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July 2003 - Final Operating Examination
	ML032540409
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	08/27/2003
From:	Gody A; Operations Branch IV
To:	Anderson C; Entergy Operations
References
	-RFPFR, 50-368/03-301 50-368/03-301
	Download: ML032540409 (228)
	v • d • e

Facility: ANO-2 Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2003-1 Page 1 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% MOL, All ESF systems in standby. Green Train Maintenance Week. B Vacuum pump tagged out for maintenance.

Turnover:

100%. 250 EFPD. B Vacuum pump tagged out for maintenance. Green Train Maintenance Week. EOOS indicates Minimal Risk.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 XRCCHAPCNT I (CBOR) Control Channel A Pressurizer Pressure fails HIGH.

2 XSPUPFAIL C (CBOR) Loss of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)

Update 3 XFW2TE0361 I (CBOT) Common MFP lube oil supply temperature transmitter, 2TE-0361, fails LOW (fails 2TIC-5283 closed).

4 RCP2P32BLOW RCP 2P32B Lower and Middle Seal failures; RCP2P32BMID R (CBOR) Requiring a plant shutdown.

N (ALL) 5 RCP2P32BUPP C (CBOR) RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP.

6 RCSLOCATCB M (ALL) Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage.

7 HPI2P89AFAL C (CBOT) A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay.

8 416_2A406 C (CBOT) B HPSI pump fails to start due to breaker fault.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Page 2 of 16 SCENARIO #1 NARRATIVE Simulator session begins with the plant at 100% power and steady state. B vacuum pump is tagged out for maintenance.

The in-service Pressurizer (PZR) control channel pressure instrument will fail high.

Alarms on Pressurizer Control Channel 1 pressure HI and Pressure HI HI will come in. This will result in BOTH PZR spray valves opening, the backup heaters to deenergize, the proportional heaters to go to minimum fire and actual PZR pressure to drop. AOP 2203.028, PZR Systems Malfunctions, will be entered and actions directed by the CRS. The CBOR may take both PZR spray valves to manual and close them. The CBOR may take the Backup heaters to ON to raise PZR pressure.

The CBOR will verify that the other pressure control channel is reading correctly and select the channel 2 for control using 2HS-4626. The CBOT will place SDBCS Master Controller in AUTO local and adjust setpoint to 1000 psia About two minutes into scenario, the SPDS computer will fail to update. The CBOR will report that the SPDS is not updating. This will remain failed the rest of the scenario. Primarily the CBOR will be forced into using redundant indications since one of the SPDS CRTs is on 2C03 and the CBOR relies heavily on it for indications.

The CBOT also will be forced to use redundant indications as one of the SPDS CRT is located on the upper part of 2C16. The CRS will notify maintenance and log the time SPDS is lost. This is a 1-hour reportable event if SPDS cannot be restored (10CFR50.72).

Five minutes into the scenario, 2TE0361 fails low. This will result in CCW isolation to the common MFP lube oil cooler. Temperature alarms will come in on supply temperature at 135°F. The CRS will refer to ACA2203.012C that will direct obtaining local lube oil temperatures from the AO. The CBOT will monitor MFP lube oil temperatures on 2TRS 0325 chart recorder located on 2C11. The CBOT will recognize that 2TIC-5283, MFP Lube Oil Temp. Controller on 2C04 has zero output due to the temperature feed failing low. The CBOT will take manual control of 2TIC-5283 to lower and control MFP lube oil temp using the PMS MFP screen and the AO to watch MFP lube oil temperature.

Approximately 15 minutes into the scenario, two seals on B RCP will fail.

Annunciator 2K11-G3, RCP Bleedoff flow HI/LO will alarm. The CBOT will verify using PMS and RCP chart recorder on 2C14 that the lower and middle seals have failed. The CRS will enter the RCP emergencies AOP, 2203.025 and direct the board operator actions. The crew will perform a power reduction such that the plant will be off line in one hour. The CBOR will borate the RCS and reduce turbine load to maintain Tave-Tref within 2°F. The CBOT will make preparations to remove secondary plant equipment out of service as power is reduced.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Page 3 of 16 SCENARIO #1 NARRATIVE When the lead examiner is ready, the third seal will fail on B RCP. When the crew recognizes the failure the CRS will direct a manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP. The Crew will complete SPTAs when the reactor is tripped.

On the Reactor trip, the vapor seal on B RCP will fail resulting in a 400 gpm LOCA ramped over 5 minutes. The crew will manually actuate SIAS and CCAS when pressure is observed to be trending towards the trip setpoint of 1650 psia. The CBOR will secure one RCP in each loop when RCS pressure reaches 1400 psia.

When SIAS is manually actuated, the A HPSI pump will fail to automatically start.

The CBOT will recognize the A HPSI pump not starting (annunciator will alarm) and manually start the pump (with direction from the CRS). Also when SIAS is manually actuated, the B HPSI pump will fail due to a breaker fault (annunciator will alarm).

The CBOT will place B HPSI pump in PTL and start C HPSI pump.

After SPTAs are complete, the CRS will diagnose a LOCA and enter the LOCA EOP 2202.003. The CRS will direct the CBOR to cooldown the RCS. The CBOR will cooldown the RCS using the SDBCS bypass valves to the condenser and plot and record the cooldown using standard attachments 1 and 8. When HPSI termination criteria is met, the crew will secure one HPSI pump and throttle the opposite loop HPSI injection MOVs to maintain PZR level. The scenario may be terminated at the lead examiners discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Page 4 of 16 Simulator Instructions for Scenario 1 Reset to 100% power MOL IC.

Triggers T1, T3, T4, T5 set to false.

Conditional trigger T2 set to reactor trip.

Place Green train maintenance week sign in simulator.

Place Minimal Risk sign in simulator.

Align C HPSI to Green Train and in PTL.

PZR Pressure control hand-switch 2HS-4626 in Channel A.

B Vacuum pump tagged out. Handswitch on 2C01 in PTL. Overide for Green light (2HS-0696-

4) set to FALSE. Override for handswitch in PTL (2HS-0696) set to TRUE. Override for Seal Water Pump Green light (2CI-P31B) FALSE.

Event Malf. No. Value/ Event No. Ramp Time Description 1 XRCCHAPCNT 2500 Control Channel A Pressurizer Pressure fails HIGH.

Trigger=T1 2 XSPUPFAIL Insert Loss of Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)

Update Trigger = T1 2 min TD 3 XFW2TE0361 0 Common MFP Lube Oil Supply Temperature Transmitter, 2TE-0361, fails LOW (fails 2TIC-5283 Trigger = T3 closed).

4 RCP2P32BLOW 100 RCP 2P32B Lower and Middle Seal failures:

RCP2P32BMID 3 min TD Requiring a plant shutdown.

Trigger = T4 5 RCP2P32BUPP 100 RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP.

Trigger = T5 6 RCSLOCATCB 400 gpm Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage.

Trigger = T2 5 min Ramp 7 HPI2P89AFAL True A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay.

8 416_2A406 Locked B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

OPEN 2HS-5079-2_w True

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 5 of 16 Event

Description:

Control Channel A Pressurizer Pressure fails HIGH..

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce annunciator 2K10-E6 Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel 1 Pressure HI / LO.

Report both Pressurizer spray valves open and actual pressurizer pressure dropping.

CRS Refer to PZR Systems Malfunctions AOP 2203.028 and direct board operators actions.

Refer to TS 3.2.8 if pressure not 2025 to 2275 psia.

CBOR Compare channels and determine Channel 1 failed low.

Control backup heaters manually to maintain pressure > 2100 psia.

Place PZR Pressure Channel Select switch (2HS-4626) to channel 2.

Verify PZR spray valves closed.

Restore backup heaters to automatic control.

CBOT Place SDBCS Master controller in AUTO local and adjust setpoint to 1000 psia.

Termination Criteria: PZR Pressure Control selected to Channel 2 in auto control or at examiner's discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 16 Event

Description:

Loss of the Safety Parameter Display (SPDS) Update.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce the loss of the SPDS computer to the CRS CRS Logs the failure of the SPDS.

CRS Direct the CBOR/CBOT to use the other means of monitoring plant parameters.

CBOR Monitors the plant and provides information from other panel indications.

CBOT CRS Inform SM:

To Contact maintenance (CSG),

That it is a 1-hour reportable occurrence if it cannot be restarted within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . (10CFR50.72(b) (1) (v) and ANO procedure 2105.014, SPDS.

Termination criteria: SPDS is logged out of service, maintenance is contacted (CSG) and SM informed of loss of SPDS or at the examiners discretion (NOTE: this condition will remain throughout the rest of the scenario).

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 16 Event

Description:

Common MFP Lube Oil Supply Temperature Transmitter, 2TE-0361, fails LOW (fails 2TIC-5283 closed).

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOT Announce annunciators:

2K03-E8/E11 Turbine bearing Metal Temperature High.

2K03-D8/D11 Turbine Bearing Oil Temperature High.

CRS Implement Annunciator Corrective Action AOP 2203.012C.

NOTE: When contacted by control room as AO, report that local MFP bearing temperatures to A MFP (2TI2611A) and B MFP (2TI2611B) are trending up are reading the value obtained from instructors area qume (IEW CCT2E22).

CBOT Report that 2TE-0374(A MFP) and 2TE-0371(B MFP) are > 135°F and trending up. Also Report that bearing metal temperatures are also trending up.

CBOT Report that MFP Lube Oil TEMP Controller (2TIC-5283) has zero output. Take manual control of controller and control MFP lube oil temperature < 135°F.

CBOT Report that PMS point T0361 has failed low. (P&ID M-2216 sh2, E7

& M-2234 sh 1, G-2)

Termination Criteria: When MFP Lube Oil controller is in manual and controlling MFP lube oil temperature or at examiners discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Lower and Middle Seal failures requiring a plant shutdown.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce alarm 2K11-G3 RCP BLEEDOFF FLOW HI/LO.

Report lower seal failure on B RCP.

CRS Refer to RCP Emergencies AOP 2203.025 and direct board operator actions.

CBOR CBOT Monitor RCP seals for further degradation.

Report middle seal failure on B RCP.

CRS Setup contingency to trip reactor and RCP if upper seal fails.

Refer to OP 2102.004 Power Operations and commence a plant shutdown.

Notify NLOs, Management, Dispatcher, Chemist, and Nuclear Eng.

CBOR Commence boration ~ 20 gpm.

Maintain ASI -0.20 to +0.20 with Group 6 or P CEAs.

CBOT Reduce main turbine load to maintain Tave within 2° F of Tref.

Termination criteria: Plant shutdown in progress or at examiners discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No. 5, 6 , 7 & 8 Page 9 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP; Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage; A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay; B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce Upper Seal failure on B RCP (third seal).

Manually trip reactor.

Secure B RCP and place associated spray valve in MANUAL and closed.

CRS Implement Standard Post Trip Actions, 2202.001 Notify operators to monitor Exhibit 7 CBO Reactor Trip Checklist, track safety functions, and direct board operator actions.

CBOR Check reactivity control:

Reactor power decreasing.

All CEAs inserted.

CBOT Check maintenance of vital auxiliaries:

Main turbine tripped.

Generator output and exciter breakers open.

Both 4160v and 6900 v non-vital buses energized.

Both 4160v and 480v vital AC bus energized.

Both 125v vital DC bus energized.

CBOR Check inventory control:

PZR level 10 to 80%.

Trend from setpoint.

RCS MTS > 30°F Continue to next page

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No. 5, 6 , 7 & 8 Page 10 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP; Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage; A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay; B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Check RCS pressure control:

RCS pressure 1800 to 2250 psia.

Trend from setpoint Verify SIAS when pressure less than 1650 psia.

CT Trip one RCP in each loop when pressure less than 1400 psia. (may not be done until LOCA procedure)

Place spray valve for secured RCP in manual closed.

Secure ALL RCPs if NPSH requirements violated.

CBOR Check core heat removal by forced circulation:

RCP status Loop T less than 10° F.

RCS MTS 30° F or greater.

Component cooling water aligned to RCPs.

Service water not aligned to CCW.

CBOT Restore SW to CCW using Exhibit 5.

CBOT or Check RCS Heat Removal:

CBOR Report SG levels.

MFW in RTO (Reactor Trip Override).

Report feedwater line intact.

Report SG pressures.

CBOR Report RCS Tc 540 to 555°F.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Continue to next page

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No. 5, 6 , 7 & 8 Page 11 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP; Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage; A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay; B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Check CNTMT parameters:

Temperature less than 140° F and trending up.

Pressure less than 16 psia and trending up.

CNTMT Spray Pumps secured.

Status of radiation alarms:

CAMS (2K10-B6) In alarm Area radiation (2K11-B10) in alarm.

Process liquid (2K11-C10)

Report trends on radiation monitors increasing.

Status of SEC SYS RADIATION HI (2K11-A10)

Report trends on secondary system radiation monitors stable.

CRS Notify SM to perform the following:

SE report to control room.

Announce reactor trip on plant page.

Refer to Tech Specs and EALs.

Tech Specs 3.0.3, 3.6.3.1 and in Alert Emergency Class CRS Direct CBOs to acknowledge all control room annunciators and announce all significant alarms.

Diagnose Loss of Coolant Accident EOP 2202.003.

CRS Implement Loss of Coolant ORP, open place keeping page, and direct board operators actions.

CRS Perform crew brief and review floating steps.

CRS Contact chemistry to sample SG for activity Continue to next page

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No. 5, 6 , 7 & 8 Page 12 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP; Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage; A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay; B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Verify SIAS and CCAS actuated on PPS inserts.

CBOT Verify CCW aligned to RCPs (Floating Step)

CBOR Check RCS pressure greater than 1400 psia. (Floating Step)

CT

Secure one RCP in loop 2 (if not done in SPTAs).

Secure ALL RCPs if MTS <30°F.

CBOT Restore ESF/Non-ESF systems: (Floating step)

Verify at least one SW pump running in each loop.

Verify DG SW outlet valves open.

Verify SW suction aligned to Lake.

Check 4160v Non-vital buses energized from offsite power.

Check 4160v Vital buses energized from offsite power.

Start SW pumps as needed to maintain header pressure.

Restore SW to ACW per Exhibit 5.

Maintain SW header greater than 85 psig.

Continue to next page

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No. 5, 6 , 7 & 8 Page 13 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP; Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage; A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay; B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CT CBOT Verify HPSI flow to RCS:

Report A HPSI pump failure to auto start and manually start.

Report B HPSI Pump breaker trip. Manually start C HPSI pump (Only one HPSI pump is required to be started).

CBOT Verify all CNTMT Cooling Fans running in emergency mode.

CBOT Verify SG levels greater than 22.2%. (Floating Step)

CBOT Align Feedwater:

Check EFW pump 2P7B running.

Secure EFW pump 2P7A.

Verify AFW pump 2P75 secured.

Secure running MFW pump and close ALL FW blocks.

CBOT Verify CCW surge tank constant and CCW radiation monitor trend stable.

CBOR Check LOCA is limited to containment.

Containment sump level going up.

Containment temperature, humidity and pressure are going up.

Auxiliary Building radiation levels steady.

Auxiliary building sump is less than 53%.

Waste tanks 2T20 A/B levels are steady.

Continue to next page

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No. 5, 6 , 7 & 8 Page 14 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP; Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage; A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay; B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Check CNTMT Isolation parameters. (Floating Step)

CNTMT pressure exceeds 18.3 psia.

CNTMT RADIATION HI alarm 2K10-A6 in alarm. Actuate CIAS and commence Attachment 5.

Verify ONE Penetration Room Ventilation Fan Running.

CBOR Check CNTMT pressure trend not exceeded 23.3 psia. (Floating Step)

Verify CSAS actuated on PPS inserts.

Stop ALL RCPs, place spray valves in manual closed.

Verify spray pumps running with greater than 1875 gpm each.

CBOT Terminate CNTMT Spray if conditions met.

CBOT Start both Hydrogen Analyzers per 2104.044.

CBOT Verify All available miscellaneous CNTMT ventilation running:

CNTMT Bldg. Recirc fans (2VSF-31A-D)

Reactor Cavity fans (2VSF-34A&B)

Three CEDM Shroud Cooling fans (2VSF-35s)

Continue to next page

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No. 5, 6 , 7 & 8 Page 15 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP; Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage; A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay; B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOT Check ALL AC and vital DC buses energized. (Floating Step)

CBOR Check IA pressure greater than 65 psig. (Floating Step)

CRS Check LOCA not isolated and proceed to Section 3 CBOR Perform controlled cooldown to 275°F. (Float Step)

Reset low PZR pressure and low SG pressure setpoints.

Record and plot cooldown on Attachments 1 and 8.

Initiate cooldown using SDBCS bypass valves.

CBOT Check Condensate pump in service.

CBOT Maintain SG levels 45 to 90%.

Check CST level greater than 82%

CBOR Restore PZR level. (Floating Step)

Maintain 29% to 80%

CBOR Verify Natural Circulation if RCPs secured:

Loop T less than 50° F.

Thot and Tcold constant or lowering.

RCS MTS 30° F or greater.

T between Thot and average CETs less than 10° F.

Continue to next page

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No. 5, 6 , 7 & 8 Page 16 of 16 Event

Description:

RCP 2P32B Upper Seal Failure requiring manual Reactor trip and securing of B RCP; Loss of Coolant Accident after Reactor trip due to vapor seal leakage; A HPSI pump fails to auto start due to faulty ESF relay; B HPSI pump fails due to breaker fault.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Check that RCP restart criteria is NOT met.

CBOR Check RCS void free:

PZR level stable using aux spray.

RVLMS LVL 01 indicates WET.

Upper head thermocouples indicate subcooled.

CBOR Maintain RCS P-T limits and RCP NPSH per Attachment 1.

Check uncontrolled RCS cooldown below 500° F Tcold has not occurred.

CT CBOT CBOR Override HPSI when termination criteria met: (Floating Step)

RCS MTS 30° F or greater.

PZR level greater than 29% and controlled.

RVLMS LVL 03 or higher indicates WET.

At least one SG available - Level 10 to 90% with FW available OR level being restored with FW flow greater than 485 gpm.

Throttle HPSI flow OR place HPSI pump in PTL as needed to control RCS pressure, inventory, and heat removal.

Termination criteria: Cooldown in progress with HPSI throttled or at examiners discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Facility: ANO-2 Scenario No.: 2 (New) Op-Test No.: 2003-1 Page 1 of 13 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

70% and decreasing. Down Power commenced from 100% due to Rod Drop (CEA # 46).

Azimuthal Tilt in Alarm and continuing power decrease.

Turnover:

Continue power decrease to 50% due to Azimuthal Tilt Alarm. Azimuthal Tilt has not cleared with the Power Reduction. CEA 46 dropped to bottom ~ 80 minutes ago and has been re-aligned with other CEAs in Group 6. Entered AOP 2203.003, CEA Malfunctions. Green Train Maintenance week. EOOS indicates Minimal Risk.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 XSG2LT11311 I (CBOT) Steam Generator B Safety Channel Level Fails CUED LOW.

2 POWER N (ALL) Continue Power REDUCTION T=0 REDUCTION R (CBOR) 3 XCVLDNHXOU I (CBOR) Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature T+10 Transmitter fails LOW From T1 4 CEA48STUCK C(CBOR) Degraded Rod Motion for CEA 48 on Controlling CEA T=0 Bank. This requires individual CEA adjustment to align Value = 80% the CEA with the CEA bank.

5 EHLEAK M(ALL) Leak in Electro Hydraulic System resulting in Loss of CUED (NEW)

EH Pressure to Main Turbine and MFPs resulting in Manual/Automatic Reactor Trip.

6 MS1002 M (ALL) Main Steam Safety Valve OPENS and Fails to CLOSE RX (Set to 0#) on A Steam Generator resulting in an ESD outside Containment TRIP 7 ESF1025 C (CBOT) B EFW isolation valves to A SG fail to close, one EFAS 2CV10382_A automatically and one with valve failure. This results in continued EFW Feed to Affected Steam Generator.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Page 2 of 13 SCENARIO #2 NARRATIVE Simulator session begins with the plant at 70% power and a power reduction in progress. Annunciator 2K10-B2, TECH SPEC AZ TILT EXCEEDED and 2K10-C2, CPC AZ TILT EXCEEDED are in alarm. Direction from Reactor Engineering has been given to continue reducing power to less than 50% in the next 30 minutes (40 minutes is the Tech Spec required time). The crew will enter OP 2102.004, Power Operations procedure, step 11.16, Power Reduction. The CBOR will start a power reduction by RCS boration and lowering turbine load on the turbine load potentiometer to maintain Tave-Tref within 2°F.

During the down power,Axial Shape Index (ASI) will become more negative; to maintain ASI within .01 of Equilibrium Shape Index (ESI), Group 6 CEAs will need to be inserted. As Group 6 CEAs are inserted, CEA 48 will lag behind the other four CEAs in the group. Annunciators 2K04-J5 CEAC #1 DEVIATION and 2K04-J6, CEAC#2 Deviation (5) may alarm. PMS CEA Annunciator 2K10-D1, CEA Minor Deviation (3) or 2K10-C1, CEA Major Deviation (6) may also alarm. Manual Individual CEDMCS operation will be needed to align CEA 48 with the rest of the group.

When Reactivity manipulation completed and on lead examiners cue, 2LT-1131-1, safety channel for B Steam Generator (SG) Level, will fail low. This will trip one of the four PPS trip channels for low SG level trip. Alarms for RPS Channel Trip/Pre-trip and Channel A Operator Insert (2C03) trip and pre-trip lights will be lit. The CRS will refer to the ACA 2203.012D and Tech Specs 3.3.1.1, 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.5 for guidance. The CBOT will place Channel A PPS in bypass for Point 8, LOW SG B Lvl, Point 10, HI SG B Lvl, and Point 20, SG B ?P for maintenance and trouble shooting. The crew will have one hour to place these points in bypass before exceeding the Tech Spec LCO.

Approximately 10 minutes after SG Level transmitter fails low, the Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature transmitter, 2TIC-4815, fails low. This will cause the temperature controller to close and actual Letdown temperature to go up. With no operator action, the Letdown Radiation Monitor will be isolated, the Letdown Demineralizer will be bypassed and the VCT temperature will rise. Annunciator 2K11-C1, Letdown HX 2E29 Outlet Temp Hi will alarm. CRS will refer to ACA for 2K11-C1 and direct actions. CBOR will evaluate 2HIC-4815 and report that demand out of HIC is zero and temperature indicated is zero. CBOR or CBOT will look at PMS computer point T4805 and report that letdown temperature is above alarm set point. CBOR will place 2HIC-4815 in manual and control CCW flow from the Letdown Heat Exchanger to maintain letdown temperature less than 140°F. CRS will contact the WCO and ask flow on 2FIS-5261, CCW flow out of Letdown Heat Exchanger. If letdown temperature exceeded 145°F, letdown flow through the letdown radiation monitor must be manually restored.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Page 3 of 13 SCENARIO #2 NARRATIVE (Continued)

When cued by the lead examiner, an EH leak will start down stream of isolation valve 2EH-1A (on EH Pump Skid) on the common header. EH pressure will degrade to

~1300psig over the next 3 minutes. Annunciator 2K02-A9, LOW EH Pressure, will alarm and the standby EH pump will automatically start. EH pressure will rise and then lower again as the leak worsens. Annunciator 2K02-C10, EH Tank Low Level will alarm about 5 minutes after the start of the malfunction. The Main Turbine Generator will automatically trip at 1100 psig EH pressure. The Main Feed Pumps will automatically trip at 400 psig EH pressure. The crew will secure the EH pumps and the CRS will enter SPTAs.

Post reactor trip the Main Steam Safety Valve (2PSV-1002) on A SG will fail open resulting in an Excess Steam Demand (ESD) outside containment. Also, post EFAS, Emergency Feed Actuation Signal, 2CV-1038-2, B EFW Pump to A SG will mechanically fail to close and 2CV-1025-1, B EFW Pump to A SG will fail to close due to a stuck relay. This will result in severe overcooling of the RCS, if not corrected. The CBOT will override 2CV-1025-1 and close.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Page 4 of 13 Simulator Instructions for Scenario 2 Reset simulator to MOL 70% power IC normal system lineup.

Group 6 is inserted for ASI control.

Markup OP 2102.004, Power Operations up to step 11.16 for power reduction.

Place Green train maintenance week sign in simulator.

2K10-B2, Tech Spec AZ Tilt Exceeded alarm in.

2K10-C2, CPC AZ Tilt Exceeded alarm in.

Triggers T1, T3, and T4 are set to False.

Conditional Trigger T2 is set to Reactor trip.

Conditional Trigger T5 is set to EFAS-1.

Event Malf. No. Value/ Event No. Ramp Description Time 1 XSG2LT11311 0 Steam Generator B Safety Channel Level Fails Trigger T1 LOW.

2 POWER Continue Power REDUCTION REDUCTION 3 XCVLDNHXOU 50°F Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Trigger T3 Transmitter fails LOW 4 CEA48STUCK 80% Degraded Rod Motion for CEA 48 on Controlling CEA Bank. This requires individual CEA adjustment to align the CEA with the CEA bank.

5 EHLEAK TRUE Leak in Electro Hydraulic System resulting in Loss of Trigger T4 EH Pressure to Main Turbine and MFPs resulting in Manual/Automatic Reactor Trip.

6 MS1002 0 Main Steam Safety Valve OPENS and Fails to Trigger T2 Ramp = CLOSE on A Steam Generator resulting in an ESD 20 min. outside Containment 7 ESF1025 TRUE B EFW isolation valves to A SG fail to close. 2CV-1025-1 fails to automatically CLOSE. 2CV-1038-2 fails to CLOSE due to valve failure. This results in 2CV10382_A 1.0 continued EFW Feed to AFFECTED Steam 2HS-1038-2_R FALSE Generator.

Trigger T5 TD 20 sec.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 5 of 15 Event

Description:

Steam Generator B Safety Channel Level Fails LOW.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce annunciators:

2K04-A4, CH A RPS/ESF/PRETRIP/TRIP 2K04-B3, PPS Channel TRIP 2K12-K7, DEFAS Trouble CRS Implement Annunciator Corrective Action AOP 2203.012D.

CBOR Report B SG level low pretrip/trip on A PPS insert.

CBOT Compare all four channels and report 2LI-1131-1 indicates zero.

CRS Inform SM to refer to Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.2.1 and TRM 3.3.1.1.

CBOT Place the following points in bypass on PPS Channel A:

LOW SG B Lvl (Point 8)

HI SG B Lvl (Point 10 )

SG B P (Point 20)

CBOR Verify annunciator 2K04-C3, PPS CHANNEL BYPASSED alarms.

Verify correct channels in bypass.

CRS Contact Maintenance/Work Week Manager.

Termination criteria: Affected points are placed in bypass or at examiner's discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 6 of 13 Event

Description:

Continue Power REDUCTION Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ALL Crew will conduct brief for power decrease.

CRS Implement normal operating procedure 2102.004, Power Operations, Section 11.0. (Step11.16)

Direct CBOR to borate to lower RCS temperature and adjust turbine load using load set potentiometer.

CBOR Commence RCS boration using OP 2104.003, Chemical Addition, Exhibit 3, Normal Boration At Power.

Verify Boric Acid Makeup Controller in Auto at desired flow rate.

Verify selected Boric Acid Pump in Normal-After-Stop.

Verify Mode Selector Switch (2HS-4928) in BORATE.

Verify 2CV-4830, Charging Pump Suction from Boric Acid, opens.

Verify selected Boric Acid Pump running.

Open associated Boric Acid Pump Recirc valve.

Depress red push button on Boric Acid Makeup Batch Controller, 2FIQS-4926 and verify it is set for proper quantity.

Verify 2FIC-4926 indicates proper flow rate.

Monitor Tave and ASI.

Obtain PEER check.

CBOR Adjust turbine load to maintain reference temperature and RCS average temperature within two degrees.

Obtain PEER check.

CBOR Maintain ASI within 0.05 of power dependant ESI by inserting CEAs.

Obtain PEER check and CRS permission to insert CEAs.

Termination criteria: Reactivity manipulation observed or at examiners discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 11 Event

Description:

Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Transmitter fails LOW.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce Annunciator 2K12-C1, Letdown HX 2E29 Outlet Temp HI Verify temperature 2TIS-4815 is reading zero.

CRS Refer to ACA for 2K12-C1 and direct Board Operator actions.

CBOR or Verify Computer point T4805 and 2C09 TIS-4805 are reading greater CBOT than 140°F.

CBOR Verify normal letdown flow.

NOTE: When contacted as WCO, Report CCW flow rate based on approximate demand of 2TIC 4815. (Until manual control is initiated the flow rate is zero, the maximum flow rate is 1200 gpm.)

CRS Contact WCO to verify CCW flow through Letdown Heat Exchanger using 2FIS-5261.

CBOT Report CCW Loop II temperature from 2C14.

CBOR Report that 2TIC-4815 is not controlling CCW flow in Automatic and take manual control of 2TIC-4815 and raise CCW flow through the Letdown Heat Exchanger to maintain Letdown temperature less than 140°F.

CBOR If Letdown temperature went above 145°F, then verify:

That the Letdown To Ion Exchanger valve, 2CV-4803, is in bypass

That the Letdown To Radmonitor valve, 2CV-4804, is closed.

CBOR When Letdown temperature drops below 140°F, then verify:

That the Letdown To Ion Exchanger valve, 2CV-4803, is NOT in bypass

Take the Letdown to Radmonitor valve, 2CV-4804, closed then open.

CRS Contact Maintenance / Work Week Manager.

Termination criteria: Letdown Heat Exchanger temperature controller, 2TIC-4815 is in manual and controlling Letdown temperature less than 140°F.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 13 Event

Description:

Degraded Rod Motion for CEA 48 on Controlling CEA Bank.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce CEA 48 position indication deviating from rest of bank:

CEAC 1 or 2 indication

Announce Annunciator 2K04-J5, CEAC #1 Deviation and 2K04-J6, CEAC#2 Deviation alarms. Report 5 deviation.

Announce PMS CEA Annunciator 2K10-D1, CEA Minor Deviation. Report 3 deviation.

Announce Annunciator 2K10-C1, CEA Major Deviation alarm. Report 6 deviation.

CRS Direct Manual Individual CEDMCS operation to align CEA 48 with the rest of the group.

CBOR Align CEA 48 with rest of group by Manual Individual operation of CEDMCS and insert CEA 48 until it is aligned with the other four CEAs in Group 6.

Obtain PEER Check.

NOTE: This evolution may occur more than once during the scenario. It is dependant on the magnitude of power reduction.

Termination Criteria: Event may be terminated when CEA 48 is aligned with the rest of the CEAs in Group 6 or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 9 of 13 Event

Description:

Leak in Electro Hydraulic System resulting in Loss of EH Pressure to Main Turbine and MFPs resulting in Manual/Automatic Reactor Trip.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOT Report Annunciators 2K02-A9, EH Header Press LO and 2K02-B9, EH Pump 2P14A/B Auto Start are in alarm and report that Standby EH Pump 2P14B automatically started.

CRS Refer to ACA for 2K02-A9 and direct actions.

CBOT Report EH pressure is less than 1300 psig and lowering.

NOTE: When contacted by CRS, report that EH fluid is spraying into EH pit area from a break on the common EH discharge header down stream of isolation valve 2EH-1A and is a large leak.

CRS Direct AO to investigate EH system.

CBOT Report Annunciator 2K02-C10, EH Tank 2T38 Level Hi/LO is in alarm.

CRS Refer to ACA for Annunciator 2K02-C10, EH Tank 2T38 Level Hi/LO and direct actions.

CBOT Monitor EH pressure and report that pressure is approaching Main Turbine Generator (MTG) trip set point and recommend manually tripping the plant.

CBOT Report that the MTG is tripped.

CRS Direct CBOR to manual trip the reactor.

CBOR Manually trip the reactor.

CBOT Place both EH pumps in PTL.

Manually trip the MFPs or report that they have tripped on low EH pressure.

Termination Criteria: Event may be terminated when the reactor is tripped.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 and 7 Page 10 of 13 Event

Description:

On reactor trip one MSSV on A SG, 2PSV-1002, will stick open. On EFAS actuation, the B EFW isolation valves to A SG, 2CV-1038-2 and 2CV-1025-1 will not close. Implement SPTAs and diagnose event.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CREW Announce reactor trip.

CRS Implement 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions, track safety functions, and direct board operator actions.

CRS Direct crew to use Exhibit 7, CBO Reactor Trip Checklist, track safety functions, and that the CRS has control of annunciator horn during moment of silence.

CRS Directs crew to take control of annunciator horns and implement SPTAs.

CBOR Check reactivity control:

Report reactor power lowering.

Report all CEAs are inserted.

CBOT Check maintenance of vital auxiliaries:

Report main turbine tripped.

Report generator output and exciter breakers open.

Report both 4160vac and 6900vac non-vital buses energized form S/U #3.

Report both 4160v and 480v vital AC bus energized from S/U #3.

Report both 125v vital DC bus energized.

CBOR Check inventory control:

Report PZR level 10 to 80%.

Report PZR level NOT trending to setpoint.

Report RCS MTS greater than 30 °F Event 6&7 Continued.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 & 7 Page 11 of 13 Event

Description:

On reactor trip one MSSV on A SG, 2PSV-1002, will stick open. On EFAS actuation, the B EFW isolation valves to A SG, 2CV-1038-2 and 2CV-1025-1 will not close.

Implement SPTAs and diagnose and mitigate event.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Check RCS pressure control:

Report RCS pressure 1800 to 2250 psia. May be lower than 1800 due to the RCS cooldown.

CBOR Check core heat removal by forced circulation:

Report RCPs are running.

Report CCW is aligned to RCPs.

Report SW is aligned to CCW.

CBOT Check RCS Heat Removal:

Report SG levels are lowering.

Report all condensate pumps are secured.

Report both MFW pumps are secured.

Manually actuate EFAS, if not already actuated.

Report that a SG safety valve is open and depressurizing the SG.

Manually actuate MSIS or announce that MSIS has been automatically actuated.

CRS can direct the CBOT to setup to maintain post SG lowdown RCS temperature using upstream ADV on B SG.

CBOR Report RCS Tc 540 to 555°F and slowly lowering.

CT CBOT Close 2CV-1025-1 by overriding EFAS actuation or secure 2P7B, Motor Driven EFWP to secure feeding the AFFECTED SG.

Event 6&7 Continued.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 & 7 Page 12 of 13 Event

Description:

On reactor trip, one MSSV on A SG, 2PSV-1002, will stick open. On EFAS actuation, the B EFW isolation valves to A SG, 2CV-1038-2 and 2CV-1025-1 will not close.

Implement SPTAs and diagnose event.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Check CNTMT parameters:

Report temperature less than 140° F.

Report pressure less than 16 psia.

Report containment spray pumps secured.

Report status of radiation alarms:

CAMS (2K10-B6) not in alarm Area radiation (2K11-B10) not in alarm Process liquid (2K11-C10) not in alarm Report stable trends on radiation monitors.

Report SEC SYS RADIATION HI (2K11-A10) not in alarm.

Report stable trends on secondary system radiation monitors.

CRS Notify SE to report to control room.

Announce reactor trip on plant page.

Notify SM to refer to Tech Specs and EALs. (3.7.1.2 EFW valve failure and NUE - 3.1, Uncontrolled depressurization of secondary that results in MSIS actuation)

CRS Direct CBOs to acknowledge all control room annunciators and announce all significant alarms.

Notify crew of status of Safety functions.

Diagnose EXCESS STEAM DEMAND event on A SG.

Conduct crew brief.

Event 6 & 7 Continued.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 & 7 Page 13 of 13 Event

Description:

On reactor trip, one MSSV on A SG, 2PSV-1002, will stick open. On EFAS actuation, the B EFW isolation valves to A SG, 2CV-1038-2 and 2CV-1025-1 will not close.

Implement SPTAs and diagnose event.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Implement EXCESS STEAM DEMAND Event EOP 2202.006.

Direct board operators in performing the below actions.

CBOR Verify one RCP in each loop if RCS pressure drops less than 1400 psia and associated spray valve in manual and closed.

CT CBOT Maintain Post SG Blowdown RCS temperature and pressure less than 200°F margin to saturation by steaming the B SG using the Upstream Atmospheric Dump Valve.

CT CBOR Maintain Post SG Blowdown RCS temperature and pressure less than 200°F margin to saturation by controlling RCS pressure using Normal Spray or Auxiliary Spray.

CBOR Maintain PZR level by overriding HPSI.

CBOT Event Termination: RCS temperature is maintained using Upstream ADV on B SG and RCS pressure is maintained using Normal or Auxiliary Spray or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Facility: ANO-2 Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2003-1 Page 1 of 12 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% MOL; Thunderstorm Watch for Pope and Conway counties.

Turnover::

National Weather service has issued a Thunderstorm Watch for Pope and Conway Counties until 8:00 pm today. AOP 2203.008, Natural Emergencies, Section 3, Tornado, steps 1 and 2 have been completed. Call 890-4987 for weather updates.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 500BRK5106 N (ALL) Mabelvale 500KV line failure. Site must reduce load to 1250MW total net generation. Unit One will 500BRK5110 R (CBOR) reduce turbine load to 350MW. Unit 2 will reduce turbine load to 900 MW in 15 minutes.

2 XRCCHAPLVL I (CBOR) A Pressurizer Level Control Channel fails LOW.

CUED 3 CVC2P36BFAL C (CBOR) B CCP breaker trip.

10 Min after event 2

4 RCSPZSTMLK M (ALL) PZR Steam Space leak.

CUED RPSRXAUTO RPS/DSS fail to manually and automatically trip.

RPSRXMAN Open feeder breakers to MG sets.

RPSDSSAUTO RPSDSSMAN 5 CEA52STUCK C (CBOR) Stuck CEA # 52 on Reactor trip.

TRIP 6 MFWPMPATRP C (CBOT) A MFP trip.

EFAS 2CV-0332 A EFW pump over speed trip on startup.

EFW2P7BESF B EFW pump fails to auto start.

7 416_2A306 C (CBOT) A HPSI trip after verification.

CUED

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Page 2 of 12 SCENARIO #3 NARRATIVE When crew takes the watch, the Systems Dispatcher will call the Control Room and report that the 500 KV line to Mabelvale has failed and the ANO site output must be reduced to less than 1250 MW within 15 minutes. Unit 2 must reduce load to 900 MW gross output within 15 minutes. The CRS will enter Attachment H of OP 2102.004, Power Operations, and direct the CBOR to borate and reduce turbine load to maintain Tave -Tref within 2°F.

After the CBOR has completed the required reactivity manipulation, the in-service Pressurizer (PZR) Control Channel Level instrument will fail low. Alarms on Control Channel 1 Level LO and Level LO LO will come in. This will result in Letdown going to minimum flow, the two backup CCPs will automatically start, all PZR heaters will de-energize and actual PZR level will go up. AOP 2203.018, PZR Systems Malfunctions, will be entered and actions directed by the CRS. The CBOR will take the Letdown Flow Controller to manual and control PZR level. The CBOR will also verify that the other level control channel is reading correctly and select that channel for control and place the PZR Low Level Cutoff switch to the unaffected channel.

When the auto and manual signals are matched, the CBOR will place the Letdown Flow Controller to automatic. The CRS will determine that TS 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6 are applicable.

Approximately 10 minutes after the PZR Level Control Channel fails low, B CCP breaker will trip. The CRS will enter the Loss Of Charging AOP. The crew will determine that the CCP breaker tripped and start a backup CCP. Letdown may isolate on high Regen Heat Exchanger temperature, depending on the promptness of starting the Backup CCP. If letdown isolated, then, letdown will be restored using 2104.002, CVCS.

When Charging and Letdown have been restored, a PZR Steam Space leak in excess of PZR heaters capacity to maintain pressure will begin. PZR pressure will drop rapidly and the crew will manually trip the reactor. Both the RPS and DSS manual and auto pushbuttons will fail to actuate a reactor trip. The CRS will direct the CBOT to open the feeder breakers to the MG sets, 2B712 and 2B812. CRS will identify 3.0.3 applicability due to the failure of all manual trip pushbuttons. When the reactor is tripped, one CEA will fail to insert requiring the CBOR to perform Exhibit 1, Emergency Boration. The CRS will enter Standard Post Trip Actions and determine safety function status and diagnose a LOCA. During SPTAs the crew will verify SIAS, CCAS actuations. The Crew will secure ALL RCPs when Margin to Saturation conditions are reached. When RCS Heat removal safety function is evaluated, EFW will be manually actuated due to the trip of A MFP. Upon EFAS

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 actuation A EFW pump will overspeed trip and B EFW pump will fail to auto start.

The CBOT will manually start B EFW pump.

Page 3 of 12 SCENARIO #3 NARRATIVE (continued)

After SIAS has been verified to be operating correctly, A HPSI pump will trip. The CBOT will place the handswitch for A HPSI in PTL and manually start B HPSI pump. The crew will complete the entry section for LOCA procedure and determine that the LOCA is an unisolated event and the CRS will implement Section 3 of the LOCA procedure. The crew will start an RCS cooldown to SDC.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Simulator Instructions for Scenario 3 Page 4 of 12 Reset simulator to MOL 100% power IC.

Align swing pumps (HPSI and SW) to the Red train, except for Charging.

Markup AOP 2203.008, Natural Emergencies Section 3, Tornado steps 1 & 2.

Ensure that AACG is secured and annunciators clear.

B CCP is selected as lead pump.

Place MINIMAL RISK and Green Train Maintenance Week signs on 2C100.

T1, T3, T4, T5, T7 set to false.

T2 set to RXTRP; T6 set to EFAS 1.

Event Malf. No. Value/ Event No. Ramp Description Time 1 500BKR5106 TRUE Mabelvale distribution line failure.

500BKR5110 Trigger = T1 2 XRCCHAPLVL 0 A Pressurizer Level Control Channel fails LOW.

Trigger = T3 3 CVC2P36BFAL TRUE B CCP breaker trip.

Trigger = T4 4 RCSPZSTMLK 50 PZR Steam Space Leak Trigger = T5 Ramp =

5 min.

RPSRXAUTO RPS/DSS fail to manually and automatically trip. Open RPSRXMAN feeder breakers to MG sets.

RPSDSSAUTO RPSDSSMAN TRUE 5 CEA52STUCK 0 Stuck CEA 52 on Reactor trip.

6 MFWPMPATRP TRUE A MFP trip.

Trigger T2 2CV-0332 0 A EFW pump over speed trip on startup.

EFW2P7BESF TRUE B EFW pump fails to auto start.

Trigger T6 7 416_2A306 LCK- A HPSI pump trips after verification and entry into OP LOCA EOP.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Trigger = T7 OP LOCA EOP.

Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 6 of 15 Event

Description:

Mabelvale distribution line failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator operators cue: When directed by lead examiner; call the CRS as the System Dispatcher with the following direction:

The 500KV line to Mabelvale has been damaged and ANOs net generation must be reduced to 1250KW within the next 15 minutes. Unit One will reduce load to 350 MW and Unit Two will reduce load to 900 MW gross output.

ALL Crew will conduct brief for RAPID power reduction to net Unit 2 Generation of 900 MW.

CRS Implement normal operating procedure 2102.004, Power Operations Section 11.0, Power Reduction and refer to Attachment H for rapid power reduction.

CBOR Commence RCS Boration using OP 2104.003, Chemical Addition, Exhibit 3, Normal Boration At Power.

Verify Boric Acid Makeup Controller in Auto at desired flow rate.

Verify selected Boric Acid Pump in Normal-After-Stop.

Verify Mode Selector Switch (2HS-4928) in BORATE.

Verify 2CV-4830, Charging Pump Suction from Boric Acid, opens.

Verify selected Boric Acid Pump running.

Open associated Boric Acid Pump Recirc valve.

Depress red push button on Boric Acid Makeup Batch Controller, 2FIQS-4926 and verify it is set for proper quantity.

Verify 2FIC-4926 indicates proper flow rate.

Monitor Tave and ASI.

Obtain PEER checks.

CBOR Adjust turbine load to maintain reference temperature and RCS average temperature within two degrees.

Obtain PEER checks.

CBOR Maintain ASI within 0.05 of power dependant ESI by inserting CEAs.

Obtain PEER checks and CRS permission to withdraw CEAs.

Termination criteria: ~150 MW reduction and Reactivity manipulation observed or at

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 examiners discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 8 of 15 Event

Description:

A Pressurizer Level Control Channel fails LOW.

CBOR Announce alarms 2K10-G6 CNTRL CH 1 LEVEL LO.

2K10-F6 CNTRL CH 1 LEVEL LO LO.

Report 2LI-4627-2 and 2LR-4625 indicate normal.

Report backup Charging Pumps started.

CRS Refer to PZR Systems Malfunctions AOP 2203.028 and direct board operators actions.

CBOR Determine PZR Level Channel A failed.

Place Letdown Flow Controller (2HIC-4817) in MANUAL.

Place PZR Level Channel Select switch (2HS-4628) to Channel B.

Place PZR Low Low Level Cutoff select switch (2HS-4642) to Channel B.

Verify PZR heaters and Normal Spray maintaining RCS pressure 2025 to 2275 psia.

The CBOR will take the Letdown Flow Controller to AUTO when AUTO and MANUAL signals match.

CRS Inform SM to refer to TS 3.3.3.6 Post Accident Instrumentation.

Termination criteria: Unaffected PZR Level Channel selected and Letdown in automatic or at examiners discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 9 of 15 Event

Description:

2P36B, B CCP breaker trip.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce annunciator 2K12-B3 CHARGING HEADER FLOW LO Verify that Charging flow indicates zero.

CRS Implement Loss of Charging AOP 2203.036 and direct board operator actions.

CBOR Verify suction and discharge flow path.

Verify Charging Header Isolation valve 2CV-4840-2 OPEN.

Verify that B CCP Breaker is tripped (RED and GREEN Lights out)

CBOR Start Backup CCP.

Verify proper operation of CCP (Flow, Pressure and Temperature)

CRS Contact WCO to locally check B CCP for gas binding.

Simulator Operator Cue:

When contacted to check for gas binding, report that B CCP venting complete and no gas was observed.

CBOR Restores Letdown System to operation using OP 2104.002, Chemical and Volume Control, Section 9.2 Restoring Letdown After Temporary Isolation (if isolated on high Regenerative HX Outlet Temperature previously).

Termination criteria: CVCS restored to operation, or at examiners discretion.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 15 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Steam Space Leak and failure of RPS and DSS to Automatically or Manually actuate.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Announce the following:

PZR pressure dropping rapidly.

ALL PZR heaters are energized.

Containment temperature and pressure are rising.

CRS Verify that leak is from the PZR and not a Main Steam Line Break by comparing Tave, Steam/Feed Flows, PZR Pressure and PZR Level.

Direct CBOs to manually trip the reactor.

CBOR Attempt Manual Reactor Trip pushbuttons on 2C03, Attempt Manual DSS pushbutton on 2C03, Attempt Manual Reactor trip pushbuttons on 2C14.

C CBOT Open Breakers 2B712 and 2B812 and reclose after 10 seconds.

CRS Direct board operators to verify Safety Functions using Exhibit 7.

CRS Identify 3.0.3 applicability.

Termination criteria: Reactor tripped or at discretion of Lead Examiner.

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4, 5, 6 and 7 Page 11 of 15 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Steam Space Leak (post trip), Stuck CEA 52, A & B EFW pump failures, A HPSI pump failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Implement SPTAs and direct contingency actions.

CBOR Check reactivity control:

Reactor power decreasing.

Identify CEA 52 stuck out.

Emergency Boration in progress (SIAS will actuate/ CBOR will verify 40 gpm Charging Flow and BAM pumps started and Emergency Borate valve is open)

CBOT Check maintenance of vital auxiliaries:

Main turbine tripped.

Generator output and exciter breakers open.

All 4160v and 6900 v Non-Vital busses energized.

ALL 4160v and 480v vital AC bus energized.

All 125v vital DC bus energized.

CBOR Check inventory control:

PZR level 16 to 80%.

Trend from setpoint.

Report SIAS actuated or manually actuate and verify all PZR heaters off when PZR level less than 29%.

C CBOR Check RCS pressure control:

RCS pressure 1800 to 2300 psia.

Trend from setpoint Secure Two RCPs when RCS pressure is less than 1400 psia or ALL RCPs when MTS is lost.

Place spray valve for secured RCPs in manual closed.

Verify SIAS when pressure less than 1650 psia.

Termination criteria: RCPs secured, RCS Cooldown in progress, EFW pump started or at lead examiners discretion. (continued on next page)

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4, 5, 6 and 7 Page 13 of 15 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Steam Space Leak (post trip), Stuck CEA 52, A & B EFW pump failures, A HPSI pump failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Check core heat removal by forced circulation:

Two RCP s running (if all are secured no further actions are taken)

Loop T less than 10° F.

RCS MTS 30° F or greater.

Service Water Pump suction aligned to Lake.

Component Cooling Water aligned to RCPs.

CBOT Restore SW to ACW per Exhibit 5. (NOTE: This action requires several minutes)

Check SIAS actuated.

Maintain SW pressure greater than 85 psig.

(If all RCPs are secured, above actions are not taken until LOCA procedure)

CBOT Check RCS Heat Removal:

Report SG levels and method of feed.

Manually actuate EFW.

Announce A EFW pump overspeed trip.

Manually start B EFW pump.

Report feedwater line intact.

Report SG pressures.

CBOR RCS Tcold 540 to 555° F.

Termination criteria: RCPs secured, RCS Cooldown in progress, EFW pump started or at lead examiners discretion. (continued)

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4, 5, 6 and 7 Page 14 of 15 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Steam Space Leak (post trip), Stuck CEA 52, A & B EFW pump failures, A HPSI pump failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBOR Check CNTMT parameters:

Temperature trending up.

Pressure trending up.

Status of radiation alarms:

CAMS (2K10-B6) in alarm Area radiation (2K11-B10) in alarm Process liquid (2K11-C10)

Secondary Sys Radiation Hi (2K11-A10) NOT in alarm.

CBOR Check CCAS, and SIAS actuated on PPS inserts.

Verify one Emergency Penetration Room Vent fan running.

CNTMT coolers in Emergency Mode.

CRS Notify SM to perform the following:

SE report to control room.

Announce reactor trip on plant page.

Refer to Tech Specs and EALs.

CRS Direct CBOs to acknowledge all control room annunciators and announce all significant alarms.

Diagnose Loss of Coolant Accident.

CRS Implement Loss of Coolant Accident procedure and open place keeping page. Direct board operators in performing the following actions.

ALL Perform crew brief and review floating steps.

Termination criteria: RCPs secured, RCS Cooldown in progress, EFW pump started or at lead examiners discretion. (continued)

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES D2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4, 5, 6 and 7 Page 15 of 15 Event

Description:

Pressurizer Steam Space Leak (post trip), Stuck CEA 52, A & B EFW pump failures, A HPSI pump failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Direct actions in LOCA procedure.

CBOT Restore CCW to RCPs (Att.21), SW to CCW (ATT.5) and SW to ACW (ATT. 5)

CBOR Verify HPSI and LPSI flow adequate.

CBOT Verify Containment Cooling is operating in Emergency Mode.

CBOT Verify one Penetration Room Exhaust Fan running.

CBOT Start Hydrogen Analyzers.

CBOR Start RCS cooldown.

Termination criteria: RCPs secured, RCS Cooldown in progress, EFW pump started or at lead examiners discretion.

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-Estimated Critical Condition PAGE 1 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 7 DATE: 14 July 2003 SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: 2.1.25 Ability to obtain and interpret station reference materials such as graphs, monographs, and tables which contain performance data.

TASK: Calculate an Estimated Critical Boron Concentration (for given CEA positions)

JTA#: 20015130101 KA VALUE RO: 3.5 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

001 A4.10 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO: X TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: X OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:

SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Perform LAB:

POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO: .

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 minutes REFERENCE (S): OP 2103.015 EXAMINEE'S NAME: SSN: - -

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time: Stop Time: Total Time: .

SIGNED__________________________________ DATE: _____________________

SIGNATURE INDICATES THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PROCEDURE BY A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-Estimated Critical Condition PAGE 2 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE THE EXAMINER SHALL REVIEW THE FOLLOWING WITH THE EXAMINEE:

The examiner shall review the "Briefing Checklist with the examinee.

JPM INITIAL TASK CONDITIONS:

Plant startup in progress.

RCS pressure= 2200 psia RCS Tave = 545°F Shutdown Bank "A" CEA's withdrawn EFPD = 122.0 Reactor trip occurred @ 07/13/03 at 1800 Startup target @ 07/14/03 at 0500 From RHOBAL Program:

Xe worth = - 3.8526 Sm worth = - 0.8262 Reactor Engineering states the Reactivity Correction factor is "0" (handout JPM task initial conditions attachment to examinee)

TASK STANDARD: Estimated Critical Boron (ECB) for Group P at 90.0" withdrawn is calculated.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS: Calculator, OP 2103.015, and completed Worksheet 1 (cycle 13)

SIMULATOR INITIAL CONDITIONS: Plant is in hot standby condition.

OP-2103.015 Reactivity Balance Calculation Tools, Equipment, Job Aids, etc:

Calculator OP-2103.015 RHOBAL computer program JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-Estimated Critical Condition

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-Estimated Critical Condition PAGE 3 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs, "Calculate an ECB for 07/14/03 at 0500 hours0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months with Group P at 90 inches withdrawn using RHOBAL computer program."

CRITICAL ELEMENTS (C): 9, 10, 11 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (Circle One)

CHECKLIST

1. Select worksheet 1. From Unit 2 RHOBAL computer N/A SAT UNSAT program screen, select Worksheet 1.

2. Entered correct EFPD in Entered 122.0 in EFPD box. N/A SAT UNSAT appropriate box.

3. Entered correct RCS temperature. Entered 545 °F in RCS N/A SAT UNSAT temperature box.

4. Entered correct Xenon worth. Entered - 3.8526 in Xenon worth N/A SAT UNSAT box.

5. Entered correct Samarium worth. Entered - 0.8262 in Samarium N/A SAT UNSAT worth box.

6. Entered Correct CEA position for Entered Group P and 90.0 N/A SAT UNSAT criticality. inches for critical CEA position.

7. Enter Correct Date. Entered 07/14/2003 05:00 in N/A SAT UNSAT correct box.

8. Obtain printout of ECB. Printed ECB to local printer. N/A SAT UNSAT EXAMINER'S NOTE:

Expected value 998.1 ppm to 1219.9 ppm

9. Verify ECB. Determined ECB to be 1109 ppm N/A SAT UNSAT (C) boron.

EXAMINER'S NOTE:

Expected value 941.4 ppm to 1150.6 ppm

10. Verify +0.5% ECB. Determined the +0.5% ECB to be N/A SAT UNSAT (C) 1046 ppm boron.

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-Estimated Critical Condition PAGE 4 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (Circle One)

CHECKLIST EXAMINER'S NOTE:

Expected value 1054.8 ppm to 1289.2 ppm

11. Verify -0.5% ECB. Determined the -0.5% ECB to be N/A SAT UNSAT (C) 1172 ppm boron.

END

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-Estimated Critical Condition PAGE 5 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINERs COPY JPM INITIAL TASK CONDITIONS:

Plant startup in progress.

RCS pressure= 2200 psia RCS Tave = 545°F Shutdown Bank "A" CEA's withdrawn EFPD = 122.0 Reactor trip occurred @ 07/13/03 at 1800 Startup target @ 07/14/03 at 0500 From RHOBAL Program:

Xe worth = - 3.8526 Sm worth = - 0.8262 Reactor Engineering states the Reactivity Correction factor is "0" INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs, "Calculate an ECB for 07/14/03 at 0500 hours0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months with Group P at 90 inches withdrawn using RHOBAL computer program."

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-Estimated Critical Condition PAGE 6 of 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE EXAMINEEs COPY JPM INITIAL TASK CONDITIONS:

Plant startup in progress.

RCS pressure= 2200 psia RCS Tave = 545°F Shutdown Bank "A" CEA's withdrawn EFPD = 122.0 Reactor trip occurred @ 07/13/03 at 1800 Startup target @ 07/14/03 at 0500 From RHOBAL Program:

Xe worth = - 3.8526 Sm worth = - 0.8262 Reactor Engineering states the Reactivity Correction factor is "0" INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs, "Calculate an ECB for 07/14/03 at 0500 hours0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months with Group P at 90 inches withdrawn using RHOBAL computer program."

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-Valve lineup JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 7 DATE: 14 July 2003 SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: A.1: Conduct of Operation JTA Task #:

TASK: Prepare a manual tag out to isolate the 2E28C Heat Exchanger for tube repair.

JTA#:

KA VALUE RO: 3.5 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.29 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO: .

TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: X OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:

SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Perform LAB:

POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 minutes REFERENCE (S):

OP-1015.035 Valve Operations, PID for Component Cooling Water System M-2234 sheet 1 & 2 PID for Service water M2210 Sheet 3 EXAMINEE'S NAME: SSN: - -

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time: Stop Time: Total Time:

SIGNED__________________________________ DATE: _____________________

SIGNATURE INDICATES THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PROCEDURE BY A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

Initiating Cue: The 2E28C Heat Exchanger is being isolated to repair a leaking tube. The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager has instructed you to prepare the TAGOUT TAG HANG LIST FORM to mechanically isolate the heat exchanger for repairs.

Terminating Conditions:

Finishes preparation of the TAGOUT TAG HANG LIST FORM.

1 Provide candidate with completed copy of the initiating cue. Candidate should SAT UNSAT review Admin JPM and initiating cue.

2. Prepare a tag out hang list which Tag out hang list completed completely isolates the 2E28C Heat which completely isolates SAT UNSAT Exchanger the 2E28C Heat Exchanger

3. 2CCW-83, 2E28C CCW inlet Position: Shut SAT UNSAT Sequence either 1 or 3

4. 2CCW-84, 2E28C CCW outlet Position: Shut SAT UNSAT Sequence either 2 or 4

5. 2CCW-1110, 2E28C CCW vent Position: Open SAT UNSAT Sequence 5

6. 2CCW-83, 2E28C CCW drain Position: Open SAT UNSAT Sequence 5

7. 2SW-8, 2E28C SW inlet Position: Shut SAT UNSAT Sequence either 1 or 3

8. 2SW-9, 2E28C SW Outlet Position Shut SAT UNSAT Sequence either 2 or 4

9. 2SW-1174, 2E28C SW Vent Position Shut SAT UNSAT Sequence 5

10. 2SW-1175, 2E28C SW Drain Position Shut SAT UNSAT Sequence 5

EXAMINERs COPY Initiating Cue:

The 2E28C Heat Exchanger is being isolated to repair a leaking tube.

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager has instructed you to prepare the TAGOUT TAG HANG LIST FORM to mechanically isolate the heat exchanger for repairs.

EXAMINEEs COPY Initiating Cue:

The 2E28C Heat Exchanger is being isolated to repair a leaking tube.

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager has instructed you to prepare the TAGOUT TAG HANG LIST FORM to mechanically isolate the heat exchanger for repairs.

ANO page 24 of 32 Tagout Coversheet Clearance #(U-YY-Man-##)___________

Tagout: (SSS-FFFFFFFFFFFFFF-###)___________________ Date___\___\___

Component to be Worked:

Description Placement Inst._______________________________________________________________

Hazards:__________________________________________________________________

Restoration Inst._______________________________________________________________

Tagout Attributes:

Attribute Attribute Description Value Tech Spec Impact?

Compensatory Actions Req? Yes\No (circle one)

Locked Components(e.g. Cat E)? Yes\No (circle one)

Fire Protection Impairment Yes\No (circle one)

Equip Drain/Vent Required? Yes\No (circle one)

Work Order Task List Work Order Task # Description Tagout Verification:

Status Description User Verification Date Prepared Ops Prepared By Reviewed Ops Reviewed By Approved Approved Verified Hung Tags Verified By Removal Approved Removal Approved Verified Removed Tags Verified Removed by FORM TITLE: FORM NO. REV.

TAGOUT COVERSHEET FORM (TYPICAL) 1015.046D 000-00-0

ANO page 25 of 32 Tagout Tag Hang List Clearance#(U-YY-Man-##)__________

Tagout:______________ Date___\___\___

Tag Tag Equipment S Placement Configuration Place Place S Restoration. Configuration. As Left Rest Rest No. Type Equipment Desc. E ----------------------------- ment ment E ------------------------------- Config 1st 2nd Equip Location Q Notes. 1st 2nd Notes Verif Verif verif verif Q . .

Page __of__

FORM TITLE: FORM NO. REV.

TAGOUT TAG HANG LIST FORM (TYPICAL) 1015.046E 000-00-0

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-Surveillance review JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 7 DATE: 14 July 2003 SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: A.2: Equipment Control JTA Task #:

TASK: Identify Errors in a completed surveillance JTA#: 20015130101 KA VALUE RO: 3.5 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.12 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:

TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: X OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:

SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Perform LAB:

POSITION EVALUATED: RO: X SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 minutes REFERENCE (S):

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. 2104.005 PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: CONTAINMENT SPRAY CHANGE: 041-06-0 EXAMINEE'S NAME: SSN: - -

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time: Stop Time: Total Time:

SIGNED__________________________________ DATE: _____________________

SIGNATURE INDICATES THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PROCEDURE BY A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

Page 1 of 6

SET-UP INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK

9026)

- Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Provide a marked-up copy of Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

Page 2 of 6

NO PERFORMANCE STEP STANDARD S/U Comments (Required for Unsat)

NOTE: Provide a marked up copy of Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED.

1 Perform review of the surveillance Reviews the surveillance procedure Start Time:

procedure results. provided.

2 Discover errors (C) Pump D/P is out of LIMITING RANGE Pump D/P is out of LIMITING RANGE FOR SAT UNSAT FOR OPERABILITY. OPERABILITY.

YES has been circled instead of NO. YES has been circled instead of NO. SAT UNSAT Axial Vibes Upper Motor Brg is out of Axial Vibes Upper Motor Brg is out of SAT UNSAT LIMITING RANGE FOR OPERABILITY. LIMITING RANGE FOR OPERABILITY.

2BS-1A is not marked as full open 2BS-1A is not marked as full open SAT UNSAT (Identification of three of the four errors required and two of the three must be the Pump D/P and the Axial Vibration) 3 Report to CRS that the results of the Reports to CRS that results of the Stop Time:

surveillance are unsatisfactory. surveillance are unsatisfactory SAT UNSAT TERMINATING CUE:

This JPM is complete.

Page 3 of 6

EXAMINERs COPY INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK #9026) - Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

Page 4 of 6

EXAMINEEs COPY INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK #9026) - Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

Page 5 of 6

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN PAGE: 44 of 80 2104.005 TITLE: CONTAINMENT SPRAY CHANGE: 041-06-0 SUPPLEMENT 1 3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 3.1 Record values observed during 2P-35A operation AND compare against limiting range of values for operability.

TEST QUANTITY INSTRUMENT MEASURED ACCEPTABLE LIMITING IS DATA IN (INCLUDE VALUE NORMAL RANGE FOR LIMITING TEST INST. RANGE OPERABILITY RANGE?

Running Suction 2PI-5677 32.5 psig N/A > 6 psig YES NO Pressure (local)

Discharge Pressure 2PI-5678 249.5 psig N/A N/A N/A (local) 2PI-5622 251.5 psig N/A N/A N/A (2C17)

Pump D/P 2PI-5678 - 219 psid N/A 217.9 to YES NO 2PI-5677 245.3 psid Flow (1) 2FIS-5610 2430.00 gpm N/A > 2330 gpm YES NO (2C17)

Motor Running Ammeter at A 49 Amps Amps 2A-304 (CR-1-96-0272-07) B 50 Amps N/A N/A N/A C 48 Amps Upper Motor Brg VIB001 Radial #1 0.105 in/sec < 0.232 in/sec < 0.558 in/sec YES NO (North) Vibes Upper Motor Brg VIB001 Radial #2 0.135 in/sec < 0.185 in/sec < 0.444 in/sec YES NO (West) Vibes Upper Motor Brg VIB001 0.321 in/sec < 0.130 in/sec < 0.312 in/sec YES NO Axial Vibes 2BS-4A N/A X (X) if closed N/A Closed YES NO 2BS-1A (2) N/A X ( ) if Full N/A Full Open Open per per Component YES NO Component Engineer Engineer N/A 2BS-1B Closure Initial 34.5 N/A N/A N/A

{4.3.6} P5058 Final P5058 41.2 N/A N/A N/A Final - 6.7 N/A > 4 psid YES NO Initial

{4.3.3}

(1) > 2330 gpm verifies partial stroke of 2BS-1A AND full stroke of 2BS-3A AND 2BS-4A (2) (2) N/A if test not performed Vibration Instrument Number __VIB001_____________ Cal Due Date _07/30/2003_

Vibration Data Collected By Joe Electrician .

FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY Page 6 of 6

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-Surveillance review JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 7 DATE: 14 July 2003 SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: A.2: Equipment Control JTA Task #:

TASK: Identify Errors in a completed surveillance JTA#: 20015130101 KA VALUE RO: 3.5 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.12 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:

TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: X OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:

SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Perform LAB:

POSITION EVALUATED: RO: X SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 minutes REFERENCE (S):

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. 2104.005 PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: CONTAINMENT SPRAY CHANGE: 041-06-0 EXAMINEE'S NAME: SSN: - -

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time: Stop Time: Total Time:

SIGNED__________________________________ DATE: _____________________

SIGNATURE INDICATES THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PROCEDURE BY A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

Page 1 of 6

SET-UP INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK

9026)

- Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Provide a marked-up copy of Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

Page 2 of 6

NO PERFORMANCE STEP STANDARD S/U Comments (Required for Unsat)

NOTE: Provide a marked up copy of Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED.

1 Perform review of the surveillance Reviews the surveillance procedure Start Time:

procedure results. provided.

2 Discover errors (C) Pump D/P is out of LIMITING RANGE Pump D/P is out of LIMITING RANGE FOR SAT UNSAT FOR OPERABILITY. OPERABILITY.

YES has been circled instead of NO. YES has been circled instead of NO. SAT UNSAT Axial Vibes Upper Motor Brg is out of Axial Vibes Upper Motor Brg is out of SAT UNSAT LIMITING RANGE FOR OPERABILITY. LIMITING RANGE FOR OPERABILITY.

2BS-1A is not marked as full open 2BS-1A is not marked as full open SAT UNSAT (Identification of three of the four errors required and two of the three must be the Pump D/P and the Axial Vibration) 3 Report to CRS that the results of the Reports to CRS that results of the Stop Time:

surveillance are unsatisfactory. surveillance are unsatisfactory SAT UNSAT TERMINATING CUE:

This JPM is complete.

Page 3 of 6

EXAMINERs COPY INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK #9026) - Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

Page 4 of 6

EXAMINEEs COPY INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK #9026) - Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

Page 5 of 6

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN PAGE: 44 of 80 2104.005 TITLE: CONTAINMENT SPRAY CHANGE: 041-06-0 SUPPLEMENT 1 3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 3.1 Record values observed during 2P-35A operation AND compare against limiting range of values for operability.

TEST QUANTITY INSTRUMENT MEASURED ACCEPTABLE LIMITING IS DATA IN (INCLUDE VALUE NORMAL RANGE FOR LIMITING TEST INST. RANGE OPERABILITY RANGE?

Running Suction 2PI-5677 32.5 psig N/A > 6 psig YES NO Pressure (local)

Discharge Pressure 2PI-5678 249.5 psig N/A N/A N/A (local) 2PI-5622 251.5 psig N/A N/A N/A (2C17)

Pump D/P 2PI-5678 - 219 psid N/A 217.9 to YES NO 2PI-5677 245.3 psid Flow (1) 2FIS-5610 2430.00 gpm N/A > 2330 gpm YES NO (2C17)

Motor Running Ammeter at A 49 Amps Amps 2A-304 (CR-1-96-0272-07) B 50 Amps N/A N/A N/A C 48 Amps Upper Motor Brg VIB001 Radial #1 0.105 in/sec < 0.232 in/sec < 0.558 in/sec YES NO (North) Vibes Upper Motor Brg VIB001 Radial #2 0.135 in/sec < 0.185 in/sec < 0.444 in/sec YES NO (West) Vibes Upper Motor Brg VIB001 0.321 in/sec < 0.130 in/sec < 0.312 in/sec YES NO Axial Vibes 2BS-4A N/A X (X) if closed N/A Closed YES NO 2BS-1A (2) N/A X ( ) if Full N/A Full Open Open per per Component YES NO Component Engineer Engineer N/A 2BS-1B Closure Initial 34.5 N/A N/A N/A

{4.3.6} P5058 Final P5058 41.2 N/A N/A N/A Final - 6.7 N/A > 4 psid YES NO Initial

{4.3.3}

(1) > 2330 gpm verifies partial stroke of 2BS-1A AND full stroke of 2BS-3A AND 2BS-4A (2) (2) N/A if test not performed Vibration Instrument Number __VIB001_____________ Cal Due Date _07/30/2003_

Vibration Data Collected By Joe Electrician .

FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY Page 6 of 6

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-RO-NRC-A3 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: DATE: 14 July 2003 SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: A.3 Radiation Control TASK: Utilization of Radiation Work Package to determine radiation equipment requirements for a job as well as ALARA concerns JTA#:

KA VALUE RO: 2.9 SRO: 3.3 KA

REFERENCE:

2.3.10 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO: X TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: OUTSIDE CR: X BOTH:

SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Perform LAB:

POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 32 minutes REFERENCE (S):

EXAMINEE'S NAME: SSN: - -

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time: Stop Time: Total Time:

SIGNED__________________________________ DATE: _____________________

SIGNATURE INDICATES THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PROCEDURE BY A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE This JPM is to be conducted in conjunction with JPM B.2.b ANO-2-JPM-NRC-SFPSW Add water from Loop II SW to the Spent Fuel Pool.

THE EXAMINER SHALL REVIEW THE FOLLOWING WITH THE EXAMINEE:

Inform the examinee that the JPM shall begin as soon as the RCA control point is reached.

Provide the RWP to the examinee.

JPM INITIAL TASK CONDITIONS:

The following conditions exist:

1. Plant is DEFUELED and all cask loading operations are secured.

2. Power has been lost to both SFP cooling pumps and 2K11-K5 FUEL POOL TEMP HI is in alarm.

3. An operator is stationed at the spent fuel pool to monitor Spent Fuel Pool Level.

4. SFP purification is out of service for replacement of 2FP-10, SFP purification pump discharge.

5. Fuel Pool low level alarm is in and SFP level is lowering.

The SM/CRS directs, Align for makeup water addition to the SFP system from CVCS using OP 2104.006, Section 10.0 beginning with step 10.5 TASK STANDARD: 2.3.10 Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS: RWP, Dosimeter, protective clothing as necessary SIMULATOR INITIAL CONDITIONS:

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs, Align for makeup water addition to the SFP system from CVCS using OP 2104.006, Section 10.0 beginning with step 10.5 Hand the examinee the RWP and survey for this JPM when he is ready to enter the RCA CRITICAL ELEMENTS (C): 1, 2 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (Circle One)

CHECKLIST

1. Review RWP. Examinee reviews the RWP and survey map to determine N/A SAT UNSAT (C) requirements.

Identify required dosimetry from Identifies that the required the survey map. dosimetry based on the provided N/A SAT UNSAT survey is only a TLD.

POSITIVE CUE:

Dosimeter obtained EXAMINER: Do not provide JPM RWP and Survey map until Examinee has completed review of the actual RWP and survey.

2. Obtain Electronic Alarming Examinee will obtain an EAD Dosimeter (EAD) from the rack and insert the EAD into the (C) outside the CAA entrance and activation slot, scan the bar code activate it at the access turnstile on his TLD, and follow the N/A SAT UNSAT using appropriate Radiation instructions on the screen.

Work Permit number, and enters Entering RWP number and the CAA when access is granted. answering the questions on the computer fields of the access terminal. Once all fields have been entered appropriately, access is granted.

Determine the requirements for Used RWP and survey provided dosimetry, clothing, and to determine that protective N/A SAT UNSAT respirators. clothing is required to be worn in this area.

3. Dons personal safety equipment Hardhat, safety glasses, and as required inside the CAA earplugs worn where required in N/A SAT UNSAT the CAA.

4. (C) While in the CAA the examinee While in the CAA the examinee observes and adheres to all observes and adheres to all N/A SAT UNSAT applicable postings and entry applicable postings and entry requirements. requirements.

5. Determines radiological status of Determines or knows that the area around valves to be area around valves to be N/A SAT UNSAT operated to refill SFP. operated to refill SFP is a contamination area.

6. (C) Determines requirements for NO additional dosimetry, single entry into the contaminated area PCs, and no pre-job brief. N/A SAT UNSAT around the SFP.

CUE: Examinee is not required to don Protective clothing

7. (C) When exiting the CAA the Examinee clears the PCM-1 examinee enters the control point monitor and exits. N/A SAT UNSAT area and enters a PCM-1 monitor.

8. (C) If hand carried materials were Examinee places hand carried taken into the CAA, they will be items in the TCM for counting N/A SAT UNSAT cleared through the tool contamination monitor (TCM)

9. After clearing the PCM-1 Examinee clears the Portal monitor, the examinee exits Monitor N/A SAT UNSAT through the Portal Monitor

10. Examinee deactivates EAD at Examinee deactivates his EAD final exit of session and returns it to the Health Physics rack.

Terminating cue: Egress from CAA completed.

END

EXAMINEE COPY JPM INITIAL TASK CONDITIONS:

The following conditions exist:

1. Plant is DEFUELED and all cask loading operations are secured.

2. Power has been lost to both SFP cooling pumps and 2K11-K5 FUEL POOL TEMP HI is in alarm.

3. An operator is stationed at the spent fuel pool to monitor Spent Fuel Pool Level.

4. SFP purification is out of service for replacement of 2FP-10, SFP purification pump discharge.

5. Fuel Pool low level alarm is in and SFP level is lowering.

The SM/CRS directs, Align for makeup water addition to the SFP system from CVCS using OP 2104.006, Section 10.0 beginning with step 10.5

RWP ANO Page 1 of 3 Status: Active RADIOLOGICAL WORK PERMIT Rev 0 Unit C RWP 2003-0005 SECTION I RWP DESCRIPTION START DATE: 01-Jan-2003 END DATE: 31-Dec-2003 RWP TYPE: General DESCRIPTION:

Tours and Inspections SYSTEM COMPONENT BLDG LOCATION NA NA A1 Non LHRA's NA NA A2 Non LHRA'sl NA NA OSCA Non LHRA's JOB CONTACTS. Various ALARA CODE....C0008011 JOB CODE......ROS- ALARA CAT.....Level II SECTION II TASK LIST ESTIMATED TASK STATUS TASK DESCRIPTION PR-HR PER-REM 1 Active Non Locked High Radiation Areas 116709. 0.617 TOTALS l116709. 0.617 SECTION III RWP REVIEWS AND APPROVAL Originator FULTZ MW 19-Dec-2002 Development RASMUSSON DC 19-Dec-2002 ALARA Eval RASMUSSON DC 19-dec-2002 HP Supv. RASMUSSON DC 19-Dec-2002 Terminated ____________ ___________ Completed ____________ ___________

Withdrawn ____________ ___________

Fri Jun 6 07:30:50 2003 working RWP 2003-0005

RWP ANO Page 2 of 3 SECTION IV PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS BY TASK Rev 0 RWP 2003-0005 TASK TASK DESCRIPTION ( Task# 1 )

1) Non Locked High Radiation Areas RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS ( Task# 1 )

Component/Location (mrem/Hr) Dpm/100cm2 Yr/DANI#

Gen Max A1,A2 OSCA 1 200 <1K Monthly pkg 1 80 <1K Monthly pkg Dosimetry : Whole body TLD required, and Alarming Dosimeter.

Fri Jun 6 07:30:50 2003 working RWP 2003-0005

RWP ANO Page 3 of 3 SECTION IV PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS BY TASK Rev 0 RWP 2003-0005 TASK TASK DESCRIPTION (Task# 1)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ------------------------

ALARA Actions:

1) Unless otherwise directed by RP supervision, Electronic Alarming Dosimeter (EAD) set points will be 5 mrem dose and 40 mrem/hr dose rate.

2) Utilize low dose areas whenever possible to minimize exposure.

Monitoring:

1) Notify the zone coverage RP or the on duty shift RP of areas to be entered and work to be performed.

2) Area posting/survey maps should be reviewed to ensure awareness of radiological conditions in your work area. This information can be obtain from one or more of the following:

A.) RWP - Radiological Conditions Section.

B.) Area Posting - Locale posting in the field.

C.) Status Board - At CA-2, Unit-1 elevation 404', Unit-2 elevations 354', 335' and 317' general areas.

D.) Surveys Maps - Posted outside cubicles. (Unit-1 only, 386' elevation and below).

E.) RWP File - Contact RP if file is desired.

F.) RP Personnel - Contact RP @ CA-1 (#5166), or use radios (on channel 2), located at CA-2 386' dress out area, 354' and 335' elevations near the elevators.

3) Periodically check Electronic Alarming Dosimeter (EAD). This check should be more frequent in areas where your ability to hear the alarm is diminished. If any EAD alarm is received secure work, exit area, and notify RP.

4) Initial/intermittent RP coverage is required for entry into High Radiation Areas unless the individual is "Category 3 Advanced Radworker" qualified and has the appropriate radiation survey meter at all times during the entry.

NOTE: An EAD is not an appropriate survey meter.

5) Prior to entering a "Radioactive Materials Area" outside Controlled Access, contact RP to ensure all personnel, equipment, and material is evaluated for appropriate monitoring upon exit.

Work Controls:

1) Ensure the proper surveys are performed prior to removing any items from the RCA.

Respiratory:

l1) Based on historical and current data Airborne Activity is <30% DAC. Respiratory protection is not required unless otherwise posted.

Anti-C's:

1) Use Anti-C's appropriate for the area to be entered.

Fri Jun 6 07:30:50 2003 working RWP 2003-0005

9 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONLY SMEAR DATA SURVEY DATA (DPM/100cm2) 1- 2000 Unit: 2 2- 3000 Building: RAB 3- 800 Elevation: 354 4- 1000 Room: 2151 5- 200 RxPwr: 100 6- 400 Template: 2A2 -24 L.A.S. Data (cpm/LAS) Frequency: monthly Survey Date:07-01-2003

1. 20 Survey Time: 21:10:00

2. 30 Status: Complete

3. 20 RWP: 1 Task1

4. 20 DAN#: 5-1-7

5. 40 Surveyed By: Keith A. Murray

6. 35 Badge: 956 Reviewed By: James D.

Looper Notes:

Peer Check by BEK/837 Alpha Data Instruments Used (DPM/100cm2) Instrument: RAM-ION-RAM-049 Cal Due:08-31-2003 SrcCk Due: 07-04-2003 D/C & Bkg N/A N/A Instrument: RM-CHP-CR-106 Cal Due:07-30-2003 SrcCk Due:N/A D/C & Bkg 10 100 L.A.S. Alpha (cpm/LAS)

All Radiation values are in mrem/hour unless otherwise noted Smear results: < 1000 dpm/100cm2 or < 100 CCPM/LAS unless otherwise noted O Smear location (100cm2) q Large Area Smear (LAS) location

ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTION PAGE 1 OF 3 TYPE: OPEN REFERENCE COMPLETION TIME: 10 Minutes KA VALUE RO: 2.6 SRO: 4.0 KA

REFERENCE:

2.4.29

REFERENCES:

1903.010, EAL CLASSIFICATION (Revision 037-01-0), Step 4.20.

RO OPERATING ADMIN TEST SUBJECT A.4 QUESTION 1:

Given the following plant conditions:

The selected Back Pressure Control Valve, 2CV-4810 has failed closed.

Letdown relief valve, 2PSV-4822 has lifted and is stuck open.

How long does the Control Room staff have to isolate this leak before it will be classified as RCS leakage for the purpose of Emergency Action Level classification?

ANSWER:

10 minutes COMMENTS:

ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTION PAGE 2 OF 3 EXAMINEES COPY TYPE: OPEN REFERENCE RO OPERATING ADMIN TEST SUBJECT A.4 QUESTION 1:

Given the following plant conditions:

The selected Back Pressure Control Valve, 2CV-4810 has failed closed.

Letdown relief valve, 2PSV-4822 has lifted and is stuck open.

How long does the Control Room staff have to isolate this leak before it will be classified as RCS leakage for the purpose of Emergency Action Level classification?

ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTION PAGE 3 OF 3 TYPE: OPEN REFERENCE COMPLETION TIME 10 Minutes KA VALUE RO: 2.6 SRO: 4.0 KA

REFERENCE:

2.4.29

REFERENCES:

1903.030, EVACUATION (Revision 024-03-0), Section 6.3 1903.011, EMERGENCY RESPONSE/NOTIFICATION (Revision 027-00-0), GE EMERGENCY DIRECTION AND CONTROL CHECKLIST RO OPERATING ADMIN TEST SUBJECT A.4 QUESTION 2:

A General Emergency has been declared and a site evacuation declared. As a Control Room Operator:

How are you accounted for, and, What is the time limit for initial accountability?

ANSWER:

All Control Room personnel (operators, chemists, RP, etc.) log into the designated security card reader (in the Unit 1 Control Room) using "0000".

30 minutes time limit from the time that declaration is made.

COMMENTS:

ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTION PAGE 4 OF 3 EXAMINEES COPY TYPE: OPEN REFERENCE RO OPERATING ADMIN TEST SUBJECT A.4 QUESTION 2:

A General Emergency has been declared and a site evacuation declared. As a Control Room Operator:

How are you accounted for, and, What is the time limit for initial accountability?

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-SRO-Estimated Critical Condition JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 7 DATE: 14 July 2003 SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: 2.1.25 Ability to obtain and interpret station reference materials such as graphs, monographs, and tables which contain performance data.

TASK: Identify Errors in a Faulted Estimated Critical Boron Concentration calculation (for given CEA positions)

JTA#: .

KA VALUE RO: 3.5 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

001 A4.10 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: SRO: X TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: X OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:

SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Perform LAB:

POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 minutes REFERENCE (S): OP 2103.015 EXAMINEE'S NAME: SSN: - - .

EVALUATOR'S NAME: .

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time: Stop Time: Total Time: .

SIGNED__________________________________ DATE: _____________________

SIGNATURE INDICATES THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PROCEDURE BY A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-SRO-Estimated Critical Condition JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE THE EXAMINER SHALL REVIEW THE FOLLOWING WITH THE EXAMINEE:

The examiner shall review the "Briefing Checklist with the examinee.

JPM TASK INITIAL CONDITIONS Plant startup in progress.

RCS pressure= 2200 psia RCS Tave = 545°F Shutdown Bank "A" CEA's withdrawn EFPD = 397.0 Reactor trip occurred @ 07/13/03 at 1800 Startup target @ 07/14/03 at 0500 From RHOBAL Program:

Xe worth = - 4.4325 Sm worth = - 0.9943 Reactor Engineering states the Reactivity Correction factor is "0" TASK STANDARD: Estimated Critical Boron (ECB) for Group P at 90" withdrawn is reviewed for approval.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS: Calculator, OP 2103.015, and completed Worksheet 1 (cycle 13)

SIMULATOR INITIAL CONDITIONS: Plant is in hot standby condition.

OP-2103.015 Reactivity Balance Calculation Tools, Equipment, Job Aids, etc:

Calculator OP-2103.015 RHOBAL computer program

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-SRO-Estimated Critical Condition JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Instructions: Make or simulate all written and/or oral reports as if the evolution is actually being performed. You are expected to discuss the steps that you would take to include identification of what problems you find and actions necessary to correct them.

Initiating Cue: The ECC was prepared by the previous shift and you have been asked by the Shift Manager to review the prepared ECC prior to commencing the reactor startup. Identify all the substantive errors associated with ECC.

Terminating Conditions:

Finishes review of the ECC and identifies 3 errors. Errors can be found in any order.

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (Circle One)

CHECKLIST

1. Identify errors in the ECC N/A SAT UNSAT N/A SAT UNSAT (C) a. Step 1 wrong value for Rho Identify wrong value in step 1 (Fuel)

N/A SAT UNSAT (C) b. Step 2 wrong value for Rho Identify wrong value in step 2 (Temp)

c. Step 5 not N/A ed Identify step 5 not N/A ed N/A SAT UNSAT

EXAMINERs COPY JPM TASK INITIAL CONDITIONS Plant startup in progress.

RCS pressure= 2200 psia RCS Tave = 545°F Shutdown Bank "A" CEA's withdrawn EFPD = 397.0 Reactor trip occurred @ 07/13/03 at 1800 Startup target @ 07/14/03 at 0500 From RHOBAL Program:

Xe worth = - 4.4325 Sm worth = - 0.9943 Reactor Engineering states the Reactivity Correction factor is "0" Initiating Cue:

The ECC was prepared by the previous shift and you have been asked by the Shift Manager to review the prepared ECC prior to commencing the reactor startup. Identify all the substantive errors associated with ECC.

EXAMINEEs COPY JPM TASK INITIAL CONDITIONS Plant startup in progress.

RCS pressure= 2200 psia RCS Tave = 545°F Shutdown Bank "A" CEA's withdrawn EFPD = 397.0 Reactor trip occurred @ 07/13/03 at 1800 Startup target @ 07/14/03 at 0500 From RHOBAL Program:

Xe worth = - 4.4325 Sm worth = - 0.9943 Reactor Engineering states the Reactivity Correction factor is "0" Initiating Cue:

The ECC was prepared by the previous shift and you have been asked by the Shift Manager to review the prepared ECC prior to commencing the reactor startup. Identify all the substantive errors associated with ECC.

2103.015 REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION PAGE 1 0F 3 CHANGE:

WORKSHEET 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Configuration Reference Conditions: 0% FP, No Xenon, No Samarium, No CEAs inserted, Tref = 545 deg F Data Needed for Calculation:

Cycle Burn up: 379.0 EFPD RCS Boron Conc.: (if calculating Critical CEA Position)

Critical on: Group P at 90.0 inches withdrawn (if calculating Boron Concentration)

RCS Tave: 540 deg F Latest B-10 atom %: 19.8a/o (use 19.8a/0 if no Boron-10 depletion)

1. From Figure B1 or Table B1 Rho (Fuel) = 8.4786 %dk/k

2. If Tave is not within 2 deg F of the reference condition make a temperature correction, otherwise Rho (Temp) =

0.0. From Table A4 or Figure A4 (note, if determining control rod positions, use actual boron concentration. If determining boron concentrations, use critical boron concentrations from Physics data):

MTC = -1.7984E-04 dk/k per deg F @ 246.8.0 PPM and 397.00 EFPD Rho (Temp) = MTC

100. * (Tave - Tref)

Rho (Temp) = -1.7984E-04

100. * (540.00 - 545.00)

Rho (Temp) = 0.0899 % dk/k

3. a) Enter the Xenon worth as a function of time from:

RHOBAL X , Other (Indicate method) b) Enter the Net Samarium worth as a function of time from:

RHOBAL X , Other (Indicate method)

Time Rho (Xenon) Rho (Samarium) 07/17/03 07:30 -4.4325 -0.9943 07/17/03 08:30 -4.4325 -0.9943 07/17/03 09:30 -4.4325 -0.9943 07/17/03 10:30 -4.4325 -0.9943 07/17/03 11:30 -4.4325 -0.9943 07/17/03 12:30 -4.4325 -0.9943 07/17/03 13:30 -4.4325 -0.9943 07/17/03 14:30 -4.4325 -0.9943

2103.015 REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION PAGE 1 0F 3 CHANGE:

Worksheet 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Configuration Note: Step 4 is completed if determining the estimated critical boron. Step 5 is completed if determining the estimated critical control rod position. Complete the desired step and N/A the other step.

4. If determining the estimated critical control rod position, N/A this step. .

4.1 From FigureB3 or Table B3, for the desired CEA group position:

Rho (CEAs) -0.7082%dk/k 4.2 At each time step interval calculate Rho (Boron) and enter in the table below:

Rho (Boron) = - (Rho (Fuel) + Rho (Temp) + Rho (Xenon) + Rho (Samarium))

Time Rho (Boron) Boron Concentration Adjusted concentration Rho +0.5%dk/k -0.5%dk/k ECB +0.5%dk/k -0.5%dk/k ECB +0.5%dk/k -

(Boron) 0.5%dk/k 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

07:30 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

08:30 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

09:30 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

10:30 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

11:30 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

12:30 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

13:30 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

14:30 07/17/03 -2.3435 -1.8435 -2.8435 257. 202. 311. 257. 202. 311.

15:30 4.3 For each value of Rho (Boron) determine a maximum and minimum boron worth which corresponds to

+0.5%dk/k and -0.5%dk/k from the value of Rho (Boron) foe each time step. Enter these values in the table under step 4.2.

4.4 For the values of Rho (Boron) at each time step (including the minimum and maximum), from Figure B2 or Table B2, determine the boron concentration which corresponds to that value and enter the value in the table under step 4.2. These are the critical boron concentrations and the minimum and maximum boron concentrations.

4.5 For each value of boron concentration calculated in step 4.4, convert to the B-10 adjusted boron concentration based on the latest B-10 atom % as Follows Boron (Adjusted) = Boron

19.8 / Latest Boron B-10 atom %

Record the values found in the last three columns in the table under step 4.2. These are the adjusted critical boron concentrations and the maximum and minimum boron concentrations.

2103.015 REACTIVITY BALANCE PAGE 1 0F 3 CALCULATION CHANGE:

Worksheet 1 Calculation of Estimated Critical Configuration

5. If determining the estimated critical boron concentration, N/A this step. .

Performed by: .

Date and Time: 06/17/2003 10:42 Reviewed by .

RHOBAL DATABASE=(A2C16BF RHOBAL UPDATE, NEAD-SR-2002/017.RO, **BANK P IS THE LEAD BANK)

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-SRO-Valve lineup JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 7 DATE: 14 July 2003 SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: A.1: Conduct of Operation JTA Task #:

TASK: Review a system lineup to restore the Component Cooling Water system to normal operation following completion of maintenance.

JTA#:

KA VALUE RO: 3.5 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.29 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: SRO: X.

TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: X OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:

SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Perform LAB:

POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO: X .

ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 minutes REFERENCE (S):

OP-1015.035 Valve Operations, PID for Component Cooling Water System M-2234 sheet 1 & 2 EXAMINEE'S NAME: SSN: - -

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time: Stop Time: Total Time:

SIGNED__________________________________ DATE: _____________________

SIGNATURE INDICATES THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PROCEDURE BY A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

Initiating Cue: The component cooling water system is being restored to normal system lineup following completion of maintenance on the system. The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manage has instructed you to review the system lineup and verify proper restoration.

Terminating Conditions:

Finishes review of the system lineup.

NO PERFORMANCE STEP STANDARD S/U Comments (Required for Unsat)

NOTE: Provide a marked up copy of the system lineup to the examinee 1 Perform final SRO review Reviews the system Start Time:

of the system lineup lineup paperwork paperwork. provided.

(C) 2CV-5217 Loop I CCW SAT UNSAT Surge Tank Vent: wrong 2 position 2CCW-1023 Surge Tank SAT UNSAT 2T-37B Drain: wrong Examinee Identifies position 3 of the 4 errors and must identify the 2CV-5210 Condensate vent valves. SAT UNSAT Transfer to 2T-37A: wrong position 2CV-5218 Loop II CCW SAT UNSAT Surge Tank Vent: wrong position SAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT (C) Perform the step required Informs Shift for unsatisfactory results. Manager of errors.

3 Initiates actions to correct errors TERMINATING CUE:

This JPM is complete.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE E-DOC TITLE: E-DOC NO. CHANGE NO.

PARTIAL SYSTEM LINEUP SHEET 1015.017C 008-00-0 System: Component Cooling Water Page 1of 1.

Reason for partial lineup, e.g. post maintenance test, clearance no., etc. Describe lineup if needed, e.g., list major components, boundaries, or list components excluded, etc.:

Restore system to normal line up following completion of piping repairs Partial lineup approval:

SRO Signature Date:

Component Description Required Checked SRO (optional) Position Initial Initial*

2CCW-5214 2LT/LG-5214 Root Valve OPEN 2CV-5217 Loop I CCW Surge Tank Vent Per 1015.017, Att. D Locked shut 2CCW-1023 Surge Tank 2T-37B Drain Open 2CCW-89 Surge Tank 2T-37B Chem. Recirc OPEN 2CCW-5031 Surge Tanks 2T-37A/B CLOSED X-Connect Drain 2CCW-5030 Surge Tanks 2T-37A/B Drain to LRW CLOSED 2CT-651 2FI-5210 Inlet Isol OPEN 2CT-650 2FI-5210 Outlet Isol OPEN 2CT-652 2FI-5210 Bypass CLOSED 2CT-653 2FI-5210 Drain CLOSED 2CT-16 Surge Tanks 2T-37A/B Makeup Isol OPEN 2CV-5210 Condensate Transfer to 2T-37A Per 1015.017, Att. D shut 2CV-5218 Loop II CCW Surge Tank Vent Per 1015.017, Att. D Locked shut 2CCW-5082 Surge Tank 2T-37A Makeup Line Vent CLOSED 2CCW-5083 2LT/LG-5210 Root Valve OPEN 2CCW-5210 2LT/LG-5210 Root Valve OPEN 2CCW-1022 Surge Tank 2T-37A Drain CLOSED 2CCW-88 Surge Tank 2T-37A Chem. Recirc OPEN 2CV-5214 Condensate Transfer Supply to 2T-37B Per 1015.017, Att. D shut 2CCW-5084 Surge Tank 2T-37B Makeup Line Vent CLOSED 2CCW-5085 2LT/LG-5214 Root Valve OPEN

SRO Initial signifies review.

Lineup Performed By:

. / /

Signature Initial Date

. / /

Signature Initial Date SRO Review: Date

EXAMINERS COPY Initiating Cue:

The component cooling water system is being restored to normal system lineup following completion of maintenance on the system. The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager has instructed you to review the system lineup and verify proper restoration.

EXAMINEES COPY Initiating Cue:

The component cooling water system is being restored to normal system lineup following completion of maintenance on the system. The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager has instructed you to review the system lineup and verify proper restoration.

JPM- ANO-2-JPM-Surveillance review JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE UNIT: 2 REV #: 7 DATE: 14 July 2003 SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: A.2: Equipment Control JTA Task #:

TASK: Identify Errors in a completed surveillance JTA#: 20015130101 KA VALUE RO: 3.5 SRO: 3.9 KA

REFERENCE:

2.1.12 APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: SRO: X TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR: X OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:

SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):

PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform Perform LAB:

POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO: X ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:

TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:

APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 minutes REFERENCE (S): PROC./WORK PLAN NO. 2104.005 PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: CONTAINMENT SPRAY EXAMINEE'S NAME: SSN: - -

EVALUATOR'S NAME:

THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:

SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:

Start Time: Stop Time: Total Time:

SIGNED__________________________________ DATE: _____________________

SIGNATURE INDICATES THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PROCEDURE BY A QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

Page 1 of 6

SET-UP INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK

9026)

- Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Provide a marked-up copy of Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

Page 2 of 6

NO PERFORMANCE STEP STANDARD S/U Comments (Required for Unsat)

NOTE: Provide a marked up copy of Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED.

1 Perform final SRO review of the Reviews the surveillance procedure Start Time:

surveillance procedure. provided.

(C) Discover errors:

SAT UNSAT 2 Pump D/P is out of LIMITING RANGE Pump D/P is out of LIMITING RANGE FOR FOR OPERABILITY. OPERABILITY.

SAT UNSAT YES has been circled instead of NO. YES has been circled instead of NO.

SAT UNSAT Axial Vibes Upper Motor Brg is out of Axial Vibes Upper Motor Brg is out of LIMITING RANGE FOR OPERABILITY. LIMITING RANGE FOR OPERABILITY.

SAT UNSAT 2BS-1A is not marked as full open 2BS-1A is not marked as full open (Identification of three of the four errors required and two of the three must be the Pump D/P and the Axial Vibration)

(C) Perform the step required for Performs the following: Stop Time:

unsatisfactory results.

3 - Refers to TS LCOs 3.6.2.1.

- Initiates actions IAW TS 3.6.2.1 With one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to SAT UNSAT OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

- Repeats the surveillance test TERMINATING CUE:

This JPM is complete.

Page 3 of 6

EXAMINERs COPY INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK #9026) - Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

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EXAMINEEs COPY INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS The Containment Emergency Cooling System 2P-35A QUARTERLY TEST WITH SDC SECURED (WMS TASK #9026) - Train A has just been completed IAW Procedure 2104.005 Containment Spray Supplement 1.

Initiating CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor/Shift Manager directs determination of the operability of the Train A Containment Spray System by performing a review of completed surveillance data.

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PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN PAGE: 44 of 80 2104.005 TITLE: CONTAINMENT CHANGE: 041-06-0 SPRAY SUPPLEMENT 1 3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 3.1 Record values observed during 2P-35A operation AND compare against limiting range of values for operability.

TEST QUANTITY INSTRUMENT MEASURED ACCEPTABLE LIMITING IS DATA IN (INCLUDE VALUE NORMAL RANGE FOR LIMITING TEST INST. RANGE OPERABILITY RANGE?

Running Suction 2PI-5677 32.5 psig N/A > 6 psig YES NO Pressure (local)

Discharge Pressure 2PI-5678 249.5 psig N/A N/A N/A (local) 2PI-5622 251.5 psig N/A N/A N/A (2C17)

Pump D/P 2PI-5678 - 219 psid N/A 217.9 to YES NO 2PI-5677 245.3 psid Flow (1) 2FIS-5610 2430.00gpm N/A > 2330 gpm YES NO (2C17)

A 49 Amps Motor Running Ammeter at Amps 2A-304 B 50 Amps N/A N/A N/A (CR-1-96-0272-07)

C 48 Amps Upper Motor Brg VIB001 Radial #1 0.105 in/sec < 0.232 in/sec < 0.558 in/sec YES NO (North) Vibes Upper Motor Brg VIB001 Radial #2 0.183 in/sec < 0.185 in/sec < 0.444 in/sec YES NO (West) Vibes Upper Motor Brg VIB001 0.321 in/sec < 0.130 in/sec < 0.312 in/sec YES NO Axial Vibes 2BS-4A N/A X (X) if closed N/A Closed YES NO 2BS-1A (2) X ( ) if Full N/A Full Open Open per per Component YES NO N/A Component Engineer Engineer N/A 2BS-1B Closure Initial 34.5 N/A N/A N/A

{4.3.6} P5058 Final P5058 41.2 N/A N/A N/A Final - 6.7 N/A > 4 psid YES NO Initial

{4.3.3}

(1) > 2330 gpm verifies partial stroke of 2BS-1A AND full stroke of 2BS-3A AND 2BS-4A (2) (2) N/A if test not performed Vibration Instrument Number VIB001 Cal Due Date _07/30/2003_