Improvement
Program, the licensee has reorganized the chemistry group and has
created and filled additional positions. Staffing was.found to be
adequate. Technician knowledge and understanding of' procedures-
was apparent.
.
As part of the routine inspection program the licensee was requested
to analyze split samples and pre prepared samples (both radioactive
and non-radioactive). ' Licensee technicians performed acceptable
analysis of samples provided thereby demonstrating licensee cap-
ability to perform satisfactory analysis of effluents.
The licensee experienced a number of unplanned releases this as-
sessment period. Two-involved releases of-liquid and gaseous ef-
fluents from a machine shop. A portion of a normally " clean" ma-
chine shop was converted.to a hot machine shop without the benefit
of an adequate review of the potential for unmonitored, uncontrolled
release from the hot shop. .In one event,. liquid' radioactive mate-
'
rial was introduced into normally clean station sewage. In another
event, the normal ventilation system in the shop released unmoni--
tored contaminated air to the environment. Although the situation
was licensee identified, the licenseeLfailed to perform adequate i
1
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' ',.
wi__..'__.__ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
'
.
.
18
reviews of normally uncontaminated systems in accordance with IE
Bulletin 80-10. Such reviews were to be performed to prevent and
readily detect situations similar to the one which occurred. The
-third release involved malfunction of sewage pumping equipment which
led to an inadvertent overflow of sewage to storm drains. It was
quickly repaired by the licensee. No apparent release in excess
of allowable limits occurred during the three releases.
A special inspection of the licensee's post accident sampling, an-
alysis, and monitoring capabilities relative to NUREG-0737 require-
ments found that the licensee met the requirements specified in the
NUREG with few exceptions. This reflected good coordination between
the engineering groups and the site. Some procedural deficiencies
and a deviation " volving a failure to install protective conduit
on the drywe'. ~ .igh range monitor detector cables were identified.
Training of technicians on the operation of the post accident pri-
mary coolant and containment atmosphere sampling system was com-
mendable as evidenced by demonstrated performance capabilities.
5. Summary
In summary, the licensee continues to experience problems in the
area of oversigh- of radiological work and self identification and
resolution of problems to prevent their recurrence. Despite ongoing
program improvements under the RIP, these problems indicate that
weaknesses were still present in the radiation protection program.
Weaknesses in the identification and-correction of problems indi-
cates that upper management initiatives in this area are not fully
understood by mid-level managers or that human resources may not
be sufficient. Program improvements being made to satisfy RIP com-
mitments should considerably improve the overall quality of the
program.
6. Conclusion
Rating: Category 3.
Trend: Improving.
7. Board Recommendations
Licensee:
--
Upgrade the process used to self identify radiological problems
to ensure timely resolution and prevent their recurrence.
Maintain independent reviews of the radiation protection pro-
gram.
--
Contir.ue to vigorously implement initiatives and/or recommen-
dation contained in the Radiological Improvement Program.
--
,
'
19
--
Fill identified vacancies and minimize reliance on contractor
personnel providing oversight of radiological work.
NRC:
Maintain increased inspection effort in this area. Hold a manage-
ment meeting with the licensee to review the status and effective--
ness of the Radiological Improvement Program.
.
.
A
20
C. Maintenance and Modificatic's (820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br />, 22%)
1. Analysis
During the last assessment period, a lack of ,rocedural guidance
for electrical bus transfers was identified c a weakness. The
+ licensee olans to address this concern prior to the next refueling
outage. ibis action is considered timely. The SALP board also
recommended that the licensee continue initiatives in maintenance
trending and tracking. While no significant additional actions have
been taken in this area, no recurring maintenance problems were
identified that indicate weakness in the licensee's trending program.
During the current SALP period, specialist inspections reviewed
previous ins, action findings and water hammer events that occurred
in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. No signifi-
cant problems were identified during these reviews or during routine
resident inspections of this functional area.
Licensee approaches to maintenance and modifications were generally
thorough and continued to emphasize the identification of root
causes to problems. Despite weaknesses in the areas of vendor in-
teractions 4,id preventive maintenance, the overall performance in
this functional area was considered strong.
Good control was demonstrated over extensive online plant modifica-
tions which have been conducted with the reactor at power. With
the exception of one security problem (See section G), significant
plant modifications have been installed without incident during the
current operating cycle.
A review of the licensee vendor interface program identified several
weaknesses. The licensee program did not systematically address
correspondence from vendors other than General Electric. Additional
problems involving the scope of reviews of vendor information, the
timeliness of the reviews, and the documentation of the reviews were
identified. However, no significant equipment deficiencies were
identified resulting from these program weaknesses.
Licensee corrective actions for maintenance findings were typically
comprehensive and timely. Licensee actions to correct recurring
problems appeared generally effective. Two isolated instances of
untimely corrective action were identified during this period. In
one case, the licensee did not plan to complete corrective action
to prevent the defeat of safety systems during crmponent isolations
until 1995. Additional NRC effort was required , obtain timely
action ir. this case. The licensee has also been slow to repair the
backup 125V and 250V station battery chargers. These chargers have
been out of service since the 1984 outage. This could be a problem
if battery charger reliability degrades. The backup chargers are
.
-.
.
21
.
not required to be operable by the technical specifications. The
licensee occasionally has been slow to repair equipment-that was
not required to be operable by the technical-specifications, e.g.,
post accident monitoring equipment. The lack of timely response
to out of service safety _ equipment (not covered by technical spect-
fications) may indicate a weakness in scheduling second and third
-
priority maintenance.
Corporate management was actively involved in site' activities. A
i site representative of the_ corporate engineering department helped
'
coordinate engineering input to the site and minimized interface
problems. One interface problem-between the corporate staff and
the site was identified. Contractors reporting to offsite licensee
engineers -improperly installed a test instrument on the high pres-
sure coolant injection (HPCI) system, which made the system in-
. operable. The improper installation was found after the HPCI system
failed a subsequent routine surveillance test. _The licensee took
prompt corrective action after the problem was identified.
Corporate management was actively involved in the assessment of HPCI
water hammer events. The engineering approaches-used to evaluate
'
and correct the water hammer problem were judged to be conservative
and effective. In contrast, previous licensee-responses to water-
hammers in the HPCI steam exhaust line were limited in scope and
were not consistent with documented vendor recommendations.
-
At the end of the assessment period, the licensee brought mainten-
ance and modification groups together under a newly created manage-
ment position, the Maintenance Section Head. This action should
'
help coordinate station activities and provide additional management
oversight for the groups. The Chief Maintenance Engineer was ap-
pointed to the Section Head positior., creating a significant vacancy
in the maintenance department.
The licensee also strengthened the maintenance program by adding
three maintenance planner staff positions. These individuals are
responsible for planning maintenance activities and coordinating
'
maintenance logistics in the plant. First line maintenance super-
visors will be freed of these duties and should be able to spend
more time in the plant directly supervising work.
The backlog of outstanding-maintenance req"ests has been reduced
since the end of the last outage demonstrating licensee initiative.
'
Maintenance management tracks the open maintenance requests-and
actively seeks to reduce the second and third priority maintenance
items. However, ongoing environmental qualification modifications
to plant equipment have impacted Maintenance Department priorities,
hampering efforts to reduce the backlog. The licensee has recog-
nize' a staffing weakness and is considering enlarging the mainten-
anct .aff, in part due to additional plant modifications scheduled
during the coming years. This demonstrates licensee initiative'in
- anticipating future maintenance staffing needs.
.
_ __
,
,
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22
The licensee's commitment to establishing a comprehensive preventive
maintenance program was evident, although plant modification work
has prevented the completion of some routine maintenance. Minor
administrative weaknesses in the preventive maintenance program were
identified duiing the assessment period. Preventive maintenance
scheduled for the next refueling outage for valve motor operators
has not been proceduralized. Also, preventive maintenance for the
emergency diesel generators which is currently supervised by a con-
tractor had not been proceduralized. The licensee plans to formal-
ize both programs during 1986. A weakness in the computer-based
scheduling system for preventive maintenance was identified at the
end of the assessment period. Continued-licensee efforts are needed
to ensure that the preventive maintenance program is adequately
documented and implemented.
,
Maintenance worker training appeared adequate to support station
activities with few errors. The maintenance training program is
being formalized in preparation for INP0 accreditation, with program
submittal expected by the beginning of 1986. Special training
courses for maintenance staff included valve and motor operator
training, fundamentals of pressure and temperature, and environmen-
tal qualification training.
2. Conclusion
Rating: Category 2.
Trend: Consistent.
3. Recommendations
None.
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D. Surveillance (646 hours0.00748 days <br />0.179 hours <br />0.00107 weeks <br />2.45803e-4 months <br />, 17%)
1. Analysis
The previous assessment period did not identify major deficiencies
in the surveillance program However, few surveillance tests were
observed because a major outage coincided with the assessment period.
During the current assessment period, three specialist inspections
were conducted in the areas of containment leak rate testing and
startup physics t esting. Post modification testing was reviewed
during a special team inspection prior to startup from the 1984
outage. Routine resident reviews of surveillance testing were also
conducted.
Procedures for containment leakage testing were clearly written and
technically accurate. All pnases of test activities, especially
access to the reactor building, were well controlled by the Test
Coordinator. Initiation of leak searches during temperature
stabilization were prudent and timely. Water leakage discovered
during the +.est was well controlled. QA/QC coverage of containment
leakage testing activities was appropriately planned, technically
useful, comprehensive, and well documented.
During power operation, performance was mixed. Strength was demon-
strated by the successful completion of an unusually large number
of compensatory surveillance tests required by ongoing environmental
qualification modifications to plant safety equipment. The licen-
see's approach to surveillance testing demonstrated a consistent
concern for safety, particularly in the area of secondary contain-
ment damper testing. However, weaknesses in the areas'of startup
test scheduling, test adequacy, compliance with procedural require-
ments, and response to abnormal test results were also observed.
The licensee conducted a slow startup from the 1984 pipe replacement
outage to provide time for extensive startup testing. While the
startup test program demonstrated an organized approach to the
startup, eight surveillance tests required by the technical speci-
fications were not conducted in a timely manner. The tests were
missed due to scheduling omissions and procedural deficiencies.
The scheduling omissions indicate a weakness in the licensee's com-
puter scheduling system, the Master Surveillance Tracking Program
(MSTP). While normally adequate to ensure that surveillance tests
are conducted in a timely manner, the MSTP was not able to adequately
schedule tests during a prolonged startup.
The procedural deficiencies involved the failure to completely test
some safety system components. Deficiencies were identified in
testing neutron instrumentation and certain other reactor protection
system instrumentation. An additional example of an incomplete
,
.
.
24
surveillance test procedure was reported in LER No. 85-26. The
licensee's staff had difficulty in some cases determining which
one of several overlapping test procedures fulfilled regulatory
requirements. These problems indicate that additional effort should
be made to verify the technical adequacy of surveillance test pro-
cedures.
Another problem with the startup tests involved the timeliness of
followup to quality assurance (QA) audit findings. A QA finding
identified two surveillance tests that did not meet technical
specification requirements two months prior to the startup from the
1984 outage. The licensee did not resolve the finding until after
the startup, which was within QA program timeliness guidelines but
which demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the-finding. Subsequent
NRC action could have been avoided if the finding wa; resolved prior
to startup. Additional licensee attention should be given to en-
suring that QA findings that involve regulatory concerns are re-
solved in a timely manner.
Licensee personnel generally conducted surveti tance tests in a com-
plete and timely manner. However, deficiencies were identified
during the assessment period which involved a lack of attention to
detail. In one case, operators failed to correct known deficiencies
in a station battery surveillance test procedure, which subsequently
caused a technical specification surveillance test to be missed.
Lack of attention to detail was also evident in the inadvertent
return to service of an uncalibrated local power range neutron
monitor during surveillance tests. Arithmetic errors were noted
in several salt service water system surveillance tests and a com-
puter program error was identified which falsely lowered vacuum
breaker ',eak rate results b9 a factor of sixty. Licensee corrective
actions were prompt in each case, and no problems of this type were
identified during the latter portion of the assessment period.
The licensee did not always react promptly to abnormal surveillance
test findings. The lack of action was usually related to delays
in reporting abnormal results to the control room via the licensee's
Failure and Malfunction Reporting system (F&MR). Delays in sub-
mitting F&MR's to the control room caused secondary containment
integrity to be lost for a day while the reactor was at power and
caused a delay in conducting compensatory surveillance tests for
an inoperable emergency diesel generator. A delay in submitting
an F&MR on abnormal inservice inspection results for safety system
pipe hangers delayed the licensee's response to those test results.
Technical evaluations of abnormal surveillar.ce test results were
generally thorough and demonstrated an adequate regard to safety.
Concern for safety was particularly evident when the licensee in-
creased the frequency of secondary containment damper inspections
after finding failed dampers during routine surveillance. However,
in one case, considerable NRC effort was needed to resolve abnormal
<
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.._ . . .. . -
..
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' 25
surveillance test results. In this_ case, the safety implications
of drifting main steam line radiation monitors were not recognized ~
by the licensee. In addition, the licensee was slow to correct _a
potential weakness in.the surveillance-test program involving-the
-uncontrolled removal of safety related instruments from service for.
calibration and testing.
- The inservice test (IST) program was not fully implemented during
_
the assessment period. The deviations from the program submitted
to the NRC were minor, but indicated a need for additional attention
to~the program.
A new halon fire suppression system for the cable spreading room
had not been declared operational at the-end of the assessment
period because of the lack of a surveillance test for several months.
-
Continued management effort should be directed to placing this sys-
tem in operation.
In summary, performance-in this functional area was mixed, with
strength noted in the conduct of compensatory surveillance testing
for inoperable equipment and in the conduct of _ the 1984 primary
containment integrated leakage test. However, weaknesses were noted
in the response to abnormal surveillance test results, in surveil-
_
lance test procedural adequacy, and in startup test scheduling.
j Responses to NRC and QA findings in this' area were'sometimes slow.
Personnel performance errors contributed to most of these weaknesses.
- Additional emphasis on attention to detail would improve test time-
liness and help minimize problems in this-functional area.
2. Conclusion
Rating: Category 2. ,
f
Trend: Consistent.
3. Board Recommendation
Licensee:
.
--
Develop better control of startup surveillance testing to en-
sure better timeliness and adequacy.
--
Assure that measures exist to provide for prompt evaluation
of abnormal test results and followup actions (if necessary).
{ NRC
f
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26
E. Emergency Preparedness (310 hours0.00359 days <br />0.0861 hours <br />5.125661e-4 weeks <br />1.17955e-4 months <br />, 8%)
1. Analysis
During the-previous assessment period the licensee-was rated as-
Category 3 in Emergency Preparedness, due principally to observa-
tions made during the August 1984 exercise. Weaknesses were.iden-
tified in the preparation and plar.ning for the exercise and-in com-
'
mand and control in-the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Based
on the. performance during this exercise, a remedial-drill was held
in October 1984, to reassess the licensee's dose assessment cap-
abilities and decision making process.
During this assessment interval, the remedial drill was observed,
a routine EP follow-up inspection was performed, and the September
1985 exercise was observed. The remedial-drill demonstrated im-
provements in the areas of dose assessment and decision making,
which had been identified as weaknesses during the August 1984
exercise.
During the December routine inspection, two problems were identified
concerning implementation of provisions of the Emergency Plan.
(Failure to mail information brochures to the general public and
failure to perform an annual update-to the Emergency Plan and pro-
cedures). During the review of the scenario package submitted for
the 1985 exercise, it became apparent that the scenario package did
not contain sufficient detail. It was recommended the the exercise
be postponed in order to take time to clarify and complete the
exercise scenario. The licensee agreed to delay the exercise from
August 1 to September 5, 1985 to make the necessary improvements
to the scenario package.
During the exercise, two significant areas of concern were identi-
fled b: the NRC. The first involved a lack of evaluation or control
of rad ation exposure for re-entry teams sent into the plant for
various tasks. Serious overexposures would very likely have resulted
from tie actions taken if this had been an actual situation. The
second concern involved the fact that there were no procedures in
effect 'or relocation of the EOF to the alternate location, in spite
of the fact that the trailers which presently' function as the EOF
are positioned near the stack with no shielding or ventilation fil-
tering. Improvements were evident over the 1984 exercise, however,
a remedial drill was required to demonstrate the ability to evaluate
and control radiation exposures of re-entry team personnel. The
licensee has indicated that plans for construction of an off-site
EOF are nearing completion, which will help solve some of the con-
cerns relating to the facility.
In summary, some improvements in emergency facilities and in the
annual emergency exercise were noted during the assessment period.
However, performance was only minimally acceptable in this func-
i
. m.. . . _ _ _ ._ , . .
. .
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27.
P
tional area-fortthe second year in a row. -Portions of the annual
exercise were unsatisfactory-and had to be demonstrated in a sup-
. plementary drill. The lack of ' thorough exercise critique was?a l
,_ recurring p'roblem. . Personnel errors were evident;during the' exer- .
cise and may reflect weaknesses .in program staffing and training.
!. 2. . Conclusion
'
,
Rating: : Category 3.
. Trend: -Consistent.
3. Board Recommendation
Licensee: -
]
~ - -
Promptly implement plans for construction of off-site EOF.
t
!' --
Assess staff resource commitments for this area to assure that
it receives adequate attention between exercises and drills.
'
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28
F. Security and Safeguards (100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, 3%)
1. Analysis
During the previous assessment period, weaknesses in the'Itcensee's
oversight of the contractor security force were noted. No further
problems in this area were identified during the current period,
indicating that licensee supervision'of the contractor-guard force
has improved. The previous SALP report also identified a weakness
l~ in reporting. security events-to the NRC. .-Nine security event re-
!
ports were reported to the NRC during this assessment period demon-
strating an improvement in the reporting program.
l
During the curront assessment period, one routine unannounced
l physical security inspection and one special inspection were per-
formed by region-based inspectors. Routine resident inspections *
cor.tinued throughout the period. One severity level III violation,
for which a civil penalty was proposed, was identified as a result
of the special inspection.
Licensee corrective actions for reportable events were sometimes
weak. For example, six events were reported this year which in-
volved the failure to promptly compensate for security equipment
failures. The recurring problem demonstrates both a staffing de-
ficienciy and a lack of effective corrective action. Additional-
security program. weaknesses were appcrent during a review of open-
ings in a security vital area barrier. .These weaknesses included-
inadequate control over contractee construction activities adjacent
to the barrier, an incomplete licensee evaluation of the barrier,
and the use of material to repair a barrier opening that did not
meet requirements. Previous' licensee evaluations of barrier integ-
rity were conducted in 1982 and were inadequate. Considerable NRC
attention, including escalated enforcement action, was. required to
obtain comprehensive corrective action. In both instances, the
licensee failed to establish guidelines to implement security ob-
jectives. In the first case, the licensee did not establish cri-
teria for timeliness of compensatory actions. In'the second case,
no guidelines were established for judging acceptable site openings
in security barriers. Licensee management should be more aggressive
in establishing guidelines and ciarifying security program objec-
tives.
Staffing of the program by the licensee and the security centractor-
appears adequate with the possible exception of. shift manning.
Shift manning was increased at the end of the assessment period to
ensure that timely compensatory ' action is taken for security system !
equipment failures. The security contractor also increased shift '
supervision by adding a second supervisor to each shift. The second
shift supervisor provides the capability for patrolling the site
!
l
i
.
.
29
to assess personnel performance and the general status of security
features. The security contractor provided several formal manage-
ment training seminars to supervisory personnel during the assess-
ment period. The security contractor also engaged a consultant to
revies its overall training program. These actions have apparently
been effective as evidenced by improved morale and a significant
reduction in security force personnel errors during this assessment
period.
Maintenance of security systems hardware and software received con-
siderable management attention during this assessment period. The
licensee has assigned two dedicated instrumentation and calibration
technicians to maintaining the system and provided two software and
two hardware computer technicians on 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> call.
The annual security program audit appeared to be more comprehensive
l in scope and detail than previous audits. In contrast to previous
l years, the audit teams included a consultant with nuclear power
i
plant security expertise. Previous audits were largely compliance
oriented. Additional program effectiveness could be achieved by
reviewing the security plan, procedures, and systems and by focusing
on NRC security objectives during the audits. The security program
- was included in monthly QA surveillances. Monthly backshift in-
i spections were being conducted by the security supervisor and/or
l a corporate security investigator who was assigned to the site
during this period. The corporate security investigator provided
management with another perspective on the effectiveness of the
program and demonstrated management initiative.
In summary, weak corrective actions and a staffing deficiency were
noted in this area. While improvements in contractor training and
QA auditing were apparent, additional clarification of security
objectives and emphasis on timely corrective action to meet these
objectives is needed.
2. Conclusion
Rating: Category 2.
Trend: Consistent.
3. Board Recommendation
j Licensee:
Clarify security program objectives and review causes for untimely
corrective actions.
.
.
30
G. Refueling and Outage Management (303.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, 8%)
1. Analysis
Strong outage management was evident during the previous assessment
period for the conduct of the 1984 pipe replacement outage. Con-
tinued good performance was noted during the current assessment
period. The pipe replacement outage ended during the first quarter
of the assessment period on December 24, 1985. As a result, no
last quarter trend was noted for this functional area. Plant power
was increased slowly over a period 'of several weeks, demonstrating
a cautious a, oroach to the startup and a concern for safety.
A team inspection at the start of the assessment period reviewed
the readiness of the licensee for startup from the outage. No major
program deficiencies were identified during the inspection.
Strengths were noted in updating operator training, drawings, pro-
cedures, and technical specifications to reflect plant modifications.
Weaknesses in the turnover of modifications from the construction
to the preoperational test groups, verification of system-configura-
tion following preoperational testing, control over nonconforming
material, and the lack of a station drawing for the air start system
- on the emergency diesel generators were noted. Licensee response
to the inspection results was prompt and acceptable.
'
Numerous last minute changes were made to valve lineups for safety
systems just prior to startup, in part due to the simultaneous
close-out of many maintenance work packages. The last minute valve
lineup verifications and changes were a significant burden on the
- plant management. No actual lineup problems were identified after
these verifications indicating that, although rushed, they were
successful. Additional planning in this area would minimize the
impact of maintenance close-out reviews on the plant staff, con-
trituting to more thorough reviews.
The startup test program in December 1984 was well controlled and t
well doucmented. Startup test procedures,' including physics testing
procedures were technically sound. The reactor engineering staff
was judged knowledgeable and responded readily to NRC suggestions
for improvements in the testing program. The QA staff conducted
a post fuel load core verification and agreed to participate in
startup physics tests.
A significant lack of housekeeping control was indicated by the
presence of articles of protective clothing and masking tape in the
main and test tanks of the standby liquid control system (SLCS) l
early in the assessment period. The debris likely fell into the '
tanks during the 1984 outage. A reactor shutdown in January 1985
was required while the SLCS system was ilushed and the debris re-
l moved. The presence of loose items on the floor of the reactor
.
l
F
. 1
.
31
building (protective clothing, trash, and loose tools) .s a con-
tinuing intermittent problem at the station. Management should
increase the emphasis on housekeeping to help prevent SLCS type
problems from recurring.
2. Conclusion
Rating: Category 1.
Trend: No basis.
.3. Board Recommendations
None
i
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O
.
32
H. Licensing Activities
1. Analysis
During the previous assessment period, the need to resolve inaccu-
rate and inappropriate technical specifications was noted. Speci-
fication changes were subsequently submitted to NRR regarding plant
organization, a reactor water level trip setting, and primary con-
tainment inerting makeup requirements. These changes demonstrate
responsiveness to NRC concerns. However, continuing efforts are
needed to clarify and correct the technical specifications. Licen-
see responses to concerns about technical specification clarity were
slow during the current assessment period and are discussed below.
Throughout the rating period the utility's management has demon-
strated a high level of interest in licensing mattere by active
participation in the important issues. An example of this was the
participation by the Senior Vice President and other management in
a briefing of NRR on BEco's efforts to environmentally qualify
electrical equipment and the need for a schedular extension beyond
March 31, 1985 for completion of this work. A senior executive
signs all letters to the NRC, thus ensuring management involvement
in licensing activities. The Senior Vice President-Nuclear fre-
quently visits both the engineering offices and the plant site and
the utility now has a vice president in charge at each of these
locations.
The licensee's submittals during this period have been more complete
technically than some in the past, which reflected the additional
attention being given to them by review committees and licensing
personnel.
The If:ensee's management and staff have demonstrated a clear un-
derstanding of technical issues involving licensing actions. Sub-
mittals normally exhibited conservatism from a safety standpoint.
On occasions when the licensee took the position that 1 modifica-
tion would be of marginal benefit compared to its cost, it has pro-
vided a sound technical approach accompanied by credible analysis
to support its position. This was the case with implementation of
automatic switchover of RCIC suction to the suppression pool when-
ever the condensate storage tank level is low, as called for by
NUREG-0737 Item II.K.3.22.
In order to develop acceptable resolutions to important technical
issues, the licensee has frequently consulted the staff and this
approach has proven beneficial to both parties. For example, in
meetings with the staff concerning masonry walls, fire protection,
environmental qualification of electrical equipment, and hydrogen
addition to reactor coolant, the licensee provided clear presenta-
tions of proposed solutions to these issues.
I
.
.
33
BECo has had a Long Term Plan (integrated schedule) in effect since
July 1984 which includes target dates for plant modifications re-
quired by NRC rules or orders (Schedule A) and other plant modifi-
cations, procedure revisions, or changes to staffing requirements
(Schedule B) for which BECo has committed to implementation dates.
With the exception of minor changes in several Schedule B items that
were agreed to by NRR, BECo has met all such requirements and com-
mitments during this assessment period, demonstrating management
initiative in this area. However, meeting the December 31, 1986
date for completion of control room design modifications is in doubt
since the licensee is overdue in establishing a date for submittal
of a supplement to its Detailed Control Room Design Review Summary
Report.
The licensee was prompt in responding to NRC requests for informa-
tion or gave logical reasons for delay and establishes a new date.
During this rating period, the licensee provided appropriate infor-
'
mation which enabled NRR to conclude its review of several important
issues. Among these were Radiological Environmental Technical
Specifications, the Mark I Containment Program, Environmental Quali-
fication of Electrical Equipment, the B-41 Appendix R Fire Protec-
tion Exemptions, Control of Heavy Loads over the Spent Fuel Pool,
and Post Accident-Sampling System (PASS) modifications. However,
the submittals for several other issues (notably hydrogen recombiner
capability and IST), which are in review, were very sicw in forth-
coming. The resolutions proposed have generally been acceptable,
but several have required considerable NRC effort to resolve.
An area where responsiveness could be improved concerns clarifica-
tions and corrections of technical specifications. These could be
proposed and handled more quickly if BECo's decision process were
modified to simplify its review of administrative changes. Cur-
rently, even minor changes in technical specification wording re-
quire several months to prepare and submit to NRR. Current techni-
cal specification problems include vaguely worded action statements
and incomplete definitiens. In some cases, the licensee uses stand-
ard technical specification requirements to interpret vaguely worded
station specifications. Also, the licensee could have shown more
initiative in requesting changes regarding surveillance technical
,
'
specifications that require additional testing (as compared to
Standard Technical Specifications) when components are made inoper-
able. This change could have resulted in less equipment testing
and wear when components were made inoperable during on-line EQ
modification work.
The licensee maintained a larpe licensing staff to deal with NRC
and other agency requirements. During this rating period, members
of the licensing staff participated in simulator training, the
l
Reactor Safety Course at MIT, and a course in licensing procedures.
<
.
.
34
In summary, there was consistent evidence of prior planning, man-
agement involvement, and thorough audits. Design work is generally
timely and complete records are usually available. The licensee
has generally proposed technically sound and conservattve resolu-
tions of the issues and these resolutions have been timely in most
cases. Acceptable resolutions to NRC initiatives are generally
proposed, but some responses have been slow in coming. Nevertheless,
only a few long standing issues remain to be completed. The com-
pletion of a long term plan reflects good planning and a respon-
siveness to NRC initiatives in this area.
2. Conclusion
Rating: Category 1.
Trend: Consistent.
3. Board Recommendation
None.
.
m
.- . . . ~. . . -
g ..
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-e
l' 35
i
!
V. SUPp0RTING DATA AND SUMMARIES
t i
A. Investigation and Allegation Revies ,
- No investigations were conducted during the assessment period,
i
Three allegations were' received and reviewed. One was unsubstantiated.
- A second involved lack of! control of core drilling in the reactor build-
l ing floor. A citation was issued in connection with this concern. .A
l third allegation involved health physics records. . Documentation was
subsequently modified to resolve this concern.
l
8. Escalated Enforcement Actions :
1. Civil Penalties
A fifty thousand dollar civil penalty was proposed during the as-
~
,
sessment period in connection with unidentified openings in a
security vital area barrier. A special inspection by a regional
specialist inspector identified weaknesses in control of contractor
personnel, inspections of the barrier, and corrective actions.
2. Orders
An Order Modifying License was issued on November 29, 1984 in con-
nection with recurring weaknesses in the radiation protection pro-
gram. The order confirmed implementation of an extensive Radio-
logical Improvement Program (RIP). '
3. Confirmatory Action Letters.
A Confirmatory Action Letter was issued on October 26, 1984 in con-
.
nection with recurring radiation protection program weaknesses.
l The letter outlined licensee plans for evaluating and correcting
these weaknesses.
C. Management Conferences
Enforcement conferences were held on November 20, 1984, January 31, 1985,
and August 27, 1985 in the Region I office. Weaknesses in the control
l and monitoring of neutron instrumentation during' refueling were discussed
during the first conference. An unplanned occupational radiation expo-
sure was discussed at the second conference. The licensee's response
' to abnormal surveillance findings and a degraded vital area barrier were
discussed during the third conference. Management meetings with Region
I personnel were also held at the licensee's reque'st to discuss various
program improvements.
One management meeting with NRR was held on March 26, 1985 regarding the
licensee's request for schedular extension to November 30, 1985 for com-
pletion of' environmental qualification of electrical equipment important
to safety.
f
I .
,
.
.
36
D. Licensee Event Reports
1. Tabular Listing
Type of Events:
A. Personnel Errors ,
4
B. Design / Man./Const./ Install 10
C. External Cause 0
D. Defective Procedure 1
E. Management / Quality Assurance
Deficiency 0
X. Other 20
Total 35
LERs Reviewed
LER No. 84-13 to 85-27
2. Causual Analysis
Two sets of common mode events were identified:
a. LERs 84-14, 84-15, 84-17, 85-06, 85-15, and 85-17 reported
inadvertent safety system actuations caused by maintenance
or surveillance activities.
b. LERs 85-02, 85-05, 85-16, 85-20 and 85-24 involved missed
surveillance tests.
.
1
1
a
c- -
,
.* ,
- .
37
.
1
E. Operating Reactor Licensing Actions
1. Schedular Extensions Granted
'
March 28,.1985- - extension until November 30, 1985 for com -
pletion of electrical equipment environmental
qualification
l
l
2. Reliefs Granted.
l .
I
August 8, 1985 - relief from implementation.of automatic
switchover of RCIC suction per NUREG-0737
Item II.K.3.22
3. Exemptions Granted
l December 18, 1984 - exemption from certain requirements of
I
Appendix R,Section III.G.
i
L 4. License Amendments Issued
, t
!
Amendment No. 81, issued October 9, 1984; deleted License Condition
3.D " Equalizer Valve Restriction"
Amendment No. 82, issued October 10, 1984;. revised Technical Spect-
fications relative to RPV thermal and pressurization limits
i
Amendment No. 83, issued November 7, 1984; revised Technical Speci-
fications for surveillance instrumentation on suppression chamber
water temperature, torus water level,. containment pressure and high
radiation, and vents.
l '
.
Amendment No. 84, issued November 27, 1984; revised Technical Spec-
l , ifications to apply to Halon fire suppression system which replaced
i carbon dioxide system in the cable spreading room.
I ,
Amendment No. 85, issued December 17, 1984; added License Condition
3.I requiring the installation of a post-accident' sampling system -
,
and a containment atmospheric monitoring system by June 30, 1985.
Amendment No. 86, issued April 5, 1985; revised Technical Specifi-
cations to permit changes in the normal . full power background trip
level for the main steam-line hign radiation scram and isolation i
setpoints to accommodate a short-term test of operation with hydro- ~
l
gen injection into the reactor coolant. '
'
Amendment-No. 87, issued April 22, 1985; revised Technical Specifi-
cations by reducing the maximum permitted oxygen concentration in t
the primary containment during plant operation from 5%-to 4%.
'
-s )
1
l .
.,
t
-. . . . _ , _ . . -
-.
_
- .
38
Amendment No. 88, 1ssued August 14, 1985; revised Technical Speci -
fications to reflect changes in reporting requirements per 10 CFR -
50.72 and 50.73 and Generic Letter 83-43 and to recognize changes
in title, organization and responsibilities.
Amendment No. 89, issued August 30, 1985; revised radiological ef- '
fluents sections of the Technical Specifications to meet Appendix
I requirements.
Amendment No. 90, issued October 9, 1985; revised Technical Speci-
!- fications by changing the Reactor Low Water Level (inside shroud)
-trip requirements.
~
l
l
4
-
I
4
t
u
i
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l
'
l
l _ _ . -- __ _ - __ - - _- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _.
.. -. . . . - . . ~ - . - . - . .
, . . _. -
., -
4
1
'
T-1-1
1 -
.
' TABLE 1.
a i.
, TABULAR LISTING OF LERS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA '
- . PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION '
,
<
t
'
Area Number /Cause Code Total
A. Plant Operations' 18, 8X
'
9
d
B. Radiological Controls IX 1
$: C. Maintenance &
Modifications 3A, 68, 10,'2X 12
l' .
D. Surveillance IA, 3B, 8X 12 e
i. E. Fire Protection /
Housekeeping IX 1 *
i
j F. Emergency Protection None O' ,
- G. Security and Safeguards None , O '
< 's,
'
, H. Refueling & Outage
- . Management None 0
1. Licensing Activities None O'
Total ' i lc i 35
9
-
'f
, r
4
'
Cause Codes: A - Personnel Error b
B - Design,-Manufacturing, Construction or Installation Error
'
C - External Cause t'
D - Defective Procedures ' *
E - Management / Quality Assurance Deficiency :
X - Other "
.
-
,
,;
f
L .
- -
i
5
'
. .,
)*
'
.
-._-_._-..-.__s ----------.-_---_.-____.-----_-__-.-x..____.
_
.
.
T-2-1
TABLE 2
LER SYNOPSIS (10/1/84 - 10/31/85)
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION'
LER Number Summary Description
84-13 Jet pump instrumentation nozzle indications
84-14 Inadvertent RPS actuation (bus transfer)
84-15 Inadvertent containment spray actuation
84-16 Loss of power to 120 V AC bus Y-4
84-17 Loss of offsite power - unclanned diesel generator start
84-18 Inoperable motor operator for LPCI injection valve MD-1001-28A
84-19 MSIV isolation during startup
84-20 MSIV isolation during startup, LPCI valve npt fully seated
35-01 SLCS system inoperable due to debris
85-02 Missed surveillance tests
85-03 Completion of a shutdown
85-04 Reactor vessel drain line leak
85-05 Missed surveillance test
85-06 Reactor scram during surveillance test
85-07 Secondary containment dampers inoperable
85-03 HPCI system inoperable
85-09 Reactor scram on turbine high vibration signal
85-10 Secondary containment dampers inoperable
85-11 Absolute versus gauge containment pressure transmitters
85-12 HPCI system inoperable; 5/18 trip, 5/23 isolation 6/6 trip 4
!
85-13 HPCI' isolation on false high steam flow signal
!
,
n r
- . .- . -- . .. . . .. - - - _ . . -~
,
- .:
.-
, .T-2-2
l
l
l
t
'
'LER Number Summary Description.
65-14' Reactor scram due to an inadvertent high water'1 eve 1 ~ tso'lation ~'
85-15 Secondary containment isolation due'to personnel error.during
during a surveillance test
,
! 85-16 Missed surveillance - reactor building vent gross' radioactivity !
analysis
85-17 Secondary containment isolation due to personnel error-during
a surveillance test
85-18 Failure to meet technical specification requirements --inoper--
able secondary containment damper
85-19 Secondary containment dampers inoperable
85-20 Failure to conduct' compensatory . surveillance tests for inoper-
able zA' diesel generator .;
85-21 Main steam line monitors "B" and "C" outside. technical speci- t
fication limits ;
85-22 Hot shop ventilation contamination
85-23 HPCI system inoperable
85-24 Missed surveillance test - station batteries
85-25 Reactor scram after load rejection
85-26 Inadequate surveillance procedure for control rod position
indication
'
85-27 LPCI injection valve inoperable
..
l
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l
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! ~ .
.
.. .
.
.
T-3-1
TABLE 3
INSPECTION HOURS SUMMARY (10/1/84 - 10/31/85)
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
HOURS % OF TIME
A. Plant Operations ..................... 1100 29
B. Radiological Controls ................ 513* 14
C. Maintenance & Modifications .......... 820 22
D. Surveillance ......................... 646 17
E. Emergency Preparedness ............... 310 8
F. Security and Safeguards .............. 100 3
G. Refueling & Outage Management ........ 303.5 8
H. Licensing Activities ................. ** **
__
Total 3792.5 100%
Includes hours for nonradiological chemistry inspection.
- Hours expended in facility license activities not included with direct
inspection effort statistics.
1
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-_a__ -_____l
.
.
T-4-1
TABLE 4
ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY (10/1/84 - 10/31/85)
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
Severity Levels
FUNCTIONAL AREAS I II III IV V DEV Total
A. Plant Operations - - -
4 2 -
6
B. Radiological Controls - -
1 1 1 2 5
C. Maintenance & Modifications - - -
1
- -
1
D. Surveillance - - -
9 2 1 12
E. Emergency Preparedness - - -
2 - -
2
F. Security & Safeguards - -
1 - - -
1
G. Refueling & Outage Management - - - - - -
0
H. Licensing Activities - - - - - -
0
Totals by Severity Level 0 0 2 17 5 3 27
'
______ . - _ . .- - _ . - - - - _ _ - - _ . . - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - . - - - . - - - - - - - . - - - . - - - - -
. __ _
.
.
T-5-1
'
TABLE 5
ENFORCEMENT CATA
PILGRIM NUCLEAR p0WER STATION
Insp. Insp. Severity Functional
No. Date Level Area ~ Violation
84-36 11/1-11/85 IV Plant .
Failure to conduct an adequate
Operations . shift turnover for control room i
personnel during refueling
IV Plant Failure to continuously monitor
Operations _ ' source range monitors during
,
refueling
84-39 11/21- IV Surveillance Failure to promptly identify
12/31/84 conditions adverse to quality
(i.e. failure to initiate Failure
and Malfunction Reports)
84-41 12/10-13/84 IV Emergency Failure to diseminate emergency
- Preparedness planning information
, IV Emergency -Failure to update the emergency
j Preparedness plan and procedures
84-44 12/18-19/84 III Radiological Failure to' follow radiation work
- Controls permit instructions and failure
to establish a procedure for a
, remote reading teledosimetry
system
'
!
85-01 1/1-31/85 V Plant Failure to maintain control room
- Operations staffing
- at levels required by
4
IV Surveillance Failure to test the containment
cooling subsystem immediately
when the low pressure coolant
injection system was inoperable
85-03 2/1/85- IV Surveillance Failure to conduct surveillance
3/4/85 tests for the reactor protection
system (six examples)
l
Surveillance '
'
'
IV Failure to conduct rod block
surveillance tests (five examples)
, -
____.__.______m._~__ _.___.______________._.____.__.-__.__________.________.______..m__.____a________l-_. '_____.___._ __ _ ____ _ _ _._ _ ._______ _ .._u__.___._____m__
o
.
T-5-2
Insp. Insp. Severity Functional
No. Date Level Area Violation
IV Plant Failure to promptly correct con-
Operations ditions adverse to quality (i.e.
failure to take timely action
on Quality Assurance surveillance
findings)
V Surveillance Failure to use the most current
revision of a surveillance test
procedure
V Surveillance Failure to calibrate test equip-
ment within the calibrated period
85-06 3/5/85- V Plant Failure to maintain an uncali-
4/1/85 Operations brated local power range monitor
in a bypassed state
IV Maintenance Failure to conduct a dioctyl
phthalate test of HEPA filters
following maintenance on the
85-13 5/20-23/85 V Radiological Failure to have the Operations
Controls Review Committee (ORC) review
two radiological procedures and
failure to control work in the
fuel pool with a maintenance
request
Deviation Radiological Failure to conduct an adequate
Controls review of systems that could
generate an uncontrolled, un-
monitored radioactive effluent
release, as recommended in IE
85-17 6/13/85- IV Surveillance Failure to conduct a surveillance
7/15/85 surveillance test of the 250 V
battery system required by the
technical specification and to
follow station procedures for
additional battery tests
IV Radiological Failure to specify high radiation
Controls area surveillance frequencies
on radiation work permits
.
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
.
. .
T-5-3
Insp. Insp. Severity Functional
No. Date Level Ar ea Violation
Deviation Surveillance Failure to conduct inservice
tests as specified in an NRC
submittal
85-20 7/16/85- IV Surveillance Failure to maintain the trip
8/19/85 level setting for the "B" and
"C" main steam line high radi-
ation monitors within technical
specification limits
.
85-21 7/16/85- IV Surveillance Failure to maintain secondary
7/30/85 -
containment
IV Surveillance Failure to test alternate safety
system when an emergency diesel
generator was found to be
IV Surveillance Failure to initiate Failure and
Malfunction Reports as required
by station procedures
85-24 8/6-8/85 III Security Failure to maintain an adequate
vital area barrier
85-26 8/20/85- IV Plant Failure to properly authorize
9/23/85 Operations excessive licensed operator
overtime as required by station
procedures (thirty-five instances)
85-27 9/16/85- Deviation Radiological Failure to install a protective
9/20/85 Controls conduit
1
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. , . _ .. .,_
.
,
, ,
-
T-6-1
TABLE 6 {
INSPECTION ACTIVITIES (10/1/84 - 10/31/85)
PILGRIM NUCLEAR p0WER STATION
Inspection Inspection
Rep;rt No. Hours Areas Inspected
_
84-28 259 Plant readiness for restart, team. inspection
29, 30, 31, 32 ---
Cancelled
'
33 174.5 Resident inspection, plant operations
34 ---
1984 SALP Report
35 88 Emergency preparedness, ra ec'ial drill
36 41 Special inspection, source range monitor
i operation during refueling activities
37 18 Operator license examination
, 38 64 Containment integrated and local leak rate
testing
<
39 402 Resident inspection, plant startup follow--
ing a recirculation pipe replacement outage
.
(see also inspection no. 85-01)
'
40 46 Startup test program
41 75 Emergency preparedness program
42 29 Startup physics testing
43 --
Cancelled
, 44 13 Special inspection, radiological controls
i for desludging the "C" monitor tank (see
.also inspection no. 85-02)
i
85-01 293 Resident inspection, plant startup follow-
ing a recirculation pipe replacement outage
(see also inspection no. 84-39)
.
<
02 58 Special inspection, followup on radiologi- ,
, cal controls actions (see also inspection
no. 84-13)
1 .
, _ . , , ,,,,_e , - , . , , , _ _ . . , , ., y . , , , .. ,, , . -
_
.. .-
4
e.
e.
.T-6-2
-
Inspection Inspection
. Report No. Hours Areas Inspected
03 179 Resident inspection, plant operations
04 38 physical security programs
05 24 Nonradiological chemistry program
06 195 Resident inspection, plant operations
07 64 Special inspection, followup on radiologi--
cal controls actions, bulletins and cir-
culars, and high reading TLDs
08 134.5 Resident inspection, plant operations
09 138 Vendor-licensee interface
10 ---
Cancelled
11 216 Resident inspection, plant operations
12 27 Plant modifice.tions and operations
13 70 Radiological controls program
14 30 Followup on previous inspection findings,
plant operations
'
15 xx Operating license examination
16 28 Special-inspection, unauthorized mainten-
ance and modification activities on the-
high pressure coolant injection (HPCI).
system-
17 98 Resident inspection, plant operations
18 37 Followup.to HPCI waterhammer events and
pipe snubber. inspection progrTm ,
19 147 Emergency prepa-edness, annua. exercise
20 132.5 Resident inspection, plant operations-
21 24- Special inspection, review of licensee
response to-two abnormal surveillance test-
results
~
L'<_.- -,n -
a
,
.
T-6-3
Inspection Inspection
Report No. Hours Areas Inspected
22 35 Radiological controls program
23 109 Radiochemistry program, mobile laboratory
24 12 Special inspection, review of licensee
response to a degraded vital area barrier
25 6 Enforcement Conference, concerning NRC
inspection nos. 85-21 and 85-24
26 86 Pcsident inspection, plant operations
,
27 140 Post accident sampling system and related
accident monitoring system review
28 148 Resident inspection, plant operations
29 114 Special inspection, refuel bridge damage
followup
_
.
.
T-7-1
TABLE 7
PLANT SHUTDOWNS
Shutdown Period Description Cause
Dec. 11, 1983 to Refueling and recirculation pipe ---
Dec. 24, 1984 replacement outage.
Dec. 24, 1984 Startup from the outage. ---
Dec. 25, 1984 Shutdown from low power due to Design (trapped air possible
erratic. indication of reactor in instrument lines) or
water level instruments during the procedure weakness (venting
startup. Trapped air in instru- instrument lines following
ment reference legs is a long an extended. outage not ade-
standing problem. quate).
Jan. 1, 1985 to Shutdown due to the presence of- Poor housekeeping (SLCS)
Jan. 7, 1985 debris in SLCS and for maintenance and component malfunction
on torus to drywell vacuum (vacuum breakers).
breakers.
Feb. 9-15, 1985 Shutdown to replace failed recir-' Component-malfunction and
culation pump bearings. The bear procedure weakness (response
ing failure was caused by a loss to a hi/lo oil level alarm
of pump lubricating oil inventory. not adequate).
The oil loss was caused by a leak
in an oil packing gland that sur-
rounds a cooling water line.
Feb. 15-18, 1985 Shutdown to repair a leaking weld Component malfunction.
in the reactor vessel drain line.
March 15-20, 1985 Scram from 100% power on a false Design weakness (instrument
high reactor pressure signal valves prone to stick)"or-
caused by a sticking. instrument personnel- error (valve
valve. The shutdown was continued overtightened).
to complete maintenance on.the
reactor water sample system and
secondary containment dampers.
June 14, 1985 Scram from less than 10% power due Personnel error. l
to a high reactor water level '
isolation during low power
maneuvers. j
April 4-S, 1985 Scram from 85% power due to a . Design weakness ~(turbine
false turbine high vibration trip logic;is one out of
signal. n).
)
,
d
._ _ _._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - - - _ - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
c-
e
G
9
T-7-2
Shutdown Period. Description Cause
Sept. 1-5, 1985 Scram from 32% power due to high Design weakness (portions
reactor prassure following a of switchyard must be washed
generator load rejection. The live).
load rejection was caused when a
ground fault occurred in the sta-
tion switchyard during washing ac-
tivities. The fault was caused
by a buildup of ocean salt on
switchyard insulators. A leaking
recirculation pump seal was re-
placed while the reactor was shut
down.
Sept. 5-7, 1985 Shutdown to replace an additional Design or maintenance
leaking recirculation pump seal. weakness.
_
. _ _ - _
.
,
-h. p '
3
FIGUPI 1. Pilgrim Unplanned Reactor Shut Downs
20
.
-
_ . .
.
.
10 _.
^
1 \ 2
" ;s ' 5 N X
Shut Down
~ \ \ 1
\
N N 5 N
,
N N N N
N N N \
\ \ N N
O N \ \ \
DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
1984 1985
- Number of shut downs per month. The recirculation pipe replacement outage ended on
December 24, 1984.
?
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ __